CONTEMPORARY CHINESE STUDIES

Scars of War

The Impact of Warfare on Modern China

Edited by Diana Lary and Stephen MacKinnon

Scars of War

Contemporary Chinese Studies

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Scars of War: The Impact of Warfare on Modern China

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"My identifying features are rapture and despair."

In celebration of the life of Janice R. MacKinnon, 1943-1999

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Contents

Illustrations and Tables / ix

Preface / x

Introduction / 3
Diana Lary and Stephen MacKinnon

1 Burn, Kill, Rape, and Rob: Military Atrocities, Warlordism, and Anti-Warlordism in Republican China / 18
Edward A. McCord

2 The Pacification of Jiading/ 50
Timothy Brook

3 Atrocities in Nanjing: Searching for Explanations / 76
Yang Daqing

4 A Ravaged Place: The Devastation of the Xuzhou Region, 1938 / 98
Diana Lary

5 Refugee Flight at the Outset of the Anti-Japanese War / 118
Stephen MacKinnon

6 The Politics of Commemoration: A Comparative Analysis of the Fiftieth-Anniversary Commemoration in Mainland China and Taiwan of the Victory in the Anti-Japanese War / 136
Chang Jui-te

7 Between Martyrdom and Mischief: The Political and Social Predicament of CCP War Widows and Veterans, 1949-66 / 162
Neil J. Diamant

Glossary / 189

Bibliography / 193

Contributors / 203

Index / 204

Illustrations and Tables

Plates *(following page 84)*

1 Woodblock print showing a much feared aspect of behaviour of Japanese troops in China – rape and murder

2 Woodblock print reflecting the widespread terror caused by Japanese troops setting fire to towns and villages

3 Chinese troop train at Xuzhou, 1938

4 Women refugees on a train, 1938

5 Refugees from the Yellow River Flood near Zhengzhou, June 1938

6 Refugees begging for food, Wuhan, August 1938

7 Refugees crowding onto trains bound for Guilin

8 Chongqing after an air raid, 1940

Maps

Map of China in the 1930s / 2

Hunan during the warlord period / 19

Diocese of Suchow (Xuzhou): Sites of missionary reports of atrocities/ 100

Tables

4.1 Railway bridges destroyed during the Japanese invasion of North China, 1938 / 104

4.2 Massacres in the Xuzhou region during the first half of 1938 / 108

4.3 Casualties of the Yellow River Flood, June 1938 / 112

5.1 Wartime refugees and homeless people, 1937-45 / 122

5.2 Age and sex distribution of refugees from five Hunan counties (surveyed in Sichuan, 1939) / 125

6.1 A comparison of the main points of war commemoration discourse across the Taiwan straits / 144

6.2 A comparison of the means of war commemoration discourse across the Taiwan straits / 149

Preface

This book grew out of a conference, "The Scars of War," held at the Institute of Asian Research at UBC in April 1998. The papers presented at the conference looked at the effects of warfare on Chinese society from the early Republic to the early Communist period. Seven papers, extensively revised, make up this book. We thank the participants, particularly Robert Perrins, Keith Schoppa, and Hans van de Ven, whose papers do not appear in the present volume.

The conference represented one outcome of the work of an informal group of scholars who have been working on the history of warfare in modern China. During the 1990s the group met in Tempe, Washington, DC, Cambridge (UK), Taipei, as well as in Vancouver. We thank those present at the Vancouver conference and those who were not, especially Arthur Waldron, Johanna Waley-Cohen, and Hung Chang-tai.

As scholars of the impact of war on Chinese society, our greatest debt is to Jerome Chen, the man who more than any other scholar working in English created the field of research, i.e., the history of warfare in modern China and its devastating impact on the society, economy, and culture of China. Jerome was a commentator at the Vancouver conference, but his influence on the project started far earlier, stemming from the advice and encouragement he gave us as individuals in our work on a subject that was close to his heart.

Jerome's own life has been heavily influenced by war and fighting. As a child he saw his hometown, Chengdu, change hands from one warlord to another many times. His father was ruined by the impact of warfare on the Sichuan economy. As a young man, Jerome studied at Xinan Lianda (Southwest United University) in Kunming rather than Nankai University in Tianjin, because Tianjin was under Japanese occupation. His working life as a teacher and scholar started during the chaos of the Civil War. Jerome's wisdom, erudition, and insight, gained from his personal experiences and from more than fifty years of dedicated scholarship, have shaped our field. The editors especially owe him an incalculable debt.

Several other people made major contributions to the conference. Alexander Woodside (UBC) provided perceptive and penetrating comments. James Boutillier (Pacific Command, RCN) gave us the benefit of his practical knowledge of the military. Several UBC graduate students helped with the conference. Colin Green (UBC History) handled all the logistics with the efficiency expected of a former officer in the Canadian army. James Flath (University of Western Ontario), Norman Smith (UBC History), and Chu Shao-kang (UBC History) worked at the conference itself.

The conference was supported by a conference grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, with significant additional funding from the Pacific Cultural Foundation of Taipei. We also received help from the Institute of Asian Research and the Centre of Chinese Research within the Institute at the University of British Columbia.

In editing the papers for publication, we thought illustrations would add a critical dimension. We looked for photographs showing the effects of warfare in China, the United States, and England. We were very fortunate to have access to the extraordinary photographs taken by Robert Capa and to receive the support of Richard Whelan, Capa's biographer, and Cornell Capa, his brother, to use them in this volume. We decided to use some of the searing woodblock prints produced in China during the Anti-Japanese War. These prints were one of the major artistic productions of the war, and show the transformation of China's traditional woodblock prints through the introduction of contemporary propaganda themes. At the beginning of each chapter we have reproduced well-known *chengyu* (proverbs, sayings) about the miseries of war. Chengyu are one of the unique riches of the Chinese language and carry much of popular culture. Chu Shao-kang delved through his extensive knowledge of chengyu to come up with appropriate ones for the volume, while Joanne Poon (Sun Yat-sen Gardens, Vancouver) produced the characters for them.

In preparing the manuscript we were lucky enough to have the help of Huang Xianfeng (UBC Law) who solved our computer-editing problems. At UBC Press we received consistent encouragement and help from Jean Wilson, Emily Andrew, Holly Keller-Brohman, and Darcy Cullen. They have set a record for a quick turnaround from manuscript to printed book. Beth Luey of Arizona State University and her graduate seminar in academic editing have prepared an index for us that is unusually thorough.

A Note on Terminology

We have used the term "Anti-Japanese War" to refer to the conflict that engulfed China between 1937 and 1945. We prefer this term to others – the Resistance War or the Second Sino-Japanese War – because it is the term most commonly used by the Chinese people and the one that most accurately described the war.

We have used the romanization *hanyu pinyin* throughout the text and have converted almost all place names and proper names to *pinyin*. We use Nanjing not Nanking, Beijing not Peking, and Hankou not Hankow. The one exception is Chiang Kai-shek, a name so much better known than Jiang Jieshi that it seems misleading to change it.

Abbreviations used throughout the text include CCP (Communist Party of China), GMD (Guomindang), PLA (People's Liberation Army), PRC (People's Republic of China), and ROC (Republic of China).

Scars of War



Map of China in the 1930s

Introduction

Diana Lary and Stephen MacKinnon

Wars appear in the historical record as events that have beginnings and ends – the Qin Conquest (230-221 BC), the Opium War (1840-42), the First World War (1914-18). These neat time frames delineate actual warfare but stop far short of marking the full impact of war, which continues long after the fighting has stopped. The scars that mark people who have lived through war become part of the fabric of society. Our study looks at the long-term impact of warfare on modern China – at the scars of war that mark Chinese society, at how those scars were created, and at how long they have lingered.

Our concern is the civilian victims of the violent disruption of warfare, not its perpetrators. Our object is not to explain why the violence erupted, but to show what happened to the victims of violence – to look at the long-term impact of violence on individual lives and on society.

Perspectives

Throughout its modern history, China has suffered from immense destruction and loss of life from warfare. In the worst period of warfare, the eight years of the Anti-Japanese War (1937-45), millions of civilians lost their lives. They died in massacres carried out by Japanese forces, in bombing raids by Japanese planes, and in defensive measures by the Chinese army. Countless others died in disruptions caused by war: starvation, sickness, and despair.

For China the story of modern war-related death and suffering has remained hidden. The Rape of Nanjing (Nanking) in December 1937 is beginning to be known, but hundreds of other Anti-Japanese War massacres are still unrecognized. These were major atrocities that in other countries would be the subject of investigations, prosecutions, trials, and reparations.[1] Instead, in China, there has been until recently a reticence verging on denial about discussing the slaughter. This reticence extends to the horrors caused by scorched-earth policies, such as the loss of at least 800,000 people who died in 1938 after the dikes of the Yellow River were destroyed to try to stop

the Japanese advance. These people were victims of a desperate defensive measure – but they are not accorded any status by the country in whose cause they died.

If the enormity of Chinese civilian suffering during the Anti-Japanese War has yet to be recognized publicly in China, in the rest of the world the anguish of Chinese suffering is much less well known than the sufferings of Japanese civilians – in particular the citizens of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Many of the Chinese victims did not survive. They left no written record of their sufferings. Surviving victims have often suppressed memories because they are too painful to deal with. On the mainland there has been no public outcry to voice the pain and anger of Chinese survivors. Since the war crimes trials of the immediate postwar period, there have been no ongoing legal processes to deal with wartime issues.

Political inhibitions on the Chinese side have conspired to keep the sufferings of the civilian population during the Anti-Japanese War hidden from view. Chinese press coverage of Japanese atrocities has been consistently low key on both sides of the Taiwan straits. The Guomindang (GMD) government on Taiwan has found it difficult to deal with events that occurred in the process of its own defeat by the Japanese. The Communists blame wartime suffering on feudalism (Chinese) and fascism (Japanese), and they shun detailed analysis. The Communist Party is vulnerable to comparisons: the examination of suffering caused by the Japanese might lead to an examination of the self-inflicted suffering of the Cultural Revolution. Media coverage of the wartime suffering has been limited, couched in a formulaic format that privileges the actions of the ruling Communist Party and almost ignores the victims. Spontaneous anti-Japanese demonstrations in China have not been allowed, and calls for the Japanese government to compensate war victims have resulted in activists being detained. In the meantime, successive Japanese governments have fought a staunch rearguard action to avoid admitting guilt or paying compensation to their victims.[2] Recent publicity about the Nanjing Massacre has led to a virulent campaign in Japan against those who have thrown light on it.[3]

Recently the veil of silence about war in China has begun to lift. Besides the celebrated 1997 book by Iris Chang, *The Rape of Nanjing: The Forgotten Massacre,* other accounts are being published about the horrors of the war, especially the Nanjing Massacre. These studies, often based on eyewitness accounts of survivors, show that those who died did not become nameless statistics; their names and the manner of their deaths are now being recalled from previous oblivion.

The oblivion into which so much of the suffering of the Anti-Japanese War disappeared for so long points to a harrowing aspect of modern Chinese history. These awful events and their casualties were too common to commemorate individually, and so they were neglected. This lack of commemo-

ration is a factor both of China's turbulent modern history and of her vast population. The repetitive horror of huge casualties from disasters, natural or man-made, was entrenched by the mid-nineteenth century. Disasters became commonplace, often with attendant casualties on an enormous scale. But China's population was already so huge that the casualties in any specific disaster were slight in proportion to the total population. This disjuncture made it difficult for outsiders to grasp the full horror of what was going on in any disaster, partly because the numbers were so overwhelming and partly because they still seemed tiny in relation to the whole population.

The problem of comprehension intensified during the Anti-Japanese War. The number of atrocities committed during the war, coupled with the statistical slightness of individual events within a vast population, almost disqualified these atrocities from detailed coverage in historical works, whether Chinese or Western. They were either ignored or lumped together under vague rubrics such as "heavy casualties." Foreigners fell back on insulting clichés such as "the Chinese are used to suffering" or "the Chinese are fatalistic." Nothing could be further from the truth. The terrible things that happened in so many parts of China may be unknown to the wider world, but not to the people who lived through them or to their descendants.

The disjuncture between numbers and proportion is compounded by the ways in which casualty figures are analyzed. One tendency is to focus on proportion. This approach has been used to minimize the impact of Japanese excesses in China, making huge casualties seem like a drop in the bucket (an approach later used by Mao Zedong in the 1950s to scorn the threat of nuclear war). The opposite tendency is to cite figures baldly, giving numbers so huge that they dwarf casualty figures from any other society. Neither of these approaches does justice to the experience of disaster; both preclude compassion for the anguish and suffering that the figures embody.

The scale of suffering during the Anti-Japanese War was so great that it *does* almost defy description and analysis. It was unrelieved. There was almost no government relief and no compensation for deaths, injuries, lost income, or property. There was a horrible finality to damages suffered; they were almost certain to be permanent. Physical injuries were likely to be fatal, given the dearth of medical care. The loss of a husband or father meant destitution; there were no state pensions for the injured or for the dependents of the dead. There was no insurance to cover property loss; the insurance industry had begun to establish itself in China, but only in the coastal cities.

How are we to understand suffering so vast, to see the scars of war? This book tries to find ways. One way is to disaggregate populations down to the local level and to look at local accounts. This is done in the chapters by Edward McCord on Hunan, Timothy Brook on Jiading, and Diana Lary on the Xuzhou district. Another path, taken by Neil Diamant and Stephen MacKinnon, is to explore the broader social implications of violence through

the lives of refugees, veterans, and widows. Yang Daqing bravely confronts the historicity of the violence of the Anti-Japanese War at its most controversial, tackling head-on questions of causality for the Nanjing Massacre.

Climate of Violence

The Anti-Japanese War was the nadir of civilian suffering in modern China, but it was itself only one stage in a history that has been marked by violence. The onset of this climate of violence dates to a century before the Anti-Japanese War.

War became a dominant fact of Chinese life after the Taiping wars of the mid-nineteenth century. In *God's Chinese Son,* Jonathan Spence reminds us of the enormous scale of the violence that occurred in the 1850s and 1860s. The violence was arbitrary and incredibly destructive. Demographers estimate that more than 30 million lives were lost. The living memory and legacy of the Taiping wars in the form of widows and orphans continued to haunt central China for the rest of the nineteenth century.[4]

The end of the Qing Dynasty was marked, from 1895, by a series of three wars of foreign aggression at five-year intervals (the Anti-Japanese War of 1894-95, the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5) that ravaged different parts of China's coastal provinces. By the time of the 1911 Revolution, Chinese society in the eyes of its greatest writer, Lu Xun, was already seriously brutalized. Moreover, the escalation internationally of military technology and its importation into China permitted the mercenary or warlord armies of the late 1910s and 1920s to lay waste the countryside in a series of regional wars. Edward McCord's chapter describes such an episode. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the "revolutionary armies" organized by the GMD on Leninist principles to put a stop to the militarism of warlords fought each other and their erstwhile allies, the Communists, in what amounted to an intermittent civil war. This fighting stopped in 1937 with the Japanese invasion but resumed in 1946 and went on until 1949.

The height of death and destruction occurred in the second Anti-Japanese War of 1937-45, which actually began earlier, with the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931 and the bombing of Shanghai in 1932. Accurate statistics about casualties and material losses are lacking (in part because of the civil war that followed), but we know that many of China's major cities were reduced to rubble and at least 100 million civilians were put to flight. Conservative estimates put the number of lives lost at 20 million. Needless to say, China's economy was turned upside down. In short, the violence of the Anti-Japanese War in one way or another scarred almost the entire Chinese population.

If looked at cumulatively as a cycle of officially sanctioned violence that began in the mid-nineteenth century, Chinese experience with the arbitrary

violence and destruction of war has no European parallel. It could be argued that the experience left the Chinese population numb by the mid-twentieth century. Living with war or state-sponsored violence became internalized as a fact of life for the ordinary Chinese family – rich or poor – by the mid-twentieth century. At some point the memory of war in the form of commemoration became both too painful and too commonplace for contemplation. This helps to explain the comparative dearth of war memorials or commemorative plaques to the fallen of the Anti-Japanese War, for example.

The terror of daily bombing raids and fear of arbitrary death and dismemberment became every man's family story – too horribly mundane to be told by novelists or historians. There is no work comparable to *War and Peace* or *All Quiet on the Western Front* in the canon of modern Chinese literature. We know who and how many were lost in the Holocaust, but it is impossible to establish the names and numbers of those lost in such a well-known atrocity as the Nanjing Massacre with statistical accuracy to the tens of thousands, as Yang Daqing's chapter reveals. The Chinese population was traumatized and rendered inarticulate by the ever-present possibility of arbitrary death. This state of trauma is far removed from clichés such as "a disregard for human life."

Insights into the numbing effect of repeated, long-drawn-out suffering can by gleaned from the experience of people in other countries that have suffered the same kind of odyssey of pain. Modris Eksteins has recreated the agony of Latvia as it passed from German to Russian domination, then to a period of independence, followed by another German occupation, then a Soviet one, and a final return to autonomy. His book, *Walking since Daybreak*, captures the horrible confusion, suffering, and death that a people endure from chronic warfare.[5] As a tiny state sandwiched between two powerful neighbours, Latvia has been especially vulnerable to repeated, arbitrary attacks.

Another cause of chronic conflict and misery in Eastern Europe appears to have been the lack of a strong state. In *The Warrior's Honour*, Michael Ignatieff describes what has happened recently to various societies as states disintegrate, the forces of violence take their place, and law and order break down. He concludes: "The police and armies of the nation state remain the only available institutions we have ever developed with the capacity to control and channel large scale human violence."[6] In Republican China, a similar breakdown in state authority led to pervasive violence. Instability at the centre fuelled the descent into violence, as it has often done in the past. Violence begot brutalization and social distortion. People lost trust in governments that could no longer perform the minimum role of guaranteeing security.

Is it the task of historians to fix the blame for the descent into violence? In the case of specific acts of violence, certainly. The work of Iris Chang

fixes the blame for the Nanjing Massacre. But the generalized climate of violence demands deeper explanation. Empirical description, such as that provided in Edward McCord's chapter, gives a convincing picture of the complexity of events and actors that contribute to the climate of violence.

It is tempting *not* to explain what happened, to fall into a pattern of thinking that sees violence as genetically or culturally conditioned. For example, much current discussion about the Balkans assumes sharply differentiated ethnicities fighting for centuries in a mindless, bloodthirsty way. The reality is more complex. In China's case, the elite tradition stressed stability and harmony over all else, and although a cynic might ascribe this concern with harmony to a lack of harmony, the philosophy did work for long periods. China has known long periods of peace, when levels of violence have been low. But it has also known periods of prolonged unrest and violence, such as the era known as the Three Kingdoms (AD 222-280). Unfortunately, the twentieth century has been such a period, in which violence and warfare have gripped the whole of society. This pattern of violence started under a unified but weak government at the end of the Qing Dynasty and continued through the period of disunity and into the rule of a unified, strong government.

Scars of War

The scars of war take many forms. Some of them are visible, constant reminders of loss; others are hidden, festering quietly in darkness. Bereavement creates the deepest scars, which can only heal partially. The loss of a parent, a spouse, or a child is the most acute form of bereavement. The sense of loss is overwhelming – powerful enough that it is transmitted from those who suffer it down through the generations. Eighty years after the end of the First World War, the number of people visiting war graves in France is increasing, not declining. Many of the visitors are going to the graves of unknown grandfathers and great-grandfathers. Few Chinese can go to such graves. There are no war cemeteries in China; the best that Chinese descendants of the war dead can hope for is to find a name on a martyrs' memorial. It is as if the nation as a whole were in the grips of what Adrian Gregory, writing about the First World War, describes as "the silence of memory" – memories too painful to be recalled. "Some experiences could not be expressed. Some went mad because of the War, and some had moments of despair bordering on madness. For them the silence signified the inexpressible."[7]

Other forms of loss are less grievous but still leave deep scars. The loss of property, or of opportunity, or of a society that is destroyed all leave deep scars on the survivors of war. They are beset by a sense of having lost the best, of being the victims of arbitrary, malevolent fate. Some devote their lives to mourning the loss of those they loved; others sink into nostalgia for

the pre-war days (the antebellum South, Hapsburg Vienna, Beijing in the 1930s).[8]

In China, feelings of loss are pervasive and cumulative. Furthermore, comparatively speaking, the Chinese have been especially vulnerable. Without the protection of insurance policies, losses were absolute. The reliance on the family to assist individuals in times of disaster broke down in the face of widespread loss, and there were no impersonal agencies to help victims. The terms of the end of the Anti-Japanese War meant that there was no postwar restitution or compensation for Chinese victims from Japan, as there was for the victims of Germany in Europe. Neither the GMD nor Communist governments in China was able or willing to compensate civilian victims. As Neil Diamant demonstrates in his chapter, even benefits and privileges given by law to Red Army veterans and widows have proved highly problematic in practice.

Chinese women were particularly vulnerable to being scarred by war. The most painful scars were those of women who were victims of rape and enforced prostitution.[9] The physical and emotional horror might be compounded by the birth of an unwanted child. The fear of rape infected all women and made them chronically insecure. Many women suffered from another form of insecurity – virtual abandonment. With no effective system for paying living allowances to soldiers' dependents, their wives had to take on full support of the family. Personal remittances were unreliable with many parts of China under Japanese occupation and a myriad of unstable currencies in circulation. Wives had little contact with their husbands and seldom knew whether they were dead or alive. They were condemned to poverty as long as their husbands were away – and forever if they were widowed. As long as the Anti-Japanese War lasted, this was the lot of almost all soldiers' wives. Later on, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) tried, with great difficulty, to provide some protection (see Chapter 7, by Neil Diamant). This protection did not extend to the wives and widows of GMD soldiers. Many were left on the mainland when their husbands fled to Taiwan and did not see their husbands again for forty or fifty years. In the meantime, they suffered horribly in every campaign of the Mao era as family members of "traitors."

One predictable scar of war for a whole society, the loss in population due to the deaths of young men, is often not the actual outcome. Periods of high mortality are often followed by baby booms. This is what happened in North America after the Second World War and in China after the famine of the early 1960s, when population growth in the late 1960s more than made up for the terrible casualties of the famine.[10]

For China there were some scars of war that could be construed as positive. Out of the destruction and dislocation of the Anti-Japanese War, new social programs and a sense of community – or collective consciousness, as

Durkheim would say – were forged. The process was comparable to the "Blitz effect," a phenomenon that has occurred elsewhere around the world since the Second World War. When a population is systematically bombed and otherwise brutalized, it pulls together in new ways that strengthen the state and the will to resist.[11]

In China the role of the state in social welfare had been limited traditionally to famine and flood relief. In reaction to the wars of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, urban local elite organizations grew up in the form of merchant associations *(tongxianghui)* and "benevolent alliances" *(shanhouhui)*, which handled public health and the feeding of the urban poor as well as fire prevention and local public works.

The Anti-Japanese War created a social services crisis of unprecedented proportions. In his chapter, Stephen MacKinnon writes about how at Wuhan in 1938, new social programs and public-health campaigns were initiated by the state that continued later to be run from Chongqing. Although inadequate to the needs of the time, these efforts became models for the much more effective and comprehensive programs of the 1950s in both the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan.

Along with new social and health programs, the Anti-Japanese War produced a change in collective consciousness among many Chinese. In the media of the day, there was a turning away from the elite and individualistic concerns of the May Fourth Enlightenment Movement models and a movement towards popularization and acceptance of collective values. Put another way, the Chinese responded to the violence of war with a spirit of resistance – a patriotic pride in the survivor community. Chang Jui-te shows in his essay how nationalism has been recast and how it still dominates the rhetoric of commemoration of the war on both sides of the straits.

The agony of war in twentieth-century China has yet to be told in literary terms. There is as yet no Chinese Tolstoy. The most important novel on Japanese brutality, *Red Sorghum*, by Mo Yan, was not written until the 1980s.[12] To the Chinese intellectual, the subject of war itself has been profoundly alienating and has been avoided. Despite war being a constant feature of Chinese life, good eyewitness accounts by Chinese writers are difficult to find. Instead, it is in *chengyu* (proverbs, sayings), in the verses of poets, and in the graphics of woodcut artists that the portrayals of suffering seem richest (see proverbs at the beginning of each chapter and woodcuts in the plates section). There is also a dearth of memoirs about the war. This comparative silence on the part of Chinese witnesses, as compared to those of other countries, has made the accounts of foreign witnesses all the more important. The observations of foreigners have been a major source of details about the human suffering or scars of war from the Taiping period to the 1950s – a fact reflected in the research underlying many chapters in this

book. Diana Lary uses the diaries of Quebec missionaries; Yang Daqing draws on the eyewitness accounts of many foreigners.

Hidden Histories

The Anti-Japanese War in contemporary China has been covered far less in books, films, monuments, or commemorations than has the Second World War in Europe and North America. The treatment has been equivocal, made up of uneven parts of memory, amnesia, and suppression or avoidance of memory. The production of memory has been heavily influenced by contemporary politics. There is an uncomfortable coexistence of official and personal memories. Even the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the war aroused very different patterns of commemoration, as Chang Jui-te's essay shows.

For China, memories of the Anti-Japanese War and the ultimate victory are overlaid with feelings of shame and humiliation, of the knowledge of initial defeat and occupation. There has been no question, until very recently, of the wallowing in memory that has come to characterize the treatment of the Second World War in the other victor countries – the growth of something close to nostalgia for a time when men were brave, women were plucky, and society was united. In the case of China, memory is partial and segmented. Periodization and self-censorship occur, blocking out painful periods and focusing on happy times. Through repetition, the "good" memories come to overlay more painful ones, which become increasingly difficult to retrieve. The problem in modern China is that "bad" memories far outweigh the good.

An optimist might believe that the scars of war would act as a deterrent against future violence, that fresh memories of suffering from the violence of warfare would lead to a collective revulsion against war: "Never again." This is not what happened in China. In China, the memories of the Anti-Japanese War have been overlaid by the more recent pain of the Civil War, the Great Leap Forward, and the Cultural Revolution. These memories are even more difficult to deal with, since so much of the suffering was internal, inflicted by Chinese on other Chinese. The accumulation of awful memories makes the past agonizing and means that many scars of war remain buried, part of a hidden history.

Despite the overwhelming importance of war in modern Chinese history, very little analysis has been done in Chinese, and even less in English, regarding the effects of war on twentieth-century China. A common view is that war is an aberration from the political and social norm, and therefore should not be taken too seriously. This in turn means that the effects of war are not a major topic of research, in either Chinese or English. When modern wars from the Taiping to the present *are* discussed, viewpoints are lim-

ited. In works by Chinese historians, the analysis remains highly politicized. This is certainly the case with the Anti-Japanese War (see Chapter 6, by Chang Jui-te). The military details of warfare, especially of specific battles, are known, but little research has been done into the costs and damage of war in China, except the strictly military costs. We know little about the direct economic, social, political, and psychological damage to the Chinese people.

The focus of this book is the social and psychological – not the economic. The economic cost of war is certainly important, but it is very difficult to assess accurately.[13] We know only that in the twentieth century, the losses were devastating. Wuhan lost two-thirds of its industrial capacity between 1938 and 1941. Yet to date, economic historians seem to avoid the subject. For example, in the debate about the pre-1949 Chinese economy (was it growing or not?), the chief protagonists, Thomas Rawski and Philip Huang, both place relatively little emphasis on war and its disruptive impact on the economy.[14]

We do not have a good understanding of the long-term effects on Chinese society and culture of such extended periods of war. Perhaps the recurrent resort to violence in post-1949 China has more to do with the legacy of war than with other factors such as ideology. In recent works, when Western historians of China have studied violence, they have written about its spontaneous forms within traditional structures in books on peasant rebellions and ethnic violence.[15] The history of state-organized and -directed violence has been neglected.

In recent years, European historians have once again turned to the serious study of war and its social impact, and there are signs that a similar shift is coming in Chinese studies.[16] In part this is the result of a surge in publication of Chinese-language source materials and the opening of archives. It is the availability of new sources that made this volume possible. Leading the way in this research are important Chinese scholars such as Lu Fangshang, Chang Jui-te, and Yang Daqing, two of whom have chapters in this volume.

The Ultimate Scar: Fear of Chaos and Survivor Mentality

Modern Chinese society has been traumatized and at times paralyzed by a pervasive fear of chaos or *luan*. There are good reasons for this, considering the level of arbitrary state-sanctioned violence (including warfare) that has been visited upon the populace over the last hundred years. This deep Chinese fear of chaos has no clear counterpart in the Western historical experience, and hence it has been difficult for non-Chinese to understand. Such fear has been exploited to the hilt by political figures from Chiang Kai-shek to Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping. It has been the crucial factor in mobilizing support for and justifying the intrusions of the modern Chinese state –

first under Chiang Kai-shek and more recently in post-Mao China of the 1980s and 1990s. Often it is invoked as a pretext for crushing demonstrations and restricting public discourse.

Just as the fear of chaos has repressed China politically, the shame or humiliation associated with wars fought in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has had a numbing or silencing effect on Chinese public opinion. Accustomed to being invulnerable from maritime invasion, China was humiliated by one foreign invader after another from the Opium Wars of the 1840s to the Anti-Japanese War. From unequal treaties, opening of treaty ports, war indemnities, and other gross infringements on Chinese sovereignty, foreign encroachment escalated into outright occupation and rule by puppet administrators.

Collaboration with the enemy is a grim subject and still uncharted territory in terms of serious scholarship. In this volume, Timothy Brook dissects the puppet administration that governed Jiading for the Japanese after 1938. The pervasiveness of collaboration meant that in many places there was little positive to celebrate or commemorate about the outcome of China's wars – in contrast to the British or North American experience, though not to that in parts of Occupied Europe. (See Diana Lary's discussion of the term "collaboration.") This, too, helps to explain a persistent Chinese reticence about discussing the scars of war.

Another debilitating outcome of more than a century of war has been a deeply ingrained survivor mentality. Since at least the 1920s, life for many ordinary Chinese citizens has been dominated by the struggle to survive. By the mid-twentieth century, at least half the population had been through a refugee experience – as a result of either the Sino-Japanese or civil wars running from 1931 to 1949. The agonies and uncertainties of being a refugee for the long term traumatized a generation to the point that survival by whatever means became their principal goal in life. The dominant concern with the struggle to survive was only exacerbated in the PRC by the years of political movements and arbitrary punishments culminating in the Cultural Revolution of 1966-69.

What precisely characterizes a survivor mentality? There is a strong sense of guilt – not unlike that of Holocaust survivors. Chinese society has been haunted by questions such as "why?" What compromises might have been made to explain the survival of one family member over another? This mindset is accompanied by a short-term outlook in vision and planning. Relationships become instrumental. There is an even greater reliance on *guanxi* or connections, because of the unreliability, arbitrariness, and dangerous nature of formal institutions. And, finally, throughout the past century, from the late Qing Dynasty onward, there has been an acceptance of the idea that corruption, bribes, and special favours are necessary to survival.

Conclusion: The Meaning of Suffering

Where, in this catalogue of suffering, is a larger meaning or the possibility of a constructive analysis? We seem caught within a mesh of vague generalities about the banality of evil, the cruelty of the Japanese, and the horror of war. We are somewhere between windy generalizations and deep despair about the human condition. It seems so difficult to say anything meaningful about suffering that it is easier to ignore it or to push it aside. It is much easier to analyze the reasons for the Anti-Japanese War: to blame Japanese ultra-nationalism as the cause of aggression or Chiang Kai-shek's *annei rangwai* (first settle the country internally, then resist the outsider) policy as appeasement than it is to understand what happened during the war and as a result of it. The discussion of suffering is by definition dismal, hard to ennoble except through transcendent narrative, usually religious, but in the case of China also Communist. Such narratives ennoble suffering rather than explain it. Narratives of triumph through suffering are valuable political tools for the creation of a new society. But the transcendent explanations of suffering do not explain why so many of the horrors of this period have been ignored or even negated in formal records. Failing to recognize the past does not destroy it. It was this past that made the present. The fact of suffering, rather than the causes of it, continues to affect the present.

The long-term effects of insecurity, fear, and terror are still with us. The social distortions of war, the sense of injustice born of its haphazard cruelty, when some survive and others are done for, the feeling of being abandoned by Chinese elites, the domination of life by fear and anxiety – all of these had long-term effects on Chinese society. The mentality that came to dominate was one of survival, the survival of the fittest, in which normal social relations were ravaged.

The scars of war sometimes have a life of their own. They give birth to new forms of violence; violence begets violence, and victims become perpetrators. Victims may seek vengeance, or they may grow up in a climate of violence that conditions them to become violent adults. It is tempting to pursue such hypotheses, to look for a pattern of background conditioning in China's violent experiences in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s as a partial explanation for the violence of the 1950s and 1960s. But we leave the making of these connections to others, and to another volume.

Notes

1 In France, for example, the massacre at Oradour-sur-Glane in 1944 continues to be the subject of minute examination. See Sarah Farmer, *Martyred Village: Commemorating the 1944 Massacre at Oradour-sur-Glane* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).

2 Ian Buruma, *The Wages of Guilt* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1994).

3 Yang Daqing, "Convergence or divergence? Recent historical writings on the Rape of Nanjing," *American Historical Review* 104, 3 (June 1999): 842-65.

4 Jonathan Spence, *God's Chinese Son: The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996).
5 Modris Eksteins, *Walking since Daybreak* (Toronto: Key Porter, 1999).
6 Michael Ignatieff, *The Warrior's Honour* (London: Viking, 1997), 160.
7 Adrian Gregory, *The Silence of Memory* (Oxford: Berg, 1994), 6-7.
8 A good example of the latter is George Kates, *The Years That Were Fat* (New York: Harper, 1952).
9 George Hicks, *The Comfort Women: Sex Slaves of Japan's Imperial Forces* (London: Souvenir, 1995).
10 Jasper Becker, *Hungry Ghosts: China's Secret Famine* (London: J. Murray, 1996).
11 Angus Calder's study *The Myth of the Blitz* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1991) suggests that much of the spirit of the Blitz was manufactured by the official English (not British) propaganda machine. We find this argument exaggerated.
12 Mo Yan, *Hong gaoliang* (Beijing: Jiefang jun wenyi chubanshe, 1987). It was translated into English as *Red Sorghum* (New York: Viking, 1993). In 1987 Zhang Yimou made a film of the novel.
13 For a recent discussion, see William Kirby, "The Chinese war economy," in *China's Bitter Victory: The War with Japan, 1937-1945*, ed. James Hsiung and Steven Levine (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1992), 185-212.
14 Philip Huang, *The Peasant Family and Rural Development in the Yangzi Delta, 1350-1988* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990); Thomas Rawski, *Economic Growth in Prewar China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). See also David Faure, *The Rural Economy of Pre-Liberation China* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989).
15 Joseph Esherick, *Origins of the Boxer Uprising* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); Elizabeth Perry, "Collective violence in China, 1880-1980," *Theory and Society* 13 (1984): 427-54; Spence, *God's Chinese Son*; Jonathan N. Lipman and Stevan Harrell, eds., *Violence in China: Essays in Culture and Counterculture* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990).
16 See *Modern Asian Studies* 30, 4 (1996), a collection of eleven essays addressing "War in modern China"; Arthur Waldron, *From War to Nationalism: China's Turning Point, 1924-1925* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Hung Chang-tai, *War and Popular Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); and Edward A. McCord, *The Power of the Gun: The Emergence of Modern Chinese Warlordism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). Hans van de Ven, in "The military in the Republic," *China Quarterly* 150 (1997): 352-74, reviews recently published Chinese works and sources.

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兵連禍結

Ravaged by a
string of wars

History of the Han Dynasty

1
Burn, Kill, Rape, and Rob: Military Atrocities, Warlordism, and Anti-Warlordism in Republican China

Edward A. McCord

The emergence of warlordism in the early years of China's Republican period (1912-49) had many baneful effects, not the least of which was the considerable violence done to China's civilian population by warring armies and marauding soldiers. This violence took many forms and had wide-ranging effects. Its immediate victims suffered most directly from the loss of their property, their health, and, in many cases, their lives. Serious economic consequences included the periodic destruction or disruption of agriculture, industry, transportation, and trade. Chinese society as a whole suffered in a more general way from the psychological insecurity brought on by the ever-present threat of random violence from the soldiers in its midst. The frequency and seriousness of this military violence was such that the term "military disaster" *(junzai* or *bingzai)* appeared in descriptions of the troubles of the era as often as "natural disaster" *(tianzai).*

This chapter aims to show the ways that the impact of military atrocities committed in the warlord period went beyond the physical or psychological effects on their immediate victims. I argue that these atrocities created a "scar" on Chinese public memory that not only inspired contemporary and subsequent political movements but ultimately had a deeper and more lasting impact on Chinese political attitudes and beliefs.

To understand how this "scar" was formed, it is first necessary to examine the way in which the military violence of this period was linked to the conditions of warlordism itself. To show how the "scar" of this violence was inscribed on the minds of a population broader than its immediate victims, it is also important to show how the popular outcry against such atrocities was reported and represented in the forum of public opinion. The most obvious and immediate impact of such reporting was to contribute to a range of political movements that sought, at the most, to bring an end to the problem of warlordism or, at the very least, to eliminate specific warlords. In the process, however, such anti-warlord movements, and the issues that informed them, also realigned popular perceptions of military-civil

relations. To no small extent, the Chinese people today still measure their army against the negative example set by soldiers of the warlord period.

The scope and number of military atrocities committed against the Chinese people in the warlord era makes it impossible to provide a comprehensive treatment of this subject within the confines of a single article. Therefore, this chapter focuses more narrowly on the military violence committed during the 1918-20 invasion and occupation of Hunan province by Northern military forces. The particularly egregious nature of the atrocities committed in Hunan in this period left a particularly strong impression on both the Chinese public and the historical record. As a result, this study provides an effective context for an analysis of the reaction of the Chinese people to the horrors inflicted upon them with the emergence of warlordism.

Hunan during the warlord period

Hunan's "Military Disaster"

The invasion of Hunan by Northern military forces in 1918 was the culmination of a series of efforts by successive Beijing governments to re-establish central control over Southern provinces that had gained a large degree of autonomy during the 1911 Revolution. Following Hunan's participation in the unsuccessful 1913 "Second Revolution," Yuan Shikai sent Northern troops into the province and replaced its popular governor, Tan Yankai, with his own non-Hunanese appointee. In early 1916, Hunan military forces rose up in opposition to Yuan's attempt to make himself emperor, forcing the flight of Yuan's governor and permitting Tan Yankai's return to office. The Beiyang army generals who took control of the Beijing government after Yuan's death were no less determined to reassert their control over the relatively autonomous Southern provinces, and Hunan again emerged as an important focus of their efforts. In late summer 1917, the Beijing government ordered Northern troops into Hunan to support the replacement of Tan Yankai with a more compliant governor. A portion of Hunan's provincial army quickly declared their independence of the new governor. Aided by Guangxi and Guangdong troops supporting their cause, the Hunan army forced the flight of the new governor in mid-November and the retreat of the Northern armies that had supported him to Yuezhou, on Hunan's northern border.[1]

After a number of unsuccessful attempts to negotiate a peace settlement, conditions for yet another Northern invasion of Hunan were set when the Hunan army and its allies pushed the last remaining Northern troops from Yuezhou in late January 1918. This event coincided with a declaration of independence by Hubei military forces, based in west Hubei, who hoped to link up with the Hunan forces to expel Beiyang army forces from their province. Suddenly the Beiyang-dominated government in Beijing was threatened not just with the failure of the efforts to expand its authority southward but with the danger of an actual contraction of Beiyang army power in central China. This threat was sufficient to end, at least temporarily, growing differences among Beiyang army commanders for one last effort to crush the rebellion in west Hubei and regain control over Hunan.[2]

The Northern counterattack on Hunan began in early March, involving nearly 150,000 troops drawn from a range of Northern armies. The main thrust of the attack was provided by the Third Division and other Zhili forces under the command of Wu Peifu. After retaking Yuezhou in mid-March, Wu's forces followed the Xiang River southward, taking the Hunan capital Changsha on 26 March. On 27 March, Zhang Jingyao, commander of the Seventh Division, was appointed military governor by the Beijing government, arriving with his troops in Changsha on 31 March. Wu Peifu's forces then continued their southward advance, taking the important south Hunan city of Hengyang on 21 April. Simultaneously, the military governor

of Shandong, Zhang Huaizhi, led a mixture of Jiangxi, Shandong, and Anhui troops in a flanking attack from Jiangxi into east Hunan. Other Northern forces pushed into west Hunan, culminating in the mid-June conquest of Changde (eventually garrisoned by Feng Yuxiang). No match for an attack of this strength, Hunan's provincial army, and its allies from other Southern provinces, were forced to retreat to the province's western and southern borders.[3]

The military conflicts that had preceded the Northern invasion of Hunan in 1918 had seen their share of both wanton destruction and violence by their various combatants. Nonetheless, the scale of violence and the nature of the atrocities directed against Hunan's civilian population in the 1918 campaign was without precedent in Hunan's recent history. As Zhang Jingyao entered Changsha, his troops were reported to have been "unrestrained in their violence; killing, robbing, and raping, there was nothing they did not do."[4]

After taking the city, Zhang's troops fanned out to pillage nearby villages. In a common tactic, a few soldiers would be sent through a village firing their guns. As the villagers tried to flee, they would run right into the hands of the main body of troops, who would then tie up and rob all the men and rape the women. In many cases, the soldiers did not stop with robbery and rape. In one location outside Changsha, 173 bodies were discovered, many of which had been horribly mutilated – their eyes gouged out, their genitals cut off, or their hearts ripped out.[5] Similar atrocities were reported in many counties occupied by Northern troops. By all accounts, though, the Liling-Zhuzhou area in eastern Hunan was the hardest hit, and the experience of this region provides a striking example of the horrors of warlordism in this period.

Liling County, located southeast of Changsha on the border of Jiangxi province, was a main target for the Northern flanking attack into east Hunan led by Zhang Huaizhi. Liling City was an important commercial and industrial city in east Hunan. One of the main roads between Hunan and Guangdong passed over the Lu River at Liling, on an ancient bridge dating back to the Song Dynasty.[6] Just over Liling's western border in Xiangtan County, the town of Zhuzhou was the link between Hunan's main railway line, running through Changsha to Wuhan, and a branch line running eastward through Liling to the coal mines of Pingxiang in Jiangxi province.

The same features that made Liling City and Zhuzhou important commercial and transportation centres unfortunately also made them strategic military prizes. With Hunan's forces concentrated to resist Wu Peifu's assault from the north on Yuezhou and Changsha, Zhang Huaizhi initially had little trouble seizing Liling and other east Hunan counties, despite the fact that he led a hodgepodge of poorly trained forces. But as Wu's forces pressed southward, the Hunan army saw the weakness of Zhang's forces as

presenting an opportunity to break through Northern lines and swing behind Wu from east Hunan. Thus, just as Wu was assaulting Hengyang, a major Hunan force shifted around his flank to the northeast with an assault on Zhang's position. Liling lay in the direct path of this struggle for the control of east Hunan, and over the course of this conflict it became the site of some of the worst military atrocities of the war.[7]

Diana Lary has noted that looting by troops in the warlord period usually occurred under specific circumstances, such as the evacuation of a town or city by defeated troops or its capture by victorious troops.[8] The "rape" of Liling occurred in two stages, reflecting both of these circumstances, in the ebb and flow of the battle between Northern and Southern forces. The first stage began on 27 April as defeated Northern troops who had gathered in Liling, mainly from the Anhui army of Li Chuanye and the Shandong army of Zhang Zongchang, began to plunder the city. The next step, as reported by an American missionary on the scene, was a military proclamation ordering the execution of any civilians found on the streets. The families in homes where Northern soldiers had been quartered were also systematically murdered. Finally, before retreating with their loot, these troops set fire to the city, destroying its commercial heart and the Lu River bridge. Large numbers of civilians who had escaped harm up to this point died in these fires. The Northern soldiers continued to plunder, kill, and burn as they retreated through the countryside from Liling to Zhuzhou. As the Southern armies advanced on Zhuzhou, the Northerners also looted and burned this town before retreating, destroying most of its buildings and killing large numbers of its inhabitants.[9]

The second stage of the rape of Liling followed quickly on the first when the Southern army found its advance north from Zhuzhou blocked by Northern reinforcements, including troops from Zhang Jingyao's Seventh Division and newly arriving Fengtian units. Already exhausted from their long campaign, the Hunan forces were demoralized by the accidental death of their main commander at a river crossing. Thus they began to fall back, first giving up Zhuzhou and Liling, then retreating to south Hunan.[10]

On 7 May, the Northern forces re-entered Liling and began a large-scale pillage of the city that made the destruction of 27 April pale by comparison. As one source noted, the Northern troops "decided to bathe the city in blood."[11] Any men found in the city, even those who had sought refuge in foreign missions, were seized and executed.[12] This was followed by the systematic looting of the city and more indiscriminate killing. On 9 May, the city was again set afire. This time the magistrate's yamen, schools, and temples were targeted along with shops and residences, turning the city into a mass of flames. People fleeing the flames were shot by waiting troops, while many people who remained hidden in their homes were burned alive.

Having taken their revenge on Liling City itself, the Northern troops spread out to ransack villages throughout the surrounding region. For several weeks these soldiers robbed and plundered door to door, destroyed and burned property they could not steal, raped women at will, and murdered with little or no reason. Liling City had meanwhile become a ghost town. When a new magistrate arrived in late May, he found only sixteen people in a city that once had a population of 60,000. Even after several months of encouraging residents to return to their homes with promises of safety, tax remissions, and relief supplies, this magistrate reported that less than 100 families had returned to their occupations in the city.[13]

The scale of the suffering inflicted on Liling County can be seen from figures provided by a December 1918 district-by-district investigation. Although a complete accounting was never possible, this investigation was able to verify that nearly 48,000 families had been victimized in some way by the troop violence, with more than 22,000 dead, nearly 15,000 homes burned, and more than 19 million yuan in property losses.[14] In Zhuzhou and some of its surrounding townships, between 4,000 and 5,000 civilians were killed, and over 3,500 buildings burned or destroyed.[15]

General statistics such as these cannot do justice to the actual horror many families and individuals experienced. One eyewitness recounted a case from a village outside Zhuzhou where forty-six people trapped in the middle of a battle were summarily executed by Northern troops. One man who tried to escape was recaptured, tied to a tree, and flayed alive. One man's wife was raped by more than forty soldiers until she died. A young pregnant woman was disembowelled and her fetus impaled on a pitchfork.[16] In another location, a man who worked his way through a pile of more than a hundred bodies looking for a missing brother reported finding, "amid the mass of corpses some that had been beheaded, shot, and stabbed. Some had their skulls split in half, some were dismembered or disemboweled, and some had their genitals cut off and stuffed in their mouths."[17] This is only a sampling of the horrors inflicted on the Hunan people in this period. Reports from many different areas conquered by Northern troops were replete with their own examples of brutal atrocities.

The initial success of the Northern campaign in Hunan eventually foundered as a result of internal dissension among its commanders. The leader of the Zhili forces, Wu Peifu, resented the appointment of Zhang Jingyao as Hunan's military governor, since Zhang's forces had mainly followed in the wake of Wu Peifu's advance and had contributed very little to the actual campaign. Thus Wu halted his advance in southern Hunan and negotiated a ceasefire with his Southern opponents. The result was a stalemate, which was to last two years, that left most of Hunan, except for its western and southern borders, in Northern hands.[18]

As the Northern armies settled into new roles as occupiers instead of invaders, the massive, organized campaigns of slaughter and destruction seen in the initial invasion slowly came to an end. Random acts of violence by individual soldiers or small units, however, continued throughout the occupation period. Troops on guard duty robbed or extorted money from passersby at will, and patrolling units plundered villages or forced villages to meet their demands for money, food, and clothes. Soldiers in towns or cities forced sales by shops at reduced prices or simply took the goods they needed without payment, beating or in some cases killing anyone who objected. Unpaid troops frequently rioted, plundering business districts, or extorted payments from merchants to avoid such incidents. Anti-bandit campaigns were used to pillage villages and to extort funds from their residents, under the convenient pretext that they were bandit lairs. Belying his claims of an orderly administration, some of the worst offenders in these ongoing atrocities were the troops of the military governor, Zhang Jingyao. Such depredations were sufficiently serious and frequent to be noted and reported in major newspapers in Shanghai and other distant cities.[19] Meanwhile, Zhang himself replicated the plundering of his soldiers at a higher level through forced "loans," currency manipulation, and the misappropriation of provincial funds.[20]

The result of the 1918 war in Hunan was to divide the province up into territories controlled by an assortment of military forces. The majority of the population living in the central heart of the province were forced to accept rule by, and live with, soldiers who had perpetrated horrifying atrocities upon them. With this conflict, warlordism had come to Hunan with a vengeance.

Warlordism and Military Atrocities

The military atrocities suffered by the Hunan people from 1918 to 1920 were, to a large extent, the natural outcome of a steady escalation of military violence brought on by the emergence of warlordism. Diana Lary has outlined many of the factors that led to increased military violence against civilians in this period. First, there was the sheer increase in the number of men under arms, along with the fact that they were armed with modern guns that greatly increased the power of individual soldiers relative to civilians. Lary also notes that once they were trained to kill, these troops were desensitized to the use of violence and could be as easily turned against civilians as against enemy soldiers. Lary suggests, however, that the particular brutality evidenced in the behaviour of many warlord soldiers was to a large extent due to the brutalization they themselves received from their officers.[21]

This brutalization was also largely the result of the conditions of time, in which large numbers of new soldiers could be easily recruited into warlord

armies from an impoverished population. This created a situation where, as Lary notes, "The number of men was what counted, not their quality or loyalty. Obedience was secured by harsh discipline and little attention was given to training or welfare."[22] The mistreatment of soldiers by their officers led them to act out their own frustrations in a violent fashion against the civilians they encountered.

Beyond the psychological effects of military life on soldiers in the warlord era, warlordism also created conditions that led many military commanders to tolerate, or even encourage, violence against civilians. Recurring wars placed pressure on commanders to expand their armies. In a rush to bring new soldiers to the battlefield, many commanders abandoned more discriminating recruiting standards and reduced training, with an obvious effect on troop discipline.

The most blatant example of relaxed recruiting standards was the practice of enlisting bandits into military forces, carried out under the rubric of "bandit pacification." This sort of "pacification" had a double advantage for military commanders. First, it "eliminated" the problem of banditry from their garrison areas with a minimal expenditure of military forces. Second, it provided a ready means of military expansion. Many warlords found bandits attractive recruits because they were already experienced fighters who could be put to immediate use. They were also fairly easily recruited with offers of pardons, regular salaries, and a chance to loot with official approval.[23]

Perhaps not surprisingly, some of the worst offending units in the Hunan conflict were known for having large numbers of troops with bandit backgrounds. These included many of the units under Zhang Jingyao, some of the commanders of which actually began their careers as petty bandit chiefs.[24] The benefits of bandit recruiting, however, also came with its costs. It was difficult to get bandit recruits, already used to the more free life of the hills, to accept military training and discipline, which in turn reduced their military effectiveness. Just as obviously, though, such troops had little inhibition against using violence against the civilian population. In reference to one of these bandit-ridden armies, one commentator noted that "raping, robbing, burning and killing were seen as normal fare."[25]

Just as constant warfare placed pressure on commanders to expand their armies, this expansion also created pressure to find new resources to support them. Commanders quickly discovered that the threat of troop mutinies or disorder was an effective means of extorting the additional resources they needed to support their armies from the people in their garrison areas. Such coercive measures also had a trickle-down effect as unpaid soldiers used similar techniques to obtain pay or provisions from civilians. One single article written in September 1919 noted examples of this type of extortion by officers or soldiers in Changsha, Xiangtan, Lukou, Lingling, Liuyang,

and Xiangyin.[26] Obviously some actual violence was needed to make the threats accompanying such extortion credible. Giving free rein to soldiers to loot was also a cost-effective means to pay and provision an army on campaign. According to a foreign newspaper, a main objective behind Zhang Jingyaos' participation in the Hunan campaign was giving his unpaid troops a chance to supplement their incomes through looting.[27] Commanders choosing this route of troop "payment" could hardly object to the violence committed by their troops in the process.

Thus, it is possible to find some explanation for widespread military violence against civilians in the warlord period within the general conditions of warlordism itself. At the same time, not all military forces exhibited the same behaviour. There was, for example, a definite contrast between the behaviour of Southern and Northern forces. Abuse of the civilian population by Southern troops was not unknown. The cities of Yuezhou and Changsha, for example, were extensively looted by Southern troops as they retreated before the Northern onslaught in 1918.[28] Contemporary commentators saw this looting as particularly egregious, since it was inflicted on the Hunan people by their own army.

Nonetheless, many commentators also noted that the poor discipline of the Southern armies paled next to the behaviour of the Northern invaders. Not limited to looting, many Northern units went on a rampage of arson, murder, and rape.[29] Indeed, depredations of the Northern invaders were commonly summed up with the statement "Burn, kill, rape, and rob; there was nothing they did not do" *(Fen sha yin lue; wu suo bu zhi)*.[30] Although this is a stock description of military atrocities, more detailed accounts of Northern actions show that this characterization was well deserved. For an explanation of the differences between the behaviour of Southern and Northern troops, we need to consider the more specific conditions of this particular conflict.

The first and most obvious reason for differences in troop behaviour was the factor of "identity." Southern (largely Hunanese) troops were more likely to see the civilian inhabitants of Hunan as their own "people," whereas the Northerners, drawn from distant provinces, would not. The inability of Northerners to comprehend the distinctive Hunan dialect strengthened their perception of the alienness. In fact, the difficulty of communication was specifically mentioned as an obstacle in the efforts of at least one community to meet the invading forces on a friendly basis.[31] Thus, perceptions of the Hunan people as "alien" might have lessened the inhibitions of Northern troops towards violence against them.

Although differences in provincial identities might have produced a distance between Northern soldiers and the Hunan people, the role of Northern troops in repeated central attempts to regain control over the province created mutual animosity. During the 1917 withdrawal of Northern armies

from Hunan, the hatred of the Hunan people for these troops was reflected in acts of violence against individual soldiers who had been separated from their units. One foreign missionary reported on a Northern officer killed and mutilated by a mob in Liling; another reported several Northern stragglers murdered in Xiangtan, including one who was burned to death.[32] The Northern forces entering Hunan in 1918 would have been aware of such incidents, and many were no doubt primed to exact revenge for these past offences.

Whatever the pre-existing antagonism of many Northern soldiers towards the Hunan people might have been, upon entering Hunan they again confronted the general hostility of the Hunan people. In many cases, Northern soldiers found themselves under attack from irregular local forces, which, when defeated, faded easily back into, and were protected by, their home communities. This blurred the distinction between combatants and noncombatants for many Northern troops and made them even more suspicious of an already hostile population.[33]

When attacked or, even worse, defeated by Hunan forces, Northern troops turned their anger against the local people. Northern troops returning to Liling after their defeat at the hands of the Hunan army openly admitted that the city was being punished because it was the home of a leading Hunan army commander.[34] In the aftermath of the incident, the Northern-appointed magistrate in Liling also told an American consul that the city's destruction had been due in part to the perception that the people of the town had aided Southern armies while hiding supplies from Northern forces, and that many of the city's inhabitants were Southern soldiers in disguise.[35] Not surprisingly, then, the soldiers involved in this violence were heard to shout the slogan, "Kill the Hunanese."[36] A particularly ferocious attack on one Hunan town at the end of the Northern occupation was apparently provoked when an irregular Hunan force ambushed a Northern force as it retreated towards the town.[37] In the eyes of such soldiers, the entire population had become their enemy.

Within this context of mutual animosity and suspicion, Northern troops were predisposed to see evil intentions in innocent activities, and misunderstandings easily sparked seemingly senseless violence against civilians. For example, cases were reported in Changsha where wedding or funeral parties were attacked when the firecrackers in their ceremonies were mistaken for enemy fire by edgy Northern soldiers.[38] In other cases, entire families were massacred when guns found in their homes were taken as proof of an association with enemy forces.[39] Not unexpectedly, such incidents against apparently innocent people only served to heighten the antagonism of the Hunan people towards the Northern invaders. One source compared this antagonism to the hatred of the people of Belgium for the German army in the First World War.[40]

The nature of the conflict in Hunan, and of the armed forces involved, thus helps to explain why Northern troops were more likely than Southern soldiers to turn with violence on the civilian population. There are other patterns in this violence, though, that demand other explanations. Whereas Northern forces were generally responsible for the worst atrocities, not all Northern forces committed atrocities. Invading Northern armies under the command of Wu Peifu and Feng Yuxiang were consistently cited for their excellent discipline in contrast to the behaviour of other Northern forces.[41] In some cases the arrival of Wu's army was welcomed as an improvement over occupation by Southern forces.[42] The people of Changde were so thankful for Feng's efforts at maintaining order that they proposed setting up a temple in his honour.[43] These examples suggest that the quality of specific units, as well as the character of their commanders, also had important effects on the propensity of soldiers towards violence against civilians.

It is not difficult to uncover the reasons why some troops, such as those in the armies commanded by Wu Peifu and Feng Yuxiang, behaved better than others. First of all, in contrast to many of their fellow commanders, whose forces were riddled with bandits, Wu and Feng were well known for the relative care they took in maintaining high standards in recruiting. More important, though, was the greater emphasis they placed on rigorous training and the enforcement of discipline.[44] They did not hesitate to punish soldiers caught committing the type of atrocities seen in the Liling case, and as a result, their troops were less likely to commit them.

The contrast in terms of recruitment, training, and discipline between these forces and the ones implicated most frequently in military atrocities was clear. Foreign observers also noted the correlation between the poor behaviour of Zhang Jingyao's troops and his lack of attention as a commander to training and discipline.[45] But even when it was clear that his own troops were involved in atrocities against civilians, Zhang habitually blamed the violence on other troops. His response as military governor to reports of such incidents seldom went beyond a promise of an investigation or the reissue of standing orders against disturbances.[46] The amused reaction of a group of soldiers to threats that they would be reported to Zhang for their attacks on Christian churches in Pingxiang showed that they had little expectation that they would be held responsible for their actions.[47] Given Zhang's indifference to troop discipline, his officers could hardly be expected to behave any better. One report noted that as Zhang's troops entered Changsha, "They saw rape and plunder as appropriate activity; although the officers clearly knew it all, they never intervened."[48] Obviously, then, the character and disposition of individual commanders played an important role in determining the extent to which any particular military force maintained discipline in its relation to the civilian population.

Recognizing differences in commanders as a factor in military discipline does not, however, simply reduce the problem of military atrocities to an issue of good versus bad commanders. The wide variation in the discipline enforced by different military commanders was, in the end, also the result of the warlord system, which left military commanders largely accountable to no one but themselves. Some petitions protesting Northern military violence noted that there were, in fact, "national" military regulations against the mistreatment of civilians to which armies on both sides still claimed to adhere.[49] But under the conditions of warlordism, there was no "national" authority capable of enforcing these regulations against commanders who decided to ignore them.

Military violence against civilians can have many causes, and to a certain extent some abuses by soldiers are "normal" in any military conflict. Nonetheless, the extent and incidence of the violence witnessed in Hunan in the early Republican period went well beyond any "normal" expectations. There is little question but that the emergence of warlordism itself was an important contributing factor in creating an atmosphere in which military atrocities flourished. Insofar as military atrocities in this period were connected to the broader political-military context of warlordism, they also had an impact that went beyond the personal tragedies they caused in the lives of their victims. But for this impact to be felt, the experience of these victims had to be made known to a broader audience. To understand the effect of the military atrocities of this period on public opinion, then, one must examine the ways in which reports on these atrocities reached the public.

Cries That Shake the Earth: Protests, Publicity, and Propaganda

The formulaic phrases used to describe the crimes committed by military forces in the warlord period were repeated so often that they almost seem reduced to clichés. One such example, already cited above, was the oft-repeated accusation "Burn, kill, rape, and rob; there was nothing they did not do." The use of such phrases was not, however, meant to trivialize the atrocities they described but to emphasize their enormity by generalization. Thus another stock phrase commonly employed to show the depth of suffering endured by the victims of those atrocities was that "their cries shook the earth" *(kusheng zhendi)*. This expression in effect declared that the crimes committed did not, and would not, simply sink unnoticed into oblivion. The "earth" that was shaken in this case, though, was not just outraged nature but the broader public who learned of these atrocities through the protests, publicity, and propaganda that emerged in the wake of these incidents.

Neither military violence against civilians nor protests against such violence were new phenomena in Chinese history. Vivid accounts of earlier

historical incidents also played important roles in "scarring" the public mind in ways that had a broader political impact than the immediate effects of the atrocities themselves. The most obvious examples of such accounts are two works that described the massacres carried out by invading Manchu armies at the founding of the Qing Dynasty, "Diary of Ten Days at Yangzhou" and "Account of the Jiading Massacre."[50] Although banned by the Qing government, these histories continued to circulate secretly among the literati and thus preserved the memory of the horror inflicted on the citizens of these two cities by the Manchu invaders. In the hands of late-Qing revolutionary propagandists, these accounts contributed to growing anti-Manchu sentiments that finally helped to bring about the 1911 Revolution.[51] Other examples of this type of literature, and ones that received a more sympathetic hearing from the Qing state, were memoirs, diaries, and histories of the destruction caused by mid-nineteenth-century rebels (though atrocities were also committed by state forces against rebel populations). In this case, these publications not only commemorated the "righteous" who had suffered at the hands of the rebels but also supported the dynasty's restorationist values.[52]

Because these past incidents were strongly imprinted in popular memory, they made appropriate benchmarks for those trying to describe the atrocities suffered by the Hunan people in the warlord period. Thus, the editors of one collection of materials on the Hunan atrocities concluded that the devastation suffered by the Hunan people was no less than the Yangzhou and Jiading massacres.[53] Eyewitnesses and authors of accounts of specific atrocities made comparisons both to these famous Qing cases and to the destruction that accompanied the Taiping Rebellion.[54] In a new twist, many commentaries on atrocities committed by departing Northern troops in 1920 also likened them to the devastation suffered by Zhuzhou and Liling two years before – marking the emergence of the 1918 Zhuzhou-Liling case as a new standard in evaluating military atrocities.[55] More than just a descriptive technique, the use of such comparisons implied that the military violence seen in Hunan was deserving of equal attention. As in the previous historical cases, reporting on the Hunan atrocities therefore not only reflected but also sought to arouse public outrage over the effects of warlord conflicts on China's civilian population.

The protests that arose in the wake of military atrocities in the warlord period were widespread and varied. They included petitions, complaints, and reports from individual victims, groups of concerned citizens, public organizations, and local officials from affected areas. Like the chronicles of the early-Qing massacres in Yangzhou and Jiading, accounts were also written of the experience of specific communities that had particularly suffered in the Hunan war. Two notable examples of works of this type, which played important roles in raising awareness of the level of violence inflicted on

Hunan's civilian population, were "A record of the military disaster at Liling" *(Liling bingzai jilue)* and "A record of the military disaster at Baoqing" *(Baoqing bingzai jishi)*.[56] However, one important difference between reports of earlier historical atrocities and those of the warlord period, and their ability to make an impact on Chinese consciousness, was the broader availability of channels for the dissemination of publicity on warlord atrocities. The most important of these was an expanding popular press.

A significant feature of Chinese newspapers in this period in regard to their coverage of military atrocities was the diversity of materials represented. Besides articles reporting or commenting on events written directly by reporters or editors, most newspapers also relied heavily on a variety of primary texts – including statements by public officials, official documents, petitions, reports of public and private organizations, and even telegrams and letters from private individuals – as a low-cost way of filling out their editions. Taking advantage of this situation, individuals and organizations often issued petitions and protests in the form of "circular telegrams." These were sent not only to various authorities and public organizations, but also to leading newspapers in major centres in hope of publication to a wider audience. A complementary relationship thus developed between those seeking to publicize news about military atrocities and the demand of newspapers for copy. The variety of "voices" emerging from such sources made newspapers powerful vehicles for the representation as well as the moulding of public opinion.

There were, however, also limitations on the role that newspapers could play in the construction of public opinion around issues such as military atrocities. Given their domination of government and politics, military commanders in this period could, and often did, forcibly suppress dissent against their rule, frequently censoring or preventing the distribution of critical publications in their territories. In many locations this censorship resulted in the death of "political" newspapers that had been common in the early Republic. So it was in Hunan, where press censorship was commonplace under all centrally imposed military governors, including Zhang Jingyao. The penalty for the publication of critical news could range from a temporary suspension of the newspaper to the arrest and imprisonment of editors and journalists.[57] Not surprisingly, then, one of Hunan's leading newspapers, the Changsha *Dagongbao,* was for the most part silent on atrocities committed by Northern troops in Hunan after Zhang Jingyao's arrival in Changsha in 1918. The *Dagongbao*'s coverage of atrocities committed by departing troops in 1920 only began the day after Zhang's flight from the capital, with a telling editorial note that previous reports had been blocked by Zhang's censors.[58] Thus, censorship often proved an obstacle to newspaper coverage of military atrocities in the areas controlled by commanders whose troops were responsible for this violence.

Ironically, however, the political fragmentation of the warlord system itself also created some "space" where critical opinion could be expressed. Thus, organizations of sojourners in other provinces often took the lead in expressing outrage over military abuses in their home provinces, while their compatriots at home were forced to remain silent. Similarly, a military commander could not prevent reports on atrocities committed by his troops by newspapers in territories outside his own control – particularly if that territory was controlled by a military rival. Beyond the effects of the political fragmentation of warlordism itself in opening up alternative arenas for public expression, the existence of foreign concessions gave even greater opportunities for publication free from military interference. It is hardly surprising, then, that large numbers of newspapers located themselves in these concessions, and that these newspapers often carried news of events that newspapers in areas where the events occurred could not publish. Thus, while Hunan newspapers were silent on the atrocities committed by Northern troops in Hunan in 1918, these events were in the end still extensively reported in Shanghai newspapers with nationwide circulations. News of such events could therefore never be completely suppressed.

Besides the prominence of newspapers in spreading news of military violence to a broader audience in the warlord period, another significant development seen in the case of Hunan was the emergence of specialized groups in response to the growing problem of warlordism that took the publication of information on military atrocities as one of their main tasks. There were, of course, many pre-existing organizations that also played an important role in publicizing this kind of information, the main examples of which would be chambers of commerce and native place associations. But the formation of specialized groups to address the problems raised by military violence resulted in a much more concentrated effort to publicize this violence and seek redress for its victims.

The most prominent example of this type of organization was the Hunan Rehabilitation Association *(Hunan shanhou xiehui)*, established by Hunan sojourners in Shanghai in late 1918. In its inaugural declaration, the association noted, with some rhetorical exaggeration, the conditions arising from the war in Hunan that compelled its organization: "The lives and the property of the people have been perversely trampled, and public and private enterprises have all been destroyed, to the extent that it is unbearable to recount the details. The cruelty revealed is unheard of in past history, and even a hundred years may not be enough to recover from the devastation."[59] Claiming to represent Hunan's entire population of 30 million people, the association set broad goals for itself, including the organization of relief for the victims of the war and the promotion of a peaceful solution to the conflict. In the pursuit of these ends, it also tasked itself with "the collection of

information on the repeated tragedies suffered by the Hunan people, to display the facts, and disseminate them to China and the world."[60]

True to its objectives, the Hunan Rehabilitation Association made a special appeal to local organizations in each of the province's counties to report on military atrocities and other effects of the war in their areas.[61] It also issued its own petitions and reports on these conditions to the authorities in both Northern and Southern governments, many of which were concurrently published in leading newspapers.[62] The most important contribution of the association in publicizing the effects of warlordism on Hunan was a book it edited and published, *Xiangzai jilue* (A record of Hunan's calamities).[63]

Xiangzai jilue was presented as a comprehensive record of all the recent disasters visited on Hunan. However, except for a chapter on the effects of floods, most of the book focuses directly or indirectly on the effects of the recent war in Hunan on its people. The book begins with a detailed history of the conflict itself, followed immediately by a long chapter on military violence and atrocities *(junbao)*. Other chapters provide information on financial and educational conditions, focusing on the abuses of Zhang Jingyao's administration in currency manipulation, forced loans, and the misappropriation of public funds. Chapters on banditry and famine also reflect on the relationship of these conditions to both the war and the mismanagement of Zhang's regime.

The book has a particular historical value because it is largely a compilation of materials from other sources, including newspaper articles, eyewitness reports, official proclamations and orders, as well as protests, petitions, and reports issued by various individuals, citizen groups, and public associations. As such, the book remains an important window on the extensive outrage provoked by military violence in this period, the coverage it received, and the extent to which such violence was linked to the broader harmful effects of the civil wars of the warlord era. This historical value aside, the book was in its own time a fairly important exposé of the harmful effects of warlordism. The Hunan Rehabilitation Association also increased the impact of this publication by distributing it free of charge.[64]

In its bylaws, the Hunan Rehabilitation Association claimed to be apolitical. Nonetheless, the information it collected and published was more critical of the Northern army of occupation in Hunan than of its Southern opponents. Thus, the association's claim of neutrality notwithstanding, *Xiangzai jilue* could be, and no doubt was, read as an anti-Zhang Jingyao tract. It is hardly surprising, then, that the association was established by Hunan sojourners in Shanghai (with a mailing address in the French concession).[65] The security of the Shanghai concessions provided the association with an opportunity to pursue its objectives with little danger of political or military interference.

Published as "Volume One," covering material up to the end of 1918, *Xiangzai jilue* was clearly intended to be the first in a series that would continue to publish new materials as they became available.[66] Although it is unclear whether a second volume was ever produced, the work of exposing the abuses committed by Northern soldiers in Hunan was continued when some of the original members of the Hunan Rehabilitation Association joined other Hunan literary figures and educators in Shanghai to publish the *Hunan yuekan* (Hunan monthly journal). Among the announced goals of this publication, the first was "to report local agonies" *(chenshu difang cantong)* and the second "to conduct research on rehabilitation."[67] True to these goals, the first issue contained a long article narrating the atrocities committed by Zhang Jingyao's troops in Changsha, and subsequent issues recounted continuing military abuses in other locales.[68]

Soon this journal was joined by other specialized publications equally dedicated to exposing not only such military atrocities but also other "crimes" committed by Zhang's regime, including the theft of public property, currency manipulation, embezzlement, extortionate taxation, and the suppression of nationalist movements.[69] One of these anti-Zhang journals was even able to take advantage of the growing rivalry between Zhang Jingyao and Wu Peifu to begin publishing from Hengyang, the city that served as Wu's headquarters in south Hunan.[70]

This brief review, based only on sources that survived this turbulent era, clearly shows that the atrocities committed in Hunan in the period from 1918 to 1920 were widely publicized in their own day. It is equally clear, however, that much of this publicity was more than a dispassionate reporting of the news of the day. The publication efforts of groups like the Hunan Rehabilitation Association were intended to influence public opinion and to take advantage of the expected public outrage to sway this opinion towards specific ends. When able to publish freely, many newspapers and periodicals also took editorial positions critical of military violence. Even in the absence of an explicit editorial stand on this issue, straightforward reporting on military atrocities could not help but produce a sympathetic impact on public opinion. Thus, publicity on military atrocities helped to inspire, and occurred within the context of, broader political movements reacting to the effects of warlordism.

Military Atrocities and Anti-Warlordism

The initial reporting of incidents of military violence usually expressed or supported very immediate concerns. Appeals to military commanders or higher authorities to restore troop discipline and to ensure that no further incidents would occur were obvious examples of such concerns. Pleas for relief for the victims of military atrocities were another immediate response to these incidents, though obviously such appeals also continued for as

long as such relief was still seen to be needed. Finally, in some cases, there would be demands for the punishment of officers and soldiers responsible for mistreatment of the civilian population.

The direct effect of such appeals was limited, to say the least. Commanders whose troops had been involved in violence against civilians could easily ignore these complaints altogether or reply with empty promises. Thus, responding to an appeal from prominent Hunanese residents in Beijing concerned about reports of the 1918 "military disaster" at Liling, Zhang Jingyao, without acknowledging any blame for this disaster, promised to "console the people and punish the wicked" *(diaomin fazui)*. He cited his orders to public organizations and local officials in Liling to provide relief for the victims and noted that the officers of the various armies garrisoning the area were strictly overseeing their troops to prevent any disturbance.[71]

Actual conditions, however, belied these assurances. According to a report issued five months after the disaster, the abuse of Liling civilians by Northern troops, including Zhang's own, continued unabated, and their "inhumane cruelty" *(can wu rendao)* had grown even greater.[72] Zhang's promise to "punish the wicked" did not materialize. In fact, military abuses were covered up, and attempts by citizens to file charges in such cases were simply ignored.[73] Rubbing salt in the wounds of the Liling people was the handling of relief measures by Zhang's government. Official relief funds, very limited to begin with, were funnelled through the official Hunan provincial bank and distributed in debased paper currency that only retained a portion of its face value.[74]

The lack of a satisfactory response to demands for redress and relief broadened the political impact of the military atrocities of 1918 by increasing incentives for a succession of anti-war, and ultimately anti-warlord, movements. Military atrocities were by no means the sole impetus for these movements. As the first decade of the Chinese Republic progressed, the various harmful effects of the expanding political power of military commanders became increasingly obvious. Local administration, education, and public works were ignored as military rulers concentrated their attention on their military affairs. Public funds were mishandled or embezzled as commanders focused on increasing revenues for their growing armies. Military conflicts over political spoils weakened national unity and the ability of the Chinese government to resist the pressures of foreign powers. These and other issues provided a broad and complex foundation for the development of anti-warlord political movements. Nonetheless, military atrocities remained the most obvious and shocking effect of China's descent into warlordism, and incidents of military violence played a strong propagandizing role in generating broader public support for successive anti-war and anti-warlord movements.

The first of these movements centred around the idea of convoking a national peace conference to resolve, by negotiation, the various differences

between Northern and Southern governments and military forces. Support for this North-South peace conference came from a variety of sources. First, there were specific commanders within both Northern and Southern military alliances who saw the continuation of the North-South conflict as only benefiting their factional adversaries. The most important of these commanders was Wu Peifu, who had found the spoils of his victories in the Hunan campaign handed over to Zhang Jingyao. Thus, after halting his advance in south Hunan, Wu arranged his own ceasefire with his Southern opponents and declared his support for a negotiated peace. Other commanders, North and South, soon followed Wu's lead. Meanwhile, foreign powers, which found the instability of continued civil war a threat to their own interests, also began to pressure the Beijing government to pursue an internal peace settlement. Responding to these developments, and seeing a chance to strengthen his own political leadership, the newly elected president in Beijing, Xu Shichang, announced a formal ceasefire in mid-November 1918 in preparation for peace talks.[75]

Although the decision to proceed with North-South peace talks had to come from military and political leaders, this decision unfolded within the context of broad-based public support. A desire for peace was, of course, a recurring theme in much of the public commentary on the military conflicts of the period. In late 1918, however, this desire took a more organized form. In October 1918, a group of the nation's leading citizens, representing a broad range of political positions, announced the formation of a Peace Promotion Society *(heping qicheng hui)* calling for an end to military conflict and the unification of the country through peace talks. This was quickly followed by the establishment of another association, the National Peace Alliance Society *(quanguo heping lianhe hui),* which sought to unite various public associations, such as chambers of commerce, educational associations, and provincial assemblies, in support of a North-South peace conference. There was an immediate and widespread response to the organization of these societies, with prominent citizens taking the lead in organizing branch societies throughout the country.[76]

As might be expected, support for this peace movement was particularly strong in Hunan. Immediately after the announcement of the establishment of the Peace Promotion Society, Hunan's Provincial Assembly, Educational Association, General Chamber of Commerce, and other public organizations wired their support for this society and its peace proposal. Without exception, these organizations cited the suffering of the Hunan people at the hands of soldiers as the main factor behind their desire for peace. A group of prominent Hunan citizens who had organized a "Peace Petition Society" *(heping qingyuan hui)* to support the peace effort in mid-November 1918, soon reorganized this society as the Hunan branch of the Peace Promotion Society.[77] In mid-December, plans also began for a Hunan

branch of the Peace Alliance Society with support from the Provincial Assembly, the Educational Association, and the Chamber of Commerce. The announcement of the formation of this group again cited the severity of the "military disasters" *(bingzai)* in Hunan as the main reason why such an organization was so needed.[78]

Since they were based inside Hunan in areas under Zhang Jingyao's control, these organizations were even more careful than the Hunan Rehabilitation Association, established in Shanghai in this same period, to assert their neutrality in the political conflicts dividing the North and the South.[79] Their citations of Hunan's military disasters were therefore made without any reference to the specific military forces responsible for them. Their immediate goal was simply to increase public pressure on all authorities for peace talks, which they then hoped would provide some means to end further suffering at military hands. The first part of this goal was met when an agreement was finally reached for representatives from all concerned parties to meet for talks in Shanghai on 20 February 1919 to negotiate a peace settlement and begin the process of rehabilitation.[80]

Although at first published materials on military atrocities were used in the campaign to pressure authorities to agree to the conference, once the conference began, these materials took on a second role as evidence that would both aid in the planning of relief measures and remind participants of the need to prevent further conflict. Thus the Hunan Rehabilitation Association saw its collection of materials about military atrocities in Hunan as resources for petitions to be presented to the North-South peace conference.[81] One of the most complete accounts of the 1918 atrocities in Liling, *Liling bingzai jilue,* was included as an appendix to the petition of Hunan representatives at the conference.[82] Liling's own representatives also presented materials to the conference detailing the military disaster that had befallen their county.[83] Such efforts made sure that the military atrocities that had accompanied the war were never far from the minds of the conference's delegates.

The 1919 Shanghai peace conference was an attempt to address the issues that had led to civil war, and its effects, on a nationwide basis. Among the issues discussed were the separation of military and civil administration, troop disbandment, and rehabilitation measures for war-devastated areas. In the end, however, the conference foundered on its inability to reconcile the conflicting interests of different military commanders and factions, none of whom were ultimately willing to yield a significant portion of their own power, or their expectations of future power, in the interest of a greater peace. Despite subsequent efforts to revive it, by mid-1919 the peace conference had for all practical purposes collapsed.[84]

For many of those who had placed their hopes for peace on the Shanghai conference, the actual experience of the conference seemed to reveal the

impossibility of a comprehensive or nationwide solution to the problems created by warlordism. Disillusionment with the peace conference led many anti-war activists to refocus their attention on their own provinces. Instead of seeking nationwide solutions to end warlord conflicts, they looked for more immediate means to eliminate specific warlords. Thus, one Hunanese-edited journal published in Shanghai in early 1920 called on the Hunan people to look to themselves, rather than to higher authorities or peace conferences, to solve the problems of warlordism.[85]

For most Hunanese, the main warlord "problem" in Hunan was, of course, Zhang Jingyao. Appeals for Zhang's removal had, in fact, already been raised at the Shanghai peace conference. Two Liling representatives to the Shanghai peace conference made a tearful appeal to its delegates that included a bitter denunciation of Zhang's acts.[86] Despite its claim of political neutrality, the Hunan Rehabilitation Association also published materials on Zhang's crimes and worked for his removal. Thus, in a March 1919 petition to President Xu, the society noted, "Each day that Zhang remains in Hunan means another day that Hunan's disaster is unrelieved."[87]

Such efforts were successful to the extent that a proposal for Zhang's removal was ultimately placed on the agenda of the peace conference.[88] Hopes that Zhang's removal could be effected through the conference obviously collapsed with it. But the end result was to shift the focus of many of the Hunan activists away from the promotion of peace talks to a more direct "oust-Zhang" campaign. For example, the two Liling representatives mentioned above stayed in Shanghai with the collapse of the conference, joined the Hunan Rehabilitation Association, and threw themselves more fully into the anti-Zhang movement by helping to found two anti-Zhang publications, the *Hunan yuekan* and *Tianwen*.[89]

The collapse of the North-South peace conference also coincided with events that would soon give anti-warlord movements across China a new inspiration. The revelation of secret agreements by the warlord government of Beijing, accepting a Japanese takeover of German concessions in China at the end of the First World War, provoked a student demonstration in Beijing on 4 May 1919 that gave its name to a new political movement (May Fourth Movement) that linked the problem of warlordism more directly to the issue of China's national weakness in the face of imperialism. This linkage was made clear in Hunan when Zhang Jingyao suppressed anti-Japanese protests and boycotts led by Hunan students. The anti-Zhang Jingyao campaign thus gained a new impetus as student organizations in Hunan recast Zhang as a national traitor as well as a local tyrant and threw their support behind efforts to achieve his removal. Leaders of a Hunan student strike called in December 1919 declared, "Until Zhang leaves Hunan, students will not return to their classes."[90]

Such events are important to relate because they reveal the full range of factors that ultimately supported anti-warlord movements such as that seen in Hunan in 1919 and 1920. There is a tendency among many Chinese historians, however, to privilege the patriotic and anti-imperialist motives of the May Fourth Movement in these anti-warlord campaigns. Thus Hunan historians have often looked to the anti-Zhang efforts of student organizations in the aftermath of his suppression of their anti-Japanese protests as initiating the oust-Zhang movement in Hunan.[91] In fact, such efforts simply added to a campaign that was already well under way, and that drew its original strength from Zhang's complicity in the violence inflicted on the Hunan population by his troops. Thus, while recognizing the diverse motives that inspired anti-warlord movements, we must not overlook the central role of military atrocities in initiating and inspiring these movements.

Although efforts to publicize Zhang Jingyao's "crimes" continued to be a major goal of the anti-Zhang movement, in practice, few thought that Zhang could be removed from his post by the power of public opinion alone. One of the founders of the Hunan Rehabilitation Association noted that since attempts to remove Zhang by peaceful means had failed, they had to turn to a "military solution."[92] In this regard, anti-Zhang activists found they had an advantage they could exploit in the growing tension between Zhili and Anhui military factions for the control of the Beijing government, and the particular ill-will between Zhang Jingyao and Zhili commanders such as Wu Peifu in Hunan. Thus, Cao Kun, the leader of the Zhili faction, and his main subordinates in Hunan all found themselves targeted by successive delegations, from groups such as the Hunan Rehabilitation Association and student organizations, seeking support for their efforts to bring Zhang's rule in Hunan to an end. As Zhili-Anhui tensions increased, these delegations received an increasingly sympathetic reception.

The pattern of military atrocities that had occurred during the conflict in Hunan again provided the backdrop for an alliance between the Zhili faction and these anti-Zhang forces. Because the more disciplined troops under Zhili commanders such as Wu Peifu and Feng Yuxiang had not been involved in the types of atrocities seen under other Northern commanders, Hunanese delegations could meet more easily with these Zhili commanders. By focusing on "crimes" committed by Zhang that could not be charged against the Zhili commanders, both sides could construct a common ground for their alliance against Zhang. Thus, one Hunan delegation to Cao Kun's headquarters in early 1920 presented copies of *Xiangzai jilue, Liling bingzai jilue, Hunan yuekan,* and other anti-Zhang publications and reportedly brought Cao's staff to tears by their description of the cruelties of Zhang's rule in Hunan. In meeting this delegation, Cao's secretary in turn noted how press reports had already made Zhang's crimes well known to Cao and

expressed his sympathy for their appeals.[93] No matter what practical politics ultimately guided the Zhili faction, the constant reference to military atrocities in their negotiations with anti-Zhang forces in Hunan provided a moral and public relations cover for their actions.

The removal of Zhang Jingyao from Hunan was ultimately effected by the unilateral decision of Zhili forces in Hunan to withdraw from the province. Since his crack troops were needed to shore up the Zhili position in North China, Wu Peifu negotiated a settlement with his former Southern enemies and on 27 May began the withdrawal of his forces from Hunan. Other Zhili commanders positioned along the Hunan front quickly followed suit. The Hunan army advanced quickly on the heels of the retreating Zhili forces and, as agreed in their settlement with Wu, concentrated their efforts on attacking the non-Zhili forces that remained loyal to Zhang. Having relied so heavily on Wu Peifu in the past, these forces had no stomach for a fight, and their resistance quickly collapsed. On 11 June, Zhang himself fled, and most of the remaining Northern troops retreated from Hunan in short order. Backed by a coalition of Hunan military commanders, Tan Yankai quickly returned to Changsha to reclaim the governorship he had lost two years earlier and restore a government for Hunan by Hunanese.[94]

Although the flight of Zhang Jingyao may have provided some closure on the atrocities the Hunan people had suffered since the Northern invasion of their province in 1918, it did not signal the end of warlordism. Instead, Northern warlords were simply replaced by Hunan warlords. After only a short term of office, Tan Yankai was forced from his position during a struggle between competing Hunan military factions who soon began to battle for control of Hunan's government. Certainly the departure of less disciplined and less "alien" Northern troops lessened the number and intensity of military atrocities against civilians. But with the basic conditions of warlordism unchanged, the Hunan people would continue to suffer periodic military abuses from the troops of their new Hunan masters.

The ultimate failure of "successful" anti-warlord campaigns directed at the removal of individual warlords, such as the Hunan "oust Zhang Jingyao" movement, provided the context for broader political movements seeking a more comprehensive political solution to the problem of warlordism. The Northern Expedition of the Nationalist Party (GMD) that entered Hunan in 1926 was the first step in a renewed effort to combat warlordism on a more systematic level. Meanwhile, until the civil warfare that had bred warlordism was brought to an end and the last remnants of warlord power were eradicated, the problem of military atrocities would continue. The experience and memories of these atrocities would also continue to prod efforts to end warlordism and to inspire the construction of new patterns of military behaviour.

Military Atrocities and the Scars of the Warlord Period

Many Western historians find little of historical significance in China's warlord period. Lying between such important events as the overthrow of the imperial state in 1911 and the rise of the new revolutionary and state-building movements of the Nationalist and Communist Parties, the confusing and disorderly period of warlord rule is often all but ignored.[95] Chinese historians have given the period more attention because, for them, the struggle against warlordism was an intrinsic and crucial stage in their revolutionary history. This greater attention to the problem of warlordism in their history is, to some extent, also a reflection of the scars left on the Chinese people by this experience, even as historical accounts have continued to pass the memory of this disastrous period on to new generations.

The legacy of warlordism on Chinese politics and society has been both multi-faceted and persistent. Current Chinese apprehensions about any threat to Chinese unity or the possibility of political disorder are rooted, at least to some extent, in memories of the civil wars, political disorder, and social instability of the warlord era. Military misrule of the warlord period also left a lasting aversion to military interference in politics, to the extent that May Fourth-period slogans to this effect have reappeared in contemporary cases when this issue has been raised.[96] It is hardly surprising, then, that memories of the military atrocities of the warlord period have also had a lasting impact on Chinese political concerns. These atrocities first of all constitute part of a public recollection of the evils of the warlord period that has contributed to a general dread of any return to these conditions. More specifically, the negative example of warlord atrocities during this period helped to raise new expectations of proper military-civil or, more precisely, soldier-civilian relations.

During the past century, Chinese attitudes towards the military have changed considerably. Although China had a military tradition that glorified military heroes and valued martial skills, by the late imperial period, a dominant civil tradition that looked on soldiering with disdain had solidified. Such attitudes began to change towards the end of the Qing Dynasty for several important reasons. First, the rise of nationalism in the face of foreign threats placed new value on a strong military as a national requirement. Concurrently, the Qing state initiated reforms to improve the quality of military recruits, reward military service, and strengthen military discipline. Edmund Fung has shown how new patriotic appreciation for, and the improved social standing of, the Chinese military contributed to its leading role in the 1911 Revolution.[97] Ironically, the new status of the military also gave military men more access to political power and thus contributed to the emergence of warlordism.

While the value of military office as a path to wealth and power continued to increase in the warlord period, popular appreciation for the military plummeted. As civil wars raged and military atrocities increased, it became more and more difficult to view soldiers as the defenders of the nation. Instead, the protectors of the people were in effect transformed into their tormentors. The depth of disillusionment over this development literally cries out from the critiques of military abuses in this period. Thus, the opening lines of *Xiangzai jilue* read: "Since the beginning of the war in Hunan, the Hunan people have suffered from the violence of soldiers. How can one bear to speak of this? ... A nation establishes an army to protect its people. Today, because of the army, the people have no way to protect themselves. Therefore the original purpose in establishing an army has indeed been completely lost."[98] Likewise a petition by Hunan residents in Beijing noted that the Northern troops involved in the pillaging of Zhuzhou and Liling in 1918 were not worthy of "holy name" of a national army *(guojun),* whose duty was to protect the people rather than to harass them.[99]

Publicity about the atrocities committed by warlord armies obviously strengthened anti-warlordism as a central political goal of the period, and both the Nationalist and Communist Parties took the elimination of warlordism as one of their objectives. The prominence of military atrocities in the critique of warlordism, however, also meant that these parties would ultimately be judged on their ability not only to reunify the country but also to bring an end to military violence against the civilian population. Indeed, in the face of warlord atrocities, the creation of a disciplined army that could regain the confidence and support of the people became an obvious strategy in the struggle for both military and political power.

Donald Jordan has shown how National Revolutionary Army soldiers were taught inspirational songs about loving the people and practical slogans such as "Don't seize coolies" and "Don't live in the people's homes" in an effort to distinguish them from their warlord enemies. Even more important were efforts to enforce discipline so that the actual behaviour of these soldiers would match the promises of these slogans. In the end, Jordan concludes that it was the conduct of the Nationalist army, rather than its ideology per se, that played the most important role in gaining popular support for the Nationalist Party during the Northern Expedition.[100] In organizing the Red Army, the Communist Party followed the same model, placing a strong emphasis on discipline and training its soldiers to be meticulous in their courtesy towards the common people.[101]

The deliberate efforts by both parties to create disciplined armies that would offer a sharp contrast with warlord forces did not, however, mean that these armies committed no violence against civilians. The inhabitants of Canton's (Guangzhou) main commercial district no doubt saw little difference between other warlord atrocities and the devastation wreaked on

their homes and businesses by Sun Yat-sen's Whampao-trained GMD forces during the so-called Merchant Corps Incident in late 1924. As Michael Tsin's discussion of this incident notes, Sun's government itself admitted that 100 soldiers were executed as a result of crimes committed during this action.[102] At the same time, the fact that these executions were carried out at all still served to highlight the difference between GMD and warlord forces.

A more serious problem for the GMD arose as a result of the incorporation of warlord units into the National Revolutionary Army over the course of the Northern Expedition. Although crucial to the GMD's military success, this process weakened the enforcement of military discipline, increasingly tainted the party's reputation, and reduced its ability to distinguish itself from its warlord enemies. The Red Army was not immune from such problems either. Although generally supporting the view that the Communist Party benefited from a cordial relationship between the Red Army and the peasant population, Odoric Wou notes that two of the three divisions of the Eyuwan Red Army in Henan, which had largely been recruited from bandit and sectarian bands, were looked upon by local residents as "nothing but bandit gangs ... that practiced random violence and predatory activities."[103]

To the extent that violence perpetrated by GMD or Communist troops against civilians hindered their attempt to represent themselves as fundamentally different from their warlord predecessors, both parties had an obvious stake in continued efforts to maintain and improve military discipline. In this regard, the relative, if not absolute, success of the Communist Party in preventing egregious violence against civilians probably contributed significantly to its ultimate victory. At the same time, the key to success in creating a new model of military-civil relations was never simply a matter of enforcing troop discipline. It was, after all, not warlord atrocities per se but effective publicity about these atrocities, deployed as anti-warlord propaganda, that gave rise to the anti-warlord movement. In the end the Communist Party was also more effective than the GMD in creating and controlling the image of the Red Army as an army truly dedicated to the welfare of the people.

The scars left by military atrocities in the warlord era did not simply fade away with the passing of the warlords into history and the establishment of the People's Republic. Just as accounts of the massacres of the early Qing conquest were points of reference for observers of troop atrocities in the warlord period, the atrocities of this period have continued to operate as a negative standard for Chinese judgments of military-civil relations. This is all the more true because the careful image of the People's Liberation Army as an army that "loves the people" was deliberately constructed as a mirror image of the marauding and violent forces of the warlord era.

For obvious reasons, then, the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations opened a discourse on the relationship between the Chinese people and the Chinese

army and put assumptions about this relationship to the test. For a time, demonstrators effectively manipulated the Communist Party's assertion that the People's Liberation Army was the "people's" army, arguing with soldiers sent to disperse them that the "people's" army should not turn its weapons against the people. The embarrassed reaction of soldiers caught on film during such appeals, and their apparent reluctance to follow their orders in the early stages of the demonstration, suggest that many of them shared this understanding of the military's relationship to the people. In the end, the Communist Party leadership managed to overcome the qualms of its soldiers about suppressing the demonstrators. Nonetheless, by turning the People's Liberation Army on its own people in a massacre reminiscent of the military atrocities of the warlord era, they also risked the army's utility as a legitimizing force for party power.

In the context of Chinese history, it is not surprising that the Communist Party has put considerable effort since Tiananmen into attempts to overcome the impression that the People's Liberation Army was no longer the "people's" army. One aspect of this damage control was the "big lie" that no massacre had occurred in Tiananmen Square. Instead, the officially controlled press focused on cases of soldiers harmed by demonstrators. Likewise, the press immediately began a campaign to highlight friendly services provided by soldiers for Beijing residents. One cannot but assume that the prominent coverage of efforts by army units and soldiers to fight the floods of 1998 and provide relief for flood victims was part of a continuing effort to restore the benevolent image of the PLA after the events of 1989.

There is an obvious difference between the role of the press in informing public opinion about military atrocities in the warlord era and the complicity of the press in China today in covering up the massacre of 1989. There are, however, also some continuities. Press reportage in the Republican period was also severely constrained by political controls. The difference from current conditions is that the political disunity of the warlord period also created the "space" needed for the expression of anti-warlord sentiments and for reportage of military atrocities. The success of the Communist Party in ending this disunity for the most part also eliminated the domestic "space" that allowed this expression to take place.

Nonetheless, a China open to the world cannot control the international "space" where details of the 1989 massacre are still being recorded and publicized. There is no reason to believe that the Communist Party will be any more successful in suppressing memories of the events of 1989 than the Qing Dynasty was in eliminating records of the Yangzhou and Jiading massacres or than Zhang Jingyao was in stopping publicity about the rape of Liling. Just as certainly, accounts of the 1989 incident, wherever or however they appear, will be embedded in, take inspiration from, and contribute to a broader history of military atrocities in China that

continues to shape popular expectations of military-civil relations and give these expectations a political force.

Notes

1 Edward A. McCord, *The Power of the Gun: The Emergence of Modern Chinese Warlordism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 174-78, 216-29, 253-59.
2 Ibid., 259-63.
3 Hunan shanhou xiehui, ed., *Xiangzai jilue* (Record of Hunan's disasters), vol. 1 (n.p., 1919), 30-52.
4 Ibid., 96.
5 Ibid., 118-20.
6 Ibid., 344.
7 The details of this conflict, reported by Zhao Hengdi, one of the main Hunan army commanders and later military governor of Hunan, can be found in Hunan shanhou, *Xiangzai jilue,* 45-49.
8 Diana Lary, *Warlord Soldiers: Chinese Common Soldiers, 1911-1937* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 74.
9 United States, Department of State (hereafter cited as USDS), "Decimal File, 1910-1929: Internal Affairs of China," 893.00/2860 (Niebel, 15 May 1918); Hunan shanhou, *Xiangzai jilue,* 97; *Liling xianzhi* (Gazeteer of Liling county) (1948), *dashiji,* 24.
10 Hunan shanhou, *Xiangzai jilue,* 51.
11 Ibid., 135.
12 USDS 893.00/2860 (Brecht, 15 May 1918).
13 USDS 893.00/2863 (Johnson, 6 June 1918); Hunan shanhou, *Xiangzai jilue,* 97, 135-36; *Liling xianzhi, dashiji,* 24-26.
14 "Liling bingzai jilue" (Record of Liling's military disaster), in *Hunan lishi ziliao* (Hunan historical materials), comp. Hunan lishi ziliao bianji weiyuanhui (Changsha: Hunan renmin chubanshe), no. 3 (1959): 114; Hunan shanhou, *Xiangzai jilue,* 101-3.
15 "Zhuzhou lidai dashi jishu" (Record of great events in history in Zhuzhou), *Zhuzhou wenshi ziliao* (Materials on the culture and history of Zhuzhou) 1 (1982): 64.
16 Ye Jingwu, "Wuwu Zhuzhou binghuo ji: Biluan shiri jianwen jiyao" (Account of the 1918 Zhuzhou troops' disaster: A record of important facts seen and heard during a ten-day flight), *Hunan wenshi ziliao* (Hunan materials on culture and history) (Changsha: Hunan renmin chubanshe), no. 8 (1964): 159-60.
17 Ibid., 156.
18 McCord, *The Power of the Gun,* 263-64.
19 For example, see Hunan shanhou, *Xiangzai jilue,* 423-24, and *Shibao* (Shanghai), 17 January, 13 February, 28 September, and 14 November 1919.
20 Zhang's financial manipulations are extensively outlined in Hunan shanhou, *Xiangzai jilue,* 161-275.
21 Lary, *Warlord Soldiers,* 72, 87-89, 104-6.
22 Ibid., 50.
23 Ibid., 62-63.
24 USDS 893.00/2959 (13 December 1918 interview with Xiong Xiling enclosed in Reinsch, 11 January 1919); *Shibao,* 31 July and 10 August, 1920; and *Dagongbao* (Changsha), 27 July and 9 August 1920.
25 *Dagongbao,* 27 July 1920.
26 *Shibao,* 28 September 1919.
27 *Peking Leader,* 17 April 1918, enclosure in USDS 893.00/2837.
28 Hunan shanhou, *Xiangzai jilue,* 96, 130-31.
29 *Shibao,* 1 June 1918; Hunan shanhou, *Xiangzai jilue,* 96, 98, 118, 368.
30 Hunan shanhou, *Xiangzai jilue,* 132, and appendix, 4.
31 Ibid., 353-54.
32 USDS 893.00/2754 (Johnson, 29 January 1917).
33 Hunan shanhou, *Xiangzai jilue,* 404.

34 USDS 893.00/2857 (Johnson, 11 May 1918), 893.00/2860 (Knecht, 19 May 1918).
35 USDS 893.00/2863 (Johnson, 6 June 1918).
36 USDS 893.00/2860 (Niebel, 15 May 1918).
37 *Dagongbao,* 17 and 19 June 1920.
38 Hunan shanhou, *Xiangzai jilue,* 114, 119.
39 Ye Jingwu, "Wuwu Zhuzhou binghuo ji," 149; Hunan shanhou, *Xiangzai jilue,* 113.
40 Hunan shanhou, *Xiangzai jilue,* 421.
41 Ibid., 96, 101; *Guomin xinbao* (Citizen's News) (Hankou), 5 and 31 March, and 28 May 1918; *Shibao,* 15 July 1919.
42 Hunan shanhou, *Xiangzai jilue,* 118.
43 *Shibao,* 15 July 1919.
44 James E. Sheridan, *Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yu-hsiang* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1966), 74-90.
45 Hunan shanhou, *Xiangzai jilue,* 392.
46 USDS 893.00/2857 (Johnson, 14 May 1918); Hunan shanhou, *Xiangzai jilue,* 325.
47 Hunan shanhou, *Xiangzai jilue,* 420.
48 Ibid., 112. A missionary defending his hospital from rampaging Northern troops also reported the orders of one officer to his troops forbidding them from killing anyone in the hospital but allowing that anyone outside the hospital could be killed at will. Ibid., 405.
49 *Dagongbao,* 26 June and 3 July 1920.
50 Both of these works have been reprinted in Shen Yunlong, ed., *Ming-Qing shiliao huibian* (Compilation of Ming-Qing historical materials) (Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1967), 13: 2385-416 and 16: 857-918, respectively.
51 In one of the best-known revolutionary pamphlets of the period, "Gemingjun" (The Revolutionary Army), the author, Zou Rong, noted the influence of these two works on his own revolutionary development and quoted from them to remind his readers of the evil acts committed during the establishment of the Manchu Dynasty. Tsou Jung, *The Revolutionary Army: A Chinese Nationalist Tract of 1903,* trans. John Lust (The Hague, Paris: Mouton, 1968), 75-76.
52 Examples of this sort may be found in Taiping Tianguo lishi bowuguan, comp., *Taiping Tianguo shiliao congbian jianji* (Selected historical materials on the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom), 6 vols. (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1961-63).
53 Hunan shanhou, *Xiangzai jilue,* 141.
54 Ibid., 333 and 349; Ye Jingwu, "Wuwu Zhuzhou binghuo ji," 158 and 161; *Dagongbao,* 26 June 1920; 3 and 14 July 1920.
55 *Dagongbao,* 17, 21, and 26 June 1920; 7, 11, and 14 July 1920; 4 August 1920.
56 These two works have been reprinted in Hunan lishi ziliao bianji weiyuanhui, comp., *Hunan lishi ziliao,* no. 3 (1959): 100-34.
57 Zhang Pingzi, "Cong Qingmo dao Beifajun ru Xiang qian de Hunan baojie" (Hunan's newspaper world from the late Qing to the eve of the entry of the Northern Expedition army), *Hunan wenshi ziliao* (Hunan materials on culture and history), no. 2 (1961): 73-76, 78-81.
58 *Dagongbao,* 13 June 1920.
59 Hunan shanhou, *Xiangzai jilue,* appendix, 1.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid., appendix, 8-10.
62 Ibid., appendix, 1-8; *Shibao,* 8 December 1918.
63 Hunan shanhou, *Xiangzai jilue.* Although lacking a publication date, internal evidence suggests that the book was published in late 1918 or early 1919, soon after the formation of the Hunan Rehabilitation Association.
64 The words "Not for Sale" *(fei maipin)* are printed prominently on the book's cover.
65 Hunan shanhou, *Xiangzai jilue,* appendix, 1-2, 10.
66 Ibid., 93.

67 Hunan lishi, *Hunan lishi ziliao,* no. 2 (1959): 3.
68 Extensive selections from *Hunan yuekan* on this subject are reprinted in Hunan lishi, *Hunan lishi ziliao,* no. 2 (1959): 24-34.
69 Ibid., 1-80.
70 Ibid., 3.
71 Hunan shanhou, *Xiangzai jilue,* 324-25.
72 "Liling bingzai jilue," 103.
73 Ibid., 104-5.
74 Ibid., 112.
75 Lin Tongfa, *Minguo banian zhi nanbei yihe* (The 1919 North-South peace negotiations) (Taipei: Nantian shuju, 1990), 48-58, 63-68, 87-92.
76 Ibid., 58-63.
77 *Shibao,* 11, 19, and 27 November 1918; 9 December 1918.
78 Ibid., 17 December 1918 and 21 January 1919.
79 Ibid., 11 and 27 November 1918; 9 December 1918.
80 Lin, *Minguo banian,* 124-25.
81 Hunan shanhou, *Xiangzai jilue,* appendix, 1.
82 Hunan lishi, *Hunan lishi ziliao,* no. 3 (1959): 100.
83 *Liling xianzhi, dashiji,* 27.
84 Lin, *Minguo banian zhi,* 163-68.
85 Hunan lishi, *Hunan lishi ziliao,* no. 2 (1959): 52-53.
86 *Liling xianzhi, dashiji,* 27.
87 *Shibao,* 29 March 1919.
88 Zuo Linfen, "Xiangren qu Fu (Liangzuo), Zhang (Jingyao) huiyi" (Memoir of the Hunanese ouster of Fu [Liangzuo] and Zhang [Jingyao]), *Hunan wenshi ziliao* (Hunan materials on culture and history), no. 8 (1964): 111.
89 *Liling xianzhi, dashiji,* 27.
90 Hunan lishi, *Hunan lishi ziliao,* no. 2 (1959): 46.
91 See, for example, the coverage of this movement in Lin Zengping and Fan Zhongcheng, eds., *Hunan jinxiandaishi* (Hunan's modern and contemporary history) (Changsha: Hunan shifan daxue chubanshe, 1991). The authors cite on page 399 a Hunan student association proclamation in November 1919 as "the Hunan people's first oust-Zhang declaration."
92 Zuo, "Xiangren qu Fu (Liangzuo)," 111.
93 Hunan lishi, *Hunan lishi ziliao,* no. 2 (1959): 52.
94 McCord, *The Power of the Gun,* 300.
95 A good example of such neglect is John Fairbank's *China: A New History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 250-78, which passes from an examination of the 1911 Revolution and the dictatorship of Yuan Shikai to the May Fourth Movement with only a cursory mention of the warlords who dominated Chinese politics in this period.
96 Edward A. McCord, "Warlords against Warlordism: The Politics of Anti-Militarism in Early Twentieth Century China," *Modern Asian Studies* 30, 4 (1996): 824-27.
97 Edmund S.K. Fung, *The Military Dimension of the Chinese Revolution* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1980).
98 Hunan shanhou, *Xiangzai jilue,* 95.
99 Ibid., 333-34.
100 Donald A. Jordan, *The Northern Expedition: China's National Revolution of 1926-1928* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1976), 231-50.
101 Edgar Snow, *Red Star over China,* rev. ed. (New York: Grove Press, 1969), 172-73.
102 Michael Tsin, *Governance and Modernity in China: Canton 1900-1927* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 85-86.
103 Odoric Wou, *Mobilizing the Masses: Building Revolution in Henan* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), 153-54.

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生靈塗炭

The people
are plunged
into an abyss
of misery

History of the Jin Dynasty

2
The Pacification of Jiading

Timothy Brook

Only at certain places and moments is wartime occupation "war." If an invasion is to lengthen into an occupation, the short phase of armed conflict quickly gives way to a longer, cooler phase of stabilization. The shift from invasion to occupation, from sustained to sporadic violence, is also for the invader a shift from predator to state administrator. As the occupied territory becomes subsumed within an occupation state, more state-like means of coercion come into play: conscription, recruitment, and relocation; expropriations, levies, and corvées; policing, propaganda, and administrative restructuring. All these are standard devices of control and extraction that state builders under any conditions, not just occupation, use to mobilize or discipline a population in its support. But in taking these devices up, an occupation state is unlike an indigenously constituted state in at least one crucial aspect. Dependent on foreign military power and staffed by whomever the foreign power is lucky (or, often, unfortunate) enough to recruit, it lacks a strong relationship to the routine functioning of society. Constrained by that lack, the occupier is caught in the conundrum of having no venue within which to project a convincing claim to legitimacy. Without this legitimacy it appears only as what it is, externally imposed and unwanted. This conundrum is self-generated, of course, for the physical and symbolic violence of military invasion created the legitimacy problem in the first place. Work must be done to conceal and exploit the work that *has* been done.

The effort of assembling a plausible occupation state at the local level falls on both the occupier and the local people brought under occupation. For while occupation is an imposition, it is also a relationship, albeit a relationship dramatized and prejudged by the term "collaboration." This relationship is negotiated in a situation of clearly unequal power, yet it "exists" only to the extent that both sides engage in creating it.

Popular literature on occupation stresses that, for the occupied, "foreign occupation constitutes a massive, brutal intrusion into the familiar frame-

works of a society. It imposes authority and demands obedience founded upon neither tradition nor consent. It disrupts the networks and routines of collective life and confronts groups and individuals with choices that, in such circumstances, are very grave."[1] This is how Swiss historian Philippe Burrin eloquently describes the French experience of German occupation, and fairly so. But while people anxiously find themselves under home-ground occupation, the occupier faces the challenge of turning disruption back to order. The occupier does not have to confront choices as life-threatening as those the other side faces. The agents of occupation come better armed and are not subject to the deprivations that the occupied may be made to suffer. Yet they face their own monumental task: to create an administrative system and a plausible ideological structure that function to make the occupation "work" in the face of widespread popular opposition. Aware of the brutality of their intrusion – a brute fact that they need to obscure yet cannot allow to be completely forgotten in the new regime of discipline they seek to impose – the agents of occupation have to find ways to impose authority that appear to rest not on violence, but on the political assets of "tradition" and "consent" their intrusion has banished. If they find this difficult, as they invariably do, it is because they are obliged to carry out their state-building project when, as Burrin notes, "the networks and routines of collective life" no longer function as they did. The choices the occupiers make in this sort of situation are important: they shape the grassroots of the occupation state, and in so doing affect the viability of the overall occupation. Ultimate victory or defeat is likely to be determined elsewhere, but daily life in the short term is always worked out locally.

Pacification

The Japanese army's war of invasion at Shanghai in 1937 massively disrupted the lives of those who lived there. The battle for Shanghai was fought mostly to the north of the city itself and lasted through until the first week of November, when Japan landed flanking forces first to the south along Hangzhou Bay on 5 November, then to the north along the Yangtze estuary. The Chinese line to the east of Nanxiang at the outer perimeter of Shanghai collapsed on 11 November, and the defence turned to a rout. As Japan's Central China Area Army (CCAA) turned its aim from Shanghai to Nanjing, the character of the invasion changed from its original design of short-term assault to long-term occupation. With this development came the new and challenging task of turning devastated battlegrounds into fertile fields for colonial development. Accordingly, in mid-November, the CCAA's political arm, the Special Service Department (SSD, Tokumubu), began dispatching small numbers of military and South Manchurian Railway (SMR) personnel to county towns that had fallen behind the Japanese lines. Their task was to take up what the army called "pacification work" *(senbu kōsaku)*: shifting from

a war footing to civil rule, and devolving the administrative and security work as much as possible to Chinese.

The model for pacification had already been developed by the Japanese army in North China. In following that model for its own pacification program, the SSD called on the services of the SMR's Shanghai office, which it judged to have the best grasp of actual conditions in the Yangtze Delta. The SMR also served to create the appearance of an arm's-length relationship, a posture that was felt to be more conducive to winning Chinese support for restoring local order. Even military officers seconded to the program were officially demobilized so that they might appear not to be working directly in the army's service, or indeed to have any connection whatsoever to the military force that had rained such hardship on the people of the Yangtze Delta. By 10 December, ten pacification teams *(senbuhan)* consisting of up to half a dozen Japanese agents each had been formed in Shanghai and were being readied for dispatch to the field.[2] Two days later, one of these teams set off for Jiading.

Jiading was the first county west of Shanghai, and the first territory the Japanese army occupied on its path along the railway to Nanjing. The county seat of Jiading was not on the railway line, but the towns of Nanxiang, Huangdu, and Anting, all within Jiading county, were the three main railway stations on the first thirty kilometres of track leading out of Shanghai, and they were the first places in Jiading to fall. The county seat was occupied on 12 November after extensive aerial bombardment, which destroyed a third of the buildings within the city walls. (The practice of bombing civilian targets was a military tactic the Japanese had developed in Shanghai in 1932 to demoralize the Chinese.) Jiading, a town of 30,000, was virtually emptied. Casualties remain impossible to determine. They were not as great as they had been in the more famous sacking of the town by Manchu forces in 1645, when possibly 20,000 people were killed, but they were severe enough. According to its report to the SSD, the Jiading Burial Society had disposed of 4,570 civilian and military corpses by the end of February 1938 – and that figure can only represent something well below the actual total.

The Yamada Unit *(butai)* was the military detachment that captured the city. Shortly thereafter it brought into being a Chinese body called the Peace Maintenance Committee (PMC, *zhian weichihui*). The head was a man named Sun Yunsheng.[3] Nothing is known of Sun, other than that he was not a local but hailed from Baoshan county to the east: an outsider at the very least. When the Yamada Unit pulled out of Jiading for service further west, it left behind the Uchino Police Corps *(keisatsutai)* to keep the peace and supervise the PMC. From its office in the ruined city, and under strict Japanese supervision, the PMC set up a commodity-purchasing cooperative to get control of local grain supplies and operated a registration program issuing "good citizen certificates" *(liangmin zheng)* to trustworthy local residents.

But only with the arrival of the pacification team did the process of constructing the grassroots of the occupation state begin in earnest.

The team was headed by Kumagai Yasushi. Kumagai was recruited from civilian life by the SMR in early December to engage in this work. He is our main witness to the early formation of the occupation state in Jiading, in part because he oversaw the compilation of the classified reports that all pacification teams were required to send back to the Pacification Department in Shanghai. But Kumagai also wrote a personal memoir about his experiences as a pacification agent, first in Jiading and later in Bengbu, which was published in 1943.[4] By chance, a copy was procured in China in the late 1940s and deposited in the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. No historian could hope for more in getting both "objective" and "subjective" accounts of the experience of pacification written by the same man. The two texts are as different in tone as could be: the one is a terse work diary typed in *katakana,* the script of official wartime communications, for Kumagai's superiors in Shanghai, covering the months from December 1937 to April 1938; the other is an expansive and emotional reminiscence printed in the more common *hiragana* script for the Japanese public. In the one, he chronicles his team's work according to the guidelines laid down by the SSD; in the other, he strives to evoke the experience of working in the Chinese countryside, as he tells his readers in his preface, so that they might better appreciate the integrity of rural Chinese life and accord the Chinese the respect they deserve if "co-prosperity" is to mean what it says. In one account, he is an agent of the colonial state; in the other, he is a man on a civilizing mission.

The two voices of Kumagai do not contradict each other, but they do often choose to tell different stories, or tell those they share in different ways. In the absence of Chinese documentation on Jiading during the first half-year of occupation, Kumagai's are valuable records of the process of creating the occupation state's grassroots in Jiading, even if they are written from the occupier's point of view. What Kumagai reports to his superiors and his public does not constitute the whole story of the occupation of Jiading, but the two voices communicate that pacification was not an easy task; they also indicate that it went ahead despite the difficulties encountered: an occupation state emerged.

The memoir opens at the moment when Kumagai's pacification team arrives in the town of Jiading to take up their work, and serves to introduce the main characters in the story, that is, the Japanese.

> Having received an order to pacify the people of Jiading, we entered the town on the morning of the 12th day of the 12th month in the 12th year of the Showa era [12 December 1937]. This was in the period just before the fall of Nanjing. It was a terribly cold day, colder than anything in the last

few years. By the time we got down out of the truck that had brought us the ten kilometers from the pacification office in Shanghai to the county seat, our hands and feet were numb with cold.

There were five of us together on this assignment: myself, Furukawa, Kawase, Yukimoto, and Yamanaka. We were in a state of some agitation as we walked through the west gate, but when we looked about us once we were within, we didn't see a living thing. It was a desolate scene: roads torn up, houses collapsed, not a shadow moving. We found five or six military police standing around a fire, and they were surprised by our sudden intrusion.

"Who the hell are you?" they wanted to know.

"We're the pacification team," I replied. A kindly look immediately lit up their faces.

"Is that so? We're glad you made it."

These soldiers had come through a tough battle and had just been assigned that day as the military police for the area. For whatever reason they seemed relieved to see familiar faces. They were all a little older than regular soldiers.

"I'm Kumagai," I told them when they asked my name.

We went off directly to call on the head of the military police unit, then looked for a suitable house in which to set up our base camp for pacification work. The next morning we got right down to the tasks at hand.[5]

The genre is the first-person travel/adventure story. Kumagai takes the persona of the outsider approaching an unknown and potentially dangerous place who finds his footing by making his first contacts with other outsiders like himself. An ominous larger world awaits discovery and eventual salvation at his hands. His mission will be a civilizing one: bringing the chaos that meets his eyes under control, making the unfamiliar familiar.

Standing there in the midst of this desolation, we knew we had jobs to do: get the residents who had fled to return first of all, set up local self-government organs, work diligently with the army to maintain security, help revive the economy, enlighten people through education and propaganda, devote ourselves to medical treatment and public-health measures, and as well provide support for and liaison with the military.[6]

Kumagai "sells" this plan to the reader by declaring that his commitment is to achieve more than what he disdains as "camera pacification." Some pacification agents sent into hostile territory must have succumbed to the temptation to carry out nothing more than a Potemkin-style cleanup – and by succumbing, displayed the bankruptcy of Japanese colonialism. In the battle for Chinese hearts and minds that Kumagai thought he was waging, objective results were necessary, and yet the right subjectivity was essential

if the tasks he was carrying out were going to serve the higher civilizing enterprise on which he was embarked. And in the absence of real achievements, which were few in Jiading, subjectivity was this colonizer's first and last resort.

To establish his position in the story of Jiading's resurrection, Kumagai, the memoirist, highlights the devastation on which he must act in order to become the hero of his own story. The greater the devastation, the greater his heroism. That devastation was almost satisfyingly complete, to judge from the description of the bombed-out town with which he begins the next chapter.

> What a sorrowful scene of desolation it was. As soon as we arrived in Jiading, we walked through the town from the west gate to the east gate, and then from the south gate to the north gate. Houses had collapsed, roof tiles were scattered over the roads, and snapped electrical wires were strewn about, making it hard just to walk. Here and there were holes probably caused by bombs dropped from airplanes. Oddly enough, the towering pagoda standing in the centre of town was the only thing to survive unscathed. Not a soul was to be seen. All we saw occasionally was a doddering elderly person crawl out from one of the collapsed hovels and then go back in again. A third of the houses within the city wall had sadly been destroyed. We found ourselves in a city of death, a mysteriously silent world in which the only sound was the tap of our own footsteps. Where on earth had all the residents fled to? One after the next, every uninhabited house was completely empty: no furniture to sit on and absolutely nothing to eat.
>
> How pitiable, we thought. Reviving the place seemed hopeless. We were supposed to pacify the people, yet there was no way to do our work if they weren't there. Standing in the midst of the ruins, we felt that our glorious dream had been completely shattered. We had absolutely no plan other than starting by gathering and taking away the scattered timbers and tiles and getting the roads back in order.
>
> We spent a week at it. During that time we gradually began to see more and more refugees coming back from wherever it was they had gone.[7]

Kumagai portrays himself as plucky and pragmatic in the face of great odds. Yet the absence of anyone willing to be saved (except for the "doddering elderly," who don't seem to count except as objects of pity) causes him momentary panic, and rightly so. He came to Jiading to project a different Japanese presence than that created by the invading army. His Achilles heel as a pacification agent lies in being complicit in the devastation that he has come to clean up, however much he might try to downplay Japan as the source of the violence by, for instance, suggesting that the holes in the road were only "probably" the result of aerial bombing. The refusal of the Chinese

to come forward and accept his presence as caretaker robs him of his role: with no one willing to be saved, he cannot be the saviour. He can start only with the inanimate world, removing rubble and reopening roads, but with the hope that the people will come to accept their role as the object of his team's activity.

Initial Tasks

The process of bringing the former residents of Jiading into the team's plan began with a registration scheme. The PMC had already started issuing "good citizen certificates" for a fee of five fen each, though with little success. The first task Kumagai's team took up the day after it arrived was to set up a Good Citizen Inspection Post at the PMC office. The early results were modest: roughly 300 people a day showed up to register. But as those who had fled returned in greater numbers towards the end of December, that rate went up to 700 to 800 people a day. People had reason to apply for them, for without one, a peasant could not enter the town and a retailer could not set up a stall in the market outside the west gate. By 29 January 1938, 16,541 people held "good citizen certificates": the population of Jiading who had registered with the new occupation state was thus just over a quarter of its estimated strength under the GMD state (which is the implicit benchmark against which the team assessed everything it did in Jiading). As of the end of March, the registered population was at 32,286.[8] The pacification team judged passing the halfway point to be a major political success. Yet it was a success that rested on the unspoken military hegemony of the Japanese army in urban Jiading: if one wanted to move about in the town or enter or leave it, one could not do so without showing a certificate to the guards posted by the Japanese police corps.

Another early project of the pacification team was propaganda. Within a day or two of the team's arrival, its members went out around the town to remove anti-Japanese flyers and replace them with posters that the Pacification Department back in Shanghai had supplied them with when they left. On 15 December, they put up warnings against pillaging the damaged areas of the town and banning the removal of anything to the countryside. In his memoir, Kumagai professes shock at the extent of pilfering that he found going on, as people carried off materials from their neighbours' houses to repair their own. He took this behaviour as evidence of a serious lack of community feeling and an absence of mutual assistance in Chinese life, which boded ill for the New China that he wanted to build.[9]

Nine days later, the pacification team issued further regulations against theft, gambling, and arson. Most curious of these three from the point of view of establishing local control is the second ban. How could gambling affect the security of the Japanese occupation? Clearly it couldn't in the way in which arson or other forms of sabotage did. This prohibition hints,

rather, at a nation-building intention that stands somewhat apart from the peculiarities of occupation. Just as the GMD regime recognized gambling as a vice that was not wanted in the new modern nation that it sought to create, the occupation regime as it was manifested in Jiading was fashioning its moral order with similar, or even the same, concerns to identify elements of popular practice as anti-modern and subject to legal sanction.

The issuing of orders by the local Jiading administration for the registration of opium dens on 4 April reflected the same intention to create the appearance of modern nation-building, although the control of this popular practice entailed fiscal consequences of particular interest to local administrations that far exceeded anything the taxing of gambling could furnish. Opium smoking and gambling were only two among many faults that Kumagai frequently refers to in his memoir. Tea houses, flower-drum singing, local-dialect operas *(shenqu)*, and inappropriate sexual relations (each of which he represents as complicit with all the others) – these were just the sorts of bad practices that annoyed GMD reformers and that Kumagai took on as part of his nation-building mission.[10]

A third arena of early political practice for the pacification team was the provision of medical services. This aspect of the team's work is not highlighted in the work reports to the SSD, but it is featured in Kumagai's memoir, probably because it constituted his first person-to-person contact with real Chinese. There he remarks on the poor level of the people's health, particularly in the countryside, and praises the team's efforts for bringing "civilized medicine" to these people. Between 13 and 25 December, the team treated 196 patients, most with some success according to Kumagai. Although their medical work amounted to little more than giving rudimentary first aid and standard prescription drugs, it impressed some peasants sufficiently that they thought the team members were doctors. Doctors were a rarity in the Jiading countryside: before the war there were just fifty or so in the county, of whom only two were trained in Western medicine. Kumagai thus used free medical work as any modernizing cadre would – to build credit among people who never saw doctors. He interpreted their gifts of chickens and eggs as signs of gratitude, but at what level does being grateful become a way of placating feared intruders? A field hospital soon took over this work and by early February was handling some fifty patients a day in a clinic outside the west gate.[11]

Finding Collaborators

Of the many tasks that the pacification team took on as its mandate, the most important in terms of laying the grassroots foundation for an occupation state – and the focus of this chapter – was the creation of a cooperative Chinese administration to take the place vacated by the GMD county government. The Special Service Department's pacification program called for

peace maintenance committees to be set up in the immediate wake of occupation, then for these to be reorganized into what it called "self-government committees" (SGC, *zizhi weiyuanhui*). The topic is delayed in the memoir, possibly because it might have seemed less interesting to ordinary readers, but as well perhaps because it was not an area in which the team felt it had achieved what it wanted to. In the one chapter in which he talks about building a Chinese administration, ruefully entitled "The Reality of Politics," Kumagai exposes the depth of his difficulties.

> Among the most important tasks for those of us on the Pacification Team was directing the setting up of local self-government organs. I can say that this was one of the tough assignments. We had to discover who were relatively powerful in the area, then we had to get them together and hastily organize them into a "peace maintenance committee" or a "self-government committee." In many cases we proceeded by starting with a peace maintenance committee, developing that into a self-government committee, and then after many failures and reorganizations establishing the foundation for a county government.
>
> To carry out this work, in fact, we had to get over I don't know how many shoals. Over the course of two months after we started, we were gradually able to get relatively powerful people to come forward and bring about the formation of a committee.[12]

Kumagai thus declares the outcome satisfactory, but only barely. The source of the difficulty the team had in "directing" a Chinese administration into being was its lack of access to "relatively powerful people," that is, the people of influence whom Japan wanted to collaborate. Kumagai's work report observes sparely that as late at April "unreliable elements" among the Chinese were hindering what he called the committee's "development." In his memoir he phrases the problem more elaborately:

> The interpersonal relations were truly complicated, which got us into real difficulties. Some of them were busy plotting in favour of Guomindang interests, some were taking advantage of their positions to pursue private gain, others were gathering private retainers and arrogating police power, and yet others were secretly making contact with the bandits. Initially many people hid their real names and acted under various false names. We were fully aware of all this, but there was nothing we could do to counter it.[13]

Those who came forward to collaborate were engaging in so many evasions that it was hard for the pacification team to keep track of them all, although Kumagai declares full awareness of what was afoot. He does not raise this difficulty as an inevitable aspect of regime-building under occupation but

takes refuge in the concept of "interpersonal relations," which Japanese readers would find culturally familiar. He portrays the Chinese he tried to work with as prey to a sort of undisciplined confusion of allegiances and alliances, attributing this situation to their devious character and petty self-interest rather than factoring in the effect of the Japanese presence on the process of local regime formation. Again, as with the absence of locals willing to be pacified on his team's first arriving in Jiading, Kumagai could not allow the problem of creating a cooperative Chinese administration to appear as arising from his presence. The root of the problem, he reasoned, lay rather in the tumultuous environment that he had come to sort out.

A prior condition shaping the process of setting up an SGC was having to deal with a Peace Maintenance Committee that was already in place when the pacification team arrived. The PMC had been thrown together "hastily" (Kumagai's term) in the first days of the occupation, engaging whoever had come forward at that unstable moment. Its membership was a fait accompli that the late-arriving Kumagai had to work with. Sun Yunsheng, the head of the PMC, would prove tenacious. His alliance, or at least prior relationship, with Police Chief Uchino must have made it harder for Kumagai to bypass his candidacy, if indeed he wanted to, in creating the county SGC. The difficulty of having to deal with a pre-selected group of collaborators was embedded in the larger problem of elite recruitment under the condition of occupation. The people who came forward in the first days of occupation, as he observes in his classified report, were "mostly unreliable and of dubious virtue and capacity"[14] – not, it seems, the people that Kumagai wanted. He needed local elites of a certain quality because, in order to succeed, his project to bring order to Jiading needed their reputation, their visibility, and their authority to command the acquiescence of the local people. Without the collaboration of at least some fraction of the established local elite, he could not hope to build an occupation state that would be anything but a massive sinkhole into which scarce resources seemed simply to disappear.

The matching problem from the other side was that the established elites had, at least initially, little to gain (other than recovering their homes, which the army had requisitioned) and much to lose in choosing to cooperate with the occupier. Collaboration is rarely more than a short-term arrangement (although that is a judgment more easily made in hindsight), one which, should it fail, carries with it long-term costs. Jiading residents probably shared that perception with most Chinese who had come under occupation, but they lived also with the memory of their heroic and futile resistance to the Manchu invasion of 1645, when a consortium of elite and popular leaders held out against a siege that ended in the brutal destruction of the town. Kumagai knew the story and tells it in the book as a way of explaining why anti-Japanese consciousness seemed strong in the county.[15]

Given that this cultural memory was still alive in Jiading, it was especially important that anyone choosing to cooperate with the invader avoid the appearance of collaboration. This structural impediment brought with it a further flaw, which is that the initial reticence of established elites to enter a working relationship with the Japanese created opportunities for those at lower levels of the local political heap. For the boldly opportunistic, the coming of an occupation state throws open the gates of power that normally admit only a few – and all from a narrow circle of locally dominant families. Individuals with marginal claims to public authority can step through during the liminal transition between the old order and the new. And in this case they did step through and onto the PMC.

Kumagai was thus in a double bind. He had to use at least some of those who were already on the PMC lest even that coterie reject the Japanese. Their presence, however, made it even more difficult to draw in those who earlier had abstained from any kind of involvement, and might continue to do so given the committee as it was initially constituted. But these reluctant collaborators were the people Kumagai needed most. Because the Japanese did not have the authority to impose a complete changeover of the local elite, nor any reason to suppose that popular support for a new elite would be forthcoming if they did, constant negotiation and compromise was the only solution. The grassroots leadership of the occupation state could in the end only be made up of those who were available and willing to serve in the highly charged environment of foreign military occupation. The early assassinations of Chen Guiquan, a middleman with whom the pacification team established profitable links, and of Zhang Liangui, a capable young man whom the team recruited on the basis of his experience as a GMD tax collector to set up a tax scheme for them, were powerful factors in dissuading the faint-hearted from coming forward to collaborate.[16]

The Jiading Self-Government Committee

Reorganizing the PMC became the team's main behind-the-scenes task in January, especially after the eighteenth, when army planners in Shanghai called for the gradual replacement of ad hoc local organs with regular administrations. On 21 January the team announced the formation of a nine-member Jiading Self-Government Preparatory Committee.[17] The preparatory committee was charged with overseeing the reconstitution of the existing PMC into an SGC, which was to be the next step in normalizing local state administration. The team's confidential report concedes, however, that the new SGC was simply the PMC by another name.

The pacification team's new goal for the SGC was to broaden the search for members by looking beyond the county. "The formerly really powerful people of Jiading," as the team report refers to the upper elite, had been among the first to flee before the Japanese attack. Some headed west to

Suzhou, but most sought shelter in Shanghai, as they had in 1932 apparently. (The poor mostly found refuge in the neighbouring county of Qingpu.) They were also among the last to return. They began doing so towards the end of January, just as the new committee was being formed. The team hoped to entice some of them onto the SGC, not only to improve the reputation of the committee but also to suppress the covert factional struggles among existing members, which appear to have been stimulated by the prospect of making a quick profit. The team also wished to attract the local wealthy in hopes of drawing on their resources to cover some of the expenses of the committee.

The relationship between the pacification team and the SGC is exposed in the regulations of the Preparatory Committee drawn up at the beginning of February. (By the last week in February, that name was dropped in favour of Self-Government Committee.) The reorganized committee consisted of seven sections *(zu):* General Affairs, Civil Affairs, Transportation, Relief, Finance, Security, and Economy. The first of the three responsibilities assigned to the General Affairs Section is specified as: "Liaison with the army and the pacification team, and mediation work of all sorts with the army." The section was thus tasked at a general level with coordinating the committee with the Japanese military, and at a more specific level with handling the contradictions that might arise between the Japanese army and the local populace. These contradictions were numerous to judge from the frequent entries in the team's work diary for the first half of February, which read: "Resolution of an incident involving conflict between army and people." The team also worked on the other side of the divide by lecturing Japanese soldiers (on 10 January) about not starting up conflicts with local people. Thus, despite its claim to be paving the way for "self-government," the General Affairs Section was not engaged in setting up institutions or procedures designed to enable Jiading people to make decisions about their own affairs.

The three specified tasks of the Civil Affairs Section of the SGC were similarly linked to the occupation. The first was to issue "good citizen certificates," which the earlier Peace Maintenance Committee had already been issuing and which the Japanese army required all Chinese to carry. The second was to lay the foundations for a complete household registration preparatory to imposing a system of mutual surveillance known as *baojia*. The third was to supply corvée labour to the Japanese army. Rates of corvée were high through the winter of 1937-38 as the Japanese army struggled to repair the damage it had done.

The regulations for the other sections have the same drift of tooling the committee to the needs of the occupying power. To cite one last example, the regulation covering the Economic Section, which was tasked with reviving the economy, states that until such time as merchants appointed by the central office for pacification teams (in Shanghai) arrived in Jiading, this

section would buy up materials needed in the current emergency. It specifies in particular raw cotton, which was to be bought from rural producers only by agents appointed by the Self-Government Committee. The Japanese were so concerned with restoring the supply of cotton to their mills in Shanghai that four representatives of the Japanese Cotton-Spinning Association in China were dispatched from Shanghai as early as 28 December to investigate. The destination of this cotton would of course be the Japanese mills in Shanghai, which in February were coming back into operation and by the end of May would reach 80 percent capacity.[18] (The right of wholesale purchase of Jiading cotton was assigned to the Tōyō Cotton Company sometime prior to 17 March, when it appears in the minutes of a committee meeting.) Japanese control of industrial raw materials was thus built into the original design of local collaborationist agencies. They did not however force down prices: brokers in 1938 paid cultivators twelve *yuan* per 100 catties, an increase of 20 percent over the pre-war price.[19]

Did the external design of this body as an institution of self-government correspond in any way to its real capacities? The report of the pacification team suggests not at all. The committee began operating on 3 February. The evening before, the pacification team held a reception in the committee's headquarters with Japanese officers and prominent local people to encourage links among those who would thenceforth be running Jiading. Then, on the afternoon of the new committee's first day of operations, the team called all the members to its office to, as it reported, "give direction regarding the conduct of [committee] business."[20]

In theory the team may have wanted a county administration that did not look like a puppet, yet it treated the SGC as precisely that. The report gives the distinct impression that the pacification team initiated most of the SGC's projects, everything from getting the roads cleaned to enforcing the ban on public meetings by sending police patrols into tea houses. A few specific examples follow from four areas of public management: the publication of regulations, propaganda, transportation, and security.

The pacification team dominated the SGC's public pronouncements. The team's proclamation of 25 December 1937 against removing goods from the city went out over the names of both the PMC and the team. Thereafter, the pacification team would disappear as the posted voice of authority. A 12 January 1938 public notice listing punishments for crimes bore only the SGC's name, but it originated entirely with the team. The team went on to issue many more public notices in the name of the SGC. These included edicts: against cutting down electricity poles, which people were doing to get the wood they needed to rebuild their houses (early February); demanding that weapons be collected (14 February); ordering the removal of Chinese corpses (18 February); cordoning off a rifle range (22 February); and outlining anti-aircraft procedures (21 March).

On 19 February, the SGC began publication of its first official organ, the *Business Daily*. By appearance, this was the work of the Chinese committee, but it was the pacification team that exercised editorial supervision and physically printed the newspaper. News dissemination within occupied central China was eventually regularized with the publication of *xinbao* (new dailies) in every county seat, though not until October was the Jiading administration able to publish the *New Jiading Daily*.

The team was careful to control the movement of goods and people in order to promote flows favourable to the new regime and forestall economic losses and security breaches. On 18 February, for example, the team met with the Transportation Section. As a result of this meeting, the section agreed to operate two boats to ferry people between Jiading and Shanghai. The team's interest here was to make it easier for refugees who had fled to Shanghai to return to Jiading, as well as to absorb Jiading natives thrown out of work when factories there shut down. Such matters were well outside the SGC's own purview. The day before this meeting, the team had issued a notice banning boat travel at night, which is repeated on 18 February without consultation with the Transportation Section.

Security matters similarly remained in Japanese hands, although the pacification team involved SGC members in order to lend them the appearance of being SGC-mandated operations. When a squad of soldiers was sent to Xujiahang to deal with guerrillas on 29 January, for example, one team member and one SGC member, along with an interpreter, went out with the soldiers to oversee operations; the raid resulted in the capture of three guerrillas. Even after the SGC formed a Public Security Section to coordinate local policing, team members continued to accompany section members and Chinese police on their operations. The team also oversaw the process of regularizing police operations in the county. At a joint meeting on 17 March, the SGC and the pacification team together resolved that police forces throughout the county should be unified and that the details of this unification be handled by the pacification team.[21] All these examples expose the SGC as quite literally a front for the Japanese control of Jiading.

Branch Committees

The pacification team was keen to extend its administrative reach to the outlying towns in the county. Before the team's arrival, the Peace Maintenance Committee had already set up branch committees *(fenhui)* in Loutang and Xujiahang. The team sponsored two more in January and another two in February (in Waigang, Sunbangqiao, Fangtai, and Anting). Three of these six affiliates were moved down to sub-branch status in a reorganization on 27 February that called for reinstituting the five-district jurisdictional system of Republican Jiading. One district PMC was still lacking. This was the railway town of Nanxiang, which had been too severely damaged for any

sort of leadership agency to be formed in January or February. Kumagai was finally able to oversee the installation of a branch committee in Nanxiang on 5 March. The resulting structure consisted of a general committee overseeing five district committees in Xujiahang, Loutang, Waigang, Fangtai, and Nanxiang.

Kumagai reflects on the tortuousness of this process of committee proliferation in his memoir.

> Subcommittees were organized in the various districts throughout the county. Because of the security situation along with various internal difficulties, we lost contact with these subcommittees on several occasions. Under certain conditions we had to "supervise" them into becoming healthy self-government organizations. More than a few times we were at a loss to know what to do. I won't write out in detail all the various situations and difficulties that arose, but at that time I didn't let the question of whether I lived up to the title of "supervisor" or not trouble me overly. The "supervision" or "work" I did was in fact simple work and supervision; what concerned me was whether it was of any use. More essential than any theory of political organization or economic work is one's "sincerity." The sincerity of really trying to save the peasantry and rebuild the villages is more important than any political work: that is true politics.[22]

Once again, sincerity is Kumagai's final refuge in the face of the intransigence of local elite politics. These opportunistic elites may not have put "rebuilding the villages" high on their agenda, but neither would they have regarded a passive acceptance of Japanese "supervision" as a main priority. Their first interests were local, and whenever the state – of whatever ethnic composition – appeared to encroach on those interests, they could be expected to create the sorts of difficulties that Kumagai only alluded to.

Once the five branch committees were in place, Kumagai could report back to the Pacification Department in Shanghai that the first stage in its construction of a county-wide administration was completed. The second stage would be to "give substance" to this administrative system. Part of this task involved gaining control of self-government committees that were operating independently of the main committee and the pacification team. The head of the branch committee in Fangtai, for example, reported on 5 March that "bad elements" had formed rogue PMCs in the two other railway towns of Anting and Huangdu for the purpose of exacting levies from the local people, which was causing instability. The following day, Kumagai drove out to Anting with two other team members and several committee members to take control of that branch committee and inspect its financial records.

Guerrilla activity increased in rural Jiading once the main Japanese force had moved west, threatening the process of local regime building. In late April, Chinese soldiers moved in across the western and southern borders of Kunshan and Qingpu counties. A man named Zhao Jitang had set up an unauthorized PMC in Jiwangmiao, three kilometres southwest of Nanxiang, near the Qingpu border. Zhao's committee had the appearance of being part of the new state apparatus and even engaged in weapons collection, but the pacification team suspected that it was passing these weapons on to the guerrillas. The team's lack of control outside the largest half-dozen towns where the authorized branch committees were located left local control in local hands.

As these complications suggest, the road to the smooth functioning of local collaboration agencies was bumpy. The first inkling in the team's work diary that the SGC was not performing according to the team's standards is an entry for 20 February stating that the team had drawn up a list of all employees of the committee, presumably with the purpose of vetting them. Two days later (22 February), the team convened all SGC members plus the heads of the branch committees in Loutang and Xujiahang to discuss what it politely termed "policies to strengthen the organization." A report four days later that SGC employees were mixing with bad elements in the tea houses – presumably selling favours – confirmed Kumagai's sense that the committee was out of control.

In an attempt to upgrade the collaborators' ranks, Kumagai on 23 February called in the two leading members of the committee (Li Pinxian and Sun Yunsheng) to promote his plan to reappoint a former district head who had worked in the county administration under the GMD. Presumably he anticipated opposition from the committee to this appointment, which might be regarded, and justly so, as a sign that the Japanese wanted to edge out the committee members in favour of more reputable administrators. Kumagai appears to have been successful, for four days later (27 February), at a meeting of members of the main committee and some from the branch committees, it was formally resolved that the county would be divided into five districts (as it had been up to 1937). The overall committee would convert the existing branch committees into district committees. The rider on this resolution was that the reorganization would be carried out under the supervision of the pacification team. In other words, the team hoped to gain control over local administration throughout the county, and in the process perhaps remove some local members it considered liabilities.

The sense that the Self-Government Committee was not meeting the team's expectations grows through March. Kumagai met with Sun Yunsheng (now the acting head of the committee, Li Pinxian having fallen ill – at least that is how his sudden absence from the committee as of 27 February is explained)

on 2 March to warn him that one of the original members, Wu Hongsheng, was about to be removed for "illegal activities" considered damaging to the good reputation of the committee, and in addition as a warning to other members. (He was removed formally the following day.) Kumagai also issued Sun with "strict orders" to set up a *baojia* system and a commodity purchasing cooperative, both of which were regarded by the Japanese as critical institutions for occupation.

Finances

If creating the grassroots of an occupation regime seemed difficult, so too did financing it. Under the heading "Current Funds and Budget" in the regulations of the Self-Government Committee drawn up in early February, it simply states: "None. In process." The Finance Section was ordered to devise tax plans but had no current income. The pacification team reported at the time that the committee had only a few thousand yuan on hand and recognized that secure funding was essential if the Self-Government Committee were to continue to function. What was clear was that the Japanese were not going to underwrite its expenses. It would have to come up with local solutions.

In early February, the only sources of income mentioned are the fees for "good citizen certificates" (five *fen*) and for boat passage between Shanghai and Jiading (one yuan). Evidently, other taxes were imposed, but on an ad hoc basis. Weak security outside the town of Jiading meant that no tax mechanism could be imposed there, and the assassination of taxman Zhang Liangui only inhibited the attempt. The main hope for fiscal income was urban business taxes. As people returned in greater numbers, the businesses that had shut down reopened. (The only businesses that were operating in December 1937 were two tofu makers and one watch repair shop.) By mid-March 1938 (when there were 268 businesses in operation), the SGC was collecting (or anticipating collecting) fees on butchers, tea shop owners, and opium retailers.[23] The registration of the last of these on 4 April was designed to regularize that income.

The lack of adequate funding constrained what the Self-Government Committee could do to reconstruct local society. As of mid-March, schools remained closed and the responsibility for reopening them was devolved to the branch committees, without any funds yet available. A local daily newspaper was high on the list of Japanese priorities for county-level occupation, but as of mid-March the *New Jiading Daily* was a long way from being published, again because of lack of funds. (The inaugural issue would not appear until October.) Here again was another double bind. As long as the committee could not afford these normalizing gestures, it could not begin to assert itself as an administrative body that legitimately served the needs

of the local community; on the other hand, its illegitimacy hampered its efforts to solicit fiscal support from the people.

The pacification team was painfully aware that the occupation state could never become stable without long-term funding sources at the local level. While the SGC tried to figure out on which businesses it could impose fees, the team took a different tack and decided to solicit financial support from the absentee local elite. Two team members were dispatched to Shanghai on 16 March to talk to the leaders of the Association of Jiading Fellow-Countrymen in Shanghai, presumably to suggest that they contribute to the costs of re-establishing order in their home county, on the economy of which most must have relied to do business in Shanghai. The targeted businessmen were reluctant even to meet the pacification agents, though eventually they agreed to share a meal in a restaurant in the French concession. The bid was unsuccessful. In his memoir, Kumagai obscured the team's failure to recruit big businessmen by picturing them as unattractively Westernized, particularly the thirty-five-year-old who served as their spokesman.

> What came out of his mouth was not Chinese but a foreign language, surprisingly enough. He had an affluent manner and was dressed in the finest. The impression he made on me was of someone who wasn't Chinese, but had to be American or English. How could this sort of person, who seems to have lost his feeling as a Chinese national, hope to make any contribution to Chinese or East Asian culture? It would be much better if Chinese looked and acted like Chinese.[24]

What Chinese were supposed to look like was "East Asian," not "Western." For Kumagai, "culture" had to trump "nationality." Culture meant a stereotype of uneducated rural Chineseness that had none of the dialogic relationship with foreign influences that was a part of daily life in Shanghai. The exclusive nationalism of anti-Japanese sentiment he regarded as a product of just this sort of aberrant mixing of Asian and non-Asian. He could then dismiss the "unhealthy nationalism" exhibited by the educated in Shanghai as a Shanghai aberration and assert the nostalgia of the imperialist that "the real strength of China lies in the villages after all."

By both accounts that Kumagai has left, the process of creating a local collaborationist administration that lived up to his expectations for rebuilding a New China along healthy Asian lines was not a success. Kumagai tried to force the SGC onto a new and healthier course on 21 March, when he issued Sun Yunsheng with six orders designed to impose a complete reorganization on the SGC by making new appointments, devising new regulations governing the main and branch committees and their members, ordering the organization of *baojia* in the countryside, and promulgating

whatever other regulations were necessary to get control of the situation. The pacification team continued to hold out hope that prominent members of the established elite would join the influx of Jiading natives returning in April, but was unable to report any catches for leadership positions.

This hope was in any case more than outweighed by the effects of guerrilla activity in the countryside.[25] Armed resistance undermined whatever Sun Yunsheng might have done. In April, guerrilla forces disturbed the new order in the areas around Fangtai and Huangdu and occupied the branch committee offices in both Waigang and Loutang. (The latter occupation on 22 April, involved forty soldiers and fifty irregulars, both men and women.) This activity made committee members in Jiading extremely anxious, according to Kumagai. The successes that the SGC could report in April (two schools reopened, thirty policemen in training, and one Japanese-language school in operation) paled against the threat of open raiding and armed insurrection.

In the summer of 1938, the structure of the occupation regime changed. The pacification teams were pulled out of the delta and the grassroots approach abandoned in favour of a top-down "regularization" of local administrations under the newly established Reformed Government (working under the direction of Japanese advisors). The plan was to elevate those localities where the teams had been working back to county status and install centrally appointed magistrates to take over from the self-government committees. A Jiading native named Feng Chengqiu was appointed to the magistracy in May and took office formally on 25 June.[26] I have found no record of what happened to the old PMC/SGC cronies who for a brief time thought they were taking the power of the state in Jiading into their own hands. Magistrate Feng becomes the sole voice of local authority, though it was an authority that commanded little, for as he admits in a work report to the central government in May 1939, he accomplished next to nothing in his first year in office.[27]

The Local Burdens of Occupation

In the course of establishing an occupation regime, the Japanese pressured themselves to complete several tasks quickly. As soon as the stabilization phase began, the first task was to mobilize local elite support to consolidate their control at the county level. The second task was to extract revenue, to cover the costs of local administration, and in the long run, to pay for the costs Japan bore to sustain the larger occupation. When the Japanese directly provided funds to a local administration, they always did so on a one-time-only basis. They had no interest in paying for collaboration – and more to the point, no funds. The occupation was a low-budget operation. Capturing revenue was the chief task of the pacification teams.

Consolidating the first two tasks on a long-term basis dictated the third: sponsoring a political and ideological regime that was plausible to ordinary people and sufficiently compelling to elites that they could be induced to support it. Coordinating this effort was the work of the Japanese army's Special Services Department, which worked at two levels: nationally, in the creation of the Reformed Government, and locally, through the installation of new county regimes. The first step in the latter process was almost invariably a misstep, inasmuch as those who volunteered to collaborate were neither well established in county leadership circles nor of a character calculated to win the enthusiastic endorsement of the established elite.

The peace maintenance committees (PMCs) were a solution to a short-term problem (who can administer areas immediately upon occupation?) that generated a long-term problem (how can collaborators accumulate sufficient authority to elicit a reasonable measure of compliance from the local people?). They worked to assist the Japanese military in the first task, of establishing order; they leapt enthusiastically into the second task, of raising revenue; but they usually proved wholly counterproductive for the third task, of regime legitimation. The continuing instability in the Jiading countryside only made this failure more obvious.[28]

The restructuring of PMCs into SGCs was an important step in a pacification team's strategy to turn a sow's ear into something that looked a little more like a silk purse. But given that the collaborators' personnel had already frequently come forward on their own initiative to identify themselves to the army before the pacification teams arrived on the scene, the teams were often stuck with the very people they needed to eliminate from local leadership if they were to install regimes that were capable of winning support. When the CCAA captured a county seat, they looked immediately (and uncritically) for local people with whom they could work to provide them with their immediate resource needs of security and finances. But the people who came forward to provide these resources were almost never able to provide the symbolic resources that the Japanese needed in the longer term.

For an occupier, symbolic resources are difficult and expensive to acquire. The Japanese needed low-level administrative collaboration and, through coercion and payoffs, found it in most places. But collaborationism – the willing and active pursuit of collaboration on the basis of a commitment and ideology in common with the occupier – is much harder to elicit from an occupied population. It requires symbolic resources more powerful than those that the resistance commands, namely: (1) a prestigious state edifice symbolizing the acquiescence of the national elite to occupation and its rejection of the resisters' claim to legitimacy; (2) an ideology of nationalism, internationalism, or racism more persuasive than the anti-foreign reaction of the resistance; and (3) a perception that the conditions of life

under occupation are in all ways superior to those under the regime that has been replaced. The PMCs were miserably unable to provide these goods.

Kumagai's candid remarks in his memoir attest that the pacification teams faced difficulty in generating these symbolic resources. His evident sympathy for ordinary Chinese was not enough to inspire a sympathetic response. The Japanese simply had no base from which to construct even a regime. The Nationalist regime had been able to recruit certain segments of the local elite to participate in its state-building efforts by making various appeals, from service to the nation to local prestige to self-enrichment. The Japanese regime, by contrast, had almost nothing to offer elites it might recruit, other than money. It was therefore damned to attract precisely the sort of venal, self-serving, and usually marginal elements that pacification teams on the ground knew could neither gain local legitimacy nor win the support that was needed to deliver the security and financial goods the Japanese hoped to extract.

The attempts to dislodge the more objectionable PMC members whom the army had recruited in haste, and replace them with more established figures garnered only indifferent success. When authority remained with only the most venal of local petty elites, the plausibility that the Japanese would be recognized as Kumagai saw himself, as carrying out a civilizing mission to occupied China, vanished.

Even in counties where pacification teams were relatively successful in getting rid of marginal elites (which rarely happened), eight years of occupation had a deleterious effect on the composition of county elites in central China. County elites had already been undergoing transformation during the Republican period, as traditional gentry were edged aside by industrial and commercial elites eager to gain control of the new municipal structures that republicanism introduced. Prasenjit Duara, in his study of North China elites in the 1920s and 1930s, has observed the rise of what he terms "entrepreneurial state brokers" at both county and village levels, men who "began to seek office for immediate gain, often at the expense of the community's interests." In a time of rapid change and an even more rapid growth in resource extraction, competent and responsible political elites commanding legitimacy in their communities were desperately needed to carry out "the expansionary and modernizing goals of a state that sought to rebuild society from the top down."[29] But they were rarely forthcoming, in part because the goals were so large and the costs of failure so huge. The resulting governance arrangement Duara has termed "state involution," in which "the formal structures of the state grow simultaneously with informal structures, such as the entrepreneurial state brokers." This reliance on informal structures came at a price, for "although the formal state depends on the informal structures to carry out many of its functions, it is unable to extend its control over them. As the state grows in the involutionary mode, the

informal groups become an uncontrollable power in local society, replacing a host of traditional arrangements of local governance."[30]

The Nationalist Party had stronger ties to local political elites in central China than in the North and could more readily recruit respected figures to participate in the processes of modernization. But whatever success the Nationalist regime had in recruiting elites to state goals in the 1930s collapsed with the Japanese invasion. Working from an even more top-down relationship to county and village government, the occupation regime had far less hope of recruiting prestigious local leaders. As a result, the occupation regime drove the involutionary process harder than had Nationalist rule, relying even more on informal mechanisms to supplement, and often entirely replace, the formal mechanisms. The PMCs were outright manifestations of this replacement. In this respect, Duara's observations on North China apply equally well to central China: "Although the Japanese regime was able to force through rationalizing measures, the draconian nature of these measures ensured that only entrepreneurial brokers would undertake their implementation. In the end, state involution was the common mode of expansion in all Republican-era regimes."[31]

The Japanese regarded state involution as an unfortunate makeshift arrangement, a provisional stage prior to a process of reconstructing Chinese politics and administration on a pro-Japanese footing. The SGCs were envisioned as a phase in this process of replacing the various involutionary expedients the army had relied on in the first flush of occupation. The next stage would be the full replacement of the SGCs with formally recruited public servants as county magistrates, who could complete the normalization of county politics away from the marginal elites on whom the Japanese first relied. That, at least, was the plan.

But as the army lacked ties to local society, Japanese pacification agents had to rely on those with whom they happened to have contact, not necessarily those with whom they would have liked to have had contact. A significant proportion of collaborators in larger urban centres such as Suzhou and Nanjing had prior ties to Japan as overseas students or through friendship or marriage ties (this did not necessarily make them the best agents for building the occupation state but at least they spoke the same language),[32] but Jiading was too marginal an urban site for there to be a returned student population from which to recruit collaborators. The other difficulty was the natural inhibition of the local elite to work with what most regarded as a temporary regime. They preferred to see whether the invasion would collapse and the Japanese be forced to retreat. Most doubted that the central occupation regime, even after it was formally established at the end of March, would be a long-term arrangement.

The result was the sidelining or demoralization of local elites. Those who worked with the occupation regime were dismissed as collaborators, and

those who refused were blocked from public office and often obliged to flee. After eight years of occupation, neither group was in a position to re-emerge into political life. The pre-1937 elite had been eclipsed, if not dispossessed, and the wartime elite was pushed aside, rhetorically (as traitors or *hanjian*) and often violently as well. The effect was enormous, for it created a powerful political vacuum into which the Communist Party could move with little challenge.[33] The legitimacy and political viability of the old elite may well have been on its way to oblivion as forces of longer term than the Japanese occupation came into play. Yet the dissolution of local structures left the state without reliable linkages to local power. The outcome would be the Communist state: sufficiently powerful to exact conformity to policy all the way down to the bottom of society, but unable to mobilize local initiative to build a new polity from the bottom up that would last for more than one generation.

Notes

1 Philippe Burrin, *France under the Germans: Collaboration and Compromise* (New York: New Press, 1996), 1.

2 "Naka Mantetsu hakken Shina senbuhan kōsaku jōkyō hōkoku" (Situation report on the work of pacification teams in central China despatched by the South Manchurian Railway Company) (hereafter NMS) (11 January 1938), 4-6, reprinted in *Kachū senbu kōsaku shiryō* (Materials on pacification work in central China), ed. Inoue Hisashi (Toyko: Fuji shuppan, 1989), 19-20.

3 Sun Yunsheng is recorded as Shen Yunsheng in Yang Yubai, ed., *Jiading xianzhi* (Gazetteer of Jiading County)(Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1992), 22, 669.

4 Kumagai Yasushi, *Shina kyōchin zatsuwa: Chōkō senbu kiroku* (Observations on village China: Memoirs of pacification along the Yangtze River)(n.p., 1943).

5 Ibid., 3-4.

6 Ibid., 4.

7 Ibid., 7-8.

8 NMS, 5; Kumagai, *Shina kyōchin zatsuwa*, 11.

9 NMS, 31; Kumagai, *Shina kyōchin zatsuwa*, 9.

10 Kumagai, *Shina kyōchin zatsuwa*, 31-32; "Kososhō Katei senbuhan kōsaku shiryō," 48. The importance of opium revenue to local administrations is examined in Timothy Brook, "Opium and collaboration in Central China, 1938-40," in Timothy Brook and Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, eds., *Opium Regimes: Britain, China, and Japan, 1839-1952* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 337-39.

11 Kumagai, *Shina kyōchin zatsuwa*, 19-20.

12 Ibid., 58.

13 Ibid., 58-59.

14 NMS, 9.

15 Ibid., 85-90. The Ming loyalists who chose to resist were "members of a broad network of literati, whose links with the centres of official power were especially strong and whose links with identifiable local communities were especially weak" (Jerry Dennerline, *The Chia-ting Loyalists: Confucian Leadership and Social Change in Seventeenth-Century China* [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981], 12). Dennerline argues that their decision to stage an all-out resistance "owed something to their relative freedom from community constraints" (12). Did the principle this observation implies – that the presence of community constraints encouraging collaboration – apply in the 1930s? Or had the shift from rural power to urban and the withering of local ties into national political networks rendered this formula inapplicable?

16 Kumagai, *Shina kyōchin zatsuwa,* 68-71.

17 The members of the Preparatory Committee were Wu Hongsheng, Li Pinxian (whose name appears in the entry for 21 January as Li Pinyan), Xu Nan, Liu Zhonghe, Yin Yisheng, Sheng Yichang, Sun Yunsheng, Shi Yuwu, and Zhang Zhicheng. It appears that most, if not all, were PMC members. The 18 January document laying out the army's plan to reorganize local administrations is reprinted in Usui Katsumi, ed., *Gendaishi shiryō: Nit-Chū sensō* (Materials on modern history: The Anti-Japanese War) (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 1966), 127.

18 Sugimura Kōzō, ed., *Shanghai yōran* (Overview of Shanghai) (Shanghai: Shanghai Nihon Shōkō Kaiqishō, 1939), 144-45.

19 Mantetsu Shanhai jimusho chōsashitsu (Research bureau of the Shanghai office of the South Manchurian Railway Company), "Naka Shina nōsakubutsu no nōkō jijō" (Cultivation of agricultural products in central China) (Shanghai, 1939): Jiading County

20 NMS, 15.

21 The work diary says 13 March, which places the meeting out of sequence between the previous entry (16 March) and the following (19 March). I suspect this is a clerical error for 17 March.

22 Kumagai, *Shina kyōchin zatsuwa,* 59.

23 Ibid., 11.

24 Ibid., 24.

25 For a summary of guerrilla operations in Jiading, notably Waigang and Loutang, see Yang Yubai, *Jiading xianzhi,* (Gazeteer of Jiading county) (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1992), 739-41. Some of the difficulties of maintaining organized armed resistance in the county are reflected in *Shanghai jiaoxian kangri wuzhuang douzheng shiliao* (Materials on the history of the armed struggle against Japan in the suburban counties of Shanghai) (Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kexue chubanshe, 1986), 38-40, 71-73, 108-12, 128-34.

26 Yang Yubai, *Jiading xianzhi,* 669. When Jiading became a district of Shanghai in June 1939, Feng continud as district head.

27 "Jiading xian zhishi Feng Chengqiu Xianzheng gaikuang baogao" (Report on county administration by Jiading county magistrate Feng Chengqiu), China Number Two Historical Archives, file 2001 (2): 2.

28 *Mantetsu Shanghai jimusho chōsashitsu, Shanghai tokubetsushi Katie ku nōson jittai chōsa hōkokusho* (Research report on the rural situation in the Jiading district of Shanghai special municipality), preface.

29 Prasenjit Duara, *Culture, Power, and the State: Rural North China, 1900-1942* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988), 193.

30 Ibid., 74.

31 Ibid., 253.

32 The Chinese historiography of the war stresses collaborators' personal connections to Japan. The implication is that there is no need to delve more deeply: personal relations are deemed to explain everything. The attribution of guilt by association with the Japanese does not explain, among other things, why some Chinese with ties to Japanese chose to resist, as many did, nor why Chinese without such ties chose to cooperate. Either case can only be explained by invoking as a rider to the Japanese-friends' explanation such structurally random factors as strength of character – which is a standard narrative device in Chinese writing about the war. This way of accounting for collaboration is not good enough. Those who knew Japanese people or spoke the language would become known to the Japanese army when it arrived in a local setting, and were more likely to be pressed to serve as bridges into the Chinese world and then made to bear more loads than just communication. Those who lacked either the connections or the linguistic skills to make such easy contact would have had to find other channels of approach. But might the connection that personal relationships are deemed to signify actually have gone much deeper, possibly to the discomfort of a historiography that eschews ambiguity in favour of good guys and bad guys? Had the men schooled in Japan developed not just a liking for Japan, but a measure of respect

for the course that Japan was taking in Asia? Did they feel that China's path lay along the same course?

33 In the areas under its control during the war, the Communist Party worked with great care to develop a united-front strategy that succeeded in undermining the authority of the old rural elite, as Chen Yung-fa has shown so persuasively in *Making Revolution: The Communist Movement in Eastern and Central China, 1937-1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986). Within this strategy, anti-Japanese ideology played only a subsidiary role in achieving an erosion of elite power. Similarly, the sidelining of old elites in occupied areas occurred less because of attitudes towards Japan than because of the structural circumstance of collusion plus coercion that disrupted established patterns of dominance. Chen has pointed out the weakness of the "vacuum" argument that Chalmers Johnson invokes in *Peasant Nationalism and the Rise of Communist Power* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962) to explain the willingness of the peasantry to support the CCP. He insists that peasants were far too canny about their political allegiances, and far too suspicious of the state in any form, to have accepted the Communists simply because they showed leadership.

荼毒生靈

The people
are plunged
into the depths
of suffering

Documents of the
Diaogu Battlefield
(Tang Dynasty)

3
Atrocities in Nanjing: Searching for Explanations

Yang Daqing

On 13 December 1937, Japanese forces from the Central China Area Army overcame the last pockets of Chinese resistance and stormed into the walled city of Nanjing. Only days later, with headlines such as "All Captives Slain" in the *New York Times* and the *Chicago Daily News,* the world began to learn about the shocking conditions in the fallen Chinese capital. Eyewitness reports by Westerners who remained in the city, smuggled out and published in Shanghai during the next few months, only confirmed the most gruesome of accounts. Although what exactly transpired in and around Nanjing during that fateful winter of 1937-38 has been subject to dispute ever since, most historians today agree: that Japanese army units killed upwards of tens of thousands of Chinese POWs, stragglers, and unarmed civilians in mass executions in the Nanjing area. At the same time there were many random acts of violence committed against Chinese civilians, such as the raping and killing of women of all ages. Much of the city of Nanjing was flattened.[1] To many people today, the Nanjing Massacre ranks with the worst atrocities of the Second World War.

This chapter addresses the fundamental question of how the Nanjing Massacre has been explained. I begin by reviewing common explanations of Japanese behaviour in Nanjing that were offered at the time. I then turn to recent historical scholarship, which on the basis of new evidence, sheds light on older explanations and opens up new areas for investigation. Although historical explanations of the Nanjing atrocities necessarily rely on certain assumptions, I will argue that the dynamics of historical enquiry, despite imperfections and limitations, have significantly advanced our understanding of the causes of this terrible, traumatic event.

Wartime Speculations

Reports of atrocities in the Anti-Japanese War did not begin or end with the events in Nanjing. Almost as soon as Japan and China descended into escalating conflict in July 1937, aerial bombardment, which brought terror to urban centres such as Shanghai, Canton, and Nanjing, was widely covered

in the press in China and abroad. Nor were atrocities committed by Japanese troops only.[2] Although of less frequency and on a smaller scale, Chinese brutalities against Japanese civilians during the war were certainly not unknown.[3] Western reporters such as Tillman Durdin of the *New York Times* did not limit observations to the behaviour of Japanese troops in Nanjing: he also wrote disapprovingly of the chaos created by the defeated Chinese forces. However, as one American observer noted, the "sack of Nanking" was the event that changed the position of the Western media on Japanese atrocities in China. Nanjing made it harder to remain impartial or suppress anger about the issue.

Many wartime accounts of Japanese atrocities did not go beyond descriptions of the brutal acts. Establishing the authenticity of the atrocity was paramount, given the considerable disbelief and scepticism about atrocity stories. Indeed, two American authors noted in 1938 that the atrocity story was the main focus of Chinese wartime propaganda, because "it appeals to compassion, the sympathy by which the individual places himself imaginatively in the place of the sufferer, as distinct from the more attenuated 'rational sympathy' which is not impulsive but reflective and involving the indirection of reason."[4] For others, however, the crimes committed by the Japanese army were so hideous that no rational explanations could be fathomed or were necessary. A professor and author of several publications on Japan's war crimes in China, Hsu Shu-hsi was one of those more concerned with presenting factual accounts of the atrocities, rather than offering analysis. Much of his evidence relied on verbatim accounts from the documents of the Nanking Safety Zone.[5]

There were observers who attempted to explain motives. In fact, according to Haldore Hanson, a US Army officer stationed in China, explaining these atrocities in Nanjing apparently became a "popular pivot for dinner conversations" among Westerners in China.[6] Military attachés, medical doctors, and psychiatrists all had pet theories as to "what roused the Japanese Army to such homicidal frenzy and sexual aberration at Nanking." Hanson, who probably devoted the most extensive discussion to this question, introduced some of the "pet theories." For instance, some noted the presence of several thousand criminals in the Japanese army, but Hanson himself questioned how "this handful of men scattered among 1,000,000 explain such widespread breaches of discipline?" Another American officer speculated that the Japanese units that were disbanded after the Nanjing outrages were largely recruited from the industrial areas of Osaka and Kobe, where industrial workers were presumably rowdier and more difficult to handle than rural troops. British poet W.H. Auden and author Christopher Isherwood, who travelled through China in 1938, offered their own explanation: "The common Japanese soldiers are all right if they are not drunk," but the Japanese in general, when intoxicated, might well run amok.

Among these early Western speculations was the belief that there was a breakdown of discipline in the Japanese Army, one of the most commonly cited explanations of Japanese behaviour in Nanjing. The British-owned *North China Herald* editorialized soon after the first reports came out:

> [It] cannot be believed for one moment that what transpired [in Nanjing] was done with the approval of [the] Japanese high command, for it is readily admitted that it consists of men of high character, faithful servants of a traditional honour, the requirements of which are as high as those of any other proud nation ... The conclusion to be drawn from this horrible story is that the troops for a time got out of hand.[7]

In fact, at about this time, the new Japanese garrison commander in Nanjing offered a similar explanation. While asserting that the Japanese troops were the best disciplined in the world, he told foreign diplomats in Nanjing that lack of food and other supplies caused by the rapid advance, and the exhaustion of the troops, had led to a breakdown in discipline; hence the looting and violence.[8]

In one of the more comprehensive scholarly accounts of Japan's wartime operations in China published in English at the time, T.A. Bisson of the Institute of Pacific Affairs agreed that "when the news of 'Japanese atrocities' finally leaked out, it became apparent that a complete breakdown of discipline had occurred among the Japanese troops. Wholesale looting, terrorism, and violation of women had taken place in all quarters of the city."[9] The most obvious explanation for such a breakdown, officer Haldore Hanson reasoned, was that Japanese troops had been brutalized by the ninety-day battle at Shanghai and had cracked under the strain.[10]

Writing in 1941, British author William H. Chamberlin noted that "the reasons which are most commonly put forward in explanations are the imperfect control of the newly conscripted troops by their reserve officers, and the lack of regular supplies, which stimulated looting." Chamberlin noted that the "Japanese record was also bad in some North China towns, but in Peking and Tsingtao, where no resistance was encountered, their conduct was excellent, and it was fairly good in Hankow and Canton." Finally, Chamberlin reminded his readers that while the behaviour of the Japanese troops in Nanking was "extremely bad," these outrages were "in sharp contrast to the very high standards of discipline which Japanese troops maintain at home and to their generally excellent conduct during the Russo-Japanese War."[11] Many at the time and since have shared this view.

However, even among those who attributed atrocities to the breakdown of discipline, some, such as Bisson, noted that the "excesses at Nanking, which duplicated scenes in Paotingfu and other captured cities and towns

in North China, were clearly connived at by the Japanese officers, some of whom were seen directing the looting of street shops. The rounding up of former Chinese soldiers, who were tied together by ropes and executed in batches of forty or fifty, was also directed by Japanese officers."[12]

Rejecting the "pet theory" about the presence of criminals in the Japanese army, Hanson himself concluded that "sadism is not a contagious perversion which can be contracted during a few months of military life in a foreign country; it must have roots in the homeland." Hanson was convinced that the "principal blame for the outrages" must be placed upon a clique of younger officers in the Japanese Army who encouraged widespread terrorism because they believed that it would break the morale of the Chinese people. Ultimately, Hanson attributed the gradual deterioration of Japanese army morale to the "official" policy of terrorism adopted by the Japanese, a technique known as "totalitarian warfare," a strategy that had been widely discussed in German military journals and used by General Franco in Spain.[13] In this way, Hanson was among the first to suggest a link between the behaviour of Japan's military and that of Fascist regimes in Europe.

From the beginning many Western observers thought that what happened at Nanjing was no accident. In the first major exposé published about Nanjing, Harold Timperley, the Australian-born China correspondent for the *Manchester Guardian* and perhaps the most influential Western journalist to publicize Japanese atrocities in China, suggested that the atrocity was deliberate Japanese policy. Acutely aware that concerns about the propaganda methods used by both sides "have not unnaturally caused many people to regard with scepticism any 'atrocity' stories," Timperley was careful to present observations about atrocities by citizens from neutral countries. Towards the end of his book, Timperley raised the question of how far the outrages committed by the Japanese army in China were simply the result of troops running wild in the heat of victory or how far they may have represented a policy of deliberate terrorism on the part of the Japanese authorities. To him, the facts of these cases pointed to the latter conclusion: "One is forced to conclude either that a considerable section of the Japanese army was out of control or that it was the wish of the Japanese High Command to strike terror into the hearts of the Chinese people in the hope that thereby the latter would be cowed into submission."[14]

Most Chinese – and a few Western – writers, saw Japanese atrocities not as accidental but as an inevitable outcome, and a part of deliberate policies on the part of the Japanese authorities. Professor Hsu Shu-hsi, for one, squarely rejected the claim of "a temporary relapse in Japanese military discipline ... brought about by the heat of the battle."[15] Herrymon Maurer, an American who lived in China during the war, agreed that "the Japanese army had not

gone out of hand. There was no collapse of military discipline. Outrage was perpetrated as often as not under the guidance of officers."[16] The American newspaper, the *Philadelphia Enquirer*, asserted that "although there may be grounds for charging the Nanjing lawlessness to mutinous troops, the fact remains that Japan's whole program of aggression in China has been such as to incite its soldiery to brutal acts."[17]

In search of explanations, a number of writers located a deeper cause of brutality within Japanese culture. For instance, Chamberlin attributed the atrocities to the "lack of inhibitions which the Japanese often experiences when he leaves his native country and sets foot in China."[18] Guo Moruo, the renowned Chinese writer and historian who had studied in Japan, provided perhaps the most elaborate explanation of Japanese behaviour in China along cultural lines that has become highly influential in China. In his preface to the Chinese translation of Timperley's book, published in China simultaneously with its English version in 1938, Guo claimed that "originally, the Japanese nation is not far from the stage of primitiveness." To prove his case he stated that "during our Sui Dynasty, Japan's custom was wearing neither hats nor shoes, and they even ate with their bare hands without plate or bowl. After the importation of our civilization they began to be gradually civilized, but this benefit was only limited to the upper class, and did not permeate the ordinary masses. It was only during the early Meiji years that ordinary citizens began to have family names, the degree of primitiveness can only be imagined." Guo offered an explanation that found Japan characterized simultaneously by primitiveness and modernity:

> [It is] an originally half-civilized nation, having received the benefit of Western civilization by a fluke. But its rulers could not manage it with the power of reason, thus leading to the abuse of the tools of civilization and committing crimes unprecedented in human history. These crimes may be called barbaric, but in reality simple barbarians were not so brutal or cruel. Here is ample demonstration of the human society. Modernized but without the control of reason, abuse of tools of civilizations no doubt will lead to the destruction of human society. Humans are animals capable of suicide; isn't mankind embarking on a course of suicide?[19]

Guo blended what may be termed a culturalist explanation about Japanese behaviour with broad condemnation of the destructiveness of modern technology in general. The former had ample resonance in Chinese and Western discourses on Japan; the latter was reminiscent of many Western writings about the First World War. Not surprisingly, Guo's explanations were echoed in the writings of some prominent Western writers. Edgar Snow, author of the 1937 bestseller *Red Star over China* and one of the most

influential Americans writing on China, was a leading example. In his *Battle for Asia*, published shortly before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Snow devoted several pages to the "sordid story of the Nanking massacres," largely repeating already well known descriptions of Japanese atrocities. Snow then went on to offer a catch-all explanation of Japanese behaviour in China.

Rejecting the crude racially deterministic labelling of the Japanese, then popular in the West, Snow put the blame on what he called the "Education for Homicide" among the Japanese military. The military, according to him, embodied "traditions of headhunting days," although it had mastered the technique of modern medicine and the "science of war." Although Snow made the rare admission that similar traits might provoke equally terrifying behaviour in Western troops, he nonetheless held "Japanese rulers" to be responsible for not being aware of the havoc that this tempest of suppressed emotion could wreak.

Snow went on to make a scathing indictment of the pre-war Japanese society, which he accused of denigrating women and brutalizing its armed forces, but then digressed into a soft racial explanation that he applied to "more or less ... all Japanese society: the hand works on modern machines while the mind lives in an absurd feudal world of tribal gods, superstitions, taboos and fetishes." To Snow, the recipe for Japanese atrocities was not complicated: "Remove the normal heavy restraints, remove the sense of personal responsibility, add the sublime ignorance of the peasant conscripts who read nothing that is not first approved by the army at home, add a credo that glorifies brutality, and you get the Japanese terror in China."[20]

As this cursory survey shows, from the start there were a variety of explanations for the Japanese atrocities in Nanjing among Western and Chinese observers. There seemed to be two kinds of mechanism at work here. The first may be called the "Rashōmon phenomenon": many explanations were based on the notion of predisposition. A variety of hypotheses ranging from psycho-cultural to politico-institutional were offered to help explain the events in Nanjing, but this often said more about those speculating on the events than about the events themselves. The second is the "phenomenon of Blind Men and the Elephant": since nobody had perfect vision, some of the differences in interpretation obviously derived from what was known about events in Nanjing. What was known about the behaviour of Japanese troops in China also had an impact.

As the conflict continued and especially after the outbreak of the Pacific War, explanations of Japanese atrocities in China as purely accidental or as the product of circumstances seemed less and less persuasive. At the very least, other instances of Japanese atrocities convinced many that this explanation alone would not suffice. In this way, Nanjing also became an archetype of Japanese brutality in war, together with the Bataan Death March and other infamous atrocities. Hallett Abend, the *New York Times* correspondent

and one-time confidant of the Japanese commander in central China, General Matsui Iwane, clearly underwent a change of heart: whereas he was more indignant at what he considered to be Chinese propaganda in 1939, just a few years later, Abend would censure his fellow Americans who were still prone to questioning the authenticity of charges against the Japanese.[21]

After Japan's defeat in 1945, the accidental explanation for atrocities would seem even more apologetic for Japan. It was not until the 1960s that the wartime explanation of a breakdown of discipline would make a revival. Explanations based on social and socio-psychological factors gained much more popularity, and Japanese militarism became shorthand for a combination of social and cultural phenomena that explained Japanese aggression and atrocities against the Chinese. Although the impact of wartime conditions was rarely mentioned, Japanese militarism was considered the primary, and often the sole, culprit in most postwar Chinese writings on the Nanjing Massacre, in line with the official positions held by both Nationalist and Communist governments. Such a formulation, emphasizing militaristic and nationalistic indoctrination in Japan, held that the war was brought about by Japanese militarists and that the Japanese masses were also victims. Militarism as explanation was also influential in postwar writings in Japan insofar as they addressed the issue of wartime Japanese atrocities at all.[22]

Although militarism has been used as a standard explanatory concept, some popular historians still indulged themselves in cultural explanations that bordered on the pathological. For example, one Chinese historian pointed out that "as the war went on, Bushido was seen as the ultimate symbol of feudal remnants that contributed to the barbarity in China."[23] Many Western writers also laid stress on Bushido; Lord Russell of Liverpool called his study of Japanese atrocities *Knights of Bushido*.[24] In fact, the notion that Bushido explains Japanese barbarity has always seemed incomprehensible to many Japanese readers, who tend to consider the atrocities a result of the erosion of Bushido ethics. Other Western writers, while not specifically blaming Bushido, still saw something in the atrocities that they considered to be idiosyncratically Japanese. Frank Dorn, a US brigadier general who had fought on the Burma Front, echoed many when he found it "difficult to even begin to understand the insatiable savagery and insane glee that drove the [Japanese] victors on to outdo each other in acts of brutality" in Nanjing. He found answers in the fact that brainwashing of the average Japanese soldier had led to a belief in invincibility and "pseudo-idealistic belief" that was transformed into a "sullen urge for vengeance and violent action." Dorn ended up borrowing from popular war writer John Toland: "Within the Japanese, metaphysical intuition and animalistic, instinctive urges lay side by side ..." [25]

Circumstances, Institutions, and Decisions: Towards a Structure of Explanations

Well before the debate on the Nanjing Massacre began in Japan in the early 1970s, major motifs of explanation were already in place. Much of the debate over the Nanjing Massacre that began in Japan revolved around the extent and scale of the atrocities, sometimes reaching a level of absurdity. In the meantime, explanations for what happened in Nanjing have also been very much contested. Historians are not going to start *tabula rasa*, but instead have to take these divergent views into consideration as they inquire into causes.

In his 1960 classic, *What Is History?* British historian E.H. Carr described "a professional compulsion" of a true historian to reduce a list of causes

> to order, to establish some hierarchy of causes which would fix their relation to one another, perhaps to decide which cause, or which category of causes, should be regarded "in the last resort" or "in the final analysis" as the ultimate cause, the cause of all causes. This is his interpretation of his theme; the historian is known by the cause that he invokes.[26]

Fortunately for historians, much new documentary evidence has become available as a result of the growing interest in the events as well as the high stakes involved. Numerous army battle journals, as well as wartime diaries of officers and soldiers, have been collected and published in Japan. Former participants continue to step forward and speak out. The documentary evidence in particular has enabled historians to take a fresh look at the causes for the atrocities in Nanjing and, together with postwar reminiscences, has suggested that a variety of factors were at work.

At one extreme are the historical explanations focusing on circumstances. Battlefield psychology was an important factor affecting troop behaviour, among both Japanese and others; wars inspire terror in human beings, and particularly in those on the front line. Newly available diaries of Japanese soldiers who fought in China provide ample testimony to support such conclusions. As a wartime Japanese medical report concluded, while Japan's aerial bombing inflicted enormous fear in Chinese civilians, many Japanese soldiers also became terrified during the fighting, especially of the presumed omnipresence of Chinese guerrillas. To overcome their fear, these soldiers were indoctrinated with "patriotic sentiments as well as thirst for revenge."[27] The especially ferocious fighting in the Shanghai area, where the Japanese suffered unexpectedly heavy casualties (although Chinese casualties were even greater) intensified the Japanese troops' resolve to get revenge for lost comrades.

Many Japanese veterans who later related their experiences in Nanjing came to emphasize battlefield psychology as the cause of the partial breakdown

of discipline – still considered the most important cause of some of the atrocities in Nanjing. Regiment commander Sasaki Tōichi was one of the first high-ranking officers involved in the operations at Nanjing in 1937 to write about his experience in China after the war. He described how agitated Japanese soldiers shot many Chinese soldiers who came to surrender, despite efforts by their superiors to restrain them.[28] There was indeed a breakdown of discipline, insofar as the Japanese army's own rules of engagement and discipline vis-à-vis civilians were violated. Although their number was small, the records show that some Japanese soldiers were indeed tried by the military courts.[29]

Almost all Japanese forces involved in the Nanjing Battle had been sent to the Shanghai area in the late summer and early fall of 1937, essentially to rescue troops already committed there. These replacement troops also suffered from poor logistical supply, as they engaged in hot pursuit of retreating Chinese forces towards Nanjing – initially in violation of original guidelines issued from Tokyo. As the problem of supply degenerated with the extension of operations beyond the original area of combat, Japanese troops resorted to widespread requisitioning from local Chinese populations – a practice not uncommon among Chinese troops – hence, the widespread looting en route to and in Nanjing. Moreover, such practices also gave rise to other types of atrocities. As soldiers entered villages and homes looking for food and other supplies, often by force, the encounters triggered many more cases of brutalities against the Chinese civilian population. Those who dared to resist were often shot, while Japanese soldiers raped the women they found in helpless situations.

The pre-occupation situation in Nanjing further aggravated the confrontation. First, until the Japanese attack, it was clear that Nanjing was not only defended, but that many Chinese officers and men were prepared to defend it at all costs. They expressed a willingness to sacrifice not only themselves but also the entire population of Nanjing, an attitude John Rabe noted in a Chinese officer stranded in the city.[30] Such resolve partly explains the intensity of resistance in some areas outside Nanjing. Second, and almost in contradiction to the first factor, the rapid disintegration of the Chinese defence in Nanjing created a situation not anticipated by Japanese commanders. Command errors as well as the breakdown of the chain of command increased the loss of Chinese lives.

Out of desperation, many Chinese officers and soldiers filtered into the International Safety Zone, quite a few still carrying weapons. The chaos that characterized the first few days in areas around the city necessarily blurred the boundary between combat and atrocities. In a few instances, small pockets of Chinese stragglers engaged Japanese troops around Nanjing, and were often annihilated. These instances of resistance, however small, at least gave the Japanese troops the pretext to conduct harsh "mopping-up"

1 This print portrays a much feared aspect of the behaviour of Japanese troops in China – rape and murder. The Japanese Army claimed to be bringing a new order of peace to Asia. The bitter irony of the text on the print ("Are the Japanese soldiers who commit rape and arson really ready for peace in the East?") suggests exactly the opposite. Modern woodblock prints were widely reproduced in the propaganda battle for resistance to Japan. This new art form derived from traditional Chinese printing, with a strong influence from Western artists such as Kathe Kollwitz. This print was made by an anonymous artist from the Communist Eighth Route Army. [Published in *Kangri zhanzheng zhiqi xuanquanhua* (Propaganda art of the Anti-Japanese War period) (Beijing: Zhunghua geming bowuguan, 1990), no. 7]

2 Killing People, Setting Fires. This print reflects another aspect of the Japanese invasion that produced widespread terror – the destruction by fire of towns and villages. Whatever the Japanese motives, the widespread arson caused panic and economic loss in a society in which few people had the protection of insurance. [Published in *Kangri zhanzheng zhiqi xuanquanhua* (Propaganda art of the Anti-Japanese War period) (Beijing: Zhunghua geming bowuguan, 1990), no. 8]

3 Chinese troop train at Xuzhou, April 1938. One of the brilliant photographs taken during the spring and summer of 1938 by Robert Capa, the great Hungarian-American photographer who captured the human tragedy of war. This photograph shows Chinese troops crowded into box cars, going up to the front to resist the invading Japanese armies. The Chinese won a major victory over the Japanese at Taierzhuang, near Xuzhou, in that month. [Courtesy Cornell Capa, Capa Archives, New York (349 PRE CHI 033)]

4 Refugees on a train, April 1938. The fighting which raged round Xuzhou caused the evacuation of large parts of the local population. The peasant women shown in this Robert Capa photograph were setting off on a journey to the west with no idea of where they were going or what would happen to them. [Courtesy Cornell Capa, Capa Archives, New York (345 PRE CHI 029)]

5 Refugees from the Yellow River Flood, near Zhengzhou, June 1938. The Xuzhou Campaign ended in failure. In a last desperate effort to hold up the advancing Japanese, the Chinese Army blew the dikes of the Yellow River, causing a huge flood which spread slowly over the North China Plain, drowning hundreds of thousands of people and making many more refugees. [Robert Capa photograph, courtesy Cornell Capa, Capa Archives, New York (401 PRE CHI 085)]

6 Refugees begging for food, Wuhan, August 1938. The Central China city of Wuhan became the gathering point for floods of refugees, coming up the Yangtze by boat, by train from the north, or overland on foot. Many of them were destitute and dependent on government aid or charity. [Robert Capa photograph, courtesy Cornell Capa, Capa Archives, New York (389 PRE CHI 073)]



7 Refugees crowding onto trains bound for Guilin. In the later stages of the War, after several years of stalemate, the Japanese pushed further into the Chinese hinterland. A new wave of refugees moved south, inundating the southwestern city of Guilin. Cai Dizhi's woodcut captured the mob atmosphere of near panic besetting refugee families trying to escape. [Originally published in *K'ang chan pa nien mu k'o hsüan chi* (Woodcuts of war-time China, 1937-1945) (Shanghai: 1978)]

8 Chongqing after an air raid. By 1940, Chongqing, the war-time capital of China, was the most heavily bombed capital in the world. It was pounded on every day that it was not shrouded in cloud or mist for the first few years of the War. The population took shelter in caves during the raids. This picture shows people streaming out of caves after a raid. [Courtesy Imperial War Museum, London (CHN 284)]

operations in and around the city, which apparently included taking away many suspected civilians from the Safety Zone and executing them en masse. The extremely large number of Chinese POWs, at a time when the Japanese troops' own supplies were already inadequate, made it easier – though by no means justifiable – for Japanese commanders to issue orders to "dispose of Chinese POWs."

There is no doubt that the circumstances were crucial to an understanding of why widespread atrocities happened. At the same time, an obsession with accidental factors can only lead to a dead end. Suzuki Akira, the nonfiction writer who published an essay entitled "The Illusion of the Nanjing Massacre" and helped ignite the first round of the debate in Japan, made the most forceful statement about accidental and circumstantial factors when discussing a mass execution of Chinese POWs in Nanjing. Here is a perfect example of the pitfalls of indulging in counter-factual history:

> If the general assault had been late by one day, if Tang Shengzhi had stayed in the city one more day, if Nanjing were not surrounded by walls, if there were no Yangtze River in the back, if there had been boats on the river, if there had been enough food, if there had been enough water as well, if someone other than Colonel Chō were on the staff, if the number of Japanese troops and Chinese captives had not been so disparate, if ... if only one of such "ifs" had been real, such an incident probably would not have occurred.[31]

Critical historians do not stop with these circumstances. In fact, most of them give greater emphasis to long-term institutional factors. Although many of these have been suggested already by more astute contemporary observers, institutional causes have received renewed attention as a result of the new evidence, though in more specific terms rather than in the all-encompassing Japanese militarism or abstract cultural explanations.

The gradual but serious erosion of Japanese army discipline since the service was established in the Meiji era had been observed by many contemporaries, including many Japanese officers.[32] There is now ample documentation to support that observation. Although the record of the Japanese armed forces in earlier overseas operations was far from impeccable,[33] it is apparent that by the time of the Anti-Japanese War, discipline was decidedly worse. This deterioration of discipline resulted from a number of factors. As Japanese historian Yoshida Yutaka points out, it was partly due to army response to the more liberal social trends during the period known as the Taishō democracy. One result was what many historians call the "inhumane nature of the Japanese army," which included the demand for absolute obedience.[34] This produced the need to transfer aggression elsewhere. Violence against the Chinese became a safety valve for maintaining discipline within the Japanese

army. Army leaders' efforts to tighten discipline by demanding absolute submission through indoctrination as members of the Imperial Army actually failed to stem the deterioration of morale.[35]

Rapid expansion of an armed force in a relatively short period often brought about problems in the quality of recruits. As Japan embarked on continental expansion in the 1930s, its army swelled from 278,000 in 1931 to 593,000 in 1937. Historian Fujiwara Akira, author of many critical works on Japanese aggression, has shown in a recent study that many of the soldiers sent to fight in China in 1937 were reservists *(yōbihei)* called to active duty.[36] The arrival of reinforcements to make up for the heavy losses in Japanese units weakened the cohesion among the units and consequently undermined discipline.[37]

A perhaps more serious aspect of the institutional change in the Japanese military was the rise of radical younger officers. In a phenomenon known in Japan as *gekokujō* (juniors dominating seniors), these lower- and middle-echelon officers often took things into their own hands. Typically they had been educated in military schools from an early age, developing an often-total disregard of civilian dignity. Many of the younger officers had links with ultra-nationalist groups who aimed at a radical restructuring of Japan. The presence of these rebellious officers helped ensure that orders to maintain discipline issued by superiors were largely ignored.

Perhaps one of the most important factors in Nanjing was the Japanese military's treatment of POWs, based on attitudes to their own surrendering soldiers. While maltreatment of captured enemies was sometimes just as bad on the side of Allied forces during the Second World War, the pre-war Japanese military had institutionalized such a practice of maltreatment. By the 1930s, a Japanese soldier captured alive was supposed to have dishonoured the nation. During the Shanghai incident of 1932, a Japanese pilot who committed suicide after being captured and then released by Chinese forces subsequently became a posthumous hero in Japan. In the Meiji era the Japanese military made much of its "civilized treatment" of captured enemy soldiers, especially European adversaries, but maltreatment of enemy prisoners started well before Nanjing and would become a recurrent practice throughout the war years.[38]

These developments also influenced army policy. As a number of Japanese historians have pointed out, the Japanese army tended to treat Chinese POWs differently from Western POWs. A study issued by the Army Infantry School in 1933, for example, suggested treating Chinese captives differently from nationals of other countries: "Barring exceptional circumstances, it is possible to release them on the spot or at another location." However, as if to make sure immediate release were not the only solution, it went on to note that "the Chinese not only have an incomplete household

registry system, but there are many floaters among its troops, so their existence cannot be ascertained. Therefore, it would not become a problem even if they are killed or released elsewhere."[39] Although such instructions did not necessarily require summary execution as a rule – as some historians have alleged – they made it easier for commanders to disregard proper combat rules.[40]

Perhaps more than other institutions in pre-war Japan, the Imperial Japanese military embodied contempt, and at times even hatred, for the Chinese and other Asian peoples. The military defeat of China in 1895 first confirmed Japan's sense of superiority. As historian Yoshida Yutaka points out, the overwhelming majority of soldiers shared this contempt, which served to lessen psychological resistance to massacres and other atrocities against the Chinese population in Nanjing.[41] To be sure, these were probably extreme cases. There is no reason to believe all Japanese officers and men acted in such manners; indeed exceptions can be found. One Japanese diplomat was so distraught at the Japanese army's humiliation of Chinese that he requested a transfer out of China. As he put it, the Army's demand that all Chinese bow to Japanese soldiers "did not hurt the Chinese ... but it was destroying the Japanese people."[42] But in general the sense of superiority was widespread among the Japanese military. Ultimately, the army as an institution cannot be separated completely from society. In fact, Ōnuma Yasuaki, a Japanese scholar of international law who has written extensively on the issue of Japan's war responsibility, has attributed such feelings of ethnic superiority to the *Weltanschauung* prevailing since the Meiji era: to "leave Asia, join Europe."[43]

The Human Factor

The two seemingly opposite poles of circumstances and institutions were mediated by numerous human decisions. Decisions made by Japan's military leaders in Tokyo and in China for military operations in China regarding the battle for Nanjing in particular, as well as the failure to make other key military decisions, all had important impacts on the unfolding events in Nanjing. They deserve closer examination.

A battlefield is an extraordinary place. It requires commanding officers to exercise judgment when reining in soldiers who would otherwise run amok. Few Japanese Military Police were present in Nanjing to maintain army discipline, however, suggesting at the very least a command oversight.[44] Lack of rest for the exhausted troops increased the likelihood of violence against civilians. The objective of "subduing China by striking thoroughly at its capital of Nanjing" exceeded the Expedition's original task of defending Japanese interests in the Shanghai area. The decision to attack Nanjing by pursuing retreating Chinese troops, while perhaps justifiable from a narrow tactical

perspective, produced several serious results. A quick victory in the narrow military sense overrode the concern for possible fallout or political damage.

Likewise, the strategy of encirclement and annihilation in the battle for Nanjing made much military sense, given the geography and layout of the Chinese defence. But it was also part of the deliberate decisions aimed at inflicting maximum damage on China while minimizing losses to Japanese forces. Japan's Tenth Army, one of the two army groups attacking Nanjing, had even proposed bombing the entire city to ashes, using poison gas as well as napalm bombs over a week-long period, to avoid a repeat of the Shanghai Battle, where the casualty count was high. Although this tactic was not adopted, that such proposals for excessive force were made in the first place suggests the ferocity of tactical thinking on the part of the Japanese military commanders in China.[45]

Historian Hata Ikuhiko considers that the Japanese army erred on three major matters. In addition to its failure to issue clear orders to deal with Chinese captives, it also lacked measures to protect the civilian population.[46] Lack of resolute and clear action on the part of senior officers led to confusion, and worse, atrocities. Judging from the available evidence, Japan's policy towards Chinese captives was often ambiguous at best, allowing officers in the field to decide how to dispose of them; and at worst, it set the stage for mass atrocities against POWs, in violation of international law. In Hata's words, there was a permissive atmosphere in the entire army that regarded atrocities as a necessary evil.[47]

Decisions are not to be confused with intentions, however. Human decisions often produce unforeseen results. The Nanjing tragedy is a case in point. The Japanese attack on Nanjing was made without adequate logistical preparation. It not only made the mental and physical conditions of the soldiers worse, but also increased the need to requisition supplies, which in turn led to widespread looting and other crimes. Commanders who issued such reckless orders, ignoring the state of their troops, clearly put the lives of Chinese civilians at risk to pursue a narrow military victory.[48]

Human agency cannot be denied in a structure of causation, even though human decisions do not always lead to the intended results. For understandable reasons, most Chinese and Western wartime accounts of the Nanjing Atrocity failed to name names. Those who were mentioned, such as Colonel Hashimoto Shingorō, known for his ultra-nationalist views, turned out not to be directly involved in this particular incident. Although observers surmised at command decisions, few at the time were able to find enough supporting evidence to name the parties responsible for the events.

Newly available evidence sheds much light on some individuals and their decisions (or inaction) in Nanjing. The chain of command and existing rules must ultimately be taken into consideration when passing a legal verdict, which is beyond the scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, we can

confront questions of central importance: Did officers order the perpetration of atrocities? Did they at least know of, and if so, could they have prevented these atrocities? Can they be accused of inaction? On the basis of new evidence and recent scholarship, I shall discuss individual responsibility of ranking Japanese officers in one particular incident.

On 14 December, the Yamada Brigade of the Thirteenth Division of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army captured a large number of Chinese soldiers near the Yangtze River outside the walled city. When Major General Yamada Senji arrived at the Mufushan Battery on the morning of 14 December, he found large crowds of surrendered Chinese soldiers, 14,777 by one account, even though his own forces then consisted of one infantry regiment and two battalions totalling a few thousand men. On 15 December, he sent a captain into Nanjing city to discuss the issue of Chinese POWs and was told to "kill them all." The following day, Yamada sent a lieutenant colonel to the headquarters of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army to confirm the decision. On 17 and 18 December, his troops carried out the executions by the Yangtze River, which took so much time that their own scheduled departure was delayed.[49] According to his own recollection after the war, Yamada had repeatedly sought to reverse the onerous order of executing the Chinese POWs held by his unit but to no avail. In his postwar notes, Yamada claimed he was simply acting on orders against his own will.[50]

A number of Japanese books, informed by postwar testimonies of Japanese veterans including those of Yamada, have claimed the killings resulted from unexpected accidents.[51] In his interview with Suzuki Akira, Yamada claimed that he had in fact decided to set the POWs free, but a riot took place and the frightened Japanese soldiers opened fire, killing most of the Chinese as well as several of their own men including a Japanese officer. This incident, wrote Suzuki, shows that it was not a "one-sided massacre of the [Chinese] captives."[52] As to the order to execute all Chinese POWs, many writers attributed it to one renegade officer in the Shanghai Expeditionary Army, Lieutenant Chō Isamu.[53] The rebellious staff officer in the headquarters of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army allegedly issued the orders on his own, as he boasted to another Japanese officer sometime later during the war. Chō died in the battle of Okinawa and left no written record.

But a careful reading of newly published wartime records suggests a different scenario. First, Brigade Commander Yamada Senji was not as innocent as he claimed to be. As he noted in his wartime diary on 14 December, nearby villages and residences had all been burnt down by the Chinese before their retreat. This gave him cause to worry: "There are so many [Chinese captives] that it is difficult either to kill them or let them live."[54] The fact that Yamada was already considering the difficulty of killing the POWs even before the order came from his superiors suggests execution of captured Chinese soldiers was not entirely inconceivable to him.

Second, the execution of Chinese prisoners was known to other senior Japanese officers. Major General Iinuma Mamoru, Chief of Staff of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army immediately beneath Lieutenant General Prince Asaka, noted in his diary on 21 December that the Yamada Brigade had captured more than 10,000 Chinese prisoners. He went on to record the "rumor that as they were executing the prisoners one by one with bayonet and because they took many prisoners to the same location at the same time for several days, the prisoners rioted and machine guns were fired. They were shot with several of our own men, and many prisoners escaped."[55] Vice Chief of Staff Uemura Toshimichi recorded in his diary on the same day that "according to Colonel N, the Yamada Brigade made a big mistake in disposing of their prisoners who rioted. Machine guns were fired at both our men and the enemy, and some seemed to have escaped. It is a real pity that they did such a lousy job."[56] The diary entries of these two senior officers are revealing. Even if Chō's story contained some truth, the fact that both Iinuma and Uemura, Chō's direct superiors, were not the least troubled by the execution of large number of prisoners itself, but instead were only disturbed by the "mishandling" of the executions at the hands of the Yamada Brigade, suggests the strong possibility that they at least acquiesced to Chō's request. Their responsibility can in no way be lifted.[57]

Third, it is unlikely that the order to execute Chinese prisoners in Nanjing came from Chō alone. Existing records show that units belonging to the Tenth Army, unrelated to Chō and the Yamada Brigade but under the separate command of General Yanagawa Heisuke, also carried out executions under orders. One such unit, the Sixty-sixth Battalion, recorded in its battle diary that "all captives were to be killed according to the order from the Regiment."[58]

There is no solid evidence to suggest that Prince Asaka, who commanded the Shanghai Expeditionary Army, actually issued the order, as David Bergamini and others alleged.[59] But whether or not Prince Asaka knew is a legitimate question to ask, even though it cannot be answered with certainty. Asaka arrived in the area only a week before the events, and was there for largely symbolic purposes. Because of his status as a member of the Imperial Family, he was not tried but interrogated only once by SCAP before the Tokyo trial. He admitted that he had given orders to use Chinese prisoners as labourers, but denied that there had been systematic atrocities or orders for such. Unlawful acts such as rape, according to Asaka, had all been investigated and "all men under me who did such acts were court-martialled."[60] Today, because little is published about him in Japan, there is still much room for speculation, as the writings of Bergamini, Iris Chang, and many Chinese historians can attest.

Although nobody has found the single smoking gun in the form of a written order, it is almost certain that Japanese commanders at the division level and above accepted mass execution as a method to dispose of the large

numbers of surrendered Chinese soldiers. At the same time, however, it seems that other measures were also contemplated by some Japanese officials. For instance, there was talk of such last-minute alternatives as sending all Chinese prisoners to Shanghai as labourers or even releasing them to an island in the middle of the Yangtze River. Apparently, none of these plans was carried out.[61] One staff officer belonging to the Shanghai Expeditionary Army was dispatched to Shanghai to arrange the transfer of prisoners. When he came back empty-handed, without an agreement, the prisoners had already been executed in Nanjing.[62] Here, lack of adequate policy regarding POWs may be said to be a major fateful factor.

Even if his words can be believed, Yamada's case leads to the question of what Maruyama Masao wryly called the "system of irresponsibility," where "the locus of responsibility remained as nebulous as ever."[63] Was it possible to disobey? If someone in Yamada's position was simply following orders, such orders could ultimately be traced all the way upwards but would disappear before reaching the Emperor. The question is somewhat different for ordinary soldiers. Ōnuma's discussion of the question whether individuals should have practised the "disobedience of the extraordinary" is relevant here. He argues that "it is inappropriate to demand all soldiers to be heroes who disobey their superior's unlawful orders," since absolute obedience in the battlefield is required in all military forces. In the Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors in Imperial Japan, every man was told to "obey the orders of your superiors as if they were Our orders."[64] In this sense, individual responsibility disappears in a society that does not allow disobedience to unlawful state orders.[65]

A Japanese Atrocity?

So far, this chapter has been concerned with explanations of Japanese troop behavior in Nanjing. By analyzing Japanese institutions and personalities I have tried to shed light on why a mass atrocity happened in Nanjing in the winter of 1937. My purpose, however, has not been to suggest that the Chinese played no role in the outcome. What about the responsibilities of the Chinese, portrayed in many wartime writings as "those noble men and women at Nanking?" Should the Chinese have declared Nanjing defenceless? Or surrendered as demanded by the Japanese commanders?[66] Or withdrawn as suggested by some foreign intermediaries? The answers to these hypothetical questions can only be speculative, but the following seems certain: defending Nanjing was not just a tactical decision, but was tied to China's national policy of resistance.

The responsibility of individual Chinese commanders for failing to fulfil their duty was serious. Utter chaos characterized conditions among the Chinese defenders as the city fell. A last-minute decision to abandon the city did not reach all units in time. The worst confusion took place near the

Yijiang Gate, when the Thirty-sixth Division, an elite unit ordered to maintain order in the city, opened fire upon retreating Chinese units attempting to get out of the closed city. Many Chinese soldiers died as a result. At the riverbank, the struggle to get on the few available boats caused chaos. At the Taiping Gate in the northeast, the crush of Chinese troops trying to pass through the narrow city gate led to many casualties. The tactical errors of Chinese commanders, from General Tang Shengzhi on down, contributed to the death toll.

I have suggested earlier that sometimes decisions produce unintended consequences, a statement that also applies to some of the Chinese actions. To fight a stronger invading force, the Chinese practised scorched-earth tactics throughout the war. Though designed to deprive the Japanese troops of shelter and supplies and thus to weaken the enemy's fighting strength, such practices around Nanjing had the unforeseen and unfortunate consequence of increasing the number of Chinese taking shelter inside the city. It was also clear that many of the buildings destroyed were wrecked by retreating Chinese themselves.

Thus there is little doubt that the Chinese played a role in the events in Nanjing. This does not diminish the fact that first and foremost the massacre was a Japanese atrocity. Given the pattern of destruction and atrocities by the advancing Japanese forces after their landing near Shanghai, even if the Chinese troops had left Nanjing undefended, the capture of large numbers of soldiers would have been avoided, but other atrocities such as rape and looting and civilian casualties would not have been avoided. A deeper probing of wartime atrocities like those at Nanjing inevitably raises the question of their uniqueness. Comparison of Japanese troop behaviour in Nanjing with their behaviour elsewhere is legitimate, as is comparison of Japanese troops with other forces, including Chinese. Comparison is not to exonerate perpetrators in any specific cases, but to present insight on the human condition in general.[67]

Sixty years after the atrocities in Nanjing, are we any closer to understanding why they took place? A historian's answer must be yes. Recent works by historians on the basis of fresh evidence have greatly furthered our understanding of why the Nanjing atrocities took place. Even though evidence is still sketchy and judgments may vary, we are now much more familiar with the roles of certain individual actors. Given the obviously subjective nature of historical inquiry, can we ever have a definitive explanation for why it happened? Can historians even come close to a consensus over the causes of the atrocities in Nanjing? The answer to this question is likely to be negative in the foreseeable future. One need not despair, however. History is a constant dialogue with the past, as E.H. Carr pointed out a long time ago. For historians, the process is built on the analysis of evidence, including wartime observations. Furthermore, as historian Martin

Jay reminds us, history in this sense is not so much a single historian interpreting past events, "but rather the institution of historians, now more often credentialed than not, trying to convince each other about the plausibility of their reconstruction."[68]

An examination of the changing explanations of the Nanjing Massacre is a sobering exercise. There are many pitfalls in analyzing such a historical event, but there are also important issues at stake, epistemological as well as moral ones. To understand what happened at Nanjing and its importance to history, historians need to move the discussion beyond issues of victimhood and explore possible motives behind the actions of the Japanese and Chinese actors. Utimately, an event like the Nanjing Atrocity must be understood in the context of warfare in general. An important historiographical development in the past two decades is a growing scholarly convergence, though still limited, on the need to incorporate both institutional and situational explanations. Considerable challenges remain ahead to integrate both largely impersonal forces of circumstance and roles of individuals within the larger institutional causal structure. In the end, a totally rational explanation of what happened at Nanjing may be impossible, but to explore the grey area between the causal and the irrational in history seems to be the only way to make sense of an event like the Nanjing Massacre.[69]

Notes

1 For a discussion of recent scholarship, see Yang Daqing, "Convergence or divergence: Recent historical writings on the Rape of Nanjing," *American Historical Review* 104, 3 (June 1999): 842-65. For a brief history of the debate in Japan and China before the end of the 1980s, see Daqing Yang, "The malleable and the contested: The Nanjing Massacre in postwar China and Japan," in *Perilous Memories,* ed. Tak Fujitani, Geoffrey White, and Lisa Yoneyama (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, forthcoming).

2 For a wartime study of both Chinese and Japanese use of atrocities in propaganda, see Bruno Lasker and Agnes Roman, *Propaganda from China and Japan: A Case Study in Propaganda Analysis* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1938).

3 Just months before the event in Nanjing, a Chinese unit in the service of Japan's puppet regime in North China staged a mutiny. Apart from annihilating a small Japanese garrison in Tongzhou, they killed 200 Japanese civilians (including 100 Koreans), including children and women, in a brutal manner. For an official Japanese report, see Gaimushō, *Gaimushō Shōwa 12-nendo shitsumu hōkokushō* (Activity reports of the Foreign Ministry, 1937), vol. 2 (Tokyo: Kuresu, 1995), 582-608.

4 Lasker and Roman, *Propaganda,* 74-75.

5 Hsu Shu-hsi, *The War Conduct of the Japanese* (Shanghai, 1938), prepared under the Auspices of the Council of International Affairs, Hankou.

6 Haldore Hanson, *"Humane Endeavour": The Story of the China War* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1943), 139-46.

7 "Nanking Horror," *North China Herald,* 29 December 1937. The same writer also believed, however, that the commanding officers were responsible.

8 Allison to Cordell Hull, 6 February 1938, *Foreign Relations of the United States,* 1938, vol. 3, 73.

9 T.A. Bisson, *Japan in China* (New York: Macmillan, 1938), 287-88.

10 Hanson, *"Humane Endeavour,"* 139-46.
11 William Henry Chamberlin, *Japan over Asia* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1941), 368.
12 Bisson, *Japan in China,* 288.
13 Hanson, *"Humane Endeavour."*
14 Harold Timperley, *Japanese Terror in China* (New York: Modern Age Books, 1938); *What War Means* (London: Gollancz, 1938), 136. Still, as he stated clearly, his aim was for the war to "be recognized for the detestable business it really is and thus be stripped of the false glamour with which militarist megalomaniacs seek to invest in it." This may explain the fact that the book was published under two different titles: in the US, as *Japanese Terror in China,* and *What War Means* in Britain. These two titles well captured the two aspects of the atrocities in Nanjing: both specifically Japanese and yet emblematic of war in general.
15 Hsu Shu-hsi, *The War Conduct of the Japanese,* 98.
16 Herrymon Maurer, *The End is Not Yet* (New York: National Travel Club, 1941), 25.
17 Quoted in Cordell Hull to Joseph Grew, 3 February 1938, *FRUS* vol. 3, 66.
18 Chamberlin, *Japan over Asia,* 368.
19 Guo Moruo, *Wairen mudu zhong de Rijun baoxing* (Japanese atrocities as witnessed by foreigners), trans. Harold Timperley (Hankou: Guomin chubanshe, 1938).
20 Edgar Snow, *Battle for Asia* (New York: Random House, 1941), 69. For a different reading of Snow, see S. Bernard Thomas, *Season of High Adventure: Edgar Snow in China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).
21 Hallett Abend, *My Life in China* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1943). Compare this with his book, *Chaos in Asia* (New York: Washburn), 1939.
22 A leading example is Ienaga Saburō, *The Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon, 1975). Ienaga did not dismiss battlefield psychology altogether, however.
23 See for example, Fu Zen, "Nanjing datusha yu Riben junguozhuyi" (The Nanjing Massacre and Japanese militarism), *Jindaishi yanjiu* 16 (February 1983).
24 Lord Russell of Liverpool, *Knights of Bushido: The Shocking History of Japanese War Atrocities* (New York: Dutton, 1958).
25 Frank Dorn, *The Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1941* (New York: Macmillan, 1974), 93. In this sense, Iris Chang's popular book displayed similar tendencies of concentrating on the Japanese mentality. Iris Chang, *The Rape of Nanjing: The Forgotten Massacre* (New York: Basic Books, 1997).
26 E.H. Carr, *What Is History?* (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), 117.
27 Kimura Jun, "'Nankin daigyakusatsu' no seishin bunseki" ("A psychiatric analysis of the "Nanjing Massacre") *Shokun!* 17,8 (1985): 89. This secret report, dated April 1938 and written by a professor at the Kanazawa University of Medicine, who served in the army as an reserve officer in the Shanghai area, was discovered by accident in a used bookstore in Japan in the mid-1980s. The full text is reprinted in *Gun'ikan no senjo hōhokushū* (Battlefield reports of an army doctor), comp. Takahashi Ryūji (Tokyo: Fuji shuppan, 1992).
28 Sasaki Tōichi, *Aru gunjin no jiden* (Autobiography of a soldier) (Tokyo: Keisō shobō, 1967).
29 Usui Katsumi, ed. *Gendaishi shiryō: Nit-Chū sensō* (Materials on modern history: The Sino-Japanese War) (Tokyo: Misuzu shobō, 1966).
30 John Rabe, *The Good Man of Nanking: The Dairy of John Rabe,* ed. Erwin Wickert, trans. John E. Woods (New York: Knopf, 1998).
31 Suzuki Akira, *Nankin daigyakusatsu no maboroshi* (The illusion of the Nanjing Massacre) (Tokyo: Bungei shunju sha, 1973), 202.
32 Hora Tomio, "Nanking jiken" (The Nanjing Incident), in *Kindai senshi no nazo* (Riddles in modern war history) (Tokyo: Jimbutsu ōraisha, 1972), 160-61.
33 Japanese troops massacred Chinese captives in Lushun during the First Sino-Japanese War, 1894-95; during the Siberian Expedition Japanese forces also committed atrocities. Their discipline was considered better than those of other Powers during the joint intervention against the Boxer Rebellion in 1900.
34 Yoshida Yutaka, *Tennō no guntai to Nankin jiken* (The Emperor's army and the Nanjing Incident) (Tokyo: Aoki shoten, 1986), 204.

35 Ibid., 198.
36 Fujiwara Akira, *Nankin no Nihongun* (Japanese troops in Nanjing) (Tokyo: Ōtsuki shoten, 1997). However, as Hora pointed out ("Nanking jiken"), atrocities were also committed by young officers and voluntary cadets.
37 Hata Ikuhiko, *Nankin jiken* (The Nanjing Incident) (Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 1986) 65-66.
38 The Thirteenth Division, for instance, issued its own directive concerning captives if there were large numbers. Hata suggests that this implied that if the captives were in small numbers, they could be disposed of accordingly after necessary interrogations. The 116th Regiment of the Thirteenth Division even recorded the execution of POWs in its battle journal, indicating how prevalent such an attitude must have been in the entire army. Hata, *Nankin jiken,* 68-69.
39 *Tai-Shinagun sentō hō no kenkyū* (1933), cited in Fujiwara, *Nankin no Nihongun,* 33-34.
40 Honda Katsuichi, *The Nanjing Massacre: A Japanese Journalist Confronts Japan's National Shame,* ed. Frank Gibney, trans. Karen Sandness (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999).
41 Yoshida, *Tennō no guntai,* 189.
42 Quoted in Alvin D. Coox, *The Year of the Tiger* (Tokyo: Orient/West, 1964), 74-75.
43 Ōnuma Yasuaki, *Sensō senkinin kara sengo sekinin no shisō e* (From war responsibility to postwar responsibility) (Tokyo: Yūshindo, 1985). Consequently, he considered it a "postwar responsibility" of the Japanese to fight against the resilient influence of such an ideology in present-day Japan.
44 *Nihon kenpei seishi* (Tokyo: Kenbun shōin, 1976), cited in Yoshida, *Tennō no guntai,* 165.
45 Hata, *Nankin jiken,* 88-89.
46 Ibid., 103-7.
47 Ibid., 119.
48 Kasahara Tokushi, *Nankin jiken* (The Nanjing Incident) (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1997), 71-72.
49 Yamada Senji Diary, *Nankin senshi shiryō shū* (Collected documents on the history of the Nanjing Battle), vol. 2 (Tokyo: Kaikōsha, 1989), 331-32. He did not say to whom the first enquiry was sent.
50 Yamada Senji Notes as quoted in Suzuki, *Nankin daigyakusatsu,* 196-97.
51 For such views, see *Shina jihen rikugun sakusen I, Fukushima Sensō to ningen;* Suzuki, *Nankin daigyakusatsu;* and Abe Teruo, *Nankin no hisame* (Icy Rains in Nanjing) (Tokyo: Kyōiku, 1989). The official "battle history" by Kaikōsha also endorsed the view that it was an accident.
52 Suzuki, *Nankin daigyakusatsu,* 207.
53 Such accounts include that of Suzuki Akira. As Hata Ikuhiko has pointed out, the Chief of Staff and Commander in General should have known about the decision. See his brief biography of Chō in *Shōwa shi no gunjun tachi* (Tokyo: Bungei shunju sha, 1982), 119.
54 Yamada Senji Diary, *Nankin senshi shiryō shū,* vol. 2, 331-32.
55 Iinuma Mamoru Diary, *Nankin senshi shiryō shū,* vol. 1, 164.
56 Uemura Toshimichi Diary, *Nankin senshi shiryō shū,* vol. 1, 277.
57 Writing in 1967, before these diaries became available, Hora speculated that "divisional or regimental commanders who lost right judgment under an extraordinary atmosphere issued orders on their own to execute captives, which were acquiesced by Army headquarters." Hora, *Kindai senshi no nazo,* 146.
58 Yoshida, *Tennō no guntai, 163*-185; Hata, *Nankin jiken,* 149-60. The battle records of the Sixtieth Regiment are in *Nankin senshi shiryō shū,* vol. 1, 567.
59 See Dick Wilson, *When Tigers Fight: The Story of the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1945* (New York: Hutchinson, 1982), 71.
60 Martin Bagish and Hilary Conroy, "Japanese aggression against China: The question of responsibility," in *Japan and China: Search for Balance since World War I,* ed. Alvin D. Coox and Hilary Conroy (Santa Barbara: Clio Books, 1978), 329-30. Records of the Legal Department of the Shanghai Army under Asaka's command have not been found.
61 A few Japanese authors have insisted that the execution on the riverbank was an "accident" during the release of Chinese prisoners. As indicated by the diaries of Iinuma, Uemura, and Nakajima, it did not seem to be the case.

62 See Iinuma Diary, *Nankin senshi shiryōshū*, vol. 1, 164. John Rabe also recorded in his diary that one Japanese diplomat spoke of the plan to release Chinese prisoners to an island in the Yangtze River. *The Good Man of Nanking*, ed. Erwin Wickert, trans. John E. Woods (New York: Knopf, 1998), 76.
63 Maruyama Masao, "Thought and Behavior Patterns of Japan's Wartime Leaders," in *Thought and Behavior of Japanese Politics*, ed. Ivan Morris (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 84-134. As an example, Maruyama gave General Matsui's answers to questions at the Tokyo Trial, namely, that the charges against him referred to matters beyond his formal competence as the commander.
64 Refusal to continue fighting or killing enemy civilians, though extremely rare, was mentioned in Ienaga, *The Pacific* War, 190.
65 Ōnuma, *Sensō senkinin kara*, 175-78.
66 Hata Ikuhiko has commented that had Tang Shengzhi surrendered his troops to the Japanese in an orderly fashion, as General Stessel did at Lushun during the Russo-Japanese War or General Percival did in Singapore during the Pacific War, the Nanjing Incident would not have taken place, or perhaps on a much smaller scale even if it happened. "Nankin daigyakusatsu 'Rabe kōka' o sokutei suru" (Measuring the "Rabe effect" on the Nanjing Massacre) *Shokun*! (February 1998): 86-87. Hata should have known better, that the Chinese defence of their own capital against an invading army was fundamentally different from Russian or British troops holding on to essentially colonial outposts. Compare to his early suggestion in *Nankin jiken*, 223.
67 The uniqueness of the Holocaust has been subject to heated debate. See Alan Rosenbaum ed., *Was the Holocaust Unique? Perspectives on Comparative Genocide* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996).
68 Martin Jay, "Of plots, witnesses, and judgments," in *Probing the Limits of Representations*, ed. Saul Friedlander (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 105.
69 Joyce Appleby et al., *Telling the Truth about History* (New York: Norton, 1995), 302-6.

家破人亡

The family
is destroyed and
the people are lost
and gone

History of the Jin Dynasty

4
A Ravaged Place: The Devastation of the Xuzhou Region, 1938

Diana Lary

The Yanwo Massacre

Early in the morning of 20 May 1938, Japanese troops charged into Yanwo, a picturesque village on the slope of a hill about thirty miles southwest of Xuzhou. Yanwo was overflowing with people; besides the inhabitants, there were hundreds of refugees from Xuzhou in the village. Within an hour the Japanese had killed more than 200 people on the village streets. Then they herded 670 young men, both locals and refugees, into the courtyard of a house just outside the village. The buildings around the courtyard were set on fire from outside; men who tried to escape the flames were gunned down by soldiers surrounding the house. All but 5 of the 670 were killed.[1]

The Yanwo Massacre is scarcely commemorated. There is a memorial in Yanwo to the victims, but beyond the village it seems unknown. The description of it in the newly published district gazetteer *(Tongshan xianzhi)* takes up only four lines.[2] The accounts in the same volume of a series of massacres in a dozen villages in Hanwangxiang (southwest of Xuzhou), in which more than 2,000 people were killed at the end of May and the beginning of June, are even briefer.[3] Several other massacres in the Xuzhou region described in foreign sources do not appear at all in Chinese records.

These unknown atrocities lurk behind the facade of official Chinese history and consciousness. They are unmentioned but not gone. They are not gone because memories of them *do* exist; there are still survivors living, and the horror they experienced has been passed down to the generations born since the war. The atrocities are part of the history of a region that has paid a heavy price in casualties for the violence of warfare. Formal, official recovery of these memories is a matter of political will or expediency – neither of which has been prominent in China for most of the period since the war.

The Xuzhou Region

Xuzhou, which is often known by its ancient, name, Tongshan, lies close to the southern course of the Yellow River, on the Grand Canal; throughout

Chinese history it has been a military strongpoint. The region's people have known the horrors of war since the beginning of time. Between the Xia Dynasty (second to third millennium BC) and 1949, there were more than two hundred episodes of war *(zhanshi)* in the region. "There was not one of these battles that did not bring deep suffering to the people of the Xuzhou region."[4] The Xuzhou region has known the bitterness of being on the losing side. In the third century BC, it was the capital of the noble Xiang Yu in Chu's final struggle with the crude but victorious Han. Every time in China's imperial history that victorious armies swept north or south, the Xuzhou region would be embroiled in conflict. Violence and warfare were so common that history itself was distorted and truncated, events jumbled together in the mass consciousness without much sense of how far away they were from the present time. The region's strategic importance increased in the modern period, after it became one of the key railway junctions in China, where the north-south JinPu Line crosses the east-west LongHai Line. This increase in military status led to an accentuation of the much older and more generalized sense of being beset by warfare.

Beyond the horror of periodic warfare, Xuzhou suffered from endemic violence. It is the hub of a four-province border region (Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, Anhui), where provincial authority was historically least effective. It was constantly in the grips of violence, either military, bandit, or some combination of the two.[5] This chronic instability contributed to a strong attachment to fighting in the region. It was a centre of martial arts training. The local heroes were fighting men, from China's greatest military hero, Zhuge Liang, born in the region in AD 181, to the local desperadoes who hijacked the JinPu express at Lincheng in 1924 and held its passengers for ransom.[6] The Xuzhou region had always been a place to fight over; it became such a place again in early 1938.

The Xuzhou Campaign

The Xuzhou Campaign was a string of hard-fought battles against the invading Japanese in the first half of 1938. They followed the disasters of late 1937, when the lower Yangtze region fell to the Japanese with sickening speed, the Chinese military collapsed, the government fled from the capital, Nanjing, and Japanese troops massacred hundreds of thousands of inhabitants in the Rape of Nanjing. Much of eastern China was lost, and further huge losses seemed inevitable.

In January the Japanese launched attacks from the northern and southern ends of the JinPu Line, their strategy to make a junction at Xuzhou, then launch an attack west towards Zhengzhou and then south to Wuhan, the temporary capital of the Chinese government. The Japanese armies were supremely confident after destroying the best GMD forces and expected little resistance in the march on Xuzhou.



Diocese of Suchow (Xuzhou): sites of missionary reports of atrocities

The campaign lasted almost five months, hardly a day without fighting. Some of the battles were victories over the Japanese, which restored hope to a nation devastated by the 1937 collapse. The climax of the campaign was the Battle of Taierzhuang (24 March to 7 April), which became a symbol of Chinese courage and patriotism. By early May the tide had turned against the Chinese forces, Xuzhou was almost encircled, and the Chinese forces withdrew to the west. In mid-May the Japanese took Xuzhou and the surrounding region.

The Xuzhou battles were well reported by a small army of journalists, including Tao Zhuyin, Joris Ivens, Robert Capa, Christopher Isherwood, W.H. Auden, Jack Belden, and Peter Fleming. Evans Carlson, the most astute military observer of China, was there, as was Joseph Stilwell. These journalists were partisans of the Chinese; many of them had come to China directly from the Spanish Civil War. Most were aware of the sufferings of the people, but none of them stayed on to witness the Japanese occupation; the last to leave fled with the GMD troops to Wuhan. The act of witness was left to the missionaries.

Christian missionaries in the Xuzhou area were fiercely pro-Chinese; they were deeply committed to their congregations and identified with their sufferings. Many of them stayed through the Japanese occupation and bore witness to its horrors. This account relies heavily on the records of a group of twenty-five Canadian priests, clerics of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Suchow (Xuzhou), who stayed at their posts in Xuzhou and two dozen nearby

towns and documented the devastation of the region. They kept detailed records of casualties – sometimes of general numbers, more often of baptisms. Their religious duty required that they baptize any who would accept baptism, and in the crisis of enemy occupation many did; others were baptized as they lay close to death. The linking of baptismal numbers to casualty numbers corroborates the missionaries' figures. The daily diaries of these priests were compiled by one of them, Father Rosario Renaud, and published in the early 1980s.[7]

Civilian Suffering during the Campaign

The terror of war started for the city of Xuzhou long before the campaign began, through a weapon of war they had never encountered – aerial bombing. This was an unprecedented experience of terror: deathly attacks from the sky, especially terrifying to people most of whom had never seen airplanes before. Xuzhou was first bombed at the end of August 1937. Raids continued over the next weeks, creating an atmosphere of choking fear that half-paralyzed the city; much of the population fled into the countryside.[8] The bombing died down in the autumn and early winter, but there was no return to normal life. The city sank into chronic anxiety as news of what was happening south of the Yangtze spread.

> Everywhere RUMOUR reigned. It spoke only of the atrocities committed by the Japanese, women raped, pregnant women killed to help to wipe out the Chinese race, young men shot for having been soldiers, or to prevent them from becoming soldiers, students, prisoners, wounded, massacred ... and how many others.[9]

After the Nanjing Massacre in December, many civilians were convinced that they too would be killed simply because they were Chinese, and that Japan was engaged in a race war against China. Fear of the impending arrival of Japanese troops was so intense that whole populations from the small towns near Xuzhou fled into the countryside. Eighty percent of the population of Suxian (south of Xuzhou, in Anhui) fled in late December. Many of them were back in their homes by the Lunar New Year, but others, usually those with means, kept going, first to Wuhan and then all the way to Sichuan. With the fear came a sense of abandonment. Local officials and gentry had already fled from the cities and small towns or were ready to go at a moment's notice; merchants liquidated their stocks and closed their businesses.[10] Some local authorities made minimal attempts to train militias in self-defence, build tank traps, and so on, but their efforts were usually half-hearted and inept.

The fear was most intense in the early stages of the campaign, when Japanese victory and occupation seemed inevitable. As time wore on, and the

worst did not happen, fear gave way to cautious optimism. After the Battle of Taierzhuang, civilian spirits soared as the possibility of defeat and occupation receded. Bombing started again as the fighting intensified, but people had learned to take shelter from bombs and shells and felt more secure. They dug into the ground to make shelters. Mission compounds were opened to refugee women and children; the priests were careful not to admit young men, in case they were soldiers and the missions thus ran the danger of becoming military targets. The mission compounds were not as safe as they seemed; many were bombed. The German Catholic Mission in Linyi (Shandong) was bombed in March, even though it had a swastika painted on its roof, a symbol that should have been recognizable by Japanese pilots as the symbol for a temple – not for its political symbolism.[11]

A beautiful spring broke the grip of winter. In March the situation seemed to be turning in China's favour, and a mood of resistance gripped the region. The city of Xuzhou came into its own, a city of courage under fire.

> During the early morning raid we had been delighted to see a non-official civil defence spring into action. They were ordinary townsfolk who became wardens, fire-fighters and first-aid workers during the raid and then went back to their civil jobs. This help-your-neighbour brand of civic consciousness was a significant reversal of the selfish indifference I had seen so often displayed in Shanghai and Hankou. It was of a kind we had been led to believe was a monopoly of the Communists in China, but Hsuchow [Xuzhou] was hundreds of miles from their areas of influence.[12]

The Xuzhou Campaign became, briefly, a people's war, with much of the population caught up in the defence of the region. The glory lasted only two months. By the middle of May resistance had collapsed, the Chinese forces had departed, and Xuzhou and the region around it were abandoned to the incoming Japanese. The toll on the region, during the campaign and immediately after it, was enormous.

Damage during the Campaign

Modern warfare, with tanks, bombs, and artillery shells, causes great damage to the ground it is fought over. When that ground is heavily populated, as the Xuzhou region was, collateral damage (quite apart from deliberate killings) to civilians and the civilian economy is enormous. The English poets Auden and Isherwood saw the tragic irony of a war being fought over land that should have been producing crops.

> From here [a hill close to the front] we looked down on War as a bird might – seeing only a sinister agriculture or anti-agriculture. Immediately below

> us peasants were digging in the fertile, productive plain. Further on there would be more peasants, in uniform, also digging – the unproductive, sterile trench. Beyond them, to the north, still more peasants; and, once again, the fertile fields. This is how war must seem to the neutral, unjudging bird – merely the Bad Earth, the tiny, dead patch in the immense flowering field of luxuriant China.[13]

During the campaign, the whole Xuzhou region was caught up in the fighting, which was everywhere, battles erupting on a ring of shifting fronts and along the roads and railway lines. The greatest material destruction came from Japanese bombing. The Japanese had complete control of the air, but their pilots were unskilled or inexperienced; they operated with low levels of bombing precision and frequently missed their military targets. In an area as densely settled as Xuzhou, this meant their actual targets were often civilian ones. The city of Xuzhou, with its railway stations, military encampments, and government offices, was bombed incessantly. The last major raid on Xuzhou was on 14 May. Several square kilometres of housing were destroyed, and more than 700 people were killed.[14]

As the campaign drew to an end, the bombers turned their sights on other towns in the region. On 14 May there were seven raids on Peixian, to the north of Xuzhou, and much of the eastern part of the city was set on fire.[15] This raid produced heavy casualties and created panic in the population. The next day, when there were raids on many towns in the region around Xuzhou, casualties were lower because news had passed fast enough to get all the inhabitants out of the towns. Now the towns being bombed were empty – and in danger of being burned down. In Tangshan, to the east, with no one left to put out the flames, the whole town was destroyed.[16]

Towns and cities were not only in danger from the air; some towns were burned by ground troops. The town of Yixian (Shandong) was torched by Japanese forces retreating northwest from Taierzhuang, to deny it to the Chinese pursuing them. The civilians had fled into the hills and the town was empty, but the Japanese troops decided to stop and burn it down; they then found themselves trapped in the burnt-out shell when Chinese reinforcements arrived.[17] The town of Xiaoxian, southwest of Xuzhou, was burned by departing Chinese troops; they could not "reconcile leaving their beloved town to the enjoyment of the enemy."[18]

Other towns were destroyed as troops fought over them, most famously the town of Taierzhuang, which was completely destroyed during several weeks of fighting. The civilian population was reduced from 20,000 to 7: an eighty-five-year-old man and six women.[19]

Warfare's damage to the transportation system of the Xuzhou region was almost total. Civilian transport was completely disrupted, and trade and

Table 4.1

Railway bridges destroyed during the Japanese invasion of North China, 1938

Structure	Date destroyed	Destroyed by	Date repaired
JinPu, Yellow River bridge, north of Jinan	Early January	Retreating Chinese forces	Late February
JinPu, Huai River bridge, Bengbu	Early February	Retreating Chinese forces	June
JinPu, Gui River bridge, south of Xuzhou	Early February	Retreating Chinese forces	June
LongHai, bridge just west of Xuzhou	Early May	Japanese forces, to cut off Chinese retreat	

commerce virtually ceased. The railways were cut for long periods and were denied to civilian traffic for months. As shown in Table 4.1, many of the major river bridges were destroyed, a huge cost in lost income and for repair work.[20]

The Xuzhou Campaign brought immeasurable suffering to the people of the region. Thousands were killed in the bombing. Those who survived were thrown into terrible confusion and chronic need. Peasants in much of the Xuzhou region were reduced to paupery by the fighting during the campaign, which made it impossible for them to cultivate their fields or to plant crops. Local commerce collapsed, markets were suspended, merchants fled. The Quebec fathers give a picture of a population driven almost mad with terror and privation.

Even hardened soldiers such as the Guangxi commander Li Pinxian were shocked at the desolation of the civilians caught up in the war. In February, from the southern front, he wrote a poem[21] about the suffering he saw around him:

> Like bald, white, disabled, broken, desolate chickens
> In the full sun the common people suffer and are in pain
> In a stream of blood and tears the drums call the troops.[22]

The sufferings of the campaign, awful as they were, hardly prepared the civilian population for what was to come.

After the Campaign

Refugees

As the campaign drew to its end, much of the population of the cities and towns became refugees. Panic followed the sudden decision of the Chinese high command in early May to withdraw the Chinese armies. Many, including the wealthy and families with girls and young women, had already fled; now many others from east of the Xuzhou region streamed westwards. No sooner did they leave than other refugees arrived, people fleeing from further east in Shandong. As the news of the army withdrawal spread, the largest flight of all started. On 14 May, 10,000 peasants descended on Sanguangmiao, to the northwest of Xuzhou, fleeing before the approaching Japanese.[23] On 20 May, Father Boileau, at Yangzhuangzi (south of Xuzhou), watched with constricted heart the spectacle of the flight of people from Xuzhou and the areas to the east on their way to the southwest.

> On the road to the southwest, a long ribbon of ox carts stretches without interruption. This is the whole population of the North in flight. The women and children are on the carts, in the middle of bundles, baskets, sacks, chicks, goats, etc. Many are in tears, the children are crying. The men beat the oxen. Impossible to stop, only to go on. In the middle of all this are incredible numbers of soldiers. To go faster, they pass through the wheat. One would say that there is no air. All is gloom. One only breathes dust.[24]

The refugees tried to move at night; by day the Japanese bombed and strafed any groups of people they saw on the roads, whether they were civilians, soldiers, or soldiers who had exchanged their uniforms for civilian clothing.[25] Here, as in the Nanjing Massacre, the Japanese used the assumption that anyone in civilian clothing was a soldier who had shed his uniform to justify the indiscriminate killing of male Chinese.

Many of the refugees did not go far. Without resources, it was out of the question for them to flee to unoccupied parts of China. They headed for rural sanctuaries outside the towns and cities, away from the bombing. Some families could not flee, either because they had too many old, young, and sick members, or because they had no relatives to go to in the countryside. At the conference that commemorated the fifty-fifth anniversary of the Battle of Taierzhuang, Zhang Yuce told the story (obviously told to him by his family) of what happened to his family in Linyi (Shandong), after it fell to the Japanese in April. The family could not flee. He was an infant, only forty-eight days old, and there were old people in the family, too. All ten members of the family crouched in a hollowed-out part of the city wall. They were discovered by the Japanese, dragged out, and bayoneted.

He alone survived; he was at his mother's breast, and her body shielded him.[26] An infant surviving at a dead mother's breast may seem a clichéd image of an atrocity tale, but atrocities like this did happen, and mothers did give their lives to save their children.

Those Left Behind

The orgy of brutality that descended on the Xuzhou region, starting in late May after the departure of the Chinese troops and the arrival of the Japanese, and lasting for several months, was recorded in stark detail by the Quebec fathers in daily diary entries. The most acute phase lasted for two weeks, the last two weeks of May. Xuzhou City was a scene of desolation. Most of the centre was in ruins, the result of months of bombing. On 19 May the Japanese entered a city in which more than one-third of the houses were destroyed. The streets were choked with rubble, and there were dead bodies everywhere. Civil order had collapsed. The local officials had departed, the last with the fleeing armies; some kept going with the armies, far to the west, while others stayed in hiding in the immediate area, with a few army units left behind to try to keep order. The city was silent; almost all of its quarter of a million inhabitants had fled.[27]

Xuzhou and the region around it passed into a ghastly limbo. This was a completely new experience. The urban populations of the Xuzhou region should have been able to cope with a transition of power. They were old hands at being taken over by Chinese armies. They knew about the dangers from rowdy, drunken troops; they were used to stashing their valuables in well-prepared hiding places and fleeing to the country until the new order settled down. These experiences did nothing to prepare them for the arrival of the Japanese army. The population was at the mercy of capricious terror. A few places escaped unscathed, but most went through a period of horror and confusion.

The Japanese army occupied only 8 to 10 percent of the rural areas in the Xuzhou region. The rest fell into the hands of every kind of Chinese armed men – bandits, guerrillas, irregulars or free-lances *(francs-tireurs),* soldiers who had discarded their uniforms, Small Sword Society members. Most were local men, who before the Japanese arrived had been engaged full- or part-time in some form of fighting. The departure of the Chinese armies gave them total freedom in the unoccupied areas. They dominated the areas around Xuzhou, some trying to fight the Japanese as guerrillas, others robbing, pillaging, and kidnapping civilians to their hearts' content with no soldiers or militia to stop them.[28] This was a heavy burden for the unarmed civilians but a familiar phenomenon, one they had experienced several times in living memory. The men of violence were local men, and civilians could fall back on the (often vain) hope that the old proverb would come true, that "the rabbit does not eat the grass near its own burrow" *(tuzi bu chi*

wobian cao), that is, local men do not hurt their neighbours. The Japanese were not local, and the savagery with which they treated the civilian population had never occurred in the region before.

Massacres

In the two weeks after the GMD troops retreated, a great number of civilians were massacred by Japanese troops. These massacres followed a string of other massacres that had taken place during the campaign, when towns and villages fell into Japanese hands. Several of these massacres are recorded in Chinese sources. Two recent accounts of all atrocities committed by Japanese troops in China, one from the mainland and one from Taiwan, give identical figures for those killed in massacres during and after the Xuzhou Campaign, in southern Shandong and northern Anhui and Jiangsu.[29] The contemporary accounts of the Quebec priests describe further massacres. Table 4.2 gives a breakdown of figures.

This frightful record is incomplete. The Quebec priests reported only on the places where they had churches and scrupulously avoided reporting rumours. These reports represented only a tiny fraction of the whole region. The Chinese sources are equally incomplete; they mention none of the massacres recorded by the priests.

The massacre at Yanwo has been described above. Some of the others for which records exist follow. In Xiaoxian, southwest of Xuzhou, there was a massacre on 20 May. In a group of villages near the county town, more than 2,000 people were massacred in one day. This was the Hanwang Massacre. In Niulan (Xiaoxian), 500 people were killed on 16 May.[30] On 19 May, 400 civilians were killed in Zhoucai (Fengxian) and the town set on fire.[31] In Tangshan, on 24 May, 700 civilians were slaughtered during the takeover, including the entire Muslim population of the town.[32] On 20 June, 231 people were killed in several villages near Luliangshan, east of Xuzhou.[33]

The killings in the city of Xuzhou were not described in the records as a massacre, since they were spread out over several days after the Japanese occupation, though this technical distinction cannot have been any comfort to the victims. In the course of house-to-house searches, according to the priests' diaries/diocese records, Japanese troops looted houses and businesses, raped the few women still in the city, and killed any men they found, mainly wounded Chinese soldiers who had been left behind by their units when they retreated; wounded officers and men were all killed.[34]

Other Atrocities

Beyond killing, the greatest terror was rape. In Maqing, all the women who could not find sanctuary with the Catholic mission were "requisitioned for the amusement of the soldiers."[35] Direct accounts such as this one are rare;

Table 4.2

Massacres in the Xuzhou region during the first half of 1938

Date	Place	Number killed	Source
17 March	Tengxian, Shandong	2,259 in town	Zuo 1994, 366; Li Enhan 1994, 347
7 April	north of Taierzhuang, Shandong	450 peasants	Zuo 1994, 367; Li Enhan 1994, 348
21 April	Linyi, Shandong	2,840 in town	Zuo 1994, 368; Li Enhan 1994, 349
26 April	Yancheng, Jiangsu	Unknown; at least 500	Zuo 1994, 369; Li Enhan 1994, 350
16 May	Niulan (Xiaoxian), Jiangsu	500 to 1,500 peasants	Renaud 1982, 178
17 May	Fengxian, Jiangsu	At least 200	Renaud 1982, 169
19 May	Xuzhou City	Unknown; wounded soldiers and local people	Renaud 1982, 181
19 May	Zhouzai Tangshan, Jiangsu	400 peasants	Renaud 1982, 195
20 May	Hanwang Xiaoxian, Jiangsu	Over 2,000 peasants in several places	Zuo 1994, 369; Li Enhan 1994, 350
20 May	Yanwo Xuzhou, Jiangsu	800 peasants and refugees	Zuo 1994, 369; Li Enhan 1994, 350
22 May	Qugou Suxian, Anhui	264 peasants	Zuo 1994, 369
mid-May	Jinxiang, Jiangsu	2,860 construction workers; 300 peasants	Zuo 1994, 369; Li Enhan 1994, 350
24 May	Tangshan, Jiangsu	At least 700 in town	Renaud 1982, 197
20 June	Luliang, Jiangsu	231 peasants in several villages	Zuo 1994, 370; Li Enhan 1994, 352

veiled allusions are more common – perhaps false, but more likely, in a puritan society, the only way in which violation could be mentioned.

The people of the Xuzhou region were completely traumatized by their experiences. The cumulative effect of the bombing, shelling, looting, killing, and burning had already driven hundreds of thousands into flight. Those who stayed were in the grip of paralyzing fear. As the weeks passed, there was no return to normal life. A priest reported in June that "the countryside is deserted, the villages closed up, guarded night and day by people who are scared by the slightest shadow of a passer-by and shoot – usually fairly badly – before asking who it is."[36]

In many parts of the region people had fallen into a state of abject helplessness, terrified by the Japanese and almost as terrified of the Chinese bandits who flourished in the chaotic situation. Fengxian (northwest of Xuzhou) was crammed with refugees from Xuzhou. Many were destitute; 15,000 people without resources were begging in a town with a normal population of 20,000.[37] In mid-June the town was taken over by one of the local bandit chiefs, who came not to govern but to pillage. He was joined by mobs of disbanded Chinese soldiers. The shops were looted, the houses ransacked. The bandits left after two weeks, taking everything movable from the town.[38] This was the terror of anarchy, what happened when there was no government at all.

As time passed, acute fear of immediate death gave way to chronic anxiety about long-term survival. In many areas no crops had been planted during the fighting in the spring, and the early autumn harvest threatened to be a disaster. Peasants who had been able to plant their land were too terrified to go out to harvest the wheat, leaving it to wither in the ground. Where there were crops to be harvested, they were in danger of being seized by Japanese troops to feed their animals.[39]

As the summer wore on, Japanese troops, growing slightly more confident in their control, embarked on a new strategy of "mopping up," making raids out from their strongpoints to eradicate what they deemed "resistance" in the countryside. In the area to the northwest of Xuzhou they made sorties out into the countryside. Their strategy to restore order was to burn villages where there was thought to be opposition. In the area around Houjiazhuang, a hundred villages were burned in the period of a few months – all of them empty because the inhabitants fled as soon as there was news of Japanese troops arriving.[40] The process continued until the end of 1938. Hundreds more villages were burned in Fengxian, Peixian, and Tangshan.[41]

In early autumn, the Japanese turned their attention to the area east of the Xuzhou region. On 18 October, Japanese troops arrived in Dushan, rounded up all the men they could find – about 200 – corralled them into the marketplace, and, towards evening, executed 40 of them. These executions were justified as a way to force the town to set up a pro-Japanese town

council. Not surprisingly, they had the reverse effect, even when the officer in command threatened to come back in three days and kill the whole population unless the town did the bidding of the Japanese.[42]

The Japanese now held a region in which they had encountered massive, unexpected resistance from the Chinese military. The organized Chinese armies had melted away, but the remnants were widely believed to have turned to guerrilla warfare. This belief made the Japanese very nervous. They found "evidence" of guerrilla activity wherever they looked. On 26 November the local commander ordered the execution of all the monks at a temple on a hill outside Suxian, which was accused of harbouring "irregulars."[43] In the first week of December, 200 people were killed in Suxian in reprisal for an attack by "irregulars" from outside the city.[44] The process was horribly simple. Labelling someone as a guerrilla or "irregular" was an immediate death sentence.

Administration

In this part of Occupied China, the Japanese command had no plan for the takeover of civil administration, but was concerned only with profligate conquest. In a "normal" military conquest by a Chinese army, the population could expect that within a short while the occupiers would sort out the local administration and restore stability. This is not what happened in 1938. In the post-conquest period, the Japanese found themselves with quite inadequate resources to establish civilian administration. They had to scramble to find ways to administer the conquered areas and to find sustenance for their troops. An indication of how lacking they were in plans or talent was the appointment of a new governor for Shandong in March 1938. The only candidate was a ninety-nine-year-old former Qing official, Ma Liang, whose major achievement, as outlined in a Domei news release, was that he had written a book called the *The History of Spiritualism*.[45]

The level of unpreparedness showed up in language competence. Most Japanese units in the forces occupying the Xuzhou region had no Chinese speakers who could help them communicate with the local people. The Quebec missionaries were frequently called on to interpret, along a complicated route: Japanese to English to French to Chinese and back again. One missionary even used Latin to communicate with officers through a Japanese soldier who had been a seminarian in Japan.[46]

All the years the Japanese had spent in Taiwan and northeast China had not produced adequate training or preparation for the administration of the vastly expanded areas of Occupied China. It was as if the result of the conquest – the need to administer the conquered territories – was a shock to them. To help them out, the Japanese authorities brought in to the Xuzhou area a group of scabrous foreign civilians. By June a flood of civilian carpetbaggers – Japanese and Korean "adventurers, merchants, hoteliers and keepers

of houses of ill repute"[47] – had arrived. They threw Chinese out of houses or business premises they wanted and took them over. No complaints or protests were possible.

The newcomers were substitutes for what the Japanese must have expected – local collaborators. The word "collaboration" is misleading for the interactions that occurred between the Japanese and the population of the areas they occupied. In Chinese, two terms have to be used to translate the English word; there is none of the ambiguity that there is in English and other European languages. *Hezuo* (working together) could never be used in Chinese to mean working for a dominant enemy; the word used for collaboration was *tongdi* (working with the enemy). Those who worked with the enemy were traitors *(hanjian).*

From the start of the Japanese occupation, some people did go over to them, as they might have to any new military occupier. On the retreat through western Jiangsu, Jack Belden noted a pattern in the response to the arrival of Chinese mounted soldiers (cavalry units were rare in the GMD forces): "On three different occasions during their flight, village elders came out of the walled towns, bowing in welcome and bearing in their hands Japanese flags. Yes, they had been mistaken for enemy cavalry."[48] Such behaviour may have been pusillanimous, but it was a well-learned response in a region that for two decades had been criss-crossed by warlord armies and beset by banditry.

Some local bandit chiefs made alliances with the Japanese, informal agreements that allowed them to continue their operations, now under the flag of the rising sun.[49] There were accusations after the war that some of the local religious sects and secret societies *(daohuimen)* that flourished in this area (the Xiantiandao, the Hongqihui, and the Yiguandao) had collaborated actively with the Japanese.[50] These accusations should be accepted only with scepticism because the accusations came from Communist sources, who regard sects and societies as their natural enemies.

Most people did not collaborate, at least in the early stages. They had no idea how long the Japanese were going to be there; there was still hope for rescue, for a Chinese counterattack. The people who might have rallied the civilians, the gentry and the intellectuals, were hidden in the countryside. The Japanese stooped low to find people to work for them: "The Japanese had to fall back on people for whom allegiance counted little, on those who had failed in politics and teaching, on ambitious malcontents, and on the venial intermediaries who hung around the yamen willing to undertake any business, this one perhaps more profitable than others."[51]

The local residents' fear and detestation of the conquerors meant that people hardly dared go out of their homes, and the economy could not recover. In the late summer of 1938, the economic life of Xuzhou was still at a standstill. The chamber of commerce was closed, the merchants had

either fled or been ruined, and their businesses, like all industry and commerce, were shut down.[52]

The state of chaos lasted until the end of 1938. Even then the Japanese army still had little better idea of how to administer the region than to terrorize it, to kill people who seemed to oppose its presence. They had had very little success in establishing a working administration. The change was that a de facto administrative demarcation started to crystallize out. The Communist Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army gained effective control of major parts of the rural areas and brought some order there. The Japanese stopped trying to expand beyond urban areas and major lines of communication. The bandits were gradually squeezed out or incorporated into the more official guerrilla forces.[53] The Japanese were never to establish tight control over the area. Right through the war, GMD and Communist Party guerrillas operated in the region, at first in harmony and cooperation, later on in antagonism.[54]

The Yellow River Flood

However great the toll of civilians from the Japanese occupation, in numerical terms it was not the largest disaster of mid-1938. The greatest catastrophe, a tragedy of epic proportions, took place to the west of Xuzhou. It was the outcome of a desperate tactic to use the Yellow River to slow the Japanese advance. In June, GMD forces breached the southern dikes of the Yellow River at Huayuankou and created a massive flood, which rampaged through three provinces to enter the sea south of the Shandong Peninsula.[55]

Very little of the immediate Xuzhou region was flooded, but the devastation in the areas to the west and south was enormous, the casualties so huge that they dwarf the casualties of the massacres.[56] (See Table 4.3.)

The flood was a form of scorched-earth policy to deny territory to the Japanese by destroying it and its population. It was a failure, one of the many self-inflicted wounds that have marked modern Chinese history. The strategic value of harnessing the Yellow River to the anti-Japanese cause was minimal. The Japanese had to launch their attack on Wuhan west up the Yangtze; the city fell only a few months later. The long-term damage to the region was incalculable, and Xuzhou suffered, too; the whole western part of the trade region centred on Xuzhou was derelict. It became in time a major Communist base area.

Table 4.3

Casualties of the Yellow River Flood, June 1938

	Henan	Anhui	Jiangsu
Deaths	325,589	407,514	160,200
Refugees	1,172,639	2,536,315	202,400

Observations

Japanese Brutality

A record of so much suffering in a small area leaves many questions. The first is the mentality of the aggressors, the inflictors of violence and suffering. (This subject is explored in great detail by Yang Daqing in Chapter 3.) In the fighting around Xuzhou and the occupation that followed it, the Japanese Imperial Army showed a range of behaviour from callous disregard to hideous savagery towards the civilian population of the region. Several different and conflicting interpretations were possible, both at the time and in hindsight. The savagery might be seen as ethnic hatred for the Chinese, a revenge for centuries of humiliation, a lust to punish Chinese simply for existing. Or it could be seen as an outcome of virulent nationalism, an argument made by Michael Ignatieff to explain some of the current hostilities in the world.

> Nationalism is a distorting mirror in which believers see their simple ethnic, religious, or territorial attributes transformed into glorious attributes or qualities ... The systematic overvaluation of the self results in systematic devaluation of strangers and outsiders.[57]

The brutality might also be seen as a culturally conditioned one, part of the "way of the warrior." Or it could be explained as the behaviour of men brutalized by military life and driven almost mad by combat. Some parts of the Japanese army saw committing atrocities as a natural booty of warfare. Officers allowed their men to behave with savagery with the specific aim of terrorizing the population. In Fengxian this was the case, starting on 17 May.

> The Japanese commanders in effect gave their troops three days of pillage. Complete liberty to take what they wanted, to kill, to rape women, to burn houses; until the morning of May 20th Fengxian was a hell. More than two hundred civilians were assassinated without motive, by the [bad] chance of meeting soldiers or of the soldiers' mood. The north of the town was ravaged by fire, and houses [elsewhere] which had been emptied of their contents suffered the same fate. Soldiers released [from discipline] went after women and brutalized them sometimes to death. They left in trucks and made raids on the surrounding villages, killing, raping and burning ... one could soon count hundreds of villages devastated in this way.[58]

A horribly banal explanation of the brutality common in the period after the war was that it was the outcome of incompetence and lack of foresight. The Imperial Army's planning was only military; officers in the field had no

training on how to behave after victory, how to deal with civilians, how to administer the areas they had conquered. The desire for conquest was self-contained and left a post-victory vacuum. Occupation forces were at a loss, administering a vast population with very limited resources and in a state of high anxiety over guerrilla attacks.

The Long-Term Effects of Suffering

The Xuzhou region went through a prolonged period of chaos and suffering during the Xuzhou Campaign and the Japanese occupation. Every aspect of life was disrupted. Normal human relationships were distorted. Once-prosperous peasants were reduced to penury. Fear and insecurity reigned. The Xuzhou Campaign was not an end but a beginning. It was the start of a period of confusion and uncertainty that lasted into the early 1950s, then resumed in the late 1950s to last another two decades through the Great Leap Forward, the Famine, and the Cultural Revolution.

It was this past that made the present. The fact of suffering, rather than the causes of it, continues to affect the present. The short-term effects of the war were to drive the peasants of the Xuzhou region towards the Communists, the only people apparently able to offer some comfort and some leadership in resistance. But the triumph of Communism was not an end in itself.

The long-term effects of insecurity, fear, and terror are still with the Chinese. The social distortion of war, the sense of injustice born of its haphazard cruelty, when some survive and others are annihilated, the feeling of being abandoned by Chinese elites, the domination of life by fear and anxiety – all of these had long-term effects on the society of the Xuzhou region. The mentality that came to dominate was one of survival, the survival of the fittest, a mentality in which the social relations of more peaceful times were distorted and mangled. Xuzhou was one of many ravaged places in China.

Notes

1 Zuo Lu, *Jianxue de wushi dao: Zhongguo Kangri zhanzheng shiliao congshu, Rijun tushalu* (Swords stained with blood: Atrocities of the Japanese army during the Anti-Japanese War) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1994), 137-41; Ren Ming, *Tongshan xianzhi* (Gazetteer of Tongshan) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1993), 42.
2 Ren, *Tongshan xianzhi*, 797.
3 Ibid., 43.
4 Ibid., 3.
5 Cai Shaoqing, *Minguo shiqi de tufei* (Bandits in the Republican period) (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 1993), 121-25.
6 Tao Zhuyin, *Beiyang junfa tongzhi shiqi ji shihua* (History of the period of control of the Beiyang warlords) (Beijing: Sanlian, 1957), 228.
7 Rosario Renaud, *Le diocèse de Suchow (Chine): Champ apostolique des Jésuites canadiens de 1918 à 1954* (The diocese of Xuzhou, China: Apostolic field of the Canadian Jesuits

from 1918 to 1954) (Montreal: Editions Bellarmin, 1982). The Catholic priests who recorded the savagery that took place in the Xuzhou region were the products of the devout Catholic society of Quebec, which sent its paragons into the mission field. In the early 1950s they were expelled from China. By the 1980s, when their records were published, the pious world that produced them had succumbed to the Quiet Revolution, and they were forgotten in the secular, nationalist world of the new Quebec.

8 Ibid., 131.
9 Ibid., 139.
10 *North China Herald*, 5 April 1938, 183.
11 Ibid., 3 March 1938, 502.
12 Rhodes Farmer, *Shanghai Harvest* (London: Museum Press, 1945), 141.
13 W.H. Auden and Christopher Isherwood, *Journey to a War* (London: Faber and Faber, 1938), 106-7.
14 Ren, *Tongshan xianzhi*, 47.
15 Renaud, *Le diocèse*, 151.
16 Ibid., 156.
17 *North China Herald*, 13 April 1938, 52; 20 April 1938, 96.
18 Renaud, *Le diocèse*, 179.
19 *North China Herald*, 11 May 1938, 228.
20 Ibid., 16 February 1938, 238, 242; 25 May 1938, 313.
21 There is a cultural contrast in the role of the poet between the tough, martial Li, who was also a poet, and the gentle Auden, who used his pen to attack war. England had a tradition of soldier poets (Wilfrid Owen, Rupert Brooke, Siegfried Sassoon), but they served out of duty, rather than conviction, and passed their hatred of war to younger poets such as Auden. Li was a soldier to the core, but a modern and cultivated one who could express himself in poetry.
22 Li Pinxian, *Li Pinxian huyi lu* (Memoirs of Li Pinxian) (Taipei: Zhongwai tushu chubanshe, 1975), 212.
23 Renaud, *Le diocèse*, 164.
24 Ibid., 149.
25 Ibid., 150.
26 Zhang Yuce, "Taierzhuang zhanyi shijian Rijun zai Lunan diqu de baoxing" (Japanese army atrocities in South Shandong during the Taierzhuang battles), in *Taierzhuang dazhan he Zhongguo Kangzhan* (The Taierzhuang Battle and China's Anti-Japanese War), ed. Miao Fenglin (Jinan: Shandong daxue chubanshe, 1997), 488.
27 Renaud, *Le diocèse*, 180.
28 Ibid., 209.
29 Zuo Lu, *Jianxue de wushi dao*; Li Enhan, *Ribenjun zhanzheng baoxing zhi yanjiu* (Research on war atrocities of the Japanese army) (Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuaguan, 1994).
30 Renaud, *Le diocèse*, 179.
31 Ibid., 185.
32 Ibid., 197.
33 Ren, *Tongshan xianzhi*, 43.
34 Renaud, *Le diocèse*, 181.
35 Ibid., 187.
36 Ibid., 199.
37 Ibid., 207.
38 Ibid., 213.
39 Ibid., 207.
40 Ibid., 221.
41 Ibid., 229.
42 Ibid., 231.
43 Ibid., 237.
44 Ibid., 238.
45 *North China Herald*, 9 March 1938, 370.
46 Renaud, *Le diocèse*, 173, 178, 192.

47 Ibid., 221.
48 Jack Belden, *Still Time to Die* (London: Gollancz, 1945), 97.
49 Renaud, *Le diocèse,* 223.
50 Ren, *Tongshan xianzhi,* 911-13.
51 Renaud, *Le diocèse,* 222.
52 Ibid., 207.
53 Ibid., 207-8.
54 Ren, *Tongshan xianzhi,* 534, 551.
55 Diana Lary, "Drowned earth: The breaching of the Yellow River dyke at Huayuankou," *War and Society* (forthcoming).
56 Li Wenhai et al., *Zhongguo jindaishi da zaihuang* (Disasters in China's modern history) (Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe, 1994), 254-55.
57 Michael Ignatieff, *The Warrior's Honour* (London: Viking, 1997), 51.
58 Renaud, *Le diocèse,* 169.

Destitute and homeless

流離失所

History of the Han Dynasty

5
Refugee Flight at the Outset of the Anti-Japanese War

Stephen MacKinnon

> Through the long months of 1938, as the Chinese armies were pressed slowly back toward the interior, they found their way clogged by moving people. The breathing space of winter had given hundreds of thousands time to make their decision, and China was on the move in one of the greatest mass migrations in human history. It is curious that such a spectacle has not been adequately recorded by a Chinese writer or novelist. Certainly the long files of gaunt people who moved west across the roads and mountains must have presented a sight unmatched since the days of nomad hordes; yet no record tells how many made the trek, where they came from, where they settled anew.[1]
>
> — Theodore White and Annalee Jacoby, *Thunder out of China*

An immediate result of the terrible violence of the Anti-Japanese War was refugee or, more accurately, survivor flight, first to the south and then inland to the west. The movement of peoples was unprecedented, even for Chinese history. Family members who had survived the killing and destruction of war as well as the rampages of Japanese troops during the first few weeks of occupation fled in terror. They had no clear destination in mind and took with them few belongings. Needless to say, they were also deeply traumatized by the violence they had witnessed, which had a social and cultural impact that led in a variety of directions.

One was survivor guilt. Another direction, as Diana Lary has suggested in Chapter 4, was towards brutalization of relationships in attitudes in community and society – producing a survivor mentality that is still prevalent in China. But the violence had been so extreme and arbitrary, and the path to survival so haphazard and seemingly fate-driven, that the refugee experience was also transformative. Under the right circumstances, refugees were pushed by their will to survive and pulled together as a community in new ways. Survival the first time around had been a miracle, so why not unite and overcome survivor guilt by making a last stand? Such an attitude helps

to explain the heady, fatally optimistic atmosphere that prevailed at the central Yangzi commercial complex called Wuhan in 1938. For ten months, from January to October, Wuhan was the de facto capital of wartime China as floods of refugees arrived and government was reinstalled after the fall of Shanghai and Nanjing in 1937. The populace rallied in a hopelessly romantic, heroic defence of the Tri-Cities of Wuchang, Hankou, and Hanyang. The best analogy – and it was made at the time – was to the Republican defence in Spain of another capital, Madrid, under siege by General Franco from 1937-39:

> **Seven days and seven nights eating, sleeping, defecating on top of a freight car**
>
> From one hundred to three hundred swept up at the entrance to the tunnel
> Big fire, Big fire, Big fire
>
> **Bodies, Bodies, Bodies**
> The suggestive pictures on the walls
> Musclemen pushing their way forward
> Leg, Leg, Leg
> Curve, Curve, Curve
> A pair of eyes protruding from the flames
> And the flames shooting out from the eyes
> City follows city, the rail line
> From village to village, narrow trails and cavalries[2]

The story of the agony of those in flight has yet to be told. The Anti-Japanese War did not produce a Chinese Tolstoy. It was the poets, woodblock carvers, and foreign observers who best captured the horror and desperation of the individual refugee experience – in this case the bombing of a train stuffed with refugees (see Plates 4 and 7). For the historian, however, there is still the nagging problem of getting a grip on the subject in more analytically satisfying terms. We do not know enough about the who, what, and when of the numbers involved and how society and the state tried to cope with the sudden deluge of desperate refugees at a given location and point in time. A major problem is the lack of reliable numbers. Estimates of refugee movements vary widely. For the Anti-Japanese War period (1937-45), figures on total refugee population run from 3 million to 90 million. The historian has to rely on random foreign and domestic contemporary accounts and the few official "war damage" reports that were compiled after the fact. The resulting data is spotty in coverage and regional in focus. Both lead inevitably to impressionistic conclusions. Systematic annual surveys of refugee movements such as those done in our own era by the UN or the US State Department simply did not exist.

In short, to understand the social and psychological effects of war in the Chinese case, we need to better understand the demographic and geographical dimensions of refugee flight. In what follows I try to quantify and define refugee flight, with a focus on the early years of the Anti-Japanese War, and tell the little-known story of the relief efforts in and around the besieged wartime capital of Wuhan in 1938. It is a story with a heroine, Ms. Shi Liang, who was herself a refugee from Shanghai.

Dimensions of Refugee Flight

Descriptions of destruction and social cost wrought by the Taiping wars of the mid-nineteenth century can be applied just as appropriately to the devastation that followed in the wake of the fall of Shanghai in November 1937.

> [There are] the masses of refugees and homeless villagers who wander in the area, displaced again and again by fighting that seems to have no end. These farmers and small-town dwellers of the Yangzi delta have now to contend with at least eight different kinds of troops who march and countermarch around their former homes ... For more than a year ... from Shanghai through Suzhou toward the Yangzi ... one might see almost every house destroyed, wantonly burned by one side or the other, stripped of its doors and roof beams. That wood then serves either as fuel for the troops or as makeshift supports for temporary bridges across the myriad canals and creeks.[3]

And, interestingly enough, the historical record is probably clearer and more detailed demographically about the earlier horrors than the later.[4] Although aggregate figures on the number of refugees for the Taiping period are elusive, documentation was often better than for the Anti-Japanese War period. There is agreement that in the provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, and Hubei, more than 30 million people were displaced by the Taiping wars.[5] Shanghai's foreign-concession authorities reported a huge jump in the refugee population, including an influx of Chinese merchant elites. Inland, the picture was less clear. But we know, for example, that the population of Wuxi xian (county) dropped 78 percent from 1830 to 1865 (from 330,000 to 70,000).[6] Once peace was restored, refugee elites returned and rebuilt cities such as Wuxi, Suzhou, and Nanjing, with populations gradually recovering and exceeding pre-war levels by the end of the century.

During the Qing Dynasty, China's foreign and domestic wars were regional affairs, and the disruptive effect of displaced populations was confined to specific regions. During the Taiping, Nian, and Boxer rebellions as well as in the Opium War and clashes of the 1920s between regional militarists, the devastation of a locale or region could be severe. Neighbouring provinces were left relatively unscathed – tranquil and even prosperous.

Twice, in 1854-56 and 1911, for example, Qing armies burned the important commercial centre of Hankou to the ground and halved the population without touching Wuchang, the neighbouring city across the river.

By the twentieth century, urban populations in particular had learned to view war as an unwelcome guest or temporary pestilence that had to be waited out. At worst, in fear for their lives and with their property destroyed by armies still roaming in the vicinity, families would flee and take refuge in a neighbouring province or tranquil zone. Others, usually the poorest, remained and somehow managed to eke out an existence in the rubble of their neighbourhoods or hid in the immediate countryside. Once war ended and the troops were gone, with a semblance of civil order restored, the survivors returned in large numbers to rebuild on the ruins.[7] In the case of post-Taiping Hankou, the results were spectacular. After the city was razed in 1856, Hankou's population jumped from less than half a million to more than a million in thirty years.[8]

The Anti-Japanese War (1937-45) was obviously different than previous conflicts for a number of reasons. The Japanese were a mechanized foreign invader who combined air with land operations. The resulting firepower applied to a given target or field of battle was unprecedented in its destructive force – remembered today as a preview of what was to come in Europe, Russia, and Japan itself. Geographically, the speed of the reach of the Japanese military was terrifying, placing coastal China from Manchuria to Canton under nearly simultaneous attack. Within a year the Japanese had control of all or parts of twenty-one provinces, with the express purpose of terrorizing into submission the civilian population.

More than any other factor, it was the brutality of the Japanese attack and initial occupation of cities in the first six months of the war that produced the greatest forced migration in Chinese history. With massacres occurring in rapid succession, beginning in North China and culminating at Nanjing in December 1937, refugee flight exploded exponentially. The carnage was so bad and pervasive that much went unrecorded. Relying heavily on missionary accounts, Diana Lary tells the story of the terrible, vindictive violence wrought by Japanese troops in the wake of the battles on the population of the Xuzhou area in the spring of 1938 (see Chapter 4). Later that year the suffering was further compounded by two major self-inflicted refugee-generating acts in 1938: the blowing of the Yellow River dikes in May-June and the burning of Changsha in November by order of Chinese commanders. These events forced whole communities to pull up stakes and flee well in advance of the Japanese. To put it mildly, China's urban population was undergoing forced redistribution. Its cultural and professional elites moved inland in unprecedented numbers. After the war, many refugees never recrossed the country to return home. It was decades before the economies

of major battle-front cities such as Taiyuan, Jinan, Changsha, Wuhan, and Nanjing returned to pre-war levels.

Anecdotal evidence is abundant, but the statistical evidence of refugee flight on such a massive scale is skimpy and conflicting. Lloyd Eastman relied on a single secondary source in adopting a low figure of 30 million refugees for the entire Anti-Japanese War period.[9] More recently, using archival figures from a 1946 GMD survey, Ch'i Hsi-sheng has estimated that 95 million people were on the move.[10] The latter figure is broken down in Table 5.1. At the beginning of the war, from 1937-38, conservative GMD estimates indicated that at least 60 million people were in flight. The high-percentage provinces in terms of refugee flight were the inland north-central provinces of Henan, Shanxi, Hunan, and Hubei. Coastal trade centres such as Shanghai, Fuzhou, and Xiamen remained more economically viable under the Japanese and lost relatively little population. But by the end of the war the total figure had grown to 95 million.

Table 5.1

Wartime refugees and homeless people, 1937-45

Province or city	Number of refugees	% of population
Anhui	2,688,242	12.23
Beijing (Hebei)	400,000	15.45
Chahar	225,673	11.08
Fujian	1,065,469	9.25
Guangdong	4,280,266	13.76
Guangxi	2,562,400	20.37
Hubei	7,690,000	30.13
Hebei	6,774,000	23.99
Henan	14,533,200	43.49
Hunan	13,073,209	42.73
Jiangsu	12,502,633	34.83
Jiangxi	1,360,045	9.55
Manchuria	4,297,100	12.12
Nanjing (Jiangsu)	335,634	32.90
Shandong	11,760,644	30.71
Shanghai (Jiangsu)	531,431	13.80
Shanxi	4,753,842	41.06
Suiyuan	695,715	38.20
Tianjin (Hebei)	200,000	10.00
Wuhan (Hubei)	534,040	43.56
Zhejiang	5,185,210	23.90
Total	**95,448,753**	**26.17**

Source: Nanmin ji liuli renmin zongshu biao, 1946, official archival report cited by Hsi-sheng Ch'i, "The military dimension, 1942-45," in *China's Bitter Victory: The War with Japan, 1937-1945,* ed. James Hsiung and Stephen Levine (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1992), 180.

Refugee flight came in waves. The first was during July-August 1937, from the north towards the south, forced by the occupation of the Beijing and Tianjin area and the brutality of the Japanese at Tongzhou, Baoding, and elsewhere. With the Beijing-Hankou railroad blocked at Baoding and Shijiazhuang, masses of civilians from Beijing and Tianjin fled by boat to Cheefoo (Yantai) or Qingdao and then by train into Shandong. The chaos caused by the influx of refugees at Jinan was recorded by Lao She in a memorable eyewitness account for the *Dagongbao*, 4 and 5 December 1937. In August 1937, Jinan's population mushroomed as if overnight from 300,000 to more than 600,000. Then, in October 1937, Gen. Han Fuju refused to defend the city and withdrew (an act for which he was later executed). The Japanese marched into a ghost town, the population of which had dropped to less than 100,000.

The mass exodus out of Shandong and Henan lasted three months, with many heading for Shanghai.[11] Others fled west to Taiyuan and Xi'an in Shanxi province. Included were a large number of peasants as well as urban dwellers. Certain rural areas became significantly depopulated, according to Japanese surveys. Twenty-five percent of Baoding county's mostly peasant population departed rather than face continued Japanese occupation and the atrocities that went with it.[12]

The second wave occurred later in the fall of 1937, with urbanites on the run from the central coast moving up the Yangzi to Nanjing. This process began with the three-month battle for Shanghai and the carpet bombing of Zhabei. The battle involved almost a million men, of which the Chinese lost over 300,000. In panic, more than 600,000 civilians fled Shanghai. Half headed west and the rest (about 250,000, of whom about 100,000 were children) pushed into the International Settlement areas, where social services broke down and produced this scene.

> Refugees poured into the ten square miles of the French Concession and International Settlement, swelling the population from 1.5 to 4 million within a few weeks and increasing the size of the average household to 31 people. Many left the 175 refugee camps to return to their native villages, but tens of thousands of homeless clogged the streets and hundreds of thousands more slept in office corridors, stockrooms, temples guild halls, amusement parks, and warehouses. With winter came disease, starvation, and exposure; and by the end of the year 101,000 corpses had been picked up in the streets or ruins.[13]

The flight of panic-stricken Chinese from surrounding cities may have been even more extreme. It was reminiscent of the depopulation forced by the Taiping wars eighty years earlier. Overnight, the population of Suzhou dropped from 200,000 to 50,000. At Wuxi the exodus was even worse,

dropping from 300,000 to 10,000.[14] Two-thirds of Hangzhou's 600,000 residents disappeared. Overall, a 1939 source estimated that more than 16 million fled the Nanjing-Hangzhou-Shanghai battle zone during the autumn of 1937.[15]

The third big wave started in December and January 1938, as the result of the massacre of civilians at Nanjing. Ningbo on the coast was bombed and 80 to 90 percent of its population was said to have fled. By early spring 1938, the refugee "hordes" that Jacoby and White described in *Thunder out of China* were converging on Wuhan and Canton. They were joined by a final wave from the north. Millions, many of whom were peasants, fled the Huainan region as the enormously destructive battle of Xuzhou raged during the spring of 1938 and were left homeless by the intentional destruction of the Yellow River dikes. (See Chapter 4, by Diana Lary, and plates.) Many refugees headed for Wuhan. By late spring 1938, Wuhan's population had grown from 1 million to 1.5 million, and a year later Chongqing's population had doubled from 400,000 to about 800,000. Also in 1938, to the southeast, peasants fled inland along the Fujian coast or south to Canton. When Canton fell in October, a million people migrated into Hong Kong and Macau and out again in 1941.

Thus, despite the inadequacy of aggregate figures, it is clear that the scale of the mass migration that occurred was unprecedented in terms of size and impact. Twenty-one provinces suffered significant refugee flight and the economic and social dislocations that went with it. China's population was being forcibly redistributed and remixed. Suddenly city dwellers used to servants and middle- to upper-class lifestyles were living in poverty in the countryside. It was a shock to May Fourth Movement intellectuals such as Wen Yiduo and Yu Dafu. Gone were the large family compounds, servants, and comforts of Shanghai and Beijing. For the Chinese peasant family, the trauma was even greater. After harrowing experiences on the roofs of trains and cattle cars, they eked out a living in the urban refugee camps of central/southwestern China. Chinese who spoke different dialects and differed in class, educational, and regional backgrounds were being thrown together in new places and new ways. The educated classes in particular felt uprooted and complained the loudest. Thus the war was a great leveller, achieving more lasting change in the way of social, cultural, and linguistic integration between the urban and the rural than Mao Zedong's forced migration or *xiafang* campaigns of the 1950s and 1960s.

But, more precisely, who *were* these refugees? What was the social makeup of this floating, desperate population? The refugee communities of Wuhan in 1938 typically represented a cross-section of the Chinese population in terms of the distribution of rich and poor, urban and rural. Although children made up a large number of refugees, the age and gender distribution was wide indeed. A few prominent intellectuals, such as Lao She and Guo

Table 5.2

Age and sex distribution of refugees from five Hunan counties, surveyed in Sichuan, 1939

Age	Male	Female	Total	%
0-5	638	493	1,193	–
6-15	1,868	1,469	3,337	34.1
16-40	2,251	2,265	4,516	46.1
41-50	590	502	1,092	11.1
51-60	277	302	579	5.9
61-80	88	171	259	2.6
Totals	5,074	4,709	9,783	

Source: Sun Yankui, *Gunande renliu: Kangzhan shiqi de nanmin* (Refugees during the Resistance War) (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 1994), 65-67, citing document from Second Historical Archive, Nanjing, 118 *chuanzong,*16 *anquan.*

Moruo, left families behind in occupied coastal cities, but for the most part whole families were on the move, minus their elderly. Table 5.2 provides a sampling of a group of Hunan refugees who moved west from Wuhan to Sichuan during the fall of 1938. Note how few were elderly. Surveys of refugees in Wuhan and later in Chongqing also demonstrated again and again the wide representation of peoples from the various regions of China.[16]

The diversity of educational and professional background of the refugees was striking. Again the available statistical record is confusing. In a 1938 interview, Xu Shiying, the official put in charge nationally of relief work, told reporters in Wuhan that cultural and educational workers made up 55 percent of the refugee populace, party and government workers 21 percent, merchants 10 percent, industrial workers 6 percent, and peasants only 2 percent.[17] A later Chongqing survey of more than 1.2 million refugees found 50 percent engaged in small business of one kind or another, with workers and students making up 15 percent and peasants another 23 percent. The problem with these surveys is that they focus on refugees mainly living in shelters in the city. In later, more sophisticated surveys that included outlying suburban counties around Chongqing or Guiyang, for example, the results were probably more accurate and showed a closer balance between peasants, workers, merchants, and students or teachers.[18]

In general, peasants were the most difficult to track as refugees. They were probably the most numerous but also less permanently in flight. With their occupation tied to the land and involving various levels of ownership, high numbers fled during initial Japanese advances. After 1939, when the level of fighting became more subdued, an unknown number returned to their homes. In some areas, such as Hunan or Yunnan, they became refugees again when war returned. Small-time business and craftspeople represented a relatively high proportion of the visible refugee community in

cities like Wuhan or Chongqing. Occupationally they were probably the most flexible and best able to set up shop in new surroundings. Clearly they were the most adaptable of the refugee population and emerged from the war in the best shape economically – less devastated by the runaway inflation that came with the war and that was so hard on soldiers, educators, and bureaucrats.

Historically, the number of educated "intellectuals" among the total refugee population was extraordinarily high, as high as during the upheavals of the Ming-Qing transition in the seventeenth century. By intellectuals, I mean professors, schoolteachers, students, writers, poets, painters, dramatists, scientists, journalists, editors, and so forth. They were the most articulate and best organized of the population – and the best documented. The majority were from Shanghai, Tianjin, or Beijing and included most of the important names in Chinese literary, art, drama, and university worlds at the time. As a contemporary sociologist put it: "90% of the highest level intellectuals migrated west, 50% of the mid-level cultural workers, and only 30% of the lower level intellectuals."[19]

With them came the national press. Dailies such as *Dagongbao, Zhongyang ribao, Shen bao,* and *Saodang bao* moved presses inland and resumed publishing. In time the plight of the refugee intellectual often became desperate, with inflation, increasing censorship, and prolongation of the war creating despair. The attempted suicide in Chongqing in 1941 of the noted Shanghai playwright Hong Shen drew national attention as a cry for help.

Relief Work

As suggested at the outset, the impact of the war on refugees was not just economic and social, it was also psychological. The violence of war traumatized the surviving refugee population in terms of human relationships. Old ties of family and geography were torn asunder. Marriages dissolved, prostitution increased, and uncertainty spawned romance. In the process children and the elderly were abandoned or seriously neglected in increasing numbers.[20]

But there was a positive psychological side as well to the refugee predicament. At Wuhan, during the ten months of its heroic defence in 1938, a new sense of community responsibility united the bizarre regional and class mix of humanity that had been thrown together by the war. The new attitude seemed to be: having survived to this point, the only hope for survival was to unite in caring for one another while preparing for a last stand against hopeless odds. The result was an unprecedented effort to provide social services for the refugee population of the city, with special attention to women and children.

Although characterized in general terms by Eastman and others as woefully inadequate, the public and private refugee relief efforts at Wuhan

equalled the better known (and documented) effort in the foreign-concession areas of Shanghai in 1937-38.[21] Significant numbers of refugees were helped – perhaps half of those in need. Second, the relief effort tied national integration to social responsibility, reaching beyond family and local ties towards a redefinition of community. Finally, in retrospect, these efforts laid the foundation for the comprehensive social-welfare and health programs that were later instituted in the PRC and ROC.

In January 1938, shortly after the fall of Nanjing, the newly reconstituted press of Wuhan began to point with alarm at the social crisis that was gripping the Tri-Cities. It was a crisis that threatened to undermine the defence of the city and destroy public health. The level of bedlam that had left Jinan bereft and defenceless now threatened Wuhan. Besides, the press argued, it was the duty of society at large to do something about the plight of refugees, especially the basic needs for food and shelter of children. There was a flood of articles in the popular press as well as new books and pamphlets devoted to the subject.[22] Most widely noted and reprinted were articles by Wuhan's three most prominent women – first lady Song Meiling, journalist Shen Zijiu, and lawyer-activist Shi Liang.

It was the latter, Shi Liang, who was the spark plug behind Wuhan's relief work, especially in caring for women and children. As a determined career woman, she had a reputation for rarely taking no for an answer. By the early 1930s she had fought her way to the top of Shanghai's legal profession. Then Shi Liang became nationally prominent in November 1936 as one of the "seven gentlemen" arrested for organizing the National Salvation Movement that called for war with Japan. She was the person most responsible for establishing women's branches of the National Salvation Association throughout the country, many of which survived well into the 1940s.

Born in 1900 into a rural Jiangsu scholar-official family, Shi Liang, with her father's encouragement, was in the first class of women to graduate from Shanghai's top law school. She then clawed her way to the top of Shanghai's legal profession. She was a short, square-jawed woman who projected intelligence, intensity, and toughness from the bench. Her career was her life. (She did not marry until 1937, when she wed an aide.) But in private she could be charming and persuasive. She was also politically astute. In the early 1930s she carefully cultivated a close personal relationship with the three most powerful women in China, the politically divided Song sisters (Ailing, Meiling, and Qingling). Not given to rhetorical flourishes, Shi Liang wrote and spoke straight to the point. Nor did she suffer fools gladly. She practised law on her own, specializing in civil-rights litigation. By 1935 her court appearances, especially in defence of a prominent dissident, became public events, and usually she won. When arrested in 1936 as a "gentleman," her treatment in prison was unusually polite, illustrating the respect she commanded as a public figure. One of her closest friends was Zou Taofen,

the prominent publisher and liberal, who was one of the "gentlemen" arrested with her.

The prison experience toughened Shi Liang's resolve as a social activist. After her release in the summer of 1937, she worked full-time in support of the war effort. With the fall of Shanghai in October, she followed two of the Song sisters (Ailing and Qingling) to Hong Kong. Then, in February 1938, she moved to Wuhan with the express purpose of organizing women in the interior for the war effort through the existing National Salvation Association network. But, finding herself in the midst of a social crisis of epic proportions, she switched priorities and became increasingly concerned about the refugee populations that were flooding into the city. It was she who mobilized the politically divided Song sisters, bringing them together in special appeals for refugee relief. There is little doubt that her careful orchestration of mounting attention in the press to the issue through public meetings pressured the GMD into making refugee relief a high priority. In this effort she had useful allies, like Zou Taofen's Shenghuo publications, which were particularly helpful in carrying her message. Although Communists such as Deng Yingchao (labour organizer and Zhou Enlai's wife) became involved as well, the CCP was late to see the importance of refugee relief as a cause and peripheral to the organizing effort.[23]

By late spring 1938, public opinion in Wuhan, whipped up by Shi Liang and her allies, cried out for government action. Left unresolved was who should take responsibility for what at the national, provincial, and city government levels. Much of the initial effort in Wuhan had taken place under private auspices and was led by the Hankou Chamber of Commerce president, He Hengfu. Although a nominal relief committee had been established by Chiang Kai-shek's central government in Nanjing during the autumn of 1937, its work was limited. The government only began to respond in earnest in February 1938, with the announcement of a high-level Zhenji weiyuanhui (National Relief Committee), under the Administrative Yuan (executive branch). In March and April an extraordinary session of the GMD was held in Wuchang and again refugee relief work was given high priority in speeches by Chiang Kai-shek and others. By the end of April, the National Relief Committee was operational, funded, and under the leadership of a venerable statesman, Xu Shiying (a former ambassador to Japan who had been active in refugee work in Shanghai in the early 1930s).[24]

From the end of May into mid-June, the committee conducted an investigation of what was already being done by government and private agencies in terms of providing shelter to refugees. The resulting report is revealing and important because it documents how Shi Liang pushed the state into deeper involvement in relief work.[25]

Traditionally, in the nineteenth century, the Qing state was involved in famine relief, running orphanages, and flood-control projects. Relief for the

poor, among them refugees, as well as attention to public health and local public works, including fire prevention, was left in the hands of philanthropists from the local elite (mainly merchant-supported "benevolent societies" or *shantang* in the case of Hankou).[26]

In the relief committee's report on Wuhan in 1938, investigators found 111 shelters operating in the Tri-Cities area. Of these, 18 were managed by local city-government relief societies *(zhenji hui)* of Wuchang, Hankou, and Hanyang; 13 were run by provincial merchant associations *(tongxianghui)* that had sprung up in the 1910s, 1920s, and 1930s; 15 were operated by Christian church organizations; the International Red Cross ran 4; the traditional "benevolent societies" *(cishan tang)* for which Hankou was famous ran 57 shelters; and 4 were managed privately. Out of the total of 111, 88 were in Hankou.

These statistics, however, are deceptive. Although fewer in number, the government-run shelters housed more than 20,000 people, or about 60 percent of the total number, and nearly all were located in Wuchang. Traditional self-help or merchant-run institutions operated in Hankou and Hanyang. The provincial-association shelters – Jiangsu, Anhui, and Zhejiang being the most important – housed only fellow provincials.[27] The Anhui association, for example, housed 6,933 Anhuinese by mid-June (which was dramatically up from 675 one month earlier) in nine locations around Wuhan. Church organizations used schools to house about 2,500 refugees, for whom they held special classes. Of the four shelters run by the International Red Cross, three were in Hankou. Each housed about 700, for a total of 2,681. Since the Taiping Rebellion, the benevolent societies *(cishan tang)* in Hankou had traditionally handled relief for the poor, including burial and public-health issues. Although in general their relief efforts were intended to be temporary and did not include housing, the war changed all that. In Hankou, the *shantang* were the first during the wars to offer shelter to refugees under the leadership of He Hengfu, and they were the most numerous in terms of location. But these "benevolent society" shelters served only a few families or a maximum of thirty people at each address and were limited to Hankou proper.[28]

Some sort of food rations usually went with shelter space for refugees, and an attempt was made to provide medical assistance as well. Much of the staffing was volunteer, recruited from the students and youth who were being organized by various groups all over the city. In sum, the National Relief Committee report found that by mid-June 1938, shelters were being provided in the Wuhan metropolis for 63,876 of the 430,000 people who had descended upon the Tri-Cities.[29] It was not enough, but the effort was significant. These figures on refugees served compare well with percentages of those helped by foreign merchants and governments in Shang-hai's foreign-concession zone in the autumn of 1937.[30] They also show major participation of state-run

agencies in the war refugee relief work for the first time in Chinese history. Although the traditional elite organizations such as *tongxianghui* and *cishan tang*, along with church organizations, did what they could, the refugee crisis was too great and local resources insufficient to make a difference. The government, living up to the professed ideals of a modern nation-state as much as circumstances permitted and in response to public opinion, stepped in to do as much as possible in the way of refugee relief.

The relief committee report also showed that special attention was being paid to the needs of refugee children, many of whom were orphans. Here again we find Shi Liang at the centre, earning a reputation as the heroine of Wuhan. Public concern about the plight of children had been first voiced in January 1938, in a public meeting organized by Li Dequan, social activist and wife of Gen. Feng Yuxiang. At that meeting Ms. Li asked Shi Liang to put together a campaign and organization around relief for the refugee child. Daily contact of citizens on the streets of Wuhan with child beggars in front of major restaurants, theatres, and other public places helped drive home Shi Liang's point, making organizing and fundraising easier. Politically, Shi Liang lobbied effectively, creating a movement that was nominally led by the Song sisters (Meiling, Qingling, and Ailing) in an unusual political coalition. Such a politically ecumenical approach attracted volunteers and support across the political spectrum and quickly produced concrete results.

Traditionally, during the Qing Dynasty, state-run orphanages served urban communities, so it was expected that the wartime government would manage child welfare work. By March, government education and nutrition action committees were created under a large umbrella child welfare organization *(nanmin ertong baoyu hui)* to care for refugee children, especially orphans. The *baoyu hui* was effective and became a model for later child welfare organizations in the PRC and ROC. As the organization's executive secretary, Shi Liang was careful to have the organization's steering committee include a coalition of leading GMD and CCP women, from Song Meiling to Deng Yingchao. Of the Song sisters it was Meiling (Mme Chiang Kai-shek) who was most active in the organization, giving speeches and often visiting orphanages. From Wuhan roots, more than forty state-supported childcare centres were established in southwestern China during the war. These centres succeeded in sheltering, educating, and nourishing hundreds of thousands of children under twelve years of age.[31] Agnes Smedley described the scene at Wuhan:

> Madame Chiang Kai-shek and her women followers were gathering thousands of war orphans from the war zone. One day I went into their headquarters just as another trainload of these ragged, lice ridden, half-starved children were being brought in. Dozens of women were shaving their heads, bathing and feeding them, and dressing them in fresh blue denim overalls.

> Long lines of these little tots were then marched through the streets to waiting boats or junks which transported them to the west.[32]

Shi Liang was also the organizer of a national umbrella committee for women *(funu zhidao weiyuanhui)* with the express purpose of mobilizing women for the war effort. After a special "summit" was held on women's issues at Lushan in late May 1938, the committee was formed with much fanfare. The goals of the organization remained vague and focused on war mobilization, not traditional issues such as women's rights, marriage laws, and voting rights. The Lushan meeting was chaired by Mme. Sun Yat-sen (Song Qingling) and dominated by Communist figures such as Deng Yingchao. The organization failed to become more broadly based, with relatively few GMD women leaders participating. As a result, little of substance was accomplished by the group during the early years of the war. And it had little direct impact on the lives of women refugees. Its main activity seemed to be sponsoring well-publicized rallies, at which Shi Liang and others gave pep talks to young women students and recruited volunteers for refugee relief work. Clearly women leaders such as Shi Liang were more focused on organizations more directly involved in helping refugee families, especially children, and on solving Wuhan's public-health crisis.[33]

The effort made in public health was another notable and important legacy of the Wuhan period. Malaria epidemics were especially serious among refugees, cutting a devastating swath through both civilian and military populations of Wuhan. Women and children were particularly vulnerable to disease, starvation, and exposure. In response, the most extensive pre-1949 effort in crisis management in Chinese public-health history was launched from Wuhan in 1938. Led by Harvard-trained Dr. J. Heng Liu, the elite of China's medical establishment from Beijing and Shanghai descended on the Tri-Cities in an effort to organize and deliver health care to civilians and soldiers alike.[34]

In 1938, Liu unified military and civilian health services under one health administration. His right-hand man in Wuhan was a former Peking Union colleague, Dr. Robert K. Lin (Lin Kesheng), a University of Edinburgh-trained overseas Chinese, who reorganized the Chinese Red Cross at its headquarters in Wuhan and Changsha around a new mission of penetrating the countryside. Lin was a remarkably effective and popular organizer. Within months he had fifty-three units staffed with volunteer doctors up and running. Each unit had three sections rendering aid to soldiers on the front as well as providing medical services in hospitals along the main lines of communication. The preventive section both immunized children and led sanitation campaigns. It also staffed camps and local hospitals on an emergency basis. The nursing section was organized similarly, and a third section comprised a team of surgeons who worked in field hospitals.

A major problem was the shortage of trained medical personnel, especially in the army. It was estimated that 90 percent of military medical staff had not been professionally trained. Thus Minister Liu gave high priority to the training of medical personnel and put his best man in charge – Dr. Robert K. Lin. In the spring of 1938, Dr. Lin opened an emergency training centre in Changsha that offered a three-month crash course for paramedics. There was a flood of student applicants. During the war Lin's centre trained the greatest number of medical personnel, first from Changsha and then from Guiyang.

In terms of public health, it was in Wuhan, and later Chongqing, where Drs. Liu and Lin's efforts made a noticeable difference. In a short time, public health and sanitation in the city improved. Vaccination and public-health centres were set up all over Wuhan. Existing hospitals, established by merchant-funded benevolent societies, were nationalized and put on a war footing. But these successes were limited to the cities. In the surrounding countryside, civilians and wounded soldiers received little or no care. Still, Wuhan represented a turning point in the organizational history of Chinese public health and an important new beginning.[35]

In part as a result of the June refugee report and the recognition by the summer of 1938 that Wuhan would have to be evacuated, the central government's National Relief Committee under Xu Shiying focused its attention on facilitating the evacuation *(shusan)* of refugees and the provision of services on the road. The Hubei provincial government played a major role in organizing transportation out of Wuhan by railway, boat, vehicle, or foot. Between June and November 1938, the central government created eight emergency aid centres along refugee routes (near train stations, major river ports, crossroads, and the like). At the same time, provisions were made to build refugee shelters at designated locations on the road. In 9 provinces, 26 central locations were established, with 132 branches; and a total of 166 "guest houses" for refugees became operational by the end of the year. In one way or another, this effort was said to have helped 3.5 million refugees during the autumn of 1938.[36]

To conclude, refugee flight during the initial years of the Anti-Japanese War changed the social and psychological landscape of modern China. The economic and political dislocations were the most obvious. Perhaps because Shanghai, Beijing, and Hong Kong were relatively unscathed physically and demographically by the war, historians have underestimated the level of disruption and its effects on society. In so many places, families were torn apart. As a human potpourri of class and regional differences with only poverty and fear in common, the refugee population drifted across the country and congregated by necessity in the central Yangtze Valley. Moreover, this flight to the interior of at least 100 million people was forced by a level of violence that left deep psychological scars. Brutalization of society as

well as survivor guilt were major postwar legacies of refugee flight. At the same time, during the defence of Wuhan in 1938, there were signs of renewal or the "blitz" effect. Out of the survivor mentality came a new level of community cooperation and increased state intervention. At Wuhan, a collective consciousness was forged that energized society in new ways, including the organization of a relief effort that was unprecedented in terms of Chinese history.

Notes

1 Theodore White and Annalee Jacoby, *Thunder out of China* (New York: William Sloane, 1946), 55.
2 Yuan Shuibai, in *Twentieth Century Chinese Poetry: An Anthology,* trans. Hsu Kai-yu (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1963), 375.
3 Jonathan Spence, *God's Chinese Son: The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996), 303.
4 One possible explanation points to the cumulative effects of violence on Chinese society since the nineteenth century and hence growing insensitivity on the part of twentieth-century governments and their statisticians to tracking population movements and losses or gains. See also Chapter 4, by Diana Lary.
5 Ho P'ing-ti, *Studies of the Population of China, 1368-1953* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), 236-48.
6 Li Wenzhi, *Zhongguo jindai nongye shiziliao* (Materials on China's modern agriculture), vol. 1 (Beijing: Sanlian, 1957), 151.
7 See Chapter 1, by Edward A. McCord.
8 William Rowe, *Hankow: Commerce and Society in a Chinese City, 1796-1889* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1984), 40-41.
9 Lloyd Eastman, "Nationalist China during the Anti-Japanese War, 1937-1945," in *The Cambridge History of China,* vol. 13, *Republican China, 1912-1949,* ed. John Fairbank and Albert Feuerwerker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 565. His source was Chen Ta, *Population in Modern China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946), 61-68.
10 Ch'i Hsi-sheng, "The military dimension, 1942-45," in *China's Bitter Victory: The War with Japan, 1937-1945,* ed. James Hsiung and Steven Levine (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1992), 180.
11 Wei Hongyun, *Kangri zhanzheng yu Zhongguo shehui* (The Anti-Japanese War and Chinese society) (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1997), 164-65.
12 *Dagongbao,* 21 November 1937 and 23 March 1938; Sun Yankui, *Gunande renliu: Kangzhan shiqi de nanmin* (Refugees during the Resistance War) (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 1994), 44-45.
13 Frederic Wakeman, *The Shanghai Badlands* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 7.
14 *Shen Bao,* 11 and 12 February 1938.
15 Wei Hongyun, *Kangri zhanzheng,* 169. See also Chapter 2, by Timothy Brook.
16 Sun, *Gunande renliu,* 69-71.
17 *Xinhua ribao* (Wuhan), 22 May 1938.
18 Sun, *Gunande renliu,* 75.
19 Shen Benwen, *Xiandai Zhongguo wenti* (Contemporary China's issues) (Shanghai: Shangwu, 1946), 261.
20 Sun, *Gunande renliu,* 79-80; Lu Fangshang, "Lingyizhong wiezuzhi: Kangzhan shiqi de jiatying yu hunyin wenti" (Marriage and family during the Resistance War), in *Jindai Zhongguo funushi yanjiu* (Research on modern Chinese women) (Taipei) 3 (August 1995) and "Kangzhan shiqi de qiandu yundong" (Moving the capital during the Resistance War), in *Jinian kangri zhanzheng shengli wushi zhounian* (Commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of victory in the Anti-Japanese War) (Zhuhai, 1996), 21-43. See also Shen

Benwen, *Xiandai shehui wenti,* for contemporary data on the social disruption. After the war, the disruption of the family and marriages became the subject of feature films.

21 Lloyd Eastman, *Seeds of Destruction: Nationalist China in War and Revolution, 1937-1949* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1984), 152-57. On Shanghai, see Wakeman, *Shanghai Badlands,* 7, and Feng Yi, "Le problème des réfugiés à Shanghai, 1937-1940" (The problem of refugees at Shanghai), *Mémoire de DEA,* Université Lumière-Lyon 2 (September 1993).

22 Sun Yankui, "Kangzhan chuqi Wuhan nanmin jiuji zouyi" (Refugee relief work in wartime Wuhan), *Wuhan luntan* 6 (1996): 43-48.

23 On Shi Liang, see Zhou Tiandu, *Qi junzi zhuan* (Beijing, 1999), 463-590, and Shi Liang, "Wode shenghuo daolu" (The path of my life), *Renwu* 5 and 6 (1983): 23-33, 76-90. In Shanghai the Communists did more effective organizing in refugee camps, recruiting new members and troops for the New Fourth Army guerillas; see works by Zhao Puchu, "Kangzhan chuqi de Shanghai nanmin gongzuo" (Work with refugees in Shanghai during the first part of the Resistance War), *Lishi ziliao yanjiu* 4 (1986): 31-50; as well as Feng Yi, "Le problème." Remarkable too was the fact that Shi Liang did not marry until 1937, well after her career was established.

24 Sun, *Gunande renliu,* 142-91. On He Hengfu, see *Wuhan renwu xuanlu* (Selected biographies of Wuhan personalities) (Wuhan: Wuhan wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui, 1988), 307-9, and *Wuhan wenshi ziliao* (Materials on the culture and history of Wuhan) (Wuhan: Wuhan wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui), no. 34 (1988): 173-74.

25 *Wuhan sanzhen nanmin shourongso yizhanbiao* (June 1938), from Second Historical Archives, Nanjing, as cited in Sun, "Kangzhan chuqi Wuhan," 44.

26 William Rowe, *Hankow: Conflict and Community in a Chinese City, 1796-1895* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1989), 92-186, and see Mary Rankin, *Elite Activism and Political Transformation in China: Zhejiang 1865-1911* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1986), on the subject of elite philanthropy in general.

27 On the important role of merchant *tongxianghui* or provincial associations in the urban life of early-twentieth-century China, see Bryna Goodman, *Native Place, City, and Nation: Regional Networks and Identities in Shanghai, 1853-1937* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).

28 *Wuhan wenshi ziliao,* no. 13 (1983): 155-67; no. 48 (1992): 180-85 on earliest *shantang;* see also Cishan hui, *Ge shantang zhuangli yange ji shiye qingkuang* (The history and activities of every benevolent association) (Hankou, 1945). See also Sun, *Gunande renliu,* 198-208.

29 Sun, "Kangzhan chuqi Wuhan," 44-45; for a history of the Wuchang YMCA, see Hubei lishi ziliao bianji weiyuanhui, *Hubei wenshi ziliao* (Hubei materials on culture and history), no. 5 (1982): 188-95.

30 Feng Yi, "Le problème."

31 Wei, *Kangri zhanzheng,* 174, and Sun, "Kangzhan chuqi Wuhan," 46; *Wuhan wenshi ziliao,* no. 18 (1984): 48-88; Mao Lei et al., *Wuhan Kangzhan shiyao* (History of Wuhan in the Resistance War) (Wuhan: Hubei renmin chubanshe, 1985), 220-23.

32 Agnes Smedley, *Battle Hymn of China* (New York: Knopf, 1943), 227.

33 *Wuhan wenshi ziliao,* no. 20 (1985); Mao Lei et al., *Wuhan Kangzhan shiyao,* 217-19.

34 In the early 1930s, Dr. Liu had headed the Peking Union Medical College before becoming Minister of Health in 1933.

35 Red Cross: *Wuhan wenshi ziliao,* no. 13 (1983): 170-74; also the US military attaché reported extensively on Lin's activities. J. Heng Liu papers, manuscript division, Butler Library, Columbia University. For pre-war background and an excellent bibliography, see Ka-che Yip, *Health and National Reconstruction in Nationalist China: The Development of Modern Health Services, 1928-1937* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996). On malaria epidemics, see Wu Renshu, "Kangzhan yu jiyi: Kangzhan zhanqi de yiqi yu yizhong (1940-45)," in *Zhonghua junshi xuehui huikan* 3, 1 (1997): 323-64. Among the refugee population, adult males survived the war in greatest number, demographically speaking.

36 Sun, "Kangzhan chuqi Wuhan," 46, and *Gunande renliu,* 331.

兵荒馬亂

The turmoil and chaos of war

Wutongye (Yuan Dynasty)

6
The Politics of Commemoration: A Comparative Analysis of the Fiftieth-Anniversary Commemoration in Mainland China and Taiwan of the Victory in the Anti-Japanese War

Chang Jui-te

The year 1995 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War and China's Anti-Japanese War. Countries throughout the world organized various large-scale commemorative activities. Taiwan and Mainland China were no exception, commemorating the event in a livelier than usual fashion.

Previous Commemoration

On the surface, the victory in the Anti-Japanese War is a glorious chapter in China's history and a point of pride for all Chinese, naturally worthy of commemoration. In reality, the attitudes of the Mainland China and Taiwan governments on commemoration have been extremely ambiguous. The PRC authorities' discourse on war commemoration and the scale of commemorative activities have often depended on the political climate between China and Japan. One ironic example occurred in 1991, when Japan's prime minister, Kaifu Toshiki, delayed his visit to China, originally scheduled for August, so he could attend the memorial ceremony for the victims of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima. The Chinese authorities agreed to Japan's request to postpone the visit. Ultimately, fearing controversy if Kaifu's visit coincided with the commemoration of the Nanjing Massacre, the PRC government cancelled its own commemoration.[1]

In Taiwan, commemorative activities for the Anti-Japanese War have only recently become popular. In part, Taiwan's efforts to maintain good diplomatic relations with Japan have influenced the scale of commemorative activities. Factions within the Nationalist government having close relations with Japanese conservatives adopted a low-key posture towards Japan. Public presentations on the history of the Resistance War were infrequent.[2] Only a few groups, such as supporters of *Zhonghua zazhi* (China Magazine), held annual memorial meetings.[3] These groups, however, never gained official support, and rumours circulated that government authorities obstructed their activities.[4] Political considerations have also impeded scholarly research, made doubly difficult by lack of access to archival sources.

Even Anti-Japanese War songs were banned in Taiwan, because their authors lived in Mainland China.

Political considerations have also influenced Taiwanese authorities in their decisions on whether to support research. After the Communist Party began to compile an official history of the Republic of China,[5] Taiwanese authorities, fearing that the authority of their own historical interpretation was threatened, promoted historical studies of Republican China.[6] The government sponsored ceremonies honouring important figures and events in the history of contemporary China. In 1977, the Taiwan government commemorated the fortieth anniversary of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the first time since 1949 that the government had commemorated the event.[7]

During the past decade, Western scholars have increasingly focused research on commemorations and analyzed the political dimensions of commemorative activities.[8] Here I use the commemoration of the victory in the Anti-Japanese War in Taiwan and Mainland China as a case study to compare the nature of discourse (its creation and promulgation) of the two actors and as a commentary on the differential political and social changes over the past fifty years.

The Fiftieth Anniversary on the Mainland

As reported in *Renmin ribao* (People's Daily), on 5 March 1995, PRC Prime Minister Li Peng announced that the entire country would hold grand commemorations to mark the fiftieth anniversary of China's victory in the Anti-Japanese War (6 March 1995)

Various educational institutions were required to promote activities commemorating the anniversary (11 April 1995). These activities would allow students to understand the turmoil caused by the war, and to inherit and develop the glorious tradition of resisting the foreign aggressor, thus building up the nation's self-respect and pride. They would also promote the official history that the Communist Party and the soldiers and people in the base areas were the core of the resistance forces against Japan. Students would acquire the Yanan spirit of self-reliance, struggle under hardship, solidarity, and service of the people.

In April, *Xinhua* (New China News Agency) cited statistics that showed that books on the Second World War and the Anti-Japanese War were among the top sellers of the country's publishing houses. Of 550-plus publishing houses, one-fifth had commissioned such publications, resulting in more than 250 titles. Of these 250 books, some 120 concerned the Anti-Japanese War (29 April 1995).

On the morning of 7 July, more than 2,000 delegates from every sector of Beijing gathered at the Marco Polo Bridge, where the war had begun, to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the victory and to lay the foundation for a group of commemorative sculptures. That same day, the Central

Military Committee conferred medals on ten Red Army veterans who had served in the Anti-Japanese War; 57,394 Red Army veterans received similar medals (8 July 1995).

On 31 July, the vice-chairman of the Central Military Committee, Liu Huaqing, affirmed that the Communist Party and the soldiers and civilians it had led in the base areas behind the enemy lines had been the mainstay of the Anti-Japanese War. Without their efforts, China could not have won the war (31 July 1995).

In August, party and government institutions nationwide paid homage to the veterans of the war. Students organized groups to interview veterans and collect material related to the war (15 August 1995). Veterans visited serving troops to recount their experiences, wrote articles commemorating the war, performed artistic programs relating to the war, and were interviewed by the press. Cadres held exhibitions of their own painting and calligraphy.

Every troop conducted patriotic teach-ins, taking as their central theme "The CCP was the mainstay of the force that led the Anti-Japanese War." Troops organized their soldiers to read history books, visit battlegrounds, tour exhibitions about the war, and offer sacrifices at martyrs' cemeteries. An exhibition at the Military Museum, *The Victory of the Chinese People,* was visited by 200,000 soldiers and members of the public. The television series *Zhongliu dizhu* (Mainstream Pillar) was broadcast by Central TV in prime time. Dancing troupes, drama troupes, and military bands performed special programs. Each military unit held concerts of Anti-Japanese War songs. Sixteen songs were selected by the Central Political Department, which sent out cassette tapes to the troops (15-29 August 1995).

Communist Youth Leagues held seminars with old comrades and visited historical sites relating to the war. For instance, the Beijing committee of the Communist Youth League organized seventeen public lectures within the span of two months (15-29 August 1995).

On the morning of 3 September, more than 10,000 Beijing residents laid flowers at the Heroes' Monument in honour of the Anti-Japanese War martyrs and paid their respects to 2,000 veterans. National leaders Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, Qiao Shi, Li Ruihuan, Zhu Rongji, Liu Huaqing, and others attended the ceremony.

That afternoon, Li Peng chaired a meeting in the Great Hall of the People to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary. In addition to reaffirming the official line on the war, Jiang Zemin expressed a harder line than in the past on the Taiwan issue:

> Within Taiwan island there does exist a force trying to divide the people and construct "two Chinas" or "one China and one Taiwan," thus destroying the great enterprise of peaceful reunification with the mother country.

> They brazenly go abroad, publicizing "a country with an independent sovereignty" and market "Taiwan independence" to foreigners, completely betraying the people's interests. History repeatedly demonstrates that anyone who tries to lean on foreigners to divide and betray the mother country will be thoroughly discredited and will stand condemned throughout the ages by the Chinese people. The Chinese Communist Party and Chinese government will use every means to maintain the mother country's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Any plot to divide China from within or abroad is doomed to fail. (4 September 1995)

Jiang touched on relations with Japan, pointing out that Japan's distortion of the history of China's invasion by the Japanese militarists would harm the friendly relations between the two countries.

> A correct dialogue and reflection on the history of invasion by the Japanese militarists is one of the most important bases to establish and develop Sino-Japanese relations. To distort this history will harm the long-term friendly relationship between China and Japan. (4 September 1995)

That same day, every major paper published the *People's Daily* editorial and articles that promoted nationalism by commemorating the victory in the Anti-Japanese War. Television stations broadcast commemorative programs that presented the CCP as the main force leading the resistance to Japan, ignoring or mentioning only in passing the resistance efforts of the Nationalist army.[9]

On 24 October, more than 300 Beijing residents convened at the Great Hall of the People to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the restoration of Taiwan. Li Ruihuan, the chairman of the Political Consultative Committee, presided over the meeting. Li declared that the Chinese people had a glorious tradition of resisting aggression. Fifty years ago, he said, many Taiwanese compatriots engaged in a heroic struggle against the Japanese aggressors. They expressed the people's moral courage and patriotic spirit in defending unto death their national sovereignty and territorial integrity.[10] A commentator pointed out that the commemorative activities of the Taiwan restoration were for the first time designated as a "national rank" commemorative activity, distinct from the so-called regular rank activities of the past.[11]

The Fiftieth Anniversary in Taiwan

On 25 April 1995, the Nationalist Party legislator Wei Yong proposed the building of a memorial hall to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the Treaty of Shimonoseki and a monument to commemorate the victory in the Anti-Japanese War. His proposal was passed by the National Legislature.[12]

On 5 July, the Standing Committee of the GMD passed the "Outline of the Commemorative Activities of the Victory of the Anti-Japanese War and the Restoration of Taiwan." Various types of activities were approved by the Central Standing Committee, including:

1 *Commemorative activities*
These were some of the activities held in Taiwan:
(a) a large meeting in Taipei to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of victory in the Anti-Japanese War
(b) meetings in each county and city in early September for the Anti-Japanese War and in late October for the fiftieth anniversary of Taiwan's restoration
(c) a memorial ceremony organized by religious groups for civilians and soldiers who had sacrificed their lives in the war
(d) evening parties, fairs, concerts, cocktail and tea parties, traditional folk activities, hikes, runs, and other commemorative activities
(e) commemorative stamps and a commemorative coin.
2 *Scholarly activities*
(a) a scholarly conference on the wartime history of China and Taiwan, including scholars from the Mainland and Taiwan
(b) a series of books commissioned by the Historical Commission of the GMD, including photo albums
(c) an exhibition on the history of the Anti-Japanese War.
3 *Promotion of government achievements*
This was to include an exhibition to show the major government achievements since the restoration of Taiwan, featuring the role of the GMD as the driving force behind the national reconstruction of Taiwan.[13]

On 5 July, the New Tongmenghui held a concert to commemorate 7 July, the day the war began. Several thousand people, including leading politicians Hao Peicun, Jiang Weiguo, Liang Surong, and several New Party legislators attended. The vice-chairman of the GMD, Hao Peicun, called upon the audience not to forget the contributions of the Anti-Japanese War. He urged the people to "Love the Republic of China and be loyal to the Republic of China" and called on them to invoke the *spirit* of the Anti-Japanese War, that is, "never fear hardship, never fear difficulties, never fear death."[14]

That afternoon, a special exhibition on the Anti-Japanese War opened at the Military Historical Museum. The goal of this exhibition was to "represent historical events so that viewers would be deeply moved within a short period of time and understand the historical process of hardship and struggle undergone by the Nationalist Army since the wartime resistance and national reconstruction. Furthermore, [the exhibit] would promote understanding of the present needs of military modernization and war preparation and

thus call on the people to foster the noble sentiments of respect for soldiers and love of country."[15]

On 7 July, during the session of the National Legislature, many lawmakers expressed their feelings about the anniversary. Eleven legislators held up cloth strips with the slogan "Commemorate the fallen compatriots of the Anti-Japanese War; insist on defending our national territorial integrity." Guomindang (GMD) legislator Wei Yong called on the people to commemorate 7 July and defend national territorial integrity. Li Minggao, Wu Demei, and other GMD legislators called for cross-straits cooperation and urged the PRC leaders to maintain broad minds and not oppress Taiwan diplomatically. Another GMD legislator, Pan Weigang, hoped that the Foreign Affairs Ministry would intensify demands on Japan to pay reparations and called on the Japanese government to publicly apologize for their aggressive actions.[16] The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) legislator Yan Jinfu expressed his grief, saying:

> I am grieving over the fact that the GMD during "7 July," [the war of] national subjugation, gave the Chinese Communists the opportunity to expel the GMD to Taiwan, even to the point that the GMD would disappear from the United Nations. Therefore, for those wanting to celebrate today, it should be the Chinese Communists. Because of "7 July," the Chinese who did not perform well [during and after the war] retreated to Taiwan; only then could they [the CCP] establish the People's Republic of China ... What I feel is the disaster that "7 July" has brought to Taiwan. Were it not for "7 July" there would not have been the mass deaths of the 28 February Incident.[17]

Another DPP legislator, Li Jinyong, stressed that the Anti-Japanese War represented the spirit of a people. When faced with foreign invasion, he said, they unite. The major threat to Taiwan's survival remained the CCP, which had never recognized the existence of Taiwan and maintained their right to annex Taiwan by force. If Taiwan wanted to commemorate 7 July, it should do so, said Li, by developing the spirit of unity and resistance against external aggression and concentrate its "spearheads" against the Chinese Communists.[18]

On 13 August, the New Tongmenghui organized a parade under the banner "I am a Chinese" to commemorate the anniversary of the victory and of Taiwan's restoration. Close to 20,000 people attended. Before the parade began, Hao Peicun gave a speech at the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall, saying that if one wanted to oppose the CCP's military threat and protect the safety and prosperity of Taiwan, everyone must use the vote to dismiss the Taiwan independence movement and unite to defend the Republic of China. He also condemned Japan for not admitting to their acts of aggression and war crimes.

In response to the parade, the DPP Taipei branch claimed that this type of parade, with such "ambiguous motives," was designed to justify the ongoing PRC missile tests and thus intimidate the Taiwanese. Branch member Gao Zhipeng pointed out that Jiang Zemin, in his "Jiang Badian" (Eight points relating to Taiwan, 1995), had advocated that "Chinese not fight other Chinese." Recently, he pointed out, the CCP had launched two missile tests over the Taiwan straits to intimidate Taiwan. The groups supporting reunification with China had taken to the streets yelling "I am Chinese." Had this been a response to the CCP's doctrine that "Chinese not fight other Chinese?" This New Tongmenghui parade, said Gao, strengthened the CCP's position of treating the Taiwan question as an internal affair and led people to suspect that the New Tongmenghui was inducing the CCP to rely on force to resolve the Taiwan question. It would not be too harsh, suggested Gao, to describe these people as Wu Sangui, in a reference to the man who let the Qing soldiers through the Shanhaiguan Pass to conquer China.[19]

On 3 September, President Li Denghui gave an address to commemorate the anniversary. Li pointed out that nationalism can invoke patriotic virtue in a people, especially when the country is in crisis, which can develop into an invincible force, as in the victory in the Anti-Japanese War. Li addressed Japan and the world community:

> The present government of the Republic of China on Taiwan is the government that led all Chinese to resist Japan during the war. Fifty-eight years ago, it was none other than the leader of the Republic of China who declared war against Japan. Fifty years ago, it was also the government of the Republic of China that accepted Japan's surrender. Furthermore, because of our traditional culture that emphasizes magnanimity, we did not take any means to retaliate against Japan. Then, the government of the Republic of China accompanied by other democracy- and peace-loving countries co-founded the United Nations and participated as a standing member of the Security Council. Fifty years later, the Republic of China still stands firmly in place. Not only has it made positive contributions towards the world's prosperity, peace, and stability, but it also has provided a model for economically developing countries and politically democratizing countries. However, over the past twenty some years, the international community including Japan has yielded to the Chinese Communist hegemony, causing the Republic of China to be cast out from the international stage. This situation was caused by traditional diplomatic thought, which not only is unrealistic but also is not in accordance with the principle of fairness and justice in the international community.[20]

The same day, President Li went to the Revolutionary Martyrs' shrine at Yuanshan for the annual autumn memorial for fallen soldiers and to an assembly at the Political Warfare College in celebration of the victory in the war.

On 25 October, the Taiwan provincial government held a cocktail party in celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Taiwan restoration. President Li pointed out that the Taiwanese society of fifty years ago was one in which people lived in poverty and the annual national per capita income was only $50 US. Fifty years later, Taiwan was the world's thirteenth largest trading nation, with a per capita income of $12,000 US and foreign deposits exceeding $100 billion US. Taiwan was an economic entity that the international community could not ignore. Li also noted that in recent years, Taiwan had expended great efforts in practising political democratization. By means of constitutional reform, the people themselves had begun to implement democracy. When the people elected the president and vice-president by direct vote in 1996, Taiwan would be a free, democratic, open, modern, and civilized society.[21]

That same day, Lin Yixiong, one of the DPP leaders, pointed out that many Taiwanese felt that after Japanese colonial rule, Taiwan had come under the rule of another externally imposed tyrannical regime. "Taiwan Restoration Day" marked the beginning of another period of prolonged misery; 25 October was meaningless to the Taiwanese and should be cancelled.[22]

That evening, the Taipei city government hosted a ball in front of the President's Hall in commemoration of the anniversary. Fifty thousand people attended. President Li Denghui delivered another speech, unlike the DPP presidential candidate Peng Mingmin, who refused to attend. Peng claimed that Taiwan Restoration Day was in reality another "Occupation Day of Taiwan" and so was not worthy of celebration.[23]

Differing Discourse of War Commemoration in Mainland China and Taiwan

In this section, I will compare how Mainland China and Taiwan commemorated the end of the Anti-Japanese War and the shaping and promulgation of their differing forms of discourse.

As the formation of a "civil society" in China remains in its initial stages,[24] it is only possible to analyze the official discourse of commemoration. In Taiwan, since the end of martial law in 1987, an open society has made the commemorative discourse more widespread and diverse. The discourse of commemoration in Taiwan has been shaped by two groups: the "commemorative group" (GMD and New Party supporters), which advocates the commemoration of the Anti-Japanese War; and the "anti-commemorative group"

Table 6.1

A comparison of the main points of war commemoration discourse across the Taiwan straits

		Mainland China	Taiwan	
			Commemorative group	Anti-commemorative group
Historical memory	Wartime historical facts	Historical facts of Japan's invasion of China, especially brutality	Historical facts of Japan's invasion of China, especially brutality	Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan and its modernization measures
	Commemorative days	7 July, 15 August, 2 September, 25 October	7 July, 3 September, 25 October	15 August, 25 October
	Resistance War leaders	CCP	GMD	
	People's traits leading to war victory	Yanan spirit	Chongqing spirit	
	Mass mobilization	China's united front, foreign and domestic war resistance, especially mass support of the Red Army	China's foreign and domestic war resistance	Taiwanese forced to join Japanese army or serve as sex slaves
	Postwar historical process	Progressiveness	Progressiveness	Falling into occupation again

Cross-straits relations		One country, two systems, opposing Taiwan's independence	Anti-CCP, anti-Taiwan independence, defending ROC	Anti-China, pro-Taiwan independence
Relations with Japan	War-induced problems	Opposes revival of Japanese militarism, demands Japanese apology for starting war, and demands reparations	Opposes revival of Japanese militarism, demands Japanese apology for starting war, and demands reparations (mainstream KMT faction and New Party)	Demands Japanese apology for starting war and compensation for Taiwanese forced to join Japanese army or serve as sex slaves
International status	International recognition	Shows China's hegemonic position	Seeks international recognition and UN membership	Seeks international recognition and UN membership
Visions of the future	International identification	Identifies international community, but oppose US and Japan's hegemony and interference in internal affairs	Identifies international community, obeys obligations as member of international community	Identifies international community, obeys obligations as member of international community
	Country's short-term development goals	Prosperity (economics, science, and technology)	Prosperity (economics and politics)	Prosperity (economics and politics)
	Country's future prospects	Wealthy, powerful, democratic, civilized, socialist modern country	Free, democratic, wealthy, and equitable Republic of China	Free, democratic, wealthy, and equitable Taiwan

(DPP supporters), which opposes the commemoration. I will compare the commemorative discourse of three groups across the straits in terms of their historical memory, cross-straits relations, relationship with Japan, international status, and vision of future prospects. These findings are summarized in Table 6.1.

Regarding the history of the war, commemorative groups in Mainland China and Taiwan emphasize Japan's invasion of China, especially the war crimes committed by Japan's army. On the other hand, the anti-commemorative group in Taiwan underscores Japan's colonial rule and its modernization construction in Taiwan. As for events worthy of commemoration, Mainland China emphasizes 7 July (the Marco Polo Bridge Incident), 15 August (Japan's surrender), and 2 September (Japan's signing of the surrender). In recent years, to promote Taiwan's reunification with China, 25 October (the restoration of Taiwan) has been added. In Taiwan, the commemorative group emphasizes 7 July, 3 September (Victory Day and Soldiers' Day),[25] and 25 October. The anti-commemorative group stresses 15 August and calls 25 October the end of the war in Taiwan.

On leadership in the war, mainland authorities highlight the role played by the CCP. The commemorative group in Taiwan emphasizes the role played by the Nationalist government. On "national characteristics" that enabled the Chinese to resist Japan, Mainland China underscores the "Yanan spirit." The Taiwan commemorative group emphasizes the very similar "Chongqing spirit." On mass mobilization, Mainland China emphasizes the United Front and the resistance of all people, including both domestic and foreign Chinese, particularly the mass support for the Red Army.[26] In Taiwan, the commemorative group stresses the resistance of all people, whereas the anti-commemorative group focuses on the history of the Taiwanese who experienced forced conscription and sex slavery ("comfort women").

On the construction of postwar history, Mainland China emphasizes the CCP's reconstruction efforts after the Civil War and the founding of the People's Republic of China. In Taiwan, the commemorative group emphasizes positive aspects in the wake of Taiwan's restoration, whereas the anti-commemorative group stresses that Taiwan once again became colonized and subject to an external political regime.

On present cross-straits relations, Mainland China adopts the "one country, two systems" policy and opposes Taiwan independence. In Taiwan, the commemorative group advocates an anti-Communist, anti-Taiwan independence platform and supports the defence of the Republic of China. The anti-commemorative group emphasizes opposing China and advocates Taiwan independence.

On the relationship with Japan, Mainland China opposes the revival of Japanese militarism and asks that Japan not only apologize for having launched the war but also pay wartime reparations. Yet the extent to which

this claim is emphasized depends on China's domestic and diplomatic situation. In Taiwan, within the commemorative group, the non-mainstream faction of the GMD and New Party supporters oppose the revival of Japanese militarism and also ask for a public apology and war reparations from Japan. The mainstream faction of the GMD supports maintaining good relations with Japan and thus does not emphasize this claim for reparations. The anti-commemorative group in Taiwan does not stress opposition to a renewal of Japanese militarism but emphasizes that Japan should apologize for having launched the war and pay reparations to the Taiwanese who were "comfort women" or who were conscripted by the Japanese army.

With respect to international status, Mainland China is prone to show the international status of a great power. Taiwan, whether for or against commemoration, emphasizes its aspirations for recognition by the international community and admittance into the United Nations. Mainland China stresses its identification with the international community but opposes the hegemony of the United States and Japan for interfering in its internal affairs. Both the pro- and anti-commemorative groups in Taiwan stress their identification with the international community and their respect for their obligations as a member of the international community.

On the subject of future prospects, all three groups seek continued prosperity as their short-term development goal. Mainland China stresses progress in economics, science, and technology, whereas Taiwan highlights its economic and political development. In its long-term vision, Mainland China emphasizes becoming a wealthy, powerful, democratic, civilized, and socialist modernized country. Taiwan emphasizes constructing a free, democratic, wealthy, and equitable Republic of China. The anti-commemorative group shares this same long-term vision, but centres its goal on Taiwan, not the Republic of China.

The commemorative groups in Mainland China and Taiwan have constructed a discursive system around the commemoration of the Anti-Japanese War while competing with each other for legitimacy. In the Taiwan commemorative group, the discourse of the GMD mainstream faction and the non-mainstream factions share certain similarities. Although the latter have a more pronounced anti-Japanese flavour, both groups compete for the status of "legitimate heir of the GMD." The Taiwan anti-commemorative group has constructed a discursive system regarding the commemoration of the war from the perspective of Taiwanese. This discursive system took as its antithesis the emphasis on China held by the commemorative groups on either side of the straits.

Although the three discourses have major differences, they also have many similarities, particularly their pronounced nationalism. Although totally different in their political positions, all reflect a potent nationalism. Since the language used by the three groups is heavily marked by nationalism,

this feature tends to reduce feelings of true mourning for the war dead. Second, all of the groups tend to emphasize the progress of the postwar period and the bright futures of their countries. Except for Taiwan's anti-commemorative group, which treats the postwar rule of the GMD as another state of colonization, the discourses of all three groups tend to highlight the positive in the postwar period.

Implementation of Discourse

I now analyze how these discourses were implemented in various types of commemorative activities in 1995. The following discussion comparing cross-straits production processes of war commemoration discourse is summarized in Table 6.2. In commemorative activities, the main "cultural producers" in Mainland China were members of the nationalist state apparatus. In Taiwan they were the state apparatus (GMD mainstream faction) and nationalist political groups (GMD non-mainstream faction and the New Party).[27] The cultural producers for the anti-commemorative group consisted of the nationalist political groups (DPP and others).

Minor cultural producers in Mainland China consisted of state-controlled groups (such as the China Writers' Association and the Literary Workers' Union), scholars, writers, artists, and others. In Taiwan, "civil society" groups, such as the Chinese Historical Association and the Taiwanese Historical Association, and intellectuals comprised the minor cultural producers of the commemorative and anti-commemorative groups.

In Mainland China, the key decision makers in the commemoration industry were party and national leaders. In Taiwan, they were the political party leaders, national leaders, civil representatives, social groups, and the mass media. Within the anti-commemorative group, the political parties, civil representatives, social groups, and the mass media participated in the decision-making process, reflecting the more democratic political process within Taiwan.

In Mainland China, internal meetings of the state apparatus were the locus of communication for the process of cultural production. In Taiwan, regardless of the political viewpoint, this locus was meetings of party and government administrators, public debate among civil representatives and government officials, as well as discussion circulated by the mass media.

In Mainland China, all cultural-production activities were under rigid political controls, especially those relating to historical memory. For instance, in Chongqing, the wartime Nationalist capital, many historical sites relating to the Communist Revolution still exist and are well preserved, most noticeably Red Crag Village, which served as the office of the CCP's Southern Bureau, Eighth Route Army, and New Fourth Army. However, the historical sites relating to the Nationalist government during the Anti-Japanese War, including the Nationalist government office building, the

Table 6.2

A comparison of the means of war commemoration discourse across the Taiwan straits

	Mainland China	Taiwan	
		Commemorative group	Anti-commemorative group
Major cultural producers	State apparatus	State apparatus (mainstream faction of GMD), nationalist political groups (non-mainstream GMD, New Party, etc.)	Nationalist political groups (DPP, etc.)
Minor cultural producers	Officially controlled groups, scholars, writers, artists, etc.	Civic groups, scholars, writers, artists, etc.	Civic groups, scholars, writers, artists, etc.
Main institutions and individuals in decision-making process	Leaders of state apparatus	Leaders of party and government, people's representative body, civic groups, mass media	Leaders of party and government, people's representative body, civic groups, mass media
Major place of communication	Internal meetings of state apparatus	Internal meetings of state apparatus, internal debate of people's representative body, discussion in mass media	Internal meetings of government and party, internal debate of people's representative body, discussion in mass media
State censorship of heterodox culture	Strict	Loose	Loose
Mobilization capacity	Strong	Weak	Weak

military command centre, and the anti-air raid command centre have not been preserved. If not torn down, they were transformed into offices of the local government or into housing.

Historical sites of the Nationalist government that have been preserved by the Chongqing government, such as the military police station, the machine gun post watching the office of the Eighth Route Army, as well as the Sino-American Special Technical Cooperative Organization (SACO) affiliated with the Bureau of Military Investigation and Statistics, serve only to vilify the Nationalists. In these sites, the government has even installed video and audio equipment to depict the crimes of the Nationalist government, namely the killing of CCP spies. The CCP has also appropriated and transformed monuments of the Nationalists to serve their own political ends. The monument to the Anti-Japanese War in downtown Chongqing that was erected by the Nationalist government was transformed into a monument in commemoration of the CCP's liberation.[28]

Since the market reforms of 1978, Chinese Mainland historians have conducted less ideologically driven research. At the same time, the study of the Anti-Japanese War has moved out of a "restricted zone." For instance, on the question of wartime leadership, different viewpoints have emerged. Most scholars now give a more positive reading of the Nationalist government's role in the war. The book *GMD: 1937 – Canlie beizhuang de Kangri qingjie* (The Nationalist Party, the GMD: 1937 – The bitter and tragic war front of the Anti-Japanese War), written by Su Jilu (the author's pen name), gives an extremely positive affirmation of the eight battles led by the Nationalist government during the early phase of the war. In the book's preface, the author even goes so far as to write:

> The worst disaster of this century that afflicted our people should never be forgotten. These heroic martyrs [of the Nationalist army] who sacrificed their lives for the survival of the Chinese people should never be forgotten. For this reason, we wrote this book to tell the Chinese people what happened in China. China experienced these types of days. China experienced these types of people.[29]

PRC authorities have reacted by imposing limits on this tendency. In 1994, the China National News and Publication Administration issued an official letter to "lower the temperature," that is, to curb publications of books on the Nationalist army and the war. In 1995, Li Denghui visited Cornell University, causing the tripartite relationship between the United States, Taiwan, and the PRC to become extremely tense. Li's visit contributed to greater restrictions on the press. China's national news administration publicly required the mass media, when reporting the commemorative activities of the Anti-Japanese War, to speak less of the Nationalist government's war

effort and stress the CCP's contributions. As to the European war theatre, journalists were to avoid highlighting the achievements of the Allies, such as the Normandy Landings, and to write more about the Soviet Union's contributions, particularly their resistance against Germany. Publishers were also required to print less about Nationalist war efforts and more about the CCP's contributions during the war.[30] With this order, the entire commemorative industry was greatly restricted. As a case in point, the film *Tiexue Kunlunguan* (Iron and blood at the Kunlun Pass) was quickly banned from being screened in major cities. The film, originally intended to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the war, had opened to popular acclaim in Guangxi. Yet because of its sympathetic portrayal of the heroic resistance of the Nationalist armies in Guangxi province and its neglect of the CCP's role, all promotional activities for the movie stopped.[31]

In Taiwan, with the exception of the war resistance films imported from Mainland China, which require approval of the Government Information Office, there are no examples of any commemorative activity being restricted by the authorities.

Finally, military mobilization capabilities also influenced the effect of the fiftieth anniversary commemorative activities. The mobilization capacity in Mainland China was obviously stronger than that of both pro- and anti-commemorative groups in Taiwan.

Surprisingly, although the ways in which Anti-Japanese War commemoration discourses were created across the straits were very different, they shared similarities. First, the discourses were highly politicized, with a prominent emphasis on nationalism. The tendency towards depoliticization that can be seen in the various types of commemorative activities in modern Western industrialized countries did not appear on either side of the Taiwan straits. Second, the main cultural producers and sponsors of commemorative activities consisted either of the state apparatus or political parties, which differs from the prominence of civil-society groups in the modern West. Third, in contrast to the commercialization of commemorations in Western postmodern societies, commercialization has played only a minor role in Mainland China or Taiwan, thus decreasing the potential degree of mass participation. Fourth, unlike postmodern Western societies, no emphasis has been placed on national diversity, as is apparent from the organizations, programs, and symbols of the commemorative activities.[32]

Anti-Japanese Sentiment and Factors Such as Patriotic/Political Education, Age, and Provincial Origin

Fifty years after the end of the Anti-Japanese War, Mainland Chinese still resent Japan and are dissatisfied with the PRC's low-key official position towards the Japanese government. According to a June 1995 public opinion poll conducted by the *Showa shinbun*, a Japanese newspaper, many people

in China and South Korea still deeply mistrust Japan, whereas the trust level has improved in Southeast Asian countries. The *Showa shinbun* interviewed roughly 800 people in seven large cities in Asia, asking their viewpoint on postwar Japan. When those surveyed were asked if Japan was now trusted by other Asian countries, 85 percent in Beijing, 78 percent in Shanghai, and 61 percent in Seoul responded in the negative. In contrast, 79 percent in Bangkok, 55 percent in Manila, 62 percent in Singapore, and 85 percent in Jakarta responded positively.[33] A large-scale survey of *Zhongguo qingnian bao* (China Youth News) readers conducted in 1995 revealed that 96.8 percent still felt angered by the tragic disaster inflicted by the Japanese imperialists during the war. Of those surveyed, 98.6 percent felt that the people should firmly keep in mind that segment of history.[34]

Patriotic education may explain why anti-Japanese sentiment is stronger among Chinese youth than among residents of other Asian countries. With the exception of those who personally experienced the war, images of the Anti-Japanese War, like other historical memories, are a social construction formed through programs, commemorative ceremonies, museums, monuments, popular histories, movies, plays, school textbooks, and children's literature.[35]

Since 1991, junior high schools in Mainland China have used a new history textbook. The main difference between the new and old editions is additional material on China's anti-Japanese resistance and the National Salvation Movement.[36] Textbook descriptions of the Japanese invasion use extremely strong and vivid language. High school history textbooks portray the Nanjing Massacre in the following terms:

> During the Nanjing Massacre, some of the Nanjing residents were buried alive, some were burnt to death, some were used as the objects of bayonet competition and had their intestines removed; women were killed after being raped. One-third of the houses in Nanjing were destroyed by fire. Corpses and bones were scattered, rubble piled up into hills, a prosperous historical city suddenly became a hell on earth. The debt of blood caused by the Japanese aggressors will never be forgotten by the Chinese people.[37]

Besides the school textbook, the PRC government has designated thousands of sites commemorating the Anti-Japanese War martyrs. These sites include memorials, monuments, towers, statues, martyr tombs, and cemetery parks,[38] all of which are designed to contribute towards mass patriotic education. People visiting the sites pay homage and recall the heroic achievements of the martyrs. Thousands of young people come to these sites to attend initiation ceremonies for the Communist Party, Communist Youth Leagues, production brigades, and schools. In 1995, more people than ever went to commemorative sites. In six months, the sites received 60 million

visitors.[39] Between its establishment in 1987 and June 1995, the Resistance War Memorial of the Chinese People, located near the Marco Polo Bridge, received more than 6 million visitors. During the first four months of 1995, over 300,000 people visited the memorial.[40]

Although many people visited commemorative sites, it is very difficult to estimate the extent to which they received patriotic education. In 1995, a newspaper reported that thousands of university students from Liaoyang, Shenyang, and Fushun visited Dengta county of Liaoning Province, the hometown of the anti-Japanese hero Li Zhaoling (1908-46). After viewing the martyr's statue and learning about the hero's deeds, thousands applied to their schools to be placed in areas of hardship upon graduation.[41]

Impressions left in visitors' books, albeit mainly positive in tone, also provide clues as to how the audience viewed patriotic education. For instance, an elementary school student, after visiting the Anti-Japanese War Memorial of the Chinese People, recorded the following impression: "Japanese imperialists tried to *xiaomie* (extinguish) the Chinese; this was really wishful thinking. Under the leadership of the CCP, the Chinese people defeated the Japanese aggressors. Today's happy life was exchanged for fresh blood. We must treasure it, study hard, and when we grow up definitely allow our country to become richer and stronger." Another student, studying abroad in Japan, wrote: "As someone who is studying in Japan, which formerly invaded our country, I can never forget this bitter history. My home country will always remain inscribed in my heart. Long live our country!" After visiting the Marco Polo Bridge, a military officer wrote: "There is no way to express in language my resentment against the Japanese soldiers and no way to express my feeling of respect for the Resistance War soldiers. I hope they can give me more driving force on my road ahead so that I can contribute to the development of our great country." A Foreign Ministry official wrote: "The living conditions of present-day Chinese compared to the past have improved countless times. Under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, we want to undergo bold reforms, further develop the economy, [and] strengthen the defence construction, allowing our country in all respects to lead the world and never again be humiliated by other countries."[42]

Nevertheless, some visitors to commemorative sites did not receive any political indoctrination. For instance, at the Marco Polo Bridge, a reporter found that some young visitors were utterly ignorant that the war had started at the site of the bridge. There were also some people who viewed the patriotic programs arranged by the CCP or the Youth League as a free trip.[43]

As many of the visits to the sites were officially organized, it is difficult to evaluate popular reaction to commemorative activities. On the other hand, the popularity of Anti-Japanese War books on the market can reflect popular attitudes to commemorative activities. One such book, entitled *GMD*

kangzhan xiaojiang: Yanhuang zhonghun lu (Brave generals of the GMD army during the Anti-Japanese War: Biographies of China's loyal souls) included more than eighty biographies of Nationalist generals who had sacrificed their lives during the Anti-Japanese War. Some readers were deeply moved and surprised that Nationalist generals could be so brave. This volume and the entire series of books, known as *Zhongguo Kangri zhanzheng shiliao congshu* (Series of historical materials on the Chinese Anti-Japanese War), had a first printing of 5,000 copies. At a 1995 Beijing book fair, the series was sold out within three days.[44]

Another report indicated that at the book fair at Beijing in October 1995, the series *Zhongguo Kangri zhanzheng jishi congshu* (Series of historical facts of China's Anti-Japanese War), published by the People's Liberation Army Literature and Arts Press, unexpectedly ranked among the top ten bestsellers. According to the sponsors of the fair, which attracted nearly one million people, 90 percent of the books sold were paid for in cash, indicating that most of the books were purchased by individual customers as opposed to book distributors. This particular series' popularity, notwithstanding its price of 386 Renminbi, showed that many Beijing residents were willing to spend money to participate in the Anti-Japanese War commemorative activities.[45] It is worth noting that among the twenty-three titles in the series, twelve described the war efforts led by the CCP, six described the war efforts of different social groups together with the United Front, two described the historical progress of the war, and only three described the war efforts led by the Nationalist government.[46] The series' content thus reflected the CCP's policy.

Not every series on the Anti-Japanese War was in such great demand. According to one Mainland China publisher, in 1995 certain publishing houses invested inordinate amounts of money to produce series for the fiftieth anniversary. Although these series were rich in content and beautifully designed and packaged, their thematic similarity caused most of them to sell poorly.[47] Receptivity to the commemorative activities was selective.

One last issue worth considering is to what extent different age groups had different reactions to the commemorative activities. A 1995 survey of Heilongjiang province elementary and high school students revealed that 87 percent of the elementary school students and 76 percent of the high school students did not know the year in which the Mukden Incident occurred. This survey, conducted by the Heilongjiang provincial television station, sought to pinpoint the achievements of the patriotic education. But the findings of the survey differed greatly from its creators' original expectations.

According to a reporter's interview, these findings were partly the result of didactic learning methods shared by students, which led them to emphasize test-based knowledge, in which history played only a minimal role. The

same survey indicated that students in regular schools had a greater sense of patriotism than students in key schools, because of a greater emphasis on the study of history.

In addition, students were influenced by their social environment. In terms of television-viewing habits among families, children only watched cartoons, fathers watched sport programs and foreign movies, and mothers watched Hong Kong and Taiwan soap operas. Almost no families watched programs that the Mainland China government had produced with the goal of improving the people's spiritual well-being. Likewise, students most frequently read romance and kung fu fiction.[48] These findings reveal that in a society fully supplied with information, it is very difficult to implement patriotic education.

Although postwar Taiwan, as compared to Mainland China, has received greater cultural influence from Japan, Taiwan's largely negative perception of Japan is similar to that of Mainland China. According to a 1995 poll, Taiwanese still had a love-hate relationship with the Japanese. The poll indicated that the younger the people, the more they were inclined to think that Taiwan's general image could not compare to that of Japan. Forty-four percent of respondents over the age of 55, 62 percent of the 35- to 54-year-old age group, and 67 percent of the 20- to 34-year-old age group felt that Japan's image was better than that of Taiwan. In terms of provincial origins, surprisingly, there was little difference. More than 60 percent of both the Taiwanese and Mainland Chinese felt that their image of Taiwan was not comparable to their image of Japan. Over 70 percent of the respondents even felt that Taiwan should learn from Japan. Nevertheless, few people liked Japanese. The survey indicated that 45 percent of Taiwan residents disliked Japanese, whereas only half this number liked Japanese. A further 34 percent were uncertain whether they liked Japanese.[49]

Fifty years after the end of the Japanese occupation, Taiwan residents still disliked the Japanese, and to no surprise, their feelings were linked to Japan's invasion of China. Many people on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary recognized that the Anti-Japanese War had a particular significance for Taiwan. The government's project to construct a monument commemorating the victory and the Taiwan restoration gained the support of many people. According to a telephone survey conducted by *Lianhe bao* (United Daily) in July 1995, 48 percent of the 1,045 respondents felt that the fiftieth anniversary of the Anti-Japanese War had a special meaning for Taiwan, in contrast to 15 percent who felt it held no special significance. Among the respondents, 37 percent did not express their opinions. Forty-two percent of the respondents supported the idea of building a commemorative war monument, but there were also 31 percent who felt it was unnecessary and another 27 percent who had no opinion.

Some people in Taiwan questioned whether the ruling party's motivation for celebrating the fiftieth anniversary on such a grand scale was to gain voters' support. Yet only 17 percent of the respondents held this view, while half of those surveyed disagreed. But was it necessary to hold such a massive commemoration? Respondents were roughly equally divided: 39 percent approved, and 33 percent disapproved.

After cross-analysis, the survey revealed that among GMD supporters, 58 percent supported and 25 percent opposed the building of a monument. Only 15 percent felt that the KMT was holding large-scale commemorative activities to gain electoral support, whereas 70 percent disagreed with this view. Among those who tended to favour the DPP and the New Party, more people opposed building the memorial than those supporting the project. Of these same respondents, as many as 35 percent doubted the motivations of the GMD's commemorative activities.

In addition, this survey revealed that 77 percent of the respondents had heard of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and half of the respondents knew that Japan had initiated the incident on 7 July, causing China to launch full-scale resistance. This result indicates that Taiwan residents have some understanding of the history of the Anti-Japanese War.[50]

Among the factors influencing Taiwan residents' acceptance of the commemoration activities, provincial origin and age were important variables. In 1994, the GMD legislator Han Guoyu sponsored a commemorative meeting on the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. He was especially concerned with the compensation of those Taiwanese who had served in the Japanese army. Han organized two sessions, recognizing that there were two types of people in Taiwan who had experienced the war, one that could speak only Mandarin and one that only spoke Taiwanese. In the morning session, Chinese from all over the world recalled their wartime experiences; in the afternoon session, the Taiwanese soldiers who had served in the Japanese army discussed the issue of compensation. Han discovered that the Taiwanese audience expressed absolutely no interest in issues relating to the Anti-Japanese War, such as the Nanjing Massacre, whereas Mainlanders felt that the compensation issue bore no relevance to their concerns.[51]

There existed in Taiwan great differences among people of different age groups regarding their acceptance of the war commemorations. Every 7 July there were groups who organized performances of Anti-Japanese War songs. These songs often caused elderly people to recall their experience of hardship during the war, even causing them to cry at the sight of the program alone.[52] However, there were also some of the younger generation, regardless of provincial origin, who declared, "You sing enthusiastically, but we are not moved."[53]

Shared Features of War Commemoration Discourse across the Straits and among the Public

In 1995, both Mainland China and Taiwan, in order to meet the demands of domestic politics and changes in the international situation, organized large-scale commemorative activities focusing on the fiftieth anniversary of the victory in the Anti-Japanese War. The three positions held on the commemorative activities – by Mainland China's commemorative group, Taiwan's commemorative group, and Taiwan's anti-commemorative group – each produced a different discourse through their own production process, but these different discourses also shared certain features.

First, each group's discourse had a pronounced nationalist flavour. Although different in their political position, the three groups' shared nationalism was expressed through:

1. Mainland China's opposition to US and Japanese hegemony and Taiwan's separatism
2. the Taiwan commemorative group's stance against Communism and the Japanese (principally by the GMD non-mainstream factions and the New Party supporters) and against Taiwan independence
3. the Taiwan anti-commemorative group's opposition to China.

Second, except for that of Taiwan's anti-commemorative group, which treated the postwar rule of the GMD as yet another state of colonization, the three discourses tended to highlight the positive historical development of postwar Taiwan and China and their bright future. This feature stands in contrast with some advanced countries, since after the broadening of the public sphere, elites did not congratulate themselves over their countries' progress and prosperity in their national commemorative activities. Third, all three groups ignored the issue of national diversity.

It is not easy to evaluate the influence of these commemorative activities on the general public, but based on available documentation, the following observations can be made. People on both sides of the straits did not passively accept the commemorative activities organized by the cultural centres, but responded in a variety of ways. In Mainland China, because of the lack of democratization, people accepted only what they were willing to accept or remained cynical, ridiculing the officially sponsored commemorative activities. In Taiwan, if people did not want to accept the official discourse on the war commemoration, they could directly participate in the debate over the commemorations. In some instances, ordinary people, such as the dancers in the square of the presidential office building, even fashioned their own commemorative activities, subverting the official

commemorative activities. In Mainland China, there existed a marked difference between elementary and high school students as well as between adults of different ages in their attitudes towards and acceptance of the war commemorations. In Taiwan, in addition to the age factor, party affiliations and ethnic identity also had a significant impact on attitudes towards the commemorative activities.

Notes

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妻離子散

Separated from
one's wife, one's
children scattered

Mencius

7

Between Martyrdom and Mischief: The Political and Social Predicament of CCP War Widows and Veterans, 1949-66

Neil J. Diamant

Disturbing News in 1956

From villages in Shanxi, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang provinces, the reports trickled up the administrative hierarchy: CCP war veterans and wives and family members of "revolutionary martyrs" *(lieshu)* were committing suicide. Some took poison, some threw themselves down village wells, some hanged themselves, and others used guns. When they were found, investigations began, usually at the initiation of county-level governments. What investigators found was as disturbing as the fact that people who were either heroes of the Chinese Revolution or members of their immediate family were dead at their own hands several years *after* victory had been achieved. What had apparently precipitated the suicides was maltreatment at the hands of local officials, who, together with other villagers, had ridiculed them, humiliated them, beat them up, raped them, and sometimes denied them food and housing. Feeling that they had no recourse, veterans of the People's Liberation Army and martyrs' widows preferred to take their own lives rather than submit to further humiliation at the hands of local political leaders.[1] Reports from Yunnan also noted quite a few suicides among military veterans, prompting provincial officials to instruct courts to deal harshly with those who precipitated them.[2]

At roughly the same time reports of a different kind reached the eyes of provincial officials. These, unlike the ones dealing with suicide, were far less sympathetic to the plight of widows of revolutionary martyrs. Lauded as exemplars of the idea of sacrificing one's future for the sake of the nation, some of these women were apparently not always inclined to or capable of living up to these high political ideals. In contrast to the widows who suffered at the hands of local officials, the ones in these reports were accused of having illicit sexual intercourse with officials and other villagers (among them men categorized as "bad elements") in return for good job assignments, and of otherwise engaging in "wanton" *(luan)* sexual behaviour. In other cases, soldiers' wives were accused of getting together

with village officials to write "Dear John" letters to their soldier-husbands informing them of divorce. These women, one report complained, "do not appreciate their own glorious status," and this is what had led many of them away from the correct revolutionary path. The solution: intensified "political education" to teach them about their unique and special role in maintaining the values that led to the CCP's victory in 1949 – values embodied in the hardships their husbands were enduring at the front. How successful these efforts were is difficult to know for sure, but the persistence of complaints about wives of mobilized soldiers having sex with local officials into the mid-1960s may be an indication that "education" rarely did the trick.[3]

Why should we be interested in these sorts of stories? In the sweep of history, whether in the form of the *annales longues durées* or Charles Tilly's "large structures and long processes," does it matter that PLA veterans and "martyr" families were at times victimized by local officials and at times clearly acting to maximize their interests in difficult circumstances? Should we, as President Bill Clinton would heartily recommend, ignore the sexual peccadilloes of public figures and concentrate instead on the main "stuff" of politics such as policies, legislation, and the like?

In this chapter I will try to show why this would be a mistake. Stories of local officials denying food and housing to war veterans and martyrs' families, reports dealing with suicide, and those complaining about the lack of chastity among village women who were expected to be political exemplars can tell us a great deal about the "big" issues in politics: What sort of state tolerates the abuse of those who sacrificed in its name? If the Chinese state, during a period when it was commonly seen as at the zenith of its power, was either unable to protect or indifferent to the plight of its most privileged political classes (all belonged to the "five reds," *hong wu lei*), the usual adjectives assigned to the state during this period (such as "strong," "penetrating," and "centralizing") may not be very useful.

Moving from the concrete to the abstract, how might we understand Chinese patriotism when people stood by while veterans were beaten and starved? What was the relationship between private and public virtue in China? These stories can also tell us a great deal about China-specific issues, as this sort of evidence does not quite fit into the "conventional wisdom" about a range of topics. Take the CCP efforts to implement family reform in rural areas during the 1930s and 1940s as an example. Some scholars argue that one of the main reasons the CCP backed off from implementing family reforms (such as making it easier to divorce) was because "the party" was worried about the wives of PLA soldiers divorcing their husbands given expanded opportunities to divorce.[4] Such concerns were certainly salient in the early 1950s as well, owing to the large-scale mobilization of troops during the Korean War. But if the party was so concerned about the possible

decline in military morale, then how do we explain cases in which wives of mobilized soldiers managed to secure divorce throughout the 1950s and 1960s? The state, it seems, was quite fragmented, even about an issue so vital to national security as military morale. Other ways in which new material on civil-military relations challenges prevailing wisdom are not difficult to find. If there is evidence showing that PLA veterans were treated much less than honourably back home, should we re-evaluate the now commonplace view treating the PLA as the most prestigious organization in the pre-Cultural Revolution years? Perhaps the notion that the PLA embodied revolutionary "virtue" was differently understood by different strata of the Chinese population.

Looking comparatively (historically and cross-nationally), this narrow slice of history also hints at broader importance than individual suicides or illicit sexual liaisons might initially suggest. The subject of martyrdom in "traditional" China has been the subject of a number of excellent studies. We know a great deal about chaste widows and widows who committed suicide after rape and also about statesmen who preferred to jump in a river than submit to a foreign regime. We also know about murdered student demonstrators whose friends called them "martyrs." However, we still know little about how "revolutionary" martyrs in the PRC, most of whom came from ordinary peasant backgrounds, were treated on a day-to-day level, normative prescriptions aside.[5] We have largely assumed that because this population had good class status and were lauded by the regime, they were also treated well by it and by the general public.

From a cross-national perspective as well, there is also much more than meets the eye when we consider the implications of suicide and sexual improprieties among the regime's most favoured classes. In other regimes that have won wars, or at least have been on the winning side of wars fought by more powerful countries, veterans and their families frequently received both honours (from the state and community) and material compensation. The post-Second World War "GI Bill" would be the example most familiar to Americans, but similar forms of compensation were given to veterans and their families in post-First World War France and England. In post-colonial Africa, war veterans often found their way into politics eased by the prestige that veteran status afforded.[6]

Veterans who have been on the losing side of wars, however, have often been neglected, for they were walking signs of a nation's humiliation. But even here the rule is not hard and fast: in post-Second World War Germany, SS officers who were convicted by the Allies as war criminals later received state pensions for their wartime "sacrifice" to the Fatherland.[7] The CCP and PLA clearly do not fit into this category, however, since there was never any doubt regarding the value of their sacrifice for the military victories culminating in 1949, and the regime, by promoting statist rituals

involving veterans and martyr and PLA families, was clearly interested in using the war experience to serve nationalist goals.[8]

Material compensation to those who sacrificed for the Revolution and those currently serving the state as soldiers, as in other countries, was seen as both morally imperative and necessary to maintain the livelihood of women who had lost their husbands.[9] But if at least some of the stories described above are true, it seems that there was a disjuncture between the way the state believed this population *should* be treated, given its glorious past and present, and the way they actually *were* treated. If such a disjuncture did exist, what sort of obstacles prevented good intentions from translating into positive outcomes? Why would those who sacrificed for the CCP's victory be treated in ways similar to Japanese war veterans, over whose heads hung ignominious defeat?

This chapter tries to answer some of these questions. I want to develop some concepts regarding the Chinese state and its rural communities that will help us understand how members of the most privileged political class in China might end up at the mercy of the very officials who should have been responsible for implementing central state policies as well as at the mercy of the same communities that were expected to accord them full honours. At the same time, I will seek to explain how the same people who were expected to behave very honourably by virtue of their high political status ended up undermining the moral legitimacy invested in them by the state. In short, I want to fill in the gap between what was legislated in Beijing regarding veterans and martyrs' and PLA wives and what actually happened to them.[10]

I have organized this chapter by taking the major groups who enjoyed high political status due to their association with past and present military activity and looking at the ways they benefited and suffered as a result of their high status. I begin with the official policy, then move on to what actually happened to PLA veterans and martyrs' and PLA wives in their urban or rural communities. At the outset, however, I wish to re-emphasize that the assumption in the secondary literature is that high political status *translated* into high social status and material benefits not available to the ordinary population; few scholars of the post-1949 politics in the PRC would contest the proposition that it was much better to be a martyr's wife than an ordinary peasant woman, or that it was better to be a PLA veteran than an ordinary peasant male. Drawing attention to the benefits and the costs of political privilege allows us to see the often large discrepancy between policies as they are drawn up in Beijing and their implementation at the local level, as well as the social tensions generated by preferential treatment programs. It was in the middle ground between Beijing and local communities and between policy and values that many of these people had to negotiate their political and social status.

PLA Veterans

In the comparative literature on the political role of war veterans, scholars have emphasized veterans' tendency to support "rightist" causes and their natural proclivity for leadership upon returning from war. Interwar Germany has been the prototypical example of the former sort of involvement, and post-colonial states prototypes of the latter. Hitler, of course, is the most well-known individual war veteran who turned to right-wing politics, but he would not have been able to lead Germany into the Second World War had he not had the support of veterans' groups. German war members had difficulty adjusting to post-First World War society and looked back at their "front experience" as a period when loyalty, friendship, sacrifice, and commitment were the defining responses to mass death in the trenches. After their experience, many veterans viewed everyday routines and "bourgeois" matters such as money as antithetical to the defining experience of their generation.[11]

Studies of new or post-colonial states have focused less on the political inclination of veterans than the extent to which they were capable of assuming leadership roles. Hardened by war, more worldly owing to their travels, veterans found a natural fit between their experiences and the demands of political leadership. In Israel, top political and economic posts are consistently awarded to military veterans, with the plum positions going to decorated war heroes (for instance, Ariel Sharon and Yitzhak Rabin from the Six Day War of 1967; Ehud Barak, the former Labour leader, for his anti-terrorist commando raids; and Moshe Dayan for the 1956 Sinai Campaign and the Six Day War). Only a minority of these ex-generals were right-wing, because the establishment that promoted them over the years was the socialist Labour Party, suggesting that in many countries the issue is not left/right affiliation but pro- or anti-*establishment*, left or right.

In China, as in Israel, the political position of war veterans does not easily fit along a left-right continuum, for obvious reasons. Nor could their position be described as either pro- or anti-establishment, since after 1949 there was no other "establishment" aside from the CCP to be either for or against. Instead, I would suggest that the political situation of PLA veterans be conceived of as either "in" the political-military establishment or "outside" it. In the former case, PLA veterans joined village or townships militias and other security units; in this capacity, they were responsible for much mischief. In the latter, however, they were often victims of the political and military institutions their former comrades joined. Exactly how veterans ended up either "in" or "out" is beyond the scope of this chapter, but my reading of the sources suggests that the timing of demobilization was important: if soldiers returned to a village where a local or "native" leadership structure had already coalesced, veterans often found themselves on the

outside; in areas where a civilian leadership structure did not exist or was weak, veterans quickly became insiders.

According to official policy, it was virtually inconceivable that PLA veterans (or their dependents) would be victimized by the very same political system they helped to establish and by the society that they helped to "liberate." In 1949, Beijing established its basic guidelines regarding treatment of PLA veterans in the new state, guidelines whose basic spirit was similar to the post-Second World War "GI Bill." This document stated that "dependents of those who have given their lives for the revolution and of the members of the revolutionary forces who are in need shall receive preferential treatment from the state and from society. The People's Government shall make appropriate arrangements for disabled or retired servicemen who have participated in the revolutionary war, providing them with the means of livelihood or with occupations."[12]

Providing such assistance, however, was not expected to be limited to state-run programs. Unlike the "GI Bill," Chinese preferential programs vis-à-vis PLA veterans, dependents, and widows were to operate hand-in-hand with community support; that is, neighbours or fellow villagers, out of recognition of veterans', soldiers', or martyrs' sacrifices, would *voluntarily* lend them a helping hand. Given how hard it was for soldiers to adjust to civilian life after many years in the military, the need for assistance – whether directly from the government or from the community – would necessarily be extensive. Many soldiers had left their villages to join the PLA at a young age and, after having spent many years away from home, were no longer accustomed to agricultural labour; those who ended up in cities had little in their background that would allow them to become productive members of an urban industrial workforce.

Veterans who had been wounded in battle were in particular need: their work capacity was often seriously diminished and their bodies' aches and pains required medicines that were often in scant supply. Responding to the needs of this population, the state allocated subsidies either on a regular or temporary basis, but in doing so made sure to warn local officials not to grant subsidies "indiscriminately," but instead to account for rank upon leaving the service and degree of physical difficulty. In the early 1950s, these subsidies were supposed to be disbursed by municipal or county-level Bureaux of Civil Affairs *(minzheng ju)*, or BCA. By 1959, it was estimated that close to 670,000 former servicemen, of whom 200,000 to 300,000 were permanently disabled, received state aid (whose total sum was 254 million yuan), which included cash, medicine, and rehabilitation programs.[13]

After 1950, however, municipalities and counties were instructed to place the responsibility for caring for this population in the hands of lower level administrators in residence committees (in cities) and townships (in rural

areas). After collecting information on needy veterans in their area, these officials were expected to report the numbers to the district and municipal level (in the city) and to the county in the countryside. Other forms of assistance included arranging for employment in factories or for other jobs that did not require a great deal of skill. In the countryside, agricultural work demanded different forms of assistance, which included "substitute tilling" (which required that peasants be assigned to a veteran's plot to work the land) from the early to mid-1950s and then, when "agricultural producers cooperatives" increasingly dominated the rural economy, in the form of extra "work points." These extra points were designed to guarantee that the work points earned by veterans' families "not fall below that of the average" for families in a rural community. Again, the BCA, particularly at the residence committee and township levels, was charged with implementing this and other preferential-treatment programs (such as bringing in students to visit PLA families at homes and in hospitals, sending their children to school, and so on).

State intentions and policies notwithstanding, evidence shows that not one of these provisions easily translated into practice. Both at the level of the state (BCA) and community, many veterans found that aid and assistance promised was not easily forthcoming, and that the same communities that were expected to come to their assistance were reluctant or unwilling to do so.

Whether in the city or the countryside, the key organization standing between the state's coffers and that of the deserving veteran was the Bureau of Civil Affairs, so any explanation of the grey area between intentions and outcomes must begin with it. In 1950s China, there was probably no organization with more roles to fulfil than the Bureau. Its wide-ranging, somewhat baffling administrative portfolio included everything from marriage and divorce registration to famine and drought assistance to resettlement of refugees to welfare programs for the poor to minority affairs and opium addiction, all in addition to handling compensation for martyrs' families and PLA dependents.

At the same time, those who staffed its ranks were often drawn from the military, whose discharged veterans were often quite young, often minimally literate, and had no experience dealing with the daily tasks that fill many a welfare officer's day: interviewing, investigating, and filing paperwork. More importantly, BCA officials, as administrative officials, had no *direct* leverage over party cadres managing enterprises or other work units in cities, nor over village or township officials in the countryside. As much as BCA officials might have wanted to help PLA veterans, between them and the veteran stood someone else, whose relationship to the veteran was often entirely different. This, together with the low-skill level of BCA cadres, virtually ensured that a large percentage of funds disbursed from

Beijing's coffers would be blocked or somehow "lost" somewhere along the route.

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, reports on the administration of aid to PLA veterans in urban areas were filled with complaints that indicated a wide gap between central state guidelines and what happened in practice. The first sign of difficulty was spotted early on, when state investigators noticed that the "preferential" feature in the criteria for distributing aid was all but ignored by local BCA officials. According to the official guidelines, PLA veterans' living standards should either be equal to or above the "average" denizen of the area. But what sort of people did "average" include? In many cases, this average was calculated purely from an economic standpoint, without considering political class status or the extent of sacrifice to the Revolution. What encouraged this sort of calculation was the absence of administrative differentiation between "welfare" to the poor and "preferential treatment" programs to the regime's privileged classes. As a result, preferential-treatment programs were often administered as if they were ordinary welfare programs, and PLA veterans were often treated as if they were "ordinary" poor.

In the 1950s, however, the absence of a sharp distinction between the two programs made the political position of veterans particularly problematic, since many people had recently *become* poor because they were politically disenfranchised. Among these were former Guomindang officers, former landlords, political prisoners, and others who would often be the targets of political campaigns. According to a 1954 BCA report from Beijing, local administrators "forgot their [the administrators' own] class standpoint" by feeling excessively "sympathetic" to these people. As a result, not a few looked upon aid to "bad class" elements the same way they would treat "charity" to the poor. The unintended outcome was that former GMD officers ended up receiving the same amount of state aid as PLA veterans simply because both were considered "needy poor."[14] Similar problems were also noted in BCA internal reports in the early 1960s: "Our work methods are shallow, crude, not routinized, and very little political education is being done vis-à-vis the five black classes."[15]

Placing PLA veterans (and their dependents) in the same category as other urban poor – as "welfare" cases – led to a certain style of treatment at the hands of state authorities. As in many welfare systems, early PRC efforts to prevent the death of the urban poor by distributing free rice or by granting small sums of money were riddled with mismanagement and fraud. BCA officials, many of them new to their jobs, were criticized for giving away excessive amounts of aid, being easily swayed by tales of woe, or acting far too "bureaucratically," that is, not handling welfare distribution on a case-by-case basis but instead according to simplistic rules of thumb. This was said to be occurring even among BCA cadres who had been at their positions for

several years. "Some cadres have worked for two years and still don't know anything about welfare policy."[16] Even after high-level officials explained what the policy was, many low-level administrators "just didn't get it."

Likewise, when dealing with veterans, BCA officials were said to avoid differentiating between new recruits and veteran soldiers or between currently mobilized soldiers and veteran revolutionaries – everyone got the same amount.[17] The extent of waste was such that work teams would be sent into urban neighbourhoods to figure out how people were using their aid (not a few took their free rice, sold it, then went to a restaurant for a feast!) and how welfare rolls might be reduced. Reports indicated that these officials often acted quite harshly with people, asking personal questions and requiring them to fill out extensive forms. In some areas, interviews succeeded in reducing the welfare roll by some 65 percent; on the other hand, PLA veterans and family members of mobilized soldiers felt that they were being unfairly investigated. Some thought that the price for receiving assistance was too high. One family member of a PLA veteran said: "It would be easier if we took down our honorary plaque *(guangrong pai)*; that way we wouldn't have to deal with all this hassle."[18] In other cases, however, aid was demanded even if the family could get by without it. Some said: "Not getting benefits is not glorious," and "Why should we have to live like everyone else?"[19] Sometimes these arguments helped, sometimes not; in the absence of well-functioning bureaucracies, decisions were often made in an ad hoc fashion, frustrating the social scientist seeking recurrent patterns. What is clear, however, is that those who were refused aid did not simply bow before authority. Many veterans and their family members who were taken off the rolls immediately trotted off to the BCA office, where they reportedly "created a racket." The BCA, they complained, "investigates a lot but solves only a little" *(diaocha duo, jiejue shao)*.[20]

At issue here is not so much the absence of good intentions; by almost all indicators, the state sought to use veterans and their families, martyrs' widows, and the stories of mobilized soldiers to "educate" the rest of the population about the importance of sacrifice for one's country. This can be seen in the sort of "civil religion" built around this population.[21] During Spring Festival, for instance, veterans and martyrs' widows and families went out to tell their stories of glory and heroism while students and neighbours made quasi-religious pilgrimages to widows' homes to do their laundry and hang honorary plaques and certificates on the entrance to their homes and walls. These activities occurred annually but reached their strongest intensity during the Korean War, the Great Leap Forward, and in the years prior to the Cultural Revolution, when society at large was told to emulate the PLA.[22]

Good intentions, however, frequently fell victim to bureaucratic bumbling. BCA reports devoted to Spring Festival activities dedicated to veterans

and others associated with the glorious PLA frequently included two to three pages detailing what had been done, but concluded with three paragraphs devoted to "mistakes." Most of these centred around general disorganization, lack of planning, officials rushing about hither and thither between offices, excessive meetings, and procrastination. Others focused on BCA officials' own "bad attitude" towards their assignment, which resulted in these occasions becoming pro forma affairs devoid of meaning to participant and official alike.[23] One would have expected that by the early 1960s, more than a decade after the establishment of the PRC, organizational problems common to the early years would have been resolved, but apparently this was not the case. A 1964 report, for instance, noted that many BCA cadres, "Even after nine years of work ... still do not know the policies, objectives, or the importance of their work; the problems haven't been huge, but the situation has become increasingly chaotic."[24]

But it would be unfair to blame the large gap between intention and implementation only on the bumbling BCA. The BCA had overall responsibility for implementing education and welfare activities among PLA veterans, soldiers, and their families, but the main organization enveloping urbanites was the *danwei*, or "work unit."[25] It was the danwei, not the BCA, that had the most comprehensive knowledge about the needs of its citizens, and its party secretary certainly had more power to deny or add benefits to his workers than BCA officials.

Given this power structure, it was somewhat understandable that BCA officials thought that once they managed to arrange for a veteran's employment in a factory or office, their role was finished and the danwei would "take over" from there. This arrangement might have worked well had danwei party secretaries been attuned to the special needs of veterans, or else highly cognizant of the value of their sacrifices for the Revolution, but often this was not the case. PLA veterans, many of whom came from peasant backgrounds, were often the targets of discrimination on the factory floor and were denied the benefits they deserved. In other cases, veterans were assigned to what were called "inappropriate" danwei, but when they complained about their assignment, the BCA paid them no heed, since they believed it was the responsibility of the new danwei to find them another job. As one BCA report complained: "Officials finish their job and then just relax."[26]

The solution to this problem was quickly identified: "strengthening the ties" between the BCA and work units. This, however, was much easier said than done given the strong vertical lines of authority *within* organizations and the weak horizontal ties *between* them. This problem, of course, was not limited to the BCA's relationship to work units. The relationship between the Women's Federation and courts, courts and work units, the police and residence committees were likewise characterized by an inability to coordinate,

plan, and carry out policies that affected people over whom they shared joint responsibility.[27]

If the main result of the CCP's urban political structure was to leave veterans and their families wandering in the wasteland between bumbling bureaucracies, in rural areas, the structure of rural politics left veterans in a far more precarious situation. According to BCA guidelines, county-level officials had overall responsibility for administering funds and programs to help demobilized veterans readjust to civilian life, and they, in turn, would be assisted by BCA officials in district and township governments. Villages, however, were only loosely connected to the BCA. This turned out to be a fatal flaw in the system, a flaw that left some veterans dead and others beaten and bruised.

The massive demobilization of the PLA during the 1950s placed returning veterans in an extremely difficult situation in villages. During the years they had been away at war, a political leadership in the villages had coalesced around participation in a number of CCP activities, particularly land reform and anti-counter-revolutionary campaigns. Village officials, such as the village chief and the chair of the peasant association, saw no personal benefit in awarding preferential treatment to returning veterans. On the contrary, veterans, with their revolutionary credentials and experiences, were seen as a threat to these political leaders' new-found power and identity, and often took drastic steps to lower veterans' expectations of their political status in the village. In other cases, demobilized soldiers who immediately assumed leadership positions were resented by other village officials for their sudden ascent into power.

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, scores of reports authored by county-level BCA officials emphasized the tension-ridden relationship between PLA veterans and local officials, especially village and township cadres. As might be expected in the countryside, one major source of tension was land. PLA veterans who returned to their villages often found that the best plots had already been distributed and that local officials controlled whatever land was left over. Many of the latter were completely unsympathetic to veterans' predicaments, and even less inclined to consult the official guidelines regarding the resettlement of veterans. As a result, many veterans were assigned rocky and otherwise difficult-to-till plots, making their everyday existence in the village very difficult. Upset by this reception, some veterans were not even on speaking terms with their village cadres.[28]

In some cases, however, veterans were not able to work the land, so the question of the land's quality was moot. Some veterans lacked agricultural skills, while others returned disabled from the war and were thus unable to engage in demanding physical labour; others had debilitating chronic diseases. Even in these cases, there is little evidence to suggest that local cadres made any effort to ease veterans' way back into rural society. Veterans had

to make their own way from the village to the township (and to the commune after collectivization) to get basic medicines, but even after arriving at the BCA township office, they were given the bureaucratic runaround: incomplete forms, a torn official discharge letter, or the lack of medical certification were all grounds for delaying or refusing veterans' requests outright. Many then made their way back to the village in the same pain in which they had left. The spate of suicides among veterans, county reports noted, often resulted from their inability to realize the rights and benefits they had been granted by national legislation, particularly with regard to the medicine and rehabilitation that could have made them productive members of rural society after their discharge.[29]

Political power, perhaps even more than land, was another bone of contention between village cadres and returning veterans. In the early 1950s, local elections were held in many areas of rural China. These elections, like those that took place in CCP base areas during the Anti-Japanese War, were mainly intended to strengthen the party organization by weeding out people who were either politically unreliable or had committed some sort of policy "deviation" during previous political campaigns.[30] In this sense, veterans were ideal candidates for political position: their war experiences had already proved their commitment to the party, and many had been away from the village when the rural political revolution was at its most intense (and many mistakes had been committed) in the early 1950s.

In the eyes of villagers, moreover, veterans were often preferred to village cadres who had risen to their posts only through activism during land reform, and in elections, villagers often chose veterans over sitting officials. Village officials, however, refused to abide by "democratic" procedures and vacate their posts. Instead, they spread rumours and hearsay about veterans' military service, suggesting that the latter had been dishonourably discharged or even purged for political reasons. One cadre, for example, said, "The army didn't want him, so why should we give him a position?"[31] In other cases, village cadres resorted to violence to prevent veterans from assuming political posts. Beatings of veterans by local officials were mentioned in a number of reports.[32]

Completing the triangle of veterans' difficulties was marriage. In many poor villages, marriageable young women were as scarce a "resource" as rich, fertile farmland. Much like the politics over land distribution, the politics of marriage were competitive and frequently ruthless, shaped by the availability of women, the resources men could muster to attract women, personal vendettas, and, of course, love. In this competition, veterans who had not found their way into local politics (as village officials or heads of security units or militias) were clearly outgunned and outmanoeuvered by the politicians.

Take, for example, a case in Hebei province. In Yangzha village, a demobilized veteran named Xia Guozhu fell in love with a woman from Five Mile Shop village (Wuli dian) named Qu Xiuzhen and wanted to marry her. A member of the village security unit, however, had previously lent money to Xia, which Xia had been unable to repay. Holding a grudge against Xia, the security official refused to allow the marriage, claiming the two had already engaged in illicit sex. Incensed, Xia threatened to commit suicide. Evidently this caused enough commotion to bring the village chief to the scene. The village chief told Xia that he was "looking for an opportunity to kill a veteran." Xia and Qu were then tied up and hauled to the county seat. When they were finally released, the couple was so distraught they made a suicide pact. For their last meal they purchased good wine and food, in addition to cord to hang themselves. Their fulfilment of the pact was eventually prevented by an observer.[33]

But not only veterans like Xia had little recourse but to threaten suicide.[34] Xia's disadvantage may simply have been his inability to mobilize any coercive force against his detractors; we might expect that village chiefs, who were nominally in control of the village militia, would not be subject to such abuse. Although there is no systematic evidence on this issue, some evidence suggests that village heads who had been elected by virtue of their veteran status might also become victims of abuse in matters of the heart and marriage. The case of a village chief in Dagao village in Tong county is a good example. In Dagao, the village chief, a demobilized soldier, was apparently involved with a young woman. The village militia chief was not happy about this, so he and some others followed the village chief and his lover and managed to catch them while they were having sexual relations. Afterwards, the militia chief and his buddies made sure the two remained apart and managed to have him thrown out of the party.[35]

PLA veterans who found it impossible to navigate their way in local politics were not defenceless, however. Some were well aware of the existence of institutions far more powerful than the village, township, or even county. The more that township-level organizations avoided responsibility, the greater was the demand for higher level intervention. But just who would be the veterans' cavalry to ride in and topple these bureaucratic fortresses? According to a number of sources, many veterans believed they had a fundamental right to appeal directly to *central* state authorities. Veterans, who had served many years in uniform, apparently felt that a certain amount of reciprocity was due to them by the central government, and that a single letter from Beijing would go very far in breaking local barriers to their reentrance into civilian life.

Here, relevant comparisons might be the Civil War veterans in the United States, whose demand for generous pensions was justified by calling for

the "fulfillment of a contract which the government made with its soldiers when they enlisted," or to First World War veterans who descended upon Washington in the 1920s, the "Bonus Marchers."[36] As in the United States, where veterans appealed to Congress, in China, veterans' appeals came in the form of letters to the National People's Congress or in visits to the capital. During the early 1960s, such visits to the capital were common enough that the Beijing Bureau of Civil Affairs called them a "disturbance of the public order" that also "harmed agricultural production." The Beijing BCA did not blame the veterans but instead blamed the local governments, which had either ignored the policy guidelines, could not match the predicament of "their" veterans to the policy, or were excessively bureaucratic.[37]

Veteran Mischief

Comparative studies of war veterans have shown the difficulty of drawing hard and fast conclusions about their political inclinations. In Europe in the interwar period, some veterans were well-known supporters of rightist causes (Ernst Jünger in Germany, for instance), while others became resolutely pacifist; the majority, however, lay somewhere in between, anxious to make up lost time and politically uninvolved.[38] In China, as noted earlier, the main cleavage among veterans was not along a right/left axis but an "inside/outside" one; the veterans described above were clearly in the latter category, and as a result suffered many political, economic, and social misfortunes. This group, at the very least, demonstrates the need to look behind class labels (most veterans were as "red" as one could get) to determine how individuals were treated by the state, as well as the need to disaggregate the concept of "legitimacy": for some veterans, Beijing, or the "party centre," was clearly more legitimate than township or county offices. It would, however, be wrong to suggest that *all* veterans suffered from discrimination, dirty politics, and difficult love lives. Many, as the paragraphs below demonstrate, were *insiders,* and were as likely to take advantage of their positions to secure economic, political, and sexual benefits as some of the village cadres depicted above.

Nowhere was the position of PLA veterans in local leadership structures as important as in the southwest. Unlike other areas of China that had been "liberated" before the CCP formally took power in 1949, Yunnan, Sichuan, and Guizhou had been under GMD control until very late in 1949 and early 1950, and as a result had very few CCP officials capable of implementing central state policies. Because land reform, collectivization, and other policies tended to follow Beijing's "political clock" rather than local ones, Beijing had to make do with the PLA soldiers and veterans who had only recently finished various "mopping up" operations against the remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's army, landlord militias, minority headmen *(tu si),* and various bandit groups.[39]

These soldiers and veterans, however, should not only be seen in a political and military light, as state agents assigned to fulfil certain state goals. Sociologically, they were members of communities and families; physiologically, they were male – and these different identities were also important in shaping their behaviour. In the early to mid-1950s, probably the most relevant element of their daily existence was loneliness and sexual frustration. After many years at war, PLA soldiers who arrived in the southwest from northwestern base areas (in some counties, almost 100 percent of county-level cadres hailed from the northwest[40]) saw in their new situation opportunities for political and sexual gratification. Unlike Northern territories such as Hebei, Henan, and Anhui, which had established peasant associations and village governments prior to 1949 and could prevent veterans from quickly rising in the political hierarchy, in the southwest the ex-soldiers found themselves in virtually virgin political territory.

According to new intraparty sources, veterans found many opportunities to satisfy their lust for power and women. Often, the objects of their desires were not those considered "politically correct" by the regime. A Women's Federation investigative report on cadre discipline, for example, found that many recently demobilized cadres at provincial, county, district, and township governments, as well as public-security bureau officers, frequently engaged in illicit sex with prostitutes, family members of "counter-revolutionaries," "female criminals," and even wives of the bandit leaders they themselves had executed. In Gujin county, one report noted, the county chief himself had sex with the wife of a bandit during the pacification campaign. After becoming pregnant, the former bandit wife rented a bridal carriage and scoured the countryside for the county chief in order to "hold him accountable" for his actions. In another case, a deputy township chief used four militiamen to try to abduct and marry a landlord's widow. Fortunately for her, she managed to escape before the raiding party reached her home.[41] There were also many reported incidents of rape and abuse of women among demobilized solders at district, county, and township levels.[42]

Such incidents occurred not only at the level of individual soldiers and veterans taking advantage of isolated women. There were also many instances of veterans operating within the structures of newly created CCP rural institutions, particularly as village and township chiefs and militiamen. In the early 1950s, many of these abuses came in the context of the campaigns to enforce the 1950 Marriage Law, a law that allowed women easier access to divorce. Divorce threatened what many veterans thought they deserved after many years at war: easy (or easier) access to women. In Chuxiong (Yunnan), for instance, there were reports of village cadres locking up women divorce petitioners (for up to three weeks) and raping them while in prison, punishing women who requested divorce by assigning them to construction work, stringing up the first woman in the village who

requested divorce at peasant association offices for other women to see, preventing free-love marriages, conducting struggle sessions against adulterers, chopping off body parts, and threatening widows seeking to remarry. In one case, officials prevented a couple seeking a free-love marriage by forcing them to write a "guarantee" that "they wouldn't marry during their entire lifetimes."[43]

Militias, which were often staffed by macho villagers and demobilized soldiers, were said to be particularly abusive of their power. In their official role, militiamen were expected to serve as an auxiliary force at the disposal of the village's political leadership. In practice, however, militiamen initiated action against men and women whom they believed disrupted the social order, even if this conception of "order" had nothing whatsoever to do with politics. Some reports complained that militiamen were particularly active in exacting revenge on women and men caught having illicit affairs in the fields, and that they "kept watch over adulterers more vigilantly than over landlords." [44]

The policy guidelines issued by the Yunnan provincial government instructed militiamen and cadres to cease "monitoring adultery and sex, forcing confessions, humiliating and tying people up, hanging, beating, and organizing struggle sessions" and blamed these actions for the rash of suicide attempts by both men and women. The rise in suicides resulting from these abuses of power at the lowest level of the political structure was coupled, however, with a concomitant increase in the number of abuse cases received by higher level institutions such as courts. Faced with village and township officials who were willing to take extreme measures to prevent young women from abandoning young peasant males, courts and counties in Yunnan became the preferred institutions for protection and getting justice. Just as disenfranchised veterans in other areas of the country sought justice in higher level institutions, so too did those who *suffered* at the hands of excessively franchised veterans.[45]

Martyrs' Widows and PLA Wives

According to Mamphela Ramphele, the political widow "embodies a desired social memory about the fallen hero and the nobility of the commitment he made to the struggle. A widow must demonstrate a worthiness to personify that social memory for the benefit of society."[46] In the sense of representing a political cause, the situation of the political widow is quite different than the "ordinary" one, whose husband or father does not fill a paragraph, page, or chapter in the annals of a movement or a state's official "history." Sociologists and anthropologists have often described widows' predicament, particularly that of young ones, as one involving "danger" to her community: still able to bear children, unattached, and sexually desirable, the widow tempts married men and threatens to disrupt family life.

Not surprisingly, in Europe, Church leaders and other moralists focused on the need to keep widows from "straying" from the proper path through sermons, charity, and community-leadership roles.

Alongside their association with danger, however, widows have also been portrayed as moral paragons, particularly if they demonstrate their loyalty to their husbands by killing themselves – the Hindu *sati* is a good example of this, as are various *lienü* (virtuous women) in the Chinese tradition.[47] *Political* widows, however, bear an even greater burden. Not only must they continue to live in communities where the basic "unit" is the family or kinship group, but they are also forced, simply by virtue of the manner of their husband's death, to act in ways deemed acceptable to the movement to which the latter belonged. Becoming a political widow is usually not a decision made by the widow herself, but by, as Ramphele astutely points out, "political movements in the[ir] contest for moral space following the fall of heroes in the struggle for power."[48]

All political movements and states have quite a few "heroes" – warriors, statesmen, industrialists, or leaders of social movements – but those who qualify as "martyrs" are notably fewer; not all dead soldiers, or even "heroes" qualify as "martyrs." Martyrdom, a concept found in many religions, is usually attached to those who died either a *defiant* or a *voluntary* death for a large, often abstract, "cause."[49] It is not enough "merely" to have died during the course of battle for a righteous cause; martyrdom often requires evidence of *extraordinary* death, a death whose example can serve to mobilize others for the "cause." Revolutionary politics, in this sense, require martyrs as well as heroes, since most political leaders who call themselves "revolutionary" claim to represent new, dramatically different, social and moral orders. Of course, the line between "hero" and "martyr" could be blurred. In festivals of the French Revolution, for example, the picture of Marat, who supposedly died a martyr's death, was held up alongside those of Voltaire and Rousseau, mere "heroes." But it is often the case that martyrdom demands a sacrifice qualitatively different than that of "ordinary" heroes.[50] From the perspective of the martyr's widow, the burden she must bear, and the benefits she might gain, are perhaps the greatest should the "cause" eventually succeed. Not only is she drawn into political circles by virtue of her husband, but she is also expected to comport herself in ways that would not disappoint the memory of her martyred husband or his political comrades.

The Chinese Revolution, like the French, American, and Russian ones before it, produced its martyrs and heroes during the course of its long struggle for power, first in the cities and later in the countryside.[51] The CCP's student supporters who were killed by foreign troops in the 1920s and 1930s, for instance, were often called "martyrs" by their classmates. They would

also produce pamphlets describing the martyr's life history and the tragic circumstances of his death *(lieshi zhuan)* in their effort to mobilize public opinion. Student martyrs, it was believed, provided a potent symbol for others to rally around because of their leading role in society.[52]

Including students in the revolutionary pantheon of martyrs was relatively easy; most wrote letters and articles; many kept diaries and talked to other articulate people. Such commemoration, however, does not change the fact that most deaths in the Communist cause were not of students, but of peasants, the majority of whom were illiterate, left behind few documents, and had few friends who could communicate their life stories to a wider audience. Communist *heroes*, on the other hand, were more amenable for inclusion in the revolutionary narrative for the simple reason that death, let alone a martyr's death, was not a requirement. Soldiers fighting valiantly in the Korean War or on other fronts could easily be described as "heroes" and their wives given hero status without the construction of altars or memorials or the composition of elegant verse.

The disproportionate number of educated martyrs included in various lieshi zhuan does not suggest that peasant martyrs and heroes were entirely forgotten, but that the method of commemoration and valorization would have to be different. Rather than write accolades to peasant martyrs for publication in various collections, the party relied mainly on the class label and the benefits that would accrue to their wives and family members, or *lieshi shu*, or *lieshu*. Like PLA veterans, lieshu and PLA soldiers' wives and family members enjoyed very high political status. Moreover, women belonging to the PLA family and lieshu category were expected to receive material benefits, such as assistance with the harvest, medicine, and affirmative action for their children in educational opportunities. If martyrs were the dead nobility of the Revolution, their wives and children were considered its aristocratic children, who deserved, by virtue of their husband's or father's sacrifice, to be pampered and placed on a high political pedestal. Certainly the high political status of former prime minister and current National People's Congress Chairman Li Peng, whose father was a "revolutionary martyr" and who was adopted by Zhou Enlai, suggests that the party took care of the family members of its fallen heroes.

But was this always the case? New evidence greatly complicates the conventional wisdom of a grateful state creating privileged status groups and of "the party" caring for the families of those who died in its name. As with the case of PLA veterans, there was often a wide gap between policy formulated in Beijing and its implementation in villages, and there was a concomitantly large gap between martyrs' families' formal political status and the level of respect and honour they actually received by fellow villagers. It would, however, be wrong to portray these women as only historical *subjects*

whose identity was created by a state eager to create a reservoir of heroes and fill post-revolutionary "moral space." As we will see below, martyrs' wives exercised a good deal of agency.

As in the case of PLA veterans, I have little doubt that the regime's intentions vis-à-vis martyrs' wives were strictly noble. I am convinced that central state leaders were truly committed to enhancing these women's status and assuring their livelihood. This can been seen in various welfare provisions and programs and their red political label. The way things actually worked, however, cannot always be derived from good intentions or policy prescription, and the case of martyrs' wives is a good example.

From the very beginning, the very concept or category of "martyr" was problematic, and this, in turn, complicated the status of their wives and family members. Unlike cases of students who were killed by British in the May Thirtieth Movement (1925), where the death was witnessed by the articulate elite, deaths during the height of battle – whether in the Anti-Japanese War or the Civil War – were often more anonymous, and thus more complicated to categorize. In the early 1950s, Beijing found itself swamped by letters penned by county and provincial officials inquiring just what sort of death qualified a person as a "martyr" or "hero": Was a pro-Communist village chief who was killed while running away from a Japanese aerial attack a martyr? Was a paramilitary unit leader who supported the CCP in skirmishes but later committed suicide a martyr? Were PLA veterans who were heroes during the war but later died of illness in their villages martyrs? And what about revolutionaries who were executed or who died in accidents? Regarding women, would wives of martyrs who married counter-revolutionaries be allowed to retain their designation as "wives of revolutionary martyrs"?

Given the messiness of battle, these questions were not surprising, and their scope was testimony to the difficulty of trying to squeeze complicated reality into the tidy boxes of political categories. Resolving them was even more difficult, since at the township, district, and county levels, many officials could not even read, let alone reach wise decisions in cases where details could make all the difference.[53] Many wives of dead soldiers therefore could not get into the esteemed ranks of "wives of martyrs" because they were either unable to convey the circumstances of death clearly (even if the death was in fact heroic) or because local officials were themselves confused about official guidelines. Even though the Ministry of Interior answered many of the questions posed above, subsequent reports showed that implementation was at best spotty.

But even when a woman was able to prove that her husband deserved to be categorized as a martyr, the benefits that were expected to flow to her by virtue of this status were not smooth in coming. Many reports indicated that one of the main programs designed to help martyrs' families in villages

– the "substitute cultivation" program – was extremely unpopular: many peasants refused to lend widows a hand, and cadres sometimes used high-handed measures to force peasants to work widows' land. In other cases, cadres refused to allocate extra labour to martyrs' families because of labour shortages in the villages, forcing many of them to become supplicants of their extended family just to bring in the harvest.

Yet another method for alleviating martyrs' wives difficulties – the mutual aid team – was also fraught with problems. The government established a scale of benefits to martyrs' families geared to their economic status. This policy proved to be a disincentive to entering the teams, since martyrs' wives feared that any rise in their economic status would mean that they would lose their benefits. When this happened, they were criticized as becoming "too dependent" on the government *(yilai sixiang)*. But even in cases when martyrs' wives sought to enter the teams, many peasants refused to accept them. As women, their labour input was considered too small to justify their inclusion. As a result, peasants only seemed amenable to accepting those martyrs' wives who were able to provide the team with draft animals, or money of their own.[54]

The restructuring of the rural economy in the late 1950s further complicated state efforts to protect and enhance the status of martyrs' families. For some village cadres, the establishment of the commune meant that commune officials, not them, were responsible for handling martyrs' families. Wives of lieshi who came to them for assistance were simply told to go to the commune BCA for help.[55] This would not necessarily be a problem had commune officials read (and understood) the relevant documents, but in many instances they failed to read the communiqués from Beijing. Some BCA officials, on the other hand, were reported to be overly bureaucratic, insisting on all the necessary documents and refusing to grant assistance if even one signature was missing. As a result, not a few wives of revolutionary martyrs who needed assistance, because their land was not fertile or because they could not get other villagers to help with tilling and harvest, had to make do without any assistance from local authorities. In these cases, some martyrs' wives adopted the same strategy as PLA veterans who were abused by village- and township-level cadres: direct appeal to the top. Not a few martyrs' wives made the trip all the way to provincial capitals and Beijing (from Henan or Anhui) to request audiences with central state leaders, clearly believing that their benefits should reflect their high political status. Others wrote to the National People's Congress.[56]

It was not always the case that martyrs' wives endured bureaucratic rigidity and could not collect their due benefits. Many were able to take advantage of the organizational and "conceptual" chaos that frequently prevailed in BCA offices to get more benefits than they deserved or even benefits they did not deserve. In the annual investigative reports on BCA work, a frequent

complaint was that BCA officials "blindly distributed aid," giving money even to women whose husbands had left for Hong Kong in the early 1950s, or to women whose husbands were killed in the Anti-Japanese War while fleeing their village during an air raid, or to those who for other reasons "did not deserve it." Their basic rule of thumb was: "the more they ask, the more they get; if they don't ask, they don't get" *(duo bao duo fa; bu bao bu fa)*, a "policy" that led higher level investigators to accuse BCA officials of excessive "egalitarianism" *(pingjunzhuyi)* and squandering state resources.[57]

On occasion, martyrs' wives and village cadres collaborated to misreport income and increase manpower in the village by fabricating martyrs' wives' dependence on the substitute cultivation program; in other cases, martyrs' wives themselves would tell fabricated sob stories exaggerating their degree of worthiness.[58] BCA officials, confronted by determined martyrs' wives and lacking the means to conduct a thorough examination of each and every detail of their stories, frequently acceded to these requests. Other villagers, however, were more knowledgeable about martyrs' wives' true situation, and grew increasingly angry at their benefits. Why, they asked in the late 1950s and 1960s, should martyrs' wives receive benefits when the country has long been at peace? The BCA, which was partially responsible for the strained relations between peasant villagers and martyrs' wives, then called for "improving relations" between them.[59]

To understand the situation of martyrs' wives in villages, however, we need to look beyond economic changes and the state. Until they remarried (and this itself could be a problematic issue if they married a "bad class" husband), they remained widows in the homes of their dead husbands' families. In the best of circumstances (such as in a well-off village), this was a highly precarious position for a widow to be in, but it could be even more precarious if she did not have children. Without her husband's protection, such a woman was often surrounded by her husband's brothers or other relatives who wanted to lay claim to her. She could also be the target of predation by political officials, for whom access to village women was considered one of the perks of power.[60]

During the 1950s and 1960s, rape and sexual abuse happened often enough that investigators took notice. The sources do not indicate whether or not the martyr's wife had already remarried, but a good guess would be that instances of rape would be more common prior to their remarriage than afterwards. Marriage, however, would not always prevent village cadres from trying to seduce martyrs' wives, and some reports hinted at cases of adultery *(luan gao guanxi)*. The degree of consensuality, of course, is difficult to determine. It would seem that both parties would have something to gain from such a relationship: vulnerable widows could gain patrons, and the patrons could enhance their "face" and line their pockets through association with and possibly marriage to a wife of a revolutionary martyr.[61]

Conclusion

This chapter attempts to reconcile new evidence about the way the Chinese state dealt with its most privileged classes with the treatment that might have been expected according to state intentions and secondary sources on the subject. In other words, this chapter explores the grey area between policies formulated at the top level of China's structure and their implementation in the middle and at the bottom level, between intentions and the often unintended consequences. As we have seen, many policies concerning veterans and wives of revolutionary martyrs, well intentioned as they were, were often ignored, misinterpreted, or manipulated by officials at multiple levels in the Chinese administrative hierarchy. At best, people who were supposed to benefit received more than their due share; at worst, the distortion of official policies, whether owing to political and community ill will or administrative "bumbling," resulted in not an insignificant number of suicides, as well as instances of rape, beatings, and political disenfranchisement.

On the other hand, it was often this very same "bumbling" – a concept that I believe is fundamental to understanding how the Chinese Communist party-state works at the grassroots level – that allowed some people to take advantage of the system in order to get more than they deserved or to behave in ways that were considered either highly unorthodox and sometimes criminal. In short, veterans and revolutionary martyrs' wives could be both beneficiaries and victims of the system designed to guarantee their privileged status in Chinese society. Insofar as the secondary literature has emphasized the former aspect of this system, my assigning more or less equal weight to privileges *and* their costs (even if unintentional) may help nudge thinking on civil-military relations in new directions.

This chapter, in addition to dealing with the nitty-gritty details of policy implementation (or lack thereof), has also, somewhat gingerly, attempted to introduce some methodological suggestions. In a path-breaking article published in *The China Quarterly* several years ago, Joseph W. Esherick politely attacked the tendency in some of the China scholarship to view the party-state as a monolithic organization independent of the rural society from which it emerged. To capture the myriad ways the party interacted with society, Esherick suggests that we "analyze the internal composition of the party-state and the complex relations among its different levels" and not draw too thick a boundary between the "peasant" and "the party."[62] This chapter has attempted to do just this by taking an anthropological, or "bottom-up" perspective on the state.[63]

The interaction between state and citizen inside party offices and organizations such as the Bureau of Civil Affairs allows us to appreciate just how difficult it is for central state officials to govern China. Here was an example of ordinary people looking for creative ways to take advantage of new

opportunities, and local officials being either unaware of, or confused about, national policies. If we can find so many instances of policy gone awry among the most privileged Chinese, we can only imagine what sort of bumbling went on with regards to other, less politically sensitive, issues.

Probably one of the main faults of the literature on Chinese politics in recent years has been its downplaying of the messy stuff of politics in favour of relatively elegant and straightforward models (structural, rational choice, principal-agent, etc.). As this chapter has shown, however, elegant models cannot always capture the all-too-common "mess" of Chinese politics – instances when the final outcome of policy is very different than the original intentions owing to miscommunication, apathy, incompetence, or entrenched interests. To remedy this analytical shortcoming, perhaps we should aim not for models as such but for, as Max Weber would argue, useful *concepts*. By calling attention to the role of "bumbling" in policy implementation and through looking at institutional variations in the state's legitimacy, I have taken a step in this direction. As more and more archives open to foreign scholars, further evidence of "administrative bumbling" and the wide variation in how citizens view different state institutions will force us to revise much of the conventional wisdom about state-society relations in China.

Notes

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1 Dongcheng District Archives (hereafter DCA), 11-7-89, 128-29.
2 Chuxiong Prefectural Archives (hereafter CXA), 11-77-14B-1 (1956), 23.
3 Neil Diamant, chap. 6 in *Revolutionizing the Family: Politics, Love, and Divorce in Urban and Rural China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).
4 Kay Anne Johnson, *Women, the Family, and Peasant Revolution in China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).
5 See Mark Elvin, "Female virtue and the state in China," *Past and Present*, 104 (August 1984): 111-52; Susan Mann, *Precious Records: Women in China's Long Eighteenth Century* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996); Susan Mann, "Widows in the kinship, class, and community structures of Qing Dynasty China," *Journal of Asian Studies* 46, 1 (1987): 37-57; Richard L. Davis, *Wind against the Mountain: The Crisis of Politics and Culture in Thirteenth-Century China* (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1996); Jeffrey Wasserstrom, *Student Protests in Twentieth-Century China: The View from Shanghai* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991).
6 On First World War veterans in Europe, see Stephen R. Ward, ed., *The War Generation: Veterans of the First World War* (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1975); on Israeli war widows, see Lea Shamgar-Handelman, *Israeli War Widows: Beyond the Glory of Heroism* (South Hadley, MA: Bergin and Garvey, 1986); on Nigeria, see James K. Matthews, "World War I and the rise of African nationalism: Nigerian veterans as catalysts of change," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 20, 3 (1982): 493-502.
7 On Japan, see Hiroko Storm, "War widows in postwar Japan," *Asian Profile* 20, 2 (1992): 125-36; on Germany in the period after the First World War, see James Diehl, "Victors or victims? Disabled veterans in the Third Reich," *Journal of Modern History* 59 (1987): 705-36; on Second World War veterans, including disturbing evidence of the coddling of convicted war criminals, see Katherina Tumpek-Kjellmark, "From Hitler's widows to

Adenauer's brides: Towards a construction of gender and memory in postwar West Germany, 1938-1963" (PhD. diss., Cornell University, 1994).

8 George Mosse has written extensively on Nazi Germany's use of fallen soldiers to inculcate nationalism, as well as the hatred of those who did not make such sacrifices. See his path-breaking work *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). For the use of revolutionary martyrs in Iran for similar purposes, see Abdolrahman Mahdjoub, "La manifestation, le martyre," *Peuples méditerranéens* 29 (1984): 17-40.

9 On the United States, see Theda Skocpol, *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1995).

10 This essay relies on sources that until recently have been unavailable in the China field (at least for the post-1949 period): party and government archives. Between 1993 and 1994 and during several weeks in 1997, I was allowed access to party archives in several areas of China, ranging from urban areas (such as Shanghai and Beijing) to suburban areas (Tong county near Beijing, Songjiang and Qingpu in central China) to rural ones (Chuxiong Prefecture in Yunnan, the Yunnan Provincial Archives, the Jiangsu Provincial Archives). During this time most of my work focused on the implementation of the Marriage Law, not on the PLA or widows or martyrs. However, during my research I came upon a number of documents dealing with the implementation of Article 19 of the Marriage Law, an article that made it difficult for wives of mobilized PLA soldiers to divorce by requiring the soldier's written consent. Many of these materials did not find their way into my book, *Revolutionizing the Family: Politics, Love, and Divorce in Urban and Rural China*, but their richness convinced me that there was a new project in the making.

11 See, for instance, Peter Merkl, *Political Violence under the Swastika: 581 Early Nazis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); Richard Bessel, *Political Violence and the Rise of Nazism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984).

12 Cited in John Dixon, *The Chinese Welfare System, 1949-1979* (New York: Praeger, 1981), 343.

13 Ibid., 345.

14 DCA, 11-7-74 (1954), 26-27.

15 DCA, 11-7-337 (1961), 1.

16 Ibid.

17 DCA, 11-7-201 (1953), 3.

18 Ibid, 2.

19 Ibid.

20 DCA, 11-7-201, 5; "Why should we ...," DCA, 11-7-400, 5; *diaocha duo*, DCA, 11-7-25.

21 On "civil religion" in Israel, which also uses military events and sites as central rituals, see Charles Liebman, *Civil Religion in Israel* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). On the "cult" of fallen soldiers in the Soviet Union, which involved "a panoply of saints, sacred relics, and rigid master narrative," see Nina Tumarkin, *The Living and the Dead: Rise and Fall of the Cult of World War II in Russia* (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 134; on Canadian memorials, rituals, and mythology concerning its fallen soldiers of the First World War, see Alan Young, " 'We throw the torch': Canadian memorials of the Great War and the mythology of heroic sacrifice," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 24, 4 (1989): 5-28. According to Young, "The sacrifice of the fallen warriors brought victory, the implication in part being the victory was granted by God because of the justice of the cause. Those who have fallen are martyrs or even types of Christ and are not to be thought of as dead since they have ascended to Heaven" (13).

22 DCA, 11-7-132 (1956), 6; 11-7-380 (1963), 1-3.

23 DCA, 11-7-380 (1963), 4; 11-7-132 (1956), 11; 11-7-421 (1963); 11-7-89 (1954).

24 DCA, 11-7-399 (1964), 107.

25 For several interesting essays on the evolution of this institution, see Xiaobo Lu and Elizabeth J. Perry, eds., *Danwei: The Changing Chinese Workplace in Historical and Comparative Perspectives* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997).

26 DCA, 11-7-74 (1954), 1; 11-7-400 (1963), 6-7; 11-7-116 (1957), 5.

27 Diamant, *Revolutionizing the Family,* chap. 3.
28 DCA, 11-7-89, 151-52; DCA, 11-7-230 (1954).
29 DCA, 11-7-306 (1959), 3.
30 For an excellent study of rural elections in central China base areas, see Chen Yung-fa, *Making Revolution: The Communist Movement in Eastern and Central China, 1937-1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 223-59.
31 DCA, 11-7-89 (1954), 151.
32 For a typical report, see DCA, 11-7-96 (1955), 5.
33 Tong County Archives (hereafter TCA), 7-1-1 (1953), 9.
34 Suicides usually resulted in investigations, which could exact a certain political price; moreover, the belief that the ghost of a person wronged would never rest and would avenge the oppressor also made suicide a potentially potent threat.
35 TCA, 1-4-6 (1952), 20.
36 For similar sentiments towards the central government among Civil War veterans in the United States, see Wallace E. Davies, *Patriotism on Parade: The Story of Veterans' and Hereditary Organizations in America, 1793-1900* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955), 160-61.
37 DCA, 11-7-405 (1963), 2-4; 11-7-89 (1954), 15.
38 See Ward, introduction to *The War Generation.*
39 On the problem of refugee troops, see A. Doak Barnett, *China on the Eve of Communist Takeover* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985), 293; David Goodman, *Centre and Province in the PRC: Sichuan and Guizhou, 1955-1965* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 39; Dorothy Solinger, *Regional Government and Political Integration in Southwest China, 1949-1954* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 28. On the alliance between the GMD and landlord militia, see Jung Chang, *Wild Swans: Three Daughters of China* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 156.
40 In An county, Sichuan, for example, top government and party leaders all hailed from Shaanxi until the early 1960s. See *An xian zhi* (An County Gazetteer) (Chengdu: Bashu Publishers 1991), 460, 506.
41 Yunnan Provincial Archives (hereafter YNA), 89-1-36, 44.
42 CXA, 16-15-B1, 85, 89; 16-8-B1 (1951), 131-33.
43 For cases, see YNA, 89-1-24, 27; CXA, 16-3-A1, 52; YNA, 103-1-45, 149; CXA, 16-5-B1, 11; 16-14-A1, 3; 16-3-A1, 181.
44 See YNA, 89-1-24, 46.
45 In Chuxiong district, in 1953 women accounted for 57 percent of suicide and murder cases (*n*=119), men 23 percent, and children 20 percent. Close to 37 percent were attributed to "abuse and humiliation." Abuse cases rose from nineteen between January and February 1953 to forty between November and December the same year. See CXA, 16-3-A1, 184, 186. For instances of these deviations from policy, see CXA, 16-5-B1, 10-11; 16-3-A1, 181; 16-14-A1, 3, 5; YNA, 103-1-45, 149; 89-1-24, 27.
46 Mamphela Ramphele, "Political widowhood in South Africa: The embodiment of ambiguity," *Daedelus* 125, 1 (1996): 102.
47 Marjo Buitelaar, "Widow's world: Representations and reality," in *Between Poverty and the Pyre,* ed. Jan Bremmer and Lourens van den Bosch (London: Routledge, 1995), 1-2, 7-8; Jan Bremmer, "Pauper or patroness?: The widow in the early Christian Church," in the above volume. On Chinese widows, see Mann, "Widows"; Elvin, "Female virtue."
48 Mamphele, "Political widowhood," 101.
49 According to *Webster's Third International Dictionary,* "martyr" refers to "one who voluntarily suffers death as the penalty of witnessing to and refusing to renounce his religion or a tenet, principle, or practice belonging to it; one who sacrifices his life, station, or what is of great value for the sake of a principle or to sustain a cause."
50 On Marat, see Mona Ozouf, *Festivals and the French Revolution,* trans. Alan Sheridan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), 267.
51 On martyrdom in the Republican period, see Henrietta Harrison, "Martyrs and militarism in early Republican China," *Twentieth Century China* 23, 2 (1998): 41-71.

52 Wasserstrom, *Student Protests,* 102-17.
53 DCA, 11-7-89 (1954), 11-12.
54 Ibid., 144, 149.
55 DCA, 11-7-306 (1959), 4.
56 DCA, 11-7-405 (1963), 2; 11-7-191 (1952), 23.
57 DCA, 11-7-89 (1954), 116-19.
58 DCA, 11-7-89 (1954), 150. In the United States there were comparable cases. In certain towns, politicians, physicians, and war widows would collaborate to fudge the degree of hardship in order to qualify for a pension. The widow would get the money, the physician a cut, and the politician a vote. See Skocpol, *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers,* chap. 2.
59 DCA, 11-7-319 (1960), 2. In the United States as well, many citizens resented the benefits awarded to First World War veterans and veterans' own insistence that the state owed them a special debt, especially during the Depression years. According to Donald Lisio, "Liberals and conservatives alike ... denounced the one-time heroes as mercenaries of patriotism." See his "The United States: Bread and butter politics," in *The War Generation,* ed. Stephen Ward, 42.
60 See, for instance, Richard Madsen, *Morality and Power in a Chinese Village* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 77; Diamant, *Revolutionizing the Family,* chap. 6.
61 DCA, 11-7-89 (1954).
62 Joseph W. Esherick, "Deconstructing the construction of the party-state: Gulin County in the Shaan-Gan-Ning border region," *China Quarterly* 140 (1994): 1053.
63 According to Joel S. Migdal, a major fault of state-centred words in comparative politics was the tendency to "reify and anthropomorphize the state, treating it as a unitary actor that assesses its situation strategically and then acts accordingly to maximize its interests." The anthropological approach, by contrast, involves "investigation at different levels of the state, including the lowest rungs on the organizational hierarchy where direct engagement with society often occurs, and the interaction among the levels ... participant observation [and] ... the interplay of power and symbols in state-society relations." See "The state in society: An approach to struggles of domination," in *State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World,* ed. Joel S. Midgal, Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 8, 14-15.

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Glossary

Terms

Baoqing bingzai jishi 宝庆兵灾纪实
baoyu hui 保育会
bingzai 兵灾
butai 部队
can wu rendao 惨无人道
chenshu difang cantong 陈述地方惨痛
cishan tang 慈善堂
Dagongbao 大公报
danwei 单位
diaocha duo, jiejue shao 调查多解决少
diaomin fazui 弔民伐罪
duo bao du fa; bu bao bu fa 多报多发不报不发
fenhui 分会
fen sha yin lue; wu suo bu zhi 分杀淫掠无所不至
funu zhidao weiyuanhui 妇女指导
guangrong pai 光荣牌
haisen 败战
hanjian 汉奸
heping qicheng hui 和平期成会
heping qingyuan hui 和平请愿会
hezuo 合作
hong wu lei 红五类
Hunan shanhou xiehui 湖南善后协会
Hunan yuekan 湖南月刊
Jiang badian 江八点
junbao 军暴
junzai 军灾
keisatsutai 警察队
kusheng zhendi 苦声振地

Liling bingzai jilue 醴陵兵灾纪略
Lianhe bao 联合报
lianomin zheng 良民证
lieshi shu 烈士属
lieshi zhuan 烈士传
luan gao guanxi 乱搞关系
minzheng ju 民政居
nanmin 难民
nanmin ertonghui 难民儿童会
nantong baoyuhui 难童保育会
New Tongmenghui 新同盟会
nofuku 降伏
pingjunzhuyi 平均主义
qi junzi 七君子
quanguo heping lianhe hui 全国和平联合会
Saodang bao 扫荡报
senbu kōsaku 宣抚斑
shantang 善堂
Shen bao 申报
shenqu 申曲
Showa shinbun 新日新闻
shusan 疏散
shusen 终战
Tianwen 天文
tianzai 天灾
Tiexu Kunlunguan 铁血昆仑关
tomuku kikan 特务机关
tongdi 通敌
tongxianghui 同乡会
tu si 土司
xiafang 下放
Xiangzai jilūe 湘灾纪略
xiaomie 消灭
xinbao 新报
Xinhua ribao 新华日报
yilai sixiang 依赖思想
zhanshi 战事
zhian weiyuanhui 治安委员会
Zhongguo qingnian bao 中国青年报
Zhonghua ribao 中华日报
Zhongliu dizhu 中流砥柱
Zhongxing xincun 中兴新村

Zhongyang ribao 中央日报
Zili zaobao 自力早报

People

Cao Kun 曹琨
Chen Lifu 陈立夫
Chen Yishen 陈仪深
Feng Yuxiang 冯玉祥
Fu Yingchuan 傅应川
Gao Zhipeng 高志鹏
Guo Moruo 郭沫若
Han Fuju 韩复榘
Han Guoyu 韩国瑜
Hao Peicun 郝伯村
He Hengfu 贺衡夫
Jiang Weiguo 蒋纬国
Jiang Zemin 江泽民
Kaifu Toshiki 海部俊树
Kumagai Yasushi 熊谷康
Lao She 老舍
Li Chuanye 李传业
Li Dequan 李德荃
Li Denghui 李登辉
Lin Kesheng 林可胜
Li Jinyong 李进勇
Li Minggao 李鸣皋
Li Peng 李鹏
Li Pinxian 李品宪
Li Ruihuan 李瑞环
Liang Surong 梁肃戎
Liu Huaqing 刘华青
Pan Weigang 潘维刚
Peng Mingmin 刘华青
Qiao Shi 乔石
Shen Zijiu 沈兹九
Shi Liang 史良
Song Meiling 宋美龄
Su Jilu 苏冀鲁
Sun Yunsheng 孙云笙
Tan Yankai 谭延闿
Wei Yong 魏镛
Wen Yiduo 闻一多

Wu Demei 吴德美
Wu Peifu 吴佩孚
Wu Sangui 吴三桂
Xiang Yang 向阳
Xu Linong 许历农
Xu Shiying 许世英
Yan Jinfu 颜锦福
Yu Dafu 郁达夫
Yuan Shikai 袁世凯
Zhang Huaizhi 张怀芝
Zhang Jingyao 张敬尧
Zhang Zongchang 张宗昌
Zhu Rongji 朱 基

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Index

Abend, Hallett, 81
"Account of the Jiading Massacre," 30
Adultery, 177, 182
Anhui, 176
Anhui forces, 21, 39
Anti-Japanese War (1894-95), 6
Anti-Japanese War (1937-45): commemoration of, 146; historical neglect of, 3-4, 5, 119; legacies of, 124, 132-3; statistics of, 119; uniqueness of, 121-2. *See also* Nanjing Massacre
Anting, 52, 63
Anti-warlord movements: in Hunan, 39; incentive for, 35; objectives of, 42; public perception of, 18; successes of, 40
Archives, 137
Army, Chinese: Eighth Route, 112, 148, 150; in Nanjing, 92; New Fourth, 112, 148; support for, 146. *See also* Veterans
Army Infantry School, 86
Asaka, Prince, 90
Association of Jiading Fellow-Countrymen in Shanghai, 67
Atrocities: deliberate policies of, 79; establishing authenticity of, 77; explanations of, 81-7, 89; eyewitness reports of, 76
Auden, W.H., 77, 100, 102-3

Bandits: in military forces, 25; pacification of, 25; in Red Army, 43; in Xuzhou, 106, 109, 111
Bataan Death March, 81
Battlefield psychology, 83-4
BCA, 167-73, 181-2
Beijing: book fair, 154; Bureau of Civil Affairs, 175; Hunanese residents in, 35, 42; Japanese conduct in, 78; residents mistrust Japan, 152
Beijing government: complicity with Japanese, 38; control of, 39; in Hunan invasion, 20; and internal peace settlement, 36
Beiyang army, 20
Belden, Jack, 100, 111
Benevolent alliances *(shanhou hui),* 10
Benevolent societies *(cishan tang),* 129
Bereavement, 8, 148
Bergamini, David, 90
Bisson, T.A., 79
Boileau, Father, 105
Bombing: impact of, 76-7, 83; of Jiading, 52, 55; of Linyi mission, 102; of Shanghai, 6; of Xuzhou, 101, 103; of Zhabei, 123
Books, as commemoration, 140, 153, 154
Boxer Rebellion, 6, 120
Brainwashing, 82
Brutalization, of civilians and soldiers, 24, 78, 113-14, 118
Bureau of Civil Affairs (BCA) *(minzheng ju),* 167-73, 181-2
Bureau of Military Investigation and Statistics, 150
Bureaucracy, 170, 183-4
Burrin, Philippe, 51
Bushido, and Japanese behaviour, 82

"Camera pacification," defined, 54
Canton (*Guangzhou*): commercial district, 42; Japanese conduct in, 78
Cao Kun, 39-40
Capa, Robert, 100
Carpet bombing. *See* Bombing
Carr, E.H., 83, 92
CCP. *See* Chinese Communist Party
Censorship, 31, 44, 150, 151
Central China Area Army (CCAA), 51-2, 69, 76
Central Military Committee, 137-8
Central Political Department, 138
Chamberlin, William H., 78, 80

Chang, Iris, 4, 7-8
Chang Jui-te, 12
Changde, 21, 28
Changsha: atrocities in, 26, 34, 121; *Dagongbao*, 31; extortion in, 25; fall of, 20; Northern troops in, 27; training centre in, 132
Chaos *(luan)*, 12-13, 123
Chen Guiquan, assassination of, 60
Chengyu, 10
Ch'i Hsi-sheng, 122
Chiang Kai-shek, 128, 175
Children, as refugees, 130
China National News and Publication Administration, 150, 151
China Writers' Association, 148
Chinese Communist Party (CCP): commemoration by, 137-9; cultural production, 148; and family reform, 163; grassroots operations of, 183; and missile tests, 142; and Red Army, 42, 43; relief efforts of, 128, 146; response to Taiwan, 142, 146-7; spies of, 150; support of, 178; and wartime sacrifices, 164
Chinese Historical Association, 148
Chinese Revolution, 163, 165
Chō Isamu, 89-90
Chongqing: historic sites, 148; public health in, 132; spirit of, 146; survey of, 124, 125
Churches: attacks on, 28; relief efforts of, 129. *See also* Missionaries
Chuxiong (Yunnan), 176
Cishan tang, 129
Civil Affairs Section, of SGC, 61
Civil War, 163, 165
Civilians: as bandits, 106, 109; and guerrilla warfare, 110; psychology of, 101-2, 109; resistance of, 10, 84-5; violence by, 27
Collaboration: in Chinese historiography, 73n. 24; defined, 69; historical neglect of, 13; in Jiading, 57-60, 71; during occupation, 50, 111
Collective consciousness. *See* Communiity
Comfort women, 146, 147
Commemoration: attitudes toward, 143, 146, 147, 157; of Battle of Taierzhuang, 105; coins, 140; commercialization of, 151; dearth of, 4-5, 7; effect on public, 157, 158; stamps, 140; of Yanwo Massacre, 98
Communist Youth Leagues, 138
Community: redefinition of, 124; sense of, 99-100, 118-19, 126, 133
Compensation, 5, 9, 141, 146, 156. *See also* Veterans
Conscription, 146, 147
Criminals, female, 176
Cultural Revolution, 170

Dagao village, 174
Dagongbao, 31, 123
Danwei, 171
Demobilization, of PLA, 172
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), on commemoration, 141, 142, 146, 148, 156
Deng Yingchao, 128, 130, 131
"Diary of Ten Days at Yangzhou," 30
Discipline, of troops, 28, 42, 78, 82, 83-4, 85-6
Divorce, 163-4, 168, 176-7
Dorn, Frank, 82
Duara, Prasenjit,70-1
Durdin, Tillman, 77
Dushan, executions in, 109

Eastman, Lloyd, 122
Education, patriotic, 152, 153, 154, 155
"Eight points relating to Taiwan," 142
Eighth Route Army, 112, 148, 150
Eksteins, Modris, 7
Esherick, Joseph W., 183
Executions, 22, 23, 60, 89-90, 109-10
Extortion, 25, 26

Family, breakdown of, 9
Fangtai, 63, 68
Fascism, 79
February 28 Incident, 141
Feng Chengqiu, 68
Feng Yuxiang, 21, 28, 39
Fengxian, 107
Films, 151
Five black classes, 169
Five reds *(hong wu lei)*, 163
Franco Bahamonde, Francisco, 79
Fraud, 169
Foreign concessions: newspapers in, 32, 33; refugees in, 120, 123, 129
Fujiwara Akira, 86
Fung, Edmund, 41
Funu zhidao weiyuanhui, goals of, 131

Gambling, 57
Gao Zhipeng, 142
Gekokujō, 86
Genocide, fear of, 101
GMD. *See* Guomindang
Good citizen certificates *(liangmin zheng)*, 52, 56, 61, 66
Government Information Office (of Taiwan), 151

Great Leap Forward, 170
Gregory, Adrian, 8
Guangdong troops, 20
Guangxi troops, 20
Guerrillas, 65, 68, 106, 110, 112
Guizhou, 175
Gujin County, 176
Guo Moruo, 80, 124-25
Guomindang (GMD): army of, 43; and commemoration, 140-1, 143, 148; Historical Commission, 140; officers of, 169; relief efforts of, 128; on reparations, 147; retreat of, 100, 107; survey by 122

Han Fuju, 123
Han Guoyu, 156
Hangzhou, 51, 124
Hankou, 78, 121, 129
Hanson, Haldore, 77, 79
Hanwang Massacre, 103, 107
Hanwangxiang, 98
Hao Peicun, 140, 141
Hashimoto Shingorō, 88
Hata Ikuhiko, 88
He Hengfu, 128, 129
Hebei province, 174, 176
Henan, 176
Hengyang, 20, 22, 34
Heping qicheng hui, 36
Heping qingyuan hui, 36
Heroes' Monument, 138
Historic sites: in Chongqing, 148, 150; Marco Polo Bridge, 153; related to Nationalist government, 148; Resistance War Memorial, 153; transformed by CCP, 150; visitors' reactions, 153
Historiography, of military atrocities, 19, 29
Homelessness. *See* Refugees
Hong Kong, 182
Hong Shen, 126
Hong wu lei, 163
Houjiazhuang, 109
Hsu Shu-hsi, 77, 79-80
Huang, Philip, 12
Huangdu, 52, 68
Hubei military forces, 20
Hunan: ceasefire in, 23; civilians in, 21, 23, 27; extortion in, 25; invasion of, 19-20; media and, 29, 31, 32, 34, 43; Peace Promotion Society, 36; provincial army retreat, 20; troop behaviour in, 26; violence in, 18, 24, 28
Hunan province, 19, 24
Hunan Rehabilitation Association *(Hunan shanhou xiehui),* 32, 33, 38
Hunan yuekan (Hunan Monthly Journal), 34, 38

Ignatieff, Michael, 7, 113
Iinuma Mamoru, 90
Insurance, lack of, 5, 9
International Safety Zone, 84
International Settlement areas, 123
"Iron and blood at the Kunlun Pass," 151
Isherwood, Christopher, 77, 100, 102-3

Jacoby, Annalee, 124
Japan: militarism of, 82, 146, 147; mistrust of, 152
Japanese army: behaviour of, 113-14; discipline in, 78, 85-6; military police in, 87; officers of, 79-80, 86, 89-91; quality of, 77, 79, 86; recruitment for, 77; tactics of, 121
Japanese Cotton-Spinning Association in China, 62
Jay, Martin, 92-3
Jiading: casualty and population statistics, 52, 56; corvée labour, 61; guerrilla activity in, 65, 68; history of, 30, 52; police in, 63; politics in, 64; propaganda in, 56-7; traitors *(hanjian)* in, 72
Jiading Burial Society, 52
Jiading Self-Government Preparatory Committee, 60, 63
Jiading-Shanghai ferry, 63
"Jiang Badian," 142
Jiang Weiguo, 140
Jiang Zemin, 138, 139, 142
Jiangxi troops, 21
Jinan: refugees in, 123
JinPu Line, 99
Jiwangmiao, 65
Jordan, Donald, 42

Kaifu Toshiki, 136
Korean War, 163, 170, 179
Kumagai Yasushi, 53-4, 55, 65, 67
Kunshan, 65

Landlord militias, 175
Lao She, 123, 124
Li Chuanye, 22
Li Denghui, 142, 143, 150
Li Dequan, 130
Li Jinyong, 141
Li Minggao, 141
Li Peng, 137, 138, 179
Li Pinxian, 65, 104
Li Ruihuan, 138, 139
Li Zhaoling, 153

Liang Surong, 140
Lienü, 178
Lieshi zhuan,179
Liling: population of, 23; public perception of, 30; punishment of, 27; "rape" of, 22, 42, 44; reports on, 35; strategic importance of, 21
Liling bingzai jillue, 31, 37
Liling County, casualty statistics, 23
Lin Kesheng, 131-2
Lin, Robert K., 131-2
Lin Yixiong, 143
Lingling, extortion in, 25
Linyi, mission bombed in, 102
Literary Workers' Union, 148
Liu Huaqing, 138
Liu, J. Heng, 131-2
Liuyang, extortion in, 25
LongHai Line, 99
Looting, as troop payment, 26
Loutang, 63, 65, 68
Lu Fangshang, 12
Lu River bridge, 22
Lu Xun, 6
Luan, 12-13, 123, 162-3
Luan gao guanxi, 177, 182
Lukou, extortion in, 25
Luliangshan, massacre of, 107

Ma Liang, 110
"Mainstream pillar," 138
Malaria, 131
Manchester Guardian, 79
Manchu invasion (1645), 30, 50, 52, 60
Marco Polo Bridge, 153
Marco Polo Bridge Incident, 137, 146, 156
Marriage, 173, 174
Marriage Law (1950), 176-7
Martyrs: in Chinese history, 164; defined, 178, 180; 164; memorials to, 138, 143, 152, 153; pamphlets on, 179; survivors of, 161, 177-82
Maruyama Masao, 91
Matsui Iwane, 82
Maurer, Herrymon, 79
May Fourth Movement 38, 39, 41, 124
May Thirtieth Movement (1925), 180
Medals, 138
Medical services, 57, 128, 131-2
Meiji era, 80, 85, 86
Memory, 11, 18, 30
Merchant associations *(tongxianghui)*: relief effort of, 10, 129, 130
Merchant Corps Incident (1924), 43
Militarism, of Japan, 82, 146, 147
Military Historical Museum, 140
Military Museum, 138
Military-civil relations, 19, 41
Militias, 175, 177
Minzheng ju, 167-73, 181
Missile tests, 142
Missionaries: accounts by, 104, 106, 107; role of, 100-1, 102, 110
Mourning, 8, 148
Mukden Incident, 154
Mutinies, 25
Mutual aid team, 181

Nanjing Massacre: aftermath of, 101-2; Chinese role in, 92; commemoration, 136; described, 99; explanations of, 83-7; press coverage of, 76-9; recent treatment of, 4; refugees from, 105, 124; in textbooks, 152
Nanxiang, 51-2, 63-4
National Peace Alliance Society *(quanguo heping lianhe hui),* 36
National People's Congress, 175, 181
National Relief Committee (*zhenji weiyuanhui*), 128-30, 132
National Revolutionary Army, 42, 43
National Salvation Movement, 127, 152
Nationalism, 147
Nationalist Army, 140
Nationalist Party, 41, 70, 71
New Fourth Army, 112, 148
New Jiading Daily, 63
New Party: and commemoration, 143, 148, 156; and nationalism, 157; and reparations, 147
New Tongmenghui, 140, 141, 142
Newspapers: control of, 31, 44, 150, 151; in foreign concessions, 32; in pacification, 63, 66; primary texts in, 31; in refugee centres, 126, 127; reporting of atrocities, 4, 24, 76-80, 100, 123
Nian Rebellion, 120
Niulan (Xiaoxian), 103, 107
North China Herald, 78
Northern Expedition, of Nationalist Party, 40
North-South peace conference, 36, 38

Occupation, of China, 50-1, 67, 71, 110-12
One country, two systems policy, 146
Ōnuma Yasuaki, 87, 91
Opium, 57, 168
Orphans, 130

Pacification Department, Shanghai, 53
Pacification team (*senbuhan*), 62-4
Pacification work *(senbu kōsaku),* 51-2

Pan Weigang, 141
Paotingfu, capture of, 78
Peace Maintenance Committee (PMC, *zhian weichihui*): branch committees of, 63-6; as occupation force, 52; reorganization of, 60, 69; role of, 59
Peace Petition Society *(heping qingyuan hui)*, 36
Peace Promotion Society *(heping qicheng hui)*, 36
Peixian: raids on, 103
Peking. *See* Beijing
Peng Mingmin, 143
People's Daily, 137, 139
People's Liberation Army, 44
People's Liberation Army Literature and Arts Press, 154
People's Liberation Army Veterans, 75
Pingjiang, 28
Pingjunzhuyi, 182
PMC. *See* Peace Maintenance Committee
Poetry, 10
Political movements, and violence, 18
Population: impact of war on, 9; and perception of suffering, 5; redistribution of, 23, 120, 121, 124
POWs: executions of, 85, 88-9; Japanese treatment of, 86-7, 88, 89-91
Press. *See* Newspapers
Propaganda: Chinese, 77; Japanese, 56-7
Prostitution, 9, 176
Public health, 131-2
Public opinion: on anti-war movements, 35; effect of atrocities on, 18-19, 29; influenced by organizations, 34; of warlord conflicts, 30
Publishers, 137, 154

Qiao Shi, 138
Qing Dynasty, 30, 41, 120
Qingpu, 61
Qu Xiuzhen, 174
Quebec fathers. *See* Missionaries

Rabe, John, 84
Race, and brutality, 81, 87
Railway bridges, destruction of, 104
Ramphele, Mamphele, 177-8
Rape, 9, 23, 107, 161, 164, 176, 182
Rape of Nanjing. *See* Nanjing Massacre
Rawski, Thomas, 12
"Record of the military disaster at Baoqing," 31
"Record of the military disaster at Liling," 31, 37
Red Crag Village, 148
Red Cross: Chinese, 131; international, 129
Reformed Government, creation of, 68
Refugees: diversity of, 125; from Henan, 123; historical perspective of, 119; intellectuals as, 124-5, 126; malaria among, 131; movement of, 120, 121-2, 123-4, 127, 132; of Nanjing Massacre, 105, 124; peasants as, 125-6; psychological state of, 118, 126, 132; resettlement of, 168; return of, 56; from Shandong, 123; statistics on, 119, 120, 122-6; in Xuzhou, 105-6. *See also* Social services
Relief efforts. *See* Social services
Renaud, Father Rosario, 101
Renmin ribao, 137, 139
Reparations: sought by Mainland China, 146; sought by Taiwan, 141
Residence committees, 167
Resistance: China's national policy of, 91; occurrences of, 10, 84-85
Resistance War Memorial of the Chinese People, 153
Revolution of 1911, 20, 30, 41
Revolutionary Martyrs' shrine, 143
Russo-Japanese War (1904-5), 6, 78

Sasaki Tōichi, 84
Scorched-earth policy, 3-4, 92, 112
Sculptures, 137
Second Revolution (1913), 20
Self-government committees (SGC, *zizhi weiyuanhui*), 61, 66
Self-reliance, 137, 146
Sex, illicit, 162-3, 174, 176, 177, 182
Sex slavery, 146, 147
Shandong troops, in Liling, 21
Shanghai: anti-Japanese sentiment in, 67, 152; bombing of, 6; foreign-concession zone, 32, 33, 120, 129; and Hunan, 24, 32, 37, 38, 76; invasion of (1937), 51, 88; Japanese interests in, 62, 87; Japanese landing at, 92; Japanese troops in, 84; military casualties in, 83; refugees in, 61, 119
Shanghai Expeditionary Army, 89, 91
Shanghai incident (1932), 86
Shanghai peace conference (1919), 37
Shanhaiguan Pass, 142
Shi Liang, 127-31
Shimonoseki, Treaty of, 139
Showa shinbun, 152
Sichuan, 175
Sino-American Special Technical Cooperative Organization (SACO), 150
Sino-Japanese War. *See* Anti-Japanese War (1935-47)

Smedley, Agnes, 130
Snow, Edgar, 80-1
Social services: breakdown of, 123; of GMD, 128; government-run, 130-2, in Hunan, 32-3; rise of, 9-10; by *tong xianghui*, 129, 130; in Wuhan, 126-7
Soldiers' Day, 146
Song Meiling (Mme Chiang Kai-shek), 127, 130-1
Song Qingling (Mme Sun Yat-sen), 131
Song sisters, 127-8, 130
Songs, 137, 138, 156
South Manchurian Railway (SMR), 51
Special Service Department (SSD, Tokumubu), 51, 69
Spence, Jonathan, 6
Spring Festival, 170
Statistics: analysis of, 5; lack of, 7, 119; on refugees, 122-6
Student demonstrations (1919), 38
Su Jilu, 150
Substitute cultivation program, 181
Sui Dynasty 80
Suicide, 126, 162, 173, 174, 177
Sun Yat-sen, 43
Sun Yunsheng, 52, 59, 65-6, 67
Sunbangqiao, 63
Survivor mentality, 13-14, 114, 118, 133
Suxian, flight from, 101
Suzhou, 61, 123
Suzuki Akira, 85, 89

Taierzhuang, Battle of, 100, 102, 103, 105
Taipei, commemoration in, 143
Taiping Wars, 6, 30, 120
Taishō democracy, 85
Taiwan: censorship in, 151; democracy in, 143; economic development of, 143; independence of, 146; and Japan, 136, 155; martial law in, 143; military modernization, 140; and reparations, 141; restoration of, 139, 140, 141, 143, 146, 155
Taiwanese Historical Association, 148
Tan Yankai, 20, 40
Tang Shengzhi, 92
Tangshan, raids on, 103, 107
Teach-ins, 138
Technology, impact of, 224, 80-1, 102-3, 121
Television, 139, 154, 155
Three Kingdoms, 8
Tiananmen demonstrations (1989), 43, 44
Tianwen, 38
Tiexue Kunlunguan, 151
Tilly, Charles, 163
Timperley, Harold, 79
Toland, John, 82
Tong county, 174
Tongshan xianzhi, 98
Tongxianghui, 10, 129, 130
Toyo Cotton Company, 62
Tri-Cities, 119, 127, 129
Tsin, Michael, 43
Tsingtao: Japanese conduct in, 78

Uchino Police Corps *(keisatsutai)*, 52
Uemura Toshimichi, 90
United Front, 146, 154
United Nations, 142, 147

Veterans: misconduct of, 175-7; plaque for, 170; as political leaders, 166-7, 173, 175; preferential treatment programs for, 164, 165, 167, 169; in rural areas, 172-4; treatment of, 138
Victory of the Chinese People exhibit, 138
Victory Day, 146
Village cadres, 173
Virtuous women (*lienü*), 178

Waigang, 63, 68
Wanton behaviour (*luan*), 161
Warlordism: and civil wars, 33; emergence of, 18; legacy of, 41; May Fourth Movement, 38; military commanders, 29; politics of, 29, 32, 34; and violence, 24, 25; Western historians on, 41
Weber, Max, 184
Wei Yong, 139, 141
White, Theodore, 124
Widows, 177, 179-82
Women's Federation, 171, 176
Work unit (*danwei*), 171
Wu Demei, 141
Wu Peifu: behaviour of troops under, 28, 29; commands troops in Hunan, 20-1, 39, 40; negotiation of ceasefire, 36; and Zhang Jingyao, 23, 34
Wu Sangui, 142
Wuhan: as capital, 99, 119; public health in, 128; relief efforts in, 126-7

Xia Guozhu, 174
Xiang River, 20
Xiangtan, 25, 27
Xiangyin, extortion in, 26
Xiangzai jilue (A record of Hunan's calamities), 33, 34, 42
Xiaoxian, 103, 107
Xinhua, 137
Xu Shichang, 36

Xu Shiying,128, 132
Xujiahang, 63, 65
Xuzhou Campaign: aftermath of, 106-7, 109, 114; battle of, 124; civilian suffering in, 101-2, 104, 107; described, 99-100
Xuzhou region: damage to, 101, 102-3; occupation of, 112; strategic importance of, 98-9

Yamada Senji, 89
Yamada Unit *(butai)*, 52
Yan Jinfu, 141
Yanan spirit, 137, 146
Yang Daqing, 12
Yangtze Delta: strategic importance of, 52
Yangzhou massacre, 30
Yangzi. *See* Wuhan
Yanwo Massacre, 98
Yellow River dikes, breaching of, 112, 121, 124
Yixian (Shandong), burning of, 103
Yoshida Yutaka, 85, 87
Yuan Shikai, 20
Yuanshan, 143
Yuezhou, 20, 26
Yunnan, 162, 175, 177

Zhabei, bombing of, 123
Zhang Huaizhi, 21
Zhang Jingyao: administration of, 20, 23, 24, 28, 33; behaviour of troops under, 22, 28, 34, 39; and ceasefire, 36; and press, 31; removal of, 38, 40; response to 1918 atrocities, 35; and Wu Peifu, 34
Zhang Liangui, assassination of, 60
Zhang Yuce, 105
Zhang Zongchang, 22
Zhao Jitang, 65
Zhenji weiyuanhui, 128-30, 132
Zhian weichihui. See Peace Maintenance Committee
Zhili forces, 39, 40
Zhonghua zazhi, 136
Zhongliu dizhu, 138
Zhou Enlai, 179
Zhoucai (Fengxian), massacre of, 107
Zhu Rongji, 138
Zhuge Liang, 99
Zhuzhou: atrocities in, 23, 42; occupation of, 22; public perception of, 30; strategic importance of, 21
Zizhi weiyuanhui, 61, 66
Zou Taofen, 127-28

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