



Italy and the
European Powers

The Impact of War, 1500-1530

Edited by Christine Shaw

BRILL

ITALY AND THE EUROPEAN POWERS

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Cover illustration: The Castelnuovo, Naples, drawn by Simon Pepper after a drawing by Francisco de Holanda, 1539-40 (Escorial, 28.1.20, f.53v), showing the medieval keep with its lower-level Aragonese gun gallery, and the outer Spanish ramparts, 1503-1519. The elaborate curved merlatura crowning the works dates from the early 16th century Spanish enlargement.

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PREFACE

When I began preparing my biography of Julius II about twenty years ago, I was surprised at how limited the available literature on the Italian Wars was. A period of such significance not just for the history of Italy but for the history of Europe would, I assumed, have attracted the scrutiny of many historians, but time and again I found the most useful works, sometimes the only works, available on important aspects were the pioneering studies of nineteenth and early twentieth century scholars. The fall from fashion of diplomatic history and to some extent of political history as well, and the centuries-long aversion of Italian scholars to confront what was widely seen as a national catastrophe, all contributed to this.

Fortunately, in recent years, more and more work on this period has begun to appear. Even diplomatic history is being revived, although probably more attention has been paid to diplomatic ceremonial and propaganda and the artistic productions to which these gave rise, than to the substantive politics behind them. Military historians are reconsidering the campaigns and the changes in the conduct of warfare and the organisation of armies during the Italian Wars, in the light of the thesis of a “Military Revolution” in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Political historians, disengaging from theories of the “rise of the modern state”, are taking a fresh look at the Italian states of the sixteenth century, at the pattern and structure of relations between states, and at the role of what became the Italian dominions of the Spanish monarchy within the Spanish empire. The recovery from neglect, sometimes oblivion, of the work of musicians living and working in Renaissance Italy has enhanced understanding of the extraordinary cultural life of the society that lived through and endured the Italian Wars. Interest in the visual arts and the literature of that society has, of course, never flagged.

Much of the recent new work has appeared in the form of collected essays and conference papers, including publications stimulated by the quincentenaries of significant episodes, and of the birth of Charles V in 1500. Italians have, for understandable reasons, not been much inclined to commemorate significant stages of the wars,

although the anniversaries have stimulated some reappraisals.¹ It was primarily French scholars who organized conferences and published volumes marking the anniversaries of the descent of Charles VIII and his army through Italy to the conquest of Naples in 1494–5, and the conquest of the duchy of Milan by Louis XII's troops in 1499–1500,² and there have been some British contributions, too.³ Spanish initiatives to commemorate the quincenaries of the reigns of Ferdinand and Isabella, and particularly of the birth of the Emperor Charles V in 1500 have produced a wealth of publications, dealing with the Spanish in Italy along with many other subjects.⁴ Several Italian conferences on Italy during the reign of Charles V have made evident how much work is now under way.⁵ Significant monographs have also appeared, with particularly welcome additions to the literature on areas of Italy that have not in the past been so favoured by scholars as Florence, Venice and Rome;⁶ and the daunting task of synthesis of new information and insights has begun.⁷

Much work remains to be done before even the main features of the Italian Wars and their consequences for Italy and for the European powers can be mapped out with confidence. The new research that is being done and fresh interpretations that are being made are not picking over the architectural details of a well-known building; the basic plan and structure of the building are not yet agreed. Long-

¹ For example, Letizia Arcangeli (ed.), *Milano e Luigi XII: ricerche sul primo dominio francese in Lombardia (1499–1512)* (Milan, 2002).

² For example, Adeline Charles Fiorato (ed.), *Italie 1494* (Paris, 1994); Jean Balsamo (ed.), *Passer les monts. Français en Italie—l'Italie en France (1494–1525)* (Paris, 1998); Philippe Contamine and J. Guillaume (eds.), *Louis XII en Milanais. Guerre et politique, art et culture* (Paris, 2003).

³ David Abulafia (ed.), *The French Descent into Renaissance Italy, 1494–95: Antecedents and Effects* (Aldershot, 1995); Stella Fletcher and Christine Shaw (eds), *The World of Savonarola: Italian Elites and Perceptions of Crisis* (Aldershot, 2000).

⁴ Many of these publications have been under the auspices of the Sociedad Estatal para la Commemoración de los Centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V.

⁵ Including the conferences whose proceedings have been published as: Marcello Fantoni, *Carlo V e l'Italia* (Rome, 2000); G. Galasso and A. Musi (eds), *Carlo V, Napoli e il Mediterraneo*, in *Archivio storico per le province napoletane*, 119 (2001); Bruno Anatra and Francesco Manconi, *Sardegna, Spagna e Stati italiani nell'età di Carlo V* (Rome, 2001); Francesca Cantù and Maria Antonietta Visceglia, *L'Italia di Carlo V. Guerra, religione e politica nel primo Cinquecento* (Rome, 2003).

⁶ Such as Arturo Pacini, *La Genova di Andrea Doria nell'Impero di Carlo V* (Florence, 1999); Carlos José Hernando Sánchez, *Castilla y Nápoles en el Siglo XVI. El Virrey Pedro de Toledo: Linaje, estado e cultura (1532–1553)* (Salamanca, 1994).

⁷ For example, Alberto Aubert, *La crisi degli antichi Stati italiani (1492–1521)* (Florence, 2003).

established perspectives from which the shape and significance of the period of the Italian Wars have been seen are being altered or abandoned: of national triumph for France (at least for a while) or Spain; of disastrous setbacks for dreams of a united Italy; of the political decadence of Italy and the failings of Italian mercenary armies, in confrontation with the “national” armies of France and Spain; of the triumph of the nation-state or the rise of the modern state; of Italian cultural superiority set against military defeat and political humiliation; of the ‘leaden capes’⁸ of Spanish domination descending on the Italians, stifling intellectual as well as political liberty.⁹

No dominant new perspectives have yet replaced them. If the history of Italy during the Italian Wars is no longer being presented as a morality tale, inescapable questions must still be posed, and attempts made to answer them. Why was Italy so open to invasion and conquest? What were the consequences for the political and cultural life of Italy, for the economy and society, of the fundamental changes to the political structures and systems of the peninsula? The answers that historians are giving now are informed by a better appreciation of the complexities of the responses to and consequences of the invasions, occupations and conquests that afflicted so much of the peninsula during the Italian Wars.

Assessment of the impact of the wars is the main theme of this volume—not in the sense of estimating the destruction they caused, but in the wider sense of how the experience of war and its aftermath, including for some regions subjection to foreign powers, affected the Italian states and the cultural life of Italy, and affected the European powers as well.¹⁰ It concentrates on the first three decades

⁸ In the famous image (taken from Dante) from the influential work by Carlo Cipolla, *Storia della Signorie italiane dal 1313 al 1530* (Milan, 1881), p. 973.

⁹ For recent analyses of Italian historiography of the period see Giuseppe Galasso, ‘La storiografia italiana e Carlo V da G. De Leva a F. Chabod (1860–1960)’, in Juan Luis Castellano Castellano and Francisco Sánchez-Montes González (eds), *Carlos V. Europeísmo y universalidad*, 5 vols (Madrid, 2001), I, pp. 145–57; Christine Shaw, ‘Charles V and Italy’, in C. Scott Dixon and Martina Fuchs (eds), *The Histories of Charles V. Nationale Perspektiven von Persönlichkeit und Herrschaft* (Münster, 2005), pp. 115–33.

¹⁰ Regrettably, it does not include essays directly examining the economic and social impact of the wars—but these are themes that are also scarcely represented in the volumes on the Italy of Charles V. While the long-prevailing picture of economic stagnation and decline in sixteenth-century Italy is now being questioned, as yet this has not given rise to a focused major historiographical debate about the specific social and economic consequences of the wars, such as there has been for the Hundred Years War between France and England, for example.

of the sixteenth century, from the conquest of Milan by Louis XII which began the long struggle for dominion in Lombardy, and the definitive conquest of the kingdom of Naples by the troops of Ferdinand of Aragon, to the triumph of Charles V. His coronation in Bologna in 1530 and the settlement of Italian affairs negotiated there was seen at the time and has been seen ever since as a landmark in the history of Italy—although his dominance over Italy was not so overwhelming or unshakeable as it has often been presented. But 1530, with the siege of Florence by the troops of Charles V ending in the fall of the Florentine republic, did mark the end of the most decisive phase of the military campaigns.

Michael Mallett provides an overview of the ‘transformation of war’ during this period, when, as he writes, ‘Soldiering as a profession came of age’. Both he and Simon Pepper, in a discussion of fortifications and the strategy and tactics of siege, stress the limitations of the artillery which so impressed contemporaries, and the importance of the timeless factors of morale, of organization and of logistics. Failures of morale and in logistics figured prominently in the enquiry into the decisive French defeat by the Spanish in the kingdom of Naples in 1503–4, analysed by Atis Antonovics. Antagonism between financial officials and soldiers seems to have been especially intense in the French armed forces, he argues, and lay behind other major defeats suffered by the French during the Italian Wars. A reminder that Italians in this period were concerned by the threat of attack from Turkish forces as well as from French, Spanish, German and Swiss troops, is provided by Eva Renzulli’s essay on the fortifications at Loreto in the Papal States.

After the immediate consequences of the military campaigns, the most obvious impact of the wars in Italy was that two of the five major states that had dominated the peninsula in the fifteenth century were conquered, occupied and eventually brought under permanent rule by foreign powers. As David Abulafia shows, King Ferdinand of Aragon regarded the conquest of Naples not as the acquisition of new territory for his crown, but as the recovery of a kingdom that had been separated from the crown of Aragon by his uncle, Alfonso, in 1458. Consequently, Ferdinand wished to present himself, not as a conqueror, but as the legitimate successor to the kingdom, and this was reflected in the approach to government under the Spanish viceroy. Milan, like Naples, was to become part of the

Spanish empire, but that had not yet been determined in 1530. Letizia Arcangeli's examination of the government of the city of Milan shows how the confusion and uncertainties of these years brought opportunities for the citizens to press for recognition of a political role rarely permitted them under the Visconti and Sforza dukes of the fifteenth century. In this instance, at least, foreign conquest and rule, rather than suppressing civic liberties, arguably strengthened and revived them in one of the greatest cities of Italy. One consequence of the first French conquest of Milan in 1499 was the submission to Louis XII of the republic of Genoa; as Genoa had already been subject to the French, most recently from 1458 to 1464, this was another Italian state that a foreign prince could regard as returning to its rightful lord. How the nature of Louis XII's rule over Genoa was expressed in the symbolism of ritual is analysed by George Gorse, contrasting his festive entry into the city in 1502 with his return in 1507 as a vengeful king, reimposing his rule over rebellious subjects in a 'ritual of conquest'.

The impact of the wars was not, of course, confined to areas directly affected by the campaigns or directly subject to conquest and occupation. John Law's essay on the Varano of Camerino shows the effects of the disruption of the networks of patronage, influence and dependence based on military contracts, *condotte*, that had supported the signorial dynasties who had built up their little states within the structure of the Papal States. One possibility investigated by Giovanni Maria Varano was whether he might be given a *condotta* by Henry VIII of England; more realistically, perhaps, he also tried to secure the protection of Charles V. In some ways, it appeared that the game was still being played by the same rules, but the scale of the forces that were contesting for supremacy in Italy meant that a state the size of Camerino would carry little weight when Charles V was balancing the interests involved in his relations with the pope. The character of the relations between the pope and the emperor, and the pope and other European powers, was significantly changed by the Italian Wars, I argue in my own contribution. Increasingly, the powers were dealing with the popes as political and military allies or opponents, as dynasts, anxious to establish their families among the ruling houses of Italy, and as secular rulers, preoccupied with the maintenance of the Papal States. Ultramontane princes and their envoys and advisers quickly learned how to deal with the pope as

an Italian power and with the popes as individuals—as the other Italian states had done in the fifteenth century—probably to the detriment of their respect for the papacy as an institution.

Disenchantment with Italy and with Italians in general caused by the French experience of the wars is discussed by Nicole Hochner in her examination of the literature produced during the reign of Louis XII. Admiration for the wealth and beauty of Italy was replaced by laments for the carnage that took place there and condemnation of the Italians as false and unreliable. Reflections on the significance of the wars and their impact naturally permeated the work of Italian writers, including some of the greatest intellectual and literary figures of their day. In an analysis informed by a sense of how the experiences of Francesco Guicciardini and Niccolò Machiavelli shaped their perceptions, Humfrey Butters compares and contrasts their consideration of the relation between social and political structures, of political allegiance, of the diffusion of political information and the formation of public opinion. Fundamental cultural issues were also brought to greater prominence by the wars. As John Najemy shows in his discussion of Baldassare Castiglione and Lodovico Ariosto, the perceived contrast between Italy's leadership in literature and military weakness gave new resonance to the classic conundrum of the relationship of arms to letters. Those who claimed that letters were a stimulus to valour would have to confront the problem of the vulnerability of Italians to military defeat and conquest by those—like the French—reputed to hold letters in much less esteem. The varying fortunes of the main institutions of formal learning, the ten universities of the peninsula, during the wars are examined by Jonathan Davies. Famine and plague, as well as the direct results of military action, brought troubles to the universities of northern Italy, but others, particularly Bologna, experienced phases of prosperity and expansion during these years. Local factors that had little or nothing to do with the wars also played their part.

This is true, too, of a significant change in the social role of music-making traced by William Prizer. The long tradition of music as an intrinsic element in the education of aristocratic women in Italy came to be questioned by the 1540s because, he argues, the association of music with courtesans became so strong in early sixteenth-century Rome that making music could no longer be seen as a fit activity for noblewomen. The effects of the sack of Rome of 1527 on music and musicians are considered by Iain Fenlon, who also discusses

music inspired by or commenting on the Florentine republic of 1527–30. Prominent among them were works by the French composer, Philippe Verdelot, who was resident in Florence throughout the 1520s, and is usually assumed to have died during the siege. A major source in which his music is found is a manuscript produced in Florence, possibly as a gift to be sent to Henry VIII in an attempt to arouse his diplomatic support. Music by a French composer used to elicit help from the king of England for the republic of Florence under siege from the Spanish forces of the emperor who was helping the pope to reinstate the supremacy of his family there—an apt symbol of the complexity of the relations of the European powers and Italy and of the impact of the Italian Wars.

Most of the essays in this volume were among those given at a conference sponsored by the AHRB Centre for the study of Renaissance Elites and Court Cultures in the Centre for the Study of the Renaissance of the University of Warwick, and organized by the directors, Professors Julian Gardner and Michael Mallett, and the research fellows, Jonathan Davies, Fabrizio Nevola, and myself, of the Italian elites project.

This was the development of a project fostered for many years by Prof. Michael Mallett. While it would be unusual to present a volume of essays as a tribute to one of the contributors (and one of the main organizers of the conference from which it arose), as this one focuses on themes that have been central to the work of Michael Mallett, it furnishes too good an opportunity to miss to evoke the respect, admiration and affection for him of his colleagues at Warwick, and among the wider community of historians in the USA and Italy, as well as Britain. His book, *Mercenaries and their Masters: Warfare in Renaissance Italy* (1974) is still the authoritative survey of Italian *condottieri*, the armies they commanded and their relations with their employers. The book on Venice, *The Military Organization of a Renaissance State: Venice c. 1400 to 1617* (Cambridge, 1984), that he wrote jointly with the late John Hale (and which had its genesis when they were colleagues at Warwick), has been a benchmark for the study of the military organization of a single state. His study of the organization of the armies that fought the Italian Wars, which is nearly complete, will surely be an authority as well. Important as his contribution to military history, especially to the history of military organization, has been, the scope of his contribution to the study of Renaissance Italy has ranged much wider. His first book was *The Florentine Galleys in*

the Fifteenth Century (Oxford, 1967), a study of the communal galleys, whose primary purpose was to promote trade rather than to function as a battle fleet. Many years of meticulous work went into the three volumes (V–VII) of the *Lettere* of Lorenzo de' Medici that he edited, including the volume dealing with the War of Ferrara of 1482–4. Earlier in his career, four years as Assistant Director of the British School at Rome resulted in his book *The Borgias: The Rise and Fall of a Renaissance Dynasty* (1969), which still stands out among the copious literature on the Borgia family, as a cool-headed, even-handed model of how that elusive quarry, the scholarly but readable book by the professional historian, can be attained.

His long association with Warwick University began in 1967, shortly after the university was founded, and continued after his formal retirement in the AHRB Centre. He had a pivotal role in organizing and running the Venice Term, a distinctive feature of the history course at Warwick. A prolific output of books, articles, essays and conference papers never interfered with his dedication to his teaching and the welfare of his students. His attributes as a scholar and teacher are complemented by a flair for administration; his keen eye for details of budgets and balance sheets earned him the healthy respect of the officials of the university.

The distinction of his career has been recognized by several awards and honours, including the Serena Medal and election as a Fellow of the British Academy. If this book were a *Festschrift* with the tributes of all who have benefited from his scholarship and quiet kindness, it would be a bulky volume indeed.

Christine Shaw

ABBREVIATIONS

ASF	Florence, Archivio di Stato
ASMan, AGonzaga	Mantua, Archivio di Stato, Archivio Gonzaga
ASMi, ASforzesco	Milan, Archivio di Stato, Archivio Sforzesco
ASMo	Modena, Archivio di Stato
Sanuto, <i>I diarii</i>	Marino Sanuto, <i>I diarii</i> , ed. R. Fulin <i>et al.</i> , 58 vols (Venice, 1879–1903; repr. Bologna, 1969)

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ITALY AS A THEATRE OF WAR

THE TRANSFORMATION OF WAR, 1494–1530

Michael Mallett

‘War has become very different. In those days when you had 8,000 to 10,000 men, you considered that a very large number; today it is quite another matter. One has never seen a more numerous army than that of my lord of Burgundy, both in artillery and in munitions of all sorts; yours is also the finest that has ever been mustered in the kingdom. I am not accustomed to see so many troops together. How do you prevent disorder and confusion in such a mass?’

This was the French captain, Jean de Bueil, veteran of the Hundred Years War, addressing Louis XI in his extensive commentary on warfare, *Le Jouvencel*, in ca. 1471.¹ The date is significant, partly because it draws attention to a phenomenon which was to be a crucial factor in the Italian Wars more than twenty years later: the growing size of armies. The second point of significance was that the army to which de Bueil was referring as the largest army of the day was that being created in the early 1470s by Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy. At that moment Charles was in the process of issuing the first of his military ordinances which provided for a standing army of 8–9,000 men.² His ambitions subsequently grew, but the Burgundian armies which were defeated by the Swiss in the battles of the mid 1470s were still, in a sense, paper armies, larger in the muster rolls than they were on the battlefield.

De Bueil can have had little experience of these armies at the time he was writing. The army that he knew intimately was that of Louis XI, which saw relatively little action in these years, but which was assembled in annual parades and manoeuvres calculated to add

¹ Jean de Bueil, *Le Jouvencel*, ed. C. Favre & L. Lecestre, 2 vols. (Paris, 1887–9) I, p. cclxxxi; cited in translation by M. Vale, *War and Chivalry* (London, 1981), pp. 148–9.

² On the Burgundian military ordinances of 1471–3, see R. Vaughan, *Valois Burgundy* (London, 1975), pp. 123–7; C. Brusten, ‘Les compagnies de l’ordonnance dans l’armée bourguignonne’, in D. Reichel (ed.), *Grandson—1476* (Lausanne, 1976), pp. 112–69; M. Keen (ed.), *Medieval Warfare: a History* (Oxford, 1999), pp. 283–6. Italian reports suggested that Charles had 30,000 men at the siege of Neuss in 1472, but this was clearly an exaggeration (Vaughan, pp. 123–4).

menace to Louis' energetic foreign ambitions. That army had grown since the end of the Hundred Years War with a doubling of the number of heavy cavalry companies, and a large part-time militia infantry component, the so-called free archers, which amounted to about a third of the total.³ It was said in the late 1470s that Louis could raise an army of 45,000 men, but more than half would have been militia and feudal levies.⁴ De Bueil had, no doubt, witnessed the parades, and been both impressed by the numbers and concerned about the implications for control and discipline. The army which fought for Louis' successor, Charles VIII, in the Breton Wars in the late 1480s and early 1490s was nothing like this size. It was only when Charles VIII gathered together 30,000 men for the invasion of Italy in 1494 that the change of scale which had taken place since the end of the Hundred Years War began to be fully appreciated.⁵

The Italian Wars were fought by the armies and navies of the western European powers, largely—up to the 1530s—on Italian soil and waters. They were fought for the conquest and retention of territory and economic resources, as well as for the prestige and dynastic concerns of rulers and the benefit of ruling elites. They involved the gathering of troops from all over Europe, from Scotland to the Balkans, the movement of armies across the Alps and across wide stretches of the Mediterranean, and the maintenance of those armies hundreds of miles from their normal billeting areas and supply chains. Inevitably the circumstances of these wars, the bitterness created by the ebbs and flows of victory and defeat, led to a new continuity of war, a sustained determination on the part of leaders, fighters and tax payers, to see it through, to avenge defeats and recover recently lost territory. The result was a transformation of war between 1494 and 1529; thereafter the pace of change slowed, the objectives became

³ P. Contamine, *Guerre, état et société à la fin du Moyen Âge* (Paris, 1972), particularly pp. 284–7; *L'histoire militaire de la France*, I, ed. P. Contamine (Paris, 1992), pp. 210, 220–1; D. Potter, *War and Government in the French Provinces* (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 158–9.

⁴ Contamine, *Guerre, état et société*, pp. 316–9. See now also for comparisons: L. R. Garcia, 'Types of armies; early modern Spain', in P. Contamine (ed.), *War and Competition between States* (Oxford, 2000), pp. 36–8.

⁵ The figure of 30,000 for the invasion of Italy in 1494 has been generally accepted as being realistic. It included 10,000 Italian troops raised by various northern Italian states—most notably Milan, which some authorities have not allowed for. For full details, see F. Lot, *Récherches sur les effectifs des armées françaises des guerres d'Italie aux guerres de religion, 1494–1562* (Paris, 1962), pp. 15–21.

more diffused, the anxiety to win gave way to a determination to avoid defeat.⁶ The transformation was particularly apparent in the Italian campaigns, and was partly a matter of increased numbers involved in war, partly of a new emphasis on permanence and long service, and partly of the developing role of gunpowder weapons. Between the battles of Fornovo (1495) and Pavia (1525), the balance of numbers in the opposing armies shifted from an approximately equal division between cavalry and infantry, to an infantry predominance of 6:1.⁷ The overall increase in numbers was, therefore, largely the result of a new perception of the value of infantry as battle troops, and not just as baggage train escorts and garrisons. It was the new effectiveness of the Swiss and German pike infantry, and of the massed Spanish arquebusiers, that encouraged the growth of infantry numbers and led to an extension to the infantry companies of the institutions of permanence and long service which had already been introduced into cavalry organisation. The lower cost

⁶ Much of our knowledge of the events of the Italian Wars, and their impact both within Italy and outside, remains heavily dependent on Francesco Guicciardini, *La Storia d'Italia*, first published in 1561 and other sixteenth-century Italian writers such as Paolo Giovio and Niccolò Machiavelli. German nineteenth-century historians, like Pastor, Ranke, Delbrück and Hobohm, developed an interest in the individual battles of the Wars, and in the idea of a major transition in international relations reflected in the struggle for Italy. However, it was the work of F. L. Taylor, *The Art of War in Italy, 1494–1529* (Cambridge, 1921; reprinted 1973) and more particularly P. Pieri, *Il Rinascimento e la crisi militare italiana* (Turin, 1952) which launched an interest in the Wars as a formative moment in the history of warfare, and linked up with the major debate in the late twentieth century on a 'Military Revolution' in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Some recent accounts have gone far beyond the original context of Italy and the Mediterranean, and drawn attention to global strategies and innovations as part of the 'revolution': G. Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1560–1800* (Cambridge, 1988); A. Corvisier, *Armies and Societies in Europe, 1494–1789* (Bloomington, 1979); J. R. Hale, *War and Society in Renaissance Europe (1450–1620)* (London, 1985); B. Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe* (Baltimore, 1997); J. Black, *European Warfare, 1494–1660* (London, 2002).

⁷ Accurate figures for the size of armies in the battles of the Italian Wars are difficult to pin down. A preliminary assessment, and comparison with the battles of the Thirty Years' War, was attempted by this author in T. A. Brady, H. A. Oberman and J. D. Tracy (eds.), *The Handbook of European History, 1400–1600* (Leiden, 1994), p. 550. That list was heavily dependent on Lot, *Les effectifs*, pp. 23–86. Now see also F. Tallett, *War and Society in Early Modern Europe, 1495–1715* (London, 1992), p. 6, and *L'histoire militaire de la France*, I, pp. 240–1. For recent accounts of the battles of Fornovo and Pavia, see: A. Santosuosso, 'Anatomy of defeat in Renaissance Italy: the battle of Fornovo in 1495', *International History Review*, 16 (1994), and R. J. Knecht, *Renaissance Warrior and Patron: The Reign of Francis I* (Cambridge, 1994) pp. 218–25.

of equipping and training infantry was also obviously a factor in explaining the increasing numbers, as was the nature of the Italian Wars as wars of conquest, occupation and defence of conquests.

These factors all contributed to the sense of novelty and the willingness to experiment which characterized the warfare of the period. At the same time the scale and extent of the confrontation which developed between the major powers itself created a new atmosphere in which the main armies faced each other on neutral soil, far from their bases and supply points. This undoubtedly stimulated a willingness to seek battle solutions and a search for the decisive blow. It increased the problems caused by casualties and changed attitudes towards the treatment of prisoners. It imposed new pressures on the commanders and the captains, and hastened the professionalisation of the military world.

Most accounts of the wars of this period focus on the pike as the predominant infantry weapon, and indeed Louis XI had begun to hire Swiss pikemen in the 1470s. He and his advisers were impressed by the successes of the Swiss in conflict with Charles the Bold, and at the same time dissatisfied with the fighting quality of the French free archers. Ferdinand of Aragon, on the other hand, had made little use of pike infantry in Granada, and it was only in Italy after 1495, that Gonzalo de Córdoba, the Spanish commander, began to train some of his infantry in the use of the heavy pike.⁸

Mass was the secret of the success of the pike; not just large numbers of pikemen but pikemen trained to march and fight in close order, to support each other, and to handle their heavy weapons for long periods. A well-organized pike square could quickly overwhelm other types of infantry which rarely had the same level of training and *esprit de corps*, and could also resist a cavalry charge and turn the tables on disorganised horsemen once their charge had failed. At the beginning of the wars the hiring of large numbers of Swiss pike infantry was seen as the best recipe for military success, although the cost was already changing the whole scale of military expenditure. In fact, however, some of the most impressive victories of the Swiss were already in the past, and the early years of the wars were marked

⁸ P. Pieri, 'Gonzalo de Córdoba e le origini del moderno esercito spagnolo', in *V Congreso del Historia de la Corona de Aragon*, (Zaragoza, 1954), pp. 206–24; Taylor, *The Art of War*, p. 37; Hall, *Weapons and Warfare*, pp. 166–7; P. Stewart, 'The Santa Hermandad and the first Italian campaign of Gonzalo de Córdoba, 1495–8', *Renaissance Quarterly*, 28 (1975), pp. 29–37.

more by attempts to catch up and imitate their tactics and to find other ways to combat them, than by further outstanding successes for their methods. Charles VIII's Swiss were little used in 1494–5 although they did win a significant encounter with the newly arrived Spanish infantry at the first battle of Seminara. The response of Gonzalo de Córdoba to this defeat, however, was not only to arm and train a part of his own infantry with pikes, but to hasten the equipping of his shot infantry with firearms rather than crossbows.⁹

As with the pike infantry, the success of the arquebusiers, and later the musketeers, lay in their deployment in large numbers, and preferably with some protection in the form of a trench, or a wall or earth rampart. The early arquebus was far less accurate than the crossbow or longbow which it began to replace, but if used by large numbers firing regular and rapid volleys in several ranks taking it in turn to load and fire, it became a lethal weapon against both pikesquares and charging cavalry. The battle of Cerignola in 1503 was the first example of the effective deployment of large numbers of arquebusiers,¹⁰ and by 1522 at Bicocca the tactics and discipline required to make best use of the new weapons had been perfected. Indeed, shortly afterwards at Romagnano Sesia and at Pavia, the Marquis of Pescara introduced the idea of using the arquebusiers as skirmishers, moving about the battlefield in loose order, taking advantage of natural cover, and harassing the flanks of the opposing forces. This was a decisive shift towards a more offensive role for shot infantry, but there was no way that firearms could replace pikes at this stage, even if, properly handled, they could halt and disperse a pike square. By the 1530s, as army commanders were further expanding their infantry contingents, the emphasis switched to finding ways of getting pike infantry and arquebusiers to fight in close cooperation. It was at this point that large mixed infantry units emerged with the French legions and the Spanish *tercios*. As François de La Noue, a French veteran of the religious wars was to comment in the 1580s: 'musketry without pikes is like arms and legs without a body'.¹¹

⁹ For the first battle of Seminara in 1495, see Pieri, *Il Rinascimento*, pp. 359–60. Evidence of the success of Gonzalo's efforts to re-equip and retrain his infantry is to be found in Simancas, Contaduría mayor de Cuentas, 1ª época, 147. Of the 4500 infantry with Gonzalo in 1503, c. 1000 were equipped with arquebuses, 1400 with crossbows and 2000 with foot lances and pikes.

¹⁰ Pieri, *Il Rinascimento*, pp. 408–12.

¹¹ François de La Noue, *Discours politiques et militaires*, ed. F. E. Sutcliffe (Geneva, 1967), p. 312.

While in the early stages of the wars the French and the Swiss had shown little interest in the handguns and arquebuses, early Spanish interest was demonstrated by the infantry ordinance of Valladolid, issued by Ferdinand and Isabella in 1496, which called for infantry companies to be composed of one third foot lances, one third swordsmen and one third shot infantry.¹² The infantry lances were quickly replaced by heavy pikes, while the shot element which would have been largely crossbowmen in 1496, had become mainly arquebusiers by the time of Cerignola.¹³ The Black Bands of Guelders, one of the most prestigious Landsknecht contingents, which fought for the French at Marignano (1515), had 12,000 pikemen, 2,000 arquebusiers, 2,000 swordsmen and 1,000 halberdiers.¹⁴ The presence of swordsmen in large numbers in some of these lists is again out of line with contemporary French practice, and suggests that the Spanish, in particular, remained mindful of the siege warfare in Granada. It is also possible that the relatively new demands on Spain to provide defenders for the galley fleets contributed to strengthening a demand for swordsmen and arquebusiers. On the other hand, the French company of Blaise de Monluc in the Pyrenees in 1522 had no arquebusiers although its young captain was later to become one of France's most distinguished proponents of hand firearms.¹⁵ It was, however, the co-ordination of pike and arquebus which ensured the dominance of infantry in European armies by the 1530s, and at the same time it was the successes achieved by Spanish, German and Italian arquebusiers in the battles of the 1520s, that ensured the dominance of the Habsburg bloc in Italy.

This relatively sudden emergence of effective hand firearms in the early sixteenth century can be attributed to three factors. First, the development of the matchlock firing mechanism in the 1480s: this enabled the arquebusier to fire from the shoulder instead of one-handed from the hip, as had been the practice with the earlier hand-

¹² A. Vallecello, *Legislacion militar de España antigua y moderna* (Madrid, 1853), V, pp. 281–94. For the broader implications of the Spanish military ordinances, see Garcia, 'Types of armies', pp. 42–3 and Keen, *Medieval Warfare*, p. 286. For the theme of the early Spanish use of hand firearms, and concern for tight central control, see René Quatrefages, 'Le système militaire des Hapsbourg', in *Le Premier âge de l'état en Espagne (1450–1700)*, ed. C. Hermann (Paris, 1989) pp. 341–50.

¹³ See above n. 10.

¹⁴ Knecht, *Renaissance Warrior*, p. 70.

¹⁵ *Commentaires et lettres de Blaise de Monluc, maréchal de France*, I (Paris, 1864), p. 52.

guns.¹⁶ Secondly, improved and cheaper powder: the cost of gunpowder fell by 80 per cent in the fifteenth century, and improvements in quality gave greater range and velocity to the shot.¹⁷ Thirdly, the development of large scale manufacture of firearms in south Germany and northern Italy linked up geographically with the emergence of the Landsknecht companies as rivals to the Swiss.¹⁸

There is no doubt that the Spanish, and later the Spanish-Imperial armies, had an advantage over the French in terms of the quality and achievements of the infantry. It was often remarked that in most parts of France there was no tradition of infantry service and that the social gap between the landed nobility and the peasant classes inhibited the arming of a peasant infantry. The recently established French practice of including two mounted archers in each heavy cavalry lance as part of the following of the man-at-arms was a sort of answer to the problem, but in an age when the focus was increasingly on the training and battle deployment of infantry in mass, this somewhat individualistic approach of having mounted archers linked to the cavalry organisation and scattered round the companies of lances seemed a clear anachronism.¹⁹ Certainly the practice was not imitated in Spain when in 1493 the heavy cavalry was reorganised under direct royal control; the Spanish lance numbered only two or three men with no attendant archers, and the infantry organisation was kept entirely separate.²⁰ Attempts were made during the wars to reorganise the French infantry into permanent regiments officered by nobles, and the legions of 1534 were the final stage of this; but the monopoly of the services of the Swiss which benefited the French in the early stages of the wars left a legacy of dependence on them

¹⁶ Hall, *Weapons and Warfare*, pp. 95–6, 129, 149; Tallett, *War and Society*, pp. 21–2.

¹⁷ P. Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1984), pp. 196–8; Hall, *Weapons and Warfare*, pp. 67–104.

¹⁸ D. Miller, *The Landsknechts* (London, 1976), pp. 12–15. For discussion of the manufacture of portable firearms in northern Italy, see: Hale, *War and Society*, pp. 219–24; F. Rossi, *Armi e armaioli bresciani del '400* (Brescia, 1971); M. Morin, 'La produzione delle armi da fuoco a Gardone (VT)', in *Armi e Cultura nel Bresciano, 1420–1870*, supplemento ai *Commentari dell'Ateneo di Brescia* (1981) pp. 67–76.

¹⁹ Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, pp. 126–32, described the inclusion of two mounted archers in each lance formation as a response to the disaster of Agincourt.

²⁰ The Spanish military ordinances of 1495 and 1496 drew very clear distinctions between cavalry and infantry formations, and showed the same sort of care for the efficiency and loyalty of the infantry as the French did for the cavalry: Quatrefages, 'La système militaire', pp. 346–50.

which was another factor in this assessment of the relative strengths of the two sides.

When we shift the focus to the cavalry institutions and forces, we find a somewhat more traditional picture. The dramatic switch in balance of arms from cavalry to infantry was the result of a massive increase in the recruiting of infantry, not of any significant decrease in cavalry numbers. The numbers of men-at-arms available to the French crown changed little throughout the wars; the cavalry components of the great expeditions to Italy shrank only proportionately; the organisation of the six-man lance remained unchanged until 1534 when the two archers per lance became three for every two lances.²¹ In the lance unit which he led, the French man-at-arms had two mounted archers who would have normally dismounted to fight; the surviving musters reveal that this practice continued into the 1530s, although there is evidence that the archers of a cavalry company tended to be mustered as a single unit. The practice was clearly something of an impediment to the emergence of separate infantry companies, and certainly leads to confusion when one attempts to count accurately the numbers of cavalry and infantry in a French army. It was always unrealistic to count all the members of the lance as cavalry effectives, but the problem remains of whether two of the six should be considered infantry or light cavalry effectives.

With the reorganisation of the Spanish heavy cavalry into companies of 100 men-at-arms under the direct control of the Crown in 1493, archers were not included in the lances.²² The Spanish lance consisted of two or three men—either a single man-at-arms with a squire (*senzillo*) or two men-at-arms with one squire (*doblado*). The distinction is kept quite clear in some of the records, but not always, and again confusion in counting cavalry numbers can arise. The Spanish heavy cavalry never had the same reputation as the French although their equipment was basically the same. They were rarely

²¹ The maintenance of a fairly steady level of recruitment to the lances throughout the first half of the sixteenth century is indicated by Lot, *Pièces justificatives*, p. 243. The reduction in the number of mounted archers attached to the lances, imposed in 1534, was restored to the original proportions of 2:1 in 1549 (Contamine, *Histoire militaire*, p. 248).

²² For an important discussion of the impact on Spanish military organisation and attitudes of the War of Granada, see the introduction to the recent new edition of W. H. Prescott's work on the Granada war, edited and extended by A. McJoynt under the title *The Art of War in Spain* (London, 1995).

used as the spearhead of an attack in battle, but more commonly held in reserve to exploit a weakness in the enemy. In fact, this applied increasingly to the French as the wars progressed and tactics changed, but for the Spanish a reluctance to commit the heavy cavalry was there from the start.

One of the things that lay behind this difference was the fact that the Spanish made much more use of light cavalry. When Gonzalo de Córdoba was sent to Italy with the first Spanish expedition in 1495 he had no heavy cavalry with him, only 600 of the light horsemen known as genitors (*jinetes*).²³ The genitors were lightly armed with short lances, swords, and sometimes bows; their use by the Spanish kingdoms was the result of centuries of campaigning against the Moors, who relied entirely on light horsemen for their cavalry units. Five of the 25 cavalry companies formally established in 1493 were companies of genitors, and by the early sixteenth century there were 26 companies of genitors and only ten of men-at-arms. This rapid expansion of the Spanish light cavalry reflected the wide variety of tasks which were now entrusted to such troops. Apart from traditional roles like scouting and foraging, and harassing a retreating enemy, light cavalry were seen as much more suited to collaborating closely with infantry. Companies of mounted crossbowmen and mounted arquebusiers began to appear in Spanish service from early in the wars, and this was a development in which Italian influences on Spanish practice were particularly apparent.²⁴ The Venetians had led the way in the use of Balkan stradiots, equipped in a similar fashion to the Spanish genitors, and by the second decade of the sixteenth century genitors were being replaced by stradiots in Spanish service in Italy. The French also experimented with the use of stradiots but without great conviction; the traditions of the heavily armed lancer were too deeply embedded in French military culture to be eroded quickly. An erosion of that tradition was apparent by the middle of the sixteenth century, however, as the lancers began to

²³ *Ibid.*, for discussion of the role of the *jinetes*, and also Garcia, 'Types of armies', pp. 42–3, and R. Quatrefages, *Los Tercios* (Madrid, 1983), pp. 52–69.

²⁴ The appearance of companies of mounted crossbowmen and arquebusiers in Italy in the second half of the fifteenth century was noted by M. Mallett, *Mercenaries and their Masters: Warfare in Renaissance Italy* (London, 1974), pp. 151–3, 158. Such companies, led by Italians, were also appearing in Spanish armies by 1504 (AGS, Contaduria mayor de Cuentas, 1^a época, 177).

be equipped with wheel-lock pistols in imitation of the German *Reiters* and this led to a shift in cavalry tactics.

While it is important to seek to identify the numbers engaged in the battles and to chart the increase in those numbers, what is more significant is the shift towards the role of mass in war and the implications that this had for the broader conduct of war. In this period the shift from armies which were predominantly composed of cavalry, and the back-up troops necessary for cavalry, to those made up largely of fighting infantry, took place. The ground was prepared for whatever expansion of quickly-trained and cheaply-equipped infantry the western European powers could afford.

If the growing involvement of infantry and the increased size of armies which resulted from this, contributed to a sense of novelty and dramatic change surrounding the Italian Wars, a more immediately striking factor in this assessment was the reactions of contemporaries to artillery. Guicciardini's insistence on the terrifying impact of the French guns—'so violent was their battering that in a few hours they could accomplish what previously in Italy used to require many days'—reflected a sense of astonished outrage, just as did the frequent cries of foul play that followed the death or wounding of a noble captain at the hands of a plebian arquebusier.²⁵ That such utterances should not necessarily be taken at their face value as expressions of general opinions about guns is an issue which I do not intend to explore here.²⁶ Here, the emphasis must be on the factual basis for Guicciardini's judgment. How exceptional for its time was the French artillery? How great was its influence, or indeed that of any artillery, on the course of the wars? Are we looking at a mini-gunpowder revolution, as Bert Hall in his recent important book on *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe* has described it?²⁷ Or do we accept the more sober assessment of John Hale that 'gun-

²⁵ Guicciardini, *History of Italy*, p. 51 (Book 1, Chap. II).

²⁶ Hale, 'Gunpowder and the Renaissance', pp. 389–420, discusses contemporary reactions to the development of gunpowder weapons and points out that widespread prejudice gradually changed to grudging and even admiring acceptance. See also, D. Henderson, 'Power unparalleled: gunpowder weapons in the early Furioso', *Schifanoia*, 13/14, pp. 109–31 for some revision of Ariosto's hostility to gunpowder weapons.

²⁷ Hall, *Weapons and Warfare*, Chaps. 1 and 7. Despite a tendency to talk of battles won by artillery and firearms, he is clearly reluctant to endorse fully ideas of a 'gunpowder revolution'.

powder revolutionised the conduct but not the outcome of wars’?²⁸

The gradual development of gunpowder weapons in the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries has now been reasonably well charted. What is clear is that such weapons improved dramatically in the middle years of the fifteenth century. The crux of this was improved and cheaper gunpowder, and the implications were most quickly apparent in the gunfoundries and the artillery parks of the French crown. Stronger, lighter, more mobile guns, firing metal shot with greater hitting power, were produced in France and Burgundy, and quickly imitated elsewhere. Undoubtedly by 1494 Charles VIII had at his disposal the largest, best-equipped, and best-manned artillery train in Europe. But the inevitable reactions to these developments in terms both of the diffusion of the new technology and improved defence, had already started, and guns did not win the wars. Guicciardini’s comments on the role of the French artillery, particularly in the early stages of the wars, were repeated in a number of his writings.²⁹ The remorseless destruction of anachronistic defence works became for him the epitome of Italian weakness in the face of foreign invasion. For Machiavelli, on the other hand, writing also in retrospect but with a very different agenda, artillery seemed of far less importance. He accepted that the new guns reduced fortifications more quickly, but to him walls were always a poor protection to the faint-hearted. On the other hand, on the battlefield guns were little more than impediments and this viewpoint led him generally to disparage artillery.³⁰

The experiences of the Italian Wars made both these positions questionable. The French artillery did not make a great contribution to Charles VIII’s successful march through Italy in 1494–5. The main siege guns were being transported by sea at the time of the initial breakthrough in the Lunigiana, and had not been used by the time that Paolo Giovio was moved to write his lyrical description of them entering Rome in December 1494: ‘Above all what caused astonishment

²⁸ Hale, ‘Gunpowder’, p. 391.

²⁹ F. Guicciardini, *Storia d’Italia* (many editions). The incomplete English edition of S. Alexander, *The History of Italy of Francesco Guicciardini* (New York, London, 1969) is cited here, with appropriate page references. For other references to the French artillery, see *History*, p. 248 (Book X, Chap. 13), p. 288 (XII, 15), pp. 340–1 (XV, 6).

³⁰ For Machiavelli’s low opinion of the value of artillery in battle, see N. Machiavelli, *Arte della Guerra*, ed. S. Bertelli (Milan, 1961), Book III. His discussion of fortifications and siegecraft is to be found in Book VII.

and impressed everyone was more than 36 guns on carriages, which were drawn by horses at incredible speed over both level and uneven ground. The biggest of these, eight feet in length and 6,000 pounds of bronze in weight, were called cannon and threw an iron ball as big as a man's head.³¹ Their subsequent use in the occupation of Naples produced ambivalent results; small fortresses could be reduced quickly, but major defensive works in Naples itself resisted stubbornly.³² Prolonged resistance, periodically of the Castello Sforzesco in Milan, of Pisa for fifteen years, of Barletta throughout the winter of 1502–3, of Padua in 1509, of Marseilles in two famous sieges, and particularly of Siena in 1555–6, has to be set against the moments of brutal force, the success of which often depended as much on morale factors and the overall strategic situation as on guns.³³ On the other hand, the evidence of the major battles suggests a growing role for the artillery, and particularly for the arquebusiers, which has to be contrasted with Machiavelli's rather negative opinion. A letter of Jacopo Guicciardini to his brother Francesco when the latter was Florentine ambassador in Spain, describing the carnage caused by the artillery at the battle of Ravenna in 1512, must have made a deep impression on one of our writers, even if its implications were ignored by the other: 'It was a horrible and terrible thing to see how every shot of the artillery made a lane through those men-at-arms, and how helmets with the heads inside them, scattered limbs, halves of men, in vast quantity, were sent flying through the air'.³⁴ But these were Ferrarese guns as well as French, and all the evidence suggests that on the whole the French handled their firepower on the battlefield less effectively than the Spanish.

A number of factors contribute to these conflicting views about the effectiveness of gunpowder weapons in the Italian Wars, apart from the salient one—that the main improvements had already taken

³¹ Paolo Giovio, *Dell' Istoria del suo tempo di Mons. Paolo Giovio da Como* (Florence, 1555), pp. 54–5. For the English translation of this passage, and for comment, see S. Pepper, 'Castles and cannon in the Naples campaign of 1494–5', in Abulafia (ed.), *The French Descent*, pp. 263–5.

³² Pepper, 'Castles and cannon', pp. 271–81.

³³ For the prolonged sieges of Pisa and Siena, see M. Luzzati, *Una Guerra di Popolo* (Pisa, 1973) *passim*, and S. Pepper and N. Adams, *Firearms and Fortifications: Military Architecture and Siege Warfare in Sixteenth-Century Siena* (Chicago, 1986), pp. 117–40.

³⁴ The passage from Jacopo Guicciardini's letter is quoted by M. Murrin, *History and Warfare in Renaissance Epic* (Chicago, 1994), p. 125. It also appears in an abbreviated version in Guicciardini, *History*, p. 248 (Book X, Chap. 13).

place by 1500, and that we are considering a period of diffusion of technology and techniques, rather than of further innovation. In the first place, equipment such as obsolete guns, bombards and stone-throwers represented an investment which could not be lightly set aside. Artillery trains were made up of a heterogeneous collection of old and new which made it difficult to produce co-ordinated salvos and accurate bombardment. Furthermore, the rate of fire of the larger guns remained very slow; nor is it true that the heaviest guns could move at the same pace as the army, although, of course, the speed of march of armies was itself being slowed by the growing proportion of infantry in their ranks. Guns on the battlefield remained extremely vulnerable to capture and counter-bombardment; their improved mobility gave opportunities to switch the focus of a bombardment, but at the same time put them out of action while they were being moved.³⁵ Above all, cost was a key factor in replacement, modernisation and expansion of artillery trains. Such trains, in fact, did not increase in size significantly in this period, and their operation did not greatly increase the number of trained men needed, although there was undoubtedly an increase in the number of pioneers required to dig emplacements and to service the guns. In the last resort, guns contributed more to a shift towards defence than to one towards blitzkrieg. The majority of the guns manufactured and employed by the European powers were sited in defensive works, on the walls of towns and castles, guarding routes, all encouraging the development of bastions and earthwork emplacements.

Concern about the impact of the new guns and the need for new fortification techniques were already clearly apparent in the second half of the fifteenth century. Initially the emphasis was on the scarping and thickening of defensive walls, and on the renovation and strengthening of individual fortresses. The northern parts of the Papal States, the whole of Tuscany, and the city defences of Naples, have been identified as the foci of active experimentation with strong, low, projecting bastions which could take the weight of heavy guns for counter-bombardment and provide extensive fields of fire. A whole

³⁵ The battle of Ravenna (1512) provided the classic example of light guns being moved round the battlefield to create opportunities for enfilade fire. The inspiration for these manoeuvres came from Alfonso d'Este who supplied a significant proportion of the guns to the French army in this battle. For a detailed account see Taylor, *The Art of War*, pp. 180–215.

generation of military architects, led by Francesco di Giorgio Martini and the Sangallo family, were at work in the two decades before 1494, stimulating an intellectual enthusiasm for the new ideas, and preparing the way for a new style of fortification, involving defence in depth through elaborate outlying earthworks, which was to culminate in the work of Vauban and his contemporaries in the seventeenth century. During the wars attention switched from individual fortresses to rebuilding of city walls; by 1512 a Spanish report described Bologna as 'the most bastioned city in the whole of Italy', but the new defences of Padua and Treviso, and later Vicenza, were not far behind,³⁶ and Milan was also substantially refortified, although the French showed relatively little interest in fortification in the rest of Lombardy. After 1530 it was the threat from the Turks which led to the building by the Spanish of a series of coastal fortresses in the new style in the kingdom of Naples and in Sicily. The focus on Italy in this period of frantic refortification was not only an indication of where the main military pressure lay, but also provided a training ground for a new generation of military architects, many of whom began to work extensively outside Italy.

To some extent the gradual shift to a dominance of defence in the later stages of the Italian Wars was the result of the spread of the new fortifications which outpaced the rate of expansion of artillery trains and improvements in the effectiveness of guns. However, while besiegers relied on new mining techniques as well as guns to bring down the walls of fortresses and cities, effective defence depended as much on the skills of the garrison troops and on the determination of the entire population, as it did on defensive structures. Given the slow rate of fire of the siege guns it was possible for an active defence, with sufficient manpower, to convert breaches in the walls into potential death-traps for storming besiegers by using the rubble to create enfilade positions for arquebusiers behind the surviving walls. The fifteen-year resistance of Pisa to all the siege attempts of the Florentines, even aided in 1500 by a strong French army, and the nine-month resistance of Siena to the assaults of imperial and Florentine troops in 1555–6, stand at either end of the wars as exam-

³⁶ Some of the most significant programmes of refortification were to be found in the Venetian Terraferma state; see, in particular, M. Mallett and J. Hale, *The Military Organisation of a Renaissance State: Venice, ca. 1400–1617* (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 409–28.

ples of what determined defence could achieve. Cities could be defended against the new artillery and ‘fare come Pisa’ became a byword for the new defensive possibilities.³⁷ If Gaston de Foix’s successful storming of the fortress of Brescia in 1512, with arquebusiers firing over the heads of his assault troops to give covering fire, demonstrated the new aggressive potential of siegecraft, the heroic defence of Pavia by de Leyva’s infantry in 1524 saw the balance swinging back towards the defence, and the beginning of a new stalemate.³⁸

This essay started out by identifying three elements of transformation in the military scene round 1500: larger numbers, greater permanence, and a new firepower. The first and last of these have so far been considered, and it remains to focus briefly on the issue of permanence and professionalism.

The first European standing armies since classical times emerged in the fifteenth century. Medieval armies were mustered for particular campaigns, either on the basis of feudal obligation or as volunteers or mercenaries. Apart from small numbers of garrison troops and bodyguards, the first significant attempt to retain large numbers of men in permanent service was the reform of Charles V of France in the 1360s which set up permanent cavalry companies for service in the Hundred Years War.³⁹ This organisation, however, did not survive the long years of uneasy truce and the outbursts of internal factionalism within France of the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. By the time that Charles VII recreated the *compagnies de l’ordonnance* in 1445, some Italian states, notably Milan and Venice, were also maintaining significant bodies of troops in permanent service, that is, in peace as well as in war.⁴⁰ Such troops, in both Italian and French experience, were mostly heavy cavalry; there was not yet felt to be a need to maintain large numbers of trained infantry on a permanent basis, given the existence of militia traditions of

³⁷ Ivy Corfis and M. Wolfe (eds.), *The Medieval City under Siege* (Woodbridge, 1995), p. 254 describes the successful internal defence of Pisa, which inspired the proverb—‘fare come Pisa’.

³⁸ Pieri, *Il Rinascimento*, pp. 488–90 (Brescia) and pp. 555–6 (Pavia). Antonio di Leyva’s determined defence of Pavia against the entire French army owed much to the support of the local population.

³⁹ The classic account of the early moves towards permanence initiated by Charles V of France is Contamine, *Guerre, état et société*, pp. 3–131.

⁴⁰ Mallett, *Mercenaries*, *passim*; Mallett and Hale, pp. 1–210; N. Covini, *L’esercito del Duca: organizzazione militare e istituzioni al tempo degli Sforza, 1450–1480* (Rome, 1998) *passim*.

part-time service and training, and the speed with which the infantry of the time could be recruited and trained. It was only in the late fifteenth century that permanent mercenary companies of Swiss pikemen began to emerge from a local militia tradition, and this led quickly to a recognition of a need for standing companies of trained infantry. Conscription was introduced in the Swiss cantons in the mid fifteenth century and thereafter a proportion of recruits were expected to be ready for immediate service. It was, however, the continuity of the campaigns, the new demands of occupation of territory and constant threats of renewal of war, of the Italian Wars period, that really confirmed the need for substantial standing armies, with accompanying shifts towards professional military service. Spain had instituted the permanent cavalry companies just before the outbreak of the wars, but the campaigns in Granada had already provided a framework of almost continuous service of infantry companies for a number of years. Indeed the conflict with the Moors did not end with their expulsion from Granada; further campaigns in North Africa were launched over the next twenty years by Ferdinand, and added to Spain's military commitments in Italy and on the Pyrenees frontier. For France, war on two or three fronts also became a characteristic of the period, although there was a considerable continuity about the captains and companies involved in the fighting and the garrison duties in Italy. Experience in Italy was clearly regarded as an important criterion when armies were being put together for a new campaign in the peninsula.

At the heart of the new permanence were the military ordinances issued by both states, binding the troops to service during the king's pleasure. These were a novelty in Spain in 1493 but had been the framework for the maintenance of the heavy cavalry companies in France for more than fifty years. The promulgation of ordinances for the service of infantry was a product of the post-1494 period and completed the arrangements for comprehensive permanent service.⁴¹ The extensive and continuous demand for the specialist Swiss and Landsknecht pike infantry had a similar effect of creating perma-

⁴¹ Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, pp. 165–72, summarises well the stages in the advance of standing armies and military permanence. Royal ordinances (France: 1445, 1448, 1498, 1534; Spain: 1493, 1495, 1496, 1503) are the milestones on the way. But it is the more informal evidence of permanence: collections of letters, diaries, autobiographies, military treatises, for all of which Contamine provides a remarkable bibliography, that fill the gaps.

nence in those mercenary companies. War and the engagement of individuals in war was moving towards new levels of continuity and, necessarily, expertise. Machiavelli's concern about a growing gap between the military life and that of the civilian population was, to some extent, a reflection of reality.⁴² Levels of skill and discipline among the professional troops, whether foreign mercenary or "national", made part-time and militia service increasingly anachronistic. The Venetian militia infantry at Agnadello and the Florentine militia which surrendered Prato in 1512 proved to be no match for the French, Swiss and Spanish professionals which they faced. Consequently Machiavelli, whilst perceiving a real problem, was pressing for an unrealistic solution when he put his faith in a citizen militia.

The development of standing forces, however, provided only the core of early modern armies; numbers always had to be made up and volunteers recruited when war approached. In these circumstances part-time militia service remained an integral feature of sixteenth century military organisation. Both French and Spanish armies also remained heavily dependent on "adventurers", often young men from lesser noble families who usually served as heavily-armed infantry or light cavalry for the duration of a campaign. Some 400 adventurers were present in the French army in the Agnadello campaign; the presence of the king and the possibility of catching his eye was thought to be a particular attraction for such service. In 1523 6,000 adventurers were said to be ready to join Francis I's expedition to Italy.⁴³ Swiss companies crossing the Alps to join the campaigns in Italy tended to gather new recruits on the way, and to arrive at the assembly point sometimes three times as large as when they left the cantons. This caused headaches for the paymasters, and inevitably tended to dilute the discipline and effectiveness of the companies.

Soldiering as a profession came of age during this period. The professional captain, the captain who owed his position more to his

⁴² *Arte della Guerra*, Book I illustrates Machiavelli's dilemma in the debate about militias and permanent troops, and the Spanish great ordinance of 1503 seems to be specifically addressing the same issues (Quatrefages, *Los Tercios*, pp. 83 ff.). On Machiavelli's military ideas, see also M. Mallett, 'The theory and practice of warfare in Machiavelli's Republic', in G. Bock, Q. Skinner, and M. Viroli (eds), *Machiavelli and Republicanism* (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 173–80.

⁴³ Contamine, *Histoire militaire*, p. 240. L. Garcia, in Contamine, *War and Competition*, p. 41, suggests that the phenomenon of 'adventuring' was even more common in Spanish military experience.

skills and experience than to birth or wealth, was already appearing by the beginning of the fifteenth century. But the emergence of standing armies and permanent service tended to slow down this particular development as members of the aristocracy jostled for rank and reward in royal service. A survey of the French captains in Italy during the Italian Wars reveals very few who were not of noble birth; but at the same time it also reveals a continuity of service and experience which allows us to classify them as professionals. Traditionally it is the gunners who have been seen as the first true professionals in late medieval and early modern warfare, and whose reconдите skills seemed to set them apart from other soldiers. But the armies of the Italian Wars were filled with men with new skills and long service, recognised by promotion through the ranks and by higher pay.

There are many implications of this scenario of expansion and greater permanence which I shall not elaborate on here: the implication for training, and a shift from the development of individual skills to an emphasis on group training; the implication for tactics and strategy of the new predominance of infantry; the implications for command structures and leadership, and particularly the need for new hierarchies of junior officers and NCOs; the implications of permanent service for the military life and for the experience of war; above all the implications for supply and pay.

I should like to conclude, however, with a brief consideration, in this whole context of changing warfare, of the war at sea. Three salient points emerge: first, transportation of troops, supplies and money was the main role of the fleets—particularly for Spain. Blockade proved relatively ineffective and naval confrontation rare. Secondly, in terms of the fighting potential of the fleets, early moves towards the building and deployment of very large carracks as gunships were abandoned because of the difficulties of collaboration between such ships and the traditional warships of the Mediterranean—the galleys. By the 1520s Spain was switching its attention towards the creation of a large galley fleet for the service in the Mediterranean, and both sides jostled for the support of Andrea Doria and his Genoese galleys. Thirdly, Spain emerged at sea, as well as in the Italian peninsula, as the predominant Western power. The war at sea, however, became increasingly a matter of confrontation with the Ottomans, periodically allies of France, rather than with France itself.

The transformation of naval warfare was a much slower process than that on land. The period of the Italian Wars cannot be described

as formative in that process, although the role of the fleets was a good deal more important than is usually recognised. The arquebus became the standard weapon of the Venetian galley crews in 1518, but this does not seem to have added greatly to the fighting potential of the galleys. Galleys and river fleets continued to play a role in river and coastal warfare, as they had done in the fifteenth century, while the demand for small and medium-sized sailing ships to convey and supply the military operations, increased steadily.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ For recent work on naval warfare during the Italian Wars, see Contamine, *Histoire militaire*, Chap. 12 by M. Mollat, and bibliography on pp. 579–81. Attention must also be drawn to two modern ‘classics’: C. Cipolla, *Guns and Sail in the Early Phase of European Expansion, 1400–1700* (London, 1965) and J. Guilmartin, *Gunpowder and Galleys: Changing Technology and Mediterranean Warfare at Sea in the Sixteenth Century* (Cambridge, 1944).

HOMMES DE GUERRE ET GENS DE FINANCE:
THE INQUEST ON THE FRENCH DEFEAT
IN NAPLES 1503–4

Atis Antonovics

William Hickling Prescott, the great nineteenth-century historian who provides the clearest narrative of these events, wrote of the Neapolitan campaign of Louis XII:

Few military expeditions have commenced under more brilliant and imposing auspices; few have been conducted in so ill-advised a manner through their whole progress; and none attended in the close with more indiscriminate and overwhelming ruin.¹

Following upon the Treaty of Granada in 1500 with Ferdinand of Aragon, French and Spanish forces and their allies launched a joint invasion of Naples and by September 1501 the last Aragonese ruler, Federigo, had been sent into exile in France. The kingdom was carved up between the conquerors, with the French being assigned mainly the northern section, including the capital Naples and Abruzzo, and the Spaniards, under their commander Gonsalvo da Cordoba, occupying Calabria and Apulia. By the summer of 1501 disputes over the division of territory had escalated into full-scale warfare. Diplomatic efforts to patch up their differences, such as the Treaty of Lyons in April 1502, were made unrealistic by events on the ground, as the Spanish commander refused any compromises, and began to advance through Calabria to drive back the French forces. The decisive Spanish victory at Cerignola on 28 April 1503 led Louis XII to plan the sending of major reinforcements and supplies to his beleaguered army, and to launch a diversionary attack against the Franco-Spanish border in Roussillon. The French relief forces that arrived in Italy suffered delays on account of the two papal conclaves of 1503 in Rome and through the replacement, because of ill-health, of Louis de La Trémoille as commander by Francesco Gonzaga,

¹ W. H. Prescott, *History of the Reign of Ferdinand and Isabella the Catholic*, ed. J. F. Kirk (London, 1908), p. 573.

Marquis of Mantua. The Spaniards were able to advance further to blockade Gaeta and take up positions at San Germano, to the north of Naples.

The final encounter between the French and Spanish forces was a bitter affair, when for some six weeks from early November 1503 the two armies were deadlocked on either side of the River Garigliano. The rain made movements of horses, waggons and artillery difficult and the infantry succumbed in large numbers to dysentery and cold.² In the account of the chronicler Jean d'Auton 'nearly all were bare and cold, up to their knees in mud'. A captain of the infantry, seeing 'his poor soldiers dying of cold and hunger', pleaded on their behalf with one of the civilian commissioners, Courcou, 'to which this Courcou did not wish to lend an ear, or to stir a hand', whereupon the captain advanced his own money on written sureties.³ We shall return to Courcou. Machiavelli gave the example of Garigliano to prove that the French could not long endure hardship and privation and spoke of the disorder of the camp there.⁴ Discipline and effective command were lacking. The captains left their troops, to seek better quarters far from the front, and desertion began to mount among the mass of the army.⁵ Only the Spanish infantry famously held their discipline under their resolute commander, Gonsalvo da Cordoba. Finally, on 27 December, in a daring manoeuvre the Spanish army crossed the river. Surprise by their sudden appearance, the Marquis of Saluzzo apparently panicked and ordered a retreat upon Gaeta, abandoning much of his artillery and supplies. This last stronghold of French power in Naples was to fall shortly afterwards.

² Machiavelli in *The Art of War* wrote that the French were defeated by the winter and not by the Spaniards: 'dal verno, e non dagli Spagnoli': *Arte della guerra*, Book VI (*Art of War*, ed. and trans. C. Lynch (Chicago, 2003), p. 140.

³ Jean d'Auton, *Chroniques de Louis XII*, ed. R de Maulde La Clavière (Paris, 1885–95), III, pp. 263 ff, 291 ff. What relatively little is known about the author is well summarised by P. Contamine, 'Jean d'Auton, historien de Louis XII', in P. Contamine and J. Guillaume (eds), *Louis XII en Milanais. XLI^e Colloque International d'Etudes Humanistes, 30 juin-3 juillet 1998* (Paris, 2003), pp. 11–29.

⁴ N. Machiavelli, *Legazioni e commissarie*, ed. S. Bertelli, 3 vols (Milan, 1964), II, pp. 664–5, 728–9.

⁵ For the battle, see P. Pieri, *La battaglia del Garigliano del 1503* (Rome, 1938); for the war, see P. Pieri, 'La guerra franco-spagnuola nel Mezzogiorno (1502–1503)', *Archivio storico per le provincie napoletane*, 72 (1952), pp. 21–69; C. Oman, *The History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century* (New York, 1937), pp. 115 ff.

In a well-known despatch, the Venetian envoy Giustinian described the pitiable state of the remnants of the French army arriving in Rome.

They are despoiled and even actually naked; nor have they refuge or resting-place; and to avoid perishing of cold, they go, if I may be pardoned for mentioning such details, and bury themselves up to their heads in the dung-heaps . . . nearly all have been robbed and plundered by the peasantry.

Finally, in Rome, ‘as soon as a Frenchman shows himself in the streets, he is pursued by derisive cries’.⁶ Jean d’Auton wrote of the condition of the defeated French military captains:

Almost all the principal captains died on their return, some from grief at their defeat, others from melancholy at their misfortune, some from fear of the king’s displeasure, and others from illness and exhaustion.⁷

The disastrous end to the Neapolitan expedition marks perhaps the low point of Louis XII’s reign. Who, or what, was to blame? Contemporaries, as we shall see, were not slow to offer explanations and proposals for reform. How far can the king be held personally responsible for the catastrophe? The delay of the French forces in Rome, seeking by their presence to influence the outcome of the papal conclaves in 1503 also had serious consequences, for which Cardinal Georges d’Amboise must share some censure—although his alleged ambition to become pope deserves re-examination.⁸

Louis XII had made desperate efforts to avoid the disaster and to raise money. He requested loans from the Council, the lords of the Sommaria (the financial audit department) in Naples, and from the citizens: ‘some good sum, the best that can be found’. Yet everywhere the troops complained of lack of pay, or of being paid ‘only in promises and in paper’.⁹ Louis XII had little sympathy with financial officials who failed to come up with the money. When one

⁶ Antonio Giustinian, *Dispacci*, ed. P. Villari (Florence, 1876), II, pp. 375–6, 379.

⁷ d’Auton, *Chroniques*, III, p. 306.

⁸ The account in Ludwig Pastor, *History of the Popes*, vol. VI (London, 1911), pp. 182–230, remains useful for both conclaves, of September and November, 1503; see also F. J. Baumgartner, *Louis XII* (Stroud, 1994), pp. 179–81; on Cardinal d’Amboise (Rouen) and the conclaves of 1503, see Christine Shaw, *Julius II. The Warrior Pope* (Oxford, 1993), pp. 117–23.

⁹ As reported in February 1503: d’Auton, *Chroniques*, III, p. 136.

of his treasurers, during an earlier military campaign, claimed that no revenues were available, the king was reported to have said:

I know that you will find some for me, and indeed more than I ask: and I will show you that I wish to be served not like his late Majesty, King Charles VIII, but like your former master, King Louis XI.¹⁰

In the early part of 1503 the king's control may, in part, have been affected by his own illness, but by this time matters in Naples had been allowed to slide too long. Early in May, Louis XII reproached Yves d'Alègre for his hasty retreat from Capua, following the defeat at Cerignola: 'considering the number of troops that you have', estimated by Louis as 400 horse and 2,500 infantry, 'and the reinforcements that the lord of Avesnes [Gabriel d'Albret] has brought you, I find it a little strange that you did not stop at Capua to wait for the great reinforcements and help that I am sending to you and to give relief to the city of Naples.' D'Alègre was to spare no efforts to recover Capua, 'for, with no shadow of doubt, there lies the heart of my affair', and the king proceeded to give further tactical advice to his commander in the field, assuring him of help en route.¹¹

A vast effort had gone into sending provisions by sea with the fleet under Prègent de Bidoulx, and with ships specially contracted for the purpose.¹² Underlying all these elaborate preparations was the acute financial situation, seemingly made worse by the endemic corruption of the officials disbursing the money. A typical tale of the difficulties encountered comes from a letter of the Marquis of Saluzzo to Louis XII on 18 June about his efforts to bring artillery and munitions by sea to Naples. He had been assured that Prègent de Bidoulx was bringing him money and provisions:

but I have received none of them; and moreover I have not been paid by your financial officials until the month is over, and also they pay me for the most part in kind with provisions at a very dear price . . . for they sell me a quintal of biscuit at 30 carlini, and I find them available

¹⁰ L.-G. Pélissier, *Louis XII et Ludovic Sforza (8 avril 1498–23 juillet 1500)*, 2 vols (Paris, 1896), I, p. 382: Maffeo Pirovani to Lodovico Sforza, 6 May 1498. While the reference is to the Milanese campaign, the attitudes of the monarch to his financial officials remained the same later.

¹¹ H. Courteault, 'Le dossier "Naples" des Archives Nicolai', *Annuaire-Bulletin de la Société historique de France*, 1916, no. 49, pp. 197–8.

¹² Courteault, 'Le dossier "Naples"', nos. 65, pp. 219–21, and 67, pp. 223–4 (three carracks with 3,000 *charges de blé* at Gaeta early in June).

at 20 carlini everywhere that I wish to purchase them . . . May it be your good pleasure to send . . . orders to your financial officials that they give me an advance of two or three months beforehand, so that I can perform some good service to you; without that, I can do no more.¹³

The financial officials in turn set out their own griefs. In a letter of 11 June, for example, Louis Poncher, *général des finances*, sought to recover some money from certain merchants in order to pay the infantry:

I know well how necessary it is that the said Swiss and infantry be promptly paid; but, if it is to gain entry to Paradise I could not do any better . . . and as you well know and understand, it is no easy matter for [one] man alone to find such large sums of money to borrow.¹⁴

He reported the arrival of a large quantity of harnesses and halberds by sea to arm the cavalry but expressed the view that it would be better to keep them at Gaeta than to send them to the camp in the field ‘for fear that they might get lost’.¹⁵

The experience was, of course, not new. The events of 1503–4 and subsequent recriminations were a close echo of what had occurred with Charles VIII in the course of 1495–6, when the French had to evacuate the kingdom. Then, too, the king protested vehemently that he was giving every possible help to the remnants of the French forces there. He wrote defiantly to François du Fau, anxious about his brother remaining in Naples: ‘I shall in no way forget not only him, but all those who are over there in my service, for I have them often on my mind’.¹⁶

But it was not easy to transform that concern into practical assistance. At that time too, blame was attached by contemporaries to the delays of the financial officials, particularly Guillaume Briçonnet, named and shamed by Commynes.¹⁷ Payment of the French troops

¹³ L.-G. Pélissier, ‘Documents sur la première année du règne de Louis XII’, *Bulletin historique et philologique* (1890), p. 284.

¹⁴ Courteault, ‘Le dossier “Naples”’, no. 69, pp. 226–7.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 227.

¹⁶ ‘je les ay souvent en mémoire’: *Lettres de Charles VIII*, ed. P. Pélicier, 5 vols (Paris, 1898–1905), V, p. 70. Cf. Courteault, ‘Le dossier “Naples”’, no. 53, p. 203: Louis XII writing to Naples from Lyons, 21 May 1503, giving assurances that ‘we will never abandon you’ (‘soyez assurez que nous ne vous habbonderons jamaiz’).

¹⁷ S. Kinser (ed.) and I. Cazeaux (trans.), *The Memoirs of Philippe de Commynes* (Columbia, S. Carolina, 1973), II, pp. 565, 578. Commynes’ hostility to Briçonnet and the other financial officials runs throughout his account of the expedition.

fell into serious arrears. Lancelot du Lac wrote desperately to Charles from Atella on 25 July 1496: 'I have written to you several times that the most important thing is to pay the men-at-arms and the Swiss, and it is because of the lack of provision in this regard that we are here in such dire straits'.¹⁸

To lose Naples once might be considered a misfortune; to lose it twice looks, at the very least, like carelessness. Let us return to the causes of the second defeat.

The best known and fullest contemporary analysis comes in the chronicle of Jean d'Auton, who described the arrest of some twenty financial officials (some fifteen are named) in the immediate aftermath of the disaster.¹⁹ Among these was the Courcou previously mentioned: apparently the nickname (is it an obscenity?) for Jean Du Plessis, who was tried and condemned to be hanged, but was freed after the petitions of the queen (he was master of her household) and the Marquis of Saluzzo. Indeed, he returned to favour under Francis I and his family continued their social ascent into the seventeenth century. Another prominent figure, Antoine de Baissey, was accused of retaining money owing to the Swiss, but defended himself 'moult vertueusement', and was also freed and restored to his offices. He continued to play an important role in negotiations for recruiting infantry from the Swiss cantons. François Doulcet, 'maître de la Chambre aux deniers et contrôleur des guerres extraordinaires', apparently took sanctuary in the Dominican church at Blois.²⁰ Yet many of the other named officials seem to have lost their property and offices.

D'Auton is generally said to put all the blame on the financiers, and certainly his sympathies throughout his chronicle seem to be on the side of the soldiers, above all those in the lower ranks. He reported, in the course of the battle of Garigliano, the protest of a French soldier that:

The treasurers conduct themselves in such a way that, through lack of payment, all things necessary for the army remain unfulfilled, and

¹⁸ Y. Labande-Mailfert, *Charles VIII et son milieu* (Paris, 1975), p. 451, n. 648.

¹⁹ d'Auton, *Chroniques*, III, pp. 336–8. In addition to the editor's extensive notes to his edition of d'Auton, there is useful material for identifying a number of these officials in A. Lapeyre and R. Scheurer, *Les notaires et secrétaires du roi sous les règnes de Louis XI, Charles VIII et Louis XII (1461–1515): notices personnelles et généalogiques* (Paris, 1978).

²⁰ 'qui se suva cheux les Jacoppins de Blois': d'Auton, *Chroniques*, III, p. 338.

in addition some of them rob a great sum of money from the king. . . . The soldiers have always been willing and anxious to do what they could.

But it is interesting to note that in the chapter listing the fraudulent financial officials, he does give some weight to their counter-accusations against the military commanders. The arguments are set out first in the form of reported and various public opinion ('selon le cry public'—a kind of early opinion poll or focus group), and then in a curious poetic dialogue on the defeat at Garigliano, comprising the views of the soldiers, the captains, the members of the royal Council, and the treasurers, all given their voice. So while one section of 'le cry public' might blame the loss of Naples on the 'vicious rapine and odious avarice' of the financial officials, 'others said that the captains of the army, who were divided among themselves and all wanted the command [*envyeulx de gouverner*], had abandoned the honour of war for the sake of profiting from it'. Even the soldiers were not blameless: 'Others said that it was the soldiers who had not kept military order [*ordre de guerre*] or observed the discipline of chivalry [*discipline de chevalerie*]'.

These mutual antagonisms between the *gens de finance* and the military were a feature of all Renaissance and early modern warfare (and have been charted in other countries, such as Spain),²¹ but seem to have been especially intense in the French armed forces.²² The unbridgeable gulf of distrust between the aristocratic commanders and the bourgeois *gens de finance*, who were responsible for the pay and supply of the armed forces, lay at the heart of numerous defeats in the years after 1504. Most notably, perhaps, it goes some way to explain the otherwise somewhat inexplicable collapse of Louis XII's power in Milan and Lombardy at the end of his reign: how the

²¹ Among other contributions, P. Stewart, 'The soldier, the bureaucrat and fiscal records in the army of Ferdinand and Isabella', *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 44 (1969), pp. 282–92; for a later period, I. A. A. Thompson, *War and Government in Habsburg Spain, 1560–1620* (London, 1976); G. Rowlands, *The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV: Royal Service and Private Interest* (Cambridge, 2002).

²² Much light on these conflicts is to be found in the pioneering study of A. Spont, *Semblançay: la bourgeoisie financière au début du XVI^e siècle* (Paris, 1895). A modern account of the Semblançay case is in R. J. Knecht, *Francis I* (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 125–8; a revised version in *idem*, *Renaissance Warrior and Patron. The Reign of Francis I* (Cambridge, 1996). A major general study is that of P. Hamon, *L'agent du roi. Les finances de François I^{er}* (Paris, 1994).

seemingly overwhelming victory at Ravenna by the French in 1512 could lead a year later to defeat and withdrawal of their forces after the second battle of Novara in 1513.²³ The clashes between Thomas Bohier, *général des finances de Normandie*, and the commanders in the field over delays in payment lay at the heart of the subsequent collapse of French power in Lombardy.²⁴

In analysing Louis XII's loss of Milan in Chapter Three of *The Prince*, Machiavelli offered his own comment on the French loss of Naples: 'If France could have attacked Naples with her own forces, she should have done so; if not, she should not have divided it.'²⁵ It is to the first part of this passage that I wish lastly to turn. In the aftermath of the defeat, the Maréchal de Gié, Pierre de Rohan, proposed the establishment of a national infantry force of 20,000 men: 'which if it were done, would free the king from subjection to the Swiss, who hold him to ransom and carry off money from the kingdom without ever completing their terms of service'.²⁶

These proposals for military reform emerged in the records of Gié's trial. Etienne Petit, a long-serving secretary and financial official, was instructed to search out the records of the *ban et arrière-ban* (the provincial feudal levies). At his trial, Gié was accused of secret treasonable plans. Gié countered in his deposition that there was nothing secret or treasonable in these proposals which he had made ten or more years previously, that is at the time of Charles VIII's Italian expedition: 'that the said lord would do well to make use of the men of his own kingdom, both infantry and cavalry, which had not been in service for more than twenty to 22 years'.²⁷ This last remark was a reference to the disbanding of these embryonic national forces in the later years of Louis XI. Gié wished the money paid to the

²³ For a narrative account, J. F. C. Bridge, *A History of France from the Death of Louis XI to 1515*, 5 vols (Oxford, 1921–36), IV, pp. 159–69.

²⁴ The main material is in Spont, *Semblançay*, and articles by Pélissier. I hope to return to the subject in more detail on another occasion.

²⁵ Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, ed. and trans. G. Bull (Harmondsworth, 1961), p. 42.

²⁶ 'quoy fisant, le Roy se mectroit hors de la subjection des Suisses qui le ransonnioient et emportoient argent dudit royaume sans aucune foit achever leur service': R. de Maulde La Clavière, *Procédures politiques du règne de Louis XII* (Paris, 1885), p. 94: 'interrogatoire du maréchal sur la déposition d'Etienne Petit', Orléans, 27 Oct. 1504.

²⁷ 'que ledit seigneur feroit bien de se servir de gens de son royaume, tant de gens de pié que de nobles, et de son ban et arrière-ban, dont on ne s'estoit servy puis vintg ou vintg-deux ans au ça': *ibid.*, pp. 95–6.

Swiss to stay within the kingdom: ‘and it seemed that by this means the nobles and others of his kingdom would come together and exercise themselves in the art of war to serve the said lord whenever there was need, and the kingdom would thereby be strong and in greater security.’²⁸ Opposition had come, it seems, from Georges d’Amboise, who doubted if the money was there to make this happen.²⁹ Gié argued that the costs would amount to the equivalent of some 200 men at arms or lances and the king had already ordered the disbanding of various named noble companies.³⁰

Nothing seems to have come of Gié’s plan,³¹ as indeed his personal disgrace and fall from power came soon after. Frederic Baumgartner, however, has drawn attention to a further effort to establish a regular infantry corps, by an edict of 12 January 1509. ‘Its key innovation was giving command of the six infantry companies to respected captains of the *gens d’armes*, in the hope that their prestige would raise the always low regard for the infantry and get the cavalry to co-operate much better.’³² These captains were also intended to foster discipline among the infantry forces. It is not clear how far anything much came of this, as soon afterwards contracts were again signed with various Swiss cantons for troops. I have not discovered much further about this edict, which appears in some ways to anticipate the later, better-known infantry legions of 1534 under Francis— which also, according to Knecht, ‘proved a disappointment’.³³

While it may not have been necessary for Gié to look outside his own kingdom for inspiration in establishing a national infantry force, it is tempting to speculate whether the Maréchal de Gié was familiar with other well-known schemes for native militia forces at this time: the famous Romagnol militia of Cesare Borgia, close ally of Louis

²⁸ ‘et semble-lui qui parle que, par ce moien, les nobles et les autres de son royaume se adresseroient et exerceroient aux armes pour servir ledit seigneur quant besoin seroit, et en serait le royaume plus fort et en grant seureté’: *ibid.*, p. 96.

²⁹ ‘mondit seigneur le legat trouvoit le payment difficile, et ne croit pas que l’argent se peust retrouver pour ce faire, pour le grant despence qui aboit esté faicte par avant’: *ibid.*

³⁰ ‘aucunes compagnies comme celles de Foix, monseigneur de Bourbon et de Ligny et autres’: *ibid.*

³¹ ‘Bien fit que lettres furent escriptes aux gens, de Lyon, des pais pour les choisir seulement, pour près, par le Roy, leur bailler tels capitaines qu’il plairoit; et demoura la chose en cest estat’: *ibid.*, p. 97.

³² Baumgartner, *Louis XII*, p. 194.

³³ R. J. Knecht, *French Renaissance Monarchy: Francis I and Henry II* (London, 1984), p. 49.

XII; the Venetian schemes of 1508 charted by that indispensable duo, Mallett and Hale,³⁴ or indeed Machiavelli's famous initiative in Florence around 1506, dubbed by Humfrey Butters, with characteristic piquancy, as 'fatuous'.³⁵ Gié's close contacts with Florence are well-known, not least by art historians struggling to reconstruct the complex story of Michelangelo's commission of a bronze David which, according to Condivi, 'was sent to France', originally for the marèchal, 'at the request of his great friend Piero Soderini'.³⁶ It is now known that Gié's documented interest in this work goes back to 22 June 1501, where he is described by a Florentine envoy as 'afezionato alla città'.³⁷ It was not only with the Cardinal d'Amboise that Machiavelli may have had conversations on warfare and politics.

For the French, the matter of solving the problem of an efficient infantry force was far from being merely a humanistic rhetorical exercise. Their continuing reliance on hiring Swiss mercenaries, and the problems that these forces caused, was arguably at the root of French military failures in the years subsequent to the defeat in Naples. This was especially so in the aftermath of the suppression of the Genoese revolt in 1507, when the Swiss believed that they had been seriously short-changed, and the French failed to make sufficient efforts to soften their resentment.³⁸

³⁴ M. E. Mallett and J. R. Hale, *The Military Organization of a Renaissance State. Venice c. 1400 to 1617* (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 350–2.

³⁵ H. Butters, *Governors and Government in Early Sixteenth Century Florence, 1502–1519* (Oxford, 1985), p. 309; see *ibid.*, p. 105 for a fuller discussion of the establishment and performance of the militia. See also B. Wicht, *L'idée de milice et le modèle suisse dans la pensée de Machiavel* (Lausanne, 1995).

³⁶ Earlier in 1499 nine sculpted heads (seven in marble and two in bronze) were ordered by Gié from Florence.

³⁷ L. Gatti, "Delle cose de' pictori et scultori si può mal promettere cosa certa": la diplomazia fiorentina presso la corte del re di Francia e il Davide bronzeo di Michelangelo Buonarroti, *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire de l'École française de Rome*, 106 (1994), pp. 433–72.

³⁸ The major study to date is that of C. Kohler, *Les Suisses dans les guerres d'Italie de 1503 à 1512* (Geneva, 1896; repr. 1978). A recent contribution by H.-J. Schmidt, 'Les Suisses en Milanais: Coopération et concurrence avec Louis XII', in Contamine and Guillaume (eds), *Louis XII en Milanais*, pp. 189–225.

THE FACE OF THE SIEGE: FORTIFICATION, TACTICS AND STRATEGY IN THE EARLY ITALIAN WARS

Simon Pepper

The French invasion of Italy in 1494–95 has been credited not only with the introduction of a new generation of siege artillery, but with initiating changes in fortification which fundamentally transformed the nature of Early Modern warfare. Guicciardini and Giovio, writing amidst the aftermath of the *anno terribile*, were preoccupied with the destructive power and increased mobility of the French artillery trains, and the speed with which their iron-shotted guns could knock down Medieval fortress and town walls. This was no doubt part and parcel of the shock experienced by the Italians—themselves no strangers to war—in the face of the improved technology and aggression of the Northern invaders. Their initial analysis identified an increased pace in siege warfare and, with it, the accelerated pace of much wider campaigns which turned on the occupation of key fortresses and cities.¹ Later historians have taken a somewhat different view. Geoffrey Parker acknowledges the initial challenge of improved artillery but bases his Military Revolution thesis on the response to it, which in Italy (and, as we are increasingly made aware, in other countries too) saw the rapid development of new forms of bastioned

¹ The oft-quoted passage from Francesco Guicciardini, *The History of Italy*, trans. Chevalier Austin Parke Goddard (London, 1754), Vol. 1, pp. 148–9 reads: “The French brought with them a much handier engine made of brass, called Cannon, which they charged with heavy, iron balls, smaller without comparison than those of stone made use of hitherto, and drove them on carriages with horses, not with oxen, as was the custom in Italy; and they were attended by such clever men, and on such instruments appointed for the purpose that they almost ever kept pace with the army. They were planted against the walls of a town with such speed, the space between each shot was so little, and the balls flew so quick, and were impelled with such force, that as much execution was done in a few hours, as formerly, in Italy, in the like number of days. These, rather diabolical than human instruments, were used not only in sieges, but also in the field, and were mixed with others of a smaller size. Such artillery rendered Charles’s army very formidable to all Italy.” See also Paolo Giovio, *Dell’istoria del suo tempo di Mons. Paolo Giovio da Como, Vescovo di Novara*, tradotta [from the Latin] per M. Lodovico Domenichi (Firenze, 1555), pp. 54–5.

fortification which proved highly effective in swinging the balance of advantage once again to the defence.² Siege operations against strongholds of all sizes became increasingly protracted, manpower-intensive, and costly. The slow pace, high cost and enormously expanded scale of Early Modern siege operations were—in Parker’s analysis—essential ingredients in an argument which suggested that the changes in siege warfare *initiated by the development of the Italian bastion* were a key factor in shaping the Baroque European states which alone were capable of sustaining the costs of war on this scale.³

By looking critically at a small selection of key sieges from 1495 to 1530, in particular at the different siege tactics employed by both besiegers and besieged, I hope to get closer to an understanding of the changes which would prove so formative in both Italian and European history. Discussion of guns *qua* guns will be sidelined, although here too there is much to be said about the availability and performance of siege artillery, and the smaller hand-held firearms that were revolutionizing the battlefield and often making possible the effective defence of Medieval walls as well as the new field fortifications.⁴ Nor is this the place for a potted history of military architecture, although a few key facts may well be helpful.⁵ Our focus will be the different faces of the siege which emerge from the crucible of war that was late Renaissance Italy.

² Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800* (Cambridge, 1988), p. 10.

³ Some of Parker’s early ideas on the Military Revolution were incorporated into *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road 1567–1659* (Cambridge, 1972) and “The Military Revolution, 1550–1650—a Myth?” *Journal of Modern History* XLVII (1976), pp. 195–314. Some challenges and responses are conveniently collected in Clifford Rogers (ed.), *The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military transformation of Early Modern Europe* (Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford, 1995). One of the great strengths of Parker’s approach is that it embraces developments outside Europe, where it supplements W. H. McNeil, *The Pursuit of Power. Technology, Armed Force and Society since AD 1000* (Oxford, 1982), Carlo Cipolla’s *Guns and Sails in the Early Phase of European Expansion, 1400–1700* (London, 1965) and John Francis Giulmartin, *Gunpowder and Gallies: Changing Technology and Mediterranean Warfare at Sea in the Sixteenth Century* (London, 1974).

⁴ Bert S. Hall, *Weapons & Warfare in Renaissance Europe* (Baltimore MD and London, 1997).

⁵ The literature is immense but see: John Hale, “The Early Development of the Bastion: An Italian Chronology,” in *Europe in the Late Middle Ages*, edited by J. R. Hale, L. Highfield and B. Smalley (London, 1965), pp. 466–94 was seminal; collected essays in J. R. Hale, *Renaissance War Studies* (London, 1983); plus much of relevance in M. E. Mallett and J. R. Hale, *The Military Organization of a Renaissance State: Venice c. 1400 to 1617* (Cambridge, 1984). See also: Horst De La Croix, “Military

The essential features and rapidly increasing size of the new military architecture can be illustrated by reference to a single well-known complex, the Papal fortress of Castel Sant'Angelo (fig. 1). The Medieval walls surrounding the Imperial Roman drum which for almost two millennia has dominated Rome were reinforced with round towers in 1447, which were encased by octagonal gun-towers built by Antonio da Sangallo the Elder in 1492–95, and enclosed once more by Francesco Laparelli's bastions built between 1561 and 1565.⁶ Sangallo's gun-towers were built progressively bigger during the course of his programme of modernization; but the biggest of them could comfortably fit inside any one Laparelli's massive low, earthwork structures. Almost invisible to a ground level observer beyond the sloping glacis that leads up to the ditch, the fully-developed Italian bastions were capable of mounting heavy artillery on both outward faces, every part of which could be swept by guns in the recessed flanks. This outer ring of bastions demonstrates the basic simplicity of the *trace italienne*, its geometrical precision, and the enormous increase in the scale of the new works over a period of some seventy years. Time is the other key factor. Experimentation in new forms can be found throughout the second half of the fifteenth century, but the full-scale urban refortification of major towns often took much longer than the modernization of Rome's fortress. Lucca, perhaps the best preserved of Italy's new urban enceintes, initiated a programme to reinforce its medieval walls in 1513 (probably to thicken them with an earth backing), followed this with the construction between 1516 and 1525 of circular gun-towers (amongst the last in Italy to be started on this pattern) before the first of a lengthy procession of foreign engineering and military experts were consulted in 1543 about

Architecture and the Radial City Plan in Sixteenth Century Italy," *Art Bulletin* 42 (1960), pp. 263–90 and "The Literature on Fortification in Renaissance Italy," *Technology and Culture* 6 (1963), pp. 30–50; Simon Pepper and Nicholas Adams, *Firearms & Fortifications: Military Architecture and Siege Warfare in Sixteenth-Century Siena* (Chicago, 1986). The real pioneers, of course, were Italians: Carlo Promis, *Dell'arte dell'ingegnere e dell'artiglierie in Italia dalla sua origine sino al principio del XVI secolo: Memorie storiche* (Torino, 1841) and *Biografie di ingegneri militigari italiani dal secolo XIV alla metà del XVIII* (Torino, 1874); Enrico Rocchi, *Le origini della fortificazione moderna* (Rome, 1894) have all stood the test of time, as has Piero Pieri, *La crisi militare italiana nel Rinascimento* (Torino, 1970).

⁶ Piero Spagnesi, *Castel Sant'Angelo: la fortezza di Roma. Monumenti della vicenda architettonica da Alessandro VI a Vittorio Emanuele III, 1494–1911* (Roma, 1995). The image is from Pepper & Adams, *Firearms & Fortifications*, p. 5.

the best way forward. More than a century was to pass before the famous circuit of bastions finally reached completion in 1650.⁷

The geometrical precision and increasing size of the bastioned fortifications developed in response to the challenge of the improved gunpowder artillery, makes it easy to suppose that a city with anything less than modern works on this scale could scarcely hope to withstand a well-equipped siege train. Yet this was evidently not the case—even in the disastrous years of 1494–94. By the end of the Italian Wars those looking for evidence to sustain early manifestations of a military revolution could point to the sieges of Pisa (1503–09), Florence (1529–30), Mirandola (1551–2) and Siena (1554–55) which were notable for the great length of their resistance. Others such as Padua in 1509 and the two sieges of Naples in 1495 saw modified but “old-fashioned” fortifications performing surprisingly well against siege trains which had greatly impressed contemporaries.

Standard accounts of the French invasion of Italy in 1494–95 lay considerable emphasis on the rapid collapse of a series of traditional fortifications along the line of march when subjected to bombardment from the fast-moving siege train of Charles VIII. It is worth reminding ourselves here that Charles VIII’s famously mobile siege train had originally been scheduled for transport by ship to southern Italy, making use of newly-acquired access to Genoese ports to serve as staging posts. The guns were landed in Liguria to assist the army which had been brought to a halt in front of the late-15th century fortifications of Sarzana, situated astride the coast road, and its sister fortress of Sarzanello, dominating the narrow coastal plain from its heights. Forceful diplomacy, supported by news of some spectacularly brutal massacres of a number of small positions on the borders of Tuscany caused Florence to buckle and allow the French main force free passage towards Rome and Naples without having to press their assaults against Sarzana and Sarzanello. Fivizzano fell on 26 October 1495, probably overwhelmed by numerous parties on scaling ladders, and was then massacred by the French (enthusiastically assisted by local allies). Pontremoli was sacked by the Swiss pikemen on 28 October (without having resisted).⁸ An earlier glimpse

⁷ R. Martinelli and G. Puccinelli, *Lucca: Le mura del Cinquecento; vivende costruttive dal 1500 al 1650* (Lucca, 1983).

⁸ For a recent account, Simon Pepper, “Castles and Cannon in the Naples

of the new style of warfare had been seen in the Romagna where a Neapolitan force withdrew in the face of a Franco-Milanese column which took the town of Mordano on 20 October and slaughtered most of those inside, both soldiers and civilians. Mordano had rejected calls for surrender and a warning—delivered by Gaspare Sanseverino (a Milanese)—that the French serving with him fought like “mad dogs.”⁹ This was to be proved again at Montefortino, south of Rome, on 31 January 1495, and days later further south at Monte San Giovanni on 9 February, where French ire had been roused by the mutilation of the heralds sent forward to demand surrender. Retribution was of course fully justified in places which fell to storm (and even more so when atrocities had already been committed), but the horror of the massacres obscured the fact that in most of these cases the artillery played little, if any, part in the capture.¹⁰ Small breaches in weak walls, chance shots against gates or drawbridges, or the reckless bravery of French-led scaling parties, all played their part in these traumatic events. The guns of 1494–95 finally met their match in the medieval castles of Naples. Quick results were expected by the French. One of their spies had claimed it would take only two days to capture the main fortress.¹¹

The Aragonese who defended Naples in the first siege held the three sea-side fortresses: the Castelnuovo, overlooking the harbour and its mole; the Castel dell’Ovo on its island crag joined to the land by high bridgeworks; and the Torre di San Vincenzo on a reef in the bay between the two bigger castles (fig. 2). The rest of the city and its strongpoints—the Castel Capuana and the Forte del Carmine—

Campaign of 1494–95,” in Abulafia (ed.) *The French Descent into Renaissance Italy: Antecedents and Effects, 1494–95* (Variorum, 1995), pp. 263–93; but see Sanuto, *La Spedizione di Carlo VIII in Italia raccontata da Marino Sanuto il Giovane*, ed. Rinaldo Fulin (Venice, 1883) and H-Francois Delaborde, *L’Expédition de Charles VIII en Italie. Histoire diplomatique et militaire* (Paris, 1888).

⁹ Cecil H. Clough, “The Romagna campaign of 1494,” in David Abulafia (ed.), *The French Descent*, p. 211.

¹⁰ On these events, and the laws and customs of siege warfare, see Simon Pepper, “Siege Law, Siege Ritual, and the Symbolism of City Walls in Renaissance Europe,” in James D. Tracy (ed.), *City Walls: The Urban Enceinte in Global Perspective* (Cambridge UP, New York, 2000), pp. 573–604, particularly pp. 578–82.

¹¹ “Un cannonier, envoyé comme espion à Naples, affirme sur sa tête qu’en deux jour il prend le Castel Nuovo; certes les Français sont vantards par nature, mais Francesco della casa et autres Florentine, qui ont vu les pièces de leurs yeux, en racontent des chose à faire frémir.” Quoted by Philippe Contamine, “L’artillerie royale française à la veille des Guerres d’Italie,” *Annales de Bretagne*, 71, 2 (1964), p. 223.

had been abandoned, as had a number of fortified and monasteries and small castles on the heights of Pizzofalcone. The most important French objective was the Castelnuovo, which effectively closed the harbour and the mole to its enemies. The Neapolitan Castelnuovo presents a classic towering medieval profile but had been partially modernised in the second half of the fifteenth century by the addition of a broad gun gallery around the three landward faces and by a number of low level pill-boxes (*capannati* to the Italians) providing small arms positions on the floor of the ditch. These last may well have been designed by Francesco di Giorgio Martini, one of the fathers of the new military architecture and author of numerous proto-modern fortresses in central and southern Italy as well as one of the most important Renaissance treatises on architecture.¹² Francesco's treatise stressed the continuing importance of deep ditches and contains numerous sketches of the *capannati* which could be used to defend them.¹³ On the north-west (landward) side of the castle, a large barbican—known as the Cittadella—served as an island in the ditch and provided an advanced fire base for defensive guns. To the south-west another raised platform contained the formal palace garden and provided a potentially very valuable defensive fire base, which on this occasion was occupied by the French and used as one of the positions from which to bombard the Castelnuovo.¹⁴

¹² Michael S. A. Dechert, "The Military Architecture of Francesco di Giorgio in Southern Italy," *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians*, 49, 2 (June, 1990), pp. 161–80. An excellent recent overview is in Nicholas Adams, "L'architettura militare di Francesco di Giorgio," in Francesco Paolo Fiore and Manfredo Tafuri (eds.), *Francesco di Giorgio, architetto* (Siena, 1993), pp. 126–62.

¹³ Francesco di Giorgio Martini, *Trattati di architettura, ingegneria e arte militare*, ed. Corrado Maltesi in 2 volumes (Milan, 1967), Vol. 2, pp. 474 and 433–44. See also Pepper and Adams, *Firearms & Fortifications*, pp. 18–20 and p. 200, note 37.

¹⁴ A more detailed description of the Neapolitan fortresses is to be found in Simon Pepper, "Castles and Cannon in the Naples Campaign of 1494–95," in Abulafia (ed.) *The French Descent* (1995), pp. 263–93, particularly pp. 276–9, drawing heavily on Riccardo Filangieri, "La Cittadella Aragonese e il recinto bastionato di Castel Nuovo," *Atti della Accademia Pontaniana*, 59 (1929), pp. 49–73; "Rassegna critica delle fonti per la storia di Castel Nuovo: Parte Prima, Il castello angioino," *Archivio storico per le province napoletane* (hereafter *ASP*), 61 (1936), pp. 251–323; "Rassegna critica . . . Parte Seconda, Il castello aragonese," *ASP*, 63 (1937), pp. 267–333; "Rassegna critica . . . Parte Terza, Opere di compimento e di restauro durante il periodo aragonese," *ASP*, 64 (1938), pp. 258–342. Filangieri's *Castel Nuovo Reggia Angioina-Aragonese di Napoli* (Naples, 1934) summarises the text of the *ASP* articles without the academic references. See also George L. Hersey, *Alfonso II and the Artistic Renewal of Naples 1485–1495* (New Haven and London, 1969, chapters 4 and 6; L. De la Ville-sur-Yllon, "Le mura e le porte di Napoli," *Napoli. Nobilissima*, 12 (1903), pp. 49–56; Giovanni Sepe, *La Murazione aragonese di Napoli. Studi di restituzione* (Naples, 1942).

The first siege of Naples lasted from 22 February 1495 and effectively ended on 7 March when the Aragonese defending the Castelnuovo capitulated after a magazine explosion—probably accidental. The other positions surrendered on 12 and 13 March. The Castelnuovo had been bombarded vigorously by the French from the Park and from in front of the Barbican. As many as 70 guns were used in the bombardment by Sanuto's account; while Passero, a local observer, gives the much lower figure of 30 pieces in four batteries.¹⁵ Both represented very heavy concentrations of firepower by the standards of the late fifteenth century. According to the Venetian ambassador no serious damage had been sustained to the fortifications themselves, although the upper parts of the palace had been much knocked about. Indeed, had it *not* been for the ammunition explosion the story of the first siege might have been different because, after ten days of the heaviest bombardment, the French siege batteries were forced to re-ammunition from the fleet and to send to Ostia for additional supplies of their famous iron cannon balls. The French initiated negotiations under flag of truce, whereby hostages would be exchanged as security for a surrender of the Castelnuovo unless relief had arrived by 7 March. When the time came the Aragonese failed to keep their side of the bargain and the shooting was resumed. The uncharacteristic willingness of the French to negotiate speaks volumes. This was hardly the overwhelming victory for cannon fire that so dominates most accounts, nor could it possibly justify de La Vigne's bombastic claim that the "twin citadels of Naples were so overawed by the preliminary havoc wrought by the French siege train that they surrendered without waiting for the final assault."¹⁶

Evidence from a variety of contemporary sources should by now encourage a healthy skepticism for the more strident claims advanced for the performance of the modernized French artillery, as well as the widespread belief—then as now—that unmodified Italian fortifications

¹⁵ Sanuto, *Spedizione*, p. 234; Giuliano Passero, *Giornali* (ed. Vincenzo Maria Altobelli et al., Naples, 1785), p. 68. The differences may well be explained by different views about what size of gun constituted a piece of heavy siege artillery.

¹⁶ Quoted by Frederick Taylor, *The Art of War in Italy, 1494–1529*, Cambridge, 1921, p. 95. André de La Vigne (sometimes known as Le Vergier d'Honneur) left a useful diary of the "Voyage de Naples du Roy Charles VIII, mise par escrit, en forme de iournal de son exprés vouloir & commandement par ADLV, Secretaire d'Anne de Bretagne, Reyne de France," in Guillaume de Jaligny, *Histoire de Charles VIII*, ed. Godefroy (Paris, 1684).

were unable to hold out against it for more than a few hours. Defended by the French, the same Castelnuovo held out for five months later in the same year against a fierce bombardment from the Aragonese who, despite earlier losses, still owned one of the largest collections of artillery in Italy.¹⁷

Charles VIII left Naples with most of his army in May 1495, leaving a garrison of some 6,000 men to defend the city, which was quickly lost to a popular uprising in support of the Aragonese. The second siege from July to early December 1495 saw the French defending the same Castelnuovo, somewhat patched-up, which now formed one end of a chain of fortified positions which included the Parco, the convent of Santa Croce and the nearby church of Santa Trinità, the Castel dell'Ovo, and the offshore Torre di San Vincenzo. They had also fortified and held two positions on the heights of Pizzofalcone, which prevented their attackers from overlooking the other lower positions.¹⁸ The Castelnuovo was finally forced to surrender early in December, shortly following the devastating explosion of a gunpowder mine beneath the so-called Cittadella, the barbican outwork in front of the castle.¹⁹ This work was the key to the defence of the main castle and its defenders surrendered on 8 December. The lighthouse had been lost on 29 November, and with it all hope of using the ships to resupply or reinforce the garrison, or even to evacuate the more senior survivors.

Shipping support was the key to the five month resistance by the French in the second siege. Food and ammunition, perhaps even more than money, was needed. A relatively small proportion of the French garrison consisted of mercenary foot who needed to be paid, unlike the mounted men-at-arms in Charles VIII's expeditionary force who served under different conditions. The French horses, of course, presented a problem because of the enormous quantities of fodder they consumed; but surplus horses were killed and eaten, and the less useful beasts driven into no-man's-land, where they were used

¹⁷ Alan Ryder, *The Kingdom of Naples under Alfonso the Magnanimous: the Making of a Modern State* (Oxford, 1976), pp. 279–82.

¹⁸ Pepper, "Castles and Cannon", pp. 282–3.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 284–5. The same Francesco di Giorgio Martini who probably contributed to the pre-war fortification of Naples is widely believed to have been the "Etruscan Narcissus, inventor of marvellous contrivances" of Gioivo's account who is credited with the engineering of the mine (one of the first to be recorded in modern warfare).

for target practice.²⁰ In neither of the two sieges of 1495 was the city of Naples itself defended, but in the defence of Padua these wider logistical considerations and financial constraints probably factored almost as significantly in the outcome as the siege batteries and fortifications.

The successful Venetian defence of Padua pitted apparently very unequal forces against each other. After the Venetian disaster at Agnadello (14 May 1509) the Franco-Imperial League (and their Mantovan, Ferrarese and Papal allies) quickly occupied practically all of the Republic's *terra firma* possessions (save Treviso) without serious opposition. In mid-July 1509 Padua was retaken by the remnants of the Venetian army of Agnadello, aided by Paduan loyalists and quickly supported by volunteers from Venice.²¹ Padua became the key defensive position on the approaches to Venice itself, as well as the obvious springboard for the future reconquest of the *terra firma*. Padua was rapidly fortified against the anticipated League counter-attack which in August re-occupied without difficulty most of the places which had rejoined Venice. In September the League laid siege to Padua itself.²²

The Emperor Maximilian's Germans made the major contribution to the League infantry forces, the French contributing most of the heavy cavalry which at a critical stage in the siege was dismantled

²⁰ Giovio, pp. 115–6: "...egli cogliendo di mira con l'artiglierie, gli ammazzavano come per gioco."

²¹ Sanuto, *Diarii*, Vol. VIII, c. 518 ff.

²² For Padua in 1509 see: Pietro Bembo, *Della historia vinitiana di M. Pietro Bembo, Card. Volgamente scritta, libri XII* (Venice, 1552); Niccolo degli Augustini, *Li successi bellici seguiti nell'italia dal MDCCCCIX al MCCCCXXI* (Venezia, 1541); B. Cordo, *La obsidione de Padua* (Venzia, 1510); Luigi da Porto, *Lettere storiche* (a cura di N. Pozzo, Vicenza, 1973); Girolamo Priuli, *I Diarii*, R.I.S. XXIV, Vol. 4 (Bologna, 1838); P. Zanetti, "L'Assedio di Padova del 1509 in correlazione alla Guerra combattuta nel Veneto dal maggio all'ottobre," *Archivio veneto* [n.s.], Anno 1, 3 (1871); L. J. Libby Jr., "The Reconquest of Padua in 1509 according to the Diary of Girolamo Priuli," *Renaissance Quarterly*, Vol. XXVIII (1975), pp. 323–31; Angiolo Lenci, "L'Assedio di Padova del 1509: questioni militari e implicazioni urbanistiche nella strategia difensiva veneziana all'indomani di Agnadello," *Buletino del Museo Civico di Padova*, Vol. LXIII (1981), pp. 123–55; Angiolo Lenci, "Note a considerazioni sul ruolo di Fra Giocondo nella difesa di Padova del 1509," *Atti dell'istituto Veneto di scienze, lettere ed arti*, Vol. CXXXIX (1980–81), pp. 97–108; L. Martinati, *Le mura di Padova e il guasto* (Padova, 1860); G. Rusconi, *Le mura di Padova* (Bassano, 1921); Elio Franzin & Angiolo Lenci (a cura di), *Padova e le sue mura*, with preface by Lionello Puppi (Padova, 1982).

to stiffen the assaults. Possibly as many as 80,000 men (but probably closer to 50,000) surrounded the city, which was defended by some 14,000 infantry and 600 heavy cavalry, as well as by 700 stradiotti who, with 500 mounted archers, made a vital contribution to the defence by interrupting League communications and escorting into the city regular deliveries of money with which to pay the infantry.²³ The number of troops on both sides posed enormous logistical and pay problems, but gave the defenders the necessary labour force to construct an impressive temporary fortification. Manpower surplus encouraged the League to embark on some ambitious engineering activities of their own, notably an attempt to dam the Rivers Brenta and Bachiglione and reduce the water levels in Padua's ditches.²⁴ This was countered by Venetian dams constructed downstream, which reduced the outflow of the rivers and raised the water level. Early moves prompted by lack of water in the rivers were later exchanged for different concerns as unusually heavy late-September and October rain inundated the battlefield, flooding the trenchworks and dugouts of the besiegers.²⁵

The Venetian fortifications consisted of the medieval wall, now doubled in thickness, backed by a palisade of piles driven into the ground behind it and the space between packed with earth and rubble (fig. 3). Behind this a "dry" ditch (30 feet wide, and 12–15 feet deep) was excavated, tapering toward the bottom, with small artillery and hand-gun positions at intervals along it. Behind that a rampart ("of the same or greater breadth") was raised mounting cannon firing over a 15 foot wide parapet.²⁶ At key points "bastions" or "battifolle"—

²³ Combattant strengths: Sanuto, IX, cc. 56–62 for garrison on 15 August, plus list of the *gentiluomini* who had volunteered to serve in Padua, and c. 102 for Imperial forces; Andrea Gritti's report dated 4 September reported in Sanuto, IX, cc. 127–8, with the stations of the defenders; Bembo, f. 127; see also Priuli, pp. 219–20 (14 August), p. 239 (23 August), p. 282 (4 September), p. 294 (7 September) for detailed breakdown and estimate of Emperor's pay bill. By 15 September Priuli favours 40–50,000 total League, but still wonders how they can all be paid, *op.cit.*, pp. 320–1.

²⁴ Bembo, ff. 124v–125, and Priuli, p. 204 for river and ditch works, p. 355 for the cavalry operation to bring in 15,000 ducats (1,000 ducats per rider) after skirmish with 800 French cavalry.

²⁵ Priuli, pp. 349–50.

²⁶ Guicciardini, *History of Italy* (trans. Godard), Vol. 4, pp. 337–9 for the most complete description. Engineers call this process "cut and fill" and examples of banked ditch/rampart systems from our period can still be seen in Goslar in Germany, and at Ferrara where large banked ramparts were used in conjunction with relatively slight walls to present formidable obstacles to gunfire and the rush of storming parties.

as Bembo calls them—were established. These have often been assumed to have stood on roughly the same foundations as the circular bastions constructed after 1509, but Bembo's account strongly suggests that they may well have been detached works, joined to the walls, but standing largely or entirely in front of them, so that the famous work near the Porta Codalunga which was defended by Zitolo da Perugia and 1,000 men could be described as "questa fortezza."²⁷ Bembo's description has it roughly square in shape (as he put it, projecting out as much as it was wide), with sides of a little less than 400 feet (say 125 yards square). Codalunga was the focus of the League attacks, with bombardments against this work towards the end of September firing as many as 420 rounds a day, including iron cannon balls weighing 200 to 250 pounds. There were reports, eagerly recorded by Priuli, of four enemy guns blowing up from being fired so often, and the Emperor having to send for replacements from his ally, the Duke of Ferrara "his [guns] being the best in Italy."²⁸ The final League assault succeeded in over-running the position before the mines under it were sprung by the retreating defenders, killing as many as 200 enemy and allowing the defenders to re-occupy it. The battle for the Codalunga bastion demonstrated an important feature of the new fortifications: their size allowed substantial numbers of guns and men to fight in them, even when severely damaged by enemy bombardment.

While the siege was still in progress Priuli supposed that the League would soon be forced to withdraw its massive force because of the Emperor's inability to pay his troops, and this may well have been a deciding factor.²⁹ Without taking away anything from the spirit of the defenders and the effectiveness of Padua's fortifications, one further reason for the failure of the siege must have been the delay in assembling the League artillery. By the closing days of the siege some 60 pieces bombarded the city, an impressive total, but one that had involved heavy borrowing from the Emperor's allies and the transporting of the Emperor's famous heavy siege guns over the passes from Innsbruck and then down the Adige to Verona in barges before convoying them to Padua.³⁰ When Padua was seized by Venice the French had just completed the withdrawal of their own artillery to

²⁷ Bembo, f. 128v.

²⁸ Priuli, p. 357 (24 September).

²⁹ Priuli, pp. 286–7 (5 September).

³⁰ Sanuto, VIII, c. 102, and IX, c. 50.

Milan, together with the most useful guns removed from former Venetian fortresses.³¹ Getting the big guns to Padua entailed reversing this process as well as rebuilding the many bridges destroyed by the Venetian light cavalry whose operations gravely impeded the progress of the French siege train. These factors meant that the full force of the combined League artillery was brought to bear against Padua only well into the siege.³² It was countered by a large number of guns. Venice had used river barges to transport all of the available guns in the arsenal to Padua, stripped many of their ships of their armament, and launched a crash manufacturing programme which meant that the city's defenders were able to match the firepower of the League for much of the siege.³³

The Holy League was able to withdraw most of their troops successfully from Padua in the first few days of October 1509, although harried mercilessly by the light cavalry that had played such an important role in keeping open Venetian communications into the besieged city. October's heavy rains, however, meant that the Duke of Ferrara's guns (numbers vary in different reports but apparently between 25 and 30 pieces, of which three were big guns) had to be abandoned at Bovolenta.³⁴ Others were lost in river crossings on the road to Verona.³⁵ The Venetian "guasto" had already stripped the approaches to Padua (as well as the areas bordering the lagoon)³⁶ but the abandoned positions of the French and Imperialists and their Italian allies presented a scene of devastation. All things considered, the League did very well to keep most of their forces in good order, to extract many of the heavy guns, and to do so in terrible weather amidst the mob of camp followers which swelled armies on the march and multiplied whenever—as the phrase had it—an army "sat down" before a place. Withdrawal from a failed siege was in fact one of the trickiest manoeuvres of Early Modern warfare, with a potential for disaster every bit as great as a lost battle. Charles VIII of France had also been fortunate in 1495 to extract his field force from Naples

³¹ Priuli, p. 85; Sanuto, VIII, c. 393.

³² Priuli, pp. 267–8 (2–3 September) for movement of League guns.

³³ Sanuto, VIII, c. 520 (16 July) for immediate despatch by boat of guns and munitions from the Arsenal; Priuli, p. 234 (20 August) and p. 282 (4 September) for details of Venetian artillery.

³⁴ Bembo, f. 129v; Sanuto, IX, c. 229 and 330.

³⁵ Priuli, p. 387 (5 October).

³⁶ Priuli, p. 19, 75, 276–7 for damage cost estimates; Sanuto, Diarii, VIII, c. 351.

in good order and to fight a successful action when apparently trapped at Fornovo, although the French garrisons left behind in southern Italy fared much less well. When the Viscount of Lautrec led the army of the League of Cognac to Naples in 1528 in the confused aftermath of the sack of Rome, the stage was set for the most disastrous setback of any offensive siege campaign in our period.

With more than 24,000 foot, plus heavy cavalry, Lautrec's invasion force outnumbered by two-to-one the Imperial garrison of 12,000 foot and a small but body of light cavalry which proved immensely useful to the defenders. Little had been done in the years since 1495 to modernize the fortifications of Naples, although the Castelnuovo had been equipped with an additional circuit of bastions. Unlike the earlier sieges, the entire city was now to be held. The towering fortifications dominating the harbour front played no part in the actions which began with the approach of Lautrec's skirmishers on 21 April 1528.³⁷

The Imperialists had fortified an advanced base at La Maddalena (on the River Sebeto to the east of Naples) and another at S. Martino (the fortified monastery on the ridge to the north). They also held some of the offshore islands which became significant in the parallel sea-siege, as attempts were made to run the blockade of the League's galleys, operating from Pozzuoli. The League's forces, although strong, were not sufficiently numerous to completely envelope a city as big as Naples. Lautrec and his chief engineer, the renegade Pedro Navarro, planned to invest the city closely on the east and established themselves in a complex of fortified camps in and around the extensive park of Poggioreale, with the famous villa serving for Lautrec's headquarters. The main camp became something of a wonder for the ingenuity with which Navarro adapted the park gates, terraces and outbuildings into a fortification complex than—even in ruins—

³⁷ My principal source for events in Naples in 1528 is Maurizio Arfaioli, *The Black Bands of Giovanni: Infantry and Diplomacy during the Italian Wars* (Pisa UP, 2005), particularly pp. 98–161. The Imperialists had encouraged all of those able to do so to evacuate the city before the first skirmishes with advanced elements of the League army on 21 April 1528. The less efficient troops had been paid off formally or encouraged to desert by cutting off their pay, and the Neapolitan militia (considered of doubtful loyalty) had been disarmed. The reduced garrison proved difficult enough to pay during the siege, but Imperial efforts to prune the garrison, on balance, were probably well judged.

impressed Charles V when he was shown them in 1535. Towards S. Martino, Navarro built another fort—known variously as the Fort de Gascogne or the Fort de France—and towards La Maddalena a third, known as the Fort des Basques. These forts were the jumping off points for a network of trenches that pushed ever closer to the eastern walls of Naples but never quite succeeded in connecting the works at Poggioreale with the sea, or preventing sorties by the besieged Imperialists. One such operation on 18 July surprised a large body of French reinforcements commanded by the Prince of Navarre when they were being landed on the beach. Navarre's reinforcements were put to flight by an Imperial force which pursued them to Poggioreale and came close to capturing one of the gates into the main League encampment. The fighting between the outlying forts of both sides was often fierce—particularly in May, when the League finally captured the Maddalena after the place had changed hands many times—but the last chance of forcing a surrender of Naples by blockade disappeared when the League's early control of the sea was lost by the defection of Genoa and the naval squadron of Andrea Doria.

The sea blockade was one of the keys to the siege. When the Imperialists unwisely sought and resoundingly lost a battle with the League's naval forces off Capo d'Orso on 28 April, it seemed at first that the days of Imperial/Aragonese domination in Naples were numbered. Like most sea blockades at this time, it was never fully effective—even after the arrival of the League's Venetian galleys. It was to break down completely in August and September when Andrea Doria dramatically changed sides, personally abandoning an increasingly tense mercenary relationship with the French crown and then taking his republic into the Imperial fold. Even before the process of regime-change had been completed, however, Doria's personal galley squadron was supporting the Imperialists in Neapolitan waters.

The disaster at Naples rose from the collapse of the increasingly isolated League forces in their three fortified camps. Here disease rapidly reduced numbers and struck down Lautrec himself, who died on the night of 16/17 August. Lautrec had ordered the destruction of the viaducts serving Naples, but the uncontrolled water flooded the valley of the Sebeco turning it into a marsh where clouds of malarial mosquitoes spread fevers through the camps which added to the already dreadful insanitary conditions created by troops crowding into the forts. The besiegers had become besieged. In their weak-

ened state the League's troops were increasingly losing the skirmishing war in no-mans-land. They were cut off from the landing beach which represented their only contact with the outside world. When it became clear that Imperial forces were occupying positions on their line of retreat, the Marquis of Saluzzo (now commanding for the League) gave orders to abandon the main camp and attempt a breakout. The 7,000 survivors still able to walk began a night retreat toward Aversa between 28 and 29 August, but marching in separate formations were broken up by the light cavalry pursuing them. The rearguard and the main battle were forced to surrender and disarmed before reaching their objective. The vanguard reached Aversa, where they yielded the next day. Although the senior officers were held for ransom (or as traitors, in the case of Pedro Navarro), the ordinary infantry soldiers were left to fend for themselves. Many of the Italians and the German Landsknechts were able to change sides and seek employment with their fellows already serving the Emperor. Very few of the French, Gascon or Swiss saw their homes again, as unarmed and stripped naked by vengeful civilians, they set out northward through a hostile countryside which they had despoiled on the way south.³⁸ The army of the League of Cognac had ceased to exist.

The heavy losses—to say nothing of the pay and supply costs—attending protracted siege operations, help to explain the frequent recourse to shock tactics, despite their potential for high casualties. Our period witnessed some strikingly successful assaults without benefit of artillery or the marshalling of large bodies of troops. Brescia (1512) was stormed and brutally sacked by Gaston de Foix shortly after the city had risen against its French occupiers, expelled them and declared for Venice. There was no real siege; only an assault which carried the fortifications in a number of places and simply overwhelmed the defenders. Brescia thus joins Capua (1501), Prato (1512), Genoa, Pavia and Rome (all in 1527), as examples of important places carried by storm. Another reason for the continued use of unsupported shock tactics was of course the continuing shortage in Italy of the heavy artillery needed for formal siege operations, a factor powerfully illustrated by the early stages of the siege of Florence.

³⁸ Arfaïoli, p. 166 quotes Sanuto, *Diarii*, Vol. XLIX, p. 15 reporting that “of the 5,000 accompanied by the Spaniards, only 200 arrived in Rome . . . they died on the road and everywhere there are dead bodies, right up to Naples . . .”

In the Autumn of 1529 the Prince of Orange led a Papal and Imperial army north from the mustering zones in the vicinity of Rome which—even at the outset of the campaign against Florence—had very little money, supplies, or artillery. The army contained many veterans of the Sack of Rome who had survived the subsequent plague and the Naples campaign, but who had long since exhausted their spoils and were once again in lengthy arrears of pay. Both Emperor and Pope hoped that a peaceful settlement with Florence would yield a civic ransom sufficient to clear the army's arrears of pay, and that revenue from a restored Medici regime would help to prevent its recurrence. The Pope did not want another sack, this time in his native city. This factor needs to be born in mind: for although the siege was hard fought and directly or indirectly caused massive loss of life, there was little of the fierce determination to force a decision in the breach which had been seen so often in earlier operations. In the short term there were real obstacles to be overcome. The Prince of Orange's army—many of whom had stormed Rome simply by swarming over the walls with makeshift ladders—still did not have a proper siege train. Orange relied upon local allies to furnish what was needed for the siege of Florence.³⁹

A substantial part of the heavy artillery with which it was planned to threaten Florence, was in fact Florentine in origin. This was the siege train which had been entirely lost in July 1526 when a Florentine and Papal army engaged in the bombardment of Siena had been put to flight outside the Camollia gate in another spectacular example of a siege that went badly wrong for the attackers.⁴⁰ The pro-Imperial regime in Siena had agreed to make these guns available for the attack on Florence, together with transport, pioneers and sappers as part of a deal which routed Orange's predatory army around their territory on its way north.⁴¹ As well as promising more than

³⁹ For Florence 1529–30: Eugenio Albèri, *L'Assedio di Firenze, illustrato con inediti documenti* (Firenze, 1840); Pio Carlo Falletti, *L'Assedio di Firenze* (2 Vols., Palermo, 1885); Firenze, Comitato per le onoranze a Francesco Ferruccio, *Francesco Ferruccio e la guerra di Firenze* (Firenze, 1889); Giovanni Battista Busini, *Lettere a Benedetto Varchi sopra l'assedio di Firenze* (ed. Milanese, Firenze, 1860); Cecil Roth, *The Last Florentine Republic, 1527–1530* (London, 1925).

⁴⁰ Pepper & Adams, *Firearms & Fortifications*, pp. 36–7.

⁴¹ Roth, p. 211 for the role of Gerolamo Morone, former chancellor of Milan, in extracting promises from the Siense to furnish 16 cannon, oxen, and 2,000–3,000 pounds of powder daily as well as specialists and pioneers.

they could possibly deliver, the Sienese were by then desperately constructing their own new bastions around Siena's walls in case the last part of their diplomacy came to nothing.⁴² Despite the surprising Florentine failure to defend its main southern strongholds of Cortona and Arezzo, and the slow progress northward of the Papal-Imperial army, when Orange arrived in front of Florence on 12 October 1529 he was still without the promised siege artillery from Siena—although the defenders of Florence were by then well supplied with guns and ammunition, and launched a sustained artillery barrage as a defiance. The badly convoyed Sienese guns had in fact been lost to Florentine raiders near Poggibonsi. The first artillery shots against the city were fired on 29 October, but the main artillery strength of 25 guns only arrived from Milan and Ferrara via Bologna at the end of December—much of it in poor condition after a lengthy winter haul over the passes. For much of the siege, the defenders probably enjoyed better artillery support than their enemies. This siege was not going to be decided by the big guns.

That unstable genius, Michelangelo, is often credited with the defences of Florence in 1529, but works had been laid out and probably started on the hill of San Miniato by Antonio da Sangallo the Younger just before the Medici had left town, and the medieval walls had been modified on the advice of Federigo da Bozzolo and Count Pedro Navarro.⁴³ This process involved reducing the height of the towers, filling them with earth, and backing the curtain wall with earth, much to distress of Varchi who lamented the loss of the picturesque profile of his native city walls.⁴⁴ Despite many drawings and many more words on the subject, it is difficult to identify securely Michelangelo's design contribution to the defences despite his well-known participation.⁴⁵

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 37–57 for the Sienese fortifications designed by Baldassare Peruzzi between 1527 and 1532.

⁴³ Roth, *The Last Florentine Republic*, p. 186 ff. Machiavelli served as secretary for the survey team for the modifications, see his “Relazione di una visita fatta per fortificare Firenze,” in *Arte della Guerra e scritti militari minori* (Firenze, 1929), p. 207 ff.

⁴⁴ Benedetto Varchi, *Storia fiorentina*, ed. Gaetano Milanese, (3 vols, Florence, 1888), 2, pp. 95–6 where he bemoans the loss of “almost all the towers which like a garland crowned the walls of Florence round and round.”

⁴⁵ Renzo Manetti, *Michelangiolo: Le fortificazioni per l'assedio di Firenze* (Firenze, 1980) tends to favour Michelangelo's authorship, but is a useful source. On the master's drawings, see Charles De Tolnay, “Michelangelo Studies: (1) Newly Found Autographs by Michelangelo in America; (2) Michelangelo's Projects for the Fortification of

The general character of the works and the disposition of forces is well illustrated in Vasari's panorama of the siege, painted many years later but—like other Vasari history paintings on Tuscan historical themes—very well researched (fig. 4). It shows the allies encamped in a huge crescent along the southern hills, lacking a proper wall of circumvallation for much of the perimeter and thus exposed to sorties from the city, with the two Florentine strong points clearly equipped with earthwork bastions on the Belvedere (distance) and San Miniato (right foreground).⁴⁶ It was here that most of the raids and the often fierce exchanges of artillery fire took place. The pre-siege surveys had correctly identified the threatened sector where high ground most closely approached the walls. The flat open ground beyond the city on the north bank remained un-blockaded for much of the siege until substantial Imperial reinforcements arrived in January 1530.⁴⁷ Even then, the blockade was never complete and the eventual outcome—militarily, if not politically—was determined by the campaign to maintain a supply route for the defenders into the city along the Arno valley from Pisa, and to interrupt the communications of the besiegers. The siege of Florence *qua* Florence contained dramatic incident in plenty, but the outcome—in the sense of the lengthy resistance of the last republic—was to be determined elsewhere.

Prato was held for the Republic under Lorenzo Soderini and Francesco Ferrucci, before the latter moved his theatre of operations south to the key mid-Arno stronghold of Empoli and the hill-top fortress of Volterra, where his guerrilla tactics were to make him the hero of the defence. Although not a professional soldier, Ferrucci was a veteran of the siege of Naples, where he had served with the Florentine contingent in the League. There no doubt he had learnt

Florence in 1529," *Art Bulletin*, Vol. 23 (1940), pp. 127–37; Vincent Scully, "Michelangelo's Fortification Drawings: a study in the Reflex Diagonal," *Perspecta* (Summer 1952), pp. 38–45; Nario Bencivenni, "La rilevazione del perimetro urbano fiorentino in alcuni disegni di Antonio da Sangallo il Giovani," *Storia Architettura*, Vol. 5, 2 (1982), pp. 25–38; Christoph L. Frommel & Nicholas Adams (eds.) *The Architectural Drawings of Antonio da Sangallo the Younger and his Circle* (MIT, 1994), pp. 128–9, entry for U771A. The last two references favour the claims of Sangallo to the basic trace of San Miniato.

⁴⁶ Giorgio Vasari, *Le opere di Giorgio Vasari*, ed. G. Milanesi, 9 Vols. (Florence, 1906), Vol. 8, pp. 174–5 in the *Ragionamento* (a dialogue with his patron whilst touring the Palazzo Vecchio) by which the artist points out features and explains the pictorial technique.

⁴⁷ Roth, p. 244.

hard lessons about the dangers of becoming bottled up in fortified positions without a clear line of retreat, as well as the vital importance of communications to his enemies around Florence. Ferrucci's was one of the best reported mobile campaigns of the Italian Wars, and one of the most successful, until his column was cornered and he was killed at Gavinana in early August 1530, in a desperate final attempt to relieve Florence from the direction of Prato and Pistoia. Ferrucci was the best known of the guerrilla commanders, but he was not alone. Lorenzo Carnesecchi, commissary at Castrocara, fought another active campaign until April 1530 against Papal forces in the Romagna. Cecotto Tosinghi, commissary of Pisa, fought in the coastal plain until Florence itself was surrendered in August 1530. This was a campaign of small bodies of troops (Ferrucci took 1,500 men with him on his final raid) against a very much larger alliance (Roth estimates 30,000 at its brief maximum) which could often not put anything like its full strength into the field because of mutinous stand-stills enforced by the large number of unpaid troops unwilling to leave their fortified camps or to do more than defend themselves.⁴⁸ Long sieges could be almost as devastating to the besiegers as to the besieged.

If the fall of Florence marked a temporary lull in the intensity of conflict in Italy, it also signalled the start of the most energetic phase of bastioned fortification construction. Much of it took the form of urban fortresses rather than new city walls. Florence's Fortezza da Basso and the much later Fortezza Belvedere, Perugia's Rocca Paolina, Siena's Fortezza Medicea, and Turin's classic pentagonal citadel were typical of the repressive structures constructed on a massive scale following 1530, and designed primarily to maintain control of the cities they overlooked.⁴⁹ In many cases these princely citadels anticipated

⁴⁸ Roth, pp. 170–315 for one of the most lively and readable accounts of the wider siege operations.

⁴⁹ John Hale, as so often, opened up the political dimension of fortress construction with "The End of Florentine Liberty: the Fortezza da Basso," *Florentine Studies: Politics and Society in Renaissance Florence*, ed. Nicholai Rubinstein (London, 1968), pp. 501–32, but see also Nicholai Rubinstein, "Fortified Enclosures in Italian Cities," in *War, Culture and Society in Renaissance Venice: Essays in Honour of John Hale*, eds. David S. Chambers, Cecil H. Clough and Michael E. Mallett (London, 1993), pp. 1–8; John E. Law, "The Cittadella of Verona," *Ibid.*, pp. 9–28. The phenomenon of the urban citadel in the post 1530 era is explored in Simon Pepper, "L'evoluzione dell'architettura militare negli stati italiani," in *Storia dell'architettura italiana: il secondo cinquecento*, ed. Claudia Conforti & Richard Tuttle (Milano, 2001), pp. 482–509.

by decades the modernization of the entire city enceinte. In some, the enceinte never was modernized with the *trace italienne*. A few of the urban fortresses and urban defence projects initiated in the 1530s and 1540s were to see action in the final intense burst of fighting in the 1550s. In the case of the Spanish fortress begun in 1550 in Siena, the incomplete project prompted the rebellion it was designed to forestall and, in a modified form, constituted the front-line of the pro-French regime which fought so hard in 1553–55 to prolong the existence of another of Italy's last republics.⁵⁰ But most of the Italian Wars was fought over modified medieval fortifications. Outcomes in some of the best known sieges—even those from the first devastating campaigns of 1494 and 1495—did not often turn on anything like a straightforward confrontation between improved modern artillery and old fortifications.

Aspects of this critical analysis seem to have been shared by military contemporaries. A group of experienced commanders in the 1550s appeared to have been attempting in the closing phases of the Valois-Hapsburg conflict to break out of the strategic straitjacket of protracted sieges—even for major operations. The French seizure of Metz in 1552 and the Emperor's bold if unsuccessful late-Autumn attempt to retake the city by a rapidly moving strike force; the surprise attack which so narrowly failed to seize Siena in January 1554; and the French *coup-de-main* which seized Calais from the English in 1558, can all be seen as attempts to break a mould which by mid-century threatened to make war too expensive for even the greatest powers.⁵¹ Ironically, this conclusion does little to undermine the essential validity of the Military Revolution thesis. Others, it seems, in the thick of the action, had drawn conclusions which would later be articulated so forcefully by Geoffrey Parker from his researcher's desk. Lessons had clearly been learnt from the conflicts of the early sixteenth century.

⁵⁰ Pepper and Adams, *Firearms & Fortifications*, Chaps. 3–4.

⁵¹ This final theme is expanded in my paper to the Siena Conference in September 2004, under the title "The Last Hundred Years of the Sienese Republic" and organised by the Universities of Siena and Warwick with the Centro Warburg Italia.




Figure 1. Two Views of the Castel Sant'Angelo, Rome. Note the increase in scale between the outer works 1561–65 and those surrounding the drum which date from 1492–95. The turret shown bottom right on both views was originally a tower built in 1447. Drawn by the author, and reproduced from Simon Pepper and Nicholas Adams, *Firearms and Fortifications: Military Architecture and Siege Warfare in Sixteenth Century Siena* (Chicago, 1986).




Figure 2. Naples and its modernised medieval castles. Drawn by the author and reproduced from Simon Pepper, "Castles and Cannon in the Naples Campaign of 1494–95," in David Abulafia (ed.), *The French Descent into Renaissance Italy, 1494–95* (Aldershot, 1995).




Figure 3. Reconstruction of the Temporary Fortifications of Padua in 1509.

Key: (1) Spianata, cleared zone in front of the walls; (2) Wet Ditch. Because of the wet ditch other measures to strengthen the walls to be implemented "inside" with consequent destruction of civil buildings; (3) Medieval Wall, reinforced with timber piles and earth/rubble fill; (4) Dry Ditch, excavated just before the siege and filled with obstacles and pill-boxes; (5) Earthenwork Rampart raised from soil excavated from the dry ditch and debris from demolished buildings. Drawn by the author.




Figure 4. Panorama of the Siege of Florence 1529–30. The diagram is based on the fresco in the Sala di Clemente VII, Palazzo Vecchio, Florence, projected by Giorgio Vasari and largely executed by Stradano. The view is taken from the southern hills, looking north, with the Arno valley leading to Pisa extending to the far left.

Key: (1) San Miniato, the key defensive position; (2) Gramonte, where the main Imperial/Papal siege batteries were sited; (3) Defensive strongpoint near Porta S. Giorgio; (4) Earth Bastions built in front of medieval walls; (5) Villas on the Poggio Belvedere, site of the later 16th century Medici fortress; (6) Front line of Imperial/Papal positions, apparently unfortified with complex trenchworks; (7) Palazzo dei Taddai, quarters of the Duke of Amalfi and nucleus of the Spanish encampment; (8) Monastery of S. Matteo, nucleus of the German camp; (9) Houses of the Guicciardini, quarters of the Prince of Orange; (10) Torre di S. Gallo, quarters of Piermaria da Santo Secondo; (11) Camp of the Italians; (12) Quarters of Baccio Valori, Papal Commissioner with the allied camp; (13) S. Donato in Polverosa, nucleus of the German camp on the north bank, blocking communications from Pistoia, Empoli and Pisa; (14) Dome of S. M. dei Fiori and campanile of the Palazzo Vecchio; (15) Defensive strongpoint covering potential point of entry when the water-level in the Arno was down; (16) Piazzae of the different national camps, serving as mustering points and markets; (17) the location of gallows, a prominent feature of practically all siege views. Drawn by the author.

LORETO, LEO X AND THE FORTIFICATIONS ON THE ADRIATIC COAST AGAINST THE INFIDEL

Eva Renzulli*

At the beginning of June 1517, alarming news reached the civic council of Recanati that Francesco Maria della Rovere, having recovered Urbino, was advancing through the Marche, sacking various towns. The council promptly sent two representatives to the duke, who promised, in exchange for 6000 ducats and some gunpowder, not to attack the town, adding that he was agreeing this out of devotion to the church of the Madonna di Loreto near the town.¹ Although the duke had been considered as a serious threat, it is probable that the threat of a less Christian enemy was the cause of the fortified enceinte that soon after this episode was built around church, sanctuary and village. As Kenneth Setton wrote, during the reign of Leo X 'there were few periods when one was allowed to forget the Turkish threat'.² What had happened in Otranto in 1480 was still vivid in people's memory, and Turkish incursions were still very much feared along the Adriatic coasts during most of the sixteenth century.

The building of the walls around the church, sanctuary and village of Loreto, begun in 1517 (figs. 1–2) will be considered here in relation to the Turkish menace during the pontificate of Leo X and in the context of a wider papal programme to protect the Adriatic coast.³

* I am grateful to the Society for Renaissance Studies for a grant to assist with the cost of travel to the conference. This study stems from my Ph.D Dissertation 'Santa Maria di Loreto 1469–1535. Da baluardo cristiano a cappella pontificia' (IUAV, Venice, November 2002) written under the tutorship of Howard Burns, to whom I would like to express my gratitude for his encouragement and enduring support.

¹ Francesco Guicciardini, *Storia d'Italia* (Turin, 1971), II, p. 1301 (Book XII, Chap. 1); M. Leopardi, *Annali di Recanati, Loreto e Portorecanati* (1945; repr. Recanati, 1993), II, p. 59.

² K. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant* (Philadelphia, 1976–84), II, p. 152.

³ For the church of Santa Maria di Loreto see A. Bruschi and F. Grimaldi, 'Loreto', in *Dictionary of Art* (New York, 1996), XIX, pp. 685–9; A. Bruschi, 'Loreto: città santuario e cantiere artistico', in F. Citterio and L. Vaccaro (eds.), *Loreto Crocevia religioso tra Italia, Europa ed Oriente* (Brescia, 1997), pp. 441–70; K. Weil Garris Posner, *The Santa Casa of Loreto. Problems in Cinquecento Sculpture*, 2 vols. (New York, 1977).

In 1515 Leo appointed a commission of six cardinals to study the prospects of a crusade against the Ottomans and ordered the construction of several galleys in Ancona, and in May 1516 he authorized a bull granting indulgences to those who would take part in the projected expedition.⁴ News about Sultan Selim's successes against the Mamluks in September 1516, and reports of a new infidel armada being prepared, became ever more distressing. By 1517, when Selim had taken not only Syria but also Egypt, and had threatened to invade Italy as his next step, the need to protect strategic coastal towns of the Papal States had become an important issue, and can be considered part of the pope's anti-Turk programme.

Although important fortifications had quite recently been realized on the western coast, such as Nettuno (1501–3) and Civitavecchia (1512–20),⁵ the eastern coast was relatively unprotected. There had been work on the fortifications of the papal port of Ancona on the Adriatic in the last quarter of the fifteenth century.⁶ But in 1517 more modern fortifications must have been needed: on 7 February 1517 Pietro Flores, Vice-Legate of the Marches, had asked Recanati, and probably most of the nearby towns, to send 100 *some* of grain to feed those working on a new dock and fortifications for the town.⁷ More than a year later the work was still not finished, if on 18 April 1518, following a further request of the Vice-Legate, Recanati sent 22 men to help with building the fortifications of Ancona, which the *Annals* specify were 'for defence against the Turks'.⁸

In March 1517, probably on his way to Urbino, Bernardo Dovizi, Cardinal of Bibbiena, protector of the sanctuary,⁹ together with Antonio da Sangallo the Younger, had visited Loreto.¹⁰ At that

⁴ Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, II, pp. 157, 164.

⁵ F. Fagliari Zeni Buchicchio, 'La Rocca del Bramante a Civitavecchia: il cantiere e le maestranze da Giulio II a Paolo III', *Römisches Jahrbuch für Kunstgeschichte*, 23–4 (1988), pp. 273–383. This did not really dissuade the Turks, nor reassure the Pope as 'in late April 1516, twenty-seven Turkish or Moorish vessels had been sighted off the coast some miles from Civitavecchia. Leo who was hunting there fled with terror.' Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, p. 164.

⁶ For the later phases of Ancona's port and fortifications, see F. Mariano, *Architettura militare del Cinquecento in Ancona: documenti e notizie dal Sangallo al Fontana* (Urbino, 1990).

⁷ Archivio Comunale di Recanati (henceforth ACRec), 'Annali', a.1517, v. 91, f. 27v.

⁸ ACRec, 'Annali', a. 1518, v. 92, f. 43v.

⁹ M. Leopardi, *Annali di Recanati*, II, p. 55. Cardinal Bibbiena had been given the *protettorato* of Loreto in May 1513: Sanuto, *I diarii*, XVIII, col. 217.

¹⁰ Loreto, Archivio Storico della Santa Casa (henceforth ASSC), Depositario 3,

moment the supervision of the church and the sculpture of the marble shrine that were to protect and decorate the Holy House of the Virgin were in the hands of Andrea Contucci da Sansovino.¹¹ In all probability the work was going too slowly, because a few days after Sangallo and Bibbiena's visit a brief arrived from Rome, removing Sansovino from the post of architect of the sanctuary and asking him to concentrate just on the sculptural project.¹² Antonio da Sangallo was not officially the architect of the sanctuary of Loreto until November 1525,¹³ but Francesco Paolo Fiore tentatively dates to 1517 the very sketchy freehand drawing by Antonio da Sangallo the Younger for the walls of Loreto (Uffizi 1552 A recto) (fig. 4).¹⁴ Although such an enceinte completely excludes the village around the church, that did already exist, it is without doubt a sketch for Loreto, which takes into consideration the earlier Bramantesque plans for the papal palace, and it precedes all Sangallo's projects for a façade for the church.¹⁵ This project does not take into consideration the difficult

1512–21, c. 205. See G. Huntley, *Andrea Sansovino* (Cambridge, Mass., 1970; 1st ed. 1935), pp. 114–5; M. C. Marzoni, 'Il Palazzo Apostolico di Loreto', *Quaderni dell'Istituto di Storia dell'Architettura di Roma*, fasc. 23, 1994, pp. 40–41.

¹¹ For Andrea Sansovino in Loreto see Huntley, *Andrea Sansovino*, Appendix (with some mistakes); A. Pirri, 'Andrea Sansovino a Loreto', *Civiltà Cattolica*, 1931, pp. 415–29, and 1932, pp. 223–36; N. Baldini and R. Giulietti (eds), *Andrea Sansovino. I documenti* (Florence, 1999); see also documents in F. Grimaldi, *La basilica della Santa Casa di Loreto* (Ancona, 1986).

¹² Pirri, *Andrea Sansovino a Loreto*, pp. 425–8. Till Verellen seems to think that Sangallo exploited Sansovino's difficulties with the cupola to appropriate a dominant and lucrative position in Loreto: T. Verellen, 'Patterns of patronage: Antonio da Sangallo the Younger and the *setta* of sculptors', in F. W. Kent, P. Simons and J. C. Eade (eds), *Patronage, Art, and Society in Renaissance Italy* (Oxford, 1987), p. 286.

¹³ A. Bruschi, 'Cordini, Antonio', *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani*, XXIX, pp. 3–23; *idem*, 'Loreto: città santuario' pp. 441–70.

¹⁴ F. P. Fiore, entry for Uffizi 1552A *recto* in *The Drawings of Antonio da Sangallo the Younger* (New York, 1994), I, pp. 260–1; N. Adams and S. Pepper, 'The fortification drawings', in *ibid.*, I, pp. 61–74; C. L. Frommel, 'Introduction. The drawings of Antonio da Sangallo the Younger: history, evolution, method, function', in *ibid.* pp. 1–60.

¹⁵ The drawings show echoes of Bramante's project for a square and papal palace in front of the church, but Sangallo draws a straight line there, where in his subsequent drawings he always underlines the presence of the church behind the portico: the portico is either drawn as projecting outward in front of the church (Uffizi 925A r), or the presence of the church is underlined by freestanding columns (Uffizi 921A, 922A, 925A). For a further discussion of these drawings see Sabine Eiche's entries in C. L. Frommel and N. Adams (eds), *The Architectural Drawings of Antonio da Sangallo the Younger and his Circle* (New York, 2000), vol. II. For Bramante's projects: A. Bruschi, *Bramante architetto* (Bari, 1969), pp. 652–67, 960–79; K. Weil Garris Posner, 'Alcuni progetti per piazze e facciate di Bramante e di Antonio da Sangallo il Giovane a Loreto', in *Studi Bramanteschi* (Roma, 1974), pp. 313–38.

juridical situation between sanctuary and village, one under the direct jurisdiction of the pope, the other under the jurisdiction of the Council of Recanati. When the fortifications were begun, judging from what we can see in the survey drawings of Baronino (Uffizi 4190A, 1527A) (fig. 5)¹⁶ and what we can still see today, another plan was followed. If in a different way from that of Sangallo's sketch, the plan that was finally carried out also stresses the pre-eminence of the basilica in the ensemble, but includes a larger area in its circuit. Moreover, its forms are rather out of date, with round bastions (figs. 2, 6 and 7). Fiore points out that such a circuit is of late fifteenth century inspiration, and that this plan may have followed an earlier one by 'Francesco Dasena', who he hypothetically identifies as Francesco di Giorgio Martini.¹⁷

A French pilgrim, Jacques Le Saige, after a visit to Loreto wrote in his diary on 11 May 1518 that walls protected only half the village, since work had started seven months before; this would mean that work would have begun in October 1517.¹⁸ After Andrea Sansovino had been ordered by Leo X to concentrate on the sculpture of the Holy Shrine, there is no record to prove the presence of other architects in Loreto until February 1518.¹⁹ Traditionally, the plan of the circuit is attributed to maestro Cristoforo di Simone Resse da Imola, whose presence in Loreto is documented only from February 1518, when he was given the role of master of works for the church (with the exclusion of the sculpture for the revetment of the Holy Shrine) and fortifications of the village of Loreto. From the evidence of Le Saige's diary, it seems possible that work had started before Resse's arrival, and that he probably only carried out an exist-

¹⁶ F. P. Fiore, 'La "Città Felice" di Loreto', *Ricerche di storia dell'arte*, 4 (1977), pp. 35–55.

¹⁷ F. P. Fiore, entry for Uffizi drawing 1552A recto, in *The Drawings of Antonio da Sangallo*, I, pp. 260–1. See also *idem*, 'La "Città Felice" di Loreto', pp. 35–55; *idem*, 'Introduzione', in *idem* (ed.), *Storia dell'architettura italiana. Il Quattrocento* (Milan, 1998), pp. 9–38. The original document that quotes Francesco Dasena is dated 10 June 1508, but it is not clear which are the three *puntuni sive speruni* that were built following his *modello* (Recanati, Casa Leopardi, 'Manoscritti di cose Recanatensi per Loreto'), published in Grimaldi, *La basilica della Santa Casa di Loreto*, p. 208.

¹⁸ Jacques Le Saige, *Voyage de Jacques Le Saige de Douai à Rome, Notre Dame de Lorette, Venise, Jerusalem et autres Saints lieux*, ed. H. R. Duthilloevel (Douai, 1851), pp. 32–7. Fiore says that work started in September 1518: Fiore, 'La "Città Felice" di Loreto', p. 39, and *idem*, Uffizi 1552 A recto entry, in *The Drawings of Antonio da Sangallo*, I, pp. 260–1.

¹⁹ Marzoni, 'Il Palazzo Apostolico', pp. 42, 52.

ing project for the enceinte, possibly that of “Francesco da Sena” to which Fiore refers.

Jacques Le Saige’s comment that ‘there were many workmen there because they fear the Turks’ can certainly be believed.²⁰ Such a fear had some justification: soon after Le Saige’s visit, at the end of May 1518, there was a Turkish assault on the nearby port of Recanati; the *fondaci* (warehouses) and the *osteria* (inn) were sacked, but the Turks do not seem to have reached the basilica of Loreto.²¹ A few days later the council of Recanati was assembled to decide what to do about the threat from the Turks, and agreed to send 40 men to guard Loreto. In Loreto on the same day the governor of the sanctuary, Pierotti, took on twenty foreign cavalry.²²

The city council and the governor were not alone in worrying about Loreto. In September 1518, papal briefs arrived from Rome, ordering immediate work on the walls to fortify the sanctuary and village, and asking the council of Recanati to give up stone and cement destined for the port.²³ The city council was also asked by the governor of Loreto to contribute four deputies to oversee the workers, and 300 *some* of grain to feed them.²⁴ The following year another papal brief ordered that all bequests of money originally destined towards the paving of roads, making of *logge* for pilgrims, or fountains should be used for the construction of the walls, bastions and a ditch to protect the already fortified church,²⁵ and on 9 June 1519 the Legate of the Marche ordered that each major town in the region should send grain and workers for the walls of Loreto, and that Recanati should be exempted from sending men to Ancona.²⁶

In April 1519 the sculptors who were working on the Holy House, ‘illi de domo’, asked to be paid sixteen ducats for the coats of arms

²⁰ Le Saige, *Voyage*, p. 34.

²¹ Leopardi, *Annali*, II, p. 69. In his version of the story Torsellino affirms that at the sight of the basilica the Turks were stricken with terror, ‘caelesti terrore percussi’, and returned to their boats: O. Torsellino, *Historia dell’origine e traslatione della Beata Vergine Maria di Loreto*, trans. Bernardo Zucchi (Venice, 1634), Book II, Chap. 19.

²² ACRec, ‘Annali’, a. 1518, v. 92, ff. 70–1,72r–v.

²³ *Ibid.*, ff. 114–5 (11 September 1518); Leopardi, *Annali*, II, p. 69.

²⁴ ACRec, ‘Annali’, a. 1518; Leopardi, *Annali*, II, pp. 68–9. From the *Annali*, it is clear that the council was not very happy to be bypassed by Rome in decisions regarding the village of Loreto. If the Sanctuary had been subtracted from their jurisdiction in 1507 by Julius II, becoming a papal chapel, they reminded the governor that the village itself was still in their jurisdiction:

²⁵ ACRec, ‘Annali’, a. 1519, v. 93, f. 78; Leopardi, *Annali*, II, p. 76.

²⁶ Leopardi, *Annali*, II, p. 74.

of the *comune* that they had made to be inserted in the walls.²⁷ On 5 July 1519 mastro Cristophoro Resse was still working on the walls, and asked Recanati for twenty men for three days for help with building them.²⁸ In February 1521 workers from the Marche arrived to help dig the ditch; the completion of the fortifications is traditionally placed in April 1521.²⁹ Between 1517 and 1521 work had also proceeded on the papal palace, and four more bays of the palace had been built to protect the citadel on the western side.³⁰ In June 1522 all work under Cristoforo's direction would have interrupted by his death, but by that time the village of Loreto must already have appeared very much as Francisco de Hollanda drew it in 1539 (fig. 2).³¹ This drawing is accurate: although we cannot see the 'ponte levatore' (drawbridge) that Bartolomeo Fontana described in 1538, defining Loreto as a 'borgo cinto di mura in guisa di fortezza' (village surrounded by a wall like a fortress), it gives us an idea of how the village and church looked to contemporaries.³²

Why was Loreto considered by the popes to be such a tempting target for the Turks and, consequently, requiring fortification? The reasons for the fortification of Ancona are obvious, but Loreto was just a very small village: a church, a few houses and hostels. It was a rich church in 1527: Clement VII used 4,224 ducats from the treasure of Loreto for his flight from Rome. It must have already been a rich church in February 1487 when the mercenary captain Boccolino Guzzoni, besieged in Osimo by papal troops, wrote to Bajazet offering in exchange for help, among other things, one third of the Loretan revenues. In 1518 most of the treasure was not in Loreto, however, but was kept in the council tower in Recanati.³³ Santa Maria di Loreto was more than just one of the many Marian shrines that proliferated in the last decades of the fifteenth century. It is quite out of scale compared either to other contemporary Marian shrines,

²⁷ ACRec, 'Annali', a. 1519; Leopardi, *Annali*, II, p. 76.

²⁸ ACRec, 'Annali', a. 1519, v. 93, f. 64.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, a. 1521, v. 95, f. 34.

³⁰ Marzoni, *Il palazzo Apostolico di Loreto*, pp. 50–2.

³¹ J. Bury, 'Francisco de Hollanda: A little known source of the history of fortification in the sixteenth century', *Arquivos do Centro Cultural Portugues*, 14 (1979), pp. 163–202.

³² B. Fontana, in F. Grimaldi (ed.), *Pellegrini e pellegrinaggi a Loreto nei secoli XIV–XVIII* (*Bollettino storico della città di Foligno: Supplemento 2*), (Foligno, 2001), p. 393.

³³ Leopardi, *Annali*, II, pp. 6, 69.

or to the other churches of Recanati. Today it still towers over the village around it, and is perfectly visible from the coast.

As the first fifteenth century hagiographic history tells us, the basilica of Loreto was built around what was considered the Holy House of the Virgin, where the Annunciation had presumably taken place. In 1291, after the fall of St John of Acre the house had miraculously escaped infidel hands, had flown over the Mediterranean and after various stops, first in Dalmatia, then in various places of the Marches, had finally found peace at the top of Monte Prodo. There it stood for nearly two centuries, being venerated mostly by local people. It was not until after the fall of Constantinople that the little house became the object of attention and patronage on a grander scale. Indeed, it seems possible that the fact that pilgrimage to the Holy Land was getting more dangerous made such an exiled piece of the Holy Land in the Papal States much more interesting, transforming it into a surrogate of the Holy Land.

In 1469 a new church to protect the Holy House was begun by the Bishop of Recanati, Nicoló dell' Aste from Forlì. Soon afterwards, papal indulgences in favour of the construction of the church were granted by Paul II. At the same time, the diffusion of the cult was favoured by the hagiographic pamphlet hung on the columns of the building and by the printing of various versions in both Latin and Italian. A measure of the growing strategic importance of Loreto is given by the election to the bishopric of Recanati in 1476 of Girolamo Basso della Rovere, a nephew of Sixtus IV, and by the attempt of Sixtus, in the same year, to put the church of Loreto under his direct jurisdiction.

If the first phases of the building of the church of Santa Maria of Loreto seem to have attracted papal patronage, and can be related to political events such as the fall of Constantinople, other phases of fortification seem to coincide exactly with major events of the Turkish threat.

In 1480, after Otranto's cathedral had been assaulted and the bishop killed practically on the high altar, two letters, one by Cardinal Girolamo Basso della Rovere to the council of Recanati and one by Cardinal Marco Barbo to Sixtus IV, testify to the preoccupation for the Adriatic coast of the Papal States and for the church of Loreto. From Cardinal Barbo's letter, a report to the Pope on the condition of the walls of several towns on the Adriatic coast, it appears that he had been sent by the pope to survey the Adriatic coast soon after

the siege of Otranto.³⁴ The letter from Basso della Rovere to the council of Recanati is also revealing, since the cardinal writes from Rome to ask for help in making some sort of temporary fortification of the church of Loreto and of the few houses around it.³⁵

Again, in 1485 when an 'avviso' (report) arrived in Rome saying that the Turks were preparing an attack, Innocent VIII sent Cardinal Orsini with a group of men to inspect the condition of the various castles on the Adriatic coast. The cardinal wrote on 31 March 1485, after having been to Ancona, that he had gone to Loreto to carry out the pope's orders, and had found it 'adsai pericoloso per essere appresso allo lito'.³⁶ On 28 March Cardinal Basso Della Rovere, as soon as he had heard the news about the threat from the Turks, wrote to Domenico dell'Anguillara, his representative in Loreto, saying: 'Now, because we hear that the Turk is preparing a great fleet, we fear it might come to the Marche, especially to attack Santa Maria di Loreto'.³⁷ Basso della Rovere was quite sure that Loreto was a prime target, and he ordered all other work to be interrupted, including the decorations of the sacristies and the fortifications of the church, so that any attack by the Turks could be resisted.³⁸ First he asked the overseer to build the "merli" and the "corridori", the crenellated parapets projecting on corbels, with an internal walkway with machicolations (fig. 8).³⁹

³⁴ Venice, Biblioteca Marciana, Collezione Podocataro, Cod. Lat. Class X, cod. 174, f. 180 (10 Sept. 1480). See also P. Paschini (ed.), *Il carteggio tra Marco Barbo e Giovanni Lorenzi (1481-90)* (Città del Vaticano, 1948), pp. 215-8. This tour of inspection, together with that of Cardinal Orsini five years later, are interesting because they can be considered as precedents of the inspection of Antonio da Sangallo with Sammicheli in the Romagna in 1526, or of that of Antonio along the Adriatic coast in the 1530s following the renewed Turkish threat.

³⁵ Recanati, Casa Leopardi, 'Manoscritto di Cose Recanatesi per Loreto', published in Gianuzzi, 'Documenti inediti sulla basilica lauretana', *Archivio storico dell'Arte*, 4 (1888), p. 418.

³⁶ 'In some danger because it is so near the shore': Venice, Biblioteca Marciana, Collezione Podocataro, Cod. Lat. Class X, cod. 177, f. 120 (31 Mar. 1485) Some of those accompanying the cardinal knew how to draw: a chapter of my doctoral thesis deals with this subject (Renzulli, 'Santa Maria di Loreto 1469-1535', Chap. 4).

³⁷ 'Hora perché intendemo il Turco fa grandissimo apparato per mare dubitiamo non discosesse nella Marcha maxime in offensionem Beatae M. De Laureto': Recanati, Casa Leopardi, 'Manoscritto di Cose Recanatesi per Loreto', published in Gianuzzi, *Documenti*, 1888, p. 418.

³⁸ 'a ogni correira et impeto de turchi possa resistere': *ibid.*

³⁹ The Sistine Chapel in Rome was fortified at about the same time. Among other examples of fortified churches inside town walls are the cathedral in Narbonne,

The decision in 1517 to fortify the village of Loreto, and thus provide the church with further protection, seems again to be an answer to the Turkish threat, and an active reaction to the laments, such as the famous one of Pius II, that mourned the fate awaiting the churches of Constantinople.⁴⁰ By the second decade of the sixteenth century the fortifications of the church had become obsolete, and the village that had grown around the church was totally unprotected: the new enceinte was most likely realized to supply both these deficiencies. Since it was not the most up-to-date system of fortification, however, it is not clear how far its function was symbolic, a deterrent, or truly protective.⁴¹ By the sixteenth century Santa Maria di Loreto had become a defiant symbol of Christianity against the menace of the infidel. In the 1507 bull *In Sublimia* of Julius II, that removed the church of Loreto from the see of Recanati and proclaimed it a *cappella pontificalis*, the Loreto chapel was recognized as the Holy House of Nazareth transplanted to Italian land, and thus the pilgrimage to Loreto was put on the same level as the pilgrimage sites 'across the sea'. By protecting Loreto Leo X was not only protecting the Papal States, but also the Holy Land, and since his efforts from 1515 to promote a crusade failed, the Holy House of Nazareth in Loreto was the only piece of Holy Land that he ever did secure.

St Denis in Paris, St Cécile in Albi, and the cathedral of Avila (I thank Julian Gardner for some of these examples). For the Sistine Chapel see J. Shearman, 'La costruzione della cappella Sistina e la prima decorazione al tempo di Sisto IV', in *La Cappella Sistina. I Primi restauri: la scoperta del colore* (Novara, 1986). On the possible anti-Turkish iconography of the Sistine chapel's interior decoration, see E. Steinmann, *Die Sixtinische Kapelle. Der Bau und Schmuck der Kapelle unter Sixtus IV.* (München, 1901), I, pp. 262–72; C. F. Lewine, *The Sistine Chapel Walls and the Roman Liturgy* (University Park, Pennsylvania, 1993) (who cites earlier writers on the subject).

⁴⁰ For these laments, see A. Pertusi (ed.), *La caduta di Costantinopoli*, 2 vols. (Milan, 1990).

⁴¹ S. Pepper, 'The meaning of the Renaissance fortress', *Architectural Association Quarterly*, 5 (1973), pp. 22–7.




Figure 1. Aerial view of Santa Maria di Loreto [from K. Weil Garris, 'Alcuni progetti', in *Studi Bramanteschi* (Rome, 1974)].




Figure 2. Francisco de Hollanda, 'View of Loreto from the south', Madrid, Escorial [from K. Weil Garris, 'Alcuni progetti', in *Studi Bramanteschi* (Rome, 1974)].



Figure 3. Detail of drawing by Francisco de Hollanda.




Figure 4. Antonio da Sangallo the Younger, U 1552A (Florence, Gabinetto dei Disegni degli Uffizi).




Figure 5. Baronino, U 4109A (Florence, Gabinetto dei Disegni degli Uffizi).



Figure 6. Round bastion at the eastern extremity of the walls, towards the coast.



Figure 7. Detail of the round bastion.



Figure 8. The church of Santa Maria di Loreto seen from the east, with the fifteenth-century fortifications by Giuliano da Maiano.

INDEPENDENT ITALY AND THE WARS

THE ENDING OF THE DUCHY OF CAMERINO

John Law

Among the calendared documents in *The Letters and Papers Foreign and Domestic of Henry VIII*, edited by J. S. Brewer and published in 1867, there is a letter of 22 September 1522 written to Cardinal Thomas Wolsey, Henry VIII's 'prime minister', from Giovanni Maria Varano, Duke of Camerino.¹ The recipient needs no introduction. But the sender—unlike Wolsey or the Tudors—was in fact no *arriviste*: he came from a family that had held the *signoria* of Camerino in the Marche of Italy virtually without a break from the later thirteenth century.² The Varano were, therefore, papal vicars and vassals, and not only for Camerino, but for a changing conglomeration of towns and territories elsewhere in the Marche and in Umbria. Giovanni Maria, however, was the first of the dynasty to hold the prestigious, and heritable, title of duke, a title granted by Pope Leo X on 30 April 1515. The letter to Wolsey records two other titles received from the Medici pope, largely honorary but a further indication of Giovanni Maria's standing, that of Prefect of Rome (9 August 1520) and that of admiral of the papal fleet in the Adriatic (15 November 1521).³

In his letter, Giovanni Maria told Wolsey that he had previously written to Henry VIII himself, offering to serve the king with two hundred heavily armoured cavalry. The duke adopted a slightly apologetic tone: had he known of Wolsey's influence at court he

¹ J. S. Brewer (ed.), *Letters and Papers Foreign and Domestic* (henceforth *LPPD*), III/2 (London, 1867), p. 1087.

² P. L. Falaschi, 'Orizzonti di una dinastia', in A. De Marchi and M. G. Lopez (eds), *Il Quattrocento a Camerino* (Milan, 2002), pp. 35–45 (revised in A. De Marchi and P. L. Falaschi (eds), *I Da Varano e le Arti*, I (Aquaviva Picena, 2003), pp. 19–42); F. Paino and M. Paravanti, 'Camerino e il suo territorio', in M. Paravanti (ed.), *I Da Varano e le Arti a Camerino e nel territorio* (Recanati, 2003), pp. 19–26.

³ For the Varano in the sixteenth century, see B. Feliciangeli, *Notizie e documenti sulla vita di Caterina Cibo-Varano* (Camerino, 1891); J. E. Law, 'Relazioni dinastiche tra i Della Rovere e i Varano', in B. Cleri *et al.* (eds), *I Della Rovere nell'Italia delle Corti*, I (Urbino, 2002), pp. 21–34. The earliest published narrative is Camillo Lilli, *Istoria della Città di Camerino* (Macerato, 1649–52), for which see Law, 'Relazioni', p. 21. The edition cited here is that published in 1835.

would have also written to him. Now he had been told of the situation in England by Richard Pace ((1482–1536), a close confidant of the king, who knew Italy well and was again in the country as a royal envoy).⁴ Better informed, Giovanni Maria was repeating his offer, begging Wolsey for an answer. To strengthen his plea, Giovanni Maria ended his letter by declaring that he would like to follow the example of his own ancestor who had served the ‘noble king Edward’, an allusion to a Varano myth that the founder of the dynasty—Gentile—had served Edward I and that his son—Rodolfo—had received from the English king the Order of the Garter. The *Letters and Papers* record no further correspondence between the Tudor court and the Varano, other than a letter sent by Pace to Wolsey from Venice on 27 September 1522. This enclosed a letter from the duke ‘for a matter declared unto the same by my servant Thomas Clerk’. Unfortunately, the nature of the ‘matter’ is not disclosed.⁵

This slight point of contact between the English court and the rulers of a relatively minor Italian *signoria* may at first appear insignificant and inconsequential. It does, however, indicate—especially when seen in the context of the *Letters and Papers* as a whole—that Henry and his ‘first minister’ had a keen interest in the details of Italian affairs. For example, a letter written earlier in 1522 informed the English court that Giovanni Maria had been restored to his duchy by Florentine troops, a reference to the fact that the duke had been briefly expelled from his duchy by a rebellion led by his exiled nephew Sigismondo between December 1521 and January 1522.⁶

The English court was not interested in news from Italy for news’ sake. The peninsula had become a principal battleground in the confrontation between Valois and Habsburg. Henry VIII considered himself to be a major player on the European stage. On the death of Maximilian I on 12 January 1519, he had been a candidate for the imperial title. On the death of Leo X on 1 December 1521, he had advanced Wolsey as a candidate for the papal throne, using Pace as an agent in the enterprise. Hadrian VI had been consecrated

⁴ J. Wegg, *Richard Pace, A Tudor Diplomat* (London, 1932).

⁵ I intend to examine these anachronistic claims elsewhere; they were probably inspired by the award of the Order of the Garter by Edward IV to Federigo da Montefeltro, and even more by its grant by Henry VII to Francesco Maria della Rovere: see C. H. Clough, ‘The relations between the English and Urbino courts, 1474–1508’, in *The Duchy of Urbino in the Renaissance* (London, 1981), Chap. XI. For the letter of 27 Sept. 1522, *LFPD*, III/2, p. 1095.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 877–8.

on 31 August 1522, but Pace's letter to Wolsey of 27 September could have alluded to Giovanni Maria's role as a possible future advocate for the cardinal in the College; the duke of Camerino was married to Caterina Cibo, and thus linked by marriage to two powerful cardinals, Innocenzo Cibo and Giulio de' Medici. Moreover, in 1522 Henry had allied himself with Charles V, and had declared war on Francis I. At this point in the Italian Wars the French retained ambitions towards Milan and Lombardy, and although Giovanni Maria probably did not see himself leading two hundred heavy cavalry in an invasion of French soil, he might well have hoped for a *condotta* in an anti-French coalition in Italy, financed at least in part by the generosity and ambition of the English king.

The Varano had traditionally been *condottiere* princes, but this role was intended as a means to more than money or employment for their subjects. They sought the alliance and protection of greater powers: the papacy, the kingdom of Naples, the Venetian republic were the traditional employers and protectors of the Varano. Henry VIII might appear to have been too geographically dislocated for this kind of role, but he was at this point an ally of the emperor who, in turn, was very much a force to be reckoned with in Italy.

Giovanni Maria was feeling particularly vulnerable. His principal protector, Leo X, had died in December 1521. This had led to the restoration of his neighbour and rival, Francesco Maria della Rovere, to the duchy of Urbino. Francesco Maria had then backed the coup led by his nephew, Sigismondo da Varano, the son of his sister Maria, which had driven Giovanni Maria into temporary exile. Francesco Maria was also a very effective soldier. The Duke of Camerino may well have hoped that the good offices of Henry VIII with the emperor would have checked Francesco Maria's hand against him in the Marche. Moreover, he could also have heard from Richard Pace of a letter of 19 March 1522 from the Duke of Urbino to Wolsey and Henry VIII. In this Francesco Maria had announced his recovery of the duchy on the death of Pope Leo, but with God's will, and had declared himself ready to serve the king of England. He had begged Henry and Wolsey to write on his behalf to the pope and the emperor. Was Giovanni Maria Varano trying to match his neighbour and rival for English favour?⁷

⁷ *LFPD*, III/2, p. 903.

Nothing seems to have come from Giovanni Maria's letter to the Tudor court, though the volumes of the *Letters and Papers* show that Henry's government continued to take an interest in the balance of power in Italy—and in the Marche—in the context of the wider European struggle for power. From a historical point of view, the duke's letter could still be seen as emblematic of a fundamental shift in the balance of power in Italy and Europe created by the Italian Wars. Even if not actually conquered by foreign powers, the states of Italy had ceased to be in control of their own destinies, declining to client status in the European context. Indeed, on a superficial level the case of Camerino can appear to conform to that long accepted view. Giovanni Maria was the first Varano duke; he was also the last. Twelve years after his death in 1527, the duchy was brought under direct papal rule. Returning briefly to ducal status in the hands of Ottavio Farnese, nephew of Pope Paul III, in 1540, it returned to the direct rule of the Church in 1545. This contribution seeks to examine what happened in the years between 1527, the death of Giovanni Maria Varano, and 1539 for the Varano duchy to fail, and how this failure—of a lordship that had existed virtually unbroken since the later thirteenth century—relates to the wider questions raised in this volume.

In common with other heads of princely houses, Giovanni Maria was preoccupied with the standing and perpetuation of the dynasty. For the recently-built great hall of the Varano palace he commissioned a frieze that commemorated and celebrated his ancestors and their wives. Their coats of arms were accompanied by *elogie* lauding the achievements of the Varano.⁸ Giovanni Maria's commitment to the dynasty was expressed more directly in his betrothal in 1513 to Caterina, the daughter of Francesco Cibo and Maddalena de' Medici, the sister of Leo X. Maddalena appears to have opposed the union, and the marriage took place only after her death in 1520.⁹ But the

⁸ F. Paino, 'Il Palazzo ducale di Camerino: storia, architettura, ambienti e decorazioni pittoriche', in *I Da Varano*, pp. 55–76.

⁹ On 15 June 1518, John Grygge wrote from the papal court in Rome to Henry VIII, telling him that papal forces were advancing on Camerino whose duke had married Maddalena's daughter five years earlier. The duke was rumoured to be impotent and the pope wanted Caterina to marry Sigismondo Varano, Giovanni Maria's nephew by his elder brother Venanzio, living in exile but now regarded as the legitimate ruler of Camerino. (*LPFD*, II/2, p. 134.) His report was based on the fact that Sigismondo had been in Rome for several months looking for support, and had tried but failed to take Camerino in June (Law, 'Relazioni', pp. 24–5).

union produced only one child, Giulia, born on 24 March 1523. For reasons that are at present unclear—but which must have been at least rumoured at the time—it was assumed to be unlikely that the couple would have further children, and in 1524 the Medici pope Clement VII allowed Giulia to inherit the papal duchy in the event of there being no male heirs. Furthermore, on 25 November the obliging Medici pope issued a *breve* allowing Caterina to succeed in the event of the deaths of both Giovanni Maria and Giulia. Should her daughter survive, Caterina was to govern the duchy until she had reached the age of twenty-five.

Giovanni Maria himself was clearly aware of the precariousness of the succession, and the consequent dangers confronting the Varano. He placed the duchy under the protection of papacy and empire. In his detailed will drawn up between 5 and 8 August 1527 he appointed Caterina as the guardian—‘tutrix’—of their daughter and governor—‘gubernatrix generalis’—of the duchy.¹⁰ He also stipulated that at the age of fourteen, Giulia was to be married to one of the sons of Ercole Varano, the head of an exiled branch of the dynasty residing in Ferrara under the protection of the Este. Giovanni Maria thought that this would unite and strengthen the ‘Illustrissima famiglia de Varano’. He himself died on 10 August 1527.

In his will, Giovanni Maria had identified a weakness that traditionally plagued ruling houses across Italy and Europe, especially when it involved external powers or interests: dynastic division. He himself had experienced this. On his own accession to the signoria of Camerino in 1503 he appears to have shared power to some extent with his sister-in-law Maria della Rovere. Maria was the widow of his elder brother, Venanzio; she had a son, Sigismondo; she was the sister of Francesco Maria della Rovere, the acknowledged heir to the duchy of Urbino; she was the niece of Julius II, pope from 1 November 1503. In fact, the pope addressed both Giovanni Maria and Maria as his vicars ‘in temporalibus’ in a *breve* of 11 March 1505.¹¹

The strains inherent in this relationship led to Maria withdrawing to Urbino in 1505, probably provoking an unsuccessful conspiracy on her behalf in Camerino in the same year. That this

¹⁰ ASF, Ducato di Urbino, cl. iii, filza 3, cc. 55–8; Feliciangeli, *Vita*, pp. 55–6, 283–91; M. T. Guerra Medici, *Famiglia e potere in una Signoria dell’Italia centrale* (Camerino, 2002), p. 48.

¹¹ Law, ‘Relazioni’, pp. 23–4.

breakdown in relations did not earn Giovanni Maria the hostility of Julius II may have been due to the loyalty shown by his father, Giulio Cesare, to a previous Della Rovere pope, Sixtus IV, but Julius's support was probably secured less by the legacy of the past and more by the promise of substantial military and financial aid in the future.¹² Giovanni Maria was also assisted by the fact that his sister-in-law became alienated from her brother Francesco Maria, but this was not permanent. Maria became a champion of her son's claims to the Varano inheritance, and her resolve in this matter came to coincide with Francesco Maria's hostility to the Medici papacy of Leo X who, like his predecessor, became a patron of Giovanni Maria and a beneficiary of his support. From 1517, Francesco Maria was employing his nephew as a *condottiere* and rumours reached Rome that Camerino had fallen. In the following year, Sigismondo was in Rome trying to gather support for his cause: he most probably won over Maddalena de' Medici who came to prefer the prospect of her daughter, Caterina, marrying Sigismondo rather than his uncle.

Maddalena's views must have been strongly held, because it was only after her death in 1520 that Giovanni Maria's wedding to Caterina went ahead, but the death of Leo X on 1 December 1521 presented the duke of Camerino with a new crisis and his nephew with a new opportunity. The course of events was described in great detail by Camerino's historian and antiquarian Camillo Lilli, and appears to accord with more contemporary sources.¹³ On the news of Leo's death Giovanni Maria went to Rome to confer with the cardinals and others allied to the cause of the deceased pope. He was urged to reinforce the garrison in Camerino. Events in the Marche, however, were running swiftly in favour of Francesco Maria and his allies, and on 28 December 1521 the citizens of Camerino—or at least a significant number of them—handed the keys of the city to Sigismondo with 'every manifestation of loyalty' and with 'universal satisfaction of this people'. Two citizens were sent to Rome to take the good news to Maria della Rovere. The rocca of Camerino, however, still held out for the duke while his illegitimate son, Rodolfo, began to gather troops and rally support in the *contado*. Deprived of military

¹² For Giovanni Maria's alleged loyalty to and generosity towards the Holy See, see Guerra Medici, *Famiglia e potere*, pp. 81–118.

¹³ Law, 'Relazioni', pp. 25–7.

assistance from Francesco Maria, Sigismondo was unable to hold the city and after some street fighting he withdrew in February 1522.

The deleterious nature of the feud between Sigismondo and Giovanni Maria must have appeared so obvious that attempts were made to find a resolution. According to Lili, in January 1522 Cardinals Colonna and Cibo tried to mediate.¹⁴ The historian goes on to record that after Giovanni Maria's restoration he was persuaded by subjects from both the city and its *contado* to send an embassy to Sigismondo in Rome. He was urged to accept a share of the Varano *signoria* or to submit the dispute to arbitration, but he dismissed such suggestions, preferring to settle matters 'with the sword first'. Further offers, again probably the consequence of broader deliberations in Camerino itself, and involving a pension for Sigismondo and the settlement of Maria's dowry claims, were again rejected. Sigismondo would appear to have settled for half the Varano *signoria*, half its revenues, with interest to cover the income he had lost, and the settlement of his mother's dowry, again with interest. Giovanni Maria rejected these terms and almost certainly decided to settle the matter 'with the sword' himself. On 22 June 1522, Sigismondo was assassinated on the outskirts of Rome. Although not directly involved, this threatened to plunge Giovanni Maria into a further crisis. Hadrian VI was prepared to act against him on the charge of murder and of depriving Maria della Rovere of her rights, but the death of the pope (14 September 1523) and the election of the sympathetic Clement VII (18 November 1523) secured Giovanni Maria's position until the end of his life.

The precariousness of the ruling dynasty, as revealed by internal division, outside intervention and now underlined by a succession in the female line—and by a minor at that—was not resolved by the detailed provisions of Giovanni Maria's will, or by the fact that its terms were proclaimed in the vernacular at the gates of the fortress. The Varano-Cibo succession, and the person of Caterina herself, were almost immediately threatened by rival claimants among whom were Rodolfo, Giovanni Maria's illegitimate son, and Matteo and Alessandro, the sons of Ercole Varano from the branch of the family living in exile in Ferrara. On this occasion, Giulia had been removed from Camerino for safety, while military and diplomatic intervention secured

¹⁴ Lili, *Istoria*, p. 292.

the release of Caterina and the withdrawal of hostile forces, but the experience, and the military support offered by Francesco Maria della Rovere persuaded the duchess to ignore a key provision in her husband's will. A marriage alliance with the Varano of Ferrara was abandoned, and on 14 December 1527 it was agreed that Giulia would marry Francesco Maria's son, Guidobaldo, when she reached the age of fourteen. Her dowry was set at the high figure of 30,000 ducats while the rights and revenues due to Caterina by the terms of her husband's will were to be respected.¹⁵

This *volte face* put an end to rivalry between the Della Rovere and the Varano-Cibo, and provided Caterina and her daughter with a powerful, local, military backer. It did not, however, put an end to the efforts of rival claimants to the duchy, in particular from the Ferrara Varano. They attacked the city twice in 1528, while in April 1534 Matteo was even able to hold Caterina prisoner for a few days. More importantly, the new alliance threatened another request contained in Giovanni Maria's will.¹⁶

As mentioned above, Giovanni Maria had sought the protection of the empire and the papacy for his daughter's succession. Partly in view of his value as a military commander, Charles V supported Francesco Maria della Rovere, and appears to have had no objection to the Della Rovere-Varano alliance. Traditionally, the Varano had been supporters of the papacy, as subjects and *condottieri*, and the papacy had rewarded that loyalty, as in the case of Giovanni Maria Varano. Papal good will, however, was not a constant; changes in the papal office could bring an end to favours, protection and patronage, and threaten—or bring about—the extinction of a signorial regime, as when Alexander VI deprived the Varano of their *signoria* in 1502.¹⁷ The death of Leo X and the succession of Hadrian VI had emboldened rival claimants to the duchy.

¹⁵ Law, 'Relazioni', pp. 28–9. The problems facing Caterina on the death of her husband were relayed to the English court by Sir Gregorio Casali, or Gregory Casale, from Rome on 3 September 1527 (*LPHD*, IV/2, p. 1541). Events were relayed to the imperial court from Rome on 24 September: P. de Gayangos (ed.), *Calendar of Letters, Despatches and State Papers relating to the Negotiations between England and Spain Preserved in the Archives at Simancas and Elsewhere* (henceforth *LDSPSp*) (London, 1877), III/2, p. 393.

¹⁶ Law, 'Relazioni', p. 29.

¹⁷ J. E. Law, 'City, court and *contado* in Camerino', in T. Dean and C. Wickham (eds), *City and Countryside in Late Medieval and Renaissance Italy* (London, 1990), pp. 171–82.

Now the alliance of the two most powerful signorial dynasties of the Marche could be seen from Rome as a threat to the temporal authority of the Church in the Lands of St Peter. Although Clement VII had favoured the Varano—identifying the murdered Sigismondo as a rebel against the Church and endorsing the succession—there is some evidence that even he had viewed their marriage alliance to the Della Rovere with some misgivings, which may explain why Giulia continued to be mentioned in connection with other possible marriages, and why Guidobaldo himself appears to have been reluctant to accept the prospect of a Varano bride.¹⁸

Events were precipitated with the death of Clement VII on 24 September 1534. Both Francesco Maria and Caterina were anxious to press ahead with the marriage, and on 11 October an agreement was reached to proceed, with Caterina being promised her dowry and half the revenues of the state. The marriage itself took place the following day in circumstances of tight security, in the fortress of Camerino. The clear consent of both parties and the presentation of a ring were carefully recorded. It was also recorded that the marriage was consummated, although Giulia was only in her eleventh year, younger than had been stipulated in her father's will and in the marriage alliance of 14 December 1527.¹⁹

That the marriage was in fact consummated may be doubted; Guidobaldo returned to Urbino the following day. But a challenge to its success of a different kind came from Rome. Almost immediately after the ceremony, an emissary arrived from the College, offering the duchess and her daughter its support, but insisting that no marriage take place without the consent of the new pope. The day after Paul III was elected on 13 October, a *breve* was dispatched prohibiting the marriage; the pope was nervous at the increase in Della Rovere power in the Marche, 'at the gates of Rome', and probably aimed for a union between Giulia and his nephew Ottavio Farnese.²⁰

¹⁸ Law, 'Relazioni', p. 29. Other possible husbands appear in the correspondence of envoys to the Imperial court, including a Stewart (*LPFD*, V, p. 87), and Duke Leopold of Austria (*LDSPSp*, V/1, p. 6).

¹⁹ Law, 'Relazioni', pp. 29–30; Guerra Medici, *Famiglia e potere*, p. 53. Francesco Maria felt the need to take legal and political advice on the validity of the marriage (*ibid.*, pp. 78, 109–13).

²⁰ For the confrontation with the papacy, Law, 'Relazioni', pp. 30–1. The situation was reported to both the English and Imperial courts, *LPFD*, VIII, *passim*, and *LDSPSp*, V/1, *passim*; at p. 601, Urbino and Camerino are described as the gates of Rome but as also constituting a wall dividing the city from the Romagna.

The confrontation continued to escalate. On 19 October Paul III forbade the marriage once more, and on 21 October Caterina, her daughter and her new son-in-law were summoned to Rome. These commands, though repeated, were ignored, and in the following year Paul raised the stakes, first by accepting the Ferrara branch as the legitimate rulers of the duchy (7 January 1535), and then by depriving Guidobaldo, Giulia and Caterina of their rights to the duchy, which was placed under an interdict (28 March 1535). In Camerino, however, an accommodation was reached between the Della Rovere and Caterina which assured her of her rights, while Guidobaldo and Giulia appear to have been accepted by their subjects. A gold *scudo* was issued styling Giulia as ‘IVL VAR DE RVERE CAMERT DVX’; the coin bore both the Varano and Della Rovere arms, with the motto ‘NON TIMEBO MALA QUONIA TV MECVM ES’ (I fear no evil while you are with me). On 17 August 1535, Giulia formally and publicly announced that she was able to govern the duchy, and records survive which show her doing just that.²¹

This confidence stemmed in part—as the gold coin suggests—in the military support which Francesco Maria could offer the duchy, and behind him lay more important employers and patrons, the Venetian Republic and Charles V. The latter may have been swayed by a wide range of arguments prepared for Francesco Maria by Alberto Bruno and Ottonello Pasini, probably for a meeting with Charles V in November 1535. Some of the arguments prepared for the duke related to matters of fundamental principle: the pope had no business in interfering in temporal affairs; the emperor had ultimate authority over lands ceded by his predecessors to the Church; the pope should not let personal or family—Farnese—interests overrule the policies adopted towards the Varano by his predecessors.

Other points had more of a theological nature: the right of a couple to choose to marry, despite the arrangements made by others; the right of a couple to choose marriage if they were mature enough in mind and body to do so; the sanctity of marriage once freely celebrated and consummated. Ottonello also offered Francesco Maria arguments of a legal nature: the rights of the Varano as loyal vassals; the fact that Giulia’s dowry was drawn from allodial rather than feudal lands; the claim that the acts of summons, excommunication

²¹ Law, ‘Relazioni’, p. 31.

and deprivation issued by the Farnese pope were invalid, and that the pope, as an interested party, could not be an objective judge. Bruno defended the legitimacy of Giulia's succession. Francesco Maria was also reminded of other arguments: the duration of the Varano signoria; that family's loyalty to the papacy; the recognition given by recent popes to the Varano succession; the discredited nature of the claims of rival members of the Varano dynasty. Political issues were also raised: Paul III was threatening the peace of Italy and Christendom; the Varano and Della Rovere lordships were held legitimately and not through the use of force; the allied dynasties did not pose a threat to the Church. Finally, Ottonello tried to provide answers to matters arising from recent events: Giulia had not been forced to marry Guidobaldo; Camerino had welcomed its new duke; Giulia had been too ill to answer a papal summons to Rome; the rights of Caterina had been respected.

But any sense that the Varano-Della Rovere alliance was 'in the right', that the general aims, if not the details, of Giovanni Maria's will had been respected and achieved and that the succession had been secured with powerful external support, proved illusory. With the death of Francesco Maria on 21 October 1538, Paul III returned to his aim of either returning Camerino to the direct authority of 'St Peter', or granting the duchy to someone of his own choosing, almost certainly a Farnese.²² In November, Guidobaldo and Giulia were excommunicated and military operations begun against them. The fact that Charles V had reached an accommodation with Paul III that included the marriage of his daughter Margherita to the pope's nephew Ottavio Farnese, left Giulia and Guidobaldo isolated, and to save the duchy of Urbino, Guidobaldo surrendered Camerino on 3 January 1539, despite the protests of his wife. Paul entered the city in triumph on 14 October and invested his nephew with the duchy on 5 November 1540.²³ When in 1545 Ottavio was invested

²² At various stages in the confrontation with Paul III, Francesco Maria had supplied Camerino with foodstuffs and had even reinforced its garrison: *LFPD*, VIII, pp. 6, 218–9, 267, 306; *LDSPSp*, V/1, p. 471. At times in his confrontation with the Varano and the Della Rovere, Paul III had chosen to encourage the claims of Ercole and his sons from the Ferrara branch of the Varano, who later had to be compensated: *LDSPSp*, V/1, p. 160. For material on these claims and the investiture of the pope's nephew, Ottavio: Archivio Segreto del Vaticano, Archivium Arcis, Armadio I–XVIII.

²³ Paul's determination to take Camerino was frequently reported to the English court: for example, *LFPD*, XIII/2, pp. 448–9, 454–5.

with the richer duchy of Parma and Piacenza, Camerino came under the direct rule of the Church.²⁴

Angelo Antonio Bittarelli described the state of Camerino in the late fifteenth century as a ‘little terracotta vessel held with difficulty in equilibrium . . . between metal giants’.²⁵ His striking metaphor may appear even more relevant for the 1520s and 1530s. Camerino had never been a major player on the Italian and European stages. It survived—in large part—as a client state, and its *condottieri* rulers had rarely entered the ‘first rank’ of military captains. Now that Italy had become involved in a wider struggle for power between Habsburg and Valois, the relative weakness of the Varano *signoria* could appear to have become even more exposed.

As regards Giovanni Maria Varano, for reasons that are not immediately clear but which may have been the consequence of ill-health or the need to defend his inheritance from rival claimants, he does not seem to have rated highly as a *condottiere*. His title of admiral of the papal fleet appears to have been largely honorific; nothing came of his offer of military service to the English court.²⁶ The accession of his daughter, a minor, must have reduced the military credibility of the duchy even further. Thus it could be tempting to see—particularly in the light of Bittarelli’s metaphor—a confirmation of a long held view. The Italian Wars brought about a decisive change in the balance of power in Italy. A small state like Camerino became an anachronism in a new geo-political world.²⁷ This appears to receive confirmation from the efforts made by both the Varano and the Della Rovere to enlist popular support to strengthen their position—as when the terms of Giovanni Maria’s will were read out in Italian at the gates of the fortress, or when the papal bull and *breve* recognising the succession of Giulia and the regency of Caterina were read out in the cathedral before guild leaders and a gathering of citizens on 8 December 1527, or when Guidobaldo processed through Camerino after his marriage to Giulia in October 1534.²⁸

²⁴ Law, ‘Relazioni’, pp. 31–2.

²⁵ ‘piccolo vaso di terra cotta tenuto in equilibrio a fatica . . . tra giganti de metallo’: A. A. Bittarelli, *Camerino. Viaggio dentro la Città* (Macerata, 1978), p. 86.

²⁶ On 14 June 1526, Charles V was told that Giovanni Maria was anxious to enter his service: *LPSD*, IV/1, p. 1006.

²⁷ For a recent example, see G. Brucker, *Living on the Edge in Leonardo’s Florence* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2005), pp. 17–19.

²⁸ Law, ‘Relazioni’, pp. 28, 30; Guerra Medici, *Famiglia*, p. 49.

It would be a mistake to see the end of the Varano *signoria* too readily in determinist terms, as a foregone conclusion. There were many claimants and aspirants to the lordship of Camerino, from within the dynasty and without. The honour of acquiring or inheriting an ancient lordship that had attained the dignity of a ducal title should not be ignored as a motive, but the claimants must also have recognised the strategic and economic values of the lordship.²⁹

These assets were reported to their governments by English and imperial envoys in Italy; neither ever suggested that the duchy of Camerino was a lost cause, and neither was a disinterested recipient of unsolicited news. The Habsburgs were a major power in Italy; in the case of Camerino in particular, the emperor's appreciation of Francesco Maria della Rovere as a military commander drew imperial attention to the fate of the Varano duchy, while—ironically—the dowry brought by Charles's daughter Margherita to her marriage with Ottavio Farnese offered Paul III the means to settle the various Varano claims to Camerino.³⁰ For the more distant English court, interest in the balance of power in Europe and Italy was intensified by the problem of Henry's divorce, and the king's subsequent search for possible allies in Italy opposed to the 'ambitions' and 'tyranny' of the 'bishop of Rome'.³¹ Both courts appear to have been served by able and experienced envoys or ambassadors. In the Tudor case, the significance of Camerino for the position of Guidobaldo della Rovere—in confrontation with Paul III—was stressed by the king's special envoy, the poet and courtier Thomas Wyatt in January 1539, but Henry also had longer serving, resident, representatives in Italy—Richard Pace, Edmund Harvel and Gregorio Casali (or Casale).

The importance of Camerino was not only recognised internationally from various perspectives; that recognition also helped sustain an "equilibrium" which extended the life of the duchy: the protection Francesco Maria della Rovere could call on from Charles V and Venice frustrated the ambitions of Paul III at least for a few years. If the pope proved in the end to be principal among the

²⁹ *LPFD*, XIII/2, p. 454; *LDSPS*, IV/2, p. 55; V/1, pp. 292, 601; VI/1, p. 169; British Library, Add. Mss, 25,591, f. 124.

³⁰ *LDSPS*, VI/1, pp. 121–2, 146, 153, 158, 160.

³¹ Telling is a letter from Henry VIII of 21 January 1539 to Edmund Harvel, mentioning the possibility that Guidobaldo della Rovere be admitted to the Order of the Garter: *LPFD*, XIV/1, pp. 41–2.

'metal giants' that destroyed the 'little terracotta vessel' of Camerino, the fact that he was the recognised sovereign of the Papal States reminds us that papal intervention against the *signori* of the Lands of St Peter was hardly new. Neither were the other elements that weakened and undermined the Varano lordship: disputed succession; dynastic in-fighting; the lack of legitimate, adult, male heirs; aggressive and opportunistic neighbours. The impact that contemporaries and later historians rightly attribute to the Italian Wars can obscure the fact that some of the basic forces at work in the period can be detected well beyond Renaissance Italy.

POLITICAL ALLEGIANCES AND POLITICAL
STRUCTURES IN THE WRITINGS OF NICCOLÒ
MACHIAVELLI AND FRANCESCO GUICCIARDINI

H. C. Butters

In view of the historical background against which they composed most of their major works, the Italian Wars, in the course of which so many regimes were violently overthrown and so many commentators saw Italians as helpless victims in a world out of control, it is not hard to see why Machiavelli and Guicciardini both stressed the role of *Fortuna*, and the role they assign to it prevents either of them being seen in any straightforward way as distant ancestors of political science or of political sociology, at least of those practitioners of the two disciplines for whom the principal goal is the furnishing of causal generalizations. Montesquieu, who was a keen and attentive reader of Machiavelli, and an author who can genuinely be enrolled among the founding fathers of those disciplines, in part because of the importance that he attached to causal generalizations, was quick in his *Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence* to dismiss the role of Fortune: Fortune does not dominate the world; it is rather general causes that explain phenomena, and it is thanks to their operation that monarchies rise and are maintained or destroyed. To them, therefore, all accidents are subject.¹

If Fortune's power was such that political life was essentially rather than incidentally or occasionally unpredictable, there would appear to be little to offer statesmen in the way of general rules, and there would seem to be a modest place at best for notions of structures, persisting and predictable patterns of relationships and behaviour. This at times seems to have been Guicciardini's view of the matter, for in his *Ricordi* he speaks of the uselessness of general rules and of

¹ Montesquieu, *Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence*, in *Oeuvres complètes*, ed. R. Caillois (Paris, 1958), II, p. 173. On Montesquieu's contribution to sociological thought see R. Aron, *Les étapes de la Pensée Sociologique* (Paris, 1967), pp. 25–76.

the uncertainty of the future, which is so great, according to him, that in their judgments about it there is very little difference between the wise and those less intelligent;² and this is why in another *ricordo* he argues that fools often accomplish more than the wise.³

But on the other hand, the works of both men provide ample testimony to their belief that there were better as opposed to worse ways of governing, and that at least some of the difficulties that plagued statesmen in Florence and Italy during the Italian Wars were structural ones requiring structural solutions. In his approach to these matters Machiavelli was both less pessimistic and more ambitious than Guicciardini, and one of his principal aims was to render the political world more predictable for regimes and rulers, while at the same time eschewing any attempt to render it entirely or even mainly foreseeable. In particular he sought in his writings to tackle two persistent or systemic problems faced, as he saw it, by Italian governments during the Italian Wars: the unreliability of their armies and the dubious loyalty of their citizens and subjects, weaknesses that he considered to be intimately related. His structural remedies, suggested to him largely but not entirely by his reading of Roman history, can be summarized as good laws, good education, good arms, good *ordini* and sound religion.⁴ Machiavelli followed Leonardo Bruni, and his own former colleague in the Chancery, Marcello Virgilio Adriani, in seeing good arms and good laws as essential to civil order, and in considering republican Rome as infinitely preferable to imperial Rome.⁵ But by selecting for his most extended treatment of these themes the medium of a commentary on Livy, he was not merely picking a genre of great flexibility, capable of playing the role of 'an introduction to classical literature, history and culture',⁶ he was also imitating the example of Marcello Virgilio Adriani, who in his approach to commentary 'proceeded discursively, submitting the classical writers whom he treated to his own digressive style of inter-

² F. Guicciardini, *Ricordi*, introduction by M. Fubini (Milan, 1977), C 23, p. 112.

³ *Ibid.*, C 136, p. 151.

⁴ N. Machiavelli, *Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio*, I, 4, 11 and 18 in *Opere* (Biblioteca di classici italiani, Feltrinelli editore), I, *Il Principe e Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio*, ed. S. Bertelli (2nd edition, Milan, 1968), pp. 136–8, 160–3, 179–83; *Il Principe*, XII, *ibid.*, pp. 53–8.

⁵ P. Godman, *From Poliziano to Machiavelli: Florentine Humanism in the High Renaissance* (Princeton, 1998), p. 158.

⁶ A. Grafton, *Joseph Scaliger. A Study in the History of Classical Scholarship*, I (Oxford, 1983), p. 16.

pretation', with little regard to 'consecutive order'.⁷ At *Discorsi*, II, 3, for example, Machiavelli compared Rome's rise with that of Athens and Sparta and deployed ideas and interpretations distant from the content of the passage in Livy that he had selected.⁸ He was, finally, displaying originality in his selection of Livy, for no one had yet written a commentary on the great historian.⁹

Machiavelli thought that if Fortune was favourable, the structural remedies he proposed would perform the same function in his native city that they had performed in the Roman world, moulding the behaviour of subjects and citizens, turning the unpromising raw material of human nature into something more impressive and producing a people devoted to the public weal. Nothing, moreover, reveals more clearly Machiavelli's obsession with the Roman model than his willingness to follow Polybius in speaking warmly of the beneficial social effects of Rome's religious beliefs and rituals.¹⁰

But these proposals hardly exhaust Machiavelli's concern with structural questions. Like Aristotle he was also keenly interested in the relationship between forms of government and social structure, and in the question what sort of government will best suit a particular society.¹¹ Chapter fifty-five of the first Book of the *Discorsi* addresses this issue, and in it Machiavelli argues that republicanism and a landed nobility cannot be combined, and that republics have survived in Tuscany because there are so few nobles there.¹² In his *Discursus Florentinarum rerum post mortem iunioris Laurentii Medices* the matter is taken up again, and in that work he insists that a principate could be established in Florence only if a landed nobility was introduced first, and then rejects such an ambitious piece of social engineering out of hand:

But since to establish a principate where a republic would be suitable, and a republic where a principate would be suitable, is difficult, inhuman and unworthy of anyone who desires to be considered compassionate and good, I shall put aside further discussion of principates, and speak of republics.¹³

⁷ P. Godman, *From Poliziano to Machiavelli*, p. 273.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 274.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 263.

¹⁰ *Discorsi*, I, 11, pp. 160–3; Polybius, *Histories*, VI.56.6.

¹¹ Aristotle, *Politics* 1296 b.12.

¹² *Discorsi*, pp. 254–8.

¹³ N. Machiavelli, *Arte della guerra e scritti politici minori*, in *Opere*, II, ed. S. Bertelli (Milan, 1961), p. 268.

At first sight Guicciardini's views might appear to be the polar opposite of Machiavelli's. In his *Ricordi*, after all, he declared: 'It is a great mistake to discuss the affairs of the world in an indiscriminating and absolute fashion and, so to speak, by the book; because they nearly all have distinctive and exceptional features, owing to the variety of their circumstances';¹⁴ while in another *ricordo* he observed:

How mistaken are those who are constantly citing the Romans! It would be necessary to have a city with similar institutions to theirs, and then to regulate oneself according to that example; which for those who have different characteristics is as incongruous as to wish that an ass would run like a horse.¹⁵

There is little doubt that the target of these animadversions is Machiavelli, but the second of them is quite compatible with a belief in political and social structures, that is, with regular and recurrent forms of action and persisting relationships, indeed it is dependent on such a belief. Guicciardini's complaint about those who want to import a classical Roman model into early-sixteenth century Italy has indeed much in common with Machiavelli's complaint about those who seek to set up a principate in Florence: in both cases the error that is being identified consists in trying to impose upon one society the customs, social relations and institutions of another and totally different one.

Nor is Machiavelli's interest in the relationship between social and political structures absent from Guicciardini's political writings. In the *Discorso di Logrognò* of 1512,¹⁶ and in the *Dialogo del Reggimento di Firenze*¹⁷ he made a case for a mixed constitution that resembled Aristotle's polity,¹⁸ though with a bias towards the great families, but that resembled even more closely Polybius's description of the Roman republican form of government;¹⁹ and this case was based precisely on a clear view of the nature of Florentine society and of the social groups that composed it.

There is certainly a contrast to be drawn between the views of

¹⁴ *Ricordi*, C 6, p. 106.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, C 110, p. 143.

¹⁶ F. Guicciardini, *Dialogo e Discorsi del Reggimento di Firenze*, ed. R. Palmarocchi (Bari, 1932), pp. 223–59.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 85–172.

¹⁸ Aristotle, *Politics* 1295 a.25–1296 b.12.

¹⁹ Polybius, *Histories* VI.10.12–11.13.

the two men about the *popolo* and its role in government, and the nature of that contrast has been explored to very good effect by Alison Brown in the introduction to her edition and translation of the *Dialogo del Reggimento di Firenze*.²⁰ It is manifest, for example, in their strongly divergent interpretations of Roman history, which in turn profoundly affected their analyses of contemporary Florentine and Italian problems. Machiavelli thought that the conflicts between patricians and plebs in republican Rome, the institution of the tribune of the plebs and the Roman militia were all benign phenomena; Guicciardini, by contrast, thought the conflicts malign and the office of tribune relatively ineffective; and he attributed the undoubted prowess of the militia to the fact that it was created when Rome was ruled by kings,²¹ implying that Machiavelli's attempt to transplant it to Florentine republican soil was doomed to failure, a view of that project undoubtedly fortified by the pathetic performance of Florence's forces in August 1512, when a Spanish army sacked Prato and brought the Medici back to Florence.²²

It is not difficult, moreover, to find passages in the writings of the two men that indicate how much more willing Machiavelli was to trust the people than Guicciardini was. Whereas Guicciardini referred to the people in his *Ricordi* as an 'animal, mad, full of a thousand errors, a thousand confusions, without taste, without discrimination, without constancy';²³ Machiavelli in the *Discorsi* not merely declared roundly that 'the desires of free peoples are rarely harmful to liberty, for they derive either from the experience of oppression, or from the fear of being oppressed';²⁴ but also maintained that the people are in general wiser and more constant than princes,²⁵ so disagreeing both with Guicciardini, and with the author on whose work he was commenting as well.

It can be argued, however, that these quotations may give an exaggerated impression of the gulf that separated the views of the two men. Machiavelli was hardly arguing for universal manhood suffrage,

²⁰ Guicciardini, *Dialogue on the Government of Florence*, ed. and trans. A. Brown (Cambridge, 1994), pp. vii–xxviii.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. xxiii.

²² H. C. Butters, *Governors and Government in Early Sixteenth-Century Florence 1502–1519* (Oxford, 1985), pp. 161–63.

²³ *Ricordi*, C 140, p. 153.

²⁴ *Discorsi*, I, 4, p. 138.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, I, 58, pp. 261–6.

nor was Guicciardini arguing for an oligarchy, since in his *Ricordi* he makes it quite clear that of the three main forms of government, those of the one, the few and the many, it is the second that would be worst for Florence.²⁶ Nor did Machiavelli have a more idealistic view of human nature than that of his great contemporary; indeed it is he, rather than Guicciardini, who maintains that men only do good when forced to,²⁷ and that the legislator must assume that all men are evil,²⁸ opinions roundly condemned in Chapter three of Guicciardini's *Considerazioni intorno ai Discorsi del Machiavelli*.²⁹ Where they certainly appear to differ is in their deliverances on the political aspirations of the people. The reason why Machiavelli considered that the desires of free peoples rarely constitute a threat to political freedom is that he thought that while the nobility always sought to dominate the state, most of the *popolari* sought merely not to be dominated; a prince, therefore, who takes over the government of a free people can satisfy their desire for freedom by satisfying what lies behind it in most men: the wish to live securely under good laws.³⁰ Guicciardini thought that the desires of the people were less modest, and most of his writings, from the *Storie Fiorentine* and the *Discorso di Logrogno* to the *Dialogo del Reggimento di Firenze*, are full of complaints about the role played in government, thanks to the popular constitution and the Great Council, by *popolani* with no talent for public affairs.³¹

But it is not clear how far Machiavelli would have disagreed with Guicciardini's premiss: that those with little knowledge of public affairs, or those whose experience was confined to the management of a *bottega*, should not be entrusted with the government of the state.³² In one of his famous letters to Francesco Vettori, written on 9 April, he remarked of himself that thanks to the workings of Fortune

²⁶ *Ricordi*, C 212, p. 180.

²⁷ *Discorsi*, I, 3, p. 136.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 135, possibly drawing on Thucydides: *The Discourses of Niccolò Machiavelli*, ed. and trans. L. J. Walker (London, 1975), II, p. 15.

²⁹ F. Guicciardini, *Considerazioni intorno ai Discorsi del Machiavelli sopra la 'Prima Deca' di Tito Livio*, in F. Guicciardini, *Opere*, ed. V. de Caprariis (Milan-Naples, 1961), pp. 332–3.

³⁰ *Discorsi*, I, 16, pp. 175–6.

³¹ Guicciardini, *Dialogue*, p. xxii; Butters, *Governors and Government*, p. 43.

³² F. Guicciardini, *Dialogo del Reggimento di Firenze*, in *Dialogo e Discorsi del Reggimento di Firenze*, ed. R. Palmarocchi (Bari, 1932), p. 43.

he was not competent to speak of the manufacture and sale of silk or woollen cloth, or of profits and losses, so that 'it behoves me to speak about government'.³³ And one answer that he provides to Guicciardini's complaint about the presence in government of artisans or merchants whose experience is limited to the counting house is that in republics there is always an inner oligarchy of less than forty or fifty who effectively run the state;³⁴ in other words he draws a distinction between professionals and amateurs. This comment is very similar to one that appears in Guicciardini's *Ricordi*: 'in the affairs of the world it is the few rather than the many who are the real movers, and the goals of the former are almost always different from those of the latter, so that they produce effects different from what the many desire.'³⁵

Nor did Machiavelli consider that there were no exceptions to his thesis about the desires of free peoples, for in the *Florentine Histories* he not merely admits the existence of a major counter-example to it, he makes this one of the keys to the understanding of Florentine history: the victory of the *popolo* over the magnates. By contrast with the healthy competition between patricians and plebs in republican Rome Machiavelli judged the struggle between the nobles and the *popolo* in Florence to have been extremely destructive; for while in the Roman case the plebs was merely seeking to share the honours of the state with the nobility, in the Florentine case the *popolo* was seeking to dominate the government and exclude them. The result was a damaging series of violent intestinal conflicts, the passage of legislation promoting not the common good but party interest, and the ruin of the nobility, the one social group in Florence possessed of martial virtues.³⁶ But even in the case of republican Rome Machiavelli was forced to admit that the ambition of the plebs grew to the extent that it came to exceed a simple desire not to be oppressed. When in the *Discorsi* he addresses the agrarian laws, whose baneful political consequences had been stressed by Livy,³⁷ and which

³³ N. Machiavelli, *Lettere*, in *Opere*, VI, ed. F. Gaeta (Milan, 1961), pp. 239–40; J. M. Najemy, *Between Friends. Discourses of Power and Desire in the Machiavelli-Vettori letters of 1513–1515* (Princeton, 1993), pp. 108–10. Najemy's study presents the finest analysis available of this crucial correspondence.

³⁴ *Discorsi*, I, 16, p. 176.

³⁵ *Ricordi*, C 97, pp. 138–39.

³⁶ N. Machiavelli, *Istorie fiorentine*, in *Opere*, VII, ed. F. Gaeta (Milan, 1962), III, 1, pp. 212–3.

³⁷ *The Discourses*, II, p. 67.

Machiavelli saw as the long-term cause of the fall of the Roman republic, he maintains that it was the product of the excessive ambition of the Roman plebs, 'whose struggles came to be moved by ambition, and by the desire to share with the nobility the highly ranked and the lucrative positions in government'.³⁸ He reduces the force of this contention, however, by arguing that the republic would have been destroyed far earlier by the ambition of the nobles, had not the plebs restrained them, with this law, but also by other means.³⁹

One should be wary, therefore, of exaggerating the divide between Machiavelli's and Guicciardini's views about the people and its role in government; and it is not surprising, perhaps, that while the proposals for constitutional reform that the latter put forward in the *Dialogo del Reggimento di Firenze* and those set out in the same period in Machiavelli's *Discursus Florentinarum Rerum* are not identical, there are considerable similarities between them. They are both based on the Polybian model of mixed government, which combined elements of the three forms of good rule designated by Aristotle, monarchy, aristocracy and polity, and of which Polybius saw the Roman republic as the shining example.⁴⁰ In Guicciardini's version the monarchical element is represented by the Gonfalonier of Justice, the aristocratic one by the Senate and the popular element by the Great Council, and it is the second element that has most power.⁴¹ Machiavelli's version is complicated by the fact that during their lifetime he proposed that Leo X and Cardinal Giulio de' Medici should get the Balìa to transfer full powers to them, so that for that period Florence would be a monarchy,⁴² but that they should use this authority to set up the new constitution that he envisaged, of which the principal components were to be as follows: a council of sixty-five that would sit for life and that together with a Gonfalonier of Justice sitting for life or for a period of years would replace the Signoria and the Collegi as the supreme executive;⁴³ a second council of two hundred life members, which would replace the existing legislative

³⁸ *Discorsi*, I, 37, pp. 215–6.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 218.

⁴⁰ Polybius, *Histories* VI.10.12–11.13; M. Hulliung, *Citizen Machiavelli* (Princeton, 1983), p. 140.

⁴¹ *Dialogue*, pp. xvii, xxiii.

⁴² *Discursus*, in *Arte della Guerra*, pp. 271, 275.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 269.

councils;⁴⁴ and a Great Council of a thousand or at least of six hundred citizens with wide electoral powers.⁴⁵ Even though Machiavelli bestows upon the sixteen Gonfalonieri the power of acting as a check on the deliberations of his new magistracies and councils, stipulating that one of them be present at all meetings of the newly constructed Signoria, two at all meetings of the thirty-two and eight at all meetings of the council of Two Hundred,⁴⁶ it is evident that his reform proposals, if implemented, would have given Florence a considerably more aristocratic constitution than she had had between 1494 and 1512.

When one turns from the two men's constitutional reflections to their thoughts on the conduct of government and the practice of politics there are again numerous common features to be discerned, not least their shared conviction that those who engage in these activities and put all their faith in structures, in regular, recurrent and predictable forms of behaviour and stable patterns of relationships court disaster.⁴⁷ This conviction partly stemmed from the two men's healthy respect for the role of *Fortuna*,⁴⁸ but it also reflected their view that power ultimately rests on opinion or *reputazione*,⁴⁹ their perception of the signal part played in political life by ignorance and misunderstanding, dissimulation and concealment,⁵⁰ and, finally, their grasp of the intimate relationship between domestic politics and rule on the one hand, and war and diplomacy on the other.⁵¹

Machiavelli was clearly more enamoured than Guicciardini was of ambitious structural reforms, as is made clear by their disagreements about the applicability of the Roman model; even though, as already noted, Guicciardini's objections were certainly not based on a refusal

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 270–1.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 271–2.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 272–4.

⁴⁷ Butters, *Governors and Government*, pp. 104–5; Guicciardini, *Ricordi*, C 6, p. 106.

⁴⁸ Machiavelli, *Il Principe*, XXV, pp. 98–101; Guicciardini, *Ricordi*, C 20, p. 110; C 85, p. 134.

⁴⁹ Machiavelli, *Il Principe*, XXI, p. 90; Guicciardini, *Ricordi*, B 130, p. 227; C 42, pp. 120–21; C 158, p. 160; C. 218, p. 182.

⁵⁰ H. C. Butters, 'Good government and the limitations of power in the writings of Niccolò Machiavelli', *History of Political Thought*, 7 (1986), p. 415; Machiavelli, *Il Principe*, XVIII, p. 73; *Discorsi*, II, 13, pp. 311–3; Guicciardini, *Ricordi*, B 49, pp. 200–1; C 137, p. 152; C 184, p. 169.

⁵¹ Machiavelli, *Il Principe*, XIX, p. 75; XX, pp. 85–9; F. Gilbert, *Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Politics and History in Sixteenth-Century Florence* (Princeton, 1965), pp. 294–5.

to acknowledge the existence of political and social structures. But Machiavelli was quite willing to concede that the excellence of the Roman republican constitution, the balance it achieved between the powers of the consuls, the Senate and the Tribune of the Plebs, owed much to chance;⁵² even though in the *Discorsi* he rejects the view, which he ascribes both to Plutarch and to Livy, that Rome's acquisition of an empire was principally due to Fortune rather than to virtue.⁵³ He also was a strong believer in the efficacy of swift and unexpected action, that succeeded precisely because it was not regular and predictable, and in the *Prince* he cites Julius II's seizure of Bologna in 1506 as a case in point;⁵⁴ but on the other hand he also argues that the only way always to enjoy good Fortune is to vary one's conduct to suit the times, and this is very difficult. Julius was lucky that his brand of impetuosity suited the times, for if he had been Pope in another period when a more Fabian approach was suitable, he would have been a failure.⁵⁵ Machiavelli would undoubtedly have appreciated Ulysses Grant's comment on those generals who had preceded him as commanders of the northern forces during the American Civil War: 'They all knew what Napoleon would have done. The trouble was that the rebel generals didn't know about Napoleon.'⁵⁶

But what does Machiavelli mean by 'the times', and by '*Fortuna*'? Is he not referring, in some of those examples, to attitudes and expectations? If he is, one cannot really speak of these as persistent, or structural, because his discussion of these examples shows that he believes that 'the times' are always changing. So that in Machiavelli's writings there is a clear contrast between those sets of beliefs, attitudes and behaviour that are engrained and endure, for example the patriotism and dedication to the public good so effectively fostered by the civil and military institutions and laws of republican Rome,⁵⁷ and the more short-term perceptions and reasonings that are involved in situational appreciation,⁵⁸ and which determine the

⁵² *Discorsi*, I, 2, p. 134.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, II, 1, pp. 275-9.

⁵⁴ *Il Principe*, XXV, pp. 100-1.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ A. Macintyre, 'Is a science of comparative politics possible?', in A. Macintyre, *Against the Self-Images of the Age. Essays on Ideology and Philosophy* (London, 1971), p. 274.

⁵⁷ *Discorsi*, I, 4, pp. 136-8; 11, pp. 160-3.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, III, 18, pp. 440-2.

success or failure of a given military or diplomatic strategy or measure, or even of a regime. According to Machiavelli anyone wishing to succeed in war, politics or diplomacy must at all costs discover or work out what his opponents intend to do;⁵⁹ and on the battlefield the successful general is he who not merely knows when to deploy new devices that will deceive and alarm the enemy but can also gauge when such tricks are being used against him.⁶⁰ The English scholar and critic F. R. Leavis, in one of his less intelligent moments, objected to Henry James's use of the phrase 'her vision of his vision of her vision', taking it to be characteristic of the great man's needlessly Byzantine later style;⁶¹ but the sort of complicated perception to which James was referring was a perfectly natural and familiar part of the political landscape for Machiavelli, as it was for Guicciardini.

Deception and the management of impressions also play a central role for both men in the relationship between rulers and ruled, for in many cases they thought that the latter were ignorant of, or entertained profound misconceptions about, the business of government. One of Guicciardini's *ricordi* puts this point of view with particular force:

... it is often the case that such a thick fog or such a thick wall stands between the palace and the *piazza* that, since the human eye cannot pierce it, the people has no better grasp of what the government is doing, or of the reasons why it is doing it, than it has of what is going on in India.⁶²

But Machiavelli too, although he had a higher opinion of the *popolo* than Guicciardini did, says in the *Discorsi* that most men judge more by appearances than by reality, and are more moved by them to action.⁶³ In the *Prince*, moreover, having argued that monarchs in Western Europe had to do everything to satisfy their subjects, since, by contrast with Oriental despotisms, in Western European states the people was stronger than the army,⁶⁴ he confronts his intended audience of rulers with the unpalatable fact that the people's demands conflict: on the one hand they want princes to ensure order,

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, III, 14, pp. 431–3.

⁶¹ F. R. Leavis, *The Great Tradition* (Harmondsworth, 1962), p. 184.

⁶² *Ricordi*, C 141, pp. 153–4.

⁶³ *Discorsi*, I, 25, p. 192.

⁶⁴ *Il Principe*, XIX, pp. 83–4.

external security, the impartial administration of justice and low taxation;⁶⁵ and on the other hand they want them to be models of Christian behaviour.⁶⁶ In a ruthless world princes who always act in a Christian manner will be ruined; so that Machiavelli tells them that the only way to satisfy the incompatible requirements of their subjects, which they must do in order to stay in power, is to appear always to act in a Christian manner, while being prepared when necessary to behave in a radically different fashion.⁶⁷ They will succeed in this demanding performance thanks to the fact that the people tends to judge a ruler's actions by their consequences, appraising the means he employs at their face value;⁶⁸ this selective attention is, after all, what makes them suppose that Christian morality and effective government consort together in the first place. If rulers act in this way they will survive in a dangerous world and preserve the respect and the *reputazione* so essential to the retention of power.⁶⁹ Power, therefore, for Machiavelli rests on opinion, but it often rests on opinions that are profoundly misguided.

It is reasonable to suppose that in the management of impressions, which both Guicciardini and Machiavelli judged essential to the conduct of public affairs, they saw rhetoric, in whose techniques they were both thoroughly versed, as playing an important role. After all Quintilian, who was keen in the *Institutio Oratoria* to stress the moral side of rhetoric,⁷⁰ admitted that the deployment of falsehoods was a part of it,⁷¹ and that even in a court of law it was legitimate, when dealing with a stupid judge, to play upon his passions and trick him into following the right path;⁷² just as the arguments for a particular course of action that one would deploy if facing an audience of philosophers are not those one deploys in popular assemblies, the bulk of whose members are less well educated.⁷³ But while both men undoubtedly assign an important role to rhetoric, and employed it themselves in their writings, they both saw its limitations. In the

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, XVI, p. 66; XVII, p. 69; XIX, pp. 75, 77–8.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, XV, p. 65.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, XVIII, p. 73.

⁶⁸ Butters, 'Good government', p. 415.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria* 2.20.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 2.17.18–22.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 2.17.27–8.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 2.17.28–9.

Prince it is clear that while Machiavelli thought that the people could be deceived about the means a ruler employed to obtain his objectives, they could not be deceived about the consequences of his policies: a man whose daughter has been raped or whose property has been ravaged by enemy soldiers will not be persuaded, even by a master of the rhetorical art, that his prince is providing effective government; this was a point well understood by those who organized *chevauchées* in the Hundred Years War. Guicciardini in his *Ricordi* made an even more forceful point about the maintenance of appearances: 'Do everything that you can to appear to be good, because the beneficial effects of so doing are without number; but, since opinions without foundation do not last, it will be difficult for you to sustain for long the impression of being good, unless you really are.'⁷⁴

But Machiavelli also considered that rhetorical modes of persuasion are far less likely to be effective when the audience are themselves well versed in them: so that when in the *Florentine Histories* he says that in describing the virtues of Cosimo de' Medici he will be following the model laid down by those who write the lives of princes,⁷⁵ he is warning his more penetrating readers to expect a collection of panegyric *topoi* that they need not take too seriously. He may have been acquainted, and Guicciardini, the papal governor, almost certainly was, with one of the duties of Roman Proconsuls that Ulpian prescribed in his book on the subject, and that was preserved for posterity in the *Digest*. According to the great Roman jurist, a Proconsul who arrived in an important *civitas*, or provincial capital, would find that one of his first tasks was to listen patiently and with tolerance while the praises of that city and of himself were sung. He should do this, Ulpian explained, since for the inhabitants this was a matter of honour.⁷⁶ Why would Ulpian have bothered to advert to this subject, and why would Justinian's legal commissioners have bothered to reproduce his remarks, if Proconsuls had always behaved impeccably on such occasions? Is it not more likely that numerous Proconsuls, finding themselves in such circumstances, had shown themselves unable to conceal their boredom, responding to

⁷⁴ *Ricordi*, C 44, p. 121.

⁷⁵ H. C. Butters, 'Lorenzo and Machiavelli', in *Lorenzo the Magnificent. Culture and Politics*, ed. M. E. Mallett and N. Mann (London, 1996), p. 278.

⁷⁶ *Digest* 1.16.7.

praise of the city in question or of themselves by yawning, or by exhibiting other forms of distraction?

The writings of both Machiavelli and Guicciardini indicate clearly that their analyses of political life were based on a distinction between those who really understood what was going on, and those who did not, a difference that one might almost describe as one between the *furbi* and the *fessi*.⁷⁷ But for all the similarities between the views of the two men, one cannot ignore one basic difference between them: Machiavelli was most interested in the question why do the people obey or turn against those who govern them; Guicciardini, by contrast, was more interested in the question how far can a regime rely on the loyalty of its friends and partisans. Machiavelli was less interested in that question because for him factions and partisans were a sign of weakness and corruption, though in the extended lament about the vices of his native city that is the *Storie Fiorentine* he was forced to address it at length. After the return of the Medici to Florence in 1512 Guicciardini, whose political career benefited considerably from that event, never tired of denouncing the Medici for their failure to reward their true friends adequately. Like Goro Gheri, moreover, who from 1516 to 1519 managed the business of government during the absences of Lorenzo de' Medici,⁷⁸ he regarded the committed support of *amici partigiani* as fundamental to the future survival of the regime; though in his essay *Del modo di assicurare lo stato alla casa de' Medici* of 1516 he also stressed the need to keep the *popolo* content by an impartial administration of justice and by low taxation.⁷⁹ The election of a Medici Pope, Leo X, gave the family access to patronage resources vastly greater than those enjoyed by their predecessors in the Quattrocento, and yet Guicciardini, writing in 1516, declared that their friends were far from contented. This was partly because Rome's bounty was not being used to good effect to create loyalty; but it was also because even those elected to key offices in Florence such as the *accoppiatori* were not being allowed a reasonable share of power. His case was a simple one: what was the point of being an *accoppiatore* if one could not use it to reward

⁷⁷ This distinction is drawn in N. Smart's study of corruption in modern Sicily, 'Classes, clients and corruption in Sicily', in *Corruption: Causes, Consequences and Control*, ed. M. Clarke (London, 1983), pp. 130-1.

⁷⁸ Butters, *Governors and Government*, pp. 278-307.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 274-5.

one's own friends by getting them into the Signoria, or by ensuring that they were *veduti* for the Signoria?⁸⁰ As an *accoppiatore* remarked in March 1515, this was their *salario*.⁸¹ But this raises an issue that Guicciardini did not fully explore: what of those citizens who owed their primary loyalty not to the Medici, but to the friends of the Medici? He may not have explored it, but he was aware of it; and this may in part explain why in one of his *Ricordi* he came to question the soundness of relying confidently on the loyalty of those to whom one has dispensed patronage:

Nothing is more ephemeral than the memory of benefits that have been received; put more trust, therefore, in those who are so placed that they cannot fail you, than in those whom you have benefited, because in many cases the latter forget what you have done for them, or assume that the advantages in question are less than they really are, or conclude that you had no choice but to bestow them.⁸²

King Henry III of England, whose favourite motto was 'He who does not give what he has, will not get what he wants',⁸³ might have been surprised; but then he was a monarch who in the course of his reign had to accustom himself to unpleasant surprises.

If the considerations advanced in this essay are just, it may be concluded that the political views of Machiavelli and Guicciardini had more in common than is usually supposed, and that while in their view of political life political structures had a role to play, it was a strictly limited one. This was just as well for them, for after 1530 a fundamental conviction shared by both men was shown to be totally false: that Florence was a city best suited to a republican form of government. Whatever conclusion one reaches about the extent of the debt owed by political science or political sociology to their writings, it is probable that the two great Florentines would have had a good deal of sympathy for one modern approach to the study of political life that is well captured in the remarks that follow, and that self-consciously distinguishes itself from those two disciplines:

⁸⁰ Guicciardini, *Dialogo e Discorsi*, pp. 271–2.

⁸¹ Butters, *Governors and Government*, p. 258.

⁸² Guicciardini, *Ricordi*, C 24, p. 113.

⁸³ R. W. Southern, *Western Society and the Church in the Middle Ages* (Harmondsworth, 1972), p. 112.

It is easy for the mind to grasp the idea of a structure of politics, without questioning the implications and the conventional wisdom enshrined in the phrase. It seems (but is not) obvious that the political arrangements of a society exist in ascending tiers which connect the greatest in the land to the least. If this assumption (for it is no more) about mutual interaction through a great chain of being is taken as the basis of political society, then academic explanation becomes easy. For, on this view, what can be formally described constitutes a real system of relationships. Against this approach, historical investigation of the structure of politics suggests that, at least in a parliamentary system where high politics is an arcane and esoteric craft whose meaning is not even intelligible to many members of the cabinet, the idea of a 'structure' is an unhelpful metaphor drawn from Meccano and fluid dynamics. It is also untrue, in that it implies that different areas of political activity are united by sharing in a common system of information and mutual response, rather than separated by concealment, dissimulation, and mutual inattention. The presentation of political practice as aspects of a connected wholeness is a dogma to be questioned.⁸⁴

⁸⁴ A. B. Cooke and J. Vincent, *The Governing Passion: Cabinet Government and Party Politics in Britain 1885-86* (Brighton, 1974), p. 161.

THE PAPACY AND THE EUROPEAN POWERS

Christine Shaw

The period of the Italian Wars has long been recognized as one of critical importance in the history of the papacy, one in which challenges to the authority of the popes, and their responses to those challenges, profoundly affected the character of the papacy, and how it was perceived throughout Europe. Such challenges and changes are not generally attributed to the Italian Wars, however, and with good reason. Some, such as the perceived domination of papal policy by temporal concerns, particularly the affairs of the Papal States and the interests of the popes' own relatives, were evident before the beginning of the wars. Conflict between the popes and the cardinals over their respective roles and responsibilities within the Church, and controversy over the function and authority of Church councils, had still not been resolved well over a century after the beginning of the schism following the Avignonese papacy. The most influential modern general interpretation of changes in the nature of papal power and authority from the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries, that by Paolo Prodi, *Il sovrano pontefice*, was concerned primarily with these long-term factors.¹ Other challenges to the papacy that developed during the period of the Italian Wars, such as those from the Protestants, cannot be seen as a consequence of them, except to the extent that the popes' role in the wars contributed to disaffection from and lack of respect for the papacy. All of these factors could contribute to shaping the papacy's relations with the European powers—quite apart from the legacy of centuries of conflict and bargaining between temporal rulers and the popes over appointments to benefices, ecclesiastical taxation and jurisdiction. Yet even with so many other factors in play, it is still possible to isolate the specific effects of the Italian Wars.²

¹ Paolo Prodi, *Il sovrano pontefice* (Bologna, 1982).

² Some recent studies that might have been expected to address this issue have proved disappointing: Thomas James Dandeleit, *Spanish Rome 1500–1700* (New Haven, 2001); Maurizio Gattoni, *Leone X e la geo-politica dello Stato pontificio (1513–1521)* (Città del Vaticano, 2000); *idem*, *Clemente VII e la geo-politica dello Stato pontificio (1523–1534)* (Città del Vaticano, 2002).

One obvious and significant effect is that the wars brought the ultramontane powers—Spain, France, the Empire and the Swiss (whose military strength made them a major European power at this time), and to a lesser degree England—into much closer contact with the papacy as a temporal power, and with the pope as an Italian prince. This aspect of papal power often overshadowed that of the pope as head of the Church, even when formal respect was being paid to the peculiar dual nature of the papal monarch. There was an increased awareness of the popes as individuals, and as family men, that the characters and personal interests of each pontiff had to be taken into account in dealings with them. Unlike the concordats that regulated relations with the papacy in ecclesiastical matters, the diplomatic and military alliances agreed with the popes in the bewildering tergiversations of relations among the European powers during the Italian Wars usually did not remain in force after the death of a pope and had to be renegotiated—and not just because alliances frequently contained clauses concerning the personal interests of a pope to which his successor would be at best indifferent and at worst hostile. The Italian Wars brought to the ultramontane powers full realization of the extent to which the popes were preoccupied by temporal and specifically Italian affairs. They had been aware of this before, of course, to differing degrees. French and Iberian monarchs in particular had been dealing with the papacy over the affairs of the southern kingdoms of Italy for centuries. More recently, Louis XI and Ferdinand of Aragon had been invited to act as arbiters and mediators among the Italian states in conflicts involving the papacy, the Pazzi War and the Neapolitan Barons' War. But just as the nature of the involvement of France, Spain and the Emperor in Italian affairs changed, so the nature of their relations with the papacy as a temporal power changed.

With the contest for possession of the kingdom of Naples one of the main aspects of the wars, the powers contending for it were bound to seek the alliance of the pope, because of the rights claimed by the papacy. Theoretically, the kingdom was a papal fief, and the popes asserted the right to confirm the ruler, if not to choose him. It was, of course, the papacy that had brought the Angevin dynasty to the kingdom in the thirteenth century, but in general it was not the popes who determined who would rule the kingdom—that was usually determined by the customs of inheritance or the fortunes of war. Nevertheless, papal recognition of the right to the throne was

desirable, even at the cost of an annual census in recognition of papal overlordship. Whoever ruled the kingdom also had to deal with the pope as a temporal ruler, as a neighbour; the entire northern frontier of the kingdom bordered the Papal States. Relations between the popes and the kings of Naples had often been difficult, and kings had threatened, even occupied Rome (as Ladislas had done in 1408). The city of Rome was within a few days march of the border, and could be reached quite easily by an army from Naples, particularly if some of the Roman barons whose estates lay between the Neapolitan border and Rome were on the side of the king rather than that of the pope. The French or Spanish kings were prepared to use the Roman barons to put pressure on the popes, just as earlier kings of Naples had. Some Roman barons held lands in the kingdom of Naples as well, and the king was as much their sovereign, with a claim on their loyalty, as the pope was. Such divided loyalties and obligations had significant consequences for the relations between the pope and the king of Naples, when a family as powerful as the Colonna were involved.³

For centuries, the kings who had ruled Naples and had had to deal with the popes as overlords and as neighbours had come from foreign dynasties—the Normans, Hohenstaufen, Angevin and Aragonese. How did the Italian Wars change this relationship? What was new was the permanent incorporation of the kingdom into a larger complex of states, with a non-resident monarch. The Hohenstaufen Emperor Frederick II had based himself in his southern kingdoms, not in the German lands of the Empire. The Angevins were a cadet branch of the French royal house, and the Angevins of Naples became an Italian dynasty: when the Angevins of Durazzo who ruled Hungary claimed the throne, the link of Naples with the kingdom of Hungary was soon broken. When Alfonso of Aragon conquered the kingdom he settled there, fitted with ease into the Italian political system and left Naples to his illegitimate son Ferrante, severing the connection of his Italian kingdom with his Iberian realms. This pattern changed in the Italian Wars. In 1494, the French king who had inherited the claims of the Angevins, Charles VIII, came in person to conquer

³ Christine Shaw, 'The Roman barons and the security of the Papal States', in Mario Del Treppo (ed.), *Condottieri e uomini d'arme nell'Italia del Rinascimento* (Naples, 2001), pp. 311–25.

the kingdom, but left after only a few months, never to return. Louis XII and Francis I sent armies to try to recover Naples, but never came themselves. Ferdinand of Aragon only visited the kingdom for a few months in 1506–7, years after it had been conquered for him, and his heir Charles V passed through it once in 1535–6. Even if the popes (and others) still regarded the question of who should rule Naples as an open one during the Italian Wars, in practice they now had to deal with viceroys, not resident monarchs, in the kingdom, representatives of monarchs for whom Naples was only one of their concerns. The Spanish viceroys, conscious of the power and prestige of the king they represented were, if anything, less respectful of the popes, less tolerant of papal intervention in the affairs of the Neapolitan church, let alone pretensions to intervene in the affairs of the kingdom as overlord, than the resident monarchs had been. As Naples came firmly and, as it turned out, permanently under the dominion of the Spanish monarchy, the pope became for the kings of Spain, from one perspective, a neighbouring, weaker, from time to time troublesome, temporal ruler.

From 1519 to 1555, the king of Spain was also the emperor, Charles V. During the prolonged efforts to secure the election of Charles as King of the Romans, which began before Maximilian died, it was regarded as axiomatic that the pope would not want to have an emperor as king of Naples. That the emperor could not be king of Naples—and the bull of Pope Clement IV prohibiting this could be adduced in support of the argument—was one of the factors that made Francis I confident that Leo would help him block Charles's election, if not actually assist him to become King of the Romans himself.⁴ Leo, however, was not only prepared to face the possibility of Charles being elected, but also to consider releasing him from the obligation to renounce the kingdom of Naples if he became King of the Romans; a bull was drawn up by November 1518 but held back, because Leo wanted something in return for this concession. When, in early 1519, Leo began actively to lobby against Charles's election, Charles sent to Rome to remind the pope of his promise.⁵ Leo did make an agreement with Charles's envoy

⁴ Francesco Nitti, *Leone X e la sua politica secondo documenti e carteggi inediti* (Florence, 1892), p. 125.

⁵ M. Le Glay, *Négociations diplomatiques entre la France et l'Autriche durant les trente premières années du XVI^e siècle*, 2 vols (Paris, 1845), II, pp. 432–3, 435–6 (20 Apr. 1519).

Carroz, permitting him to negotiate his election as King of the Romans 'even though he holds the kingdom of Naples in fief from the Holy See'.⁶ But Charles did not ratify the terms his envoy had agreed, which included the acceptance of the prohibition in the bull of Clement IV of the king of Naples holding Lombardy or Tuscany, and the renunciation of Imperial claims to rights or jurisdiction over Florence.⁷ Once Charles was elected, Leo still had the bargaining chip of the pope's power to grant the investiture of the Kingdom of Naples. When he was negotiating a French alliance in September 1519, he was asked to agree not to grant this investiture without the consent of Francis I.⁸ It was understood at the French court that having the king of France as ruler of the kingdom of Naples would not be any more desirable to the pope than the emperor was, because he would simply be too powerful, but, it was argued, the pope 'should not tolerate an emperor having it, if he does not want to be treated like a chaplain'. If Francis sent an expedition to conquer Naples, he would be willing for a third party, agreed by himself and the pope, to be given the kingdom.⁹

At the time Francis was making this suggestion, he held the duchy of Milan. Before he conquered it, Cardinal Giulio de' Medici was already contemplating the threatening prospect that 'the Church . . . and the rest of Italy' should be 'enclosed between two powerful states, such as the kingdom of Naples and the duchy of Milan, in the hands of just one prince'.¹⁰ The rationale for the long-standing prohibition of any emperor becoming king of Naples was based on the rights he claimed in northern Italy, rights that the power of the Spanish monarchies enabled Charles V to assert and exploit. For the popes, the fate of the duchy of Milan was as great a concern as that of the kingdom of Naples. Attempts to prevent the same prince holding both states by invoking powers to impose conditions on the investiture of the kingdom of Naples had no prospect of success.¹¹

⁶ Francesco Nitti, 'Documenti ed osservazioni riguardanti la politica di Leone X', *Archivio della R. Società romana di storia patria*, 16 (1893), doc. IV, p. 219 (17 June 1519).

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 220–2.

⁸ Nitti, *Leone X*, p. 256.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 344.

¹⁰ Nitti, 'Documenti', doc. II, p. 213 (20 Aug. 1515).

¹¹ For example, *Calendar of Letters, Despatches and State Papers, relating to the Negotiations between England and Spain* (henceforth *CalSPSP*), III, part 1, p. 411 (30 Oct. 1525).

The only effective way for the popes to influence the fate of the duchy was by taking part in leagues and military campaigns, as one of the combatants in the Italian Wars. All Italy, Julius II declared, would prefer having a duke who was just Duke of Milan, and not a major power.¹² Julius was a member of the league that drove the French from Milan and installed Maximilian Sforza as duke in 1512; Leo allied with Charles V to drive the French from Milan in 1522 and proclaim Francesco II Sforza duke. When Charles V seemed to be ready to take the duchy from Francesco and rule it himself in 1525, Clement openly expressed his fear at the prospect. If Charles wished to rule Milan himself, it would be tantamount to declaring his wish to become the ruler of all Italy, the pope said; he might become the arbiter of Italy, but only with the consent and co-operation of the Italian powers. If Francesco Sforza had been guilty of conspiring against Charles, then Charles should nominate a replacement duke, to quiet fears that he was seeking to increase his own power.¹³ The Milanese affair, he warned the emperor, had given a pretext to Charles's enemies to league together against him for their common defence. As pope, and as an Italian prince, Clement was bound to do all he could to try to save Italy from servitude and oppression.¹⁴

Such declarations of principle were not mere rhetoric, and concern that the threat of the encirclement of the Papal States by the domains of one powerful ruler, with the consequent threat to the independence of the papacy, might be realized was genuine. Nevertheless, the popes had a more direct interest in the outcome of the contest for the duchy of Milan: to hold on to Parma and Piacenza. The Italian Wars provided the popes with opportunities to expand their temporal dominions—although they claimed merely to be recovering territories that rightfully belonged to the church—and the European powers had to bring these questions into their calculations when dealing with the popes.

Julius II took Parma and Piacenza in 1512, when the French were being pushed out of the duchy: he had been saying two years earlier that he wanted them, although what rights the papacy had to

¹² Cambridge University Library, MS Add. 4761, ff. 163–4; Beltrando Costabili to Alfonso d'Este, 30 June 1507, Rome.

¹³ *CalSPSp*, III, part 1, pp. 453, 489–90, 500 (12, 23, 30 Nov. 1525).

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 530 (16 Dec. 1525).

the cities was by no means clear.¹⁵ Control of the cities was briefly lost after the death of Julius, before being recovered by Leo X in May 1513. Leo was forced to cede them to Francis I after the king conquered the duchy of Milan in 1515, but was not reconciled to their loss, and took them back when he joined Charles V in attacking the French in Milan in 1521. Charles confidently expected Adrian VI—his former tutor—to restore the cities to the duchy of Milan. Adrian objected to Imperial troops being sent to Parma and Piacenza, but he was told by the emperor that he was mistaken if he believed that they belonged to the Church.¹⁶ Adrian refused to admit this and held on to Parma and Piacenza, as did Clement VII, despite Charles V's insistence they were Imperial territories and belonged to the duchy of Milan.

It was not only Parma and Piacenza that were claimed by both pope and emperor—the status of Reggio and Modena was also in dispute. These cities were imperial fiefs, held by the duke of Ferrara, but claimed by successive popes from Julius to Clement as they engaged in a bitter dispute with Alfonso d'Este, Duke of Ferrara.¹⁷ Modena was occupied by Julius II's troops in August 1510, but handed over to Maximilian in January 1511, when the pope feared it might fall to the French.¹⁸ Reggio was taken for the Church with Parma and Piacenza in 1512, and Julius wanted to claim Modena back too, but it was Leo who recovered it for the papacy, paying Maximilian 40,000 ducats for it in June 1514.¹⁹ Adrian was reported to be ready to sell Modena and Reggio to the duke of Ferrara in October 1522, but the Imperial envoy protested, on the grounds that they belonged to the Empire.²⁰ To the chagrin of the emperor and his envoys, Adrian adopted the position of the curia, maintaining any documents Charles could produce to prove his authority over Modena and Reggio could be matched by documents of even greater authority

¹⁵ For the ambiguities concerning Julius's claims to Parma, see Umberto Benassi, *Storia della Città di Parma*, 3 vols (repr. Bologna, 1971; original edn Parma, 1899–1906), I, vol. II, pp. 1–15; the basis of the claims was not referred to explicitly in the documents concerning the submission of Parma: *ibid.*, pp. 199–211, 219–28.

¹⁶ M. Gachard (ed.), *Correspondance de Charles-Quint et d'Adrian VI* (Brussels, 1859), pp. 133–6 (21 Nov. 1522); *CalSPSp*, II, p. 484 (? Sept. 1522).

¹⁷ Christine Shaw, *Julius II: The Warrior Pope* (Oxford, 1993), pp. 255–61.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 261, 272–3.

¹⁹ Ludwig Pastor, *Geschichte der Päpste seit dem Ausgang des Mittelalters*, IV, part 1 (4th edn: Freiburg im Breisgau, 1906), p. 70.

²⁰ *CalSPSp*, II, p. 487 (8 Oct. 1522).

proving the Church's rights. Authentic documents preserved in Rome also proved that Parma and Piacenza had belonged to the states of the Church since before the time of Charlemagne, he claimed.²¹ It was beside the point to adduce title deeds from the time of Charlemagne, was the brusque reply from the Imperial court; what counted was more recent agreements between Leo and Charles, 'and when we begin to discuss the ancient titles of the Church and the Empire, it would be a matter of great consequence, which it would not be to the advantage of the Church or Christendom to go into now'.²²

Reggio was taken by Alfonso d'Este during the *sede vacante* following Adrian's death; the question of its restitution became a point of honour for Clement. Until the pope had had satisfaction from Charles in this matter, the Imperial ambassador warned in July 1525, no other business, even the most trivial, would be settled.²³ After the sack of Rome, Modena too was lost to Clement, surrendered to the Imperial armies, with Parma and Piacenza. Despite desperate diplomatic efforts by Clement, in December 1530 Charles declared Modena and Reggio, as Imperial fiefs, should be held by Alfonso; and there was nothing Clement could do, other than protest.

In claiming Modena and Reggio, the popes had as little legal or moral grounds to rely on as they had in claiming Parma and Piacenza. Modena and Reggio were known to be Imperial fiefs. To the popes, Alfonso d'Este was a disobedient papal vassal, but the fact that he was a papal vassal for Ferrara did not give the popes rights over the Imperial fiefs that he held. One of the most important consequences of the Italian Wars was the renewed significance of imperial claims to suzerainty over much of northern and central Italy—but the debate between pope and emperor over the status of Modena and Reggio could not be conducted on an elevated level of principle about the relative eminence of the supreme temporal and spiritual power. The popes found themselves engaged in the kind of arguments over protection and favour extended by temporal powers to those the popes regarded as their disobedient vassals, that they had had repeatedly with the Italian powers over the vicars of the Romagna, for example. At times, they had to fall back on the plea that the emperor, or the king of France, should not value the friend-

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 531–2 (2 Mar. 1523).

²² Gachard (ed.), *Correspondance*, pp. 183–4.

²³ *CalSPSp*, III, part 1, pp. 237–8 (12 July 1525).

ship of a duke of Ferrara over that of the pope.²⁴ The measured advice of Charles's confessor, Cardinal de Loaysa (who urged Charles to value the alliance of the pope), was that if any measure of discretion was left to him in coming to his decision between the claims of the pope and the duke of Ferrara, after giving due weight to the demands of justice, he should favour the pope.²⁵

The attitudes adopted by the ultramontane powers to the popes, the language in which they addressed them, the kinds of pressure they sought to apply, the kinds of inducements they offered, came to resemble those of the Italian powers in their dealings with the papacy. Immediately after Julius II was elected, for example, Cardinal d'Amboise advocated that the papal city of Bologna should join in a league of mutual defence with Florence, Siena and Lucca,²⁶ and predicted that Julius would give papal lands to his family, as Alexander VI had done.²⁷ Louis XII declared his intention of bringing all the *signori* of the Romagna under his own protection.²⁸ When Louis suspected that Julius was intriguing against him in Genoa, he threatened to stir up trouble for him in the Papal States. One letter would be all that was required to rouse Bologna against the pope, he boasted in February 1507.²⁹ Julius, he said, would do well to attend to his own affairs, and not interfere in those of other people.³⁰ Although Ferdinand of Aragon was happy to strike the pose of defender of the Holy See against Louis and his schismatic council of Pisa-Milan, and wanted the pope to use his spiritual weapons against their mutual enemies, he also clearly saw him as an Italian prince, one to be won over by promises of Modena, Reggio and the duchy of Ferrara, or the offer of marriages and estates for his relatives.³¹ As king of Naples,

²⁴ Nitti, *Leone X*, p. 257; *CalSPSp*, III, part 1, p. 434 (5 Nov. 1525).

²⁵ G. Heine (ed.), *Briefe an Kaiser Karl V. geschrieben von seinem Beichwater in den Jahren 1530–32* (Berlin, 1848), p. 411 (26 Feb. 1531).

²⁶ Sanuto, *I diarii*, V, col. 291 (5 Nov. 1503).

²⁷ *Ibid.*, col. 634 (27 Dec. 1503).

²⁸ ASMan, AGonzaga, b. 629, c. 645: Gio. d'Adria to Francesco Gonzaga, 13 Nov. 1503, Lyons. For the approach adopted by Louis XII to the "protection" of Italian states, see Christine Shaw, 'The role of Milan in the Italian state system under Louis XII', in Letizia Arcangeli (ed.), *Milano e Luigi XII. Ricerche sul primo dominio francese in Lombardia (1499–1512)* (Milan, 2002), pp. 25–37.

²⁹ A. Desjardins and G. Canestrini (eds), *Négociations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane*, 6 vols (Paris, 1859–86), II, p. 220 (16 Feb. 1507).

³⁰ Federico Seneca, *Venezia e Papa Giulio II* (Padua, 1962), pp. 185–6 (2 Mar. 1507).

³¹ See, for example, *CalSPSp*, II, pp. 149–50 (? Sept. 1513).

he had a long list of disputes and grievances with Julius in particular, over benefices, ecclesiastical taxes and especially over the delay in granting him investiture with the kingdom. He would not make any league with Julius until he received investiture with the kingdom, he warned in May 1510; Ferdinand could have the investiture if he gave Julius Spanish troops to use against Ferrara, was the response.³² That was indeed the *quid pro quo* for which investiture was granted; the bull was only to be handed over when the troops finally arrived.³³

For the European powers involved in the Italian Wars, the image of the pope as an Italian prince became much more prominent, unavoidably so for the French, the Spanish, the emperor and the Swiss (as the dominant power in Milan after the expulsion of the French in 1512), confronted as they were with papal insistence on the priority of defence of the Papal States in their political calculations, and with papal ambitions for territorial expansion. Even the English, though never directly involved in the Italian Wars, came to recognize the prominence of territorial considerations in papal policies. English envoys in Rome were instructed to work with the Venetians—valuable trading partners rather than military allies for the English—to defend them against the hostility of Julius II.³⁴ Henry VIII and Wolsey explicitly linked the prospect of support for Clement in Italy with papal consent for the king's longed-for divorce. Why should he ask the French king to put pressure on Venice to restore Cervia and Ravenna (occupied by the Venetians after the Sack of Rome) and the lands of the duke of Ferrara that they held and the pope claimed, if he did not receive the response he wanted about the divorce, Henry enquired when he was asked to intervene on behalf of the pope.³⁵

How could the European powers avoid treating the pope as an Italian prince, when the popes they were dealing with during this period were Alexander VI, whose ambitions for his children shaped his dealings with all the powers; Julius II, who from the first days of his pontificate based his consideration of his relations with the

³² Baron de Terrateig, *Política en Italia del Rey Católico 1507–1516: correspondencia inédita con el Embajador Vich*, 2 vols (Madrid, 1963), II, pp. 119–21 (13 May 1510); Sanuto, *I diarii*, X, col. 539 (4 June 1510).

³³ Terrateig, *Política en Italia*, II, p. 147 (2 Nov. 1510).

³⁴ D. S. Chambers, *Cardinal Bainbridge in the Court of Rome 1509 to 1514* (Oxford, 1965), pp. 22–3.

³⁵ Stephan Ehses, *Römische Dokumente zur Geschichte der Ehescheidung Heinrichs VIII. von England 1527–1534* (Paderborn, 1893), p. 53 (26 Oct. 1528).

European powers on whether they would help him recover papal lands held by the Venetians, and later became focused, almost obsessively, on Bologna and Ferrara; and Leo X and Clement VII, whose territorial concerns embraced not only the Papal States, but Florence? Those negotiating with Leo or Clement were left in no doubt about the importance they attached to the affairs of their family and their native city. The pope, wrote Cardinal Giulio de' Medici, the future Clement VII, of his cousin Leo X, 'attaches such importance to his homeland and his family' ('stima tanto la patria et la famiglia sua'), that for the sake of his honour, his peace of mind, for security and to deprive those who want to cause trouble of the opportunity to do so, no treaty could be made by the pope (in this case with the Swiss) that did not specifically include them.³⁶

With Italy at the heart of the conflict among the major European powers, and with awareness of the pope as an Italian prince colouring the attitudes of the powers to the papacy, it was difficult, if not impossible, for them to accept the pope in the guise of disinterested arbiter between them, as their spiritual father with a benevolent concern for general peace.³⁷ Popes, particularly at the beginning of their pontificates, might declare that this was the role that befitted their office, and the role they wished to assume,³⁸ but such declarations seem to have been treated by the secular powers as merely conventional, an ideal to which they might pay lipservice as the pope did, but not one that would have any practical import. The terms of the treaty between Maximilian, Charles (and, nominally, his mother Juana), and Henry VIII, concluded in late 1516, encapsulate the attitude that the temporal powers adopted towards the pope in diplomacy. As the allies hoped Leo would join them, it was stated, the papacy had been included in the terms as a principal member, the head and governor of the league; he was given six months to accept this offer. It was expected that he would assume the duties of an ally, contributing in proportion to the resources of his state, and that he would use his spiritual weapons. He would be under an obligation

³⁶ Caspar Wirz (ed.), *Akten über die diplomatischen Beziehungen der römischen Curie zu der Schweiz 1512–1552* (Basel, 1895), p. 107 (3 June 1516).

³⁷ Christine Shaw, 'The papal court as a centre of diplomacy from the Peace of Lodi to the Council of Trent', in Florence Alazard and Frank La Brasca, *La Papauté à la Renaissance: réformes—représentations—pouvoirs* (forthcoming).

³⁸ *Letters and Papers Foreign and Domestic of the Reign of Henry VIII*, 2nd edn, I, part 2, pp. 922–3 (June 1513).

not to absolve any enemy of the league from spiritual censures, excommunication or interdict, without the prior consent of all the allies. The spiritual armoury of the pope was seen as a resource on which his allies could call, and one over which they should have some control, like the ecclesiastical taxes that secular rulers wanted to share with the pope.

Even remaining neutral, without assuming an active role as arbiter, was a difficult position for the pope to maintain. When Henry VIII advised Leo to remain neutral (according to Leo), the pope replied that the king could remain neutral if he wished, as his realm was surrounded by sea, but the Papal States were not an island.³⁹ Those European rulers with a more personal stake in the outcome of the Italian Wars were apt to regard the expression of a desire to be neutral as a diplomatic snub from the pope, and to suspect it covered negotiations with their opponents. The pope who most genuinely saw neutrality as his duty in this period, Adrian VI, was regarded as the most suspect of all. It was generally assumed that he would be Charles's man; and Charles and his envoys found Adrian's neutrality hard to credit. He could not understand why the pope would not enter into a defensive alliance with him; Adrian was mistaken if he believed that by remaining neutral he would ensure the liberty of Italy and the peace of Christendom. The king of France would become still more haughty and demanding, and was contemplating another invasion of Italy; if he was successful, the pope would lose Parma and Piacenza, and probably Bologna and other places as well, Charles warned.⁴⁰

It did not take long for the European powers to become accustomed to offering bargains over territorial claims or benefits for the pope's family in order to win the alliance of the papacy. In what ways, how widely and how rapidly, awareness of the pope as a temporal ruler spread beyond the circle of those directly engaged in dealing with them and their representatives would be interesting to trace, if it could be done. Evidence from a study of French historians writing during the reigns of Charles VIII and Louis XII indicates that disillusion could set in quickly. By the time of Louis, whose divorce from Jeanne, daughter of Louis XI, had to be paid for by

³⁹ *CalSPSp*, II, p. 343 (3 Apr. 1521).

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 522–3 (10 Jan. 1523); cf. Charles's letter to Adrian of the same date (Gachard, *Correspondance*, pp. 144–51).

finding a marriage and lands for Cesare Borgia, and whose investiture with the kingdom of Naples had to be paid for by further grants to Cesare of offices there, a more cynical attitude to the papacy was setting in, aided no doubt by the spectacle of the pope's son progressing to the royal court with his splendid retinue. Julius II was seen as obstructing the historic mission of the French kings to win glory and extend their dominions.⁴¹ As Cardinal Giuliano della Rovere, Julius had been well-known at the French court, which did not inspire reverence for him as pope. Louis described him as the son of a peasant, who needed to be beaten to make him behave.⁴² The Medici popes were less well-known as individuals at the French court, despite their family's long-standing connections with France. If Lorenzo di Piero di Cosimo in particular had been known as a political figure, in French eyes the Medici (like other Florentines) were still primarily merchants.⁴³ Adrian VI could not shake off the image of the tutor of Charles V; no matter how pious or well-intentioned he might be, his frugality and inability to adopt the mien of a prince provoked disdain. Few were more scathing than Charles's own envoys. Adrian had not known how to live properly as a cardinal, and if he behaved in the same way in Rome, he would create difficulties for himself; Charles had to come to meet him, if only to make him put his household in order, was the opinion of Lope Hurtado de Mendoza, who was sent to Adrian while he was still in Spain.⁴⁴ The pope was weak, avaricious, irresolute and unreliable, fumed Charles's envoy in Rome, Juan Manuel; he could not bring himself to render obedience to such a pope in Charles's name, so he had left that task to others.⁴⁵ Familiarity with the popes and their backgrounds did not breed respect for them or their office.

⁴¹ Patrick Gilli, 'Alexander VI et la France d'après les sources contemporaines: physionomie d'une relation diplomatique inconciliable', in M. Chiabò, S. Maddalo, M. Miglio, A. M. Oliva (eds), *Roma di fronte all'Europa al tempo di Alessandro VI* (Rome, 2001), pp. 59–76.

⁴² Desjardins and Canestrini (eds), *Négociations diplomatiques*, II, p. 220 (16 Feb. 1507).

⁴³ G. L. Moncallero (ed.), *Epistolario di Bernardo Dovizi da Bibbiena*, 2 vols (Florence, 1955, 1965), II, p. 164 (27 Nov. 1518). For the significance of business connections in shaping the relations between Leo X and France, see Götz-Rüdiger Tewes, 'Die Medici und Frankreich im Pontifikat Leos X.: Ursachen, Formen und Folgen einer Europa polarisierenden Allianz', in *idem* and Michael Rohmann, *Der Medici-Papst Leo X. und Frankreich* (2002) (Spätmittelalter und Reformation Neue Reihe, 19), pp. 11–116.

⁴⁴ *CalSPSp*, II, p. 460 (26 July 1522).

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 486–7 (8 Oct. 1522).

Yet the European powers and their representatives had to learn how to deal with the popes as individuals, needed to know about their characters, their ambitions, their fears, how best to approach them, who had influence over them, who needed to be won over or circumvented—the kind of considerations that had to be borne in mind in relations with other temporal princes, but which had not been of much significance when dealing with the papacy over ecclesiastical affairs. They had to learn how to reckon with papal nepotism, to make calculations about the advantages to be derived from offering lands, military commands, ecclesiastical benefices and spouses to relatives of the pope, balancing the short- and potential medium-term advantages to be derived from the alliance of the pope with the probability that in the long term, after the death of that pope, his relatives, certainly the laymen, would require protection if they were to maintain their position.

It was no coincidence that the period of the Italian Wars was also the period of “il gran nepotismo”, papal nepotism on the grand scale. The disturbance of the system of checks and balances among the states of Italy raised the stakes, and gave the popes greater scope in their search for endowments for their family. While no more ready than the fifteenth century Italian powers to accept that papal nephews (or sons) might be invested with the papal fief of Naples, or that they could set their sights on the new possibility of becoming duke of Milan, the European powers were prepared to agree to papal relatives being endowed with much larger estates than had been feasible before the Italian Wars. Sixtus IV’s endowment of his nephew Girolamo Riario with the Romagna towns of Forlì and Imola had been a shock to the Italian state system in the 1470s; Alexander VI was able to use French help to make his son duke of Romagna, and set a benchmark for succeeding papal *nipoti*. Provided that the pope’s ambitions did not clash with their own territorial claims, the European powers were more complaisant about what constituted a fitting endowment for a papal relative. Francis I was ready to endorse Leo’s nephew Lorenzo’s wish to have the Romagna;⁴⁶ it bordered Milan and would be under the protection of France, providing him with security after Leo’s death, he said. When Cardinal Bibbiena indi-

⁴⁶ Rosemary Devonshire Jones, ‘Lorenzo de’ Medici, duca d’Urbino “Signore” of Florence?’, in Myron P. Gilmore (ed.), *Studies on Machiavelli* (Florence, 1972), p. 314.

cated that Lorenzo also had his eyes on Siena, Francis said he had no objection.⁴⁷ Florence seemed a reasonable settlement for Clement's nephew Alessandro to Charles V, particularly if he was to be the husband of the emperor's natural daughter, Margaret. Not only could papal relatives aspire to more important territories, they could find grander spouses. An illegitimate daughter of the Aragonese king of Naples, or of the Sforza duke of Milan had been a prestigious match for the relatives of fifteenth-century popes; the illegitimate daughter of an emperor, even a legitimate son of the French king, could be the spouse of papal relatives in the first half of the sixteenth century. It is unlikely that the popes could have married their relatives into the royal families of France and Spain, if there had been no Italian dimension to the rivalry of the Habsburg and Valois dynasties.

And if the ultramontane powers had not confronted one another in Italy, would they have shown increasing interest in influencing papal elections? After the end of the conciliar crisis, no power outside Italy showed any desire to affect the outcome of a papal conclave until 1503.⁴⁸ The powerful French cardinal d'Estouteville in the mid fifteenth century had wanted to be pope, but was not backed by the French crown. One factor in the politics of the conclave of 1458 was the wish to prevent the election of a French pope, but there was no evidence that Charles VII made any direct intervention—he had just taken over Genoa, and neither the Duke of Milan nor the King of Naples wanted any increase in French influence in Italy. In 1503 Cardinal Georges d'Amboise hurried to Rome for the conclave after the death of Alexander VI because he wanted to be elected pope himself. Fears that if he were successful, the seat of the papacy might be transferred to France brought about the election of the aged Cardinal Piccolomini, to buy time. There were Spanish as well as French troops near Rome, so if Cardinal d'Amboise had been tempted to try to use the threat of force to secure his election, his colleagues could have appealed for the help of the Spanish forces. In the second conclave of 1503, Cardinal d'Amboise, recognizing that he had no chance of election himself, supported Giuliano della

⁴⁷ Moncallero (ed.), *Epistolario di Bernardo Dovizi*, II, pp. 161–2 (27 Nov. 1518).

⁴⁸ This analysis is based on the accounts of the conclaves in Pastor, *Geschichte der Päpste*, I–IV; and J. B. Sägmüller, *Die Papstwahlen und die Staaten von 1447 bis 1555 (Nikolaus V. bis Paul IV.)*. Eine kirchenrechtlich-historische Untersuchung über den Anfang des Rechts der Exclusive in der Papstwahl (Tübingen, 1890).

Rovere, who also had the support of the Spanish cardinals—which did not mean that they were acting under instructions from the Spanish monarchs.⁴⁹

When the French tried to persuade the cardinals preparing for the conclave of 1513 to wait for the arrival of those who had been involved in the schismatic council of Pisa-Milan promoted by Louis XII to undermine Julius II, the Spanish opposed this, and guaranteed the peace around Rome, so that the French could not say that the outcome of the conclave would be invalid because the cardinals had been under threat. The crucial division in that conclave was between the ‘young’ and the ‘old’ cardinals, with the young cardinals victorious in the election of Leo X. In 1522, however, the main conflict was between the supporters of Francis I and Charles V. Although Charles V’s men tried to convince Adrian that he owed his election to the emperor, the cardinals were almost as surprised as everyone outside the conclave when they realized what they had done.⁵⁰ On Giulio de’ Medici’s election as pope in November 1523, the imperial ambassador in Rome, the Duke of Sessa, described him as being entirely Charles’s man⁵¹ but the decisive support for Clement had come from his great rival Cardinal Colonna.

As with the Italian powers of the fifteenth century, the interest of the ultramontane powers in the outcome of papal elections in the sixteenth century was as much about keeping the partisans and candidates of their rivals off the papal throne as it was about trying to secure the promotion of their own candidates or supporters. The custom that developed later in the century of the French and Spanish kings having an effective veto on the election of cardinals they would not wish to see made pope, but not of being able to nominate, directly or indirectly, the man they did want, was a reflection of this. Too obvious, too forceful an attempt to influence the outcome

⁴⁹ Marco Pellegrini, ‘Il profilo politico-istituzionale del cardinalato nell’età di Alessandro VI: persistenze e novità’, in M. Chiabò *et al.* (eds), *Roma di fronte all’Europa*, pp. 196–7; a shorter (and not well-translated) version of this paper is in Gianvittorio Signorotto and Maria Antonia Visceglia (eds), *Court and Politics in Papal Rome 1492–1700* (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 8–30.

⁵⁰ Juan Manuel had suggested to the cardinals that if they should decide to elect a cardinal not present in the conclave, Cardinal Tortosa would be a suitable candidate, but he was not sure whether they might not elect a French partisan: *CalSPSp*, II, p. 386 (28 Dec. 1521).

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 591 (18 Nov. 1523).

of a papal election by one power, would have provoked challenges to the legitimacy of the election from their rivals, and perhaps the threat of a schism. After the election of Adrian VI, which looked as though it had been made at Charles V's command (although it had not), the French in Rome openly said that a new election to make another pope was needed.⁵² Months after the election, but while Adrian was still in Spain, Francis wrote to him addressing him as Cardinal Tortosa, and urging him not to follow Leo's policies, although promising he would be his obedient son,⁵³ and was reported to be consulting lawyers to gather legal opinion against him.⁵⁴ Charles advised Adrian that it would be unsafe for him to travel to Italy through France, and asked him not to receive in Spain the ambassador Francis was sending to him.⁵⁵ But he did want Adrian to go to Rome, rejecting Wolsey's suggestion that he should arrange for Adrian to stay in Spain for a while, which would, Wolsey argued, enrich Spain and enhance Charles's own authority. This would not be wise, Charles said: it would greatly disturb Italy and would ruin the Papal States, which would be to the grave detriment of the papacy and of Christendom.⁵⁶ While Clement was a virtual captive of the Imperial forces in Rome after the sack in 1527, Francis called on the cardinals to assemble at Avignon. When the king met Wolsey for talks in August 1527, they renewed this appeal to the cardinals, wanting to demonstrate to the emperor that should anything happen to Clement while he was in Charles's power, and Charles tried to create a pope to suit himself, they would have the means to create another.⁵⁷

In general, any influence the secular powers hoped to exert on conclaves had to be through the factions that divided the cardinals. These factions were varying and complex and could not simply be subsumed into partisans or enemies of France or Spain or the Emperor. The majority of cardinals in the College were Italian. Ultramontane powers lobbying for the promotion of particular men to the College, just as before the Italian Wars, were not aiming primarily to build

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 394 (11 Jan. 1522).

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 414 (17 Apr. 1522).

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 424 (26 May 1522).

⁵⁵ Gachard (ed.), *Correspondance*, p. 44 (9 Mar. 1522).

⁵⁶ *Further Supplement to Letters, Despatches and State Papers relating to the Negotiations between England and Spain Preserved in the Archives at Vienna and Elsewhere (1513–1542)*, ed. Garrett Mattingly (London, 1947), p. 42 (4 Feb. 1522), p. 53 (18 Feb. 1522).

⁵⁷ Desjardins and Canestrini (eds), *Négociations diplomatiques*, II, p. 984 (6 Aug. 1527).

up their own party among the cardinals, although they did have an eye to how many of their candidates were successful as compared with the recommendations of their rivals. Requests to the pope for cardinals' hats were made principally to satisfy the ambitions and requests for patronage of powerful or well-connected clerics. They could never hope to place enough of their own men in the College to sway its decisions; they needed to have friends and partisans among the Italian cardinals, whose secular allegiances were strongly affected by the Italian Wars and their territorial outcomes, temporary or permanent. The patterns of allegiance were not straightforward. Neapolitan cardinals, for example, could not all be relied on to be supporters of Spain or the Emperor; Cardinal Gianpietro Carafa, who would become Pope Paul IV in 1555, was only the best-known instance of a Neapolitan cardinal who was hostile to Spain. Some cardinals would be more reliable than others, some carry more weight with their colleagues than others; some might be more susceptible to have their opinions swayed by the grant of rich benefices than others. And, of course, they could always follow their consciences, could put the interests of the papacy, or the Church, before those of their secular patrons. The climate of opinion in the College as a whole could change quite quickly. A year ago, Cardinal de Loaysa told Charles V, you were among those most censured ('blasfemado') by the cardinals; now you are hailed by them as an angel from heaven. The cardinal was trying to find out which cardinals truly loved Charles; it would be useful to distribute grants among them, to some because they were poor and loyal, and to others because they were important (*valorosos*), so they might be of service in the future.⁵⁸

For an ultramontane prince to try to influence a papal election, he would need not only loyal cardinals in the conclave, and preferably an experienced ambassador with good contacts in Rome as well, but first and foremost, he would need good contingency plans. There simply would not be time to send detailed instructions to his men in Rome if he were to wait until news of the pope's death reached him. This could take several days, even weeks; the conclave could be over before instructions could reach Rome. Any favour or disfavour for this or that candidate would have had to be discreetly made known in advance. Once the cardinals were in conclave, even

⁵⁸ Heine (ed.), *Briefe an Kaiser Karl V.*, pp. 356–7 (6 July 1530).

though their theoretical seclusion was easy to breach and messages could be passed to and fro, changes in the fortunes of candidates could be swift, the play of factions unpredictable, and the decision was really up to them. The best Charles V could do, when Adrian was reported to be dying in July 1523, was to instruct the Duke of Sessa to use every effort that such an important matter called for, while having regard to the freedom of the election, and to keep alert to the possibility that the French might use force, in which case he should call on the viceroys of Naples and Sicily and the Imperial troops in Italy for help.⁵⁹

The Italian Wars also made a significant contribution to the revival of conciliarism. The dissident cardinals who accompanied Charles VIII on his invasion of Naples in 1494–5 wanted him to call a council to depose Alexander VI, and the idea of a council emerged again when Ferdinand of Aragon and Maximilian were discussing an alliance against Alexander in 1498–9.⁶⁰ The council Louis XII promoted against Julius II was justified by the king's councillors as using the pope's own spiritual weapons against him, on the grounds that nothing was so frightening to the pope as a council, and that this fear would impel him to be more ready to make peace.⁶¹ It would not have occurred to Louis to promote a general council of the Church if he had not been at war with the pope in Italy. Without the schismatic council of Pisa-Milan, there would probably have been no Fifth Lateran Council of 1512–7 to discuss reform of the church. Events in Germany rather than in Italy, however, lay behind Charles V's long insistence on the summons of the council that finally assembled at Trent in 1545.

Relations between the popes and even those European powers most immediately involved in the Italian Wars were never wholly subsumed into the diplomatic and military questions and conflicts to which the wars gave rise. However prominently the temporal and personal interests of the popes figured in relations with other states, it was never forgotten that the pope was head of the Church as well as of the Papal States. Nevertheless, because of the papacy's role in

⁵⁹ These instructions were repeated in October: Gachard (ed.), *Correspondance*, pp. 192–3 (13 July 1523), pp. 197–8 (2 Oct. 1523).

⁶⁰ Pellegrini, 'Il profilo politico-istituzionale del cardinalato', pp. 185–93.

⁶¹ Augustin Renaudet, *Le concile gallican de Pise-Milan: documents florentins (1510–1512)* (Paris, 1922), pp. 357–9 (10 Oct. 1511).

the Italian Wars, the European powers now expected the pope to behave like a temporal prince, to join alliances and wage wars. While the pope might argue that in defending and extending the Papal States, he was defending the rights and the liberty of the Church, inevitably he laid himself and the Roman Church open to criticism, whatever he did. By entering an alliance with one power, he was bound to aggrieve another; if he tried to stay neutral, he satisfied none of them. His allies would expect him to use his spiritual weapons to support their political and military aims; his enemies could accuse him of abuse of his spiritual powers, and neglect of his responsibilities as head of the Church, even turn spiritual weapons against him, as Louis XII did to Julius II, by promoting a general council of the Church. For the pope, no problem was more fraught with potential difficulties than the question of his choice of allies among the European powers. This was not a choice that he would have been expected to make, before the Italian Wars.

OCCUPATION AND FOREIGN RULE

FERDINAND THE CATHOLIC AND THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES

David Abulafia

I

A Venetian observer, producing a rough estimate that should not be taken too seriously, suggested that Ferdinand the Catholic was supposed to receive as much revenue from his three Italian kingdoms as from his four Spanish states.¹ Yet Ferdinand's role in the history of Naples, Sicily and Sardinia has been treated less often than one might think. Looking at the literature on Ferdinand the Catholic, one immediately observes that his Spanish kingdoms, and above all Castile, have taken absolute priority: Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada's *La España de los Reyes Católicos* and John Edwards' *The Spain of the Catholic Monarchs* pay no more than lip service to the fact that Ferdinand ruled three kingdoms in Italy.² Most studies of the reign of Ferdinand have concentrated heavily on the period up to 1492, when he was first of all helping his wife to assert her authority in Castile, and was then busily occupied with the conquest of Muslim Granada: thus José Ángel Sesma Muñoz' ten-year old study *Fernando de Aragón, Hispaniarum Rex*, never in fact goes beyond 1492 and is not (as its title hints) interested in his Italian possessions.³ An exception is the classic study of Jaume Vicens Vives of the role of Sicily in the political programme of John II of Aragon, *Fernando el Católico, príncipe de Aragón, rey de Sicilia*, which, however, ends with the succession of Ferdinand to the Aragonese throne.⁴ The twelve years from 1492 to 1504 have been passed over rather more rapidly than the early part of Ferdinand's reign (or reigns) in the existing literature, while the

¹ Sanuto, *I diarii*, VI, pp. 428–9.

² M. Ladero Quesada, *La España de los Reyes Católicos* (Madrid, 1999); J. H. Edwards, *The Spain of the Catholic Monarchs, 1474–1520* (Oxford, 2000).

³ A. Sesma Muñoz, *Fernando de Aragón, Hispaniarum Rex* (Saragossa, 1992).

⁴ J. Vicens Vives, *Fernando el Católico príncipe de Aragón, rey de Sicilia, 1458–1478 (Sicilia en la política de Juan II de Aragón)* (Madrid, 1952).

twelve years during which Ferdinand outlived Isabella have generally been treated as no more than a codicil, as can be seen, for example, from the brief last chapter of John Edwards' book, a mere eight pages summarily entitled 'Crisis, Death and Legacy' in a work of three hundred pages.⁵ Since this is the period in which Ferdinand asserted control over southern Italy and became heavily involved in the wider politics of the Italian peninsula one is bound to ask whether Edwards' understanding of Ferdinand's wider aims in the Mediterranean has been adequately thought through. The impression is confirmed by his subsequent shorter study *Ferdinand and Isabella*, which has a rather different approach and balance, but remains tantalisingly brief in its coverage of the period from 1504 to 1516, devoting four pages to the wars for control of Naples and a similar amount of space to Isabella's 'legacy' after 1504.⁶

Part of the difficulty has been a growing fascination, partly guided by developments in women's history, with Ferdinand's first wife.⁷ It is clear that there were areas of policy, particularly foreign policy, that he saw as his own; yet even there Isabella might sometimes appear to express herself very decisively, perhaps applying conscience rather more than her husband. She allowed him considerable freedom in the affairs of the Caribbean lands newly discovered by Columbus, but she did intervene to protect the American Indians from excessive exploitation, and was anxious to ensure they were not actually enslaved.⁸ This intervention occurred just when Ferdinand, greedy for new sources of money, was actively planning the seizure of the kingdom of Naples and (in his search for new supplies of gold) was more neglectful of the interests of the over-exploited Indians than Isabella believed permissible; it was to his Mediterranean wars that the profits from the Indies were redirected.⁹ Thus it is not

⁵ Edwards, *Spain*, pp. 282–90.

⁶ J. H. Edwards, *Ferdinand and Isabella* (Harlow, 2005), pp. 109–14, 164–8.

⁷ P. Liss, *Isabel the Queen* (New York/Oxford, 1992; new edn, Philadelphia, 2005); Tarsicio de Azcona, *Isabel la Católica: estudio crítico de su vida y su reinado* (Madrid, 1964); D. A. Boruchoff (ed.), *Isabel la Católica, queen of Castile: critical essays* (Basingstoke, 2004).

⁸ C. J. Hernando Sánchez, *Las Indias en la Monarquía Católica: imágenes e ideas políticas* (Valladolid, 1996).

⁹ M. A. Ladero Quesada, *El primer oro de América: los comienzos de la Casa de la Contratación de las Indias, 1503–1511* (Real Academia de Historia, Colección Minor, vol. 4, Madrid, 2002).

difficult to make important connections between Mediterranean and American matters. That the conquest of Naples in any case held far more attraction for Ferdinand than for his dying queen is abundantly clear; and, as we shall see, it was achieved on the basis of traditional Aragonese claims: the role of Castile was largely confined to the provision of valuable resources and manpower, notably the commander of the Spanish armies, the brilliant general Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba.

Although the emphasis here will be on the events leading up to the seizure of the kingdom of Naples by Ferdinand of Aragon, and his rule there until his death in 1516, it is also essential to take into account the relationship between the independent Aragonese kingdom of Naples and the Catholic Monarchs before 1503. The Aragonese direction of policy was accentuated after Isabella's death, when he took as his second wife another remarkable woman, Germaine de Foix.¹⁰ Before and after 1503, Ferdinand's policies were cast in the mould created by his uncle Alfonso the Magnanimous.¹¹ Clearly it is not possible here to examine all aspects of Ferdinand's Italian policies, and it has seemed best to make a ruthless selection of linked topics, including the nature of his claim to the throne of Naples, continuity in government from Ferrante I to Ferdinand the Catholic, economic policies, and finally the treatment of religious and ethnic minorities in southern Italy. No apology is needed for the fact that some attention has to be paid to the period before 1503: it will be seen that it is impossible to make sense of Ferdinand's aims without looking at the antecedents.

Earlier discussions of Ferdinand's Mediterranean policy have shared with the Castile-centred studies of his reign a number of political obsessions that have their origins in the Spanish Civil War and in assumptions about Spain's Christian identity. In the years around 1940, the idea of the Christian mission of Castile was forcefully expressed in the works of José-Maria Doussinague on the foreign

¹⁰ R. Ríos Lloret, *Germana de Foix, una mujer, una reina, una corte* (Valencia, 2003); also: R. Pinilla, *Valencia y Doña Germana* (Valencia, 1993); J. Fauli, *German de Valencia, segona muller de Ferran el Catòlic* (Barcelona, 1979); P. Català i Roca, *Ferran el Catòlic, vidu i 'catalanote'* (Barcelona, 2003).

¹¹ David Abulafia, *The Western Mediterranean Kingdoms 1200–1500: The Struggle for Dominion* (London/Harlow, 1997), pp. 237, 244; and, for the background, A. Ryder, *Alfonso the Magnanimous, King of Aragon, Naples and Sicily, 1396–1458* (Oxford, 1990).

policies of Ferdinand the Catholic, one of the few works on the reign which concentrates heavily on the early sixteenth century and which gives ample space to Italian affairs, and indeed to Ferdinand's wider ambitions as far afield as Greece and the Holy Land;¹² while the same can be said of the well-documented study of the last ten years of Ferdinand's Italian policies by the Barón de Terrateig, published in 1963. Mention might also hesitantly be made of the learned Carlist historian of law and political ideas, Francisco Elías de Tejada, who saw the Spanish occupation of the kingdom of Naples as beneficial to southern Italy precisely because it drew the area into the unique world of Christian Spanish civilisation, which was, he passionately argued, neither European nor African.¹³ His works provide a mine of references to the world of letters in Aragonese and Spanish Naples, even if his interpretation involved much wishful thinking. The views of these historians may easily be dismissed as irrelevant and outdated, were it not for the fact that Elías de Tejada still has his enthusiasts in contemporary Naples, where several volumes of his *Nápoles Hispánica* have recently appeared in Italian (admittedly under the imprint of an extreme Right-wing publishing house), and that Doussinague and his contemporaries exposed to view a rich documentation which makes their works essential places of reference.¹⁴

After several rather silent decades it is only in the last few years that serious interest in the early sixteenth-century kingdom of Naples has been revived, but even so we still lack a connected account of the kingdom under Ferdinand the Catholic. Particularly successful have been studies of the south Italian aristocracy, still in this period divided between 'Angevin' and 'Aragonese' factions, and of the role of the city of Naples itself, though invariably these studies have addressed a longer period stretching from the independent Aragonese kingdom of Naples into the Habsburg period: classic essays by

¹² J.-M. Doussinague, *La política internacional de Fernando el Católico* (Madrid, 1944).

¹³ F. Elías de Tejada y Spinola, *Nápoles hispánica*, 5 vols. (Madrid, 1958–64): 1. *La etapa aragonesa, 1442–1503*; 2. *Las décadas imperiales, 1503–1554*; these have been translated into Italian: F. Elías de Tejada, *Napoli spagnuola*, ed. Silvio Vitale (Naples, 1999–2002), 1. *La tappa aragonesa*; 2. *Le decadi imperiali*; also *Napoli e le Spagne. Atti del Convegno Francisco Elías de Tejada: Realismo giuridico e Istituzioni ispano-napoletane* (Naples, 1999).

¹⁴ Further discussion of the historiography is in David Abulafia, 'The diffusion of the Italian Renaissance: southern Italy and beyond', in J. Woolfson (ed.), *Palgrave Advances in Renaissance Historiography* (Basingstoke, 2005), pp. 27–51.

Galasso,¹⁵ Musi,¹⁶ Muto¹⁷ and d'Agostino,¹⁸ though we still await Galasso's volume on early modern Naples in the UTET *Storia d'Italia* which will without question be gigantic and encyclopædic.¹⁹ The career of *El Gran Capitán* Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba has elicited several military biographies of varying competence, concentrating heavily on tactics and on his chivalric conduct (to set against that of the contemporary French paragon, Bayard);²⁰ but it is only now that Hernando Sánchez has announced his intention of producing a well-rounded and serious study of the first viceroy.²¹ The famous defiance at Barletta (*disfida di Barletta*), already the subject of a highly imaginative novel by Massimo d'Azeglio, has also received attention on its five-hundredth anniversary.²² Yet by comparison with the growing and excellent literature appearing in Naples on the cultural life of fifteenth-century Naples and in particular the role of the court, the early sixteenth century still seems relatively poorly served; overall, then, we can see the period of the first viceroys as a black hole in the literature.

But the transformation has begun. For within this exiguous literature, special mention needs to be made of the meticulous study of the early years of Charles V's rule over Naples, by José Carlos Hernando Sánchez, *El Reino de Nápoles en el imperio de Carlos V*, half of which is in fact devoted to Ferdinand the Catholic and his legacy, making it the first connected account (though rather a selective one) of government and policy in the period 1503 to 1516; Hernando Sánchez has provided invaluable guidance on a number of points of detail in

¹⁵ G. Galasso, *En la periferia del imperio: la monarquía hispánica y el reino de Nápoles* (Barcelona, 2000), which has a slightly different focus to the original Italian collection, *Alla periferia dell'imperio: il regno di Napoli nel periodo spagnolo (secoli XVI-XVII)* (Milan, 1994).

¹⁶ See e.g. A. Musi (ed.), *Nel sistema imperiale: l'Italia spagnola* (Naples, 1994).

¹⁷ G. Muto, *Le finanze pubbliche napoletane fra riforme e restaurazione (1520-1634)* (Naples, 1990).

¹⁸ G. d'Agostino, *La capitale ambigua: Napoli dal 1458 al 1580* (Naples, 1979); *Parlamento e società nel Regno di Napoli, secoli XV-XVII* (Naples, 1979).

¹⁹ This will act as sequel to G. Galasso, *Il Regno di Napoli: il Mezzogiorno angioino e aragonese, 1266-1494* (Turin, 1992).

²⁰ J. Jacquart, *Bayard* (Paris, 1987); P. Balleguy, *Bayard 1478-1524* (Paris, 1935).

²¹ J. E. Ruiz Domènec, *El Gran Capitán: retrato de un época* (Barcelona, 2002); G. de Gaury, *The Grand Captain* (London, 1955) is just one of many works that deals in detail with the military campaigns but glosses over political aspects.

²² G. Procacci, *La disfida di Barletta tra storia e romanzo* (Milan, 2001); cf. M. d'Azeglio, *Ettore Fieramosca* (Milan, 2002 and other editions).

what follows.²³ Moreover, in a best-selling book published in 1999, Ernest Belenguer of the Universitat de Barcelona has sought to contextualise Ferdinand's Italian policies in a biography of the Catholic Monarch which, particularly in the extended Italian edition, takes fuller account of Italian affairs than its competitors, and which devotes a great deal of space to foreign policy during what he legitimately calls the 'Crisis of the Monarchy' that followed the death of Queen Isabella.²⁴ Belenguer has justly pointed out that there is a Francoist Ferdinand, a socialist Ferdinand, a liberal Ferdinand, to be found just within the Spanish historiography, and one might have expected his to be a Catalan or at least Aragonese Ferdinand; but arguably Belenguer does not go far enough in attributing to Ferdinand traditional Aragonese concerns in the conduct of his Italian and Mediterranean policies, and this is one of the themes addressed in this study. Less attention will be paid here to the relationship between Ferdinand, Naples and Rome; this has been examined very suggestively by Thomas Dandeleet, who presents Ferdinand as 'king of Naples and Rome' between 1504 and 1516, analysing Ferdinand's relations with Pope Julius II and then with the Medici pope Leo X. 'When Julius II died in 1513', he says, 'Ferdinand was without question the most accomplished and feared political figure in Europe', and he argues that Ferdinand was possibly the first Iberian ruler to understand the importance of intimate ties to the papacy, partly as a result of the acquisition of Naples (though a similar claim could surely be made for Alfonso the Magnanimous).²⁵ The Spanish presence in Rome was symbolised then, as it still is, by the church of San Pietro in Montorio, with its Tempietto by Bramante; building work at the supposed site of St Peter's crucifixion was paid for with revenues from royal churches in Sicily.²⁶

Finally, there have been some attempts to integrate the history of the Spanish possessions in Italy into that of Spain's worldwide empire; here warfare was no less important than the diplomacy the Spaniards

²³ J. C. Hernando Sánchez, *El Reino de Nápoles en el imperio de Carlos V: la consolidación de la conquista* (Madrid, 2001).

²⁴ J. E. Belenguer Cebrià, *Fernando el Católico: un monarca decisivo en las encrucijadas de su época* (also in Catalan: *Ferran el Catòlic*, both Barcelona, 1999); the Italian edition, *Ferdinando e Isabella: i re cattolici nella politica europea* (Salerno, 2001), shifts the balance more towards Italy.

²⁵ T. J. Dandeleet, *Spanish Rome, 1500–1700* (New Haven CT, 2001), pp. 31–2.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 1–3, 26, 32.

exercised in Rome, London and the German court.²⁷ Henry Kamen has stressed the importance of Ferdinand's Italian campaigns, which 'laid the foundations of Castile's military reputation'.²⁸ It was here that the greater manpower of Castile, often cited as a sufficient explanation for the supposed superiority of Castile over Aragon, really counted: in the men, hard trained for warfare after earlier years spent on the Granada front, who had the courage and skill at arms to confront and defeat often larger French forces.²⁹ Gonzalo de Córdoba symbolises this transfer of Spanish military skills from the Granadan frontier to Italy. Arms and the man were not, however, adequate in themselves. Money had to be found to fund these wars. Recent studies of the flow of gold from the Caribbean islands to Spain in Ferdinand's lifetime have confirmed that it was this that made it possible for Ferdinand to finance his Italian wars.³⁰

The relative lack of attention to this period results not simply from the way that it falls between the territory of medieval and early modern historians, or the way that it falls off the familiar Castile-centred map of Ferdinand's domains. The sources in and from Naples, which include hearth lists and other fiscal documents, a stray example of which rests among the manuscripts of the British Library,³¹ are more fragmentary than those of the Aragonese period and have not been the focus of the sort of teamwork that has produced volume after volume of Angevin and Aragonese archival materials. Giuseppe Coniglio did, however, publish a selection of *Consulte e Bilanci* twenty years ago, and this study will examine reports on the state of the kingdom of Naples which illustrate the attempt to restore the methods of government practised under King Ferrante in the late fifteenth century.³² Hernando Sánchez in fact mobilises a great deal of archival material in Madrid, and it is here and in Simancas, Valencia and other

²⁷ R. B. Wernham, *Before the Armada: The Growth of English Foreign Policy, 1485–1588* (London, 1966), pp. 33–5, 39, 45–6, 53–61, for the English dimensions to Ferdinand's diplomacy; a more recent and very valuable survey is provided by J. M. Currin, 'England's international relations 1485–1509: continuities amidst change', in S. Doran and G. Richardson, eds., *Tudor England and its Neighbours* (Basingstoke, 2005), pp. 14–43.

²⁸ H. Kamen, *Spain's Road to Empire, 1492–1763* (London, 2003), p. 27.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 24–9.

³⁰ Ladero Quesada, *El primer oro de America*.

³¹ British Library, London, MS Egerton 1905.

³² G. Coniglio, *Consulte e Bilanci del Vicereame di Napoli dal 1507 al 1533* (Fonti per la Storia d'Italia, età moderna e contemporanea, vol. 138, Rome, 1983).

Spanish archives that much more work needs to be done.³³ Moreover, now that fresh studies of several of Ferdinand's rivals in European politics have been published—lives of Louis XII by Quilliet and Baumgartner, and most recently studies of Philip the Handsome by Cauchiés and others—the task of situating Ferdinand's Italian ambitions in the wider politics of western Europe seems less daunting than in the past.³⁴

II

The first charge to be made is that the historiography has skewed our understanding of Ferdinand's policies by over-emphasizing the Castilian dimensions of Ferdinand's career. At the same time, there has been an increasing recognition that Ferdinand never seriously sought to undermine the distinctive character of the six or seven entities that made up the Crown of Aragon; indeed, he defended them from external interference, denying to Isabella the rights in Aragon that he as king-consort was able to exercise in Castile and paying attention to the distinct economic needs of the Crown of Aragon. A good example is his failure to expel the Muslims when his wife emptied Castile of Islam in 1502;³⁵ and it will be seen that there is some evidence for the promotion of trade between southern Italy and Barcelona or Valencia. No one would deny, either, that the foreign policy priorities of the years after the fall of Granada were guided by Aragonese interests: the recovery of Roussillon was pursued even if it meant leaving Charles VIII a free hand in Naples, and this itself was precursor to his studiously ambiguous policy towards the French which

³³ Andrew Devereux of Johns Hopkins University is examining Spanish and Italian sources for the relations between Ferdinand the Catholic and Naples from 1469 to 1516.

³⁴ B. Quilliet, *Louis XII, père du peuple* (Paris, 1986); F. Baumgartner, *Louis XII* (Stroud/New York, 1994); J.-M. Cauchiés, *Philippe le Beau: le dernier duc de Bourgogne* (Turnhout, 2003), also R. Pérez-Bustamante and J. M. Calderón Ortega, *Felipe I* (Colección Corona de España, serie Reyes de Castilla y León, vol. 14) (Palencia, 1995).

³⁵ M. Meyerson, *The Muslims of Valencia in the Age of Fernando and Isabel* (Berkeley, CA, 1991); cf. the rather different views of L. P. Harvey, *Muslims in Spain 1500 to 1614* (Chicago, IL, 2005), pp. 79–101, where doubts are sown concerning the willingness of Ferdinand to preserve the Muslim population of the lands of the Crown of Aragon; however, Harvey strangely fails to analyse the financial dimensions of the question.

enabled him to trick Louis XII time and again. The difficult question is where in this defence of Aragonese interests Ferdinand placed the kingdom of Naples, while it was still ruled by his cousin and, for a time, his brother-in-law, Ferrante I. There is no simple answer: Ferdinand's views and policies oscillated, in the opportunistic way Machiavelli ascribed to the king, notably in chapter 21 of *Il Principe*.³⁶ Here Ferdinand is presented as a crafty and manipulative ruler who cynically used religion to increase his power, in order to achieve the rank of the foremost prince in Christendom. Any assessment of this problem must also take properly into account his interests as king of the island of Sicily and of Sardinia, an element in the Neapolitan and wider picture that has been all but ignored, and to which justice cannot be done here.

One problem is where Naples stood in the congeries of states we know as the Crown of Aragon, both before and after 1503. Important in this setting was the question whether Catalan merchants were to be treated in Naples as privileged merchants with the same rights as native merchants, or as foreigners liable to heavier taxation. This question was all the more important because from the time of his Spanish succession Ferdinand was keen to reinvigorate the trade of Barcelona and Valencia (even though he tended to take away with one hand, as taxes, what he had given with the other). He hoped to recreate what Mario del Treppo has called the Common Market in the western Mediterranean knitted together by his uncle Alfonso the Magnanimous, who, it will be suggested, was the prime model for his policies in southern Italy and the Mediterranean. The *Libre del Consolat de Mar* printed in 1494 contains these words which refer to the kingdom of Naples, still at this point ruled by a separate Aragonese dynasty (though only just):

Que los subdits del dit regne de Sicilia e navilis e havens de aquells, sien enteses e compreses . . . axí com si fossen veretaders vassalls e subdits del dit nostre senyor e la senyoria fos una mateixa, axí com era vivint lo dit senyor rey don Alfonso.³⁷

³⁶ Machiavelli, *Il Principe*, Chap. 21.

³⁷ Cited in M. del Treppo, *I mercanti catalani e l'espansione della Corona d'Aragona nel secolo XV* (Naples, 1972), p. 605: 'that the subjects of the said kingdom of Sicily and their ships and possessions be understood and included . . . as if they were true vassals and subjects of our said lord and the lordship were one and the same, as was the case when the said lord king Alfonso was alive.'

Del Treppo argues on this basis that ‘the idea of an economic community, in the ambit of the Crown of Aragon, outlived Alfonso, and the separation of the kingdom of Naples from the Aragonese domains’.³⁸ In other words, the view from Barcelona and Valencia was that the Neapolitans were honorary subjects of King Ferdinand, members still of the Aragonese commonwealth, a view that suited both the political thinking of King Ferdinand and the economic thinking of his Iberian subjects. Important here is the sense that the time of Alfonso the Magnanimous should be used as a model.

Evidence for Ferdinand’s paternalistic concern for the Neapolitan kingdom is provided in 1480–1, during the great emergency of the Turkish occupation of Otranto. Later, in 1489, he wrote to Ferrante to express concern for the Christian Holy Places in Jerusalem as the war for Granada reached its peak, and as the king of Granada appealed for aid to the Mamluk sultan; here he spoke in the warmest terms of his affection for the king of Naples.³⁹ Of course, Ferrante was by now his brother-in-law as well as his cousin, and the language of family affection was a much-used diplomatic tool in this period. Most importantly, Ferdinand took an interest in the internal affairs of Naples during the severe crisis of the second baronial rebellion of 1485–6; and he sent aid to Naples in 1495, in the shape of Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba and his Spanish troops, though only after he had stood aside from earlier intervention, so as to benefit from the agreement with France that brought Roussillon back into the Catalan domain; no less significantly, Ferdinand exercised influence by way of his sister Juana, the queen of Naples, and his ambassadors at the Neapolitan court. With the approval of King Ferdinand, Gonzalo Fernández also acquired fiefs in southern Italy in recognition of his role as a defender of the Neapolitan house of Aragon, which in a certain sense added up to acceptance that Ferrante’s successors were legitimate kings of Naples: more of this in a moment. Hernando Sánchez suggests that this way he was able to groom the Neapolitan nobility for his more intrusive intervention in 1502–3 which culminated in the conquest of Naples.⁴⁰ A different sort of grooming was provided in May 1496 when Ferrandino (Ferrante II) conceded to the

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 605.

³⁹ Doussinague, *Política internacional*, App. I, pp. 515–17, from Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, MS 18700–35.

⁴⁰ Hernando Sánchez, *El Reino de Nápoles*, p. 54.

king of Aragon several Calabrian coastal stations, having already made similar grants of Apulian towns to Venice, in order to secure aid against his enemies.⁴¹ At this point it certainly seemed that Ferdinand recognised the legitimacy of Ferrandino's royal title. On the other hand, this set an interesting precedent for the later accord with the king of France, which conveyed rights over Calabria to Aragon.

Another, indirect, example of the relationship between the two Ferdinands is provided further north in Italy. In 1489 a Catalan pirate, Francesc Torella (Francesco Turriglia, known as Fra Carlo the Pirate) arrived with a sizeable fleet, supposedly planning the invasion of Elba, which formed part of the Appiano statelet of Piombino, under the protection of the king of Naples since the mid-fifteenth century. The king of Aragon, Ferdinand the Catholic, was aware of the crisis and was keen to intervene; Bernat de Vilamarina, the commander of the Catalan-Aragonese fleet, arrived promptly off Piombino, and a letter from the Aragonese king assured the Appiani that he would not permit any of his subjects to commit aggressive acts against the signore and his subjects. Help was duly given against Torella, whose squadron scampered away on the arrival of the official Aragonese fleet, and who left behind the goods and prisoners he had taken on Elba.⁴² We can detect several motives on the part of the king of Aragon. One was certainly to clear the waters of the Tyrrhenian Sea of pirates, because their presence was damaging to commerce and the king was anxious to kick-start the Catalan economy again after the damaging interlude of the Catalan civil war. A second motive was surely to express his own political claims in the area, against the day when he could assert his authority over the kingdom of Naples and those parts of Italy which depended in some way on Naples.

Yet on other occasions there were tensions, as when King Ferrante sought to ban the import of foreign cloths, in order to foster the local cloth trade.⁴³ More particularly, Ferdinand the Catholic did occasionally express a claim to authority in Naples, which appears to have its roots in the argument that Alfonso the Magnanimous

⁴¹ Carol Kidwell, 'Venice, the French invasion and the Apulian ports', in David Abulafia (ed.), *The French Descent into Renaissance Italy, 1494–95* (Aldershot, 1995), pp. 295–308.

⁴² Biblioteca Civica Falesiana, Piombino, MS 139, f. 88r–v.

⁴³ David Abulafia, 'The Crown and the economy under Ferrante of Naples (1458–1494)', in T. Dean, C. Wickham (eds.), *City and Countryside in Late Medieval and Early Renaissance Italy. Studies presented to Philip Jones* (London, 1990), pp. 125–46.

had not acted justly in separating the kingdom of Naples from his other dominions and conferring it on his illegitimate son; or, if he had the right to do so, the right was only to be exercised for a single generation. The controversial figure of Ferdinand's half-brother Carlos de Viana could be cited here: he had been passed over by the Neapolitan barons and others when Ferrante acquired the crown of Naples, but he was certainly not without supporters in 1458, possibly even including the mighty del Balzo-Orsini prince of Taranto.⁴⁴ These claims that succession should have passed in the legitimate line became more strident with the accession of Federigo, the younger son of Ferrante I, to the Neapolitan throne late in 1496, following the unexpected death of the young Ferrandino. At this point Ferdinand of Aragon launched a diplomatic campaign to secure the crown of Naples, sending his ambassador Garcilaso de la Vega to the pope to argue that the papacy had originally granted the kingdom of Naples to Alfonso of Aragon with the intention that it should pass down in the legitimate line of succession, like any other kingdom.⁴⁵ True, Alfonso had no legitimate sons and the illegitimate Ferrante had been granted the kingdom by Pius II, but this detracted from the rights of Ferdinand's father John II of Aragon and Navarre, and now that Ferrante was dead and Ferdinand's sister no longer queen consort it would be right to invest Ferdinand with the crown of Naples (our source is Zurita and seems credible enough). Thus Ferdinand would not acquire Naples as heir to the dynasty of King Ferrante, but as legitimate successor to Alfonso by way of his father, Alfonso's younger brother. Ferrante's rights were interpreted as rights that could, at best, be exercised for a single generation, an argument that was in no way novel in this part of the world (it had been cited in opposition to the heirs of Roger II as far back as the twelfth century).⁴⁶

This revived argument remained fully alive thereafter, even while Ferdinand was negotiating with the French over the division of the kingdom of Naples between France and Aragon, and with Pope Julius II for investiture as king of Naples; it will be necessary to return to this later. Of course, it was only one plank in a rather larger policy which depended not simply on papal investiture, but on conquest, treaties with the French and the hope of winning over the

⁴⁴ Biblioteca Gambalunghiana, Rimini, Sc-MS 4, Gaspare Broglio di Tartaglia.

⁴⁵ Hernando Sánchez, *El Reino de Nápoles*, p. 51.

⁴⁶ Abulafia, *Western Mediterranean*, pp. 10–11.

barons and cities of Naples; becoming king of Naples had always involved an ability to satisfy a number of practical conditions which were not necessarily theoretically consistent with one another. In the event, the barons and the towns gave their backing to Federigo, who conferred enough privileges to win the political support he needed, though at a high price to himself. To some extent the claim to the throne of the Neapolitan Aragonese dynasty also depended on conquest: on the view that Alfonso V had acquired the kingdom by his own efforts (though of course the history of his claim was far more complex) and that he therefore had an absolute right to pass it to his chosen beneficiary, because, as Guicciardini noted, Naples was ‘a land not belonging to Aragon’.⁴⁷ In 1501 Peter Martyr of Anghiera recorded Ferdinand’s counter-view that even his assent to the division of the kingdom did not undermine his claim to rightful authority, since the only alternative by 1500 had been either a total French occupation or, worse still, a Turkish one in league with the traitorous Federigo.⁴⁸ Meanwhile Louis XII acquired the title to the kingdom by treaty with Ferdinand and by papal grant, and Ferdinand was granted Calabria and Apulia but only as duchies (the question whether French jurisdiction extended into these lands was to be the subject of further negotiations between Aragon and France, culminating in the Treaty of Granada of November 1500). And of course Ferdinand did use this division of Naples to intrude his forces into the south of Italy, having argued that in any case Louis XII had broken the terms of the Treaty of Granada. Interestingly, a play by the humanist Morlini mounted for the Great Captain after his entry into Naples portrayed the rivalry of Protesilaus (Ferdinand) and Orestes (Louis), referring positively to old King Ferrante but passing over Ferrante’s Neapolitan successors.⁴⁹

Not surprisingly, Naples became a significant factor in Ferdinand’s wider diplomacy as the Catholic King attempted to secure his hold over the *Regno*. Ferdinand at first attempted to use his son-in-law Philip the Handsome as mediator with France, and (when they met

⁴⁷ F. Guicciardini, ‘Relación de España (1512–1513)’, in J. García Mercadal, *Viajes de extranjeros por España y Portugal* (Madrid, 1952), I, p. 583.

⁴⁸ Hernando Sánchez, *El Reino de Nápoles*, pp. 55–6 (from Peter Martyr d’Anghiera, *Epistolario*, vol. I (Madrid, 1955), p. 20).

⁴⁹ Morlini from Hernando Sánchez, pp. 55–6; Elías de Tejada, *Napoli spagnuola*, I, pp. 252–5.

in Madrid in 1502) he commissioned Philip to negotiate with Louis XII of France. At this point it was suggested that the kingdom of Naples should not remain within the orbit of the Crown of Aragon, but that it should pass to Philip's son Charles of Ghent (the future Charles V) following a marriage alliance between Charles and Louis' daughter Claude; this, it was intended, would neatly resolve the rivalry between France and Aragon for control of Naples.⁵⁰ Ferdinand did not take long to renounce the agreement Philip had negotiated; by 1505 he was hoping to exclude the Habsburgs from Spanish politics, and aimed to draw not just France but England into an alliance against Archduke Philip and Emperor Maximilian. He had already offered the widow of Ferrandino of Naples, Joanna, as a suitable bride for the widowed Henry VII following the death of Elizabeth of York in 1503.⁵¹ Such actions as these suggest that Ferdinand's flexible foreign policies were guided by some consistent obsessions: he sought the maintenance of his influence within all of Spain, eroded by the death of his male heir Juan and then of Isabella of Castile; at the same time, he was willing to dangle Naples as a lure in front of Louis of France, probably without any serious intention of relaxing his claims to, and then his control, of the Italian kingdom.⁵²

III

After his acquisition of Naples, Ferdinand the Catholic on 18 February 1505 confirmed the privileges and grants of Ferrante I while failing to confirm those of the subsequent Aragonese kings of Naples, Alfonso II, Ferrandino and Federigo (who had gone to live in France, and whose heirs were still alive as well).⁵³ The privileges of the later kings were to be reviewed by the viceroy in Naples, and any grants made after 25 June 1501 by King Federigo were to be entirely annulled:

⁵⁰ London, British Library, Department of Printed Books, Miscellaneous Public Documents, II. Single Documents, C.18.e.2.(61).

⁵¹ Currin, 'England's international relations', pp. 32–3.

⁵² David Abulafia, 'La politica italiana della monarchia francese da Carlo VIII a Francesco I', *El Reino de Nápoles y la monarquía de España: entre agregación y conquista (1485–1535)*, ed. G. Galasso and C. J. Hernando Sánchez (Madrid/Rome, 2004), pp. 517–38.

⁵³ Hernando Sánchez, *El Reino de Nápoles*, p. 46; cf. pp. 60, 64, 71; A. Cernigliaro, *Sovranità e feudo nel Regno di Napoli (1505–1557)*, 2 vols. (Naples, 1983), I, pp. 11–12.

this was the date when the pope had formally deposed Federigo from his throne, citing *inter alia* his negotiations with the Turk, but passing over the fact that at this stage Ferdinand was still ready to allow Louis XII to occupy Naples in return for the southern half of the *Regno*.⁵⁴ Unfortunately these actions were subsequently compromised by the extreme reluctance of Pope Julius II to invest Ferdinand with Naples, starting with abortive negotiations in 1504, which broke off just as it appeared that the pope was ready to recognise both Ferdinand and Isabella as rulers of Naples; Julius even seems to have contemplated the grant of the kingdom to the duke of Lorraine, in a sort of Angevin restoration.⁵⁵ In the age of the League of Cambrai and Ferdinand's increasingly aggressive activities north of the borders of the *Regno* everything would depend on how much Julius needed Ferdinand of Aragon and took against Louis of France. Barón de Terrateig published a number of sets of instructions sent to Ferdinand's ambassador in Rome, Jerónimo de Vich, during 1510; but Ferdinand had the growing advantage that he could refuse to participate in Julius' political schemes without receiving the long desired investiture in return.⁵⁶ The argument adopted by Vich was certainly an ingenious one: Louis XII had failed to exercise his rights in Naples, as conferred by Alexander VI, and therefore the kingdom lapsed back into papal hands; the papacy should confer full rights on Ferdinand and his successors, because the *Regno* was in fact part of his *herencia*, and also because he already ruled the kingdom with prudence, clemency and diligence. Ferdinand was hardly likely to suggest that his claim to Naples rested exclusively on a papal grant, but obviously that grant was valuable in the face of continuing tension with France.

Following the death of Julius II we find Ferdinand making approaches to Pope Leo X; and Vich and Cardona argued on this occasion that renewal of investiture was a simple formality, comparable to the way that a new king received the homage of his subjects even if they had already performed the same act to his predecessor.⁵⁷ The pope was

⁵⁴ Hernando Sánchez, *El Reino de Nápoles*, p. 46.

⁵⁵ For the curious history of attempts to bring back the house of Anjou-Lorraine, see C. Shaw, *Julius II: The Warrior Pope* (Oxford, 1993), pp. 43, 63, 67–70, 95, 313.

⁵⁶ Jesús Manglano y Cucaló de Montull, Barón de Terrateig, *Política en Italia del Rey Católico, 1507–1516: correspondencia inedita con el embajador Vich*, 2 vols (Madrid, 1963), I, pp. 149–75; II, pp. 94–162.

⁵⁷ Terrateig, *Política*, I, pp. 411–3; cf. doc. 92, II, pp. 244–6.

disposed to make the grant, which was an encouragement to Ferdinand: he had seen the kingdom of Naples used as a bargaining chip in Franco-Spanish diplomacy too many times in the past, and now the attention of the French shifted more to a marriage arrangement tying one or another of Ferdinand's grandsons to the royal house of France, with Milan as dowry. This was tempting because it would seem to lock into place Ferdinand's control of southern Italy (as Ferdinand explained in a letter to Margaret of Austria), and because closer relations with France would enable him to maintain his new hold over Navarre.⁵⁸ Rumours circulated either that Ferdinand wanted to give Naples to his younger grandson Ferdinand of Habsburg (as well as Milan and even the Venetian *Terraferma*), or that the pope wanted to give Naples to Ferdinand of Calabria, son of Federigo II of Naples, the future governor of Valencia (and second husband of Germaine of Foix).⁵⁹ It seemed that the question of rule over Naples could never be laid to rest, all the more so when Louis XII died and was succeeded by a king, Francis I, whom Ferdinand explicitly said he regarded as even more dangerous.⁶⁰

There seems to be no explicit attempt to argue that the two kingdoms of Sicily *citra et ultra Farum* should be reunited, even though, as Hernando Sánchez shows, certain aspects of the viceroyalty established in Naples after 1503 followed Sicilian rather than Iberian models. In this regard Ferdinand simply followed in the wake of Alfonso the Magnanimous, even though Alfonso had an ulterior motive: the cession of Naples but not Sicily to his illegitimate son. This seems to be a good illustration of the way Ferdinand followed in the footsteps of Alfonso. Ferdinand also saw the *Regno* as a base for yet further victories in the Mediterranean which would, he hoped, bring him to the walls of Jerusalem over which he also possessed a title: Columbus recorded the prophecy attributed to Joachim of Fiore that 'he who

⁵⁸ J. M. Doussinague, *El testamento político de Fernando el Católico* (Madrid, 1950), pp. 243–5; Hernando Sánchez, *El Reino de Nápoles*, p. 202, n. 328; cf. Doussinague, *Política internacional*, p. 498.

⁵⁹ On Ferdinand of Habsburg, see R. Gonzáles Navarro, *Fernando I (1503–1564): un emperador español en el Sacro Imperio* (Madrid, 2003); T. Egidio and N. Sabadell González (eds.), *Fernando I, un infante español emperador* (Valladolid, 2004); A. Alvar Ezquerro (ed.), *Socialización, vida privada y actividad pública de un emperador del Renacimiento: Fernando I (1503–1564). Actas del congreso celebrado en Alcalá de Henares, los días 10–12 marzo 2003* (Madrid, 2004).

⁶⁰ Abulafia, 'La política italiana', pp. 517–38.

will restore again the citadel of Zion will come from Spain'.⁶¹ Under Ferdinand the Catholic, interests were pursued along the north coast of Africa which had long been high on the agenda of the kings of Aragon and their subjects, the merchants of Barcelona and Valencia, culminating in the capture of Oran and Tripoli; Melilla, taken in 1497, remains to this day politically part of Spain, and although this and most of the conquests were assigned to Castile rather than Aragon, the overall result of the African conquests was to consolidate the Aragonese hold on the western Mediterranean trade routes, and to clear the seas of Barbary pirates.⁶²

Southern Italy was thus just one part of a broader set of policies; and when we turn to the other major possession of the Crown of Aragon in late fifteenth-century Italy, the island of Sicily, we have the sense that we are looking at a very different world to that described by historians of the Spanish territories of the Crown of Aragon. If we follow Hernando Sánchez, Sicily was less truly part of the Crown of Aragon than the three states on the Iberian mainland or either Majorca or Sardinia, which were directly and indissolubly linked to the person of the king and shared some administrative functions such as the Aragonese-Catalan *Cancillería*. Sicily, followed by Naples after 1503, stood apart, with its own *Cancillería* reporting to the viceroy; it was a separate monarchy and not just an additional monarchic title.⁶³ Indeed, it was possible for Ferdinand to be granted the Sicilian crown in 1468, but it would not have been possible for him to receive the crown of Sardinia or Majorca which were tied to the Aragonese crown by the Privilege of Union of 1318 and its codicils.

It will already be obvious that Ferdinand was acutely aware of the problem of continuity: on the one hand he wished to project himself to his Neapolitan subjects and to the wider world as the successor to Alfonso V and possibly to Ferrante I; on the other, he sought to explain away the rapid changes of rule from 1494 to 1503, including his own highly ambiguous role supporting or opposing French claims. The problem of continuity was accentuated since he

⁶¹ D. C. West and A. Kling (eds.), *The libro de las profecías of Christopher Columbus* (Gainesville, FL), p. 238 [the translation on p. 239 is imprecise].

⁶² Abulafia, *Western Mediterranean*, pp. 242–3; F. Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean world in the time of Philip II*, transl. S. Reynolds, 2 vols. (London, 1972–3), vol. II, pp. 859–60.

⁶³ Hernando Sánchez, *El Reino de Nápoles*, pp. 49–50.

was only present for a few months in his newly-acquired kingdom, in 1506–7; this was a time when his attempts to maintain control of Castile had gone awry with the coming of Philip the Handsome and Juana la Loca into their Castilian inheritance, soon followed by Philip's death in 1506. Philip himself had long posed a question mark for Ferdinand, in view of his links to France and the possibility that he would be set up as a rival champion to Ferdinand in the Iberian lands or indeed Naples.⁶⁴ At this point in Ferdinand's career, when, in addition, he had just remarried, traditional Aragonese political concerns dominated his planning: these included the restoration of his father's lost authority in Navarre, where he could claim some shadowy rights in right of his new wife Germaine of Foix, and where his freedom to intervene had previously been constrained by the awareness that he should not risk upsetting the French monarchy in such a strategically sensitive area.⁶⁵ The marriage to Germaine brought him into a closer relationship with Louis XII of France, though in the end, performing his Machiavellian role, he would use it to seize Navarre from under French noses.

The question of Navarre and that of Naples were intimately intertwined. But the restoration of direct Aragonese authority over the kingdom of Naples, another cardinal aim, posed several difficulties. In the first place, the old local Aragonese dynasty still had its adherents among the barons and leading citizens; to some extent this problem was addressed by the creation of a powerful council, later entitled the *Consiglio Collaterale*.⁶⁶ The *Consiglio* acted as a restraint upon the viceroy (since Ferdinand could not escape from the fear that Gonzalo de Córdoba, at least, was working more for his own interests than those of the king). It also ensured that the natives of the kingdom, the *regnicoli*, had a central role in the government of the kingdom, in view of their longstanding hostility to the intrusion of Catalans, Frenchmen and others by earlier conquerors. This marked a reversion to the policy of King Ferrante, who had, in some measure, returned

⁶⁴ Cauchiés, *Philippe le Beau*; B. Aram, *La reina Juana: gobierno, piedad y dinastía* (Madrid, 2001) [English edition: *Juana the Mad: Sovereignty and Dynasty in Renaissance Europe* (Baltimore, MD, 2005)], is considerably better than its many competitors, such as E. Ferri, *Giovanna la Pazza* (Milan, 1996).

⁶⁵ L. Suárez Fernández, *Fernando el Católico y Navarra: el proceso de incorporación del reino a la corona de España* (Madrid, 1985); V. Pradero, *Fernando el Católico y los fal-sarios de la historia* (Bilbao, 2003), for a very politically-charged approach.

⁶⁶ *Consiglio collaterale*: Hernando Sánchez, *El Reino de Nápoles*, pp. 136–151.

offices and places of influence to his Neapolitan subjects. In the second place, Ferdinand was stuck between the desperate hope that Germaine would give him an heir to his Aragonese lands, and commitments to the Habsburgs which, under the terms of past agreements with the French, might result in the conferral of Naples on his grandson Charles of Habsburg following his death. Zurita remarks that the Neapolitan parliament of January 1507 in fact took oaths of homage to Ferdinand and his widowed daughter Juana la Loca, queen of Castile, and not to Germaine, queen of Aragon, thereby preserving Charles' rights, and opening up the possibility of a yet further separation of southern Italy from the Crown of Aragon (though later Ferdinand did seem to associate Germaine to the throne of Naples, in his negotiations with Pope Julius II, which one might take to be part of the endless shifting of priorities, aims and assessments of the possible on the part of Ferdinand).⁶⁷

In the third place, winning back Naples for Aragon also meant governing Naples from afar (apart from his visit), through viceroys whom he did not always find it easy to control: this is plain from his differences of opinion with Gonzalo de Córdoba, possibly motivated as much by jealousy of the Great Captain's popularity and by fears that he would establish his own permanent power base in southern Italy (conceivably using Castilian support), as by any serious policy differences.⁶⁸ The transfer of the vicerealty to a reliable relative, Juan de Aragón, conde de Ribagorza, and then to the Catalan viceroy of Sicily proper, Ramon de Cardona, revealed Ferdinand's fears about losing control of a still unstable kingdom. The core of the problem was this. Whereas the lands of the Crown of Aragon were well accustomed to viceregal government, so that it had even been possible for Alfonso V to rule his Iberian lands from his base in southern Italy, the kingdom of Naples had no real experience of viceregal government, apart from some brief interludes of French occupation: Alfonso had stayed put after his conquest, and (allowing for absences in Provence) his Angevin predecessors had generally ruled *in situ* since the end of the thirteenth century.

⁶⁷ Zurita cited and expounded in Hernando Sánchez, *El Reino de Nápoles*, pp. 60–1, 125; cf. pp. 58–61, 183–4.

⁶⁸ Ruiz Domènec, *Gran Capitán*, pp. 352–76.

IV

Perhaps the best way to see these concerns at work is to look at a memoir left by Luca Russo, one of the *eletti* of Naples, representing the popular *seggio*, written at the request of the king in the last few months of 1508, during the viceroyalty of Ribagorza.⁶⁹ This memoir makes it plain that Russo had already been fulsome with advice about how to run the kingdom, so that the royal secretary Quintana did the obvious thing and said to him, essentially, “If you have such interesting ideas about what needs to be done, put them down on paper so that I can show them to His Majesty”. The terms of his brief are set out with an almost studied vagueness: ‘quello che occurrese per lo servitio de sua alteza et bisogno del regno de Napole’.⁷⁰ And yet looking deeper we can see what the real concerns of the crown were, notably the role that the viceroy should play in making the king’s authority visible. Thus the first recommendation of Russo was that the viceroy should be ordered to travel throughout the kingdom every year with the council and his officials, to hear the subjects’ grievances and deal with them justly; this would prevent them being oppressed by others.⁷¹ As well as bringing justice to Ferdinand’s subjects, the viceroy’s councillors must be accessible in Santa Chiara with great regularity: they must even eat their meals at convenient times and have waiting rooms where their less wealthy petitioners can bring their business; everything must be done to reduce overheads in the exercise of justice, ‘to the service of God and the benefit of the kingdom’.⁷² Yet in reality, as Russo goes on to explain, these ideas were not so novel. He observes that the *Vicaria* Tribunal is the ‘major cause of the maintenance of justice throughout the kingdom’,⁷³ and that King Ferrante I had been highly conscious of the need to maintain the highest standards of justice, with the result that the kingdom lived in great content because malefactors were vigorously pursued.⁷⁴ The viceroy, therefore, must be very attentive to the need to appoint worthy judges. The *Camera della Sommaria* too must be

⁶⁹ Coniglio, *Consulte e bilanci*, doc. 4, pp. 94–110.

⁷⁰ ‘what is necessary for the service of His Highness and for the kingdom’.

⁷¹ Coniglio, *Consulte e bilanci*, p. 95.

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ ‘potissima causa de la conservatione de la iusticia de tucto el regno’.

⁷⁴ Coniglio, *Consulte e bilanci*, p. 95.

staffed by people with legal and fiscal expertise and with great experience, as in the time of Ferrante. Similarly twenty advisers need to be appointed to run the Chancery, as was the custom in Ferrante's day.⁷⁵ The sense here is that abuses have multiplied in the last fourteen years, but that the solution is straightforward: to restore King Ferrante's system of government and to ensure that the key offices below that of viceroy lie in the hands of the kingdom's inhabitants. Other sources make plain the resentment against outsiders such as the wealthy Catalan merchant Pau de Tholosa, who had close links to Gonzalo de Córdoba, and whose attempts to alleviate grain shortages in Naples were in the classic way seen by critics at court (including the Spanish secretary Pedro Lázaro de Exea) as exploitation of the grain market rather than provision of a lifeline to the city.⁷⁶

Russo was also well aware of the importance of local power brokers in the provinces, and emphasized the need to appoint *li principali homini* as the viceroy's deputies in the further-flung regions (Calabria, Abruzzo, Terra d'Otranto).⁷⁷ It was equally important to reduce the tax burden to that imposed under Ferrante; but he hints at tensions between Aragonese kingdoms when he speaks of the harshness of treatment of Neapolitan merchants in Palermo, where the consul in charge of the Neapolitans was in fact a Sicilian, not a Neapolitan, as Russo said he should be.⁷⁸ In any event, Russo's advice was heeded in part, and on 12 December 1508 King Ferdinand issued a set of privileges to the city of Naples which addressed several of these concerns about levels of taxation, and which also laid heavy emphasis on the need to appoint *regnicoli* to office within the kingdom, in the light of representations from the Neapolitans themselves and in the light of the privileges granted in past times by King Ferrante I.⁷⁹ Although not all the provisions reflect earlier Neapolitan practice (for instance, measures against Albanian and Greek bandits seem to be a novelty), the general spirit of the grant, and of King Ferdinand's other privileges, is peaceful restoration, with a firm emphasis on the theme of continuity from the time of King Ferrante. Indeed, we shall see that this even applied when Ferdinand was dealing with a matter

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

⁷⁶ Hernando Sánchez, *El Reino de Nápoles*, pp. 146–9; cf. Coniglio, *Consulte e bilanci*, pp. 92–3, 163–5, 196–9, 203–5, 320–1.

⁷⁷ Coniglio, *Consulte e bilanci*, p. 96.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, doc. 5, pp. 110–33.

as close to his heart as the expulsion of the Jews. To some degree, too, the legislation and administrative reforms within the kingdom of Naples reflected changing practices within the wider world of the Crown of Aragon, where since 1494 Ferdinand had instituted, or rather re-instituted, a Supreme Council with oversight over all territories, based on a similar body that had answered to Alfonso V; one area in which practice was changing was the shift to the use of non-royal viceroys in place of the Lieutenant-Governors who had generally been drawn from the royal family.⁸⁰

In fact, one particularly difficult question concerns the role of Naples in the economy of the territories ruled by Ferdinand. While Castile began to develop its major interest in the Atlantic, the great cities of the Crown of Aragon might again function as the nodal points of a lucrative trading network that linked Naples, Sicily, Sardinia, Majorca, Barcelona and Valencia.⁸¹ Under Ferdinand, the crown took a direct interest in the commercial recovery of the Catalan-Aragonese world, and it is a fallacy to suppose that the lack of encouragement to Catalans to trade in the New World signified a lack of sympathy for their commercial interests; rather, the monarchy aimed to foster Catalan trade in the traditional commercial arena in which the Catalans had operated, as a complement to the trading activities of the Castilians in the Atlantic. Ferdinand thought of a division of function between Catalan and Castilian merchants, between Mediterranean and Atlantic; and the policy appears to have worked well in his own lifetime. But the Catalans were rather less interested in what the Neapolitan kingdom produced than in what they could sell to its inhabitants, buying some cheeses, wines, linen. This was not simply a chance to seize trading opportunities. There was an imperial idea behind it as well. For, as has been seen, del Treppo also made a very convincing case for the emergence under Alfonso the Magnanimous of 'the idea of an economic community under the Crown of Aragon', which outlasted Alfonso and which continued to include the south Italian kingdom even after Alfonso separated Naples from his other dominions.⁸²

⁸⁰ A. Ryder, 'The evolution of imperial government in Naples under Alfonso V', in J. Hale, R. Highfield, B. Smalley (eds.), *Europe in the Late Middle Ages* (1965), pp. 332–57.

⁸¹ M. J. Peláez, *Catalunya després de la Guerra civil del segle XV: institucions, formes de govern i relacions socials i econòmiques (1472–1479)* (Barcelona, 1981).

⁸² del Treppo, *Mercanti*, p. 605.

Some idea of the trading connections binding Naples to Iberia in this period can perhaps be gained from numismatic evidence. Without a doubt, evidence from coin hoards is very difficult to assess, but the treasure discovered at Sant Pere de Rodes merits particular attention.⁸³ Probably deposited as late as the 1520s, the great majority of coins in this large hoard come from the period when Ferdinand the Catholic was reigning, though by no means all are from the Catalan area. Nearly all the silver pieces—290 out of 310—are from the mint of Barcelona, but the gold coins suggest wide links between Catalonia and the rest of the Crown of Aragon: while numerous gold coins come from the north Italian states, 44 gold coins are from Valencia, a clear testimony to the importance of Valencian trade at this period, and 22 gold coins are from Naples, half of them from the reign of Ferrante I, that is, not later than 1494. The presence in the treasure of some coins of Ferdinand the Catholic minted in Naples suggests that we need a clear answer to the question whether there was serious revival of Catalan and Valencian trade with Naples following Ferdinand's conquest of southern Italy. Documentary evidence reveals that Catalan businessmen favoured at the royal court, led by Pau de Tholosa, of converso origin, acquired a major stake in the grain trade of Naples and gained the sort of influence at the court of the viceroy that had been exercised in the days of Ferrante by Francesco Coppola; this even went as far as the ennoblement of Pau de Tholosa, though he remained a controversial figure with many enemies who accused him of engrossment.⁸⁴ Ferdinand for his part was conscious of the expense that he had incurred in making real his claims to Naples, recalling in his will the money and effort that had been expended to acquire and keep the kingdom.⁸⁵ He was looking for financial returns from the kingdom, though perhaps less aggressively than his successor Charles V.⁸⁶ This still gave rise to

⁸³ T. Marot i Salsas, *El tesoro de Sant Pere de Rodes: una ocultación de monedas de oro y de plata a principios del siglo XVI* (Barcelona, 1999); *idem*, *El Tesoro de Sant Pere de Rodes: moneda, comerç i art a l'inici del segle XVI* (Barcelona, 1999).

⁸⁴ Hernando Sánchez, *El Reino de Nápoles*, pp. 146–9; Coniglio, *Consulte e bilanci*, pp. 35, 86.

⁸⁵ G. Galasso, 'Momenti e problemi di storia napoletana nell'età di Carlo V', in *idem*, *Alla periferia*, p. 50 [En la periferia, p. 60]; A. Calabria and J. Marino (eds.), *Good Government in Spanish Naples* (New York, 1990), p. 20; Hernando Sánchez, *El Reino de Nápoles*, p. 68.

⁸⁶ G. Fenicia, *Politica economica e realtà mercantile nel Regno di Napoli nella prima metà del XVI secolo (1503–1556)* (Bari, 1996), takes a fundamentally negative view of commercial

tensions within the *Regno* and the outbreak of localised revolts, while the Angevin and Aragonese factions among the barons remained a source of mistrust.

V

It is now time to turn to a particular source of mistrust, the attempt to intrude the Inquisition into Naples, and Ferdinand's somewhat inconsistent policy towards the south Italian Jews, from which his financial needs emerge quite clearly. This is also an aspect of his Neapolitan policy which reveals quite clearly some fundamental aspects of the king's character and political programme. In 1503 the south of Italy still remained one of the few areas of western Europe in which Jews could carry on their business and practise their religion with little impediment, and in which they enjoyed many of the rights of the general population.⁸⁷ The conquest of southern Italy by Ferdinand the Catholic introduced new uncertainties. The existence of increasing numbers of New Christians, some of Spanish origin, resulted in an acute fear of intensified inquisitorial activities in the *Regno*. And those who remained openly Jews were deeply conscious that expulsions of Jews had occurred not merely in Castile and Aragon but in the Italian island possessions of the Crown of Aragon, and from north African towns seized by the Spaniards; indeed, a high proportion of south Italian Jews were Sicilians who had been expelled ten years earlier.⁸⁸

An early decision of the Catholic kings was to expel the south Italian Jews, and yet within a few months it had been suspended. The Catholic Monarchs had the clearest of motives: the Jews had been expelled from their realms many years ago because their pres-

developments, from the perspective of Apulia; note, however, the evidence for continuity in commercial policy, e.g. Ferdinand's confirmation in 1503 of a privilege of Ferrandino of 1495 for free trade by merchants of Messina trading out of the *Regno* towards Sicily (p. 177); and cf. similar cases: pp. 171–83.

⁸⁷ David Abulafia, 'The Aragonese kings of Naples and the Jews', in B. Cooperman and B. Garvin (eds.), *The Jews of Italy: Memory and Identity* (Potomac, MD, 2000); N. Ferorelli, *Gli Ebrei nell'Italia meridionale dall'età romana al secolo XVIII*, ed. F. Patroni Griffi (Naples, 1990).

⁸⁸ N. Zeldes, *The Former Jews of This Kingdom: Sicilian Converts after the Expulsion, 1492–1516* (Leiden, 2003).

ence there was offensive to God, and they did not want them in that kingdom for the same reason; the viceroy was to expel them when he saw the time was right.⁸⁹ It is noticeable that even this very stern letter of July 1503 allowed the Viceroy to decide when the right moment had come for the expulsion of the Jews; and this was essentially the policy which was followed for a long time, since expulsion decrees were repeatedly deferred or modified by Viceroys with their own local priorities, which were not necessarily those of religious purification after the manner of the Catholic Monarchs.

El Gran Capitán, Don Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba, has acquired the reputation of being quite partial to the Jews, helping defend the Jews of Córdoba from their enemies when he was a young man, and making use of a Jewish physician, Joseph Abravanel; and, so long as they had such a formidably powerful patron as the commander of the Spanish armies in southern Italy, the Jews were in less danger of expulsion.⁹⁰ Moreover, Gonzalo de Córdoba himself insisted that the number of Jews in southern Italy was not so large that the government in Spain should see them as a significant problem, while there were many *convertiti* who were a much more important issue (to say this was to vary the argument which had led the Catholic Monarchs to expel the Jews from Spain in 1492: that the mixing of Jews and *conversos* was a source of judaising heresies among the *conversos*, and therefore the unbaptised Jews must be required to leave). This statement has been taken by some to indicate that the chaos of the French invasions had induced many Jews to convert, but this seems unlikely.⁹¹ The deliberate underestimate of Jewish numbers appears to be an attempt to cover the truth: as has been seen, the Jewish population had in fact risen considerably in the ten years before the Spanish takeover, as a result of the emigration from Iberia and Sicily. In addition, the Great Captain rather undermined his own case by arguing that the expulsion of the Jews would have a detrimental effect on the economy, all the more so since many of the Jews could be expected to settle in Venetian territory, thereby

⁸⁹ G. Paladino, 'Privilegi concessi agli Ebrei dal viceré D. Pietro di Toledo (1536-1536)', *Archivio storico per le provincie napoletane*, 38 (1913), p. 616, n. 2; a variant text is given in Ruiz Domènec, *Gran Capitán*, p. 366.

⁹⁰ Ferorelli, *Ebrei*, p. 99; Ruiz Domènec, *Gran Capitán*, pp. 366-8.

⁹¹ F. Ruíz Martín, 'La expulsión de los Judíos del Reino de Nápoles', *Hispania*, 9 (1949), pp. 39, 45-6.

handing to Venice a handsome benefit.⁹² It had been precisely his understanding of the economic benefits of letting Jews from Spain and Sicily settle in his kingdom, combined with a humane approach rare in his time, that had earlier prompted Ferrante I to welcome the refugee Jews in 1492–3; and we can see in the Great Captain's approach to this problem a pragmatic desire to continue the effective policies of the earlier rulers of Naples, once again allied with a lack of religious bigotry on Don Gonzalo's part.

The result of Don Gonzalo's action was that the Catholic Monarchs suspended the decree of expulsion of the Jews, while at the same time they attempted to extend throughout southern Italy the authority of the Spanish Inquisition, by granting the Sicilian Inquisition authority on the mainland. This plan was suspended following the death of Queen Isabella that year.⁹³ Indeed, following representations from the Neapolitan elite, the decision was made to confirm the privileges conferred on the Jews of southern Italy by Ferrante and his successors, in the general spirit of confirming at least the privileges of Ferrante I. Generally the *gentilhomini, cittadini ed abitanti napoletani* seem to have been more favourable to the Jews than the barons and cities of the rest of the kingdom, for the latter tried in the parliament of January 1507 to persuade the government to annul all outstanding debts owed to Jews since the death of Ferrandino d'Aragona (this would be consistent at least with the delegitimisation of the rule of Federigo, mentioned earlier), while in May 1507 the Neapolitans asked for a series of guarantees for the Jews, and eventually this was agreed: in December 1508 the crown's protection was conferred once again on native and Spanish Jews resident in the *Regno*.⁹⁴ One reason for concern among the king's Christian subjects was the constant threat that the Inquisition would be introduced if the Jews and conversos were not expelled.⁹⁵

The problem remained the almost fanatical insistence of the Catholic

⁹² Viviana Bonazzoli, 'Gli ebrei del regno di Napoli all'epoca della loro espulsione, I parte, Il periodo aragonese, 1456–99', *Archivio storico italiano*, 137 (1979), pp. 495–559; II parte, 'Il periodo spagnolo (1501–1541)', *ibid.*, vol. 139, pp. 179–287, pt. 2, pp. 180–1.

⁹³ Bonazzoli, 'Ebrei', pt. 2, pp. 182–3.

⁹⁴ David Abulafia, 'Insediamenti, diaspora e tradizione ebraica: gli Ebrei del Regno di Napoli da Ferdinando il Cattolico a Carlo V', *Convegno internazionale Carlo V, Napoli e il Mediterraneo = Archivio storico per le province napoletane*, 119 (2001), pp. 198–200.

⁹⁵ Bonazzoli, 'Ebrei', pt. 2, p. 185; Ruíz Martín, 'La expulsión', pp. 40–4, 51–2.

Monarchs that their lands should be free of Jews. Still, Ferdinand was more ready to compromise this policy than is often realised, and some would argue that the death of Isabella in 1504 resulted in a toning down of royal policy towards the Jews. Ferdinand had already refused to include the Muslims of Valencia in the process of religious purification being imposed in Spain.⁹⁶ Later, he was even prepared to allow twenty Jewish families to linger in his *presidio* of Oran, though his policy in north Africa was, once again, more favourable to Muslims than to Jews.⁹⁷ It needs to be remembered that Ferdinand was fond of taking the credit for expelling the Jews from Spain and Sicily, and that the decree of expulsion from his Aragonese kingdoms was far more hostile to Judaism than were the decrees issued in Castile. His acceptance of the Aragonese privileges in Naples was compromised when in 1506 Ferdinand insisted that the Jews of Naples must wear a distinguishing badge, on pain of a fine of eleven *oncie*, and the loss of the offending garment. But even this policy was difficult to enforce in southern Italy, and by early 1509 the penalty for failing to wear the Jewish badge had been reduced from eleven to only one *oncia*.⁹⁸ For Bonazzoli, there was a clash in southern Italy between the Castilian-inspired attitude of King Ferdinand, very negative to the Jews, and the longstanding policies enunciated by the Aragonese kings of Naples and their predecessors, which had tended to confirm the right of the Jews to live peaceably in the midst of the Christian population. Certainly, what emerged was a mish-mash of traditional Neapolitan and newfangled Castilian approaches to the Jews.

In protecting the Muslims of Valencia, Ferdinand was protecting his own pocket. This pragmatism re-emerged when the Jews were ordered out of southern Italy in 1510, along with all those Spanish *conversos* resident in southern Italy who had earlier been condemned by the Inquisition, and were thus suspected of leaving Spain to return to Judaism.⁹⁹ This unique expulsion of converts along with professing Jews was evidently seen as an alternative to the introduction of the Inquisition into the *Regno*; since its function was to identify those *conversos* who maintained Jewish practices, there would be less need for

⁹⁶ Meyerson, *The Muslims of Valencia*.

⁹⁷ R. Gutiérrez Cruz, *Los presidios españoles del Norte de Africa en tiempo de los Reyes Católicos* (Melilla, 1998).

⁹⁸ Bonazzoli, 'Ebrei', pt. 2, p. 184.

⁹⁹ See C. Colafemmina, *Ebrei e cristiani novelli in Puglia: le comunità minori* (Bari, 1991), for the example of Gravina.

an Inquisition if no *conversos* existed within the kingdom. As in the case of the expulsion of the Jews from Spain, when the town of La Guardia had been the focus of a ritual murder accusation, the expulsion from southern Italy was preceded by well-orchestrated attempts to show that bizarre sacrileges were taking place that necessitated this act: the Apulian *convertiti* were accused of holding incestuous orgies on Good Friday.¹⁰⁰ What is more likely to have been the case is that the Apulian *convertiti* did indeed live as Jews and have their own synagogues, even if they had conducted themselves with a certain amount of discretion.¹⁰¹ While this policy clearly reflected Ferdinand's wish not to permit Jews to live in his dominions so long as they practised Judaism, the policy was permitted important exceptions. Two hundred families were in fact allowed to stay, subject to payment of a 3,000 ducat annual tribute.¹⁰²

In the last analysis, Ferdinand did not insist on the principle that southern Italy must at once be *Judenfrei*, but it does appear that this was one of his longer term aims. As in Spain, however, he was very much concerned with the failure of the New Christians to become sincere converts, and it was they who appeared to be a more serious problem than the unconverted Jews. After all, it had been because of the bad influence the Jews were supposed to have on the *conversos* that he had expelled the Jews from Spain; therefore, in a situation where he had been assured by the Viceroy that the Jews were few in number but the Marranos were numerous, he felt bound to concentrate on the Marranos. Thus they too were expelled in 1514–5, an act which was never undertaken in Spain itself, perhaps because the Inquisition was thought able to deal with these Marranos by other means.¹⁰³ By contrast, in southern Italy the expulsion of the *conversos* was presented as a way of dealing with the problem of judaising heretics which would avoid the unpopular measure of introducing the Inquisition. It was also an act which raised some troubling questions: these Marranos of southern Italy were, technically at least, baptised Christians, and it was not for nearly a century that the Spanish monarchy would dare to expel Christians, however errant, from its lands (the case in 1609–10 being that of the Valencian

¹⁰⁰ Bonazzoli, 'Ebrei', pt. 2, pp. 190, 193.

¹⁰¹ Ruíz Martín, 'Expulsión', p. 69; Bonazzoli, 'Ebrei', pt. 2, p. 196.

¹⁰² Ferorelli, *Ebrei*, pp. 213–14; cf. Paladino, 'Privilegi', p. 619.

¹⁰³ Ruíz Martín, 'Expulsión', pp. 74–5.

Moriscos). Some *neofiti* had left in 1510–11, including several from Gravina; it has been seen that there were ancient communities of *neofiti* in Apulia, but the emphasis of Ferdinand's legislation was clearly on the New Christians who had come in recent times from Spain.¹⁰⁴

The impoverishment of the Jews and New Christians had rendered most of them dispensable; but the king was well aware that there still existed a rump who were able to play a valuable role in the economy. In fact, there seems even to have been a trickle of Jewish immigrants after 1510: at Lanciano Jews were permitted to attend the annual fairs, at least; some Jews arrived in the Apulian ports from Dubrovnik in 1515 after their expulsion from there.¹⁰⁵ Charles V ended up confirming Ferrante's privileges yet again and a final expulsion did not take place until 1541.¹⁰⁶ Charles sought to reaffirm the authority of the Crown over the Jews, reiterating the privileges accorded by Ferrante and insisting that barons, cities and bishops did not have the right to grant rights to the Jews nor to cancel the rights that they had.

VI

Ferdinand appears, then, as a man of contradictions. Or rather, like any ruler, he was torn between his principles and pragmatism. Alongside his attachment to the Messianic image of *el Rey encubierto*, the king remained relentless in pursuit of his dynastic rights and legal titles, determined to win Navarre, Naples, the Catalan counties across the Pyrenees, towns in north Africa long targeted by his predecessors on the throne of Aragon, and even Castile after Isabella's death in 1504, despite the claims of his eccentric daughter and her Flemish husband. The pursuit of Aragonese-Catalan interests was single-minded. His Neapolitan war of conquest was in fact complete before Isabella died. His foreign policy, which generally sought to isolate France by alliances with England, Brittany, the Holy Roman Empire, stands in a long tradition of Aragonese-French rivalry (though, true to form, he was willing to make deals with the French when this suited him best). Even

¹⁰⁴ Ferorelli, *Ebrei*, p. 219; Colafemmina, *Ebrei e cristiani novelli*, pp. 25–6, 33.

¹⁰⁵ Ferorelli, *Ebrei*, p. 221; Bonazzoli, 'Ebrei', pt. 2, p. 204.

¹⁰⁶ For Charles' policies, see Abulafia, 'Insediamenti, diaspora e tradizione ebraica', pp. 171–200; Ferorelli, *Ebrei*, pp. 219–33.

after Isabella died, he continued to take a very active role in planning New World exploration, including the settlement of Cuba and the expedition of Ponce de León to Florida. It is clear that his actions decisively altered the political and religious map of the Mediterranean and of the rest of the world. In achieving such spectacular results, he played again and again the Aragonese card.

MILAN DURING THE ITALIAN WARS (1499–1529):
EXPERIMENTS IN REPRESENTATION AND
DEFINITIONS OF CITIZENSHIP

Letizia Arcangeli

This essay¹ will examine the influence of the French and Imperial occupations on some aspects of the political life of Milan: how these brought to the fore problems of the definition of political subjects and political rights that had, in the history of the city, periodically been put under the spotlight, but which seemed to have faded into the background as the government of the Sforza became established. This occurred because, as a direct consequence of the wars between 1495 and 1535, Milan (the city and the duchy) had to deal almost unceasingly with the problem of sovereignty. Who should be the prince, and indeed whether there should be a prince or a republic instead, was almost continuously brought into question.² This was not a merely theoretical problem, but a practical one, because of the presence of powerful rival forces, in the form of armies that each supported a claimant who presented himself as the legitimate prince opposed by a tyrant or a rebel. In this context, contractual aspects of political authority were strengthened, but could only be developed with great difficulty, because the ‘city’ as a political entity was fragmented and ill-defined.

The available narrative sources—chronicles and correspondence—record the activities of social groups and political parties, though

¹ Editorial note: A longer version of this essay was originally published in Italian, as ‘Milano durante le guerre d’Italia (1499–1529): Esperimenti di rappresentanza e identità cittadina’, *Società e storia*, 104 (2004), pp. 225–66; it has not been possible to include here the full and informative footnotes to be found with that version; the translation of this paper is mine.

² Milan was governed between 1499 and 1525 by the Sforza (until late August 1499; 2 February to 10 April 1500; June 1512 to October 1515; November 1521 to October 1524; February to November 1525) or by the French; and then from November 1525 to November 1535 by the Sforza or by Charles V (7 November 1525–29 November 1529). For an outline of the events, see G. Franceschini, ‘Le dominazioni francesi e le restaurazioni sforzesche’, in *Storia di Milano*, vol. VIII, *Tra Francia e Spagna (1500–1535)* (Milan, 1957), pp. 85–333.

these were defined ambiguously. Thus the groups in play included *gentiluomini* (noblemen, gentlemen), *primates* or the principal citizens, the *popolo* (the 'people' in various senses) and the *plebe* (the lower orders, or, in the pejorative sense, the rabble), Guelfs and Ghibellines, as well as the pro-French and pro-Sforza, during the period 1512–15, and next the pro-Sforza being anti-French and pro-Imperial, from 1521 to 1524, and becoming pro-French and anti-Imperial, in the years 1526 to 1528. It is true that whether an invading force was accepted or resisted depended only to a small degree on the local society (that is, above all on the parties or factions that divided the nobility in particular), and was instead principally determined by force of circumstance: between 1499 and 1529 the room for a political dimension in the relations between invaders and the Milanese diminished, and sheer military strength prevailed. Nevertheless, those governing could never leave out of account the need to seek for some form of consent. The fortunes of war did not always settle affairs beyond any hope of alteration: whenever there was a change of prince, there was always an attempt to negotiate terms. The arrival of the French in Italy in 1499, for example, was accompanied by a succession of political acts by a variety of entities that were not institutions (the duchy [*stato*], the city, the communities) but rather the elements that composed them: from the great aristocratic families to the factions, from the *popolo* of the cities to the family clans and communities of the countryside.

Initially, the inhabitants of the city had a positive attitude to the ultramontane forces advancing on them, seeing in them a prospect of change, but direct experience of these forces led more or less rapidly to rejection and insurrection. This was a sequence that tended to be repeated with every change of regime, but with one important exception. If the citizen elites and the aristocracy appeared divided for longer between those who accepted and those who rejected the various regimes, the impression suggested by the narrative sources is that the "*popolo minuto*" adopted quite rapidly a clear anti-French and pro-Sforza orientation, which was much more than just a straightforward reaction to the presence of armies with the associated problems of lodgings and *taglie* (levies). According to one *popolare* chronicler, Gian Marco Burigozzo, in 1522–4 the urban militias were ready for military collaboration. The population, skilfully organized by the Sforza government, accepted the Spanish as 'ours', out of hatred for the French, and when the French retook the city which had been

abandoned by the Imperial army and decimated by pestilence, did not hesitate to ‘call out the name of the Emperor and of Francesco Sforza’ at the first opportunity.³ Guicciardini himself pointed out that, despite the intolerable burdens weighing on the duchy of Milan, the prime enemy for the people was the French.⁴ They became anti-Spanish in 1526, when the breach between Charles V and Francesco II Sforza appeared to be complete, and it is therefore legitimate to suppose that this was not a merely defensive reaction against the impositions of the Imperial armies, but a political reaction in favour of the duke besieged in the fortress.

It will, however, be the political discourse that developed around these problems that will be discussed here. Chronicles and diplomatic correspondence are strewn with references to the vitality of the city, to the inhabitants reacting to events, to a widespread participation in political life, whether in relation to factors—taxation, the presence and the billeting of soldiers—that impinged more directly on that ‘*libertà*’, in the sense of free enjoyment of civil rights to life and to property, that was the basic level of citizenship, or in relation to the choices—acceptance of the armies or resistance—that were concerned with the political responsibility of the city and that were destined to have weighty, and at times dramatic, repercussions. Unfortunately these references, taken together with what little remains of the public records and with research in the notarial archives, permit only indicative and hypothetical reconstructions, not just because of the lacunae, but also because of the irresolvable ambiguity of the available documentation. In the notarial deeds it is not easy to distinguish the significant elements from what are merely formulaic. In the narrative sources, there is the problem of the imprecision of their references to institutions, and the problem of their social vocabulary, referring to ill-defined entities, as is inevitable when terms of vast resonance and uncertain content like *popolo*⁵ (and, to a lesser extent,

³ ‘Cronica milanese di Gianmarco Burigozzo merzaro, dal 1500 al 1544’, in ‘Cronache milanesi scritte da Giovan Pietro Cagnola, Giovanni Andrea Prato e Giovan Marco Burigozzo’, *Archivio storico italiano*, 3 (1842) (henceforth, Burigozzo), p. 547.

⁴ Francesco Guicciardini, *Storia d’Italia*, ed. S. Seidel Menchi, 3 vols (Turin, 1971), p. 1558.

⁵ A. Savelli, ‘Sul concetto di popolo: percorsi semantici e note storiografiche’, *Laboratoire italien* 1 (2001), pp. 9–24; ‘Essere popolo. Prerogative e rituali d’appartenenza nelle città italiane d’antico regime’, *Ricerche storiche*, 32 (2002), especially the essays by G. Chittolini, G. Borrelli and C. Donati.

cives, mercatores, gentiluomini) come into play. The terminology employed (*magnati* or *gentiluomini* or *cappellazzi*; *gentiluomini* or *cittadini*; ‘*veri uomini*’ (true men) or *popolo*—‘that is, citizens and merchants’;⁶ *popolo minuto* or *plebe*) varied according to the social station and also the faction of the writers. These include historians or chroniclers from the countryside, like Ambrogio da Paullo,⁷ Milanese citizens, among them *popolari* such as Gian Marco Burigozzo, and ‘patricians’, whether rentiers who invested in manufacturing, like Giovanni Andrea Prato,⁸ or members of professional bodies, lawyers such as Gerolamo Morone⁹ and Bernardino Arluno,¹⁰ to whom might be added Francesco Muralto from Como,¹¹ doctors like Scipione Vegio,¹² and also soldiers like Antonio Grumello from Pavia.¹³ There were sources of information from a variety of social backgrounds whose voices are recorded in the *Diarî* of Sanuto,¹⁴ diplomatic agents from a variety of political backgrounds, citizens of republics such as Florence and Venice, or the officials and secretaries of princes like those from Mantua and Ferrara, to whom can be added a member of the Milanese ducal chancery, Galeazzo Capra,¹⁵ or a humanist cleric, such as Pietro Martire d’Anghiera.¹⁶

⁶ Burigozzo, p. 425.

⁷ ‘Cronaca milanese dal 1476 al 1515 di maestro Ambrogio da Paullo’, ed. A. Ceruti (henceforth, da Paullo), *Miscellanea di storia italiana*, 13 (1874), pp. 93–378.

⁸ ‘Storia di Milano scritta da Giovan Andrea Prato patrizio milanese in continuazione e emenda del Corio dall’anno 1499 sino al 1519’, in ‘Cronache milanesi’, pp. 218–418 (henceforth Prato).

⁹ ‘Lettere ed orazioni latine di Gerolamo Morone’, ed. D. Promis and G. Mueller, *Miscellanea di storia italiana*, 2 (1863).

¹⁰ Bernardino Arluno, ‘De bello veneto libri sex . . .’, *Thesaurus antiquitatum et historiarum Italiae* . . ., ed. J. G. Graevius, V, part 4 (Lugduni Batavorum, 1722) (henceforth Arluno).

¹¹ *Annalia Francisci Murali iure utroque doctoris, patricii comensis*, ed. Pietro Alvisè Donino (Milan, 1861) (henceforth Muralto).

¹² ‘Scipionis Vegii protophysici ac senatoria mediolanensis Historia rerum in Insubribus gestarum sub Gallorum dominio ab anno domini 1515 usque ad annum 1522’, in *Bibliotheca Historica Italica*, I (1876), pp. 1–48.

¹³ ‘Cronaca di Antonio Grumello pavese dal 1467 al 1529’, ed. G. Müller, *Raccolta di cronisti e documenti storici lombardi inediti*, I (Milan, 1856), pp. 1–499 (henceforth Grumello).

¹⁴ Marino Sanuto, *I diari* (henceforth Sanuto).

¹⁵ Galeacius Capella, *De rebus ge[s]tis pro restitutione Francisci II Mediolanensium Ducis* (Milan, 1531) (henceforth Capra).

¹⁶ *Opus Epistolarum Petri Martyris Anglerii Mediolanensis Protonotarii apostolici* (Compluti, 1530).

The first element that emerges from the fragmentary information that can be garnered from the sources is that the choices that were being put forward concerning sovereignty, taxation or representation were not the exclusive preserve of the higher levels of political society, but involved, in one way or another, people of every social station. In Milan between 1495 and 1530, there was a succession of episodes that concerned considerable numbers of the inhabitants of the city who made themselves, or were made, interlocutors or counterparts of the government. Each of these episodes has its own story; for many of them we know only isolated moments. The beginning might be informal meetings of the ‘*principali*’, the leading citizens, or an order of the prince or unrest in the city, followed by the closure of the shops, and mobilization of the populace (in most cases in the form of a general assembly in the cathedral, with a procession), either spontaneous or sanctioned by the authorities, and then the convocation of parish assemblies to nominate delegates with a mandate to carry out or to ratify the decisions which were taken, and sometimes to elect a sort of civic government. References by chroniclers, though sparse, have been seen as signs of vitality at the basic level of organization, the parishes;¹⁷ nevertheless, Milan in this period is usually perceived by historians as being passive.¹⁸

Some at least of these episodes, particularly those of August to October 1499, June to September 1512 and June to September 1515, were times of discussion about the destiny of the state. The existence of political debate among the citizens of republics is taken for granted, but we are much less inclined to do so for principalities, especially for the capitals of principalities, whose political life apparently gravitated around the court. We can more easily imagine political debates in subject cities, which preserved a republican dimension even within principalities. In the city of Milan, it appears that men

¹⁷ G. Chittolini, ‘Di alcuni aspetti della crisi dello stato sforzesco’, in *Rencontres de Milan: Milan et les . . . tats bourguignons: deux ensembles politiques princiers entre Moyen Age et Renaissance* (Basle, 1988), pp. 21–34; *idem*, ‘Dagli Sforza alle dominazioni straniere’, in *idem*, *Città, comunità e feudi negli stati dell’Italia centro-settentrionale (secoli XIV–XVI)* (Milan, 1996), pp. 167–80.

¹⁸ G. Chittolini, ‘Milan in the face of the Italian wars (1494–1535): between the crisis of the state and the affirmation of urban autonomy’, in David Abulafia (ed.), *The French Descent into Renaissance Italy, 1494–1495: Antecedents and Effects* (Aldershot, 1995), pp. 399–401.

drawn from those accustomed to participating in government in the councils of the prince co-operated with or confronted ever more wideranging and sometimes even 'unsuitable' groups; from professional bodies to the *popolo minuto* and the *plebe* from the outskirts of the city, all expressed their opinion through lists of demands and petitions or through action.

Behind these we find the 'public arena', the 'public space'¹⁹ in which information circulated. In the late Middle Ages, above all in the capital of a regional state, there was a great deal of political information that was not restricted and secret. In a centre of habitation like Milan, exceptionally populous for the time but that could still be crossed on foot in a few hours, the first source was the street. There were heard or celebrated the public aspects of internal politics, government decrees and ordinances, proclamations, and of external politics, truces or peace agreements celebrated by bonfires and processions, diplomatic breaches manifest in the manner of the departure of ambassadors. There travellers and storytellers milled around; there the bells that marked the ordinary and the extraordinary happenings of the life of the city rang out; there were the churches and the public spaces they overlooked, places of meeting and of the exchange of opinion, and of political propaganda through preaching. In the streets of the city and still more in the *piazza* and the *curia arenghi* (the administrative centre), significant ceremonies took place, the arrival and departure of ambassadors, sometimes even an address from the prince to the notables, who might include the heads of the guilds (an event which would not escape the observation of passers-by even when it took place inside the castle, because of the visible confluence of those summoned to attend). In short, the street was the usual theatre of communications that were received, interpreted, amplified and elaborated by the spectators, and were propagated as rumours or reports well beyond the circle of the designated audience.²⁰ As in Elizabethan England, the people showed 'a . . . sophisticated awareness of current affairs' and even a real 'appetite for political discussion'.²¹ The most *popolare* chronicles, that of Ambrogio

¹⁹ Compare, for a different context, M. Caricchio, 'Rivoluzione inglese e sfera pubblica. Spunti per un'interpretazione', *Storica*, 23, VIII (2002), pp. 29–69.

²⁰ The most vivid evocation of this climate of opinion is in Sanuto, *I diarii*.

²¹ A. Fox, 'Rumour, news and popular political opinion in Elizabethan and early Stuart England', *The Historical Journal*, 40, 3 (1997), pp. 597, 600, 616.

da Paullo or that of Gian Marco Burigozzo, testify to this circulation of items of news, true or false, to the attention with which these were garnered even by people outside governing circles, and to the process of optimistic interpretation to which they were subjected. At the end of August 1499, on the basis of the cry of ‘Marco, Marco’, by a horseman who had just arrived in the city, ‘a rumour buzzed about . . . which was not true’, that Venice had become the ally of Lodovico Sforza.²² The arrival in February 1526 of a courier from Spain who announced ‘good news’ was the point of departure for a ‘report’, inferred from this, that Charles V was restoring the duchy to Francesco Sforza, and celebrated by a popular demonstration with shouts of ‘Duca, Duca, Imperio, Imperio’, that was followed by harsh repression—at least one man, perhaps four men, hanged. As Burigozzo noted disconsolately, ‘poor Milan shouted out, thinking this was allowed, but it turned out badly for Milan’.²³ Shouting out, hurrying ‘to arms’, are expressions of a responsiveness among the people that those in government sought to discipline.²⁴

Political uncertainty intensified this sort of popular involvement, but also brought others, more substantial: the change of prince implied decisions which were to be legitimated by recourse to the *popolo*. The new prince himself asked the *popolo* for an oath of loyalty; maintaining the government provoked more calls on the *popolo*, in the first place through taxation and other levies such as those for the maintenance of occupying troops. When, therefore, as in 1495, 1499, 1513, 1515 and 1525, the prince asked for an oath of fidelity, the whole population was involved and was prepared, at least in two instances, to negotiate. In October 1499, the oath was postponed for some weeks, but in the end was sworn without approval of *capitoli* (the terms of an agreement) in exchange, although there were some slight fiscal concessions.²⁵ In 1525–6, the Imperial captains,

²² da Paullo, p. 116; Sanuto, II, col. 1167.

²³ Burigozzo, p. 450; Sanuto, XLI, cols 13, 26, 43.

²⁴ For example, the ban on cries of ‘Italia’, ‘Milano’, ‘*popolo*’, ‘Spagna’, ‘and similar calls to arms’: ASMi, ASforzesco, b. 1504, 29 May 1525; or the prohibition of taking up arms without the permission of the duke or the ringing of the great bell: *ibid.*, b. 1501, 28 Apr. 1522.

²⁵ L. Arcangeli, ‘Gian Giacomo Trivulzio marchese di Vigevano e il governo francese in Lombardia (1499–1518)’, in *idem*, *Gentiluomini di Lombardia. Ricerche sull’aristocrazia padana nel Rinascimento* (Milan, 2003), p. 18; *idem*, ‘Esperimenti di governo. Politica fiscale e consenso’, in *idem* (ed.), *Milano e Luigi XII. Ricerche sul primo dominio francese in Lombardia (1499–1512)* (Milan, 2002), pp. 281–2.

who were asking for an oath to Charles V, had to wait about four months. The lengthy resistance (and the corresponding insistence of the Imperial captains, which confirms that they certainly did not consider the oath an empty formality) can be understood as an expression of loyalty to Francesco Sforza who, barricaded in the castle, continued to declare himself the loyal vassal of the emperor; but it was explained in different and contradictory ways. When at last the Milanese took the oath, after the proclamation of peace between Charles V and Francis I, they affirmed that only then could they consider themselves freed from the oath sworn in 1515 to the king of France, thanks to the cession he had made to the Emperor.²⁶ But this was not the argument with which they had resisted for so long, with a pertinacity, and a success, that might appear surprising in an occupied city, but that was explained (apart from the fear of uprisings by a population that was still armed) by the very concept of the oath, considered effectively binding only if sworn as a result of affection ('per amore') and not because of force, which blunted the weapon of military pressure.²⁷

Milanese jurists also emphasized its reciprocal character: the counterpart to the pledge of fidelity by the Milanese people should be the observance of the *capitoli* (that in this case provided for the withdrawal of the army) on the part of the Imperialists. The simultaneous reciprocity of the undertakings (if not the actual priority of 'making terms') is the dominant theme of the negotiations that emerges from the diplomatic correspondence. The other party insisted instead on the priority of the oath over the undertaking, as the king of France had succeeded before in affirming the priority of the oath over the *capitoli*, and as, around half a century before, the prince had apparently succeeded in affirming the separation of the oath and the *capitoli* and that the oath should come first.²⁸ That the oath would be binding only if reciprocity was respected was not an unques-

²⁶ Sanuto, XLI, col. 42.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, XL, col. 643. On oaths taken under coercion, see P. Prodi, *Il sacramento del potere. Il giuramento politico nella storia costituzionale dell'Occidente* (Bologna, 1992), pp. 165–7.

²⁸ M. Della Misericordia, "Per non privarci de nostre raxone, li siamo stati desobedienti". Patto, giustizia e resistenza nella cultura politica delle comunità alpine nello stato di Milano (XV secolo), in C. Nubola and A. Würigler (eds), *Forme della comunicazione politica in Europa nei secoli XV–XVIII. Suppliche, gravamina, lettere* (Bologna and Berlin, 2004), pp. 147–215.

tioned assumption, but it was in harmony as much with the political culture of mutual obligation of the rural communities that around the middle of the fifteenth century had made their fidelity to Francesco I Sforza 'subordinate to the observation of the undertakings that had been made',²⁹ as with jurists such as Francesco Muralto from Como, who argued concerning the relations between the king and the city in 1499–1500, that subjects were not bound to keep faith, even if they had taken an oath, if faith was not kept with them.³⁰ There had been an impassioned debate about the nature of the terms, whether they were 'preces' (petitions) or 'pactiones' (agreements).³¹ It is highly significant that these dilemmas were posed again in the opening decades of the sixteenth century. Even in 1535 there was a vain attempt to make the oath to Charles V subject to approval of the *capitoli*, and there was at least success in modifying the text, eliminating, among other things, the requested pledge of obedience and renewing the less binding formula of 1525–6, which could be summarized as mere fidelity ('consilium et auxilium', counsel and aid).³² In the 1520s, however, the objective had been 'to conclude, with the agreement of the whole city, the form of the oath that the aforesaid city wishes to take'; the College of Milanese jurists was consulted about the form.³³

In short, from the Milanese documentation of the early sixteenth century, it is clear that the oath was not an established ritual, in when it was taken, or the formula used, or—as will be discussed later—in who the delegates who actually took the oath should be.

The involvement of the 'people' was also opportune in taxation, when financial requirements could not be satisfied by the usual expedients of monetary manipulation and increases of customs duties. Consulting 'the people' on tax is in itself a kind of constitutional offset for extraordinary levies, and involves negotiations and requests. As the formulation of the *capitoli* to be proposed when the oath was to be sworn divided the population, so in these consultations did the

²⁹ G. Chittolini, 'I capitoli di dedizione delle comunità lombarde a Francesco Sforza', in *idem*, *Città, comunità*, pp. 41–2.

³⁰ Muralto, p. 65.

³¹ Morone, *Lettere latine*, p. 21.

³² M. Formentini, *La dominazione spagnuola in Lombardia* (Milan, 1881), pp. 48–9, 308–31 (for the text of the formulae).

³³ ASMan, AGonzaga, b. 1655: Giacomo Cappi, 30 Nov. 1525.

problem of taxation, contrasting a dislike of indirect taxes identified with the *popolo minuto* or the *plebe*, and a dislike of direct taxation identified with the 'true people' or the 'principal men'.³⁴ Direct taxation appeared unavoidable after the restoration of the Sforza in 1512, and was then agreed in exchange for political concessions³⁵ by those same groups (the 'principal men', the 'true people'), who had opposed it. These groups appeared orientated by a strong sense of realism and calculation of the forces in play, that brought them from time to time to side with the victor, while the *popolo minuto* and the Sforza party appeared to be characterized by loyalty 'to the bitter end'.³⁶

Repeatedly, therefore, an initial moment in which various social groups acted together was followed by divisions between them over the question of taxation. This pattern was perhaps broken only in the last episode, the one that is best known because of the attention paid to it by Francesco Guicciardini in the *Storia d'Italia*, the revolt of the Milanese *popolo* against the Spanish troops of the Imperial army in 1526.³⁷ A series of more or less violent tumults between the end of the winter and early summer culminated in June in the expulsion (though only briefly) of the garrison and the killing of the *capitano di giustizia*. A real challenge to the dominion of Charles V over Milan, a potential military advantage for the recently-formed League of Cognac, it was suppressed only by the intervention of the army. The troops were stationed in the city, which was forced to pay for its pardon with heavy exactions, and reduced to the deafening silence of its bells, that is to say, deprived of the normal forms of associative life.³⁸ In this case the *popolo* had acted alone: Burigozzo as well as the diplomats underscored the absence of the *gentiluomini*, who (apart from some isolated exceptions) were not inclined to put themselves at the head of the movement, and instead intervened on the side of the Spanish to negotiate its pacification.³⁹

³⁴ Arcangeli, 'Esperimenti di governo', pp. 272–87.

³⁵ E. Verga, 'Delle concessioni fatte da Massimiliano Sforza alla città di Milano (11 luglio 1515)', *Archivio storico lombardo*, 21 (1894), pp. 331–49.

³⁶ For example, see ASMi, ASforzesco, b. 1418: May 1513; da Paullo, pp. 305, 313; Prato, pp. 337–9; Burigozzo, pp. 425–6, 441; Sanuto, XXIII, col. 169; Grumello, pp. 291–2; ASMan, AGonzaga, b. 1648: 28 Jan., 2, 4, 7 and 10 Feb. 1522.

³⁷ Guicciardini, *Storia d'Italia*, pp. 1705–7, 1726–7.

³⁸ Burigozzo, p. 463; ASMi, ASforzesco, b. 1505: 20 July 1526.

³⁹ Burigozzo, p. 452; Capra, p. LXIVv; Grumello, pp. 399–400; Sanuto, XLI, cols 243, 279, 292–3.

The state of the sources makes it difficult to form a deeper understanding of these tumults. What stands out are the problem of comprehending precisely who was meant by the *popolo* and the *gentiluomini*; the references to the *popolo* being organized on the basis of the parishes; and the problem of identifying institutions that could negotiate or enter into undertakings in the name of the city. This was a new combination of the elements that had interacted in the preceding movements. One point appears particularly obscure in the surviving narratives: while in the chronicles it is the *popolo* that is the protagonist, which could mean anything from the *popolo minuto* to everyone not included among the *gentiluomini*, the role played by the craft associations (*paratici*) is problematic, except for that of the armourers, whose bellicose acts are recorded.⁴⁰ Yet the simultaneous ‘shutting up of the shops’, indicated without further detail as the usual point of departure of the movements of the *popolo*, seems to imply co-ordination by the corporations. As will be seen later, however, one of the forms of dialogue between the prince and the city took place in assemblies based on corporations, and the great popular mobilization of the first days of September 1499 may also have had its basis in the corporations.

Guicciardini begins to show a marked interest in Milanese affairs after the return of the Sforza at the end of 1521, when the great chancellor Gerolamo Morone had set in motion an organized experiment in government, in which the *popolo* would have an important part. Through the political use of preachers, love for the natural prince and hatred for the French was fostered, producing the extraordinary result of obtaining the willing acceptance of the presence of the Spanish-Imperial armies⁴¹ and of heavy taxes, agreed and not imposed, even direct taxes whose equity was guaranteed by the reform of the *estimo* (tax assessment) and by collection through representatives designated by the parish assemblies, under the control and with the participation of the citizens.⁴² The most important innovation was the institution of a standing urban militia recruited and

⁴⁰ Burigozzo, p. 427; ‘Lettere di monsignor Goro Gheri pistoiese governatore di Piacenza nel 1515 a Giuliano, Giulio e Lorenzo de’ Medici e ad altri . . .’, *Archivio storico italiano. Appendice*, VI (1848), n. 21, pp. 40–1; Sanuto, XLI, cols 231, 300.

⁴¹ Burigozzo, pp. 435–6, 443; Capra, p. XVIIr; Guicciardini, *Storia d’Italia*, pp. 1465–6.

⁴² ASMi, ASforzesco, b. 1501, 13, 14 Mar., 24 Apr., 10 May 1522; b. 1502, 24 Oct. 1523; b. 1503, 18 Apr. 1524.

organized by parish and *porte* ('city-gates', the six districts into which the city was divided). This was an experiment of great topical interest at that time, if the ideas of Machiavelli, and also of Guicciardini for a while,⁴³ are borne in mind, and was not without practical consequences, as witnessed by the active participation of the Milanese in the battles and the defence of the city between 1522 and 1525.

The genesis of Morone's project probably came through the experience of earlier episodes in 1499 and 1515. It could be said that his own career, first in the service of the French and then of the Sforza, had been built on his ability to govern, by his words and his proposals, the movements "of the *popolo*". Even if the tumults of 1526 appear rather disorganized, and even if Guicciardini attributed the failure of the revolt to the 'lack of military skill' of the *popolo* (in the sense of inability to identify valid strategic objectives),⁴⁴ it seems probable that the military training received by the *popolo* between 1521 and 1525 bore fruit in these disturbances.

Movements such as those of 1499 and 1512–5 appear to have revealed to the upper levels of political society the political potential of the *popolo*. Morone's experiment in direct government attempted to make use of this political potential, developing a sense of local patriotism that was not just connected to the city but also to the duke and the Sforza.

2. Throughout the difficult period that began with the French conquest and ended with the passage of Milan under the direct dominion of Charles V, therefore, there could be found moments of communication, consultation, bargaining and reciprocal undertakings between city and government. What had seemed sufficient in routine administration, a dialogue between the prince and elites through channels such as the court (in its widest sense) and patronage, was no longer enough. Now the prince needed to find forms of representation of the city through which to exercise coercion and obtain consent; from the other perspective, "from below", what was needed was an arena in which the various political entities that wished to express themselves and to count for something could meet. Finding

⁴³ Francesco Guicciardini, *Pagine militari*, ed. R. Palmarocchi (Rome, 1936), pp. 25–33.

⁴⁴ Guicciardini, *Storia d'Italia*, pp. 1706–7.

a way for the various actors to meet and to arrive at a compromise was rendered even more difficult by the fact that Milan was one of the largest cities of the time. Besides the magnates or gentlemen, Milanese and provincial, courtiers or no, the crowded professional colleges, the rentiers who also employed their money in manufacturing, the ‘body of Milan, that is *artefici* (artisans, guildsmen) and merchants’⁴⁵ constituted about half of the adult males among a population estimated at almost 100,000 inhabitants,⁴⁶ difficult to control through clientage by the prominent magnate families. The lack of a civic council was a peculiarity of this as of a few other capital cities, such as Ferrara and Naples. There was a civic magistracy, in so far as it was reserved for citizens and had authority over the city, the Dodici di Provvisione, which in the course of the year could involve up to 72 people. Occasionally, this magistracy maintained it should have ‘charge of the affairs of the city’ (*civitatis rerum curam*) and that ‘they alone are the sole magistracy in the city to act in the name of the community’ (*ipsi soli sunt in civitate unicus magistratus qui pro comunitate nomen ferunt*).⁴⁷ But is it possible to speak of “representation” if (at least until 1515–16) the nomination of the members came from above, with the sole constraint of an equal number from each of the six *porte*? Moreover, this magistracy had limited competences, mostly relating to food supplies and town-planning, and throughout the Italian Wars it only rarely took on a role of political representation. Its limitations from this perspective were evident in the well-known request, which was turned down in 1502, for the city to be able to elect, as ‘almost all Italian cities did’, its own ‘praesidentes’ (and to enjoy some income of its own).⁴⁸ And in fact among the Dodici, who should be ‘upright and expert’ (*probos et peritos*),⁴⁹ there were only a few members of aristocratic families or of the professional colleges. The norm for members seemed rather to be *cives*, who often appeared among the deputies elected to administer the principal *luoghi pii* (charitable institutions), or among the *sindici* elected by the parishes.

⁴⁵ ASM_o, Ambasciatori, Milano, b. 15: B. Costabili, 14 Aug. 1499.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, b. 23: Giovanni Fino, 3 June 1521.

⁴⁷ Milan, Archivio Storico Civico, Lettere ducali, 1503–12, 2 July 1506.

⁴⁸ Chittolini, ‘Dagli Sforza’, p. 179.

⁴⁹ ASM_i, Ufficio degli Statuti (Fondo Panigarola), Registri, reg. 12, ff. 1–21, 5–9 Jan. 1495, f. 17v.

From the first contacts with the French, the aspiration to an elected citizen assembly had been manifest in the request for an elective *parlamento* with full political and administrative powers. An unsuccessful request, not only in the ample form proposed in September 1499, but also in the more limited proposals in the *capitoli* of 1501–2, and in the reform of the *statuta iurisdictionum* of 1502, which preserved with very few changes, and changes for the worse as far as representation was concerned, the fourteenth century civic institutions: *deputati alla provvisione* and a council of Nine Hundred, nominated in the last analysis by the prince.⁵⁰ Nothing was said of an elective assembly in 1515–6, in the agreement with Massimiliano Sforza and then in the *capitoli* presented to Francis I, which aimed rather at administrative and financial autonomy, to free the *vicario* and the Dodici di Provvisione (these to be elected) from the control of the duke or the king. It might be that the request was in fact made, but orally, and was promptly rejected (in examining the *capitoli* presented to the prince, it is necessary always to bear in mind this form of preliminary censorship). Nevertheless, it appears plausible that such a petition would not have been advanced, because of the deep divisions between parties and between social groups, and because of the pervasive political vitality of that period, which would not have made it easy to reach a compromise on the composition of the council. Perhaps after the experiences of 1512–5, which as in 1499, saw a broad movement in which the civic elite, the “*veri homeni*” and the *popolo minuto* mingled and confronted one another, awareness grew that to propose an elective council presented enormous political and social problems, of recognition or denial of citizenship to social strata that exercised it in fact and that could not be controlled by the elites. It might, therefore, have seemed preferable not to go beyond experiments with the forms of representation already available: assemblies organized by colleges and trade guilds, parish assemblies with the election of the Twenty-Four *delle porte*, if necessary the Council of Nine Hundred, or even the Deputati dei Luoghi Pii.

In fact the *capitoli* of 1516 provided for the nomination of 150 electors who would select the Dodici di Provvisione, and the short list of three from among whom the French governor would then nominate the vicar.⁵¹ In these 150, elected by the Milanese parishes

⁵⁰ Arcangeli, ‘Gian Giacomo Trivulzio’, pp. 17, 20, 23.

⁵¹ Prato, pp. 369–71.

in 1516 and some years later reduced to 60, has been seen what would become the Council of the Sixty Decurioni, that is the patrician council of early modern Milan. This is perhaps to project back the final result of a hesitant process in search of a stable form of representation. In the second period of French rule the 150 seem principally to have had the power to elect. This did not mean that they did not become one more among the possible consultative bodies, and that they might not be summoned with the Dodici for specific questions. Above all, this did not mean that the government did not try to turn them into an alternative representative body to the much less controllable parish assemblies. The famous reduction by Lautrec of the 150 to 60, which has been seen as an oligarchic “*chiusura*” (closing), should probably be linked to the unrest in Milan in 1518 in response to a new request for a financial levy [*taglia*]. During the Imperial occupation of 1525 to 1529, the Spanish captains in their desperate need of interlocutors turned apparently unwillingly to the Sixty or the Dieci delle Porte as representatives of the city. Certainly a fully-fledged Council of Sixty Decurioni, with duties of representation, is well-documented only from the second period of Francesco II Sforza’s government from 1530–5, when Milan and Italy had fallen under the overwhelming power of the Empire: another magistracy nominated from above and *a beneplacito* (at the will of the prince), on a territorial basis (the *porte*), and also on party lines (the supporters of the Sforza), and by social divisions (*maiores, mediocres, minores*).

Throughout the preceding period the absence of a civic council did not mean the absence of the city from the political scene: in practice political debate took place in informal meetings of the principal men, and for other social groups was expressed by shutting up the shops, in the case of the so-called ‘true men of Milan’, ‘not the magnates nor the lesser sort, but all citizens and merchants’,⁵² or by riots. Nevertheless, it was felt that more formal, even “constitutional”, means of expression were needed.

Almost all of the experiments in representation that succeeded one another at irregular intervals during the first three decades of the sixteenth century have to be seen as a special case, to be understood in its specific context, but the general impression is that there

⁵² Burigozzo, p. 423.

was continual need for a dialogue between the city and the government, stimulating a search for forms of representation. What traditional instruments were available to this end? Similar problems must have presented themselves, even if more rarely, during the period of Sforza rule. Forms that would commit the city were needed when the *translatio domini* (transfer of lordship) of Milan to Francesco Sforza was drawn up in 1450, and also in the successive oaths of fidelity to the dukes, who founded their authority on this popular investiture in the absence of Imperial investiture. Milan was then emerging from the Ambrosian republic, instituted in 1447 after the death of Duke Filippo Maria Visconti, during which the Council of Nine Hundred had become the 'principal constitutional basis of the republic' and was the expression of an electoral process that involved parishes and *porte*.⁵³ Parishes and *porte* also had a part in the transfer of powers to Francesco Sforza, and of the oath of fidelity to him and then to his successor, Galeazzo. The lack of a defined procedure is striking; all three gatherings differed in some way, in the location of the meeting or the nature of those summoned. One thing they did have in common—there was no mention of the civic institution provided for by the statutes, the Council of Nine Hundred. Two of the three provided for the summons of one man from each household (the *caput* (head) or *principalis* (principal), and there were references to different social groups—'tam patritiis et senatoribus quam etiam nobilibus et plebeis' (patricians and senators as well as nobles and plebeians). In all of them, in various ways, parishes and *porte* were involved, either as elements of a general assembly or as special separate assemblies (by *porte* or by parishes). In one case, these assemblies were only the first step for the nomination of proctors to represent the *porta*.⁵⁴

We are, therefore, dealing with events, not institutions defined once and for all. It is significant that very soon after taking power,

⁵³ F. Somaini, *Un prelato lombardo del XV secolo. Il card. Giovanni Arcimboldi vescovo di Novara, arcivescovo di Milano*, 3 vols (Rome, 2003), I, pp. 30–1; M. Spinelli, 'Ricerche per una nuova storia della Repubblica Ambrosiana. II', *Nuova rivista storica*, 71 (1987), pp. 30–2.

⁵⁴ For 1450: A. Colombo, 'L'ingresso di Francesco Sforza a Milano e l'inizio di un nuovo principato', *Archivio storico lombardo*, 32 (1905), III, pp. 297–344, IV, pp. 33–101; for the oaths to Galeazzo Maria: Biblioteca Nazionale Braidense, Miscellanea Sitoni di Scozia, AG X 36, 'Singularia ducum Sfortiadum collecta ab Iureconsulto Ioseph Benalio', 1690, vol. II (quotation in the text from assembly of Porta Comasina, 28 Dec. 1469).

Francesco Sforza sought the consent of the city for the decision to rebuild the castle, by turning to the parish assemblies.⁵⁵ It is also significant that in 1474, when Duke Galeazzo Maria was constrained by difficulties in his relations with Rome to give public proof of the consent of the city to his fiscal and monetary policy, his secretaries automatically thought of summoning the parish assemblies. That this was considered an obligatory but not an easy choice was evident from the fear of an unfavourable outcome, and from the attempts to indoctrinate and influence the principal and most “trustworthy” men of the neighbourhood beforehand. At this date, therefore, the parish assemblies were the obvious points of reference, while the court did not think of the Council of Nine Hundred—which might indeed cause concern as a great gathering of citizens, but which according to the statutes was composed of men chosen by the government. In fact, it was immediately adopted as ‘a much quicker way, more feasible and more secure and no less honourable’ as soon as a Milanese jurist refreshed the memory of the ducal chancellors.⁵⁶ If the oversight of 1450 could have been due to the situation at the time, with the search for consent “from below”, that of 1474 indicates that this institution, created by Azzone Visconti in 1330, strictly in the interests of the power of the *signore*, and appointed from above, less than a century after the revision of the statutes of 1396 that regulated it was practically unknown to the new Milanese dynasty.

Moreover, both forms of assembly were extremely rare. They were not the usual means of dialogue between the prince and the city. In the Sforza period, or at least in its last decades, the interlocutor was usually the *popolo* organized according to social and professional groups. This type of meeting was useful above all for the initial communication between the government and the city, to inform, publicize decisions and promote consensus through speeches by the prince to great assemblies in which were represented social groups, the *gentiluomini*, the professional colleges and the trade guilds. These types of assemblies or *parlamenti*, which apparently could not be used to take legally binding decisions, are referred to until almost the last

⁵⁵ Bernardino Corio, *Storia di Milano*, ed. A. Morisi Guerra, 2 vols (Turin, 1978), pp. 1335–6.

⁵⁶ Letters of Fabrizio Elfito, edited by P. Ghinzoni, ‘L’inquinto, ossia una tassa odiosa del secolo XV’, *Archivio storico lombardo*, 11 (1884), pp. 500, 502–3, 505–11, 514, 522–3.

days of the government of Ludovico il Moro. Only then, and in particular when attempts were being made to organize the defence of the city, was there recourse to the parishes.⁵⁷

These then were the traditions that could be drawn on when needed. It seems that by the end of the Sforza government, the practice of assemblies of parishes and *porte* and of the Council of Nine Hundred, had been almost lost: the course of the formation of the provisional government and of the approval of the *capitoli* of September 1499 appear to demonstrate this.

This tradition was recovered under the French, and perhaps at their initiative. There was a transition from the merely consultative assemblies, probably on a corporative basis, under Ludovico il Moro, to assemblies for various purposes on a territorial basis, by parish. The reasons for this choice perhaps sprang from tradition, but it may have been seen as a compromise between the need for a broadly-based consultation and the wish to avoid the adoption of irreconcilable positions, such as happened in September, when *artisti* (artisans) and prosperous groups had taken clearly contrasting positions on taxation. Parish assemblies elected *sindici*, procurators who met in an assembly of the *porta* and elected deputies of the *porta*. Sometimes, not always, all the deputies of the *porte* together constituted an assembly of the Twenty-Four that operated at city level, whose decisions were often submitted for ratification by the two lower-level councils. The chosen solution in 1499 was reminiscent of Savonarola's exhortation to the Florentines in a sermon of 14 December 1495: 'let the citizens meet together, each in their *gonfalone*, and let them consult together and discuss . . . the best form for your government to take', in what has been defined as a 'kind of popular referendum'.⁵⁸ In Milan, this concerned the content of the *capitoli* to be presented to the king.

Subsequently, in 1512–16, there was recourse to alternatives, to the Council of Nine Hundred or representation of social and professional groups, composed of the heads of the more important colleges and corporations and deputies of some religious institutions. In 1525 the Senate of Milan observed, with reference to the oaths of

⁵⁷ On this point, see G. P. Bognetti, 'Aspetti politici, sociali e istituzionali della prima dominazione straniera', in *Storia di Milano*, VIII, p. 10.

⁵⁸ N. Rubinstein, 'Politics and constitution in Florence at the end of the XV century', in F. Jacob (ed.), *Italian Renaissance Studies* (London, 1960), p. 161.

1499, 1513 and 1515, that ‘the city . . . had had to swear fidelity on three other such occasions, and had taken the oath in various ways, that is, once all the city was summoned, gentlemen, merchants and *popolari*, which resulted in great confusion; once, 900 men in all, of every condition were summoned; and another time two syndics were elected for each parish, who were to promise and swear fidelity in the name of the city.’⁵⁹ In the contract—literal not metaphorical—made between the city and the ducal chamber in July 1515 the city was represented by members of the professional colleges, of the association of merchants and the wool and silk corporations, by deputies of some of the most important *luoghi pii*, and by an unspecified number of ‘noble citizens’. A social and professional representation, therefore, probably used to avoid the risk of parish assemblies being influenced by the radical movement triggered by the promulgation of a new tax without prior consultation of the parishes.⁶⁰ Those ‘acting in the name of the community’, very probably self-appointed, limited themselves to acquiring some offices for the commune, the principal one among them that of the *vicario di provvisione*, and did not ask for elective magistracies instead. The same orientation was dominant in the *capitoli* of 1516, which although providing for one election from below—by the parish assemblies—still did not call for elected magistracies. In controlling the use of the revenues granted to the king, in association with the vicar and the Twelve, preference was given to representatives of social groups—four jurisconsults and four medical doctors, members of the college, as well as four ‘nobles and merchants’ chosen from among the deputies of the Ospedale Maggiore—rather than the Twenty-Four ‘della terra’.⁶¹

In the search for forms of broad representation, the initial choice was between the system based on territorial divisions, parishes, and the Council of Nine Hundred. The nomination from above of the Council of Nine Hundred (or the activation of restricted, socially-defined groups, merchants and professionals) obviously had the advantage of avoiding the infiltration of the *popolo minuto* and the *plebe* that could happen in the more open parish assemblies. Nevertheless, in the absence of the prince the Council of Nine Hundred would be

⁵⁹ Sanuto, XL, col. 384; ASMan, AGonzaga, b. 1655: 28 Nov. 1525.

⁶⁰ Prato, pp. 327–32; da Paullo, pp. 352–3; Burigozzo, pp. 424–5; Vegio, *Historia rerum*, pp. 2–5.

⁶¹ Prato, pp. 367–8.

elected by the parish assemblies (and apparently they could sometimes participate in the selection of the councillors even when the prince was not absent), and at times its decisions were subject to the ratification of the communities of the *porte* and even of the parish assemblies.⁶² On the other hand the parish assemblies did not necessarily give a voice to subordinate groups. From the available information about the syndics, it appears that these spokesmen of the populace were similar to the Dodici di Provvisione, and the Deputati dei Luoghi Pii: respectable merchants rather than high officials of the prince or magnates. In short, in this period the dialogue between the city and its governors either followed traditional, legally non-binding forms, when the duke or the French governor addressed assemblies representing social and professional groups; or extraordinary forms, in times of emergency, when groups of citizens acted on behalf of the community, without any mandate. Alternatively, means were sought which, from the prince's perspective, could impose legally binding obligations on the inhabitants and their property, or, from the city's perspective, could involve the various levels of the populace in the formation of a communal will: the Council of Nine Hundred, or, more often, the *porte* and the parishes. These were real, base organizations, civic and religious, with statutory duties, including administrative ones, similar to those imposed on rural communities, but which, if they were to act politically, needed a specific mandate from the prince authorizing a meeting for those precise purposes.

Naturally, it could be asked if the impression of novelty and of the strengthening and revitalization of these neighbourhood organizations in the years of the Italian Wars is justified, or whether it might not just be an optical illusion linked to the unusual degree of attention that civic life aroused in numerous observers, diplomats and chroniclers, during the prolonged emergency, or to the fortuitous emergence of a certain number of notarial documents. (Parish meetings were not always recorded by a notary: there are references to decisions and elections made 'ore', by voice, then ratified later.)⁶³ Should a specifically French influence be seen in the recourse to these forms of representation? An argument could certainly be made

⁶² ASMi, Notarile, 5085, 18 June 1512.

⁶³ For example, *ibid.*, 6073, 9 June 1512; 5524, 17 Apr. 1500.

for this: the fiscal policy of Louis XII in Milan, with the involvement of the parish assemblies, recalls that of Louis XI towards the French provincial estates.⁶⁴ The analogy between the dualism of prince and representative institutions and that of prince and city is enhanced by formal analogies with the procedures for the convocation of the third estate, at least in some parts of the kingdom of France.⁶⁵ It is possible that it was the provisional government of Milan that first thought of having recourse to this system, to play for time in dealings with the victors, and to confront and if possible integrate the popular movement that was pursuing its own fiscal and constitutional aims.

In the first case, there would be an active influence of the invaders in the development of new forms, or rather, in the development and use of traditional forms; in the second case the invasion would simply be the trigger. During the crisis of 1499 to 1502 parishes and *porte* came into play to agree the submission of the city, swear fidelity, debate the forms and levels of taxation, commit the citizens to payment of the *taglia*, and organize its payment. Analogous circumstances brought them back into play in the years 1511 to 1516, while during the last years of the French dominion, up to 1521, it appears that recourse to the parishes on fiscal matters was avoided. Between 1521 and 1525, as the war with the French continued, Francesco II Sforza does not seem to have called on the parishes for the oath of fidelity, but he certainly involved them in administrative matters. Military responsibilities were added to fiscal ones, as *porte* and parishes formed the framework of the militia planned by Gerolamo Morone. With the Imperial occupation, the parish assemblies constituted the obligatory way, deprecated but necessary, to obtain the oath of fidelity, even if the desire of the Imperial captains to avoid this means in favour of more restricted councils or magistracies was evident.

Representation based on territorial divisions of parishes and *porte* recurred throughout this period, therefore, in episodes of popular unrest and in meetings at the behest of the prince. But what was the significance of this kind of representation?

⁶⁴ J. R. Major, *Representative Government in Early Modern France* (London, 1980), p. 43.

⁶⁵ J. R. Major, 'The electoral procedure for the Estates general of France and its social implications', in *idem*, *The Monarchy, the Estates and the Aristocracy in Renaissance France* (London, 1988).

In Lombard cities in the fifteenth century, representation could be by territorial division, by social group or by party or political faction. If the 'horizontal' nature of representation by social group appears in clear contrast to 'vertical' representation by parties, representation by territorial division is more ambiguous. *Prima facie* it is the most democratic: all the men in the neighbourhood were called on to take part; if it was not quite the triumph of individualism it might at least be that of the small local networks of clients of the parish notables; furthermore the clustering of some types of industrial premises in certain areas could make the parishes a forum for the trade corporations.

But this hypothesis is contradicted by the inequalities implicit in the system. The six *porte* each included an unequal quota of the hundred or so parishes in Milan, which were very different from each other socially and in numbers of residents. Each parish, whatever its population, whether rich or poor, counted as one in the assembly of the *porta*, and consequently at city level, that of the 24 deputies of the *porte*, the quota of representation of a parish such as Porta Nuova or Porta Romana was perceptibly higher than that of the numerous parishes of Porta Orientale. So we have territorial bodies, the *porte*, that met each other with an equal number of representatives. Within them, other entities confronted one another, the parishes, less clearly defined but nevertheless endowed with a legal identity. The parity was between entities, not persons, similar to the situation in other cities of the duchy under the Sforza, where representation in the councils was of another type of entity, of factions.

What cohesion an administrative neighbourhood might express must have differed profoundly in small parishes, in which there were daily contacts and physical proximity between neighbours, from that in large parishes which could have as many as 7,500 inhabitants, like San Babila. The network of a hundred or so parishes was an irregular web, crowded at the centre and then very broad on the periphery. Especially in the parishes in which the great families were settled—the Trivulzio at San Nazzaro in Brolo, the Borromeo at Santa Maria Podone—the theoretically egalitarian bond of the neighbourhood shaded into the hierarchical link of clientele or patronage.

The system of parish assemblies presented various problems. One was the basis on which participation in the assemblies would be founded: those who owned houses in the parish or all the heads of households (it is rare to find explicit references to the *artesiani* of the

neighbourhood participating as such). In general, for each parish the number of participants in the assemblies is clearly greater than the number of those assessed for the *estimo* of 1524, the minimum assessment for which was at least the equivalent of the price of a modest house. The lists of those attending reveal a striking variety of social conditions. Magnates occasionally took part in the parish assemblies, although often they were absent. There were also great variations in the number of participants.

Evidently, there were no clear rules that determined the validity of the parish assembly. Some indication of a legal majority is given in references to ‘duae partes ex tribus’ (two-thirds) or ‘tres partes ex quattuor’ (three-quarters) or the ambiguous phrase ‘maior et sanior pars’ (‘the greater and sounder part’—in a qualitative and not necessarily a quantitative sense);⁶⁶ but no check was made. It is not clear whether the decisions of the assembly were binding on those who were not there. One indication of the non-binding character of the deliberations comes from the acts of ratification (more usual in matters concerning the exercise of rights of patronage than in political and administrative matters) by which one or more men of the neighbourhood declared their adherence to the decisions taken earlier by those assembled.⁶⁷ Consequently, what had been decided by an assembly could be overturned at a subsequent meeting. The status of the decision appears to have been affected by the composition of the parish assembly, with those against in effect expressing their opinion by their absence.

The system did not always work in a way that would allow the formation of a common will of the city. In some cases this did happen: the parishes elected representatives to meet together with others elected from the same *porta*, who together would elect the syndics (generally four) of the *porta*, and the syndics of the *porte* (generally 24) meeting together acted for the city. The system of imperative mandates, however, obstructed in principle taking decisions binding on all. In October 1499, some parishes explicitly barred their representatives from committing them to accept *dazi* (customs dues).⁶⁸ In this way the system favoured resistance rather than partnership

⁶⁶ See P. Michaud-Quantin, *Universitas. Expressions du mouvement communautaire dans le Moyen Âge latin* (Paris, 1970), pp. 280 ff.

⁶⁷ For example, ASMi, Notarile, 5681, 28 Apr. 1500; 5258, 8 June 1512.

⁶⁸ Arcangeli, ‘Esperimenti di governo’, p. 279.

with the government. Asked to give an opinion on extraordinary subsidies or to commit themselves to oaths of loyalty, parish assemblies sometimes became instead flash-points for uprisings (as happened in 1514),⁶⁹ or at any rate occasions for the organization of opposition, when, that is, the order for assembly was not ignored, as was apparently the case, for almost all the parishes, for the oath of loyalty to the Imperial captains in 1525–6. Only if the political and military situation rendered these forms of resistance impracticable, were the parish assemblies an effective instrument of coercion, through which the men of the neighbourhood were bound to a complex system of guarantees, collective and individual, as for the payment of the *taglia* in 1500–2. They were also an instrument of co-operation and of consent, in that the men of the neighbourhood could be assigned organizational tasks, such as administering extraordinary contributions like taxes or the militia, as in 1500–1, or, in the co-operation of government and *popolo* against the French during the years 1521–5. This is probably the motive for which the parishes continued to be summoned throughout the period of the French domination, despite attempts by the middle and upper social groups to monopolize representation.

3. In conclusion, what did it mean to be citizens of Milan during the Italian wars? It is evident that in Milan the Aristotelian definition of citizenship as participation in the civic magistracies and a vote in deliberative assemblies cannot be applied, unless the parish assemblies, with their intermittent meetings, are considered the equivalent of stable deliberative assemblies. They were not, and nor were there elective magistracies for citizens: this is the institutional aspect of that absence of “vivere politico” that Machiavelli and Guicciardini imputed to Lombardy. To be citizens of Milan did mean sharing in the liberties, privileges and laws of the city, each according to his own status, following another classic medieval definition of citizenship. It appears significant that when the Milanese statutes were reformed, it was these norms that had precedence over the statutes *de regimine* (concerning the government) that should have fixed the rules for political citizenship.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ da Paulo, pp. 341–4.

⁷⁰ On the reform of the statutes, see G. Di Renzo Villata, ‘La vita del diritto

In the end, the presence of the ultramontane armies and powers rendered the enjoyment of this minimum level of *libertà*, of citizenship, uncertain. At the same time it required political responses contributing to the creation of other definitions of citizenship: citizenship understood as consultative and administrative participation in decisions, above all fiscal decisions, concerning the city; or citizenship as the right and the duty to be consulted about peace and war (in the sense of deciding what to do when changes of regime were imminent), or citizenship as the right and the duty to defend the city. Arising from this, was what appears to be an important innovation: the growth of a sense of military, and not just political, citizenship, that can be grasped well from Burigozzo's chronicle. For him, the true citizens were the middle classes, ready to mobilize in defence of what may be defined as civil rights (the right to property in the face of levies, the right to respect for the person in dealings with the occupying armies), but also in defence of the natural prince. In its pages can also be detected a renewal of the ancient pride of the citizen called to arms and skilled in military exercises.⁷¹ This martial identity of the people of Milan is confirmed in other sources too: for example, Venetians reporting from Milan noted that, in the climate of sullen hostility to the Spanish in December 1525, 'all the Milanese had their arms and their pikes with them in their shops' (the population would be disarmed after the unrest of June 1526).⁷² The expansion of military citizenship also emerges from a comparison of the lists of exiles from the first two decades of the Cinquecento and those of the third, when, as Burigozzo observed, the provision included 'all those who were captains of the parishes, all the standard bearers and all those who were suspect, and also some poor folk.'⁷³

But above all the citizens and inhabitants of the city, whatever their social profile, were participants in a debate about the political and constitutional fortunes of the state. There are numerous testimonies to the claim to the right to counsel the prince. Certainly these primarily concern the middle and upper levels of the population of the city, but not exclusively. It was a large assembly of over

nella Milano quattrocentesca', in *Milano nell'età di Ludovico il Moro*, 2 vols (Milan, 1983), pp. 149–50; Arcangeli, 'Gian Giacomo Trivulzio', p. 23.

⁷¹ Burigozzo, p. 435.

⁷² Sanuto, XL, cols 449–50; XLI, col. 744; XLII, col. 22.

⁷³ Burigozzo, pp. 447–8.

3,000 people that in March 1500 wanted to finance and direct the war, limiting it to Venice and the defence of Milanese territory, and that proposed to resolve by judicial means the contest between Orléans and Sforza over the inheritance of the duchy of Milan.⁷⁴

Other questions arose out of these pre-eminently political and military preoccupations. In June 1512, the supporters of an independent republic of Milan, with the Swiss in its pay, as proposed by Trivulzio, were countered by those who saw in this either the risk of an actual *signoria* of Trivulzio, or too precarious a defence against the risk of the dismemberment of the state. Against this threat the strongest card seemed to be the restoration of the “natural” prince, Massimiliano Sforza, not, to be sure, for his political and military qualities—as a minor he could not be the captain to whom defence could be entrusted, but rather as the living symbol of the unity of the state and of its legitimacy in the ambit of Imperial law. On the other hand the idea of upholding the restoration of the Sforza, even against the victorious members of the league, who had initially declared this to be their objective and who then seemed to be tempted to divide up the state of Milan, found opponents among those, in hindsight ‘prudentes’, fearful of the inexperience of the ‘young prince’ and of domination by favourites, and certainly also preoccupied by the possibility that this solution would favour violent revenge by the Sforza faction.⁷⁵

Themes debated and requests advanced reveal the awareness of the citizens of Milan of being citizens of a city outstanding in its size, its riches and its power:⁷⁶ economic power and also power in men, capable of taking up arms. Burigozzo appears completely absorbed in a civic vision of citizenship—one that nevertheless included a strong sense of loyalty to the duke—and not concerned with the duchy of Milan. In the doctor Scipione Vegio, there was a proud awareness of belonging to a city of regional dimensions, so to speak, a city ‘potent’ in arms and riches, a city on which depended, therefore, the ‘*conditio pacis bellique*’ (outcome of peace and war), and also the making and unmaking of princes; and the consciousness of the rights stemming from this—rights to give counsel at the level of

⁷⁴ Arcangeli, ‘Ludovico tiranno?’, in *idem*, *Gentiluomini di Lombardia*, pp. 147–8.

⁷⁵ Arluno, col. 203.

⁷⁶ Prato, p. 377.

the state, rights to discuss and control taxation, rights to discuss ducal decisions and decrees. On the other hand, there was the sense of a clear divergence between the world of the citizens and that of the professional soldiers (a divergence that sounds a new note in this group of texts, and is evidently the outcome of recent experiences): the refusal to take risks for military objectives, to defend the territorial integrity of the dominion or to choose the prince; the objectives were limited to an exclusively civic autonomy: 'if it comes to war, let those who will take up arms, we will stay on the sidelines, watching, and be with the victor; if he does not trample on the ancient rights (*vetera iura*) of our city' (bearing in mind these *vetera iura urbis* should not be taken to include supremacy over Lombardy).⁷⁷ Yet many thought of their city as a capital. This is evident from the debates of June and July 1512, that were concerned not just with the fate of the city of Milan but with that of the state, of the *imperium mediolanense*, or from specific requests such as in 1512, the restitution of all the lands occupied by Venice since the fifteenth century,⁷⁸ or, finally, in the strategy of a movement not of the *plebe*, nor of magistrates, but of the *popolo*, that sought contacts with the communities of the *contado* and the other cities of the state, with common action in mind.⁷⁹ Participation in this broad debate, feeling engaged with a common problem is, therefore, much more than participation in magistracies, what defined being a citizen of Milan, and in this sense citizenship was shared by all social groups, who each played a part in their own way, with their own modes of action and of discourse.

⁷⁷ Vegio, *Historia rerum*, p. 4.

⁷⁸ Sanuto, XIV, col. 403.

⁷⁹ Prato, p. 329; Sanuto, XLI, col. 611.

A QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY:
FRANCE AND GENOA, 1494–1528

George L. Gorse

In his magisterial *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology*, Ernst Kantorowicz theorized the French *adventus*, the “Advent of the King” or triumphal entry, based upon medieval chivalry and the “mirror of princes”, *speculum principis* or primers of princely virtues, in which “sovereignty”, God’s legitimizing authority, emanated, as from a mirror, from the monarch’s body on earth, to be “revealed”, in God’s “reflection”, to his people, towns and realm, during “*la joyeuse entrée*,” a royal *fête* of nature’s abundance, within a highly-mediated processional ritual space. The “King’s two bodies” (sacred and temporal, sacred-made-temporal), according to Kantorowicz, constituted a “medieval political theology”, a precedent for seventeenth- and eighteenth-century notions of the “Divine Right of Kings”, that reinterpreted Christ’s Entry into Jerusalem and Roman imperial triumphal entry ceremony.¹

From the turbulent world of Italian politics after the French invasion of Charles VIII in 1494, the Florentine humanist historian, military captain and governor, Francesco Guicciardini, rendered a very different, oppositional perspective on these de-stabilizing developments. In Book I of *Storia d’Italia*, Guicciardini camped the French King with his imposing army before the gates of Firenze at Signa sull’Arno in November 1494, where ‘by many indications it was understood that the King’s idea was to frighten the Florentines, by his military strength, into yielding absolute rule of the city over to him; nor was he able to conceal this plan from *the ambassadors who had come to him several times at Signa to decide upon the mode of his entry into Florence, and complete the agreement under negotiation*’.² For Guicciardini,

¹ Ernst Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology* (Princeton, NJ, 1957); *idem*, *Laudes regiae: a study in liturgical acclamation and mediaeval ruler worship, with a study of the music of the laudes and musical transcriptions by Manfred F. Bukofzer* (Berkeley, CA, 1946).

² Francesco Guicciardini, *The History of Italy*, trans. and ed. Sidney Alexander

la joyeuse entrée was anything but “joyous” and the invasion of foreign powers with superior military technology represented (more than anything else) a “crisis in sovereignty” for Italian city-states, what Machiavelli called “la crisi d’Italia.” Monarchs could enter the peninsula or territorial city-state as sovereign, ally or conqueror. Extraordinarily, Guicciardini’s passage reveals a complex negotiation, of potential and actual violence, not one-sided, unfolding divine revelation, in the working out of triumphal entry and the determination of local “sovereignty”, mutual obligation, a relational rather than autonomous concept.

This paper explores the competing French and Italian notions of “sovereignty”, focusing on Genoa, which in many ways is a key to the question of the impact of France on Italy during the Italian wars. In narratives of “the crisis of Italy”, Naples (the ancient siren of Parthenope’s Neapolis that lured rustic Romans to Greek *luxuria*) is always the unstable element, the “apple” in the “garden of Eden” (as lyric, chivalric crusader epics of Charles VIII’s entry into “this garden of Italy” stress), in which rival claims to the Kingdom of Naples and Sicily by the Angevins and Aragonese sparked northern European invasion and loss of independence (that is, loss of “innocence”) by Italian states, indeed of the entire fifteenth-century balance of the Italian state system after the Peace of Lodi of 1454.³ However, Genoa was just as unstable as Naples, and was close to France, a convenient “hinge” between Provence, Marseilles, and Italy, a strategic gateway to northern Italy, the fertile Lombard plain and Duchy of Milan, a rich maritime republic plagued, just as Naples was, by powerful rival factions and perpetual internecine violence,

(London, 1969), p. 61 (my italics). Compare this with French royal and local civic chronicles of Charles VIII’s triumphal entry into Italy (see note 4 below).

³ See, for instance, the Neapolitan court humanist and diplomat, Giovanni Pontano’s Virgilian lyric poem, “Lepidina” (of ca. 1496, but conceived earlier in response to the French invasion and period of dynastic instability), a classical foundation myth for Aragonese Naples as “a garden paradise” after the ancient Greek and Roman Bay of Naples: Cecilia M. Ady, ‘The Invasions of Italy’, in *The New Cambridge Modern History I: The Renaissance 1493–1520*, ed. Denis Hay (Cambridge, 1957), p. 343; George L. Hersey, *Alfonso II and the Artistic Renewal of Naples 1485–1495* (New Haven, CT, 1969), pp. 18–26; Bonner Mitchell, *Italian Civic Pageantry in the High Renaissance: A Descriptive Bibliography of Triumphal Entries and Selected Other Festivals for State Occasions* (Florence, 1979), pp. 5–14, 95–9; and Bonner Mitchell, *The Majesty of the State: Triumphal Progresses of Foreign Sovereigns in Renaissance Italy (1494–1600)* (Florence, 1986), pp. 1–17, 57–84.

resulting in weak communal government, a rich Mediterranean *città portuale* ripe for the taking.⁴

Genoa did not wait for foreign claims by Angevin or Aragonese or Hohenstaufen monarchs. Genoa often gave itself up to neighbouring, more powerful lords from Milan, Savoy, even Montferrat, or France, unable to stabilize its own government of “perpetual Doges” (who were anything but “perpetual,” often ruling but months, days, even hours), established in the early fourteenth century. The doges were elected by the councils from the rival Fregoso and Adorno *popolare* families, because nobles could not be elected to the office of doge. Only a few historians of Genoa could even recount the chronology of, never mind understand, Genoa’s political history from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the period of crisis in Genoese communal history that began long before the “crisis of Italy,” after the medieval “golden age” of crusade and expansion into the “Mediterranean world” from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries. Thwarted externally by Venice and Islam, and internally by civil war, Genoa was stabilized in part by the rise after 1407 of the powerful Banco di San Giorgio, which Machiavelli called ‘lo stato dentro lo stato’, with its control over taxation and funding, and even governorship of Corsica and other lucrative colonies.⁵

⁴ For medieval descriptions of Genoa that discuss the metaphor of Ianua as “the gateway to Italy and the Mediterranean”, “a harbour amphitheatre into a mountainous Elysian field”, see Giovanna Petti Balbi, *Genova medievale vista dai contemporanei* (Genoa, 1978, pp. 76–83 and *passim*). The disruption of this idyll by Genoese “old noble” family factional violence and resulting communal insecurity figures prominently in Guicciardini’s *Storia d’Italia*, Bk. 7, vol. I, 216; as well as the famous Genoese public chroniclers from Caffaro in the eleventh century through to the Genoese republic of 1528: *Annali genovesi di Caffaro e dei suoi continuatori*, trans. Ceccardo Roccatagliata Ceccardi, Giovanni Monleone et al. (Genoa, 1923–9), 7 vols; Agostino Giustiniani, *Annali della Repubblica di Genova* (Genoa, 1537; repr. Bologna, 1981); Giacomo Bonfadio, *Gli annali di Genova dall’1528 che ricuperò la libertà, fino al 1550*, trans. Bartolomeo Paschetti (Genoa, 1597); Paolo Interiano, *Ristretto delle historie genovesi* (Lucca, 1551); Uberto Foglietta, *Istorie di Genova* (Genoa, 1597; repr. Bologna, 1969). For later travel accounts of this “entry port into Italy”, see Massimo Quaini (ed.), *La conoscenza del territorio ligure fra medio evo ed età moderna* (Genoa, 1981); Giuseppe Marcenaro, *Viaggiatori stranieri in Liguria* (Genoa, 1987); Franco Paloscia (ed.), *Genova dei grandi viaggiatori* (Rome, 1990); Giuseppe Marcenaro and Piero Boragina (eds.), *Viaggio in Italia: un corteo magico dal Cinquecento al Novecento*, exhibition catalogue, Palazzo Ducale, Genoa (Milan, 2001).

⁵ See, for example, Jacques Heers, *Gênes au XV^e siècle: activité économique et problèmes sociaux* (Paris, 1961); Teofilo Ossian De Negri, *Storia di Genova* (Milan, 1974); Gabriella Airaldi, *Genova e la Liguria nel Medioevo* (Torino, 1986); Giovanna Petti Balbi, *Una città e il suo mare: Genova nel Medioevo* (Bologna, 1991); Giuseppe Gallo, *La Repubblica*

For Genoa was a city of *private* family wealth and power over *public* communal authority and space, the antithesis of Venice and in many ways a counter-myth to the “myth of Venice” and “the rise of Italian Medieval and Renaissance communes” (what Jacob Burckhardt called “The State as a Work of Art”).⁶ Foreign *Signori* played a crucial role in Genoa’s troubled history, from before the Black Death arrived on homeward ships from Caffa and the Black Sea, to the early sixteenth century and the foundation of the Genoese Habsburg republic of admiral Andrea Doria in September, 1528: can one imagine this happening in Venice? Genoa was “in crisis” long before the “crisis of Italy”, and this brilliantly volatile commercial port or city-state (that is the question!) served as a principal actor in the “Mediterranean theatre” (Braudel and the Genoese Lopez recognized this long ago), just as it did in the “crisis of Italy” after 1494.⁷

With the question of the impact of France on Italy complementing the more traditional question of the influence of Italy on France during this period, another related query might be a “deconstruction” of the very myth of Italian fifteenth-century “harmony” and “balance”—a “Golden Age” (Guicciardini and others termed it)—dis-

di Genova tra nobili e popolari (1257–1528) (Genoa, 1997); Steven A. Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese 958–1528* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1996); Christine Shaw, *The Politics of Exile in Renaissance Italy* (Cambridge, 2000); Christine Shaw, ‘Principles and Practice in the Civic Government of Fifteenth-Century Genoa’, *Renaissance Quarterly*, 58 (2005), pp. 45–90; Heinrich Sieveking, ‘Studio sulle finanze Genovesi nel Medioevo, e in particolare sulla Casa di S. Giorgio’, *Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria*, 35 (1905–6); Roberto S. Lopez, *Storia delle colonie Genovesi nel Mediterraneo* (Genoa, 1996); Giuseppe Felloni, ‘Scritti di Storia Economica’, *Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria*, Nuova Serie, 38 (112), Fasc. I (1998).

⁶ Roberto S. Lopez, ‘Venise et Gênes: deux styles, une réussite’, *Su e giù per la storia di Genova* (Genoa, 1975), pp. 35–42. For the insight of Genoa as a “counter-myth” to Venice and the rise of medieval communes in modern historiography: Rodolfo Savelli, ‘Il rovescio e il diritto: immagini e problemi della storia di Genova in età moderna’, in Piero Boccardo, Clario Di Fabio and Raffaella Besta (eds), *El Siglo de los Genoveses e una lunga Storia di Arte e Splendori nel Palazzo dei Dogi*, exhibition catalogue (Milan, 1999), pp. 15–21. For “The State as a Work of Art”, Jacob Burckhardt, *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy: An Essay*, trans. S. G. C. Middlemore (London, 1965), pp. 1–80.

⁷ Lopez, *Storia delle colonie Genovesi*; Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (New York, 1975); Piero Pieri, *Il rinascimento e la crisi militare italiana* (Turin, 1952); Lauro Martines, *Power and Imagination: City-States in Renaissance Italy* (New York, 1979). I thank Professor Geoffrey Symcox of the U.C.L.A. History Department for the Pieri reference and for his other corrections of this essay.

rupted or violated by French invasion (the barbarian gender metaphors abound), an Hegelian-Marxist opposition of “Italian Renaissance *polis* or city-state” to French “Medieval Feudal foreign tyrannical sovereignty”, and of the complementary roles in this historical “rupture” of Milan-Genoa and Naples-Sicily, flanking the Papal States and central Italian city-states to north and south, during this fertile period of mutual interchange and conflict, leading to a larger European integration.⁸ So let us turn to this crucial period of French impact on Genoa from 1494 until the Doria Habsburg republic of 1528, that played such a key (instrumental, yet always under-estimated or ignored) role in the Italian wars and the course of European, Italian, Mediterranean, and “New World” history.

Rival French and Genoese theories of sovereignty dramatically embedded the contrasting triumphal entries of French King Louis XII into Genoa in 1502 and 1507. These constitute a major case study that serves to focus the critical historical issues on the relationship between France and Italy during the Renaissance, a ritual “double helix” that intertwines, brackets, and animates the entire era and geo-political situation. Claiming royal precedence, a deluxe commemorative manuscript by official, eye-witness French court chronicler, Jean d’Auton (Figure 1), portrays the Orléans king, heir to Charles VIII, during the third French campaign into Italy, triumphally entering and “taking possession of” his subject Mediterranean entry port city of Genoa on 26 August 1502.⁹ During 1499, Louis XII

⁸ “Golden Age” metaphors (lost and refound) abound in Renaissance historiography, rhetoric, and the visual arts: Harry Levin, *The Myth of the Golden Age in the Renaissance* (Oxford, 1969); Ernst Gombrich, ‘Renaissance and Golden Age’, *Norm and Form: Studies in the Art of the Renaissance* (London, 1971), pp. 29–34; Dale Kent, *Cosimo de’ Medici and the Florentine Renaissance* (New Haven, CT, 2000); and Janet Cox-Rearick, *Dynasty and Destiny in Medici Art: Pontormo, Leo X, and the Two Cosimos* (Princeton, NJ, 1984).

⁹ This article presents an opportunity to rethink issues considered in George L. Gorse, ‘Between Republic and Empire: Triumphal entries into Genoa during the sixteenth century’, in Barbara Wisch and Susan Scott Munshower (eds), *“All the world’s a stage . . .”*: *Art and Pageantry in the Renaissance and Baroque*, vol. VI (University Park, PA, 1990), Part 1, pp. 188–257. Sharpening issues of gender, of royal entry into urban space, seem most pressing here. In response to this paper, Professor Nicole Hochner of Hebrew University in Jerusalem offered a cogent critique, in which Louis XII and (what I interpret as) the “Sword of State” were viewed as images of “Justice” in both the 1502 and 1507 entries. I accept this criticism as the “French side”—the other edge of the Sword of State—in these royal-civic entries (where I am arguing a French-Genoese dialogue or opposition of power and cross-representation, from the Genoese perspective), which Professor Hochner will develop

entered Italy to overthrow the Milanese Duke Ludovico Sforza and consolidate his power in northern Italy, making Genoa a French dependency with a governor, Philippe de Ravenstein.¹⁰ As Milan went, so did Genoa, and vice versa; they were interdependent and strategic to the control of the peninsula, north and south, from Milan-Genoa to Naples-Sicily, gateway to the Mediterranean.

Suited to the occasion, the youthful Crowned Sovereign is shown dressed “in state” with golden (i.e., sun) cuirass and *fleurs-de-lys*, mounted on a joyous white steed with flaming golden horns.¹¹ Just Sword of State in his right hand, Louis thrusts his sovereign implement into the royal blue, red and gold baldachin above his head, the colours of France outside, of Orléans within, an epidermal frame, held aloft by eight Genoese (who, according to contemporary Genoese chroniclers, the learned Dominican Scholastic, Agostino Giustiniani, and the chancellor humanist, Bartolomeo Senarega, were chosen after intense dispute for precedence between rival factions of *nobili* and *popolari*), a tacit confession of local civic disunity and French foreign sovereignty.¹² In particular, Senarega protested about the

and surely enrich in a forthcoming book on Louis XII's royal iconography. One thought follows on the Aristotelian theory of “punitive and redistributive (i.e., the two sides of) Justice”, in Nicolai Rubinstein, ‘Political ideas in Sienese art: The frescoes by Ambrogio Lorenzetti and Taddeo di Bartolo in the Palazzo Pubblico’, *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, 22 (1959), pp. 179–207; Randolph Starn and Loren Partridge, *Arts of Power: Three Halls of State in Italy, 1300–1600* (Berkeley, CA, 1992), pp. 9–80. These balancing notions might relate to (what I see as) the affirming and punitive aspects of the 1502 and 1507 triumphal entries, analyzed below.

¹⁰ Francesco Guicciardini, *Storia d'Italia*, ed. Franco Catalano, 3 vols (Milan, 1975), Bks. IV–V, vol. II, pp. 101–188; Ady, ‘The Invasions of Italy’, pp. 355–8; Jean d'Auton, *Chroniques de Louis XII*, 4 vols, ed. René de Maulde La Clavière (Paris, 1889–95), III, pp. 43–85; Bartolomeo Senarega, *De rebus genuensibus commentaria ab anno MCDLXXVIII usque ad annum MDXIV*, ed. Emilio Pandiani, *Rerum italicarum scriptores*, XXIV (Bologna, 1932), pp. 87–90; Giustiniani, *Annali della Repubblica di Genova*, Bk. VI, pp. 257–258; Achille Neri, ‘La venuta di Luigi XII a Genova nel MDII descritta da Benedetto da Porto’, *Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria*, 12 (1877–84), pp. 922–5; Mitchell, *The Majesty of the State*, 87–90; and Gorse, ‘Between Empire and Republic’, pp. 190–192.

¹¹ d'Auton, *Chroniques de Louis XII*, III, pp. 52–58. A fine colour illustration of this magnificent manuscript page is in Luciano Grossi Bianchi and Ennio Poleggi, *Una città portuale del Medioevo: Genova nei secoli X–XVI* (Genoa, 1980), p. 161.

¹² Giustiniani, *Annali della Repubblica di Genova*, Bk. VI, pp. 257–8; Senarega, *De rebus genuensibus*, pp. 88–90; Mitchell, *The Majesty of the State*, pp. 87–90. These factional conflicts between *nobili* and *popolari* animate numerous civic rituals and government overthrows throughout the *Annali genovesi di Caffaro e dei suoi continuatori* (see note 4).

covering of local civic symbols, the medieval republic's coats-of-arms, including the crusading Banner of St. George, beneath French royal heraldry and scenic splendor, as the triumphal cortège approached with trumpet heralds, lance guards, and Cardinal Chancellor, Georges d'Amboise, Archbishop of Rouen, at the King's side.¹³

According to d'Auton and eye-witness Genoese state chroniclers, who provide insightful cross-perspectives on these ceremonial encounters, Louis was received at the Ligurian frontier on his arduous mountain passage from Milan and Pavia, and by twelve Genoese nobles (perhaps evoking the Twelve Disciples, but replaced by a rejoicing, kneeling, white-clad choral reception in illumination of d'Auton) at the "holy" city gates of Genoa (a symbolic Jerusalem), in the western suburb of Fassolo, near the Lanterna, the great lighthouse of the port of Genoa (a classical allusion to the colossal Pharos, the seignorial lighthouse tower of Alexandria, one of the Seven Wonders of the World), where a Latin oration of welcome (a *laudatio*) was presented.¹⁴ This was Louis' entrance into what Braudel would call "the Mediterranean world",¹⁵ at a liminal threshold (in this case triumphal) between north and south, part of a medieval chivalric crusade tradition.

In this epic "journey of wonders" into "the promised land" of Roman history and Augustan imperial legend (another aspect of "sovereignty" from a northern trans-Alpine perspective), the city became the stage of cross-cultural encounter and representation. Genoa, Naples, and Venice were "gateways" between these worlds.¹⁶ By contrast to contemporary Mediterranean nautical portolan representations (Figure 2) of the *open* maritime city, with U-shaped, domed, columnar,

¹³ Senarega, *De rebus genuensibus*, pp. 88–90; Mitchell, *The Majesty of the State*, pp. 88–9. The significance of the "*Vexillum San Georgi*" (the military banner of St. George) for medieval Genoa in the Mediterranean is amply documented in the *Annali genovesi di Caffaro e dei suoi continuatori, passim*.

¹⁴ Cf. Kantorowicz (in note 1 above); and d'Auton, *Chroniques de Louis XII*, III, pp. 52–8. For the Lanterna and other "civic iconography" of the *città portuale*: Ennio Poleggi, *Iconografia di Genova e delle riviere* (Genoa, 1977); Grossi Bianchi and Poleggi, *Una città portuale del Medioevo*; Ennio Poleggi and Paolo Cevini, *Le città nella storia d'Italia: Genova* (Rome-Bari, 1981); Davide Roscelli, *La Lanterna, le torri del mare: le forme, le funzioni, la storia* (Genoa, 1991).

¹⁵ Braudel's influence constitutes a continued "French impact on Italy" in modern historiography, expanding Burckhardt into the larger maritime theatre.

¹⁶ For Venice, see Juergen Schulz, 'Jacopo de' Barberi's View of Venice: Map Making, City Views, and Moralized Geography before the Year 1500', *Art Bulletin*, 60 (1978), pp. 425–74.

piazzetta Venice to the east and enclosed, rounded, natural harbour, dense, porcupine-towered, arcaded Genoa to the west, the competing “columns of Hercules” within the Mediterranean, “portals” and opposing “hinges” between east and west, south and north,¹⁷ and to Hartmann Schedel’s famous printed cosmography, *Liber Chronicarum* (or *Nuremberg Chronicle*) of 1493 (Figure 3), a portable, bound, eschatological *mappamondo*, illustrated by woodcut artist Michael Wolgemut,¹⁸ Jean d’Auton’s (presumably French) anonymous illuminator (Figure 1) apparently adapted the visual conventions of a fortified walled city to a maritime city. He depicted Genoa as barely open to the sea, with a large central piazza that the Genoese never had (apart from the harbour itself), a kind of seal of French power on Genoa, directly above Louis’ head (and that potently threatening Sword of State), with a suspiciously French *rayonnant* style city gate that differs from the robust Genoese Romanesque-Gothic wall system of the 1150s and 1330s (Figure 4).¹⁹ In other words, the French re-imagined the city, their city—Gênes, not Genova—in media and ritual, the politics of cross-cultural representation *making* “sovereignty”, that mutual obligation and power.

As Louis XII approached the western city gate of San Tomaso, patron saint of tactile knowing, a triumphal arch adorned the piazza with ‘a spectacle of greenery all covered with apples, pomegranates and oranges like a chapel, at the top of which was attached the escutcheon of France with arms all plain to see’.²⁰ On the right hand, the paired *stemme* of France (for the king) and Brittany (for Queen Anne de Bretagne); ‘to the left and slightly below them’, that of

¹⁷ For the famous portolan maps of Jacopo Russo of ca 1520, see Guglielmo Cavallo *et al.*, *Due mondi a confronto 1492–1728: Cristoforo Colombo e l’apertura degli spazi*, Mostra storico-cartografico, Palazzo Ducale, Genoa (Rome, 1992), pp. 289–91; and for portolan navigational compass direction charts: J. B. Harley & David Woodward (eds), *The History of Cartography*, 2 vols (Chicago, 1992), *passim*.

¹⁸ Wolgemut was the teacher and collaborator of Albrecht Dürer in this technically demanding and lucrative graphic book medium. For Hartmann Schedel’s “View of Genoa” in the *Nuremberg Chronicle* of 1493: Poleggi, *Iconografia di Genova e delle riviere*, p. 71; Erwin Panofsky, *The Life and Art of Albrecht Dürer* (Princeton, NJ, 1971), pp. 19, 31; and Elisabeth Rucker, *Hartmann Schedels Weltchronik: das Grösste Buchunternehmen der Dürer-Zeit* (Munich, 1988).

¹⁹ For the Genoese wall system, major defence and civic iconography: note 14 above; Leone Carlo Forti, *Le fortificazioni di Genova* (Genoa, 1971); Colette Dufour Bozzo, *La porta urbana nel Medioevo: Porta Soprana di S. Andrea in Genova* (Rome, 1989).

²⁰ d’Auton, *Chroniques de Louis XII*, III, p. 55; Gorse, ‘Between Empire and Republic’, p. 190.

French governor Philippe de Ravenstein; with a Latin inscription in gold letters in between—‘Louis XII, King of the French, Lord of Genoa’: the classical, paradisaical Lombard style of the temporary *apparati* announced and confirmed alliance between France, Milan, and Genoa.²¹ ‘Men and women and little children [dressed in white], all shouted “France, France, France, France”’ in the piazza, while artillery hailed from the fortress (il Castelletto, above the city, significantly not pictured in d’Auton’s illumination, but to play a very prominent role in events soon to come).²²

Crossing the threshold to “inscribe” the city, Louis XII and his travelling court ‘of two hundred gentlemen of the King’s household, all on horseback’, were preceded and welcomed along the processional way ‘by the nobles and people’ of Genoa:

And from the portal of San Tomaso to the church of San Lorenzo, that is the great cathedral of Genoa, the streets were hung and adorned with tapestries and [precious] fabrics, worked with life-like, speaking images [with inscriptions]; [and the streets] were [abundantly] filled with women and young girls, of the middle and merchant class, all in white robes, and all beautifully and richly adorned [personifying, while engendering the city of bounty], who resembled nymphs and mythological goddesses more than human women. All the great street [within the city walls] where the King passed was [further] spread and made green with flowering branches and palms of oranges and pomegranates, planted with green apples hanging from the branches of the same trees.²³

Thus, Genoa became a fertile, linear, golden age, classical Garden of the Hesperides in wait for its Christian King.²⁴ At the cathedral, Louis paid homage to the assembled relics in the crusading chapel of the patron saint of purifying water, John the Baptist, to the left (on the priest’s right hand) of the high altar; and during the subsequent solemn Mass, the King pledged ‘to maintain and to keep the

²¹ d’Auton, *Chroniques de Louis XII*, III, pp. 55, 58; Gorse, ‘Between Empire and Republic’, p. 190.

²² d’Auton, *Chroniques de Louis XII*, III, p. 58; Gorse, ‘Between Empire and Republic’, p. 190.

²³ d’Auton, *Chroniques de Louis XII*, III, pp. 55–6. For a reconstruction of the processional route and major sites of entry: Gorse, ‘Between Empire and Republic’, pp. 190–2 and figure 5–4.

²⁴ Cf. Kantorowicz, *The King’s Two Bodies*; Mitchell, *The Majesty of the State*, p. 89; Gorse, ‘Between Empire and Republic’, pp. 190–1.

rights, franchises and liberties of *his* town of Genoa, as for the lord of this place it is fitting to do'.²⁵

The twelfth- and thirteenth-century cathedral of San Lorenzo (Figure 5) itself represented French influence in stone, with its soaring Lombard Gothic triumphal portals and deeply splayed, sculptured ceremonial entries, similar to Chartres, the French royal style (*la manière française*) of the Île de France;²⁶ and the Genoese 'rights, franchises and liberties' Louis pledged to uphold were in large part a result of the major reforms of the famous crusader and French governor, Jean le Meigne, Maréchal de Boucicault, who oversaw the creation of the Bank of St. George in the early fifteenth century.²⁷ Even the fifteenth-century, triumphal reliquary Chapel of St. John the Baptist (Figure 6)—crusading patron saint of Holy Baptism and maritime Genoa—beside the cathedral processional nave, to which Louis paid particular devotion (as did all visiting monarchs, popes, prelates, competing local families and the commune during crisis and public jubilation), represented Genoa's *festive* life in its exuberant and abundant (*spoliated*, not pastiche or derivative) style, linked again to Milan, Lombardy, and the Visconti ducal burial monastic church of Il Certosa di Pavia, from which many of its stonemasons, sculptors, and painters came to Genoa (in this case, the influential "Maestri Antelami" workshop of Domenico Gagini, for this Fregoso, Doria, and civic commission from 1451 through to the early sixteenth century).²⁸ And the fifteenth-century portable gilded reliquary of the ashes of St. John the Baptist (Figure 7), represents even today solemn testament to French influence, the Gothic royal style, with patron saints making "sacred" the Italian Mediterranean city, when taken out of the chapel in procession from cathedral to harbour-front every

²⁵ d'Auton, *Chroniques de Louis XII*, III, p. 59; Gorse, 'Between Empire and Republic', p. 191.

²⁶ Fulvio Cervini, *I portali della Cattedrale di Genova e il gotico europeo* (Florence, 1993); Clario Di Fabio (ed.), *La Cattedrale di Genova nel Medioevo, secoli VI–XIV* (Milan, 1998). Cf. note 28 below.

²⁷ See notes 4–6 above; and Millard Meiss, *French Painting in the Time of Jean de Berry: The Boucicault Master* (London, 1968).

²⁸ Hanno-Walter Kruft, 'La Cappella di San Giovanni Battista nel Duomo di Genova', *Antichità Viva*, 9, no. 4 (1970), pp. 33–50; John Pope-Hennessy, *Italian High Renaissance & Baroque Sculpture* (New York, NY, 1985), p. 345; Ennio Poleggi, 'Il rinnovamento edilizio genovese e i maestri Antelami nel secolo XV', *Arte Lombarda*, 11 (1966, secondo semestre), pp. 53–68. For the prominent civic role of the relics (the ashes) of St. John the Baptist, brought back from Myra during the First Crusade of 1097–1099, see: *Annali genovesi di Caffaro e di suoi continuatori*.

24 June feast-day for the Archbishop to bless the sea, rival Genoa's equivalent to the Venetian Doge's "Marriage to the Sea".²⁹

Throughout the city, family palace portals (Figure 8), thresholds to triumphal columnar entrance vestibules and ascending staircases to richly-appointed interior apartments, overlooking tower societies and local neighbourhoods, heralded this *festive* Lombard Renaissance style, emblematic of the "French period"³⁰ with frequent references to the local crusading Saint George (promoted and institutionalized by Boucicault).³¹ Over the cathedral processional arcade (Figure 9), screen front to the Chapel of St. John the Baptist, a portrait bust (with inscription) to the Etruscan-Roman God Janus—"First King of Italy," protector of city gates, ports and portals, of the golden age, new year beginnings, a bygone era of peace and abundance—oversaw the ceremonial linear space and its supporting reliquary chapel, an "ancient refoundation" of the Genoese *città portuale*, and medieval etymological play on Janus, Ianus, Ianua, Genua.³² This powerful foundation myth informed cathedral, port and portal; it served as a potent metaphor for the local Genoese "imagined community" (as Benedict Anderson would have it) that made permanent (and often

²⁹ For the Processional Ark of the Ashes of St. John the Baptist: Caterina Marcenaro, *Il Museo del Tesoro della Cattedrale a Genova* (Milan, 1969); Graziela Conti, *et al.*, *La scultura a Genova e in Liguria dalle origini al Cinquecento* (Genoa, 1987), I, pp. 244–6; Patrizia Marica, *Museo del Tesoro di San Lorenzo* (Genoa, 2000). For the Procession of the Ark of St. John the Baptist from the Cathedral to the Sea for the Blessing of the Archbishop on the feastday of the Nativity of St. John the Baptist (24 June): Agostino Calcagnino, *Historia del glorioso precursore di N.S. S. Gio. Battista, protettore della città di Genova* (Genoa, 1648) (I thank Kate McCluer for this reference).

³⁰ The tenth or the fifteenth to early sixteenth centuries?; that is another question.

³¹ Hanno-Walter Krufft, *Portali genovesi del Rinascimento* (Florence, 1971); Laura Tagliaferro, 'Un secolo di marmo e di pietra: il Quattrocento', in *La scultura a Genova e in Liguria dalle origini al Cinquecento*, I, pp. 217–250.

³² Clario Di Fabio, 'Sculture, affreschi ed epigrafi: La città e i suoi "miti delle origini"', *fonti, committenti, esecutori*, *La Cattedrale di Genova nel Medioevo*, pp. 258–99. The identifying inscription beneath the "Janus portrait" of 1307 on the Genoese Cathedral north arcade pier reads: JAN[US] P[RI]M[US] REX / ITALIE DE P[RO] / GENIE GIGAN / TIU[M] Q[UI] FU[N]DA / VIT IAN[UAM] T[EM]P[OR]E / ABRAHE; and the epic inscription across from it, above the south arcade, that "Christianizes" Janus (a "Trojan Prince in exile") in relation to Noah and the Flood, appropriate to a maritime city, continues the "mythic foundation": JAN[US] PRI[N]CEPS TROIAN[US] ASTROLOGIA PERIT[US] NAVIGA[N]DO AD HABITA[N]DU[M] LOCU[M] QUERE[N]S SANU[M] D[OMI]NABILE[M] [ET] SECURU[M] IANUA[M] IA[M] FU[N]DATA[M] A IANO REGE YTALIE P[RO]NEPOTE NOE VENIT ET EA[M] CERNE[N]S MARE [ET] MO[N]TIB[US] TUTISSIMA[M] A[M]PLIAVIT NO[M]INE [ET] POSSE (see Di Fabio, 'Sculture, affreschi ed epigrafi', p. 260).

countered) the exploratory, temporary, festive language of entry ritual, the rich, polyphonic metaphors of classical and medieval illusion (Figure 10).³³

Louis XII's entry of 1507 (Figure 11) was another matter—an ominous rupture and overturn of tense negotiation (always there and revealed in Guicciardini's comments on Charles VIII's threatening approach to Florence in 1494).³⁴ In November 1506, the long rivalry between noble and popular factions erupted in the "Rivolta delle Cappette" (Revolt of the Artisans), Genoa's Ciompi Revolution, in which the *popolari*, in defiance of the French governor and the nobles, elected doge a popular leader, the rich silk dyer, Paolo da Novi, and laid siege to the Castelletto, killing many of the French garrison before forcing its surrender and withdrawal.³⁵ Many Genoese *nobili* fled into exile at the French court or to their castle strongholds along the *riviera*.³⁶ In swift and decisive reaction (because of the strategic importance of this "Janus portal" into Italy), Louis XII personally led his army to lay siege and retake the city, entering in triumph *en armes* on 28 April 1507.³⁷ The forceful imposition of French rule, supported by the nobles, and repression of the *popolari* with the execution of their leaders—in particular, Paolo da Novi, who was drawn and quartered, his body parts to decorate the city gates—was recorded in lavish French Renaissance manuscript illuminations in Jean Marot's *Voyage de Gênes* and Jean d'Auton's *Chroniques*.³⁸

³³ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York, 1991); and for a Baroque example of the "Janus foundation myth" for Genoa, where the "God of the Golden Age" actually designs (as patron overseer and architect) the fortification walls of Genoa (specifically La Porta Soprana): Ezia Gavazza, Federica Lamera, and Lauro Magnani, *La Pittura in Liguria: Il Secondo Seicento* (Genoa, 1990), pp. 401–2, figure 488.

³⁴ See notes 2 and 9 above; Mitchell, *The Majesty of the State*, pp. 90–3; Gorse, 'Between Empire and Republic', pp. 192–3.

³⁵ Giustiniani, *Annali della Repubblica di Genova*, pp. 258–64; Senarega, *De rebus generisibus*, pp. 99–120; d'Auton, *Chroniques de Louis XII*, IV, pp. 87–108; Emilio Pandiani, 'Un anno di storia genovese (giugno 1506–1507) con diario e documenti inediti', *Atti della Società ligure di storia patria*, 37 (1905). *Cappette* is a Genoese dialect variant on Italian *cappello* (bonnet or hat), a class designator (similar to the classical Roman republican or French revolutionary "phrygian cap" for the sans-culotte), meaning *popolo minuto*, artisan, or *plebe*. Genoese classes were divided into *nobili*, *mercanti*, and *cappette* (that is, 'the urban working classes called the Capetti for their distinctive wool caps': Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, pp. 312–3).

³⁶ Gorse, 'Between Empire and Republic', p. 192.

³⁷ d'Auton, *Chroniques de Louis XII*, IV, p. 231.

³⁸ Mitchell, *The Majesty of the State*, pp. 90–1; Petti Balbi, *Genova medioevale*, figs. XIV–XXII; Gorse, 'Between Empire and Republic', p. 192.

The royal triumphal entry now became a ritual of conquest, like that feared by the Florentines in 1494; and for the Genoese, a chance, in the context of ceremony, to beg for mercy, to avoid being sacked. The balance between royal authority and municipal rights and privileges was now gone. To begin, a delegation of thirty representatives of the city again met Louis in the main west entry, the coastal *faubourg* of Fassolo, but in *black* attire with *bare* heads, kneeling before the king, crying “Misericordia!”³⁹ Louis appeared in armour from head to foot on his war horse, with drawn sword in hand, wielded more as instrument of battle than symbol of state. Golden swarming bees (yellow jackets) about the hive tell all among this ominous helmeted group, visors down and stingers primed. Louis proceeded under his royal canopy, held by the Anziani now as penitent conquered people, not joyful servants of the king. The conquering monarch rode in procession, presenting himself in a menacing way not seen before—a reversal of the Genoese entry of 1502.⁴⁰ Artillery thundered from the recaptured Castelletto, bastion of foreign power, over the city, a grim reminder of violent siege, while the royal *entrée de châtement* made its way around the arc of the harbour. The king came as the triumphant leader of a victorious army entering a conquered city.

At Piazza San Tomaso, Louis did not wait for a festive reception—or to use Kantorowicz’s *adventus* terminology, *laudes regiae*. He spurned the cries of “Misericordia” offered by the white-clad (*innocenti*) children as he marched, at the point of his procession of cardinals, nobles and armed guards, straight through the city gate, without pause, *striking it with his sword* as he passed.⁴¹ So the imagery of forceful entry, castigation and punishment—a royal “rape” of these gendered agents and spaces—continued down the main street deep into the city to the cathedral, the sacred centre. His triumphal entry followed the same route as in 1502—with a vengeance. The contrast was apparent and deliberate—a ritual undoing. As one would expect (Figure 12), the 1507 *entrata* had few decorations, was austere, without *apparati* or *tableaux vivants*. Along the way, rich tapestry hangings, festivity, joyful displays, symbolic of the French-Lombard, International Gothic-Renaissance court style and royal presence, were replaced by

³⁹ d’Auton, *Chroniques de Louis XIII*, IV, pp. 232–3.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 234

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 236–7; Mitchell, *The Majesty of the State*, p. 90; Gorse, ‘Between Empire and Republic’, p. 192.

bare palace facades and demonstrations of penitence and sorrow, with groups of kneeling young girls, dressed in white, with palm branches in hand, pleading for royal clemency.⁴² Intercessory gender was once Abundance, now Repentance.

While Louis celebrated Mass in the cathedral, his soldiers began to secure the city, placing gallows (not festive *apparati*) at the principal crossroads, and gathering all the arms of the citizens to be placed (like trophies) in the chapel of the communal palace.⁴³ From the church, Louis went directly to the Palazzo Ducale (Figure 13), which he took over and fortified with cannons and archers as his temporary residence in the old city centre, adjacent to the cathedral of the archbishop. He controlled sacred and civic centres. The king assumed absolute power over Genoa.⁴⁴ To reinforce the point, Louis set up his royal baldachin in the palace courtyard, where he convened a court tribunal before a great crowned throne, draped in blue cloth of honour and gold *fleurs-de-lys*.⁴⁵ Beneath this, crowned, with sceptre in hand, the king received a delegation of Genoese Anziani who knelt before him and the French court on their raised platform, with Cardinal d'Amboise seated to Louis' right with other cardinals.

A Genoese orator presented the formal apology and plea for mercy, offering Louis the triumphal title of "Clementissimo Re" (shades of ancient Roman emperors and the French king's title of "Christianissimus").⁴⁶ Responding, a French orator speaking in Italian (so that nothing would be missed), compared Louis to Camillus, the two Scipiones Africani, and other Roman heroes 'praised for their virtue of temperance, [for which] without doubt . . . the Most Christian King is worthy of great praise', and he lectured the Genoese on the principle of "sub iusto principe vivere summa est libertas" ("to live under the just prince is the supreme liberty", again from the *speculum*

⁴² d'Auton, *Chroniques de Louis XII*, IV, pp. 236–9; Gorse, 'Between Empire and Republic', p. 192.

⁴³ d'Auton, *Chroniques de Louis XII*, IV, pp. 241–5, 251; Gorse, 'Between Empire and Republic', p. 192.

⁴⁴ d'Auton, *Chroniques de Louis XII*, IV, p. 239; Gorse, 'Between Empire and Republic', pp. 192–3.

⁴⁵ d'Auton, *Chroniques de Louis XII*, IV, pp. 252–3; Gorse, 'Between Empire and Republic', pp. 192–3.

⁴⁶ d'Auton, *Chroniques de Louis XII*, IV, pp. 253–5; Gorse, 'Between Empire and Republic', p. 193.

principis tradition).⁴⁷ Then, recounting past Genoese perfidy, the French orator compared their revolt to Adam and Eve's Original Sin against God, and to Hannibal and Carthage's treachery against Rome, among other archetypal crimes.⁴⁸

After the harangue, the Genoese pledged their fidelity to His Majesty, and watched as their book of privileges, franchises and liberties was brought out on stage, and torn up and burned before their eyes. A new book was imposed on them, placing the city, its government and sovereignty directly in French hands.⁴⁹

Twenty-one years later, in September 1528, the Genoese admiral Andrea Doria (Figure 14) threw the French out of Genoa, after a long series of devastating battles between Charles V and Francis I, Valois successor to Louis XII. The first article of the extraordinary military contract (*condotta*) between Andrea Doria and Charles V of July 1528, making him Captain General of the Habsburg fleet in the Mediterranean, called for an independent republic, in alliance with Spain and the Habsburg Empire, without (and this was explicitly spelled out) any garrison of occupation in the city.⁵⁰ The old noble republic and Italian entry port city, now central to the Habsburg empire, were refashioned in Andrea Doria's image.⁵¹ The Castelletto above Genoa, along with a French-built fortress of 1507–8, significantly called "La Briglia" ("the Bridle"), on the harbour front near the

⁴⁷ d'Auton, *Chroniques de Louis XII*, IV, pp. 255–9; Gorse, 'Between Empire and Republic', p. 193.

⁴⁸ d'Auton, *Chroniques de Louis XII*, IV, p. 255; Gorse, 'Between Empire and Republic', p. 193.

⁴⁹ d'Auton, *Chroniques de Louis XII*, IV, pp. 260–77; Mitchell, *The Majesty of the State*, p. 93; Gorse, 'Between Empire and Republic', p. 193.

⁵⁰ Lorenzo Capelloni, *Vita del Principe Andrea Doria* (Venice, 1565; 2nd edn, Genoa, 1863), pp. 51–4; Carlo Sigonio, *Della vita et fatti di Andrea Doria Principe di Melfi*, trans. Pompeo Arnolfini (Genoa, 1598), pp. 75–128.

⁵¹ For the Genoese-Habsburg imperial image of admiral Andrea Doria as colossal protector, the nude Neptune: Herbert Keutner, 'Über die Entstehung und di Formen des Standbildes im Cinquecento', *Münchener Jahrbuch der Bildenden Kunst*, 7 (1956), pp. 138–68; Detlef Heikamp, 'In margine alla "Vita di Baccio Bandinelli" del Vasari', *Paragone*, 191 (1966), pp. 51–62; Virginia Bush, *The Colossal Sculpture of the Cinquecento* (New York, 1976), pp. 184–9; Kathleen Weil-Garris, 'On Pedestals: Michelangelo's David, Bandinelli's Hercules and Cacus and the Sculpture of the Piazza della Signoria', *Römisches Jahrbuch für Kunstgeschichte*, 20 (1983), pp. 377–415; Piero Boccardo, *Andrea Doria e le arti: committenza e mecenatismo a Genova nel Rinascimento* (Rome, 1989), pp. 105–18; George Gorse, 'Committenza e ambiente alla "corte" di Andrea Doria a Genova', in Arnold Esch and Christoph Frommel (eds), *Arte, committenza ed economia a Roma e nelle corti del Rinascimento* (Turin, 1995), pp. 255–71.

Lanterna, were torn down soon after Andrea Doria turned his galleys on his native city in his dramatic change of sides from the French.⁵²

To conclude, the “French impact on Italy” can be written in many ways: from the largely French-inspired Crusades of the eleventh century, represented by Chartres and other Capetian royal churches along the pilgrimage roads to Santiago de Compostela or the Holy Land in Jerusalem via Genoa and other Italian port cities; to the twelfth-century Norman court of Palermo with its sacred royal adventus of Christ in the Palatine Chapel;⁵³ to the French Angevin Guelph politics of Naples, Florence, and other Italian city-states of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, represented by the French-Angevin-fashioned, International Gothic Style of Simone Martini’s richly-gilded and fleur-de-lys framed, state altarpiece of *Saint Louis of Toulouse Crowning Robert of Anjou, King of Naples* (Figure 16), that “legitimized” the donor patron and French (Guelph) dynasty in Italy, ca. 1317.⁵⁴ In Genoa (Figure 15), the French to Spanish periods transformed the city, inside and out. During the triumphal entry of Louis XII, in 1502, the King resided at the Fieschi (of the French party) villa in the eastern suburb of Carignano, decorated in sumptuous classical Lombard Renaissance style of plenty, verdant abundance, emblematic of the Gothic northern alliance.⁵⁵ In the 1507 entry of punishment, Louis XII took over the Ducal Palace itself, in the centre of the city, having burned and rewritten Genoa’s privileges before their very eyes, while ruling the city (through a governor and garrison of occupation) from the Castelletto and podestarial civic centre. With the

⁵² Cf. Cristoforo de Grassi’s *Urban View of Genoa* of 1597 (Genova-Pegli, Civico Museo Navale, inv. 3486), based upon an earlier view of Genoa in 1481, which shows the Castelletto over the city, with Giorgio Vigne’s *Urban View of Genoa* in 1512–4 (Genova-Pegli, Civico Museo Navale, inv. 3371) with “La Briglia” that fortified the Lanterna at Capo di Faro, and with Gerolamo Bordoni’s *Urban View of Genoa* of 1616 (Genoa, Collezione Ludovico Pallavicino), with the Castelletto replaced by the open Strada Nuova, the Genoese Renaissance aristocratic banking street of the Habsburg empire, and the Lanterna iconically standing alone at the harbor entrance: Poleggi, *Iconografia di Genova e delle riviere*, no. 58, p. 112; no. 29, pp. 56–7; no. 62, pp. 116–9 respectively.

⁵³ Eve Borsook, *Messages in Mosaic: the Royal Programmes of Norman Sicily, 1130–1187* (Oxford, 1990); Kenneth Baxter Wolf, *Making History: The Normans and Their Historians in Eleventh-Century Italy* (Philadelphia, PA, 1995).

⁵⁴ Julian Gardner, ‘Saint Louis of Toulouse, Robert of Anjou and Simone Martini’, *Zeitschrift für Kunstgeschichte*, 39 (1976), pp. 12–33; Pierluigi Leone de Castris, *Arte di corte nella Napoli angioina* (Florence, 1986); Marco Pierini, *Simone Martini* (Milan, 2000).

⁵⁵ Gorse, ‘Between Empire and Republic’, p. 191.

Genoese Habsburg republic of Andrea Doria, the admiral took over the western trading entry suburb of Fassolo, to make a classical Roman sea villa, to moor his galleys before the harbour and represent the republic at his court centre for reception of the Habsburg Holy Roman Emperor Charles V, a transformation of French governorship (direct sovereignty) to Habsburg indirect sovereignty (by confederation alliance) as part of “the golden age” of Genoa and Spain during the sixteenth century.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ Boccardo, *Andrea Doria e le Arti*, pp. 25–87; Elena Parma Armani, *Perin del Vaga, L'anello mancante: Studi sul Manierismo* (Genoa, 1986), pp. 73–152; Lauro Magnani, *Il tempio di Venere: giardino e villa nella cultura genovese* (Genoa, 1987), pp. 27–46; Gorse, ‘Between Empire and Republic’, pp. 193–203; Piero Boccardo, Clario Di Fabio, Philippe Sénéchal (eds), *Genova e la Francia: Opere, artisti, committenti, collezionisti* (Genoa, 2004); Piero Boccardo and Clario Di Fabio (eds), *Genova e la Spagna: Opere, artisti, committenti, collezionisti* (Genoa, 2004).



Figure 1. Entry of Louis XII into Genoa, 1502. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Latin Manuscripts, no. 8393. Photo from: Luciano Grossi Bianchi and Ennio Poleggi, *Una città portuale del Medioevo: Genova nei secoli X-XVI* (Genoa: Sagep Editrice, 1980), fig. 156.




Figure 2. Jacopo Russo, Portolan Map of Italy and the Mediterranean, c. 1520, Modena, Biblioteca Estense e Universitaria, Ital. 550. Photo from: Guglielmo Cavallo, *Due mondi a confronto 1492-1728: Cristoforo Colombo e l'apertura degli spazi*, Mostra storico-cartografica, Palazzo Ducale, Genova (Rome: Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, Libreria dello Stato, 1992).



Figure 3. Michael Wolgemut, Genua, 1493. From Hartmann Schedel's *Liber Chronicarum* (Nuremberg Chronicle), Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Archivio Fotografico.



Figure 4. Porta Soprani (Portal of St. Andrew) and street entry to Cathedral of San Lorenzo, Genoa, 1155-1160. Photo from: Roberto Merlo, *Genova in volo* (Genoa: Tormena Editore, 2001), pg. 70.



Figure 5. Cathedral of San Lorenzo, Genoa, 12th-13th centuries. West entrance façade. Photo: Direzione Belle Arti, Genoa.



Figure 6. Domenico Gagini and family workshop, et al., Reliquary Chapel of St. John the Baptist, north side aisle, San Lorenzo, Genoa, 1451-1532. Photo: Direzione Belle Arti, Genoa.



Figure 7. Teramo Danieli and Simone Caldera, Processional “Ark” of St. John the Baptist, 1438-1445, Treasury of San Lorenzo, Genoa. Photo from: Graziella Conti, et al., *La scultura a Genova e in Liguria dalle origini al Cinquecento*, Vol. I (Genoa: Fratelli Pagano Editori, 1987), fig. 236.




Figure 8. Giovanni Gagini and workshop, Portal of St. George Killing the Dragon, 1457. Doria family palace on Piazza San Matteo 14, Genoa. Photo from: Graziella Conti, et al., *La scultura a Genova e in Liguria dalle origini al Cinquecento*, Vol. I (Genoa: Fratelli Pagano Editori, 1987), fig. 217.




Figure 9. Janus over the north arcade of the Cathedral of San Lorenzo and Entrance to the Reliquary Chapel of St. John the Baptist, 1307. Photo from: Clario Di Fabbio, *La Cattedrale di Genova nel Medioevo, Secoli VI-XIV* (Genoa: Silvana Editoriale, 1998), fig. 46.



Figure 10. Giovanni Lorenzo Bertolotto, Janus presiding over the construction of the walls of Genoa (at Porta Soprani), Genoa, private collection, c. 1700. Photo from: Ezia Gavazza, Frederica Lamera, Lauro Magnani, *La pittura in Liguria: Il Secondo Seicento* (Genoa: Sagep Editrice, 1990), fig. 488.



Figure 11. Entry of Louis XII into Genoa, 1507. Jean Marot, *Voyage de Gênes*. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale. Photo from: Giovanna Petti Balbi, *Genova medievale: vista dai contemporanei* (Genoa: Sagep Editrice, 1978), fig. XXI.



Figure 12. Louis XII's Triumphal Entry Through the Streets of Genoa, 1507. Jean Marot, *Voyage de Gênes*, Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale. Photo from: Giovanna Petti Balbi, *Genova medievale: vista dai contemporanei* (Genoa: Sagep Editrice, 1978), fig. XXII.



Figure 13. Louis XII Receiving Genoese Pleas for Clemency in the Courtyard of the Palazzo Ducale, Genoa, 1507. Jean d'Auton's *Chroniques de Louis XII*. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale. Photo from: Giovanna Petti Balbi, *Genova medievale: vista dai contemporanei* (Genoa: Sagep Editrice, 1978), fig. XVI.



Figure 14. Sebastiano del Piombo, Portrait of Andrea Doria Pointing to an Ancient Roman Naval Relief, 1526. Genoa, Villa Doria, Sala dei Giganti. Photo: Fratelli Alinari, no. 29615.



Figure 15. Gerolamo Bordoni, *Civitas Januae* (Urban View of Genoa), 1616. Genoa: Ludovico Pallavicino Collection. Photo: Direzione Belle Arti, Genoa.



Figure 16. Simone Martini, *St. Louis of Toulouse Crowning Robert of Anjou, King of Naples*, c. 1317. Naples, Museo di Capodimonte. Photo from: John Paoletti and Gary Radke, *Art in Renaissance Italy* (New York: Harry N. Abrams, Inc., 1997), fig. 2.36.

THE CULTURAL IMPLICATIONS OF
CONQUEST AND ASSIMILATION

ARMS AND LETTERS: THE CRISIS OF COURTLY CULTURE IN THE WARS OF ITALY¹

John M. Najemy

At the end of the *Art of War*, Machiavelli has Fabrizio Colonna criticize the princes of late fifteenth-century Italy for their failure to prepare themselves for the challenges and dangers that overwhelmed them and their states beginning in 1494. Part of this failure, Fabrizio claims, was excessive attention to literature and literary finesse. Instead of focusing on military knowledge and training, ‘Our Italian princes believed—before they felt the blows of war from across the mountains—that it was enough for a prince to know how to think up a clever response in his study, to write an elegant letter, to display wit and ease in speech and language, to know how to weave deceptions . . . and to expect his words to be considered the responses of oracles. And the wretches did not realize that they were preparing themselves to be the prey of anyone who attacked them.’² Fabrizio recommends that they turn their attention to creating strong armies and training themselves to face hardships on the battlefield. Oddly, he imagines the prince willing to follow his advice not as Italy’s defender but as its potential conqueror. ‘I tell you that whoever, among those who today govern states in Italy, first takes this road will, before all others, be lord of this country [*signore di questa provincia*], and it will happen to his state as with the kingdom of the Macedonians, which, when it came under the rule of Philip who had learned how to organize armies from Epaminondas the Theban, became so powerful that with this organization and these exercises, and while the rest of Greece languished in idleness and devoted itself to performing comedies [*mentre che l'altra Grecia stava in ozio e attendeva a recitare commedie*], it was able in a matter of a few years to take the whole country

¹ I thank the members of Cornell’s Renaissance Colloquium for their comments and criticisms, Nancy Bisaha for the opportunity to read a version of this paper at Vassar College, and Julia Hairston for her valuable advice.

² *Dell’arte della guerra*, in Niccolò Machiavelli, *Tutte le opere*, ed. M. Martelli (Florence, 1971), p. 388.

and leave to his son [Alexander] the foundation upon which he became ruler of the entire world.' That Machiavelli's Fabrizio should criticize the princes of Italy for their inadequate military experience is no surprise. But the notion that the cultivation of literary and rhetorical skills had so weakened Italy's princes that it left them the easy prey of any attacker, and that ancient Greece had likewise been so debilitated by its devotion to the theatre that it let itself be swallowed up by the Macedonians, doubly implicates literature in the calamity that befell Italy after 1494. It also implicates Machiavelli himself, who, at the moment of the *Art of War* (1519–20), had already written *Mandragola* and seen it performed, and was later to write another play, *Clizia*, whose performance he helped to produce. Fabrizio's use of the theatre as an example of the fatal idleness of a people unprepared to defend itself points an accusing and self-mocking finger at those men of letters who not only surrender themselves to the dangerous *otium* of literature but encourage others to "languish in idleness" as spectators.

A similar judgment about the effects of letters and literature on the collective *virtù* of a people occurs in the first chapter of Book V of the *Florentine Histories*, where Machiavelli embraces the theory of the cycle of order and disorder that leads all countries from *virtù* to tranquillity to idleness to disorder and ruin, and then back up from ruin to order to *virtù* to glory and good fortune. 'From this', he adds, 'the prudent have observed that letters follow arms and that . . . generals come before philosophers; because, after excellent and well-organized arms have generated victories and victories have brought tranquillity, the fortitude of armed spirits [*la fortezza degli armati animi*] cannot be corrupted with a more honorable idleness [*con il più onesto ozio*] than that of letters; nor can idleness find its way into well-organized cities with greater or more dangerous deception than with [letters].' This, Machiavelli notes, was 'excellently recognized by Cato', who banned all philosophers from Rome when he saw its young men following Diogenes and Carneades 'with admiration' and realized 'the evil that could come to his *patria* from that honorable idleness'.³ Machiavelli took this famous story from Plutarch's life of Cato, which likewise says that the Roman youth 'waited on these philosophers with admiration' and that most Romans reacted with pleasure

³ *Istorie fiorentine*, 5.1, in *Opere*, p. 738.

in seeing their youth welcome Greek literature. In Plutarch's version, Cato, 'seeing the passion for words flowing into the city, from the beginning took it ill, fearing lest the youth . . . should prefer the glory of speaking well before that of arms and doing well. . . . He wholly despised philosophy, and out of a kind of pride scoffed at Greek studies and literature. . . . He pronounced . . . with the voice of an oracle that the Romans would certainly be destroyed when they began once to be infected with Greek literature'.⁴ But Machiavelli omits Plutarch's observation that the subsequent growth of Roman power, even as Rome became imbued with Greek learning, proved the "vanity" of Cato's prophecy. His use of the story probably alludes to—and implies a negative judgment of—the influence of John Argyropoulos, who arrived in Florence in the 1450s and stimulated the new interest in Greek philosophy among the city's young men. In the portrait of Cosimo de' Medici in Book VII of the *Histories*, a portrait whose apparent praise of Cosimo only thinly veils its underlying critique of the debilitating influence of the Medici on Florentine politics and civic culture, Machiavelli comments that 'Cosimo was a lover and patron of learned men [*uomini litterati*]' and that 'he brought to Florence Argyropoulos, Greek by birth and *litteratissimo* in those times, so that the Florentine youth might learn from him the Greek language and his other learning'.⁵ Machiavelli's appropriation of the story of Cato and the Greek philosophers makes more sense in the light of its implied anti-Medici polemic, but we are still left with his curious judgment that letters more generally, not merely the Greek learning imported by the Medici, weaken and enervate peoples and states and leave them vulnerable to invasion and occupation.

These passages bespeak an anxiety—even, or perhaps especially, in their mocking and playful allusions to Machiavelli himself—about the relationship of literature to politics, and of letters to arms, rendered all the more acute by the historical coincidence of Italy's leadership in letters and its military weakness in the early sixteenth century. Other writers of the time display a similarly troubled sense of literature's relationship to politics and war. In his *Viaggio in Alamagna*, Francesco Vettori, Machiavelli's friend and correspondent, wondered

⁴ Plutarch, *The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans*, trans. John Dryden and A. H. Clough (New York, 1932), p. 428.

⁵ *Istorie* 7.6, in *Opere*, p. 797.

whether, in the midst of all of Italy's and Florence's troubles, wars, and dangers, he should abandon writing altogether.⁶ Piero Valeriano's litany of unhappy fates suffered by men of letters, written in the aftermath of the Sack of Rome of 1527, builds a picture of an especially dangerous time for literary men. One of the speakers in the *De Litteratorum Infelicitate* decries the 'wretched and lamentable' fact 'that throughout all of Europe in our lifetime, literature has been so persecuted by the pitiless Fates that now there is not a province, not a city, not a village in which some memorable calamity has not befallen men of this kind in the last forty years'—'shafts of unjust Fortune' that 'seem to destroy literary men especially'. Although Valeriano's emphasis is on men of letters as victims, rather than as agents of corruption, many of his biographies point to the dangerous relationship between literature and politics.⁷

Particularly revealing among the expressions of this anxiety about the place of letters in Italy's early sixteenth-century crisis is Baldassare Castiglione's dramatization of it in *The Courtier* as a continually resurfacing worry that his speakers cannot face squarely. Near the beginning of the first book, Castiglione recalls in his own voice the memory of Urbino's legendary Duke Federigo, 'in his day . . . the light of Italy,' in whom all the virtues were combined with an 'unconquerable spirit' and '*disciplina militare*', and who also paid honour to letters by collecting in his palace 'a large number of the most excellent and rarest Greek, Latin, and Hebrew books, all of which he decorated with gold and silver, believing that [this library] was the supreme excellence of his great palace.'⁸ Castiglione makes of Federigo the symbol of the easy confidence in the alliance of arms and letters in the world before 1494, in terms that reflect the similar portrait of Federigo by Vespasiano da Bisticci,⁹ as well as the famous image of the duke dressed in armour and reading in his study. But Castiglione's

⁶ Francesco Vettori, *Scritti storici e politici*, ed. E. Niccolini (Bari, 1972), p. 85. In the new edition, entitled *Viaggio in Germania*, ed. M. Simonetta (Palermo, 2003), the passage is on p. 169.

⁷ Piero Valeriano, *On the Ill Fortune of Learned Men: A Renaissance Humanist and His World*, ed. J. Haig Gaisser (Ann Arbor, 1999), pp. 90–1. On Valeriano, see also Kenneth Gouwens, *Remembering the Renaissance: Humanist Narratives of the Sack of Rome* (Leiden, 1998), pp. 143–67.

⁸ *Il Cortegiano con una scelta delle opere minori*, ed. B. Maier (Turin, 1955), 1.2, pp. 82–3.

⁹ Vespasiano da Bisticci, *Le vite*, ed. A. Greco (Florence, 1970), vol. 1, pp. 385–6.

description of Federigo's son Guidobaldo contains a hint of the difficulties to come in the next generation (and in the dialogues of *The Courtier*). Although 'heir to all the paternal virtues' and 'dottissimo' in both Greek and Latin, the sickly Guidobaldo was unsuccessful in every undertaking 'both in arms and in all other things.'¹⁰ Guidobaldo was of course the reigning duke at the time of the conversations at the court of Urbino that Castiglione claims to record.

The task of 'depicting in words' the perfect courtier, which occupies the rest of Book 1, is entrusted to Count Lodovico da Canossa, a Veronese nobleman and bishop, Castiglione's relative on his mother's side, and subsequently an ambassador for Pope Leo and envoy for Francis I of France. Early in his construction of the ideal courtier, Lodovico declares that 'the principal and true profession [*la principale e vera professione*] of the courtier must be that of arms. This above all I want him to exercise vigorously and to be recognized among the others for his boldness and courage, and faithful to the one he serves.'¹¹ But he also wants his courtier to be learned and well versed in letters. Later in the first day (1.42) he says that 'the true and principal'—the same adjectives he had used in asserting the primacy of arms—'adornment [*ornamento*] of the mind for everyone is letters'. This prompts Lodovico to a reflection on the difference between the French and the Italians in this regard: 'the French recognize only the nobility of arms and think nothing of all the rest, to such a degree that they not only do not appreciate letters, but abhor them and hold all *litterati* to be base men. They think it a great insult to call anyone "clero"'—an Italianization of the French term for a scholar or learned man. Giuliano de' Medici intervenes to praise the likely heir to the French throne, the "Monsignor d'Angolem" (Francis I), and to express the hope that he will cause a flowering of letters in France to match that country's glory in arms. Count Lodovico embraces this optimism, on the assumption that 'subjects always follow the habits of their superiors', and offers his own prediction that 'the French might still come to value letters for the dignity they possess . . ., because nothing is more naturally desirable or appropriate to men than knowledge'.¹²

¹⁰ *Il Cortegiano*, 1.3, p. 83.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 1.17, p. 109.

¹² *Ibid.*, 1.42, pp. 157–8.

The very mention of the French, and of their alleged preference for arms over letters, evokes of course the dark history of French and other invasions of Italy since 1494, already a difficult reality for Italians in 1507, the fictional date of the conversations at Urbino, and still more troubling by 1528, the year after the Sack of Rome, when *The Courtier* was finally published. Count Lodovico registers his discomfort over the still unspoken but looming worry about the effect of letters on Italian arms by shifting the discussion from the importance of letters for courtiers to the compatibility of arms and letters in rulers and military commanders. He wishes he could show the French ‘how useful and necessary to our life and dignity are letters, which have truly been given to men by God as a supreme gift’. As examples of the natural alliance of letters and arms, he cites legendary ancient generals ‘all of whom conjoined the ornament of letters to the valour of arms [*i quali tutti giunsero l’ornamento delle lettere alla virtù dell’arme*].’ He mentions Alexander, who ‘so revered Homer that he kept the *Iliad* by his bed’ and who also studied philosophy with Aristotle; Alcibiades, who ‘increased his good qualities and made them greater with letters and with the teachings of Socrates’; Caesar, whose ‘divinely written’ books demonstrate his devotion to study; and Scipio Africanus, who never let Xenophon’s *Cyropaedia*—a work on the education of princes—escape his grasp. To these he adds the Roman generals Lucullus, Sulla, Pompey, and Brutus (but without mention of either their writings or their favorite books), and finally Hannibal, a somewhat more problematic example because, although a ‘tanto eccellente capitano’, he was ‘of a ferocious nature, alien to all *umanità*, faithless and scornful of men and the gods’. But he nonetheless had ‘notizia’ of letters and knowledge of Greek, ‘and, if I am not mistaken, I once read that he left a book that he himself wrote in the Greek language.’ After citing all these examples, Lodovico declares that there was no need to do so, because his listeners all know perfectly well ‘how much the French deceive themselves in believing that letters are damaging to arms’.

The opinion attributed to the French has now somewhat shifted, from contempt for letters to the idea that letters harm or diminish military valour. And this, it seems, is the fear, displaced onto the French but actually pointing to their own courtly world, that Lodovico and his interlocutors simultaneously reveal and evade. He grounds his confident conviction that the French are wrong in their view of letters and literature in the argument that ‘glory is the true stimulus

for great deeds in war'. Without the ambition to achieve glory one can never be a true gentleman, 'and he who goes to war for profit or other reasons is nothing but a base merchant'. True glory 'is entrusted to the sacred treasury of letters [*si commenda al sacro tesauero delle lettere*]', which means, as he immediately explains, that it is through reading the deeds of Caesar, Alexander, Scipio, and Hannibal that one becomes 'enflamed with the burning desire' to emulate them and to gain the immortality of everlasting fame. He who does not sense, or taste, 'the sweetness of letters' cannot know the greatness of the glory they have long preserved and how far it exceeds the reach of any individual's memory. Without letters and the awareness of this glory one cannot become a noble warrior.¹³

This is a defence of letters that raises more doubts than it resolves. First, Lodovico does not explain how it is possible for the French to be such fierce and effective soldiers without having tasted the 'sweetness of letters' and without having absorbed from letters the 'stimulus of glory'. Moreover, there is no mention here of letters as the road to virtue, or of the utility of letters for anyone except those who think of emulating Caesar, Alexander, Scipio, and Hannibal. And even if we surmise that Lodovico believed that some Italian prince or general—perhaps in the mould of duke Federigo—could aspire to emulate such legendary figures, the improbable notion that the unwarlike courtiers at Urbino could have entertained such dreams, or delusions, of grandeur only underscores the air of unreality that envelopes what is after all the game of 'depicting in words the perfect courtier'. In fact, Lodovico himself warns against the growing effeminacy of Italian courtiers. In a surprisingly angry outburst he had earlier decried their desire to appear 'soft and feminine as many try to do when they not only curl their hair and pluck their eyebrows, but also gussy themselves up in all the ways used by the most lascivious and dissolute women in the world. Walking, standing, and in every other thing they do, they appear so delicate and languid that their limbs seem about to fall off. And they pronounce their words in so sickly a fashion that it seems they're about to give up the ghost right then and there. . . . Since nature has not made them women, as they evidently wish to be and to seem, they should be expelled as public prostitutes not only from the courts of great lords,

¹³ *Ibid.*, 1.43, pp. 159–61.

but from the company of men of worth as well.¹⁴ Against the background of this scathing denunciation of Italy's courtiers, educated in the very ancient texts that he recommends as the source of the desire to do great things on the battlefield, Lodovico's defence of letters as a stimulus to glory in military pursuits seems detached from the reality he claims to see around him.

In fact, before he leaves the topic, the Count acknowledges the contradiction between Italy's recent history and the claim that letters are a stimulus to glory and valour in war: 'I would not want some adversary to adduce the contrary effects to refute my opinion, alleging that the Italians with their knowledge of letters have shown but little valour in arms for some time now, which is unfortunately more than true; but one could certainly say that this was the fault of a few who inflicted perpetual opprobrium as well as great harm on all the others, and that the true cause of our ruin and of the prostrate, if not lifeless, *virtù* of our spirit has come from them.'¹⁵ (1.43) So Lodovico does not deny that 'valour in arms' has been lacking in Italy, but he refuses to accept this as a valid argument against his defence of letters as the stimulus to glory. He offers instead the unexplained argument that the reason for this failure lies with some unnamed few—'alcuni pochi'—who have brought this disaster and shame upon everyone else. But who can these few be except Italy's military and political leaders, who, together with their courtiers and advisers, drank abundantly from the fountain of letters and who should therefore have absorbed that 'ardentissimo desiderio d'esser simile' to the heroes of antiquity? The puzzle remains unresolved as Lodovico closes off further discussion of this embarrassing problem by saying that 'it would be far more shameful to us to make it publicly known [*publicarla*]'—the feminine pronoun suggests that "it" refers to the 'true cause [*vera causa*]' of our ruin—'than it is for the French to be ignorant of letters. Thus it is better to pass over in silence that which cannot be recalled without sorrow and, leaving

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 1.19, p. 114.

¹⁵ 'Non vorrei già che qualche avversario mi adducesse gli effetti contrari per rifiutar la mia opinione, allegandomi gli Italiani col loro saper lettere aver mostrato poco valor nell'arme da un tempo in qua, il che pur troppo è più che vero; ma certo ben si poria dir la colpa d'alcuni pochi aver dato, oltre al grave danno, perpetuo biasmo a tutti gli altri, e la vera causa delle nostre ruine e della virtù prostrata, se non morta, negli animi nostri, esser da quelli proceduta.'

this matter (which I entered into against my will), return to our courtier.¹⁶ Fear of an unpleasant truth makes Lodovico reluctant to speak it. He cannot name those responsible for the calamity, nor in what way, despite their immersion in ancient letters, they led Italy astray. He prefers silence and wants to change the subject. His sense of shame is reinforced by the unrealistic suggestion that it is even possible to hide the failure of Italy's rulers and elites, and by the notion that, if only it is kept secret and away from public knowledge, greater shame will still attach to the French, innocent of letters although victorious in war, than to the defeated but cultivated Italians.

Uncomfortably close to contradictions too difficult to be contemplated openly, Lodovico retreats from the dilemma of arms and letters and finds easier terrain in defining the curriculum of studies for his well-lettered courtier. He must be 'more than moderately learned at least in those studies they call "of humanity [*d'umanità*]": he should possess a knowledge of Greek and Latin and know especially the poets, orators, and historians, and be skilled in writing verse and prose. But the reason Lodovico now says the courtier needs to know these things contrasts utterly with the argument—which he has just offered—that letters lead to heroism and glory on the battlefield: 'in addition to the satisfaction that [the courtier] himself will take from [these studies], he will in this way never lack for pleasing entertainments with the ladies [*piacevoli intertenimenti con donne*], who normally like such things.'¹⁷ Lodovico thus silently relinquishes the idea of letters as a stimulus to martial glory and turns them into amusements with which to charm the ladies of the court. In so doing he seems to acknowledge that his defence of the compatibility of letters and arms was wishful thinking. And he concludes by returning to his first formulation of the courtier's priorities, namely, that arms are indeed his chief profession and all his other good qualities merely their ornament, for he should 'never be like those who in their studies want to seem like warriors and among warriors to seem men of letters'. Lodovico severs the connection and makes of warriors and scholars two mutually exclusive camps.¹⁸

At this point (1.45), Pietro Bembo, paladin of letters and arbiter of literary taste, intervenes and scolds Lodovico for wanting his

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 1.43, pp. 161–2.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 1.44, p. 162.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 1.44, p. 164.

courtier to regard letters as a mere adornment of arms, instead of considering arms and all else the adornment of letters, which are, says Bembo, as superior to arms as the soul (or mind or spirit: *animo*) is to the body, since the function of letters pertains to the soul and that of arms to the body. Lodovico answers that arms pertain as much to the soul as to the body and attempts to deflect further discussion with four arguments: first, that Bembo is too biased in favor of letters to be a fair judge of the question; second, that, since the question has been debated at length by the wisest men, there is no need to discuss it again; third, that he, Lodovico, considers the matter settled in favour of arms and, having been asked to form the perfect courtier as *he* wishes, wants his courtier to hold the same view; and, fourth, that if Bembo is still unconvinced he should wait until he hears of a disputation in which the champions of letters and arms are each allowed to use their own weapons, whereupon he will see that the men of letters—the “litterati”—will lose. Lodovico’s arguments starkly contradict his earlier confidence in the compatibility and even the necessary alliance between letters and arms. In fact, his concluding polemical thrust reduces the debate in effect to a duel in which, of course, sword cuts paper.

Undeterred, Bembo criticizes Lodovico for having changed his mind: ‘Earlier you condemned the French because they have little appreciation of letters, and you said what a beacon of glory [letters] display to men and how they make man immortal; now it seems that you have changed your view.’ He asks Lodovico if he remembers the sonnet about Alexander approaching the tomb of Achilles and envying him the great fortune of having found so eloquent a poet to write of him. Although Bembo doesn’t bother to say so, the sonnet is Petrarch’s (*Canzoniere* 187). He quotes the first four lines:

Giunto Alessandro alla famosa tomba
del fero Achille, sospirando disse:
O fortunato, che sì chiara tromba
trovasti, e chi di te sì alto scrisse.

(When Alexander came to the famous tomb of the fierce Achilles, he sighing said: O fortunate one who found so clear a trumpet, one who wrote such high things of you.)¹⁹

¹⁹ Translation from Robert M. Durling, *Petrarch’s Lyric Poems: The Rime sparse and Other Lyrics* (Cambridge, Mass., 1976), p. 332.

The question of arms and letters now becomes an interpretive duel—a textual *disputa*—between Lodovico and Bembo over the meaning of Petrarch’s sonnet. Bembo’s reading is that Alexander envied Achilles (‘E se Alessandro ebbe invidia ad Achille’) not for his deeds on the battlefield but for the good fortune of having those deeds rendered immortal by Homer. Thus he must obviously have esteemed Homer’s “lettere” more highly than Achilles’ arms. Bembo was of course the editor of Petrarch’s vernacular poetry (he prepared the Aldine edition of 1501), and the debate would therefore seem to have moved onto turf on which we should expect him to have the clear advantage. Yet, oddly, Castiglione’s Bembo interprets the poem as evidence of a military man’s authoritative judgment that letters are superior to arms: ‘What other judge, what other verdict are you waiting for, concerning the dignity of arms and letters, than that given by one of the greatest military commanders who ever lived?’²⁰ Bembo imagines he has settled the matter on the authority, and what he assumes to be the actual words, of Alexander himself, apparently forgetting that his “source” is a poem by Petrarch, in turn inspired by passages in Cicero²¹ and Plutarch.²²

Nor does Castiglione let his Bembo recall the gloss on both the legend and the sonnet that Poliziano gives in the preface to the *Raccolta Aragonese*, the anthology of Tuscan poetry assembled in 1476–77 by Lorenzo de’ Medici and/or Poliziano as a gift from Lorenzo to Federico, son of King Ferrante of Naples. As the great champion of the Tuscan vernacular, Bembo surely knew the *Raccolta* and its prefatory letter. Poliziano cites Alexander as an example of the ancient love of glory and fame and, quoting the first two lines of Petrarch’s poem, quickly gives the standard interpretation (from Cicero) of Achilles’ good fortune: if Homer had not existed, Achilles’ fame, quite as much as his mortal remains, would have remained buried in his tomb. But Poliziano then adds that Homer too ‘would not have achieved such honour and fame’ if he had not been ‘restored

²⁰ *Il Cortegiano*, 1.45, pp. 165–6.

²¹ *Pro Archia* 10 (23–24): Cicero, *The Speeches*, trans. N. H. Watts (New York, 1923), pp. 32–3. On the transmission of the legend of Alexander at the tomb of Achilles, see Nadia Cannata Salamone, ‘A dispetto della morte: il sospiro di Alessandro e la memoria della poesia. Una prima ricognizione delle fonti,’ in *In Amicizia: Essays in Honour of Giulio Lepschy*, ed. Z. G. Barański and L. Pertile, *The Italianist*, n. 17, special supplement (1997), pp. 52–82.

²² *Alexander* 15.4–5: *Plutarch’s Lives*, trans. B. Perrin, vol. 7 (New York, 1919), pp. 262–3.

to life from near death by an illustrious Athenian'. After Homer died, his poem was 'scattered in many places all over Greece and almost dismembered'. The Athenian tyrant Pisistratus offered prizes to all those who brought him bits and pieces of the Homeric verses; he then 'reassembled [*raccolse*] with great diligence and care the entire body of the most holy poet, and just as he gave [Homer] everlasting life, so he acquired from this immortal glory and brilliant fame for himself', so much so that on *his* tomb was inscribed only that he 'was the author of the reconstruction of the glorious Homeric poem'.²³ Like Pisistratus, says Poliziano, Federico of Aragon inspired the project of the *Raccolta* and earned the glory of bringing back to life the great old Tuscan poets whose works it contains. This was a twist on the story that might have appealed to an editor, especially of the *Rime sparse* (also known as the *Rerum Vulgarium Fragmenta*), even as it was capable of resolving the *disputa* in either direction: Poliziano's story might mean *either* that it was the association with Homer that ensured Pisistratus' immortality—hence the superiority of literature—*or* that poets depend on princes to save their fragile scraps of paper from being scattered into oblivion—hence the primacy of arms and power.

But Castiglione's Bembo is not interested in exploring the nuances of the story. Castiglione lets his Bembo fall, in his determination to win the day for letters over arms, into a naive literalist reading of the poem. Bembo argues, in apparent contradiction to his own belief in the superiority of letters, that the dispute was long ago settled, not by poets, but by a soldier. Moreover, his conclusion that Alexander judged letters superior to arms seems forced. What the unhappy conqueror of the world actually says in Petrarch's sonnet is only that Achilles had a better poet. Nor does Bembo stop to recall that the rest of the poem, far from assuming the power of poetry, laments the poet's *failure* to sing adequately the praises of Laura:

Ma questa pura e candida colomba,
 a cui non so s' al mondo mai par visse,
 nel mio stil frale assai poco rimbomba;
 così son le sue sorti a ciascun fisse.

²³ Agnolo Poliziano, *Stanze per la Giostra, Orfeo—Rime*, ed. B. Maier (Novara, 1968), pp. 270–1.

Ché, d'Omero degnissima e d'Orfeo
 o del pastor ch'ancor Mantova onora
 ch'andassen sempre lei sola cantando,
 stella difforme e fato sol qui reo
 commise a tal che 'l suo bel nome adora
 ma forse scema sue lode parlando.

(But this pure and white dove [Laura], whose equal I think never lived in the world, resounds very little in my frail style. Thus each one's destiny is fixed; for she is worthy of Homer and Orpheus and of the shepherd whom Mantua still honors, worthy to have them always singing only of her. But a perverse star and her fate, cruel only in this, have entrusted her to one who adores her lovely name but perhaps mars her praise when he speaks.)²⁴

Petrarch implicitly likens Laura to Alexander as one most deserving of eloquent praises and in need of a good poet: her equal has never existed and she is worthy of eternal praises from the greatest poets (including Homer). But Petrarch doubts his ability to sing Laura's praises as she deserves and fears that his words have actually harmed her reputation in their 'frail style'. To the extent that the sonnet is about the poet's inadequacy, it is a curious basis on which to argue for the superiority of letters, as Castiglione has Bembo do. The poem also shifts the locus of anxiety with respect to the original story in which one warrior envies another his superior poet. In Petrarch's version a poet envies other poets their greater ability to sing the praises—and win the favour—of a woman.

Castiglione's (playful or polemical?) decision to let Bembo speak a clumsy interpretation of the sonnet enacts another failure of letters, a failure into which Bembo is led by the presumptuousness of his certainty that letters are superior to arms.²⁵ The joke on Bembo—already hinted at by Lodovico—seems to ask how men of letters will stand up to the princes and commanders they claim to inspire and lead if they are unable to use their own weapons—texts, and

²⁴ Durling, *Petrarch's Lyric Poems*, p. 332 (the translation has been slightly altered here).

²⁵ On the "Bembo" of *The Courtier*, see Giorgio Dilemmi, 'Il Bembo "cortegiano"', in *La corte e il "Cortegiano"*, ed. C. Ossola (Rome, 1980), pp. 191–8; and, for the Bembo of Book 4, Alan Hager, 'Castiglione's Bembo: Yoking Eros and Thanatos by Containment in Book Four of *Il Libro del cortegiano*', *Canadian Journal of Italian Studies*, 16 (1993), pp. 33–47.

in this case ones of which Bembo was the acknowledged expert and editor—more effectively than he does here. Bembo's superficial and tendentious reading of the opening lines of Petrarch's poem re-opens the door for Count Lodovico to show that he has a better understanding of the relationship between letters and power. He insists that there is no contradiction in his argument: he was critical of the French because they think letters are detrimental to the profession of arms, whereas (as he now says) he believes that for no one *more* than warriors are letters necessary and appropriate.²⁶ Lodovico declares that he has no wish to debate further whether arms are more praiseworthy than letters. But he now transforms the issue by saying that 'it suffices [presumably to settle the matter] that men of letters almost never praise anything but great men and glorious deeds which merit praise on their own because of the essential and inherent virtue [*per la propria essenziale virtute*] from which they are created'. Such men and deeds 'are a most noble subject matter for writers' whose works they 'adorn'. They are 'in part the reason for the long life of writings that would not perhaps be so widely read or appreciated—in fact, they would be empty and of little moment—if they lacked these noble themes'. Lodovico has cleverly reversed the issue with the idea that it is powerful men and their deeds that make poets live on, and not the other way around. Great accomplishments possess an essential virtue, or power (as *virtute* can also be understood), that has no need of poets in order to exist, to be powerful, and to merit praise. Lodovico proclaims the brute material reality of political and military power, its independence of the words of poets and historians, and, if anything, the dependence of literature on power.

He then offers his own interpretation of Petrarch's poem to show that Alexander's envy of Achilles does not mean that he valued letters over arms. 'If [Alexander]', Lodovico hypothesizes, 'had thought himself as inferior to Achilles as he judged those who would write about him were inferior to Homer, he would certainly have preferred to perform worthy deeds himself than [to be praised with] the fine words' of writers in the absence of such deeds. What Lodovico presumably means is that Alexander ultimately cared more about his accomplishments than his reputation. Alexander's lament at Achilles' tomb was really an 'implied praise of himself' and a 'wish

²⁶ *Il Cortegiano*, 1.46, p. 166.

for what he thought he lacked, the supreme excellence of a writer' who could sing his praises as effectively as Homer had sung those of Achilles—and not for what he knew he had already achieved, namely 'la virtù dell'arme', in which he did not think Achilles in any way superior. But Lodovico's interpretation is as flawed as Bembo's. Bembo had never suggested that Alexander thought himself inferior to Achilles, and it is not clear why Lodovico thinks he needs to argue that Alexander was confident of his superiority over Achilles. Was Lodovico insisting on the obvious in order to deflect the more difficult question (and really the heart of the matter)—whether Alexander feared that the memory of his deeds would die without his own Homer? His final words in the debate point in this direction. 'Perhaps Alexander wished to inspire some noble talent to write about him, showing in this way that his gratitude to him would be as great as his love and reverence for the sacred monuments of letters [*i sacri monumenti delle lettere*]—about which', he says with a hint of exasperation, 'we have now said enough'. The discussion ends as other voices intervene with jokes—one of them at Bembo's expense.

Despite the suggestion of evasion in Lodovico's interpretation of Alexander's lament at the tomb of Achilles, Castiglione has let Lodovico point to the little-acknowledged and unpleasant truth of Renaissance letters: the extent to which poets were beholden to political power through patronage and the courts. Significantly, Castiglione does not have Bembo return to the fray to defend the integrity and autonomy of letters. It is now Bembo's turn to walk away from an embarrassing truth—that letters are subservient to power—with its implication that well-lettered courtiers, far from embodying or instilling military valour, are court jesters in a theatre to which the powerful come for occasional entertainment. The question is quietly set aside as they move on to the topic of music. But, like most repressed and difficult truths, this one will resurface, as we shall see.

Count Lodovico's indirect admission that letters serve power echoes the episode in canto 35 of Ariosto's *Orlando furioso* (an episode present in the first edition of 1516 and hence known to Castiglione as he was writing and revising *The Courtier*) in which the Evangelist John speaks at length of courtiers, poets, princes, fame, and oblivion.²⁷

²⁷ On the figure of the Evangelist in the *Furioso*, see Albert Russell Ascoli, *Ariosto's Bitter Harmony: Crisis and Evasion in the Italian Renaissance* (Princeton, 1987), pp. 274–8 and *passim*.

John first denounces courtiers as false and disloyal to the memory of their masters. Fame would be fleeting, he says (35.20–21), if it depended on the ‘panders, sycophants, pretty-boys, tale-bearers, those who infest the courts and are better welcomed there than men of integrity and worth, those who are reputed gentlemen at court [*son chiamati cortigian gentili*] because they can emulate the donkey and the scavenging hog’.²⁸ When their lord, the prince, dies, they carry his name on their lips for a couple of days and then let it fall into oblivion. Only poets can rescue men of worth from this oblivion worse than death. Princes should therefore make poets their friends: ‘O shrewd and sagacious princes, if you follow Caesar’s example and make writers your friends, you need have no fear of Lethe’s waters’ (35.22).²⁹ But, as the Evangelist continues, the ‘shrewd and sagacious princes’ become ‘stingy [*avari*]’ and ‘ignorant [*ignoranti*]’; they suppress virtues, exalt vices, send the ‘good arts’ into exile, and make poets go begging for their livelihood. ‘God has deprived these fools [the princes] of their good sense . . . , and made them averse to poetry’ (35.23–24). Princes fail to realize that, if they cultivated the poets, they could emerge alive from the grave ‘even if they had all the worst vices [*ancor ch’avesser tutti i rei costumi*]’. The poets too undergo a metamorphosis in John’s diatribe. No longer rescuers of ‘men of worth’ from oblivion, poets are described as willing, no doubt because of their enforced mendicancy, to lie about their masters and attribute to them virtues and valor they do not possess. ‘Aeneas was not as dutiful [*pietoso*], Achilles not as strong, nor Hector as fierce as their reputations would have them. There have been thousands and thousands and thousands who could truthfully be ranked ahead of them.’ Then, with evident sarcasm concerning their honour, John comes to the sordid truth about poets: ‘Gifts of palaces and great estates from the descendants [of these princes] made the honoured hands of writers cover the [princes] with endless sublime honours.’³⁰ He attacks no less than Virgil and Homer as fabricators: ‘Augustus was not as saintly and benevolent as Virgil’s trumpet [makes him seem]. . . . Homer

²⁸ Ludovico Ariosto, *Orlando furioso secondo l'edizione del 1532 con le varianti delle edizioni del 1516 e del 1521*, ed. S. Debenedetti and C. Segre (Bologna, 1960), pp. 1206–7 (this edition cited below as *Furioso*); translation of this passage by Guido Waldman, in Ariosto, *Orlando furioso* (London, 1974), p. 424.

²⁹ *Furioso*, p. 1207; Waldman, *Orlando furioso*, p. 424.

³⁰ *Furioso*, 35.25, p. 1208; my (more literal) translation.

made Agamemnon the victor and the Trojans cowards and laggards, and Penelope faithful to her husband. . . . But if you want the truth not to remain hidden from you, turn the story completely around: the Greeks routed, Troy victorious, and Penelope a whore' (35.26–27).

Ariosto's John turns poets in effect into courtiers—fawning sycophants willing to trade their honesty for 'gifts of palaces and great estates'. The court poet does the bidding of the prince, often ruining the reputations of the virtuous and worthy while ennobling the wicked. John claims to be anguished by what he says but feels duty-bound to reveal this unhappy truth about writers because, he says, he loves them and was once himself a writer. Should we read John's excoriation of poets in the light of its riddle about their truthfulness—and thus enter the insoluble dilemma of the Cretan poet who claimed that all Cretans were liars? Perhaps. But this is not the only place where Ariosto points to the corrupting influence of power over letters. In the sixth of his *Satires*, addressed to Pietro Bembo, he describes Bembo and poets in general as those 'whose study is entirely human, and . . . whose task it is to sing of ancient deeds, to soften with prayers inexorable spirits, and to satiate princes with false praises.'³¹ Whereas poets were once a civilizing force creating communities and persuading the powerful to live under laws, Ariosto berates modern poets for their classicizing fetishes and denounces them as the sort that Plato banned from the republic. In *The Courtier* Lodovico argues that poets become famous because of the great men whose deeds they sing and that poets would sink into oblivion if they refused to shower great men with praises. In the *Furioso* John claims that poets make men *seem* more or less great and that, although they may think they control the destinies and afterlife of princes and warriors, in reality those 'gifts of palaces and great estates' only come with the flattery that makes legends of powerful men. Both Castiglione and Ariosto created characters who point to the disturbing dependence of writers on patrons and princes.

If the critique offered by Ariosto's John of the nexus between letters and power starkly draws out the implications left decorously unspoken in the debate Castiglione stages between Lodovico and

³¹ *The Satires of Ludovico Ariosto: A Renaissance Autobiography*, trans. P. D. Wiggins (Athens, Ohio, 1976), 6.49–87, pp. 154–7; see Amilcare A. Iannucci, 'Ariosto's Satire-Epistle to Bembo: Meditations on Humanism and the Value of a Humanistic Education', *The Humanities Association Review*, 30 (1979), pp. 147–57.

Bembo, it is tempting to speculate that in sections added to *The Courtier* in the 1520s Castiglione let one of his speakers respond to Ariosto's John and attempt to liberate letters from the accusation of servile dependence on arms and power. In Book 4 Ottaviano Fregoso—the powerful Genoese noble, a future doge in fact—tries to rescue courtiers and their learning from sycophancy and servility by assigning them the task, not of singing the praises and preserving the memory of heroic princes, but of educating a less than heroic prince in the virtues of good government. As Lodovico had done in Book 1, Ottaviano decries the effeminacy of what he calls 'this courtiership for its own sake [*questa tal cortegiania per sé sola*]'. The perfect courtier is good and praiseworthy only 'in regard to the end to which he is directed'. Without such an end, his nobility, grace, charm, and skills are not worth the effort. Even worse, in the absence of a worthy purpose, all the attention to dancing, festivities, singing, and playing games (presumably including the game of fashioning the perfect courtier) would be vain, frivolous, and actually blameworthy, because these and other such things 'belong to the entertainments of women and matters of love [*appartengono ad intertenimenti di donne e d'amori*] . . . and often do nothing more than make spirits effeminate [*spesso non fanno altro che effeminar gli animi*], corrupt the young, and lead them to a most lascivious way of living. And from this it comes about that the Italian name is submerged in infamy [*che 'l nome italiano è ridotto in obbrobrio*], and that only few can be found who dare, I won't say to die, but even to face danger. And certainly there are endless other things that, with the application of diligence and effort, would generate far greater utility both in peace and in war, than this courtiership for its own sake.'³²

So Ottaviano turns the courtier into the prince's teacher, adviser, and truth-teller whose mission it must be to lead his prince to virtue and instruct him in the principles of good government. He does not reject the courtier they have thus far created; indeed, he is confident that the skills and knowledge they have assigned him will suffice to gain the confidence of the prince, avoid flattery, speak the truth, and teach a prince all he needs to know. Among these skills is of course 'knowledge of letters [*notizia di lettere*] and many other things', evidently including the books that preserve the memory of the great

³² *Il Cortegiano*, 4.4, pp. 449–50.

men of antiquity. In Book 1 Lodovico had argued that these examples should serve as a stimulus to glory for the noble warrior. Now they serve as the foundation of the prince's education, for the courtier should 'excite him to virtue with the example of those celebrated commanders and other excellent men to whom the ancients used to erect statues of bronze and marble, and sometimes of gold, and locate them in public places, both for their honour and as a stimulus to others that they might exert themselves out of an honourable envy to reach such glory themselves'.³³ Such a courtier-adviser-teacher is particularly necessary now, he says, because today's 'princes are . . . corrupted by evil habits, ignorance, and a false view of themselves', and the 'consequences of this ignorance of how to govern their peoples include such evils, so much death, destruction, burning and ruin that it can be called the deadliest plague on earth'.³⁴ Ottaviano's denunciation of 'today's' princes finally identifies the mysterious 'few' that Count Lodovico had blamed for Italy's disaster. It paints a darker picture of the courts and of the actual relationship between princes and their courtiers as grounded in lies, flattery, deceptions, and the corruption of a *false* school of manners. Courtiers are thus complicit in the corruption that has engulfed both themselves and their princes. Ottaviano is persuaded that princes will even resist the teachings they need: 'If a rigorous philosopher [*severo filosofo*] appeared before any of our princes, or indeed anyone who wished to show them the terrifying face of true virtue and teach them, openly and without any artifice [*senza arte*], good customs and the kind of life a good prince should lead, I am certain that the moment he appeared they would revile him as a serpent and ridicule him as a worthless thing.' And, precisely because princes will resist these lessons, Ottaviano knows that his teacher-courtier will have to resort to 'seductions [or enticements: *illecebre*]' such as 'music, arms and horses, verses, discussions of love, and all those ways of which these gentlemen have spoken', thus 'deceiving him with a healthy deception [*ingannandolo con inganno salutare*]', like the cautious doctors who, wanting to give sickly and excessively delicate children a bitter-tasting medicine, often circle the rim of the cup with some sweet liquid'.³⁵ In order to fulfill

³³ *Ibid.*, 4.5, p. 451; 4.9, p. 457.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 4.9, p. 456; 4.8, p. 455.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 4.10, pp. 457–8. The simile about the doctors is taken from Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura* 1.936ff.

his truth-telling mission, in other words, the courtier must, paradoxically, practice the arts of simulation and concealment—in effect, the *sprezzatura*, the art of concealing artifice, that Count Lodovico had defined as the essence of courtiership in Book 1. Now both “verses” and “arms” become instruments of deception, seduction, and beguilement, no different in function from conversations about love or music. Castiglione lets Ottaviano sink deeper into contradictions.

His interlocutors ultimately push Ottaviano both to see and to exaggerate some of these contradictions. When the Duchess Elisabetta Gonzaga, who presides over the conversations, asks him at one point to say everything he would teach his prince if ‘you had so completely won his favor [*la grazia sua*] that you could freely tell him whatever came to your mind’, Ottaviano laughs and responds: ‘If I had the favour of some princes I know, and if I freely spoke my views to them, I fear I would soon lose that favour.’³⁶ Thus only in a joke can Ottaviano face the improbability, indeed the unreality, of the truth-telling courtier-teacher-adviser he has fashioned. Both his courtier and the princes he knows have been formed by a courtly culture that subverts and precludes the new roles he wants to assign them. But the fantasy unravels completely when Ottaviano makes the mistake of reviving the gender wars of Book 3. Finishing another speech on the duties of the good prince educated as he would have him, he incautiously includes the responsibility of tempering the superfluous expenditures of his subjects, especially excessive dowries and the jewels and clothes of women, ‘which do nothing but feed their folly: for, besides often wasting their husbands’ wealth and substance out of ambition and the envy they bear one another, they sometimes sell their modesty [*pudivizia*] to anyone willing to buy it with a small jewel or trinket’.³⁷ The others will not allow Ottaviano this breach of decorum. Bibbiena asks if he has now sided with the two speakers—Gaspere Pallavicino and Niccolò Frisio—whose misogyny sparked the debates in Book 3. ‘That quarrel is finished’, Ottaviano retorts, ‘and I don’t want to revive it. Hence I’ll say nothing more about women and return to my prince.’ But Frisio retorts that he can now leave his prince and be satisfied with the way he has ‘formed’ him, because ‘it would be easier to find a woman with the

³⁶ *Il Cortegiano*, 4.25–26, p. 479.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 4.41, p. 500.

qualities described' by Giuliano de' Medici, who had defended the honour and valour of women in the third book, 'than it would be to find a prince with the qualities of which you speak. Hence I fear that he is like Plato's republic, and that we will never see one like him, except perhaps in heaven.'³⁸ Ottaviano remains optimistic, and Count Lodovico supports his optimism by pointing to the promise of the future rulers of Spain, France, and England, as well as to the Gonzaga heir in Mantua—all of whom were of course ruling by the time *The Courtier* was written. The Duchess praises Ottaviano for what he has said and for being himself the 'perfect courtier that we seek' and indeed for having all the qualities of the "ottimo principe" that he has described—an allusion to Ottaviano's election as doge of Genoa in 1513.

The discussions seem to be at an end, but with too many unresolved questions: they talk among themselves 'confusedly and with a number of disagreements'.³⁹ Then, in a passage added in the last redaction, perhaps in the mid 1520s, but no later than 1527–28, Castiglione has Giuliano de' Medici return to Ottaviano's slur against women and accuse him of having invented his high-minded civic courtier for the express purpose of saving the courtier from being no more than the equal of the court lady ("donna di palazzo"). Giuliano accuses Ottaviano of two 'errors': first, of having set the courtier above even the prince in order to give him a higher rank than the court lady by assigning him tasks to which she cannot aspire; and second, in so doing of having set tasks for his courtier that are either impossible to achieve, or, should he achieve them, are of such a nature that 'he must no longer be called a courtier'. If the courtier's instruction can make the prince 'excellent', Giuliano reasons, it follows that the courtier must himself be 'more excellent than the prince'. One capable of instructing his prince needs to be 'of great dignity and authority, mature in years and experience, and, if possible, a good philosopher, a good commander, and must know almost everything [*e, se possibil fosse, bon filosofo, bon capitano, e quasi saper ogni cosa*]. . . . He should therefore not be called a courtier; he deserves a greater and more honorable title.' This, concludes Giuliano, is the 'fallacy' in Ottaviano's argument, one that Giuliano feels compelled to uncover 'for the honour of my court lady, whom you would

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 4.42, pp. 500–1.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 4.44, p. 502.

like to be of lesser dignity than this courtier of yours—and this I will not tolerate.⁴⁰ Giuliano's attack brings Ottaviano's elaborate attempt to rescue the courtier from pleasant irrelevance at best and corruption at worst face-to-face with its starting point: the fear of effeminacy to which Ottaviano himself had pointed in his first speech in Book 4. Giuliano accuses him of having constructed the fantasy of the noble courtier who fashions a good prince for the sole purpose of saving the courtier from being no better than the equal of the court lady, and, given Ottaviano's denunciation of women willing to sell their modesty for trinkets, from the suggestion of meretriciousness as well, from being merely a paid entertainer whose only function is to please and praise the prince. This is the fear that pervades the book: that the courtier has never been and will not be more than the pleasant dissimulator, the graceful flatterer, complicit in the corruption that has perverted the courts and made them worse than useless in the difficult business of governing and defending states. Courtiers may also be promoters, and not merely products, of this corruption, since it is their flattery, as Ottaviano admits, that turns princes into ignorant and arrogant fools incapable of good government. This complicity can now be seen as already adumbrated in the exchange between Pietro Bembo and Count Lodovico in Book 1—in Lodovico's observation that men of letters praise only powerful men, and in Bembo's willingness to accept (and flatter) Alexander as an authority for the superiority of letters.

Ottaviano disposes of the accusation against his motives by saying that it would do the court lady more honour to raise her, rather than lower the courtier, to achieve their equality and to allow her to instruct and educate her mistress ("signora") in the same way he would have the courtier instruct the prince (4.45). The lack of discussion of this suggestion underscores its weakness. He then quickly moves on to defend his notion of the ennobled relationship between courtier and prince, claiming that it does not trouble him if the name of courtier is not appropriate, as Giuliano had objected, for one who educates a prince. The courtier may indeed aspire to a higher status, that of "institutor" of his prince. And yet, Ottaviano asks, why would even the best "institutor" of a prince refuse the 'name of perfect courtier'? He gives examples that bring us back to

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 4.44, pp. 503–4.

Achilles and Alexander. Achilles' tutor Phoenix, sent to him by his father 'to be his companion and to teach him both how to speak and how to act, which is exactly the purpose we have assigned to our courtier', was, says Ottaviano, a 'perfetto cortegiano'.⁴¹ Castiglione lets Ottaviano conveniently forget that in the *Iliad* Achilles rudely rejects Phoenix's advice, given in a long speech in which the old tutor reminds him of the history of their relationship, to curb his terrible anger and let the war end.⁴² 'Nor', Ottaviano adds, 'do I think that Aristotle and Plato would have scorned the name of perfect courtier, because it is clear that they performed the tasks of courtiership and dedicated themselves to this purpose, the one with Alexander the Great and the other with the kings of Sicily.' Aristotle instructed Alexander so well in both 'the natural sciences and in the virtues of the spirit that he made him most wise, strong, moderate in his behaviour, and a true moral philosopher, not only in words but in deeds.' Ottaviano claims that Alexander brought the wild people he conquered to 'a civilized life [*al viver civile*]', but that 'the author [*autore*] of these deeds of Alexander was Aristotle, who employed the methods of a good courtier' (4.47). Gaspare Pallavicino punctures this fantastic apotheosis of the courtier with humour: 'I hardly expected our courtier to be so honoured; but since Aristotle and Plato are his companions, I believe that no one should disdain the name [of courtier]. But I'm not sure I can believe that Aristotle or Plato ever danced or played music in their lives, or performed any acts of chivalry [or horsemanship: *cavalleria*]' (4.48). Gaspare thus reminds Ottaviano how far he has taken his ideal courtier from the reality of the courts. *Cavalleria* alludes to the military dimension of courtiership that is completely absent in the image of the courtier as a teacher-philosopher in the mould of Aristotle. Ottaviano's desperate attempt to assign the courtier important tasks in the world of power has resulted in a splitting of the courtier as he was imagined by Lodovico in Book 1. Arms and letters are no longer combined in the same person. Lodovico's fierce *and* well-lettered courtier has been divided into a teacher who knows letters and philosophy and a prince paradoxically educated as a great warrior by a most *un-warrior-like*

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 4.47, pp. 507–8.

⁴² *Iliad*, Book 9. In *De oratore* 3.57 Cicero recalls Homer's description of Phoenix as a teacher of both eloquence and action: Loeb Cicero, vol. 4 (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), pp. 46–7.

tutor. And the tutors, like Achilles' Phoenix, suffer under the illusion that they are the true "autori" of the deeds of their powerful students.

Ariosto knew the final published version of *The Courtier* (of 1528) as he reworked the *Orlando furioso* into its last edition (of 1532) in which he added the entirety of canto 37—the canto that praises the 'val-rose donne' who have achieved renown in both arms and letters. Chief among these women is the poet Vittoria Colonna, and in praising her Ariosto evokes and rewrites Petrarch's sonnet about Alexander and Achilles in terms that address *The Courtier's* anxious debate over letters and arms. Vittoria Colonna was the daughter of Fabrizio, who had died in 1520, and the daughter of a daughter of Federigo da Montefeltro, the founder of the Urbino court immortalized by Castiglione. She had married Francesco Ferrante d'Avalos, Marchese di Pescara and a prominent commander in the imperial armies from the 1512 battle of Ravenna to the battle of Pavia in 1525, at which he suffered wounds that led to his death later that year. Vittoria was thus herself the Marchesa di Pescara. As she began to make her reputation as a poet in the late 1520s, she became known to, and corresponded with, many of the prominent literary figures of the time, including Ariosto, Castiglione, and especially Pietro Bembo.⁴³

Like everyone else in the Italian literary world, Ariosto knew that Colonna's cordial epistolary friendship with Castiglione suddenly soured in 1527 because she circulated a manuscript of *The Courtier* without his permission. In 1524 Castiglione had sent Colonna a copy of whatever version of the dialogues existed at the time. In September of that year she wrote Castiglione a letter (and sent a copy to the papal datary and bishop of Verona, Gian Matteo Giberti, thus making the letter semi-public), in which she praised *The Courtier* and explained why she had not yet returned the manuscript, as Castiglione had requested. She had read it once and liked it so much that she was reading it a second time. 'The pure truth', she wrote, 'is that I have never seen, nor do I believe I will ever see, a work in prose better, similar, or perhaps even deservedly second to this one.' She

⁴³ Carlo Dionisotti, 'Appunti sul Bembo e su Vittoria Colonna', in *Miscellanea Augusto Campana* (Padua, 1981), pp. 257–86; and Giovanna Rabitti, 'Vittoria Colonna, Bembo e Firenze: un caso di ricezione e qualche postilla', *Studi e problemi di critica testuale*, 44 (1992), pp. 127–55.

lauded 'its most appealing and original subject matter and the excellence of its style, [which] is such that with a gentleness never before felt it leads you up a most lovely and fertile hill, always climbing without ever making you aware of even having left the plain where you entered; and the path is so well cultivated and adorned that it is difficult to tell whether nature or art worked harder to make it beautiful.' That was praise for, and in the language of, *The Courtier's* own *sprezzatura*. Having praised its witticisms, wisdom, language, jokes, the honour it pays to the moderation and virtue of women, and the 'rare majesty' with which it raises the vernacular to the heights of the best works in Latin, Colonna added that 'it does not surprise me that you have fashioned a perfect courtier [*che abbia ben formato un perfetto cortegiano*], because only by holding up a mirror, and considering his inner and outer aspects, was it possible to describe him as [this book] has done. But because the greatest difficulty we have is to know ourselves, I think it must be more difficult to represent [or fashion: *formar*] oneself than another.'⁴⁴ Whatever she meant by this last ambiguous assertion, the similarity to Ariosto's references to Castiglione is intriguing. In the third *Satire* (v. 91) Ariosto alludes to Castiglione as the 'formator del cortigiano',⁴⁵ and in the *Furioso*, in the same canto that lauds Vittoria Colonna, he echoes her judgment that *The Courtier* is specular and autobiographical when he refers to Castiglione, among the many who champion women writers, as 'the one who has formed courtiers just as we see him [*chi, qual lui / Vediamo, ha tali i cortigian formati*]' (37.8).

In March 1525 Castiglione wrote to Colonna from Madrid, where he arrived on the 11th and spent the remaining years of his life as papal nuncio to Charles V, to congratulate her for the 'glorious successes' of her husband in the imperial victory over the French at the battle of Pavia the previous month. He expressed 'satisfaction' over her approval of *The Courtier*, and, in a rhetorically chivalric gesture, declared that his 'animo' had spontaneously obeyed her 'tacit command' that 'someone should write the Cortegiano'.⁴⁶ But in letters to a papal secretary of that same month and of the following June, Castiglione expressed worry and astonishment at the lack

⁴⁴ Vittoria Colonna, *Carteggio*, ed. E. Ferrero and G. Müller (Turin, 1892), pp. 23–6; Amedeo Quondam, "*Questo povero Cortegiano*": *Castiglione, il libro, la storia* (Rome, 2000), pp. 67–73, 534–5.

⁴⁵ *Satires of Ariosto*, ed. Wiggins, p. 62.

⁴⁶ Colonna, *Carteggio*, pp. 26–7.

of response from Colonna.⁴⁷ Their correspondence came to a halt. Even after Colonna's husband died in December 1525, Castiglione did not write again until August 1527, this time in a mood of despair and disorientation. He had 'not dared' to write, he explained, so as not to have to bring to mind what he could not say and she could not hear 'without extreme sorrow'. But 'now that such great calamities have occurred, which, almost like the biblical Flood, have made everyone's miseries equal'—the allusion is to the Sack of Rome in May—'it seems permissible to all of us, and perhaps a matter of duty, to forget every past thing, and to open our eyes and escape human ignorance as far as our weakness allows us and to acknowledge that we know nothing: most of the time what seems true to us is false, and conversely what seems false is true. Thus, as I once thought of Your Ladyship [*Vostra Signoria*] as having died in your husband the lord marchese of glorious memory, now, seeing with truer judgment, I believe that the lord marchese lives on in Your Ladyship. It seems to me that immortality is so appropriate to the virtues of both of your divine souls that the bodies inhabited by those souls should be exempt from death. And thus I believe that what has up to now so tormented us was rather an empty dream than a real occurrence.'⁴⁸

The marital union of Vittoria Colonna the poet and Francesco Ferrante d'Avalos the warrior—'still very young, but one of whom great things were expected', Guicciardini wrote in Book 10 of the *Storia d'Italia*—embodied the union of letters and arms. In the August 1527 letter to Colonna, Castiglione sees the marchese's death as a synecdoche for the "calamities" that befell Italy in 1527—the year Guicciardini described in Book 18 as 'full of atrocities and events unheard of for many centuries: overthrow of governments, wickedness of princes, most frightful sacks of cities, great famines, a most terrible plague almost everywhere in Italy; everything full of death, flight and rapine.'⁴⁹ That the warrior husband's "virtù" should live on in his wife the poet was a proffered consolation reflecting the desperate hope that Italy's *virtù*, though lost on the battlefields, could

⁴⁷ Baldassar Castiglione, *Lettere inedite e rare*, ed. G. Gorni (Milan and Naples: 1969), pp. 91 (14 March) and 100 (7 June).

⁴⁸ Colonna, *Carteggio*, pp. 47–8; Quondam, "Questo povero Cortegiano", p. 537.

⁴⁹ Francesco Guicciardini, *The History of Italy*, trans. Sidney Alexander (New York, 1969), pp. 246 (d'Avalos), 376 (1527).

somehow be perpetuated in its literary primacy. The thought—so I imagine—must have taken Castiglione back to what he had Count Lodovico say about Italy, the French, letters, and arms. And this consolatory vision of the warrior husband's life after death through his wife the poet echoes perhaps the central and unifying theme of Colonna's love sonnets to her dead husband.⁵⁰

But just a month later, in September 1527, Castiglione wrote again and angrily complained that he had had no response to his many letters. She had, so he acknowledged, heard correctly that he was expressing grievances against her, for he now had the proof of what troubled him: he had seen her letter to the Marchese del Vasto in which she 'confessed to the theft of *The Courtier* [*dove essa medesima confessava il furto del Cortegiano*]'. The astonishing accusation referred to her failure to return the manuscript despite his requests. At first he assumed that it was safely in good hands, but then he learned that 'some fragments of the poor *Cortegiano*' were circulating in Naples 'in the hands of several people' who said they got them from Colonna. 'It sorrowed me a bit, in the way a father feels seeing his son treated badly.' So he decided to correct the manuscript and get it printed as soon as possible.⁵¹ Castiglione retells this story in *The Courtier's* dedicatory letter to Don Michel de Silva, written for the published edition of 1528: his loan to her of a copy; her decision, 'contrary to her promise', to have it transcribed—over which he 'could not but feel some irritation [*fastidio*]'; his discovery that these copies were circulating in Naples; his alarm upon learning that some persons were planning to have it published; and his decision to attend to its publication himself before that could happen. He also expressed annoyance over her suggestion of several years earlier that he had formed the courtier in his own image. 'Some even say that I intended to fashion myself [*formar me stesso*], convinced that the qualities that I attribute to the courtier are all to be found in me.' He did not deny having experienced everything he wants his courtier to know: anyone, however 'erudito', who lacks 'notizia' of the things described in the book would have had great difficulty writing about them. 'But I am not so devoid of judgment in self-knowledge that I presume

⁵⁰ Suzanne Thérault, *Un cénacle humaniste de la Renaissance autour de Vittoria Colonna châtelaine d'Ischia* (Paris, 1968), pp. 133–41; William J. Kennedy, *Authorizing Petrarch* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1994), pp. 114–34.

⁵¹ Colonna, *Carteggio*, pp. 48–51; Quondam, "Questo povero Cortegiano", pp. 537–8.

to know all that I want to know.' And he leaves the question suspended by 'entrusting the defence against these accusations . . . to the views of public opinion', and thus to his readers.⁵² The language of this self-defence is so close to Colonna's comments in the 1524 letter that there can be little doubt that Castiglione was responding to her. And even as he admits its at least partial truth, he still calls it an 'accusation'. Presumably he would not have liked, had he lived to see it, Ariosto's version of the same idea.

Vittoria Colonna is never again discussed in *The Courtier*. In the Magnifico Giuliano's long defence of the heroism and virtue of women in Book 3, including a number of modern women, there is no mention of her. Instead it is Ariosto who sings her praises. Like Bembo, he wrote poems to and about her and one about her husband.⁵³ But his most famous words about Colonna are in the *Orlando furioso*. Canto 37 opens by defending the 'valorose donne' whose fame has been obscured by the 'rancour' and 'envy' of men. These women include both scholars and warriors: those who, 'if they had devoted themselves to the studies / that make the mortal virtues immortal, / and had been able on their own / to perpetuate the memory of their praises / without having to beg for help from [male] writers', would have achieved 'reputations perhaps / beyond what manly fame has ever reached' (37.1–2); and those who have won glory as rulers and conquerors, including 'the one [Semiramis] who victoriously [*con vittoria*] overran the Assyrians, the Persians, and the Indians' (37.5). The pantheon of worthy women thus encompasses both letters and arms. But because of the 'lying, envious, and wicked male writers' of antiquity, of the many women who did great things barely one in a thousand is now known (37.6). So Ariosto encourages the women of his own day to persevere and not to be 'deflected from their high undertakings by fear that suitable honours will not be forthcoming' (37.7). For times have changed, and now many men

⁵² *Cortegiano*, p. 77. In the sentence, 'non voglio già negar di non aver tentato tutto quello ch'io vorrei che sapesse il cortegiano', both modern translators of *The Courtier* understand Castiglione to be saying that he 'will not deny that I have tried to write down all that I should want the courtier to know': trans. George Bull, *The Book of the Courtier* (London, 1976); cf. Charles Singleton, *The Book of the Courtier* (New York, 1959): 'I will not deny having tried to set down everything that I could wish the Courtier to know.' I find no reference to writing here; it is rather his experience of these things that Castiglione is emphasizing.

⁵³ Nuccio Ordine, 'Vittoria Colonna nell'*Orlando furioso*', *Studi e problemi di critica testuale* 42 (1991), pp. 55–92, at pp. 55–8.

honour and support women. He names some, including Pontano and Bembo, and then alludes to Castiglione ('he who has formed courtiers just as we see him') without naming him (37.8)—a curious anonymity amidst so many names. Two come from Mantua—hence members of the Gonzaga family—'equally loved by Mars and by the Muses'. The first of these (Luigi Gonzaga) is both a poet and a warrior who 'instinctively honours and reveres you [women] and makes the mountains sacred to the Muses resound with your praises.' He is more devoted to women than to himself because of the 'love, fidelity, and the strong and indomitable spirit' of his loyal wife Isabella (Colonna). (37.8–9). Luigi is 'well deserving' that a woman so rich in all the virtues and valour a woman can have has never wavered in her constancy and has been for him a 'vera colonna' (37.11.4). The insertion of the two elements of her name—"vittoria" as in the victories of Semiramis, and "colonna" as in the pillar of strength and fidelity that Isabella was for Luigi Gonzaga—points the way to the octaves devoted to Vittoria Colonna.

More and more women, says the poet, are leaving needle and cloth to be with the Muses, and he would like to give 'good account' of them all. But to speak of so many would fill 'today's canto', and to limit himself to five or six would surely offend all the others (37.14–15). So he will select just one ('Sceglieronne una'), so worthy that no one will take it badly or feel envy if he is silent about all the rest and speaks only of her. 'For this one has not only made herself immortal / with a sweet style than which I never hear better; / but anyone of whom she speaks or writes / she can also raise from the grave and make him eternal [*Ma può qualunque di cui parli o scriva, / Trar del sepolcro, e far ch'eterno viva*]' (37.16).

Vittoria è 'l nome; e ben conviensi a nata
 fra le vittorie, et a chi, o vada o stanzi,
 di trofei sempre e di trionfi ornata,
 la vittoria abbia seco, o dietro o inanzi.

(37.18)

(Vittoria is her name, and well fitting it is for one born amidst victories, who, whether travelling or at rest, adorned with trophies and triumphs, always has victory with her.)

It now becomes clear that the opening octaves were already alluding to, and introducing, Colonna, in several ways beyond the plays on her name. First, unlike the women of old who had to beg help

from men to secure their fame, she has assured her own with her unsurpassed 'sweet style', thus achieving a poetic victory that eluded the women of antiquity. Second, whereas ancient women aspired to, but were never allowed fully to embrace, 'those studies that make mortal virtues immortal', Colonna has mastered this art as well: she can give 'eternal' life to anyone of whom she speaks or writes. And whereas the valour of those ancient women was divided into two camps of poets and warriors, Colonna is both a poet—into whom Apollo has breathed more 'eloquence [*facundia*]' and 'sweetness [*dolcezza*]' than into any other woman (37.17)—and victory personified, indeed a living triumphal procession. Of course, Vittoria Colonna fought no battles and won no wars, and the trophies and triumphs, at least the literal ones, with which she is adorned must be those of her father and husband and maternal grandfather. But her victories are not limited to reflected or borrowed military glory. Vittoria's victory is over death, or rather the oblivion that is a second death. Ariosto contrasts Colonna with the many women of antiquity and legend who wanted to be buried with their husbands and who merit some praise for this. But 'how much more honour is due to Vittoria, who, despite the Fates and Death, has drawn her consort from Lethe!' (37.19). Although Ariosto calls her 'another Artemisia', the queen who built the great tomb for her husband Mausolus, the reference to the mythological woman mentions only her devotion to her husband and says nothing of the Mausoleum. In fact, he says, it is a much greater feat to 'pull a man out [of the grave] than to bury him' (37.18).

Tombs, graves, and the perpetuation of fame after death lead inexorably back to Achilles and Alexander, and thus to the Petrarchan sonnet that was the object of dispute in the debate over arms and letters in *The Courtier*. Praise of Colonna for rescuing her husband from the river of oblivion and forgetfulness is followed by an octave in which Ariosto in effect rewrites Petrarch's poem:

S'al fiero Achille invidia de la chiara
 meonia tromba il Macedonico ebbe,
 quanto, invito Francesco di Pescara,
 maggior a te, se vivesse or, l'avrebbe!
 che sì casta moglie e a te sì cara
 canti l'eterno onor che ti si debbe,
 e che per lei sì 'l nome tuo rimbombe,
 che da bramar non hai più chiare trombe.
 (37.20)

(If the Macedonian envied the fierce Achilles the Homeric trumpet, how much more, were he alive today, would he envy you, invincible Francesco of Pescara, that a wife so chaste and so dear to you sings the eternal honour that is your due, and that through her your name so resounds that you have no need to wish for more illustrious trumpets.)

The clear echo of Petrarch's sonnet—"fiero," "chiara tromba" (twice), "nome," and "rimbombe"—makes it evident that Ariosto was commenting on it, and at least probable, given the presence of Castiglione too in canto 37, that he also had in mind the debate over the poem in *The Courtier*. The octave's first two lines repeat almost verbatim the conclusion that Castiglione's Bembo draws from Petrarch's poem, namely, that Alexander did indeed envy Achilles his poet ('E se Alessandro ebbe invidia ad Achille'). Ariosto imagines two substitutions in the sonnet's triangular anxieties: Francesco da Pescara in the place of Achilles, and Vittoria Colonna in place of Homer. These lines mock poor Alexander, who already envies Achilles his Homer, with the gloating taunt that he would have envied Francesco still more, because of Vittoria. Does this playful reworking of the tortured relationship between letters and arms posit resolution and reconciliation in the circumstance that the poet is both a woman and the loyal, loving wife of the praised hero? Or is Ariosto hinting that the union of letters and arms in one person—the ideal that Count Lodovico had pursued in *The Courtier*—is after all impossible?

But the reader of canto 37 cannot have so quickly forgotten what St John says about all poets just two cantos earlier. Is the quasi-apotheosis of Vittoria Colonna merely the gesture that a courtier poet owes a marchesa who was a friend of popes and cardinals? Was Ariosto giving himself as an example of John's critique of court poets? Or was it a way of scolding Castiglione for his treatment of her in the dedicatory letter to *The Courtier*? Colonna and Castiglione each make one more appearance in Ariosto's poem: she has a place of conspicuous honour among the poets in the last canto (46.9) who welcome Ariosto home from his long poetic voyage, whereas he appears in a rather different role in canto 42. This is the episode in which Rinaldo comes upon the great palace in the middle of whose huge courtyard is a magnificent fountain, or pavilion, on which eight statues hold up a gilded roof, each statue the likeness of a woman. They are all notable women of the courts of Mantua, Ferrara,

and Urbino—including Lucrezia Borgia, wife of Alfonso d'Este, duke of Ferrara; Isabella d'Este, wife of Francesco Gonzaga, Marchese of Mantua; and Elisabetta and Leonora Gonzaga, wives, respectively, of two dukes of Urbino, Guidobaldo da Montefeltro and his successor Francesco Maria Della Rovere. Each statue rests on two sculpted figures, who carry the women on their shoulders (42.73–81). The lower statues are of poets associated with the same courts, all shown 'with their mouths open, demonstrating in this way / how much they delight in their melodious song; / and their appearance seems to indicate / that all their efforts and dedication are to praise / the fair ladies they have on their shoulders' (42.81). They have in their hands 'long and copious writings [*scritture*] / in which they reveal, with much praise, / the names of the worthier figures [above them]' (42.82). The statue of Elisabetta Gonzaga, the duchess who presides over the four evenings of conversation in *The Courtier*, rests on the shoulders of Jacopo Sadoleto and Pietro Bembo (42.86). Leonora's supports are the Mantuan poet Muzio Arelio and 'uno elegante Castiglione' (42.87). The scene is a stinging, if humorous, rebuke of the courts and the poets who inhabit them. It confirms and poetically realizes Castiglione's worst fears—those spoken by Lodovico da Canossa and Ottaviano Fregoso in the first and last books of *The Courtier*: far from embodying any noble union of arms and letters, these courtier poets are reduced to supporting and praising the ladies of the court. The prince whom Ottaviano would have his courtier instruct in virtue and good government is nowhere to be seen (as indeed he is similarly absent in Castiglione's book). If we may say that *The Courtier* dramatizes the anxieties of the courts over their relationship to princes and power, as well as reluctance to see that relationship clearly, the poetic freedom of the *Furioso* exposes, with humour if little mercy, the reality of those fears.

VISIONS OF WAR IN THE 'TERRESTRIAL PARADISE'.
IMAGES OF ITALY IN EARLY SIXTEENTH-CENTURY
FRENCH TEXTS

Nicole Hochner

The nineteenth-century historian Maulde de la Clavière characterized the early years of the sixteenth century in France as a literary fever.¹ This paper will analyze the impact of the Italian wars on this vast French literary and political production, concentrating on the years of Louis XII's reign (1498–1515).² The *occasionnels* or *bulletins* were studied in the 1960s by Jean-Pierre Seguin, who convincingly proved the success of these cheaply printed booklets. The *bulletin* was an influential new commercial item: indeed inventories and library catalogues show that at certain peak periods a new booklet was printed and sold almost every day in Paris. A large number of these refer to the Italian wars—real or fictional military correspondence and reports from the front, or laudatory poems exalting national pride and French victories. These prints are probably the best proof that the war fascinated the French public, hungry for information and news. For the years 1494–1495, Seguin notes that if in the first publications Italy was seen as a land of wealth and beauty, by the summer of 1495, as the enthusiasm of the first few months was waning, the welcoming landscape turned into mountains that were 'droites et mauvaises' (steep and threatening) and the green and wealthy

¹ Jean d'Auton, *Chroniques de Louis XII*, ed. René de Maulde La Clavière (Paris, 1889–1895), IV, p. i.

² The first years of the Italian wars, 1494–98, have already been studied in some depth by A. V. Antonovics, "Il sembloit que ce soit là un vrai Paradis terrestre": Charles VIII's conquest of Naples and the French Renaissance', in *The French Descent into Renaissance Italy 1494–1495 Antecedents and Effects*, ed. David Abulafia (Aldershot, 1995), pp. 311–25. See also Yvonne Labande Mailfert, *Charles VIII et son milieu (1470–1498)*, *La jeunesse au pouvoir* (Paris, 1975). The other side of the question, namely the Italian perception of the French is more often raised: see especially Anne Denis, *Charles VIII et les Italiens: Histoire et Mythe* (Geneva, 1979) and Patrick Gilli, *Les représentations de la France dans la culture savante italienne, à la fin du Moyen âge: c. 1360–c. 1490* (Rome, 1997).

lands were replaced by the aridity of Italy caused by the 'sterilité des eaux' (lack of sources of water).³

Most of these works were published anonymously, but many reputed writers at the time participated in the French "discovery" of Italy. Indeed, many of the authors included in this corpus are known "Rhétoriciens", or associated with this literary group rehabilitated after centuries of denigration or neglect by such scholars as Henri Chamard, V.-L. Saulnier, Franco Simone and more recently Paul Zumthor and François Cornilliat.⁴ I shall consider in particular the works of André de La Vigne, who was invited by Charles VIII to report on his journey to Naples, and the chronicles of Jean d'Auton, a monk at the time, passionate about military history, who attached himself to the French troops and followed their progress in the battlefield like a modern day war-correspondent before becoming the official historiographer of the king. I shall briefly mention the chronicles written by Jean de Saint-Gelais and the pamphlets of Claude de Seyssel on Louis's victories. Seyssel, a Savoy ecclesiastic sent on several diplomatic missions for the French throne, was very much interested in the analysis of the effect of the occupation of Italian territories on French politics, and a third of his well-known *La Monarchie de France* is devoted to issues related to the French military adventure.⁵ Finally, I shall consider the poetical production by authors such as Pierre Gringore, Jean Marot and Jean Bouchet.

André de La Vigne's text, *La ressource de la Chrestienté*, was written prior to the expedition to Naples in 1494. La Vigne gives us a lengthy description of Naples as a magnificent garden, a 'gracieux

³ Jean-Paul Seguin, 'La découverte de l'Italie par les soldats de Charles VIII 1494-1495 d'après les journaux occasionnels du temps', *Gazette des Beaux-Arts*, 50 (1961), p. 132 and his major work *L'information en France de Louis XII à Henri II* (Genève, 1961).

⁴ For more details see P. Jodogne, 'Les "rhétoriciens" et l'humanisme: un problème d'histoire littéraire', in *Humanism in France at the end of the Middle Ages and in the early Renaissance*, ed. A. H. T. Levi (Manchester, 1970), pp. 150-75. See also Henri Chamard, *Les origines de la poésie française de la Renaissance* (Paris, 1920); V.-L. Saulnier, *La littérature française de la Renaissance (1500-1600)* (Paris, 1948); Franco Simone, 'La scuola dei Rhétoriciens', *Belfagor*, 4 (1949), pp. 529-52; Paul Zumthor, *La masque et la lumière. La poétique des grands rhétoriciens* (Paris, 1978); and François Cornilliat, "Or ne mens". *Couleurs de l'Éloge et du Blâme chez les "Grands Rhétoriciens"* (Paris, 1994). Only French texts will be considered here, not neo-Latin poetry or prose.

⁵ Seyssel's work is a theoretical treatise mainly based on ancient military history, but in several passages he refers to recent events or debates; see, for example, *La Monarchie de France*, ed. Jacques Pujol (Paris, 1961), pp. 197-98 or 208-9.

vergier' so colourful and amazingly rich in floral and arboreal marvels that it surpasses any other earthly beauty.⁶ Yet we learn very little about the city as such. The departure for war resembles a voyage to a paradisiacal land, a symbolic feast of aesthetic and olfactory stimula: 'je l'estimoye plus a ung paradis terrestre que a ung pays terriffique'.⁷ In the last analysis, however, the town remains very much in an imaginary realm.

In a later piece, the *Voyage de Naples*, La Vigne still keeps his positive vision of what he calls, as the title indicates, a 'journey'. He is so amazed by the Italian landscape that he is even ready to acknowledge that the beauty of Italy may sometimes surpass that of France itself. For example, the cathedral of Siena looks almost as beautiful as the Hôtel-Dieu in Paris,⁸ the Coliseum is as big as six Parisian palaces,⁹ the wealth and diversity of medicines in the Castel Nuovo stronghold exceed all the drugs that one can find in all of Paris, and the park at Poggio Reale seems bigger and more impressive than the 'boys de Vincennes'.¹⁰ There are several other comparisons in *La Vigne*,¹¹ but it seems that in a few cases he is simply plagiarizing printed *bulletins*.¹² The tone indeed is quite similar: one of the first printed reports on Charles's expedition likewise suggests that Italy is a stunning and prosperous country.¹³ The author is especially amazed by the wine cellar at Capua, but he is also impressed by the horses, the crockery, the house linen and finally by the garden. Another bulletin dated 22 February 1495 reports on Charles's entry

⁶ André de La Vigne, *La ressource de la chrestienté*, in p. 117.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 115–6. La Vigne again speaks in terms of an 'earthly paradise' in his *Voyage de Naples* about a scaffold raised for Charles VIII's entry into Chieri: see *Le voyage de Naples*, ed. Anna Slerca (Geneva, 1982), p. 169 and again about his entry into Florence, p. 269.

⁸ La Vigne, *Le voyage de Naples*, p. 225.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 235.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 249.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 262, 276, 295.

¹² Anna Slerca has shown that La Vigne was inspired by at least one *bulletin* printed in Paris in 1495 (reproduced by Jules L. La Pilorgerie, *Campagne et bulletins de la Grande Armée d'Italie commandée par Charles VIII, 1494–1495* (Paris, 1866), pp. 196–7); see *Voyage de Naples*, pp. 38–9. The letter reproduced in the *bulletin* makes further comparisons, of the Castel Nuovo and the Bastille, for example: see La Pilorgerie, *Campagne et bulletins*, pp. 196–7.

¹³ La Pilorgerie, *Campagne et bulletins*, pp. 195–8: 'Lettres envoyées à Monseigneur le général faisant mention des richesses et grandes beaultez qui sont au chasteau de Capouana'.

into Naples. The author admits that he does not understand Italian, so he omits the pageants and the speeches, but he is very forthcoming on the wines and new food he discovers:

Devant toutes les maisons de renom il y avait table ronde de vins grecz, vin de Rosete, vins cuits, vins muscadez et malvoisie qui estoient si forts qu'ils eschauffoient comme qui eust mangé fortes especes . . . Je vis choses nouvelles, pois, febves, bons à manger, cerises et les grandes grappes de verjus bien gros aux vignes.¹⁴

In a letter printed in Tours, the king himself confesses: 'Je vous assure que de ce que j'ay veu jusques ici du royaume, c'est ung bon et beau pays plein de biens et de richesses. Au regart de ceste cité, elle est belle et gorgiasse en toutes choses autant que ville peut estre.'¹⁵ In another printed letter addressed to the duke of Bourbon and dated 28 March 1495, Charles VIII admits that the Italian artists are more talented than the French and that he therefore intends to invite some of them back to his château at Amboise.¹⁶

Au surplus vous ne pourriez croire les beaulx jardins que j'ay en ceste ville. Car sur ma foy il semble qu'il n'y faille que Adam et Eve pour en faire un paradis terrestre, tant ils sont beaulx et pleins de toutes bonnes et singulières choses . . .¹⁷

But other than commenting on the warm welcome he received Charles gives precious little detail about his new realm. In an unpublished letter attributed to Cardinal Saint-Malo and addressed to Queen Anne, Naples is again described as a terrestrial paradise.¹⁸ It is not clear whether this letter circulated at court, but one can deduce from it that the designation of Italy as a terrestrial paradise is fairly common in French reports.

¹⁴ 'Before all the notable houses there was a table covered with *vins grecz*, *vin de Rosete*, *vins cuits*, *vins muscadez* and *malvoisie*, which were so strong that they heated you as though one had eaten strong spices . . . I saw new things, peas, beans, good to eat, cherries and the big *verjus* grapes, fat on the vines.' *ibid.*, p. 204.

¹⁵ 'I assure you that from what I have seen so far of this kingdom, it is a good and beautiful country, full of good things and of riches. As for this city, it is beautiful and as abundant with all things as a city can be': *ibid.*, p. 199.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 216.

¹⁷ 'Furthermore, you would not believe the beautiful gardens that I have in this town. For upon my faith it seems that only Adam and Eve are lacking for this to be an earthly paradise, so beautiful are they and full of all good and remarkable things'.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 218: 'si le royaume est beau il est encore meilleur'.

In *La ressource de la Chrestienté* Charles's campaign in Italy is understood as a revenge for 'les injures de la Crestienté'. In the *Voyage de Naples*, as well as in anonymous prints, the war is more generally justified because of King Alfonso's tyrannical regime, which is said to have been so unbearable that it brought his people to beg Charles to invade Italy in order to save them.¹⁹ In a typically medieval providential narrative, Charles VIII can thus be portrayed both as a saviour and a bringer of justice. In a *bulletin* published in February 1495 the king is indeed said to be awaited by the Neapolitans as a Messiah,²⁰ and in another *bulletin*, Charles writes that he found such disorder in Naples and so much oppression that he decided to cancel some taxes and amend the judicial system.²¹ The situation of Rome is apparently very similar: instead of justice, burglary and robbery reign there.²² Claude de Seyssel summarizes the French ambition in these terms: 'delivrer les Italiens de la servitude et oppression des tyrans, au grand bien et soulagement des peuples de tous estats'.²³ Under Charles VIII, the beauty of the country is often contrasted with the wickedness of its leaders. Later, when French rule encountered resistance and rebellion (as in Milan and in Naples), the liberality of the French would be contrasted with the ingratitude of the Italian people. Studies on the anti-Italian attitude of the French have already analyzed this trend, and in particular the notion of 'Francoys italiquéz' that can be found twice, for example, in Pierre Gringore's work.²⁴

If La Vigne's work more or less reflects these same ideas, it brings to light a public dispute that is known only from *La ressource de la Chrestienté*. In a debate between Nobility and Je-ne-sçait-qui, popular opposition to the ultramontane expedition is voiced by the character of Je-ne-sçait-qui, and at the end criticized by the arbiter Bon Conseil.

¹⁹ La Vigne, *La ressource de la Chrestienté*, p. 125; and *Le voyage de Naples*, p. 130.

²⁰ La Pilorgerie, *Campagne et bulletins*, p. 194.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 214–5.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 136.

²³ 'deliver the Italians from the servitude and oppression of tyrants, to the great benefit and relief of the people of all estates': Seyssel, *L'excellence et la félicité de la Victoire*, p. 333.

²⁴ Pierre Gringore, *Le jeu du prince des sottz et de mere sottte*, ed. Alan Hindley (Paris, 2000), p. 127 and *Les Fantaisies de Mere Sotte*, ed. R. L. Frautschi (Chapel Hill, 1962), p. 52. See Lionello Sozzi, 'La polémique italienne en France au XVI^e siècle', *Atti della Accademia delle Scienze di Torino*, 106 (1972), pp. 99–190. In Gringore's *Lettres nouvelles de Milan* (in *Œuvres polémiques rédigées sous le règne de Louis XII*, ed. Cynthia J. Brown (Geneva, 2003), p. 79), the form 'Italiens ytaliqués' is also used.

This dialogue reveals the street hostility towards military enterprises and could also speak for the opponents of this war (such as Philippe of Commynes).²⁵ Je-ne-sçait-qui urges Magesté Royale to reconsider Nobility's advice: the game of war seems hazardous and quite unnecessary since the realm is not under threat. If the Turks are attacking Italy, then the Pope should lead his fight himself ('Laissons le pape et tout son consistoire / Aller s'il veult . . . faire la guerre').²⁶

Hellas! Hellas! Fuyez guerre, seigneurs! . . .
 Guerre est mauvaise, dangereuse, mortelle . . .
 Payne, soucy et tribulacions
 Vyennent de guerre par cent mille moyens
 Mort et famyne, puis grans destructions²⁷

He denounces the vanity of the nobles wishing to play heroes and going to Naples 'pour faire du Rolant' ('be valiant'), ignoring the heavy price of a military campaign.²⁸ Je-ne-sçay-qui's motto is make love not war: a female conquest, he suggests, is a safer and more gratifying substitute for warfare.²⁹ This pacifist and frivolous argument is immediately rejected by Bon Conseil who naturally blames this egoist hedonism.

In 1502 Symphorien Champier is still writing about a 'terre tres belle, en toute chose gracieuse, et plantureuse en moult de biens',³⁰ but with Jean Bouchet's *Complainte des Estatz sur le voyage et guerre de Naples*, published in 1503, the positive perspective vanishes. After Charles VIII's death,³¹ and more importantly after the loss of Naples, the character Je-ne-sçait-qui has no more place in a work centered

²⁵ Philippe de Commynes, *Mémoires*, ed. Joseph Calmette (Paris, 1965), III, pp. 19–23.

²⁶ 'Let the pope and his consistory go to make war, if he wants': La Vigne, *La ressource de la chrestienté*, p. 132.

²⁷ 'Alas! Alas! Flee from war, lords! . . . / War is bad, dangerous, mortal . . . / Pain, care and tribulations / Come from war in a hundred thousand ways, / death and famine, and great destruction': *ibid.*, pp. 131, 133, 134.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 132–4, 188.

³⁰ 'a very beautiful land, gracious in everything, and fertile with many good things': from *La nef des princes* (Lyon, 1502) (quoted by Richard Cooper, 'Symphorien Champier e l'Italia', in *L'aube de la Renaissance*, ed. D. Cecchetti, L. Sozzi and L. Terreaux (Geneva, 1991), p. 233).

³¹ Anna Slerca, 'La complainte des estatz sur le voyage et guerre de neaples de Jean Bouchet', *Passer les Monts. Français en Italie—l'Italie en France (1494–1525)*, X^e colloque de la Société française d'étude du Seizième Siècle, ed. Jean Balsamo (Paris, 1998), pp. 213–26.

around the oration of a king resentful for what it perceived as Italy's betrayal.³² In Bouchet's *Complainte* there is no description of Italy, we learn nothing about the landscape or the ancient buildings of Rome, nothing about a colourful Naples or any other place: the only element emphasized is the unreliability of the Italian people, the king being especially resentful towards Milan who promised to support him but behaved in a 'detestable, tresinhumain, infect' and 'abominable' way.³³ In Pierre Gringore's *Lettres nouvelles de Milan*, concerning Louis XII's victory over Milan, Ludovico Sforza, once captured, sighs 'Adieu, Milan, cité plaisante et belle',³⁴ but the text says nothing further about the city. The Italian people, however, is pictured as 'malicieux', 'faulsaire', and 'usuriers'.

This is typical of the texts written throughout Louis's reign. They almost all abuse the character of the Italian people, while focusing on the narration of the battles and deeds of the French army. It is true that Jean d'Auton expresses his amazement at Pavia,³⁵ and mentions that French and German soldiers visited holy sites in Rome.³⁶ But unlike the letters of soldiers, which usually give some of their tourist impressions, d'Auton adds no further remarks. Jean de Saint-Gelais in his chronicle admits that Milan is probably one of the most beautiful cities in the world.³⁷ Gringore opens the *Entreprise de Venise* with the words: 'Riche cité, situee et assise / Dessus la mer qu'on dit Adriatique',³⁸ but apart from that, Italy remains a completely unknown entity.³⁹ There is nothing in these chronicles on the libraries in Naples or Pavia (from which thousands of illuminated manuscripts were taken by Charles VIII and Louis XII respectively), very little on meetings with intellectuals and humanists, and almost nothing on architecture or art encountered by the French in Lombardy, although

³² Jean Bouchet, *L'amoureux transy sans espoir* (Paris, n.d.), D4r.

³³ *Ibid.*, D3v; the prince is referring to the battle of Fornovo of July 1495.

³⁴ Pierre Gringore, *Oeuvres polémiques*, p. 83. A woodcut shows the gates, and a few buildings and roofs of Milan (p. 64).

³⁵ Jean d'Auton, *Chronicles*, I, pp. 84–5 and 90–1.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, II, pp. 31–2.

³⁷ Jean de Saint-Gelais, *Chronicles*, p. 148.

³⁸ Gringore, *Oeuvres polémiques*, p. 139: the Venetians are said to be 'traistres, desloyaulx' (144).

³⁹ See also, for example, Philippe de Vigneulles's description of Brescia in his *Chronicles* as a 'triumphante ville, belle et fier', praising the city's defensive walls and ditches, and its fortress: *La chronique de Philippe de Vigneulles*, ed. Charles Bruneau (Metz, 1932), V, p. 63.

records testify to paintings, maps and artworks being taken back to France from Italy.

This self-imposed censorship disappears where the beauty of Italian women and Italian wine and cheeses are concerned, but should we conclude from this that the French readership was only interested in military reports accompanied by a masculine vision of women?⁴⁰ Even La Vigne's *Le voyage de Naples*, which usually gives only very brief descriptions of places and buildings such as those in Pisa,⁴¹ Viterbo,⁴² Rome⁴³ or Florence, is after all mainly centred on Charles's deeds, and one can look in vain for French enthusiasm for Italian culture or interest in its natural and human resources. Alessandro Salvago, a Genoese writing in French, is himself very parsimonious in describing Genoa, and repeatedly blames the 'insolence du menu peuple', responsible in his eyes for Genoa's rebellion against the French king.⁴⁴ He enhances the French legend of the Italian admiration for French kings. This veneration is often presented as repentance.⁴⁵ Political analysts such as Philippe de Commines or Claude de Seyssel give lengthy accounts of the diplomatic and military history but avoid dealing with Italian cultural and artistic life. Claude de Seyssel does confess his wonder for the republican regime of Venice which is 'hors de danger d'estre tyrannisee' and 'jamais n'ha esté usurpe par tyrannie',⁴⁶ but while declaring that their regime is exemplary Seyssel is at pains to justify Louis's combat against the Republic. His first argument is that Louis's victory is a sign of God's approval and therefore of Louis's virtue and fortune,⁴⁷ but in the last analysis he can only blame the volte-face of alliances with Venice and its relationship with the Turks.⁴⁸

⁴⁰ See, for example, Jean d'Auton, *Chronicles*, I, p. 102; Saint-Gelais, *Chronicles*, pp. 168, 204. Maulde de La Clavière mentions a record in which we learn that Milanese cheeses (apparently stracchino) brought back in 1499 by Louis XII was still conserved in 1504: see Jean d'Auton, *Chronicles*, I, p. 320.

⁴¹ La Vigne, *Voyage de Naples*, pp. 203–6.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 227.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 235.

⁴⁴ *Cronicques de Gennes*, ed. Cornelio Desimoni, *Atti della Società Ligure di storia patria*, 13/1 (1884), pp. 457–78.

⁴⁵ Gringore, *Œuvres polémiques*, pp. 83–6.

⁴⁶ Seyssel, *L'excellence et la félicité de la Victoire*, p. 246.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 248. See also Jean Lemaire de Belges, *La légende des Vénitiens*, pp. 4, 7, 10: for him the Venetian state is a 'police injuste et illegitime', 'plustost tyrannie arbitraire et sans fondement de raison', but he blames the Venetians for their unreliability towards their own electorate, their allies and the Church.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 276–85.

What characterizes most of the texts produced around Louis XII's battles in Italy is a double paradox. On the one hand there are mixed feelings of rejection and fascination for the 'otherness' of the Italian, and on the other a paradoxical praise of the king's military deeds coupled with a denunciation of the horrors of war. Modern warfare turned the combat into a 'mortelle feste'.⁴⁹ Even a heroic epic such as the *Histoire du seigneur de Bayart* deplors that war had become a 'boucherie'.⁵⁰ Yet at the same time one can find real enthralment with the terrible war machine, Gringore calling it the 'merveilleuses tueries'.⁵¹ Indeed, court writers are torn between amazement and disturbance, best expressed for this period by the descriptions of the battle of Agnadello, which seems like a peak in the blind cruelty of modern warfare, leaving thousands of wounded and dead.⁵² Jean d'Auton speaks of 'bras et mains voller / Corps assomer et testes decoller',⁵³ and of veritable carnage: a 'montaigne . . . jonchée de mors et ensangantée du sang . . . et plus de deux mille par les montaignes'.⁵⁴ Jean Marot refers in the same vein to a 'tuerie', an 'escorcherie' and 'horreur'.⁵⁵ In the *Cronicques de Gennes* Alessandro Salvago depicts a hideous scene, of heads and limbs flying through the air, the earth running with blood, men dying, the victors covered with blood, the vanquished flying, that it was terrifying even to describe.⁵⁶ An anonymous panegyric talks about 'champs pavez de mors', the 'gemissemens des mourants', and a 'lac rougi de sang'.⁵⁷

⁴⁹ 'deadly feast': Marot, *Le voyage de Venise*, ed. Giovanna Trisolini (Genève, 1977), p. 80; see also Jean d'Auton, *Les espistres envoyées au roy* (Lyon, 1509) in which Labour curses the war (fol. fr).

⁵⁰ *Histoire du Seigneur de Bayart* (Paris, 1927), p. 154; Marot, *Voyage de Venise*, p. 105.

⁵¹ 'wonderful carnage': Pierre Gringore, *Les abus du monde* (n.d.), fol. F7v.

⁵² See also Jean d'Auton, *Chronicles*, II, pp. 61–3, graphically describing the sack of a city, the streets running with blood.

⁵³ 'arms and hands sent flying, bodies piling up and heads cut off': Jean d'Auton, *Epistre elegiaque*, Saint-Petersburg, National Library of Russia, Fr. F. v. XIV, 8, fol. 109r.

⁵⁴ 'mountain . . . strewn with the dead and running with blood . . . more than two thousand throughout the mountains': D'Auton, *Chroniques*, IV, pp. 224–5.

⁵⁵ 'slaughter, carnage, horror': Marot, *Le voyage de Venise*, pp. 106–7.

⁵⁶ 'hideuse chose veoir gens ruez de cheval, testes, braz et jambes volans par l'air et gens d'armes confonduz, le sang par terre courir, les hommes espirer, les vaincours ensanglantez, les perdans fuytiz, et à parfin tant de ruynes et mortz que impossible est sans grant effroy le racompter': *Cronicques de Gennes*, p. 435.

⁵⁷ 'fields covered with dead', 'groans of the dying', 'lake red with blood': '[*Panegirica in laudem Ludovici XII^{mi} regis Francorum*] Éloge de Louis XII père de la France, en 1509', ed. René de Maulde La Clavière, *Revue Historique*, 43 (1890), pp. 60–1; see also *La chronique de Philippe de Vigneulles*, vol. 5, pp. 2, 61.

It must be emphasized that not all French texts recall violence and cruelty. Some of the poems and panegyrics maintain a chivalric version of the theatre of war with bloodless images of courage and bravery (as in the case of Seyssel, for example).

The justification of war required Italian leaders to be evil, and in many cases the Italian people is blamed too, but it does not lead our authors to dehumanize the Italians or to xenophobic visions. There is no discourse of hatred for the victims in Jean d'Auton's chronicle of Louis XII's conquest of northern Italy, for example. The dismissal of the other, expressed by an absence of curiosity bordering on indifference, is most in evidence in the almost systematic absence of any exhaustive description of Italy other than that related to the French campaign. Can we deduce from this that the French readership was only interested in a twisted propagandistic vision of the war? The consequence of the caricature of the Italians and the focus on the military aspects alone is a representation of Italy as a land of strife, insecurity and death.

This is exactly the picture that the town of Rouen chose to give during Louis XII's entry in 1508. A struggle was simulated on stage. The fertility and the beauty of the forest on one side—France—was underlined to contrast with the grey of a large rock on the other side—Italy. A three-headed monster slowly entered on stage. It embodied Milan (represented by the head of a snake), the Empire (symbolically represented by an eagle) and Genoa (with an animal not specified other than being 'proud'). The three-headed monster threatened the French green forest by moving its eyes, tongues, wings and tails, and by spitting fire, but an enormous porcupine suddenly made a dramatic appearance and stopped the monster. This emblem of Louis XII opens a long and fierce battle in defence of its forest, which obviously ended with the invincible porcupine vanquishing its monstrous enemy. Italy is not only perceived here as a sterile and grey land, it is also the confusing and terrifying alliance of conflicting powers. The battle between the porcupine and the monster clearly expresses the idea of an imaginary struggle between good and evil, between the forces of light and the forces of darkness.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ See Nicole Hochner, *Louis XII: les dérèglements de l'image royale* (Seyssel, 2006), pp. 92–4; see also the equestrian statue of Charles VIII in 1495: La Vigne, *Le voyage de Naples*, p. 275.

This way of depicting Italy is not only typical of the texts written at the time, it is also characteristic of the contemporary images produced. Out of 47 miniatures that can be found in six different manuscripts of Jean d'Auton's chronicles and other texts,⁵⁹ for example, the majority offer images of battle. There are also architectural and topographical indications of castles and buildings, of walls and gates, but usually they are imaginary and totally inaccurate. Fausto Andrelini's poem on Louis XII's victory over Genoa, for example, gives an approximate but not totally fictitious vision of Genoa.⁶⁰

Jean Marot's *Voyage de Gênes* on the other hand is a most remarkable manuscript that offers the closest picture of the Genoese gulf and its picturesque scenery (BnF, ms. f. fr. 5091, f. 2v), the Castellazzo, the abbey and the castle of San Francesco together with a view of the town of Genoa in the background (f. 10v), as well as the Bastillon (f. 17v and f. 20v), Alessandria's walls (f. 15v) and Genoa's facades (f. 22v).⁶¹ It is not certain, however, that the artists involved in illuminating these manuscripts travelled to Italy, and it is therefore impossible to say whether these images are inspired from maps and imaginary visions of Italian urban landscape or not. For the cheap booklets which were far more widespread, it can be said that most of the time the woodcuts are standard pictures of gates and buildings reused in many other prints with differing inscriptions identifying Venice, Rome, Naples or Milan. There is no real attempt to offer images of Italian architectural or natural treasures.⁶²

One painting also seems worthy of note, a painting of the battle of Agnadello by Jean Perréal who travelled to Italy and witnessed the battle. This painting is unfortunately now lost, but it is described by Jean Lemaire de Belge in a very short text called 'Peroration de l'acteur' written during the summer of 1509 and first published by Jean de Vingle in Lyon at the end of Lemaire's *Legende des Venitiens*. This 'Peroration' is dedicated to Claude Thomassin who was in charge of the fairs of Lyon, and the text was probably written during

⁵⁹ BnF, ms. f. fr. 5081, 5082, 5083, 5089, 1684; Saint Petersburg, National Library of Russia, Fr. F. v. XIV, 8.

⁶⁰ BnF, f. lat. 8393 (De regia in Genuenses Victoria), see above, p. 194.

⁶¹ Beautiful colour reproductions are available at <http://images.bnf.fr>.

⁶² See for example, André de La Vigne, *Les ballades du bruyt commun* (1508), or Noël Abraham prints, on which see Richard Cooper, 'Noël Abraham publiciste de Louis XII, duc de Milan premier imprimeur du roi?', in *Passer les monts*, pp. 149–76.

Lyon's preparation for Louis XII's entry after his unprecedented victory over Venice.⁶³ Lemaire was not the only one involved in the preparations, as he reminds Claude Thomassin (from whom a privilege was necessary to organize the *entrée*). Both Jean d'Auton and Symphorien Champier were also coming back with their lively testimonies. But Lemaire's peroration is interesting for what it tells us, not only about how an *entrée* was staged but, more precisely, about how the myth of Agnadello was, almost immediately after the events themselves, crystallized by words as well as by images, shaped by printed texts as well as by the pageantry planned. Perréal's picture gave a detailed, precise and apparently realistic picture in his background of towns, castles, rivers, and mountains, and of the confusion and horror of battle, the piteous sight of the wounded, the fear of the fugitives, the triumph of the victors, 'making us feel we had been present at it all ourselves, just as we have heard the verbal accounts' of Jean d'Auton.⁶⁴

The beauty of Italian landscapes in the background is clearly overshadowed by the horror of war. By 1509 there is no longer any mention of a terrestrial paradise. Italy may be the scene of victory but it is also a cemetery for both the French and the Italians. The image created by this literature of war forges in the collective memory an idea of Italy as a stage for suffering as well as glory. There were a few exceptions. Two texts, *Cronicque des genevois avec la totale description en abrege de tout le pays d'ytallie* (1507),⁶⁵ and Jacques Signot's *La totale et vraie description de tous les passaiges . . . par lesquels on peut passer et entrer des Gaules es Ytalie* (1515) offer extensive descriptions of Italy, its history, its cultural identity and socio-political situation. Signot's print is even accompanied by a beautiful map of Italy.⁶⁶ Symphorien Champier in *Le triumphe du treschrestien* (1509) acknowledges the beauty and wealth of Italy while he deplores the vice of its inhabitants.⁶⁷

⁶³ See Anne Schoysman's Introduction in Jean Lemaire de Belges, *La légende des Vénitiens* (Brussels, 1999), p. xxxvii, quoting a letter to Louis Barangier dated 15 July 1509.

⁶⁴ Jean Lemaire de Belges, *La légende des Vénitiens*, p. 39.

⁶⁵ Ed. Vincenzo Promis, *Atti della Società Ligure di storia patria*, 10 (1874), pp. 181–270.

⁶⁶ A large double page folder map between fols D and D2 (BnF, Rés. G. 1245) reproduced by H.-François Delaborde, *L'expédition de Charles VIII en Italie: Histoire diplomatique et militaire* (Paris, 1888), p. 392. A 1518 version of the text can be downloaded from <http://www.gallica.fr>.

⁶⁷ *Le triumphe du tres chrestien roy de France Loys XII*, ed. Giovanna Trisolini (Rome, 1977), pp. 38–9, 43, 46.

Another type of exception concerned the readiness of the Italians to marvel at France and to admire the French. An example of this was a love legend reproduced in many illuminated manuscripts and prints, the story of the most virtuous and beautiful woman in Genoa, Thomassine Spinola, who was so much in love with Louis XII, that when a rumour circulated that he was dying she died of sorrow. The tale survives in three copies of illuminated manuscripts proving how popular the idyll was. Indeed, the story also figures in Jean d'Auton's *Chronicles*. The miniatures by Jean Poyet show three scenes of Thomassine's dramatic life and death.⁶⁸ The code of courtly love is strictly respected. The virtues of the mistress are worthy of the prince's honour. In brief, this love sketches a very flattering portrait of Louis XII and turns the Italians (at least the women) into admirers of the French king and champions of his project of conquest.

Throughout Louis XII's reign, the perception of Italy in the literature produced for the royal court remains as sombre and glorious as a battlefield can be. Despite the fact that Guillaumé Budé blames Louis XII for his 'xenomania', in other words, for filling his court with untalented Italians such as Fausto Andrelini whose only merit was simply being Italian, Louis XII did in a way slow down the incursion of the Italian Renaissance's cultural and intellectual production into France. In comparison with his ministers, the Marshal de Gié or Georges d'Amboise, who hired Italian craftsmen and artists for the construction of their chateaux in Le Verger and Gaillon, Louis XII appears far more reluctant to embrace the humanistic spirit and the neo-classical style. This 'official' resistance, so to speak, is closely linked in my opinion to the relatively distorted and dark vision of Italy given by the various popular and courtly literary texts and images produced during Louis XII's reign. It would cease with Francis I in 1515.

⁶⁸ BnF, f. fr. 1684; BnF, f. fr. 25419; Montpellier, Bibliothèque de la faculté de médecine, ms. H. 439. A fourth copy (BnF, f. fr. 6169) is not illustrated. Henri-Marcel Kühnholtz, *Des Spinola de Gênes et de la complainte depuis les temps les plus reculés suivis de "La Complainte de Gennes sur la mort de dame Thomassine Espinolle"* (Paris, 1852). The myth is still alive, see for example Paul Audibert, *Un amour génois du roi Louis XII* (Carcès, 1970).

CARDINALS AND COURTESANS:
SECULAR MUSIC IN ROME, 1500–1520

William F. Prizer

In Rome during December 1541, the aging humanist and poet Cardinal Pietro Bembo (1470–1547) wrote his thirteen-year-old daughter Elena (b. 1528) a letter responding to her request to study the clavichord. Bembo neatly states the contemporary view of the contrasting nature and purpose of study for boys and girls:

I am happy that you are well, as you write me, and that your brother is studying diligently; this will all result to his honour and profit. As to the favour that you asked of me, that I allow you to learn to play the clavichord,¹ I shall tell you what you perhaps, because of your extreme youth, cannot know: that playing [an instrument] is a thing for vain and frivolous women. And I should like you to be the most serious and the most chaste and pure woman alive. In addition to this, if you know how to play badly, you will make of your playing little pleasure and not a little shame. To play well will not be possible unless you spend ten or twelve years without thinking of other things, and what this will do for you, you can imagine yourself without my telling you. Therefore, forget this foolishness and concentrate on being humble, pious, good, wise, and obedient and do not let yourself be carried away by these wishes; rather resist them with a strong spirit. And if your companions want you to learn to play to entertain them, tell them that you do not want to give them something to laugh at to your shame. And content yourself with the study of letters and sewing, in which, if you do well, you will have accomplished more than a little.²

¹ The document reads ‘monacordo’, which Gary Tomlinson translates literally as ‘monochord’ in Leo Treitler (ed.), *Source Readings in Music History*, rev. ed. (New York, 1998), pp. 332–3. Pythagoras’s monochord, however, was at best an instrument of theoretical significance in the Renaissance, while the clavichord was a popular chamber instrument for amateurs. ‘Monacordo’ and its variants, like ‘monocordo’ and ‘manacordo’, were widely used during this period for ‘clavichord’. See Bernard Brauchli, *The Clavichord* (Cambridge, 1998), p. 8.

² *Delle lettere di M. Pietro Bembo* (Venice, 1552), IV, pp. 124–5. Bembo had already written a letter to Cola Bruno on 31 October 1540, denying Elena permission to study clavichord and citing the same arguments: Pietro Bembo, *Opere in volgare*, ed. Mario Marti (Florence, 1961), pp. 828–9.

This advice contrasts markedly with the situation for the previous generation and with Bembo's earlier views on women and music. From the High Middle Ages through to the early sixteenth century, musical training was considered an asset for aristocratic young women. They were taught to sing, to play the harp or lute, and to dance.³ Several examples from the crucial period of the early Cinquecento will suffice. In Venice, the composer Bartolomeo Tromboncino established a school to teach 'gentildonne' lute and singing. Shortly after opening it, he told the Ferrarese ambassador that it was flourishing so well that he would soon be able to pay off all his debts and bring his family to the city.⁴ Baldassare Castiglione, in his highly influential *Book of the Courtier*, considered music-making a necessity for the *donna di palazzo*. His prescriptions for her abilities exactly match those of Isabella d'Este, Marchesa of Mantua, the shining exemplar of aristocratic women as musicians: she used her apparently high level of ability at singing and playing lute and keyboard instruments to fashion her own image as a virtuosa and to attract the attention and praise of many of the princes and humanists of her age. In 1517, somewhat smugly perhaps, she complimented Anna d'Alençon, Marchesa of Casale Monferrato, for having her daughter Maria Paleologo taught lute, since 'it is a most useful virtue in ladies in this our age'.⁵

In fact, Bembo himself had praised Isabella's singing in his younger days. His letter to her in 1505 again offers a strong contrast to his later advice to his daughter:

I am sending your most excellent Ladyship and my most illustrious Patroness ten sonnets and two [*s*]tram[*b*]otti that break the rules somewhat, not because they merit coming into your hands, but because I too desire that some of my verses be recited and sung by your Ladyship, remembering with what sweetness and gentleness you sang [the verses of] others that happy evening [in Mantua], and esteeming no other favour for my verses than this. . . . I am sorry if, by chance, they neither

³ Maria V. Coldwell, 'Jouglerses and trobairitz: Secular musicians in medieval France', in Jane Bowers and Judith Tick (eds.), *Women Making Music: The Western Art Tradition, 1150–1950* (Urbana and Chicago, 1987), pp. 39–61.

⁴ William F. Prizer, 'Games of Venus: Secular vocal music in the late Quattrocento and early Cinquecento', *Journal of Musicology*, 9 (1991), pp. 7–8, 54–5.

⁵ ASMan, AGonzaga, b. 2997, libro 35, f. 8r–v, 11 Dec. 1517. See W. F. Prizer, 'Una "virtù molto conveniente a madonne": Isabella d'Este as a musician', *Journal of Musicology*, 17 (1999), pp. 10–49.

live up to your Ladyship's expectations nor to my wish, but I am comforted that if they are to be sung by you, then they can be called most fortunate and will have need of nothing more, because they will please the listeners and will be welcome in that they come from the lovely and delicate hand and the pure and sweet voice of your most illustrious Ladyship.⁶

In 1503, Bembo had already praised Lucrezia Borgia's ability to sing, play lute, and declaim vernacular verse as though she were a native Italian in his Latin elegy, *Ad Lucretiam Borgiam*.⁷

Another learned churchman, writing about the same time that Bembo wrote to his daughter, noted explicitly that he had changed his mind about this same matter. In the chapter on marriage in his *Ricordi* of 1546, Sabba da Castiglione (1480–1554), procurator-general of the Knights of Saint John, traveller, and collector of classical items, strongly attacked the notion that women should study music and the arts:

But let us return to fathers and mothers who want their little daughters [to learn] music and drivel: ignorant and blind, they do not realize that similar arts and similar pastimes are naturally weakening to women, an open precipice both to them and to the others, and an obvious occasion to fall backward, to their shame and dishonour, into the fetid mud of dishonesty. And if by chance I, as a young man, used to praise in noble and well-born women music, dance, and other similar idiosyncrasies, now as an old man of more judgment and experience and knowing more fully the errors and nonsense, I take all this back and damn them and curse them as excitements of great evil. And if it is said to you, 'Is music not a virtue? Is it not one of the seven liberal arts?', you will answer affirmatively, but you will do well to respond as Socrates did to his disciple, who, having recited to him that magnificent, well-made, and elegant oration in his defence, and not satisfied with this, said, 'Socrates, is this not a beautiful oration?' Socrates responded, 'Indeed yes', and showed him a well-made woman's shoe and said to him, 'And this shoe, even if it is pretty, nonetheless is not suitable for a man's foot'. Thus also music: even if it is a virtue, it is not well

⁶ ASMan, AGonzaga, b. 1891, f. 78. It would be interesting to know how the *strambotti* 'break the rules', but they are unfortunately not identifiable among Bembo's works.

⁷ *Rime di messer Pietro Bembo cardinale, colla giunta delle sue poesie latine, e la vita dell'autore descritta da Tommaso Porcacchi* (Verona, 1750), pp. 287–9; W. F. Prizer, 'Renaissance women as patrons of music: The North-Italian courts', in Kimberly Marshall (ed.), *Rediscovering the Muses: Women's Musical Traditions* (Boston, 1993), pp. 190–1.

suiting for a noble and well-born woman, who should study honesty and chastity.⁸

It is possible, of course, that these passages represent merely the misogynistic rumblings of grumpy old churchmen, but it is also possible to see in their change of heart a profound metamorphosis in the way society looked at women's study of music. What had for centuries been viewed as a suitable and appropriate activity was by the 1540s being seen in a negative light. If this is the case, then we should ask how and why this came about. I believe that the answer lies in Rome in the early Cinquecento.

We know a good deal about sacred music in the Eternal City at this time, but almost nothing about secular music. We are aware of the performance and composition of masses and motets there because music historians have, since the nineteenth century, studied the papal chapel, its musicians, and its manuscripts. On the other hand, we have no sources of secular music there until 1510, when Andrea Antico of Montona printed the first music book in the city, his *Canzoni nove con alcune scelte di varii libri di canto*. Its repertory is heavily reliant on composers from northern Italy and, indeed, on the Venetian books published by Ottaviano Petrucci in the first decade of the century. In his later books, Antico continues to rely on the works of North Italian composers, although elements of local repertories are present. There are a number of pieces with Spanish texts, undoubtedly catering to the large community of Spaniards resident in Rome, and there are some works by composers we know worked there, like the Petrarchan settings of Elzéar Genet, called Carpentras (c. 1470–1548), who was in the service of Leo X.⁹

It is clear that there was a great deal of secular music being performed at banquets and entertainments given by cardinals and Roman patricians. Indeed, I would see Rome as a kind of musical melting pot in which music from various regions and countries—the Low Countries, France, Spain, northern Italy, and Florence—was heard.

⁸ Sabba da Castiglione, *Ricordi di Monsignor Sabba da Castiglione Cavalier Gerosolimitano* (Venice, 1560; first published, 1546), Ricordo 121, 'Circa il maritarsi', f. 107.

⁹ Alfred Einstein, 'Andrea Antico's "Canzoni nove" of 1510', *The Musical Quarterly*, 37 (1957), pp. 330–9; Francesco Luisi, *Il secondo libro di frottole di Andrea Antico*, 2 vols. (Rome, 1975–6); W. F. Prizer, 'Local repertories and the printed book: Antico's Third Book of Frottole (1513)', in Jessie Ann Owens and Anthony Cummings (eds.), *Music in Renaissance Cities and Courts: Studies in Honor of Lewis Lockwood* (Warren, MI, 1997), pp. 347–71.

This music must have been brought to Rome by the Cardinals from their homelands. I would suppose, too, that most had at least a handful of musicians in their entourages. Paolo Cortese, after all, recommended that cardinals listen to secular music after dinner, and there must have been performers to execute this.¹⁰ Unfortunately, the household records of the cardinals are scattered and difficult to locate. The instances we can point to may be indicative of the general situation, however. Josquin des Prez (ca. 1450–1521) was in the service of Cardinal Ascanio Sforza in Rome and Milan in the 1480s and probably again in the later 1490s, and the poet and musician Serafino dall'Aquila (1466–1500) was a member of this household as well.¹¹ Cardinal Ippolito I d'Este kept an entire stable of musicians, among them his mistress, the singer Dalida dei Putti, and the important composers Tromboncino and Michele Pesenti; Pesenti was later in the service of Leo X.¹² Furthermore, the *Inventario de' beni mobili* compiled at Cardinal Sigismondo Gonzaga's death in 1525 shows that he had at least two singers in his employ, 'Antonio Piasentino, cantore', and 'Jeronimo, cantore'.¹³ Nor were the churchmen alone in having musicians in their services. Lucrezia Borgia,

¹⁰ Paolo Cortese, *De cardinalatu libri tres*; cited from Nino Pirrotta, 'Music and cultural tendencies in fifteenth-century Italy', in *idem, Music and Culture in Italy from the Middle Ages to the Baroque* (Cambridge, MA, 1984), pp. 102–12. See also Kathleen Weill-Garris and John D'Amico, 'The Renaissance cardinal's ideal palace: A chapter from Cortese's *De cardinalatu*', *Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome*, 35 (1980), pp. 45–124, and Fiorella Brancacci, 'Una fonte aristotelica della sezione "De musica" del *De cardinalatu* di Paolo Cortese', *Studi musicali*, 20 (1991), pp. 69–84.

¹¹ The biography of Josquin has undergone major modifications in recent years, and important elements of it are still being debated. The most recent published data are included in Richard Sherr, 'Chronology of Josquin's life and career', in *idem* (ed.), *The Josquin Companion* (Oxford, 2000), pp. 11–15. The standard examination of Serafino's biography remains Edward E. Lowinsky, 'Ascanio's life: A key to Josquin's biography and an aid to the chronology of his works', in *idem* and Bonnie J. Blackburn (eds.), *Josquin des Prez. Proceedings of the International Josquin Festival Conference* (London, 1976), pp. 31–75, especially, pp. 51–60.

¹² Lewis Lockwood, 'Adrian Willaert and Cardinal Ippolito I d'Este: New light on Willaert's early career in Italy, 1515–21', *Early Music History*, 5 (1985), pp. 85–112; *idem*, 'Musicisti a Ferrara all'epoca dell'Ariosto', in *L'Ariosto: la musica, i musicisti*, Quaderni della Rivista italiana di musicologia, vol. 5 (Florence, 1981), pp. 7–25; W. F. Prizer, 'Music in Ferrara and Mantua at the time of Dosso Dossi: Interrelations and influences', in Luisa Ciammitti, Steven F. Ostrow and Salvatore Settis (eds.), *Dosso's Fate: Painting and Court Culture in Renaissance Italy* (Los Angeles, 1998), pp. 290–308.

¹³ ASMan, AGonzaga, b. 3332, 'Inventario de' beni mobili . . . Sigismundi de Gonzaga', ff. 281v–284r.

when she left Rome for her wedding to Alfonso d'Este in 1502, took with her the composer Niccolò da Padova, who must therefore have been in her service while she lived in the Eternal City.¹⁴

The purpose of this study is to cast light on the repertory of secular music in Rome during the early Cinquecento, even before the publication of Antico's books, and to show that secular music flourished there in a new context: among the *cortigiane oneste*, or educated courtesans of the city. I will contend that it was the rise and fame of these courtesans that caused the paradigm shift witnessed in Bembo and Sabba da Castiglione.

The crucial evidence for Roman musical life is found not in the Eternal City itself but in Florence, for we can trace clearly the movement of secular music from Rome to that city in the first decade of the sixteenth century. In 1505, a Florentine citizen, Maestro Domenico di Benedetto Arrighi, decided to write down the texts of music he enjoyed. He continued this for at least three years, in his book now in the Biblioteca Medicea-Laurenziana in Florence, where it bears the collocation MS Antinori 158.¹⁵ The book is a gold mine of musical texts, containing many carnival songs of Lorenzo de' Medici and others, as well as native lyric texts. Two particular repertories that Arrighi entered, probably in 1505, are of importance in the present context.¹⁶

On folio 22 verso, Arrighi notes that 'Maria, *femmina* of Bianchino da Pisa, sang the following songs, and she gave them to me when she returned from Rome, which she had left for fear of the plague, and came to our villa with certain courtiers' (see Table 1).¹⁷ In a rubric to one of these songs—'La fava bem menata'—she is further defined as 'Maria cortigiana'. We shall return to the significance of Maria herself, but for the moment let us concentrate on her repertory.

¹⁴ Prizer, 'Renaissance women as patrons of music', p. 194.

¹⁵ I am preparing a study of this manuscript as a part of a monograph I am writing on the rise of secular music in Italy in the early sixteenth century. An inventory of Antinori 158 is included in Tiziano Zanato, 'Sulla tradizione dei testi semi-pseudo-popolari: le ottave delle "Ore estive"', in *La critica del testo: problemi di critica testuali. Atti del Convegno di Lecce, 22-26 ottobre 1984* (Rome, 1985), pp. 451-91. Zanato does not mention the musical settings of the texts; he also misreads the date when the manuscript was begun (f. 1v), giving '1507' instead of '1505'. The last numeral is partly cut off at the upper margin, but it is clearly '5', not '7'.

¹⁶ They are followed by a group of carnival songs that Arrighi says were performed in January and February 1506 (n.s.).

¹⁷ For further on Maria and this repertory, see W. F. Prizer, 'Wives and courtesans: The frottola in Florence', in Colleen Reardon and Susan Parisi (eds.), *Music Observed: Studies in Memory of William C. Holmes* (Warren, MI, 2004), pp. 401-15.

Table 1. Antinori 158. Works Brought to Florence from Rome by Maria

<i>Incipit</i>	<i>Folios</i>	<i>Egerton 3051</i> <i>Concordance</i>	<i>Other Music</i> <i>Sources</i>	<i>Composer</i>	<i>Poet</i>
1. Son tomato e Dio el sa Rubric: 'Queste infrascripte canzone cantava la Maria, femmina del Bianchino da Pisa et lei me le dette quando tornò da Roma, che si partì per amore [sic] del morbo et venne in villa nostra con certì cortigiani'. 2. Non pensar che mai ti lassi Rubric: 'La sopra scriptta canzona era la sua favorita, e molto la cantava bene di modo ognuno si saria innamorato d'essa audirglene cantare sì bene'. 3. I' ti lasso, donna, ormai Rubric: 'Questa canzona era la favorita della Masina'. 4. Donna, contro alla mie voglia Rubric: 'Questa canzona era la favorita del duca Valentino'. 5. La fava bem menata Rubric: 'La canzone composta per la Maria cortigiana'. 6. O passi sparsi Rubric: 'Strambotto pietosissimo de la prefata Maria, el quale lo cantava con gratia assai'. 7. Sofferire i' son' disposto Rubric: 'Ancora questo strambotto ha modo proprio'.	22v	41v-42	PeF III (1505), FlorBN 337, Fc2441	Lurano	—
	23r	—	PeF IX (1509), Flor BN 337	Peregrinus Cesena	—
	23v	58v-59	PeF V (1505). BolC Q18, FlorBN 337	Lurano	—
	24r	54v-55	PeF IV(1505) ^b	Lurano	—
	24v	—	—	Maria?	Maria?
	25r	—	—	Maria?	attr. Serafino
	25r	—	FlorBN 27 ^a , FlorBN 121, Pn 676, PerBC 431	Anon.	attr. Serafino

^a With text 'Ave regina'.^b Folio missing in 1505 edition; present in 1507 reprint.

At first glance, the musical concordances for these seven works would simply seem to indicate Roman familiarity with the music of northern Italy: four appear in the books Ottaviano Petrucci printed in Venice in the years around which Arrighi copied their texts. They are frottole, the secular songs, typical of the north Italian courts, for voice and instruments that set texts in the Italian fixed poetic forms—*barzellette*, *strambotti*, and so forth—and that espouse a version of courtly love. On the other hand, settings of three of the texts (nos. 1, 3, and 4) are ascribed to Filippo de Lurano (ca. 1470–after 1520), who worked during the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries not in northern Italy, but in Rome, probably in the service of the Colonna or della Rovere family.¹⁸ Two others (nos. 6 and 7) have poems attributed in the early sixteenth century to Serafino dall’Aquila, who lived and worked in Rome, first in the service of Ascanio Sforza and then, at the end of his life, as a member of the household of Cesare Borgia.

This is our first hint of a Roman repertory of secular music in the early sixteenth century. Arrighi’s book provides additional evidence, as well. On folio 29 recto, he begins another series of poems, writing that ‘Lionarda, wife of Baccino degli Organi, gave me these songs, which were sent from Rome in a songbook’ (see Table 2). Professor Frank D’Accone has shown that Lionarda was the daughter of Matteo di Francesco Arrighi of Florence, and that she married Bartolomeo (for which Baccio was a nickname) degli Organi, one of the two major Florentine composers of the early Cinquecento.¹⁹

These works were sent to Lionarda in a songbook from Rome, and they therefore must represent repertory current in that city. Like Maria’s works, four of these have concordances in Petrucci’s books, but again settings of three of the texts (nos. 2, 3, and 5) are ascribed to Lurano. The works sent in the songbook present a key to a much wider Roman repertory. All but one of the texts (no. 7) are found in musical settings in the manuscript Egerton 3051 of the British Library. I now believe that this manuscript, with its second portion, the Wolffheim chansonnier (now in the Library of Congress), was

¹⁸ On Lurano’s biography, see W. F. Prizer, ‘Lurano, Filippo’, *The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians*, 2nd ed. (London, 2001), vol. 15, pp. 324–5.

¹⁹ Frank A. D’Accone, ‘Alessandro Coppini and Bartolomeo degli Organi: Two Florentine composers of the Renaissance’, *Analecta Musicologica*, 4 (1967), pp. 48–9 and note 44.

Table 2. Antinori 158. Frottole Sent to Lionarda degli Organi from Rome ‘in the Songbook’

<i>Incipit</i>	<i>Folios</i>	<i>Egerton 3051 Concordance</i>	<i>Other Music Sources</i>	<i>Composer</i>
1. Per chiamar sochorso ognora	29r-v	32v-33	—	Anon.
2. Da poi ch'ai mie core in pegno	29v-30	33v-34	PeF IV (1505) ^a	Lurano
3. Fammi almancho bona cera	30r-v	35v-36	PeF IV (1505); FlorC: 2441	Lurano
4. Occhi mia di lacrymare	30v-31	50v-51	FlorBN 121	Anonymous
5. De servirti a tuo dispecto	31v-32	34v-35	PeF VI (1506) ^b	Lurano
6. Non sia sempre l'età verdde	32r-v	37v-38	—	Anon.
7. Di mie pena e mie lamento	32v-33	—	—	—
8. Per servirti perdo e passi	33r-v	38v-39	PeF VII (1507)	N. Brocco

^a Music only. Text equals ‘Tutto el mondo chiama’.^b Music only. Text equals ‘Donna hormai fammi contento’.

copied in Rome in about 1501 and that it is a document of musical life there during the later years of the pontificate of Alexander VI, Rodrigo Borgia.²⁰

The two parts of the Egerton/Wolffheim manuscript contain together a total of 68 works—53 works with Italian texts in the London section and fifteen works with mostly French and Latin texts in the Wolffheim section,²¹ and the most frequently represented composer is Lurano, with ten works (see Table 3). Indeed, it can be shown that no fewer than three series of pieces from this source suggest a Roman provenance. First, Egerton 3051 contains seventeen or eighteen pieces with texts attributable to Serafino dall'Aquila: all but of two these are found in a single, extraordinary series of *strambotti*, ranging from numbers 3 to 18 in the manuscript, the longest known series of the poet's work in any musical source. Indeed I know of no such series dedicated to any poet in musical sources of the early sixteenth century.²² Ten of these are unique in 3051, either entirely or at least with Serafino's text, appearing elsewhere setting other poems.²³ Furthermore, these pieces form a special section of

²⁰ I shall develop this argument in my forthcoming monograph. On Egerton 3051 and the Wolffheim Chansonnier (Washington, Library of Congress MS 2.1 M6 Case), see Martin Staehelin, 'Eine Florentiner Musik-Handschrift aus der Zeit um 1500', *Schweizer Beiträge zur Musikwissenschaft*, ser. 3, 1 (1972), pp. 55–81. A further inventory of the London portion of the manuscript is included in Knud Jeppesen, *La Frottole*, vol. 2: *Zur Bibliographie der handschriftlichen musikalischen Überlieferung des weltlichen italienischen Lieds um 1500* (Copenhagen, 1969), pp. 154–7.

²¹ The last two works in Wolffheim are later additions. The MS lacks eighteen folios between the two sections.

²² Undoubtedly all the poems attributed to him in various sources are not, in fact, by Serafino. Giuseppina La Face Bianconi and Antonio Rossi, *Le rime di Serafino Aquilano in musica* (Florence, 1999), attempt to clarify which works are actually by Serafino and which were merely attributed to him. The important point here, however, is that they circulated with ascriptions to him and thus formed a part of the mania for the poet's works that erupted immediately after his death in 1500. One of these works, no. 4, 'Se per humidità acqua se acoglie', I have not found attributed to Serafino (or to anyone), although it reads much like his verse: each couplet begins in a parallel fashion, and it concludes with the Serafino-like couplet that neatly turns the sentiment of the poem. No. 2, 'Veggio [spesso] sdegnato amore, crudele e fero', has a similar concluding couplet. Since, however, it is attributed to Cinzio d'Ancona in *Strambotti, sonetti, ballatecte, egloghe, epistole & capitoli del facundissimo Seraphino Aquilano, et anchora molti altri belli strambotti & sonetti composti da più diverse persone aggiunti di poi del primo originale* ([Florence], n. d.), f. 86v, I have not included it in the series of Serafino's poems.

²³ 'Quanto la fiamma' and 'Se'l pastor con affano', for example, are found in PeF VI (1506) with the respective texts 'Visto ho più volte' (f. 11r) and 'Stavasi in porto' (f. 10v). For the sigla of music sources referred to in this article, see the list on p. 277.

Table 3. The Contents of London, British library, MS Egerton 3051
and Washington, Library of Congress, MS M2.1 M6 Case
(the 'Wolffheim Chansonnier')

<i>No. Incipit</i>	<i>Folio</i>	<i>Composer</i>
A. Egerton 3051		
1. Guarda, donna, el mio tormento	2v-4	
2. Veggio sdegnato amore	4v-5	[Francesco di Dana]
Series 1: Nos. 3-18. Strambotti with attributions to Serafino dall'Aquila		
3. Io mando ognora al cielo	5v-6	
4. Se per humidità	6v-7	[Dana]
5. Silentio, lingua mia	7v-8	[Bartolomeo Tromboncino]
6. Finché uno razo aceso	8v-9	
7. Tu dormi, io veghio	9v-10	
8. Non te smarir, cor mio	10v-11	
9. Perigrando vo per mio destino	11v-12	
10. Lo inferno alhor più si consuma	12v-13	
11. Quanto la fiamma è più forte	13v-14	[Tromboncino]
12. Se'l pastor con affanno	14v-15	
13. Rendi quella alma, insidiosa Morte	15v-16	
14. Vivo sol di mirar	16v-17	
15. Spesso nascosti stan	17v-18	
16. Spesso nel mezzo d'un bel fabricare	18v-19	
17. Guardando alli ochi toi	19v-20	[Marchetto Cara]
18. Voi che passate qui	20v-21	[Tromboncino? Dana?]
19. Pace e gloria al gentil lauro	21v-22	
20. Non vale acqua al mio gran foco	22v-23	[Tromboncino]
21. Tempo è hormai	23v-24	
22. Ogni ben fa la fortuna	24v-26	[Cara]
23. I' son quella che fu mai	26v-28	[Tromboncino]
24. Questa doglia che m'acora	28v-30	
25. Che sarà della mie vita	30v-31	
26. Che sarà della mie vita	31v-32	
Series 2: Nos. 27-33. Pieces sent from Rome to Florence "in the songbook."		
27. Per chiamar soccorso ogni hora	32v-33	
28. Da poi ch'ai el mio core in pegno	33v-34	[Lurano]
29. Di servirti a tuo dispecto	34v-35r	[Lurano]
30. Fammi almanco buona cera	35v-36	[Lurano]
31. Se mie sorte ancor mie stato	36v-37	
32. Non sta sempre l'età verde	37v-38	
33. Per servirti perdo i passi	38v-39	[Brocco]
34. Nasce l'aspro mio tormento	39v-40	[Dana]
35. Se tu dormi io veghio e canto	40v-41	[M.? C.]
36. Son tornato e lui lo sa	41v-42	[Lurano]
37. Dammi almen l'ultimo vale	42v-43	[Lurano? Tromboncino?]
38. Quella nocte a me sì dura	43v-44	
39. La constantia mie perfecta	44v-45	
40. Signora, omai è tempo	45v-46	
41. Ochi dolci ove prendesti	46v-48	[Dana]
42. Piangho el mio fidel servire	48v-50	[Jacopo Fogliano]

Table 3. (*cont.*)

<i>No. Incipit</i>	<i>Folio</i>	<i>Composer</i>
Series 3: Nos. 43–53. Works by composers in Rome or that set texts by poets there.		
43. Ochi mie di lacrimare	50v–51	
44. Non mi negar, signora	51v–52	
45. Dolce amoroso foco	52v–53	[Lurano]
46. Donna ingrata, hor non più guerra	53v–54	[Fogliano]
47. Donna, contro a la mie voglio	54v–55	[Lurano]
48. Donna, quest'è la mie voglia	55v–56	[Lurano]
49. In te, Domine, speravi	56v–57	[Josquin des Prez]
50. Se ben hor non scropo el foco	57v–58	[Tromboncino]
51. Io ti lasso, donna, hormai	58v–59	[Lurano]
52. Poiché la lingua mia	59v–60	
53. Odi, donna, el mie tormento	60v–61	[Lurano]
[Missing Folios 62–79]		
B. MS Wolffheim		
54. O mater Dei / In te solum	80–81	[Josquin]
55. [Palle, palle]	81v–84	[Heinrich Isaac]
56. Adieu vos amours	84v–86	[Josquin]
57. Anima mea	86v–87v	[Weerbeke]
58. Benedictus	88v–89	[Isaac]
59. Im pace	89v–90	[Josquin]
60. Ie ne fai plus	90v–91	[Busnois? Mureau? Compère?]
61. Celesamplus	91v–92	[Colinet de Lannoy]
62. [Ha, traître amour]	92v–93	[Stockem? Rubinet? Compère?]
63. [D'un bel matin]	93v–94	
64. [Textless, unicum?]	94v–95	
65. [Benedictus]	95v–96	[Isaac]
66. [Pour mieulx valoir / Come hier]	96v–97	[Rubinet? Isaac?]
[Later Additions]		
67. [E] se per gelosia	97v–98	[Costanzo Festa]
68. Surge, amica mea	98v–99	[Festa]

the manuscript: they are with a single exception the only *strambotti* present, and, unlike the other works in the source, they uniformly contain complete texts.

The second series, comprising numbers 27–33 in Egerton 3051, returns us to Arrighi's manuscript: all but one of these were sent from Rome in the songbook. They appear in virtually the same order as in Antinori 158, and agree closely in readings. Particularly striking is 'Non sta sempre l'età verde' (no. 32), which appears only here and in Antinori 158. Both lack the essential *ripresa* that begins the *barzella* and that is repeated in all or part after each stanza; they are thus virtually unperformable.

The third series in Egerton 3051 is represented by numbers 43–53. Many of these are by Lurano or can be placed in Rome through the presence there of other poets and composers. ‘Non mi negar, signora’ (no. 44) and ‘Poiché la lingua mia’ (no. 52) have texts attributed to Serafino, and Josquin is the composer of ‘In te, Domine, speravi’ (no. 49), the text of which has been interpreted as a reference to Ascanio Sforza.²⁴ Three of these pieces in this series (nos. 36, 47, and 51) are included in Maria’s Roman works, as well (see Table 1, nos. 1, 4, and 3).

Egerton/Wolffheim thus allows us a previously undocumented glimpse of the secular music of Rome, but what was the context for the performance of this music? Certainly, the cardinals resident there cultivated a princely secular environment: many came from noble families and they were concerned to display publicly the attributes of their high station.²⁵ Their elaborate banquets and entertainments routinely included secular music, so much so that Pope Sixtus IV felt impelled in 1473 to forbid ‘sounds, music, secular songs and the acting of fables’ during banquets.²⁶ This may have been in reaction to the banquet given by his nephew, the Cardinal of San Sisto, during carnival of the same year. The account of this banquet is well known, but it is worth noting some of the musical entertainments that embellished it: each of the eleven courses was accompanied by vocal or instrumental music, including the singing of *strambotti* and the performance of ‘O rosa bella’ to a small lute (*chitarino*).²⁷ A later banquet, given by Cardinal Grimani in May 1505, also featured secular music. Here each course was announced by trumpets and shawm players, and the courses themselves were accompanied by the softer music of fiddles, viols, harps, and voices.²⁸

Pope Sixtus’s proclamation was concerned particularly with banquets given during carnival time, and this celebration provides another important context for secular music in Rome. Cardinals often participated in carnival festivities, dressing in costumes and going about

²⁴ Claudio Gallico, ‘Josquin’s Compositions on Italian Texts and the Frottola’, in Lowinsky and Blackburn (eds.), *Josquin des Prez*, p. 451, and Helmuth Osthoff, *Josquin Desprez*, I, (Tutzing, 1962), p. 35.

²⁵ David S. Chambers, ‘The economic predicament of Renaissance cardinals’, *Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History*, 3 (1976), pp. 287–313.

²⁶ ‘non soni, musici, non cantus seculares, non histrionem fabulae’: cited from Filippo Clementi, *Il carnevale romano nelle cronache contemporanee* (Rome, 1899), p. 83.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 74–8.

²⁸ Sanuto, *I diarii*, VI, cols. 171–5.

the streets on horseback *in maschera*. The Roman chronicler Stefano Infessura reports disapprovingly on what seems to be a change in carnival for the Eternal City in 1491.

A dishonest custom that had arisen in the past grew more this year [1491] than in the others, whereby each cardinal during carnival with great pomp sent through the city, and in particular to the houses of the other cardinals, *carri trionfali*, together with riders with trumpets and enticing sounds and *maschere*, with youths singing and uttering lascivious texts and other things that delighted them, with mimes and clowns and others dressed not in linens or wool, but in silks and gold and silver brocade, costing many, many ducats. From this we should say and judge that the mercy of God was changed into lust and the work of the Devil; and yet no one was offended by this at all.²⁹

Documents show that cardinals had indulged in riding through the city in *maschera* earlier, but this is the first known reference to Roman carnival songs themselves.³⁰ Two types of carnival song are present in Infessura's description. The first is the *trionfo* or triumph. This genre, sung from a *carro*, or parade float, featured classical deities or allegorical virtues. The second and more frequent type is the *mascherata*, sung by masked and costumed revellers. Its texts are considerably coarser than the *trionfi* and include many sexual allusions.

There are only a handful of these Roman carnival songs extant, all found in Petrucci's Venetian frottole books. Three of them are by Filippo de Lurano, and one, 'Son Fortuna omnipotente' is an example of the *trionfo*.

Son Fortuna omnipotente,
son regina a l'universo;
se a me piace sia sumerso
chi non crede al mio talento.
Però creder el ti bisogna:
esser ben sempre a cavallo

I am Fortune omnipotent,
I am queen of the universe;
If I wish, he shall be submerged,³¹
Who does not believe in my power.
Thus you must believe this
To [think that you can] always be at
the ready

²⁹ Stefano Infessura, *Diario della città di Roma*, ed. Oreste Tommasini (Rome, 1890), p. 265.

³⁰ There is a large literature on carnival in Rome. Among other sources, see Clementi, *Il Carnevale romano*, and Beatrice Premoli, *Ludus Carnelevarii: il carnevale a Roma dal secolo XII al secolo XVI* (Rome, 1981). I have discussed Roman carnival songs in my 'Facciamo pure noi carnevale: Non-Florentine carnival songs of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries', in Irene Alm, Alyson McLamore, and Colleen Reardon (eds), *Musica Franca: Essays in Honor of Frank A. D'Accone* (Stuyvesant, NY, 1996), pp. 173–211.

³¹ A reference to the goddess Fortuna's wheel: see Edward E. Lowinsky, 'The Goddess Fortuna in Music', *The Musical Quarterly*, 29 (1943), pp. 45–77.

e lassare l'altrui rognà	And leave the disgrace to others
per exempio longo è fallo.	Is by long experience a mistake.
Se tu prendi questo ballo	If you join in this game,
serai grato a nostra gente.	You will be welcome amongst our subjects.
Son Fortuna . . .	I am Fortune . . .

In this instance, it is the goddess Fortuna who sings in the first person singular of her power to control the fate of humankind. This must have been one of the floats in the traditional Roman *Festa di Agone*, held on the last Thursday of carnival. In 1514, for example, this celebration featured eighteen *trionfi*, all displaying allegorical virtues, including Fortuna with her wheel.³² This is too late for Lurano's song, which was published in 1505,³³ but it demonstrates, nonetheless, a probable function for his work.

Lurano's other two carnival songs are *mascherate*: 'Noi l'Amazone siamo' and 'De paesi oltramontani'. Both speak in the feminine voice, choosing warrioreses as their protagonists. The former is a song of Amazons and the second is almost a *risposta* to it, in that the singers specifically contrast themselves to Amazons and portray themselves as foreign warrioreses. Both songs are sexual in nature and must represent the voice of courtesans.

Noi l'Amazone siamo	We are Amazons
che volem l'aiuto vostro:	Who seek your help:
per servar el gener nostro	To continue our race
de' begli homeni cerchiamo.	We are looking for handsome men.
Non per altro ce partemo	For no other reason do we leave
de la terra nostra altrice,	Our native land,
se non perché noi voremo	If not because we want
quel a donne dir non lice;	That of which women are not allowed to
	speak;
e, se ben chiar non se dice	And, if this is not said clearly enough
per vergogna, sol' restiamo.	Because of modesty, we will remain alone.
Noi l'Amazone . . .	We are Amazons . . .
Habiam lege assai diverse:	We have very different laws:
tenem donne sol fra noi	We only allow women in our land,
e, per poter mantenersè,	And to maintain our race
ne veniamo a cercar voi.	We come here to look for you.

³² 'Sexto decimo. Fortuna. el carro della rota': cited from Premoli, *Ludus Camelevarii*, p. 90.

³³ PeF III (1505), ff. 4v-5.

Ma del parto nostro, poi,
sol le femine pigliamo.
Noi l'Amazone . . .

But after we give birth,
We will only keep the girls.
We are Amazons . . .

E se alcuna donna fosse
che gli piaccia questa usanza,
venghi pur, e grande e grosse,
belle, giovane, a baldanza;
che le brutte, a simel danza,
e le vecchie reffutiamo.
Noi l'Amazone . . .

And if there be any women
Who favour our custom,
Come along, both tall and wide,
Pretty, young, [come] boldly;
For the ugly and like types
And the old ones we don't want.
We are Amazons . . .

Intendemo che qui regna
una donna in ver divina,
d'ogni imperio sola degna:
el suo nome è de Antonina.
La farem nostra regina,
se con noi l'acompiamo.
Noi l'Amazone . . .

We hear that there reigns
Here a woman truly divine,
Worthy of any empire:
Her name is Antonina.
We will make her our queen
If we take her with us.
We are Amazons . . .

Questa è degna d'ogni honore;
lei sol merta la corona,
Perché Apollo el so' liquore
gli ha donato de Elicona,
sì che tal gentil persona
haver tra noi pur desiamo.
Noi l'Amazone . . .³⁴

She is worthy of every honour
Only she merits the crown,
Because Apollo his liquor
Has given her from Mount Helicon,
So that such a gentle person
We want to have among us.
We are Amazons . . .

'Noi l'Amazone siamo' is direct in its joking offers to attractive young women to join the Amazon 'nation' and its offers of sexual favours to young men, though, like courtesans, the women do not keep them, but only use them. The 'Antonina' praised in the text must be one of the many Roman courtesans who were so famous at the time; in fact, there is an 'Antonina cortesana' listed in the 1517 Roman census.³⁵ Read in this light, Apollo's 'liquore' given to her in the last stanza has an obvious double meaning.³⁶

³⁴ PeF IX (1509), ff. 33v–34.

³⁵ Mariano Armellini, 'Un censimento della città di Roma sotto il pontificato di Leone X tratto da un codice inedito dell'Archivio Vaticano', *Gli studi in Italia*, 4 (1891), p. 895.

³⁶ It is worth noting that an 'Antonia' also appears as an older courtesan in Pietro Aretino's *Ragionamento della Nanna e della Antonia* (1534); published in Aretino, *Sei giornate*, ed. Giovanni Aquilecchia (Bari, 1969). Both Nanna and Antonia seem to have been real courtesans in Rome, and both are included in the Roman census of 1526–7; see Lynne Lawler, *Lives of the Courtesans: Portraits of the Renaissance*

'De paesi ultramontani' is even clearer in its references to courtesans.

<p>De paesi ultramontani, Donne siam, armate in sella; con lo scudo e la rotella combattiam con 'taliani. Non, qual fecer l'Amazone,</p> <p>ci habiam tagliato il petto per fugir tal passione fatto habiam miglior concetto: de tener sempre in effetto ben lo scudo a chi vol giostra. Che tenendo ben si mostra forza e ingegno a monti e piani. De paesi ultramontani . . .</p> <p>Fesse e rotte e fracassate habiam le rotelle e scudi per le lance ismisurate che ci han dati colpi crudi. Ma al fin armati o nudi, chi con noi provato ha lancia</p> <p>o li mandiam presi in Francia o sottera o balza a piani.</p> <p>De paesi ultramontani . . .</p> <p>Per ogni provintia nostra tutti i bravi habiam provati e tal giorno in qualche giostra tal trentun n'ha scavlacati,</p> <p>de quei che se son vantati trarci per forza di sella.</p>	<p>From foreign lands, We are women, armed in the saddle; With our shield and buckler We do battle with the Italians. We, unlike those who make themselves Amazons, Have not cut off our breast To avoid that old passion; We have had a better idea: To hold always at the ready Our shield to him who would joust, For, holding it securely, we show Strength and skill both high and low. From foreign lands . . .</p> <p>Cleft and broken and splintered Have we our bucklers and shields On the huge lances That have given us such cruel blows. But in the end, armed or nude, Those who have tried us with their lance We have sent to France in chains, Or beneath the earth, or quickly to the ground. From foreign lands . . .</p> <p>In each of our provinces We have tried out all the braves, And some days in several jousts, Some thirty-one have we knocked from their horses; And those who have bragged That they would drag us from our saddles by force</p>
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(New York, 1987), pp. 68–9, as well as Umberto Gnoli, *Cortigiane romane: note e bibliografia* (Arezzo, 1941), p. 22, who notes a courtesan, 'Antonia ferrarese', listed in the census as living with four other people in the *rione* of Campo Marzio. This is some seventeen years after the publication of 'Noi l'Amazone siamo'; can she be the same as the 'Antonina' recorded in its text? It seems at least possible, particularly if the diminutive form of her name in Lurano's *canto* is taken to indicate youth. This would also fit with the Antonia of Aretino's dialogue, since the writer left Rome in 1525.

ma lo scudo e la rotella	With our shield and buckler
sempre gli ha mandati a piani.	Have we always sent to the ground.
De paesi oltremontani . . . ³⁷	From foreign lands . . .

The use of 'scudo' and 'rotella', or a large angled shield and a small round one, 'cleft and broken on the huge lances' is a reference also seen in many Florentine carnival songs to vaginal and anal sex, as is 'high and low'.³⁸ 'Li mandiamo presi in Francia' (stanza 2) in this context is a reference to the sexual scourge of the age—the *mal francese*, or syphilis—and the mention of the 'thirty-one' they have knocked from their saddles (stanza 3) is a specific reference to the practice of many men taking on the same prostitute contemporaneously. Sir John Florio defines it as 'a punishment inflicted by ruffianly fellows upon raskalie whores in Italy (as we pump them in England) so they cause them to be occupide one and thirtie times by one and thirtie severall base raskalie companions'.³⁹

These courtesans were seemingly everywhere during carnival. At least occasionally, they competed as a group in one of the traditional foot races of Roman carnival, which also featured separate races for the Jews, youths, and old men.⁴⁰ In late December 1501, 'Il Prete', a Ferrarese courtier in Rome with the Estense entourage that escorted Lucrezia Borgia back to Ferrara for her wedding, described the festivities to Isabella d'Este:

Here they hold *feste* every day in the piazza. . . Last evening the Cardinal [Ippolito I d'Este] went with the Duke [Cesare Borgia] and Don Ferrante [d'Este] *in maschera* through the city, and then [later] in the evening joined the duchess [Lucrezia Borgia] and everyone danced. In the city, one sees nothing but courtesans *in maschera* from morning till evening.⁴¹

During carnival 1513, the young Federico Gonzaga (1500–40) attended a Roman comedy recited in Castilian at which, according to a letter

³⁷ PcF IX (1509), ff. 39v–40.

³⁸ See, for example, Riccardo Brusagli's commentary to the *Canzona di Lanzi Venturieri*, 'Lanzi, lanzi, scutti, scutti', in *idem, Trionfi e canti carnascialeschi toscani del Rinascimento* (Rome, 1986), I, pp. 141–2, esp. 142, annotation to line 21, which makes the same point in the contrast of 'targa' and 'brocchiere'. The Florentine *Canzona delle donne schermidore* also includes the use of 'su' and 'giù' to represent vaginal and anal sex; see *ibid.*, II, pp. 479, lines 15–8.

³⁹ John Florio, *A Worlde of Wordes* (London, 1598; reprint Hildesheim, 1972), p. 431.

⁴⁰ Sanuto, *I diarii*, XXVIII, col. 299 (1519). See Premoli, *Ludus Carnelevarii*, p. 93.

⁴¹ ASMan, AGonzaga, Autografi, busta 4, f. 149.

of one of his servants, 'there were more Spanish prostitutes than Italian men because the comedy, by Juan del Encina, was recited in Castilian'.⁴² Slightly later, in 1524, one was constructed a float with papier maché figures of aged courtesans, a parody of the *trionfi* of the *Festa di Agone*, and had it driven into the Tiber.⁴³

During this period, Rome was the courtesan capital of Italy and would remain so until the Sack of 1527. Umberto Gnoli estimated that fully ten per cent of the 55,000 inhabitants of Rome in 1526 were either prostitutes or were involved in the trade as pimps, procuresses, and so forth.⁴⁴ The chronicler Infessura estimated an even higher number. In 1490, when Bishop Jacopo Botta, Vicar of Rome, issued a decree against clerics maintaining prostitutes in their homes, Infessura wrote that there were 6,800 prostitutes there, each with one or more pimps, not counting those who were long-term consorts of famous men.⁴⁵ In more recent times, the scholar Pio Pecchiai estimated the much lower number of 1,500, though he did not include pimps, procuresses, or aging former prostitutes.⁴⁶ Whichever of these estimates is closest to the truth, it is clear that there was a high number of women practising prostitution in the Eternal City. There were good reasons for this situation, since Rome, or at least the Vatican and its Curia, was a city of men alone. The majority were clerics who had taken vows of celibacy. Laymen working there often either married late in life or else left their families in other cities because of social pressure: even if they had not taken orders, it was easier to get ahead if they conformed to the single-male lifestyle of the Vatican.⁴⁷ In this atmosphere, courtesans could be sure of employment, and could attract the attentions of extremely wealthy clients, including the princes of the Church.

⁴² ASMan, AGonzaga, b. 861: Stazio Gadio to Marchese Francesco Gonzaga, 11 Jan. 1513.

⁴³ Giovanni Aquilecchia, 'Per l'attribuzione e il testo del "Lamento d'una cortigiana ferrarese"', in Gabriella Barnadoni Trezzini, et al. (eds), *Tra latino e volgare. Per Carlo Dionisotti* (Padua, 1974), I, p. 19. The *trionfi* themselves also featured 'diverse fantasie di carta'.

⁴⁴ Gnoli, *Cortigiane romane*, pp. 11–12.

⁴⁵ Infessura, *Diario della città di Roma*, pp. 259–60.

⁴⁶ Pio Pecchiai, *Roma nel Cinquecento* (Bologna, 1948), pp. 303–4; Anna Esposito, 'La città e i suoi abitanti', in Antonio Pinelli (ed.), *Roma nel Rinascimento* (Rome and Bari, 2001), pp. 25–31.

⁴⁷ John D'Amico, *Renaissance Humanism in Papal Rome* (Baltimore and London, 1983), pp. 4–7.

The ubiquity of Roman courtesans allows us to return to Maria, who sang music for Arrighi and his friends in Florence (see Table 1). Maria is a figure of the highest interest, for she was a courtesan working in Rome, a trained musician, a poet, and perhaps a composer as well. ‘La fava bem menata’ (no. 5) bears the rubric ‘the song composed by Maria the courtesan’, and ‘O passi sparssi’ (no. 6) is preceded by the statement, ‘most piteous *strambotto* of the afore-said Maria, who sang it with great grace’. She thus seems to have composed either the poetry or the music of the first work (or both), and may have composed the music of the second as well.⁴⁸ Of ‘Non pensar che mai ti lassi’ (no. 2), Arrighi writes that the song ‘was her [Maria’s] favourite, and she sang it so well that everyone would fall in love with her on hearing her sing it so beautifully’.

Maria was thus demonstrating the talents typical of the *cortigiana onesta*, the educated courtesan who entertained men both intellectually—with music, poetry, and lively conversation—and physically. So pervasive was the courtesan’s ability to make music that the anonymous author of the *Ragionamento del Zoppino fatto frate, e Lodovico, puttaniere*, describing Rome before the Sack of 1527, caused Zoppino to caution Lodovico against allowing a courtesan to come to his own house lest she ‘take from you your lutes or other instruments, saying “This will be good for me, for my singing, and just right for my voice, so, my dear, give it to me.”’⁴⁹ Pietro Aretino echoes this statement in his *Dialogo*, a conversation set in Rome between Nanna and her daughter Pippa, in which Nanna teaches Pippa to become a prostitute. Nanna tells her daughter that

No one would refuse to give you a mere instrument. So ask one man for a lute, another for a harpsichord, this man for a viola, that man for recorders; this one for a [portative] organ and that one for a lira [da braccio]; it’s all to your advantage. Then you will get the *maestri* to come and teach you the ways of music, getting them to play for you for nothing, paying them with hopes and promises.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ ‘O passi sparssi, o mie fatiche al vento’ is identifiable with a *strambotto* attributed to Serafino dall’Aquila, ‘O passi persi, o mie fatiche al vento’; although the third word differs, the poems are otherwise the same. See Barbara Bauer-Formiconi, *Die Strambotti des Serafino dall’Aquila* (Munich, 1967), p. 282.

⁴⁹ *Ragionamento del Zoppino fatto frate e Lodovico puttaniere, dove contiensi la vita e genealogia di tutte le cortigiane di Roma, attribuito a Francisco Delicado*, ed. Mario Cicognani (Milan, 1969), p. 40. The *Ragionamento* was originally published in 1539, but was probably written in about 1527.

⁵⁰ Pietro Aretino, *Ragionamento dialogo* (Milan, 1998), pp. 362–3.

The life of a Roman courtesan can be gauged from a description of one famous woman's situation. Imperia Cognati, whose real name was Lucrezia, was born in Rome in 1481; her mother Diana Cognati was also a courtesan and the long-time consort of Paolo Trotti, a papal singer and a cleric. By 1498, at the age of seventeen, Imperia had already given birth to a daughter, so she may have begun her career as early as 1495, when she was fourteen; this was the normal age for entering the profession. Her major patrons were first the Roman gentleman Angelo del Bufalo and then Agostino Chigi, the richest banker of the period. She committed suicide in 1512, at the age of thirty-one, apparently after an argument with del Bufalo.⁵¹ In 1506, at the height of her career (and just at the time Maria must have been in residence there), the Dominican friar and writer Matteo Bandello came to Rome for six months and later produced a *novella* about Imperia. He describes her situation in detail:

Her house was so beautifully decorated and furnished that whenever a stranger entered it and saw the furnishings and the number of servants, he would believe that a princess lived there. Among other things, there were a salon, a bedroom, and a small chamber, all so magnificently furnished that there was nothing in them but velvets and brocades, and on the floor, fine carpets. In the small chamber, where she retired when she was visited by some great personage, the walls were covered with tapestries of the richest gold cloth, with many lovely and fine figures. [Above the tapestries] there was a cornice decorated completely in gold and ultramarine. On it were most beautiful vases of various precious materials—alabaster, porphyry, serpentine, and a thousand other kinds. Around the room were seen many coffers and chests, richly carved and inlaid, and all of great value. In the centre of the salon there was a small table, the most beautiful in the world, covered with green velvet. And here there was always a lute or a viola [da mano?], with books of music and other musical instruments. There were also many books in Italian and Latin, elegantly bound. She truly delighted in Italian poetry, and, having been encouraged and taught by our most delightful Messer Domenico [Niccolò] Campana—called Strascino—she had already made such progress as to have composed herself some not unpleasing sonnets and madrigals.⁵²

⁵¹ Gnoli, *Cortigiane romane*, pp. 40–84; Monica Kurzel-Runtscheiner, *Töchter der Venus: Die Kurtisanen Roms im 16. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 1995), pp. 46–52.

⁵² Matteo Bandello, *Tutte le opere*, ed. Francesco Flora (2nd edn.; Verona, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 461–2 (*Novelle, Terza Parte, Novella 42*). Also quoted in Georgina Masson, *Courtesans of the Italian Renaissance* (New York, 1975), p. 37, with a slightly different translation. I take *cetra* as a general designation for string instrument.

The talents Bandello ascribes to Imperia are exactly those Arrighi attributes to Maria: poet and musician. I would maintain that the works Maria brought to Arrighi's villa represent a portion of the repertory of the *cortigiane oneste* of Rome. This conclusion is strongly supported by additional rubrics Arrighi attaches to some of Maria's songs. 'T' ti lasso, dona, hormai' (no. 3 on Table 1) bears the title, 'This song was the favourite of Masina'. Masina, like Maria, was a Roman courtesan, but a much more famous one. She was the mistress of Cardinal Giuliano della Rovere, who, by the time Maria returned to Florence, had already become Pope Julius II.⁵³ Furthermore, 'Donna, contro alla mie voglia' (no. 4 on Table 1) also bears a descriptive label: 'This song was the favourite of Duke Valentino'. This was none other than Cesare Borgia, whose mistress, according to some sources, was another famous Roman courtesan, Fiammetta di Michele of Florence. Since our courtesan Maria knew and sang this song, it may well be one that Fiammetta sang to Cesare.

The seven works Maria brought to Arrighi's villa and sang there thus represent a portion of the repertory sung by Masina, Fiammetta, Imperia, and Maria herself for their noble and clerical clients. Fortunately, settings of five of the seven texts in Table 1 are extant. These are typical frottole, and all appear first in manuscripts or in Petrucci's printed books around the time that Arrighi copied them. The manuscripts Antinori 158 and Egerton 3051 thus contain a small but traceable repertory of music sung by courtesans, very possibly the earliest one known. This repertory neatly encapsulates the dual roles of the courtesan in contemporary society. The subject matter of the majority of Maria's songs falls within current Italian ideas of courtly love.⁵⁴ These works bear amorous texts that are, perhaps surprisingly, in masculine voice. In singing such works, the courtesan was thus adopting the masculine role of seducer. In this reversal of roles, the man is now listening as the seduced, the cold, hard denier of love, and the courtesan is attempting to arouse him through the very works that would normally be sung to a woman.

⁵³ Masson, *Courtesans*, pp. 5, 20; and Lawler, *Lives of the Courtesans*, p. 35. The *Ragionamento del Zoppino*, p. 51, includes her in a seemingly endless list of Roman courtesans and states that her husband received the 'riches' ('spoglie') of Julius II. See also Giulio Rezasco, 'Segno delle meretrici', *Giornale linguistico di archeologia, storia e belle arti*, 17 (1891), p. 205.

⁵⁴ Prizer, 'Games of Venus', pp. 1-56.

On the other hand, ‘La fava bem menata’, the ‘song composed by Maria the courtesan’, is in no sense courtly. It is a song of a clearly popularizing nature, which, although purportedly about a ‘fava’—a kind of broad bean—actually refers to the penis.⁵⁵

La fava bem menata piace molto alla brighata. E chi diria che la fava fussi di tanto sapore d’ogni affanno l’huomo chava quando è ffacta di buom core; chi la vuol di buom sapore Si è col porro et l’olio fatta. La fava . . .	The well stirred-up bean Greatly pleases the crew. And some would say that the bean Has such a good flavour That it takes away every care from man When it is done with spirit; If you want it with a really good flavour Make it with leeks and oil. The bean . . .
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Chi la fava in molle pone, più s’ingrosse et più s’affina; non fa mai el miglior boccone da mangiare sera et mattina! Questa è pur cosa divina chi la fava usa menata. La fava . . . ⁵⁶	If you take the bean when it’s soft, The more it fattens and lengthens; You will never make a better morsel To eat morning and night! This is really a heavenly thing For [her] who uses the bean all stirred up. The bean . . .
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This work is squarely in the rich tradition of the Florentine *canzone a ballo*, which often, at the hands of Luigi Pulci, Lorenzo de’ Medici, and others, exhibited bawdy meanings through double entendre. Thus, ‘menare’ (‘to stir up’) is frequently used to indicate the motions of coitus; ‘porro’ (leek) represents the penis; and ‘olio’ (oil), refers to ejaculation.⁵⁷ In performing such a sexually explicit song in public, the courtesan was doing something that surely no chaste woman of the Renaissance would have considered appropriate. Here, too, however, there is a reversal of roles: the *canzone a ballo* and its sub-type the carnival song, which adopted exactly these images, were written to be sung to women, both to embarrass and to titillate them. In ‘La fava bem menata’, the courtesan is singing in place of the man in an attempt to excite him.

⁵⁵ Florio, *A Worlde of Words*, p. 127, defines fava as ‘a beane. . . . Also used for the prepuse or top of a man’s yard’. He also defines ‘fava menata’ as ‘a kinde of beane pottage’.

⁵⁶ MS Antinori 158, f. 24v.

⁵⁷ Valter Boggione and Giovanni Casalegno, *Dizionario storico del lessico erotico italiano* (Milan, 1999), s.v., and their later *Dizionario letterario del lessico amoroso: metafore, eufemismi, trivialismi* (Turin, 2000), s.v. Bruscaagli, *Trionfi e canti carnascialeschi*, annotates the repertory of the Florentine carnival song, showing these same meanings.

In conclusion, we can return to the fumings of Sabba da Castiglione and Bembo. It should be remembered that Sabba had spent approximately seven years in Rome, from about 1508 to 1515, just at the time that Imperia was the toast of the city. In his *Ricordi*, Sabba called Rome ‘the forge, nest, and dwelling-place of all the vices and obscenities of the world’.⁵⁸ When he speaks in the same work of music’s representing ‘an open precipice . . . to [women] . . . and an obvious occasion to fall backward, to their shame and dishonour, into the fetid mud of dishonesty’, he must have in mind courtesans and their music. Bembo, too, of course, had passed considerable time in Rome, both before and after he took the cloth. His long-time consort was Faustina Morosina della Torre, who was also the mother of his children, including Elena. Bembo had met Morosina in Rome in 1513, when she was a sixteen-year-old courtesan there.⁵⁹ When he writes to his daughter that music ‘is a thing for vain and frivolous women’, he may well have the same group in mind, not wishing the same life for his daughter.

We can now offer an explanation of the two men’s change of heart between the first years of the Cinquecento and the 1540s: what has happened to secular music and women’s participation in it is Rome itself, particularly courtesan culture. Gentlewomen’s amateur music-making has been subverted by the courtesans, with whom the activity has become so identified that Bembo, Sabba and other members of the patriciate no longer consider it proper for chaste gentlewomen to be associated with it. Rome in the early sixteenth century is central to this process of change. Maria, Imperia, and their companions thus represent in a certain sense the first wave of women professional musicians of the Italian Renaissance, and their small beginning would culminate in such professionals as the virtuoso singers of the *Concerto delle donne* in late sixteenth-century Ferrara and even in the magnificent compositions of Barbara Strozzi, herself probably a courtesan, in Seicento Venice.

⁵⁸ *Ricordi* 72: ‘fucina, nido et albergo di tutti i vitii et oscenità del mondo’: cited from F. Petrucci, ‘Castiglione, Sabba da’, *Dizionario biografico degli Italiani*, XXII, p. 101.

⁵⁹ Kurzel-Runtscheiner, *Töchter der Venus*, pp. 97–9.

Appendix: List of Sources

A. Printed Books

- PeF III (1505) *Frottole, libro tertio*. Venice: Petrucci, 1505 (n. st.).
 PeF IV (1505) *Strambotti, ode, sonetti et modo de cantar versi latini e capituli. Libro quarto*. Venice: Petrucci, [1505].
 PeF V (1505) *Frottole. Libro quinto*. Venice: Petrucci, 1505.
 PeF VI (1506) *Frottole. Libro sexto*. Venice: Petrucci, 1506 (n. st.).
 PeF VII (1507) *Frottole. Libro septimo*. Venice: Petrucci, 1507.
 PeF IX (1509) *Frottole. Libro nono*. Venice: Petrucci, 1509.

B. Manuscripts

- BolC Q18 Bologna, Civico Museo Bibliografico Musicale, MS Q 18.
 FlorC 2441 Florence, Biblioteca del Conservatorio Luigi Cherubini, MS Basevi 2441.
 FlorBN 27 Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, MS Panciatichiano 27.
 FlorBN 121 Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, MS Magliabecchi XIX, 121.
 FlorBN 337 Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, MS Banco Rari 337.
 ParBN 676 Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, MS Rés. Vm.⁷ 676.
 PerBC 431 Perugia, Biblioteca Comunale, MS 431 (olim G. 20).

MUSIC AND CRISIS IN FLORENCE AND ROME, 1527–30

Iain Fenlon

In early April 1527 the Imperial army, a formidable assemblage of German Landsknechts and battle-scarred Spanish troops, together with a smattering of Italians, broke camp near Bologna, crossed the Apennines, and headed south.¹ By 2 May they had reached Viterbo, and three nights later were camped on the slopes of the Janiculum. From there, shrouded in the early morning fog, they descended into Rome and quickly breached the walls of the Borgo Leoncino. At first the fighting was fierce, and Charles, Duke of Bourbon, commander of the Hapsburg army, was killed in the early stages of the assault. But the invaders prevailed, and soon they were pouring through the walls near Santo Spirito in Sassia and heading towards the Vatican. Together with the papal court, a good number of the cardinalate, and a group of terrified citizens including Alberto Pio da Carpi, Clement VII escaped just in time along the raised passageway linking the palace to Castel Sant' Angelo; they were to remain there for seven months. At the beginning there were 950 people confined in the fortress, and although there was little contact with the outside world, messages were sometimes smuggled.² Now leaderless and thirsting for spoil, the ill-disciplined soldiers rampaged across the Ponte Sisto and into the city itself. All Rome lay before it.³ As a commander in the Imperial army later wrote:

On the sixth of May we took Rome by storm, killed 6,000 men, plundered the houses, carried off what we found in churches and elsewhere, and finally set fire to a good portion of the town. A strange life indeed! We tore up, destroyed the deeds of copyists, the records,

¹ The chronicle of Cornelius de Fine gives the size of the imperial army as 25,000, made up of 14,000 Germans, 8,000 Spaniards and 5,000–6,000 Italians: see I. Ait, 'Clement VII and the Sack of Rome as represented in the *Ephemerides Historicae* of Cornelius de Fine', in K. Gouwens and S. E. Reiss (eds.), *The Pontificate of Clement VII. History, Politics, Culture* (Aldershot, 2005), p. 121.

² See the graphic account in Sanuto, *I diarii*, XLVI, cols 131–4.

³ For the Sack, its antecedents and effects, see L. von Pastor, *History of the Popes*,

the letters, and documents of the Curia. The Pope fled to the Castel Sant' Angelo with his bodyguard, the cardinals, bishops, Romans, and members of the Curia who had escaped the massacre. For three weeks we laid siege until, forced by hunger, he had to surrender the castle. . . . Inside, we found Pope Clement with twelve cardinals in a store-room. The pope had to sign the surrender treaty that the secretary read to him. They all bemoaned themselves piteously and wept a lot. Here we are, all of us, rich.⁴

This simple but vivid memoir, one of a good number of eye-witness accounts that have survived,⁵ graphically illustrates the state of total anarchy that took hold in Rome as the city of the Vicar of Christ was so comprehensively wrecked and brutalised by a half-savage and predominantly Lutheran soldiery in the spring of 1527. With its keen eye for detail, it underlines the fact that, beyond the obvious military, religious, and political effects, the consequences of the Sack were also cultural. All the major palaces of the city were pillaged, and whole libraries, including that of the distinguished humanist Angelo Colucci, were destroyed or dispersed. Inside the Vatican Palace itself Lutheran graffiti, which are still visible, were carved into the walls of the Raphael *Stanze* by the occupying troops,⁶ while in

ed. and trans. F. I. Antrobus *et al.* (1891–), IX, pp. 272–467; J. Hook, *The Sack of Rome, 1527* (London, 1972); M. L. Lenzi, *Il sacco di Roma del 1527* (Florence, 1978); E. R. Chamberlin, *The Sack of Rome* (London, 1979); A. Chastel, *The Sack of Rome 1527*, trans. B. Archer (Princeton, 1983); C. L. Stinger, *The Renaissance in Rome* (Bloomington, 1985), pp. 320–32; E. Cochrane, *Italy 1530–1630*, ed. J. Kirschner, (London, 1988), pp. 7–18; M. Firpo, *Il Sacco di Roma del 1527. Tra profezia, propaganda politica e riforma religiosa* (Cagliari, 1990).

⁴ The original text is in G. Kirchmair, 'Denkwürdigkeiten seiner Zeit (1519–1553)', *Fontes rerum austriacarum* I/I (Vienna, 1855), pp. 7–8, translated in Chastel, *The Sack*, p. 9.

⁵ G. Morone, *Ricordi inediti sul decennio dal 1520 al 1530 in cui Roma fu saccheggiata*, ed. T. Dandolo (Milan, 1855), Books 4 and 5; C. Milanese (ed.), *Il Sacco di Roma del MDXXVII. Narrazioni di contemporanei* (Florence, 1867); G. Cavalletti Rondini, 'Nuovi documenti sul Sacco di Roma del 1527', in *Studi e documenti di storia e del diritto*, 5 (1884), pp. 221–46; O. Montenovese, 'Echi del Sacco di Roma dell'anno 1527', *Archivi*, 10 (1943), pp. 9–17; M. L. Lenzi, *Il Sacco di Roma* (Florence, 1978); M. Miglio, 'Causarum cognitio. Memoria, autobiografia e cronaca del Sacco', in *Il Sacco di Roma del 1527 e l'immaginario collettivo* (Rome, 1986), pp. 7–17; P. Farenga (ed.), *Il Sacco di Roma. L'edizione Orano de I ricordi di Marcello Alberini* (Rome, 1997); K. Gouwens, *Remembering the Renaissance: Humanist Narratives of the Sack of Rome* (Leiden, 1998); A. Esposito and M. Vaquero Piñeiro, 'Rome during the Sack: chronicles and testimonies from an occupied city', in Gouwens and Reiss (eds.), *The Pontificate of Clement VII*, pp. 125–42.

⁶ D. Redig de Campos, 'Il nome di Martin Lutero graffito sulla Disputa del Sacramento', *Ecclesia*, 6 (1947), pp. 648–9; *idem*, 'Un altro graffito del Sacco nelle Stanze di Raffaello', *Ecclesia*, 19 (1960), pp. 552–4; Chastel, *The Sack*, pp. 92–3.

St Peter's the body of Julius II was exhumed by Spanish troops, who pillaged a number of items including 'two rings of great value'.⁷ In the midst of the carnage and torture, books, manuscripts, and small works of art that could easily be carried away, changed hands rapidly and repeatedly in makeshift markets, before disappearing altogether with the departing soldiers. Larger works of art were no more secure. Raphael's tapestries from the Sistine Chapel were rolled up and carted away, two of them to re-surface in the hands of Isabella d'Este's agents in Rome; later they were seized by Saracen pirates who took them to Tunisia, from where they eventually reached Venice.⁸ Plunder was rife, and human life cheap. As another witness put it:

Naught could be seen on the streets but vile ruffians carrying bundles of rich vestments and ecclesiastical ornaments and large sacks full of gold and silver vessels, bands of prisoners of all classes wailing and screaming, dead bodies cut into pieces covered with mud and their own blood. . . . Many persons were suspended by their arms for hours on end; others were tied up by their genitals or hung high over the street by their feet or half-buried in cellars or boxes or lacerated all over their bodies with hot irons.⁹

Hardly a house in Rome was left undamaged, and many parts of the city had been razed to the ground. Writing one month after the initial assault, a Spanish observer reported that 'In Rome, the chief city of Christendom, no bells ring, no churches are open, no Masses are said, Sundays and feastsdays have ceased . . . I know nothing to which I can compare it, except the destruction of Jerusalem'.¹⁰ As the smell of gun-smoke evaporated, to be replaced by the stench of decay, no one with any sort of alternative remained. In the wake of the Sack came plague. Bodies lay unburied in piles in the streets, graves had been torn open in the search for booty, and ruined houses were full of corpses. The stench in the streets was unbearable. Within a week or so of the invasion disease had taken hold, and by the beginning of June a full-scale epidemic was raging.¹¹

⁷ Ait, 'Clement VII and the Sack of Rome', p. 110.

⁸ J. Shearman, *Raphael's Cartoons in the Collection of Her Majesty the Queen and the Tapestries for the Sistine Chapel* (London, 1972), pp. 140–1.

⁹ Cochrane, *Italy 1530–1630*, p. 7.

¹⁰ Pastor, *History of the Popes*, IX, pp. 426–7.

¹¹ Hook, *The Sack of Rome*, p. 190.

It is hardly surprising that, in this anarchic atmosphere, Roman intellectual life, which had acquired a keen sense of superiority and self-assurance under the pontificate of Leo X, was severely undermined. In his dialogue *De litterorum infelicitate*, written in the aftermath of the Sack, Giovanni Pietro Valeriano claimed that this 'cruel tragedy' had destroyed the traditions of humanistic scholarship carefully husbanded over the previous eighty years.¹² One of the most distinguished archeologists of the time, Andrea Fulvio, was killed in May, and Paolo Giovio, who had been one of those who had escaped to the Castel Sant' Angelo with the pope, lost all his books and notes. Inevitably, diaspora was one consequence, as the reputation of Rome as the centre of learning, the literary haven of the world, became threatened.¹³ Under the guidance of Doge Andrea Gritti, who was determined to make Venice into a second Rome, the Republic embarked upon a *renovatio urbis*, in which refugees from the more troubled cities of Italy played a decisive role. One of the most important from the point of view of Gritti's plans was the Florentine architect and sculptor Jacopo Sansovino, who arrived in the city in 1527 and two years later was appointed *proto* by the Procurators of St. Mark, with responsibility for all the buildings and spaces under their administration.¹⁴ In that same year the distinguished Flemish composer Adriano Willaert arrived in Venice, apparently at Gritti's instigation, to take up the position of *maestro di cappella* at St. Mark's Basilica, a post he was to hold with considerable distinction for 35 years.¹⁵ In that time Willaert was to transform the music establishment in St. Mark's into one of the most distinguished in the penin-

¹² V. De Caprio, 'Intelletuali e mercato di lavoro nella Roma medicea', *Studi romani*, 29 (1981), pp. 29–33. For Valeriano and his text, see J. H. Gaisser, *Piero Valeriano on the Ill Fortune of Learned Men: A Renaissance Humanist and His World* (Ann Arbor, 1999).

¹³ On humanist culture in early sixteenth-century Rome, see J. F. D'Amico, *Renaissance Humanism in Papal Rome: Humanists and Churchmen on the Eve of the Reformation* (Baltimore, 1983); I. D. Rowland, *The Culture of High Renaissance: Ancients and Moderns in Sixteenth-Century Rome* (Cambridge, 1998); A Reynolds, *Renaissance Humanism at the Court of Clement VII: Francesco Berni's "Dialogue against Poets" in Context. Studies, with a Edition and Translation* (New York, 1999); C. L. Stinger, 'The place of Clement VII and Clementine Rome in Renaissance history', in Gouwens and Reiss (eds.), *The Pontificate of Clement VII*, pp. 165–84, particularly pp. 176–82.

¹⁴ D. Howard, *Jacopo Sansovino. Architecture and Patronage in Renaissance Venice* (New Haven and London, 1975).

¹⁵ G. M. Ongaro, 'Willaert, Gritti, e Luppato', *Studi musicali*, 17 (1988), pp. 55–70.

sular, second only to St. Peter's itself. In music, as in so many other spheres of cultural activity, Venice was a net beneficiary of the misfortunes that befell Florence and Rome.

As its title suggests, Valeriano's treatise is particularly bleak in its view of the condition of writers. 'All men of letters are fated, above all today, to suffer torment and trouble. All the ones I would have liked to see were in ruin, subjected to the most atrocious cruelties fate can bring, struck down by the most ignoble accidents, some dead of the plague, some thrown into exile and left in penury, others killed by the sword or assailed by daily miseries, still others reduced to the worst of misfortunes—suicide.'¹⁶ Bitter and self-pitying as Valeriano's text is, it nonetheless mirrors a more general feeling of despair that *literati* expressed in their verses, modern-day versions of the long-standing genre of laments for the state of Italy.¹⁷ To a greater extent than any other event in the calamitous decades at the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Sack attracted the attention of writers throughout Europe,¹⁸ a process accelerated by the activity of the press, which rapidly brought reports of the state of Rome to a wide public in the form of short news-sheets and pamphlets. The stylistic and thematic monotony of the *lamenti di Roma* suggests that they are firmly grounded in popular feeling. Sentiments such as these are common: 'Mi chiamo Roma capomundi / Misera, che del tutto fui signora.'¹⁹

Somewhat in the same vein is the following:

Trist'Amarilli mia; donqu'è pur vero / Che di Titiro tuo sì stranamente /
Vada la greg' errand' et ei dolente / Lass 'l bel Tebre et Vaticano /
Oimè ch'io vegio dentro nel pensiero / Le frond' a terra spars' onde
sovente / S'udian Pastori a l'ombra dolcemente / Di te cantar, il che
mai più non spero. / Ben seria megl' haver da te la fame / Cacciata,
in mez' i campi, scalz' e scinta, / Povera, sol con le castagne amate, /
Chè I pom' ond' Atlant' anchor fò vinta / Ti spoglian duramente liber-
tate, / Ch'al tuo soccorso non è pur chi chiamo.²⁰

¹⁶ Chastel, *The Sack of Rome*, p. 123.

¹⁷ A. Medin and L. Frati, *Lamenti storici dei secoli XIV, XV e XVI*, 3 vols. (Bologna, 1890).

¹⁸ See V. De Caprio, "'Hor qui mi fa mestier lingua di ferro". Note sull'immaginario poetico', in *Il Sacco di Roma del 1527 e l'immaginario collettivo*, pp. 19–41.

¹⁹ 'My name is Rome, capital of the world, / Woe is me, who was mistress of all.'

²⁰ 'My sad Amaryllis: is it really true, then, / That the flock quite strangely goes

The imagery of this simple politicized pastoral, with its rather obvious explanatory references to contemporary events, has been mostly traced back to Theocritus and Virgil. The Pope, Clement VII (Tityrus), sadly abandons the Vatican and the banks of the Tiber, while the disconsolate shepherds (the clergy) stop singing in praise of Amaryllis.²¹ In addition to being equated with the church, Amaryllis was also identified with Rome in contemporary literature,²² thus sharpening the topicality of the reference in this case. This text was set to music by Philippe Verdelot, a Frenchman who, by April 1523, had been appointed *maestro di cappella* at the cathedral in Florence, and a few months later is also documented as *maestro* at the Baptistery. In view of the intimate connections between these two institutions, two of the most important music establishments in the city, it is to be assumed that he held a double appointment until the chapel was disbanded in June 1527 on account of the plague. Except for a two-month stay in Rome, Verdelot seems to have stayed in Florence throughout the 1520s; although the date of his death is not known, it is usually assumed that he perished during the siege of Florence.

Verdelot's setting of 'Trist' Amarilli mia' was published in 1530 in the collection *Madrigali de diversi musici libro primo de la serena*, probably printed by Valerio Dorico in Rome.²³ The Roman connections of this publication, which have been argued in the literature largely on typographical grounds, are further strengthened by the presence not only of 'Trist' Amarilli', but also of the anonymous setting of 'Perch'io de dir desio'; this latter, it has been suggested, was com-

astray / From your Tityrus and that he, sorrowful, / Quits the fair Tiber and the proud Vatican? / Alas, in my thoughts I see leaves / Strewn on the ground where the shepherds / Oft were heard in the shade singing / Sweetly about you, which I can hope for no more! / 'Twere better to have satisfied your hunger, / Amidst the fields, barefoot, ungirt, / And poor, with favoured chestnuts only, / For the apples whence Atlanta was conquered / Rudely deprive you of your liberty, / Seeing that no one even calls to bring you aid.: Text and translation taken from D. Harran: 'The "Sack of Rome" set to music', *Renaissance Quarterly*, 23 (1970), p. 413.

²¹ D. L. Hersh (alias Don Harran), 'Verdelot and the Early Madrigal' (Ph.D., University of California at Berkeley, 1963), pp. 24–6; Harran: 'The "Sack of Rome"', pp. 414–8.

²² W. Osthoff, *Theatergesang und darstellende Musik in der italienischen Renaissance, (15. und 16. Jahrhundert)*, 2 vols. (Tutzing, 1969), I, pp. 257–8.

²³ For this publication, see S. Cusick, *Valerio Dorico. Music Printer in Sixteenth-Century Rome* (Ann Arbor, 1981), pp. 118 ff.; I. Fenlon and J. Haar, *The Italian Madrigal in the Early Sixteenth Century: Sources and Interpretation* (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 220–2.

posed in celebration of Ortensia Colonna's marriage, and the book itself may have been commissioned by Cardinal Pompeo Colonna.²⁴ Verdelot himself had been in Rome immediately before his move to Florence in May 1521,²⁵ possibly for some years.

During his Florentine years, the composition of madrigals was in addition to Verdelot's normal duties as *maestro di cappella* at both the Cathedral and the Baptistery, and was presumably a convenient way of supplementing his income. 'Trist' Amarilli mia' is not, however, the only one of his madrigals to comment on the aftermath of the Sack; another anonymous text, 'Italia, Italia, ch' hai si longamente' may also refer to events in Rome, since it has been convincingly argued that it refers to the condition of the city during the pontificate of Paul III (1534–49). The reforming churchmen that Paul III was apparently fond of appointing to the College of Cardinals are evidently the 'Pharisees' of whom the poet complains, those who have robbed Rome 'of all its amusements and festivities'. With its exhortation to arise from lethargy and shake off the yoke of oppression, it seems clearly composed as a response to the Sack:

'Italia, Italia ch'hai si longamente / Dormito nella tua maggior tempesta,
/ Svegliati et alza l'honorata testa / Et agl'ultimi danni hor pon ben
mente. / Mira i tuoi Pharisei com'empicamente / Di quell' ombra d'imperio
che ti resta / T'han priv'et Roma d'ogni gioco e festa, / Onde sia sempre
misera e dolente. / Strigni, strinn'animesa 'l iusto ferro / Che de mill'altre
ingiurie fai vendetta, / Et toglì tant'obbrobrio agli occhi tuoi, / Che se 'l tuo
ben non puoi, puoi (s'io non erro) / Ricovrar ben l'honor, l'iniqua setta /
Spegnendo [e] l'empi et rei tyranni suoi.'

[Italy, Italy, you who for so long / Slept in the midst of your greatest storm,
/ Wake up, raise your honoured head, / And heed well now your latest woes. /
Observe how wickedly your Pharisees / Have deprived you of the shadow of your
remaining authority / And Rome of all its amusements and festivities / Whence it
is ever sad and wretched. / Grasp, grasp, bold one, the righteous sword / To
avenge yourself of a thousand other abuses, / And remove so much infamy from
your sight, / For if you are unable to recover your well-being, you are quite
able (if I err not) / To recover your honour, exterminating the wicked faction /
And its cruel, evil tyrants.]²⁶

²⁴ S. Campagnolo, 'Il *Libro Primo de la Serena* e il madrigale a Roma', *Musica Disciplina* 50 (1996), pp. 95–133.

²⁵ R. Sherr, 'Verdelot in Florence, Coppini in Rome, and the singer "La Fiore"', *Journal of the American Musicological Society*, 37 (1984), pp. 402–11.

²⁶ For the argument see Harran, 'The "Sack of Rome"', pp. 419–20, from which the translation is also taken.

A third poem, one of five sonnets by Petrarch that Verdelot set to music, is the well known 'Italia mia' which, with its call for divine aid to heal the wounds inflicted by the enemy, would have had general Italian applicability in the circumstances of the late 1520s.²⁷ Nonetheless, with its explicit reference to the Tiber and the Arno (as well as the Po), Petrarch's text could be read as referring to local circumstances in one of a number of Italian cities. That might explain its first appearance in a Florentine manuscript, elaborately illuminated and bound, that was prepared for presentation to Henry VIII of England in the hope of securing practical support during the final grim days of the last Republic.²⁸ In that context Petrarch's sonnet would have had a particularly relevant appeal:

'Italia mia, bench' el parlar' sia indarno / A le piaghe mortali / Che nel' bel corpo tuo si spesse veggio, / Piacem' almen' ch' e' mia sospir' sien quali / Sper' il Tever' et l'Arno / E 'l Po dove doglioso et grave hor' seggio. / Rector' del ciel', io cheggio / Che la pieta che ti condusse in terra / Ti volgha al tuo dilect' almo paese: / Vedi, Signor ceterese, / Di che levi cagion che crudel guerra, / I cor' ch' indur' et serra / Marte superb' et fero, / Apri tu, padr', e 'ntenerisci et snoda; / Ivi fa ch' el tuo vero, / Qual' io mi sia per la mia lingua s'oda.'

[My Italy, though words are useless / For the mortal wounds / Which I see so numerous in your beautiful body, / I am glad that at least my laments be / as the Tiber and the Arno / And the Po hope for, where I now sit, sorrowful and heavy. / Governor of Heaven, I beg / That the compassion which brought You upon earth / May turn You to Your beloved, divine country. / See gracious Lord, / How cruel a war from such slight causes / And the hearts, which proud and fierce / Mars hardens and holds fast; / Open them, Father, make them compassionate and loosen their bonds; / There let your truth / (No matter who I am) be heard from my tongue.]²⁹

Among composers resident in Rome at the time of the calamity only one, Costanzo Festa, a member of the papal choir since 1517, seems to have reacted to the Sack by writing a polyphonic composition, though one that was never published at the time. Along with everything else, the musical life of the city had been severely disrupted by the invasion, and the papal choir was reduced to half; some may

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 420–1.

²⁸ See below, pp. 295–6.

²⁹ Translation from H. C. Slim, *A Gift of Madrigals and Motets*, 2 vols. (Chicago and London, 1982), II, pp. 447–8.

have fled the city in terror, while others probably died during the occupation.³⁰ Although services presumably ceased during the pope's confinement in Castel Sant' Angelo, the re-organisation of the choir was one of Clement VII's concerns during his period of exile in Viterbo, when Jean Conseil was given the task of recruiting singers in France.³¹ Festa's piece is preserved in two manuscripts, the earliest of which is a set of partbooks containing motets from the first decades of the century, christened by Edward Lowinsky, the first scholar to consider them in detail, the Vallicelliana partbooks.³² Professionally copied on paper, decorated with elaborate and at times fantastical penwork majuscules or *cadellae* at the start of each piece³³ as is common with Italian music manuscripts of the period, and elegantly bound in a Roman workshop, they have been much discussed in the literature, partly because of the questions surrounding their dating and provenance, and partly because of their contents. These include a number of "political" motets, compositions whose texts comment, if only in a general fashion, upon contemporary events. A distinction should be made between these, and the repertory of pieces for the reception of princes and other important dignitaries, or composed in their honour.³⁴ In terms of function these two genres fulfilled quite different purposes, even if in practice their stylistic features could be similar, with *cantus firmus* techniques often being deployed to bear important textual messages which frequently incorporated the name of the persons being honoured.³⁵

³⁰ R. Sherr, 'Clement VII and the Golden Age of the papal choir', in Gouwens and Reiss (eds.), *The Pontificate of Clement VII*, p. 237 and Table 13.1. I am grateful to Prof. Sherr for his help on this point.

³¹ F. X. Haberl, *Die Römische "schola cantorum" und die päpstlichen Kapellsänger bis zur Mitte des 16. Jahrhunderts* (Leipzig, 1888), pp. 72–3; A. M. Bragard, 'Détails nouveaux sur les musiciens de la cour du Pape Clement VII', *Revue belge de musicologie*, 12 [1958], pp. 12–8.

³² Rome, Biblioteca Vallicelliana, MS S1 35–40; see E. E. Lowinsky, 'A newly-discovered sixteenth-century motet manuscript at the Biblioteca Vallicelliana in Rome', *Journal of the American Musicological Society*, 3 (1950), pp. 173–232, reprinted with additions in B. J. Blackburn (ed.), *Edward E. Lowinsky. Music in the Culture of the Renaissance and Other Essays*, 2 vols. (Chicago and London, 1989), II, pp. 433–82 (all references are to this version).

³³ For the style, within the competence of any good professional scribe, see J. J. Alexander, *The Decorated Letter* (London, 1978), pp. 25–7.

³⁴ For these see A. Dunning, *Die Staatsmouette 1480–1555* (Utrecht, 1969).

³⁵ For one group of such pieces, written in praise of different members of the Medici family, see A. Atlas, *The Cappella Giulia Chansonnier (Rome, Biblioteca Apostolica*

In his fundamental study of the Vallicelliana partbooks Lowinsky argued, principally through an analysis of texts, that they were compiled in Florence about 1531, and that many of the pieces that they contain are overtly Savonarolan and Republican in character. Although disputed, Lowinsky's view is now generally accepted.³⁶ One conspicuous detail of the decoration of the Vallicelliana partbooks, the head which appears in the initial letter at the start of Lupus's motet 'Hierusalem luge', provides a valuable clue to their original owner. Once thought to be a portrait of Alessandro de' Medici,³⁷ it is more likely to be an explicit reference to the Moor's Head, the heraldic device of the Florentine Pucci family, with its characteristic headband,³⁸ an interpretation that is supported by the appearance of the name 'PVCCI' in a banderole elsewhere in the manuscript. The most recent contribution to the debate argues that the partbooks were copied in Florence, about 1530–2, by Antonio Moro, a known scribe of other Florentine manuscripts through which his music and text hands can be verified, for Roberto di Antonio Pucci.³⁹ Imprisoned after the fall of the Medici in 1527, Roberto Pucci fled to Rome where he placed himself under the protection of the pope. Under Alessandro de' Medici he became a Florentine senator, but in 1534 he was back in Rome as Florentine ambassador to Pope Paul III. Thereafter he stayed in the Eternal City, becoming a cardinal in 1540, and bishop of Pistoia in the following year. It was there that he died in 1547 at the age of eighty-two.⁴⁰ His ownership of the books might well explain the mixture of Florentine and Roman repertoires which they contain, and which has occupied so much attention in past discussions of their origins, since he was in close contact with both poles of the Medici axis.

Vaticana, C.G. XIII, 27, 2 vols. (New York, 1975), I, pp. 49–55; R. Sherr, 'The Medici coat of arms in a motet for Leo X', *Early Music*, 15 (1987), pp. 31–5, and I. Fenlon, 'Costanzo Porta and the "Missa Ducalis"', in F. Facchin (ed.), *Il cantus firmus nella polifonia. Atti del convegno internazionale di studi, Arezzo, 27–29 dicembre 2002* (Arezzo, 2005), pp. 15–28.

³⁶ For the debate see A.-M. Bragard, *Etude bio-bibliographique sur Philippe Verdelot, musicien français de la Renaissance* (Brussels, 1964), pp. 5–11; Slim, *A Gift of Madrigals*, I, pp. 55–60.

³⁷ Bragard, *Etude bio-bibliographique*, p. 10; Slim, *A Gift of Madrigals*, I, pp. 58–9.

³⁸ This suggestion was first made by Joshua Rifkin (private communication).

³⁹ I. Fenlon and J. Haar, *The Italian Madrigal in the Early Sixteenth Century: Sources and Interpretation* (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 126–30.

⁴⁰ D. Tirribili-Giuliani [= F. Galvani] and L. Passerini, *Sommario storico delle famiglie celebri toscane*, 3 vols (Florence, 1855–64), s.v. 'Pucci'.

As is common with Italian music manuscripts of the period, Moro has arranged his material in groups according to the number of voices employed. Following this standard pattern the manuscript opens with a sequence of five-voiced pieces, passes to a second section containing a collection of works for six voices, and concludes with a small batch for seven.⁴¹ Among the first group is a setting of the following text:

Deus venerunt gentes in hereditatem tuam sanctum tuum polluerunt templum posuerunt Jherusalem in pomorum custodiam posuerunt morticina servorum tuorum escas volatilibus celi carnes sanctorum tuorum bestijs terrae. Effuderunt sanguinem ipsorum tamquam aquam in circuitu Jherusalem. Et non erat qui seppeliret.⁴²

[O God, the heathen have set foot in thy domain, defiled thy holy temple, and laid Jerusalem in ruins. They have thrown out the dead bodies of thy servants to feed the birds of the air; they have made thy saints carrion for wild beasts. Their blood is spilled all around Jerusalem like water, and there they lie unburied.]

The main text of the motet is a complete setting of Psalm 78, but against this Festa has placed an ostinato: in the *Prima pars*, 'Effunde iram tuam in gentes quae te non noverunt'⁴³, and in the *Secunda pars*, 'Aduva nos Deus salutaris noster . . . Domine, libera nos'.⁴⁴

'Deus venerunt gentes' appears in only one other source, copied by a Vatican scribe, Johannes Parvus, sometime between 1534 and 1549, for the use of the Papal Chapel.⁴⁵ There it occurs among 35 motets, eleven of which are ascribed to Festa; since seven of the remaining pieces are also ascribed to Festa, it has been suggested that he wrote all of them and that the manuscript was intended as a monument to his music most of which had been written in the course of a long career in Papal service, which began in 1517 and lasted until his death in 1545.⁴⁶

⁴¹ For an inventory see Lowinsky, 'A newly-discovered sixteenth-century motet manuscript', pp. 458–81.

⁴² For a modern edition see A. Seay (ed.), *Costanzo Festa Opera Omnia*, III (n.p., 1979), no. 14.

⁴³ 'Vent thy rage on pagans who disown thee'.

⁴⁴ 'Help us, O God, Our Saviour . . . Lord, rescue us' (Antiphon to Psalm 78).

⁴⁵ Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, MS Cappella Sistina 20, ff. 36v–43.

⁴⁶ See *Census-Catalogue of Manuscript Sources of Polyphonic Music 1400–1550*, IV (1988), p. 34.

If Costanzo Festa seems to be, in the present state of knowledge, the only composer active in Rome to have reacted to the Sack through composition, that might be yet a further indication of the severe disruption that was caused by the arrival of the Imperial troops. The traditional view of the Sack as an apocalyptic event that brought to an end Leo X's *Roma felix* has been questioned and modified by recent historians,⁴⁷ and it has been pointed out that while both the rhythm of production and the turnover of the Roman economy reduced considerably, some forms of business actually benefited during these months when the circulation of money and goods increased.⁴⁸ Nonetheless, much was destroyed, and according to Pamphilio Pamphili, writing to Porcia Porcari, the only traders still in business in May 1528, just one year after the occupation began, were grocers, butchers, tavern-keepers, and bakers.⁴⁹ There can be no doubt that, of the many commercial and cultural casualties of the Sack, one was its printing and publishing industry, including the fledgling trade of the printing and publishing of music books. According to Gregorovius, most of the printing equipment in the city disappeared when the shops bordering the Campo dei Fiori were looted by the Imperial troops.⁵⁰ Although the Roman book trade in the opening decades of the century had been modest by Venetian standards, it had consistently expanded firstly with the encouragement of Julius II, and then with that of Leo X. Altogether there were 65 printers active in the city during the first twenty years of the century, nineteen of whom opened their workshops during these two pontificates.

The first printed music books to be produced in Rome were due to the initiative of Jacopo Giunta, a member of the extensive printing and publishing family whose main centre of operations was Florence.⁵¹ Recorded in the 1526 census as having one of the largest

⁴⁷ See in particular M. Tafuri, 'Il Sacco di Roma 1527: fratture e continuità', *Roma nel Rinascimento* (1985), pp. 21–35.

⁴⁸ Esposito and Vaquero Piñero, 'Rome during the Sack', pp. 134–5.

⁴⁹ A. Modigliani, *I Porcari. Storie di una famiglia romana tra Medioevo e Rinascimento* (Rome, 1994), pp. 137–8; see Esposito and Vaquero Piñero, 'Rome during the Sack', p. 134.

⁵⁰ F. Gregorovius, *The History of the City of Rome in the Middle Ages* (London, 1894–1902), VIII, p. 579.

⁵¹ W. Pettas, *The Giunti of Florence. Merchant Publishers of the Sixteenth Century* (San Francisco, 1980).

households of any tradesman in the city, he was perhaps among the few that could afford to enter the fragile market for music. He did so by establishing a three-way business partnership with Valerio Dorico and Giovanni Pasoti, in which Giunta underwrote the enterprise and the others provided technical expertise. Beginning in March 1526, a series of music editions were issued at considerable speed, yet while the rate of production was steady, the actual contents of the books themselves were repertorially cautious, being full of older pieces which had achieved a certain currency through dissemination in print and manuscript. His effort, which constitutes the first real attempt to found a music press in Rome, was shortlived.

The disruption of the brief history of the Giunta-Dorico-Pasoti initiative is another aspect, along with the effect on the size and operations of the papal choir, of the severe decline in the quality of musical life that followed in the wake of the occupation. Of the three partners in Giunta's operation, it was only Dorico who returned to the presses after the occupation had ended. Economic dislocation lasted well into 1529, and in re-establishing himself with a shop on the Campo dei Fiori, the traditional centre of the Roman printing trade, Dorico was, together with Antonio Blado, one of the first printers in the city to resume operations.⁵² Leaving aside the vexed question of whether or not Dorico was the printer of the *Libro Primo de la Serena*,⁵³ the first of the music titles that can be assigned to him without question is the *Libro Secondo de la Croce*, which carries a colophon bearing his name and the date 'Anno Domini. 1531. die xvi. Septembris'.⁵⁴

He then continued rather ambitiously in the following year, with an edition of Fabio Calvo's *Antiquae urbis Romae cum regionibus simulachrum*, which had originated in archaeological research carried out by Calvo in connection with Raphael's project for the restoration of ancient Rome, and had been published in April 1527 by Lodovico

⁵² For a general account of Dorico's printing activities see F. Barberi, 'I Dorico, tipografi a Roma nel Cinquecento', *La bibliofilia*, 67 (1965), pp. 221–61. His career as a music printer is discussed in Cusick, *Valerio Dorico*.

⁵³ Fenlon and Haar, *The Italian Madrigal*, pp. 53–5, 22–3; Campagnolo, 'Il *Libro Primo de la Serena*'.

⁵⁴ Cusick, *Valerio Dorico*, pp. 164–5; Fenlon and Haar, *The Italian Madrigal*, pp. 216–7.

degli Arrighi. Calvo's elegant book is richly illustrated with large-scale plans and diagrams of Roman monuments, beginning with a double-page view of the city showing the 'Roma quadrata' of the period of Romulus, a visual version of a recent literary topos.⁵⁵ This is followed by three further woodcuts showing in order the early Republican city under Servius Tullius, Augustan Rome, and the Imperial capital at the time of Pliny the Elder. This first section concludes with a bird's-eye view of the Capitoline. The rest of the *Simulachrum* is taken up with plans of the fourteen 'regions' of the city beginning with the Porta Capena; the results are schematic in appearance, and involve the omission of some monuments and the invention of others. Notwithstanding its faults, Calvo's book was a considerable enterprise, important for being the first book of its kind to place the fruits of archaeological enquiry in an historical context, and in choosing it to restart his business after the Sack, Dorico was certainly aiming high. The illustrations in this second edition are identical to those in the first.⁵⁶ The blocks for the *Simulachrum* were designed by Calvo himself, and had been originally cut by Tolomeo Egnazio da Fossombrone for the 1527 edition, the stock of which had been almost completely destroyed in the Sack; it is said that only three copies survived (in the Sack Arrighi also disappeared and Calvo died, having been marched out of the city by *Landsknechte* and left in an abandoned farmhouse for having failed to pay the head tax imposed on all citizens).⁵⁷ Dorico's edition, which uses Arrighi's types and calligraphic initials as well as the original woodblocks, is in effect a type-facsimile replacement of this first edition.⁵⁸

In terms of the wider market, Calvo's book had some success; a third edition was published by Hieronimus Frobenius in Basle in 1556, and another by Frobenius in partnership with Nicolaus Episcopus

⁵⁵ P. Jacks, *The Antiquarian and the Myth of Antiquity. The Origins of Rome in Renaissance Thought* (Cambridge, 1993), p. 192.

⁵⁶ J. Ruyschaert, 'Les différents colophons de l'*Antiquae urbis Romae cum regionibus simulachrum* de 1532', in *Contributi alla storia del libro. Miscellanea in onore di Lamberto Donati* (Florence, 1969), p. 213.

⁵⁷ Jacks, *The Antiquarian*, p. 203.

⁵⁸ Barberi, 'I Dorico', pp. 227–8. See also A. Jammes, 'Un chef d'oeuvre meconnu d'Arrighi Vicentino', in *Studia bibliographica in honorem Herman de la Fontaine Verwey* (Amsterdam, 1966), pp. 297–316; R. Weiss, *The Renaissance Discovery of Classical Antiquity* (Oxford, 1973), pp. 95–8; P. N. Pagliara, 'La Roma antica di Fabio Calvo. Note sulla cultura antiquaria e architettonica', *Psicon*, 8–9 (1976), pp. 65–87; and Jacks, *The Antiquarian*, pp. 191–204.

two years later. More generally, the *Simulachrum* is one of a number of books, of which the best-known is Bartolomeo Marliani's *Antiquae Romae topographia* (Rome, Antonio Blado, 1534), which mark a fresh phase of humanistic study of Roman antiquities, all the more poignant in view of the extensive damage done to the city.⁵⁹ Marliani's guidebook was an instant success.⁶⁰ Rabelais, who spent the early months of 1534 in Rome as the guest of Cardinal Jean du Bellay, prepared a second edition of Marliani's text which was published in Lyons by Sebastian Grypho.⁶¹ This was then followed by a number of others, including an amplified version published by Valerio and Luigi Dorico in September 1544 with the title *Urbis Romae topographia*, and a dedication to Francis I of France. Like Calvo's *Simulachrum* this too contained extensive illustrations of ancient monuments.

Following a working pattern that had been established by printers and publishers operating in Rome in the years before the Sack, Dorico (now joined in the business by his brother Luigi), produced a wide variety of literature for the general market, including popular books on astrology, archaeology, and editions of the classics such as Gaurico's *Trattato* and Horace's *Ars poetica*, during the 1530s. There was also a certain number of inexpensive books produced for the Church and for visitors to Rome, including papal bulls and pocket-sized editions of that old staple of the trade, first printed at the beginning of the century, the *Mirabilia urbis Romae*. It was the income from these small and inexpensive editions that often provided the capital for investment in new fonts, or could be used to subsidize more specialized publications such as music. Here Dorico started with something of an advantage, since he had somehow been able to preserve the music type that he and Pasoti had used in their work for Giunta before the Sack. With this salvaged font to hand, Dorico now made an early decision to continue printing music along with his other, no doubt more profitable, titles, and for some twelve years after the re-establishment of his shop he remained the most important

⁵⁹ For an outline of the successive phases of the humanistic study of Roman remains, see Weiss, *The Renaissance Discovery of Classical Antiquity*.

⁶⁰ Jacks, *The Antiquarian*, pp. 206–14.

⁶¹ R. Cooper, 'Rabelais and the *Topographia Antiquae Romae* of Marliani', *Etudes Rabelaisiennes*, 14 (1997), pp. 71–87; M. McGowan, *The Vision of Rome in Late Renaissance France* (New Haven and London, 2000), pp. 35–6.

printer and publisher of music working in Rome; not until Antonio Blado, the second music printer working in Rome to adopt the single-impression method, entered the field, was there any serious competition. Music printing was to continue in Rome, and indeed was to be strengthened there after the Council of Trent, but from the end of the 1530s the focus of production shifted decisively, to Venice, a city which had remained undisturbed by foreign invasions or civil commotions since the debacle at Agnadello.

As the hub of a trading empire whose products had been dispersed and exchanged along well-established trade routes, and with an established tradition of printing and publishing, Venice had an obvious advantage over Rome, which, for all its political and artistic significance, was geographically unsuited for major commercial activity. During the 1530s, Venetian peace and prosperity stood in stark contrast to the political and economic dislocation visible elsewhere in Italy, and printing benefited, as did other aspects of Venetian life, from the skills and enterprise of a new wave of immigrant craftsmen.⁶² One of the effects of this development was to begin the process that was to make the city, within a decade, the major centre for the production of music both old and new. It was only then that much of the music composed in the crisis years at the end of the 1520s finally reached print. Among them is a group of pieces which offer a commentary on the dramatic events that took place in Florence during the years of the Last Republic.

Pride of place in this small but significant corpus must be given to a number of compositions by Philippe Verdelot. Such evidence as there is places Verdelot in pro-Republican circles in Florence, and this is supported by the texts of a number of his motets which point to sympathies of that kind. In his dialogue *I Marmi*, Antonfrancesco Doni places the composer in the Rucellai gardens (better known as the Orti Oricellari) as one of the speakers, together with La Zinzera (a Florentine singer), and Plebei (a personification of the Florentine man-in-the-street). Early in their conversation, La Zinzera remarks that, a few evenings previously, she had sung in the Rucellai gardens, 'where, among those learned men, there arose a great discussion about Petrarch'.⁶³ The gardens, which lay to the north-west of

⁶² An overview given in Brown, *The Venetian Printing Press*, pp. 96–108.

⁶³ A. Doni, *I Marmi* (Venice, 1552), p. 37.

the Dominican monastery of Santa Maria Novella, and were later described by the Florentine historian Jacopo Nardi as ‘a general meeting-place and a refuge for people with intellectual interests, whether foreigners or Florentines’,⁶⁴ were closed in 1522 following the discovery of a conspiracy to assassinate Giulio de’ Medici which had apparently originated there. They were re-opened only after Machiavelli’s death and the expulsion of the Medici.⁶⁵ Doni’s dialogue implies that Verdelot was a visitor to the gardens, and whether or not this is true, there is no doubt that he knew Machiavelli, a prominent anti-Medicen.

Among the composer’s madrigals are four *canzoni* written as *intermedi* for two of Machiavelli’s plays, *La Clizia* and *La Mandragola*, the first of which is known to have been given in the mid-1520s with music performed by Barbara Salutati, Machiavelli’s mistress from 1523 until his death in 1527. A well-known actress, famed for her beauty, she is shown in a portrait painted by Domenico Puligo, which was seen by Giorgio Vasari who described it in the second edition of his *Lives of the Artists*. This shows her holding a music book, open to reveal both a motet (on the text ‘Quam pulcra es’ from the *Song of Songs*) and a French chanson (‘J’ayme bien mon amy’), and two other books, one closed, the other open to reveal the last four lines of sonnet 213 from Petrarch’s *Canzoniere*.⁶⁶ In this way Puligo’s painting commemorates both her relationship to Machiavelli and her musical interests.⁶⁷ Barbara was also the recipient of Machiavelli’s text ‘Amor, io sento l’alma’, written at her request, and also set to music by Verdelot.⁶⁸

All this places the composer in a very specific intellectual and social context, and a similar atmosphere surrounds the most elaborate of all early madrigal manuscripts, the Newberry-Oscott part-books. Copied in Florence and illuminated in the shop of Giovanni Boccardi, this is a major source of Verdelot’s music, known to have

⁶⁴ J. Nardi, *Le storie della città di Firenze sino all’anno 1531* (Florence, 1584), p. 283.

⁶⁵ R. Ridolfi, *The Life of Niccolò Machiavelli* (Chicago, 1963), pp. 202–4.

⁶⁶ H. C. Slim, ‘A motet for Machiavelli’s mistress and a chanson for a courtesan’, in S. Bertelli and G. Ramakus (eds.), *Essays presented to Myron P. Gilmore*, 2 vols. (Florence, 1978), II, pp. 457–72.

⁶⁷ For the most recent discussion of the painting (now at Firle Place, Sussex), see E. Capretti and S. Padovani *et al.*, *Domenico Puligo (1492–1527): un protagonista dimenticato della pittura fiorentina* (Livorno, 2002), pp. 122–3.

⁶⁸ Slim, *A Gift of Madrigals*, I, pp. 92 ff.

been prepared during the last Republic, possibly as a diplomatic gift for Henry VIII of England in an attempt to enlist his support for the Florentine cause during the final phase of the siege of the city.⁶⁹ In these last desperate weeks some hope was invested particularly in France but also in England, opposed to both the Empire and the Papacy over their attitudes to Henry's divorce. The Florentine bid for assistance had been promoted by the Earl of Wiltshire, father of Anne Boleyn, but in the end it came to nothing.⁷⁰

More than any other composer of the period, Verdelot seems to have reacted to the Italian situation in general during the years 1527–30, and to local circumstances in particular, with a number of compositions whose texts call for peace and for divine aid in war. Technically Florence had been at war with Charles V since 1526, first as a papal ally in the League of Cognac and then as an independent ally of France, England, Milan, Ferrara and Venice, but in practical terms war actually broke out at the beginning of 1528. It is these circumstances which are reflected in a number of motets by Verdelot whose earliest source is the Newberry-Oscott partbooks. There they appear together with other works whose texts develop similar themes. Unlike the other pieces considered above, the textual references in these motets are much less specific, being rather generalized appeals for divine aid in time of war. Thus Verdelot's six-voice 'Congregati sunt inimici nostri' is composed around a cantus firmus ('Da pacem, Domine, in diebus nostris') calling for peace, while the same composer's 'Deus, in nomine tuo salvum me fac' is built around a tenor ostinato which invokes divine aid to 'avert the harm of my enemies and by their truth disperse them.'⁷¹

A further work in the Newberry-Oscott partbooks, 'Recordare Domine', also by Verdelot, may have been composed during the plague of 1527–31 when a substantial percentage of the inhabitants of the city perished. In the first year of the epidemic the mortality rate stood at 110 per 1,000, and although in the following two years it dropped sharply, in 1530 it increased again to 52 per 1,000. It

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, and H. C. Slim, *Ten Altus Parts at Oscott College, Sutton Coldfield* (n.p., n.d. [1978]).

⁷⁰ See C. Roth, 'England and the last Florentine republic, 1527–30', *English Historical Review*, 40 (1925), pp. 174–95; Roth, *The Last Florentine Republic*, p. 294.

⁷¹ For these and other pieces in the Newberry-Oscott partbooks expressing similar sentiments, see Slim, *A Gift of Madrigals*, I, pp. 73–6.

has been calculated that about 20–25 per cent of the girls enrolled in the Monte delle doti (Dowry Fund) died in this four-year period; since they were from affluent families the death rate for the population as a whole was probably even higher, suggesting that this was a serious epidemic.⁷² Between the siege and the plague, the size of the population was halved.⁷³ In addition, these traumas were accompanied by famine and, in the summer of 1527, when Florentines were dying at the rate of 500 a day, the price of wheat escalated to over three times its normal level.⁷⁴ The text of Verdelot's motet begs the Almighty to stay the hand of his destroying angel in conformity with His Holy Covenant: 'Recordare Domine testamenti tui sancti et dic angelo percutuenti cesset jam manus tua ut non desoletur terra et ne perdat omnes anima viva.'⁷⁵

In one last example, again by Verdelot, the motet 'Laetamini in domino', the textual references are sufficiently precise to tie them to specific events. Here the two inner voices sing the Savonarolan melody 'Ecce quam bonum' as a canon while the four outer voices sing the text from Psalm 31: 'Laetamini in domino et exultate iusti, / et gloriamini omnes recti corde. / Alleluia.' [Be glad in the Lord, and rejoice, ye just, and glory, all ye right of heart. / Alleluia.] This motet, which occurs uniquely in the Vallicelliana partbooks, can be firmly anchored through its deployment of the 'Ecce quam bonum' melody to the last Republic, when Savonarola was rehabilitated and his reputation as prophet revived.⁷⁶ Although Verdelot's setting does not necessarily indicate a personal interest in Savonarola on the part of the composer (it may, for example, have been written for a Piagnone patron), its republican resonances tie in with what can be deduced of the composer's republican leanings. In this context the music of Costanzo Festa reappears. Among the motets in the Vallicelliana partbooks is one whose text, in Lowinsky's words, 'begins

⁷² A. S. Morison, J. Kirschner, and A. Molho, 'Epidemics in Renaissance Florence', *American Journal of Public Health*, 75 (1985), pp. 528–35.

⁷³ Roth, *The Last Florentine Republic*, p. 320.

⁷⁴ J. Henderson, 'Epidemics in Renaissance Florence: medical theory and government response', *Maladie et société (XII^e–XVIII^e siècles). Actes du colloque de Bielefeld* (Paris, 1989), pp. 165–86.

⁷⁵ Slim, *A Gift of Madrigals*, I, pp. 74–5.

⁷⁶ Roth, *The Last Florentine Republic*, p. 45. For the latest discussion of Verdelot's motet see P. Macey, *Bonfire Songs. Savonarola's Musical Legacy* (Oxford, 1998), pp. 176–83.

like one of those dark and fervent sermons that Savonarola preached over Florence': 'Florentia tempus est penitentiae. Non vides ceca [sic] non audis surda quod ingrata iudicaris quod insana videris.' [Florence, it is time to repent. Thou seest not in thy blindness nor dost thou hear in thy deafness that thou art adjudged ungrateful, that thou seemst insane.] A later reference in the text to Pope Clement ('ad sanctissimos pedes plora peccata tua Clamans Clemens peccavi miserere mei Revertere igitur et noli amplius peccare'),⁷⁷ together the words 'Florentia convertere ad Dominum Deum tuum' sung as an *ostinato*, make it clear that this piece too was written during the last Republic.⁷⁸

Philippe Verdelot was not the only composer to write music to texts that reflect the troubled condition of Italy in these years, but his contribution to what is effectively a comparatively new musico-literary sub-genre is important. Earlier composers had certainly set texts in praise of individuals or specific events,⁷⁹ but the pieces composed by Verdelot and his contemporaries as commentaries on social and political conditions represent something of a new functional role for polyphonic music, though one anticipated by Guillaume Dufay's lament for the Fall of Constantinople, 'O tres piteulx / Omnes amici eius', itself unusual for its time.

⁷⁷ 'bemoaning your sins at his holy feet, crying 'Clement, have mercy upon me, I have sinned. Turn back, therefore, and sin no more'.

⁷⁸ Lowinsky, 'A Sixteenth-Century Manuscript', pp. 437–8; for an edition of the motet see Seay (ed.), *Costanzo Festa Opera Omnia V* (n.p., 1979), no. 51.

⁷⁹ See, for example, the well known repertory of early fifteenth-century Venetian ceremonial motets most recently discussed in J. E. Cumming, 'Music for the Doge in Early Renaissance Venice', *Speculum* 67 (1992), pp. 324–64.

ITALIAN UNIVERSITIES AND THE WARS OF ITALY

Jonathan Davies

The threat to security posed by universities was recognised in the Renaissance. When leading members of the Medici regime discussed the pros and cons of transferring the University of Florence to Pisa in 1460, security was on their minds. According to Manno Temperani:

. . . men of every kind would enter [Pisa] to receive tuition, some of whom [would be] enemies of [Florence]. Having been brought there by a reward, they [would be] able with those Pisans responsive to their stimulus to make the city like an enemy. Having obtained the opportunity under the pretext of study they [would be] able to prolong [their] stay within the town.¹

Other speakers, however, were more sanguine about the possible security risk. Francesco Neroni argued that

although the town of Padua might not be as suspicious to the Venetians as Pisa is to us, nevertheless the Venetians have always maintained the [university] in that town without danger. Similarly also the duke of Milan in the case of the town of Pavia.²

Otto Niccolini was dismissive about the possible dangers of moving the university to Pisa:

In my opinion there is no danger that the students will betray the city to its enemies since young men are devoted to nothing except their studies, and in this kind of person these vices are not normally found. Besides there are people from various nations who disagree with each other and are not all of the same opinion and desire. Therefore one can easily see that men with such conflicting ways of life and wishes will never agree on the same course of action. There is nothing that masters desire more than to have as their subjects people who are divided . . . Experience shows that those who have learned the liberal arts [in any city] always regard it as if it were their fatherland which

¹ Gene Brucker, 'A Civic Debate on Florentine Higher Education (1460)', *Renaissance Quarterly*, 34 (1981), p. 528. All translations are mine.

² Brucker, 'Civic Debate', p. 530.

has made them better men. I for instance love those cities in which I completed my studies . . . Therefore we shall have in the town of Pisa not suspect but the most friendly men. Those who have emerged with outstanding learning will support our city throughout the world and they will provide [Florence] with a grateful goodwill. Moreover there are well-secured Pisan strongholds and new ones are also to be constructed. If they are defended well, they will remove all suspicion and all advantage to those who harbour bad feeling towards the republic.³

These men spoke in 1460, a generation before the outbreak of the Italian Wars. Which of them was proved right?

According to a recent study of Italian universities in the Renaissance, ‘although the foreign invaders defeated Italy’s armies, they respected its universities’.⁴ But was the impact of the wars so benign, or did the universities suffer? This essay will try to answer those questions.

In 1494 ten universities were active on the Italian peninsula: Bologna; Ferrara; Florence-Pisa; Naples; Padua; Pavia; Perugia; Rome; Siena; and Turin. Surveying these universities during the Italian Wars, one is struck by the variety of their experience. Contrary to what one might expect, one university went from strength to strength, while others were devastated. The rest saw periods of expansion and contraction. But the most lasting impression is of the universities’ resilience. Once the wars were over, almost all of them prospered again.

Despite the wars, Bologna, the oldest and largest of the Italian universities, steadily strengthened its position. Leading members of the ruling family, the Bentivoglio, had served regularly as communal governors of the university, *reformatori dello studio*, between 1384 and 1506. Although the Bentivoglio were ousted in 1506, the commune continued to govern and to pay for the university. Subject to the approval of the Senate and the papal legate, the *reformatori dello studio* chose the professors and allocated salaries. Since 1433 the university had been financed by a tax (*grossa gabella*) on all saleable goods coming into the city. In 1470/71 the tax had raised 14,535 Bolognese lire but by 1509/10 it was bringing the university 25,000 Bolognese lire and this rose still further to about 30,000 Bolognese

³ Brucker, ‘Civic Debate’, pp. 532–3.

⁴ Paul F. Grendler, *The Universities of the Italian Renaissance* (Baltimore, 2002), p. 129.

lire in 1526/27. Increased funding permitted an expansion of the teaching staff. There were 72 professors in 1470/71; by the 1520s there were a hundred. Without matriculation records it is difficult to estimate the size of the student body; moreover, the number of students could vary from year to year. Since Bologna had more professors than any other Italian university, however, it is likely that it also had more students. It has been estimated that it may have had average annual enrolments of about 1,500 between 1450 and 1499. These may have risen to between 1,500 and 2,000 from 1500 to 1550. The reason for the University of Bologna's success is clear: the commune recognized its key importance to the city and consistently funded it better than any of its rivals.⁵

The losers among the universities during the wars were Pavia, Padua, Ferrara, and Perugia. Pavia may have suffered the most. The university of the duchy of Milan, it had been one of the largest Italian universities for most of the fifteenth century, with up to 84 professors and 700 students, many of whom came from beyond the Alps. But the wars of the early sixteenth century devastated the city and the university. Lombardy was a major focus of military activity and Pavia was sacked several times. Together with plague, war reduced the population to 5,000 by 1536. They also closed the university from 1512 to 1516, from an unknown date to 1522, and from 1524 to 1531 or 1532. It was not until the 1540s that Pavia began to recover. Although the duchy of Milan now belonged to the Empire, the university remained under local control, subject to the Milanese Senate. By the 1550s it was appointing 30 to 35 professors. As a consequence of the wars and the change in political control, however, Pavia lost its traditional attraction for French students, who now preferred to study at Padua.⁶

⁵ Grendler, *Universities*, pp. 12–19; Guido Zaccagnini, *Storia dello Studio di Bologna durante il Rinascimento* (Geneva, 1930). For the Bentivoglio's service as *reformatori dello studio*, see *L'Archivio dei Riformatori dello Studio: Inventario*, ed. Claudia Salterini (Bologna, 1997), pp. 230–9.

⁶ Grendler, *Universities*, pp. 84–91; Pietro Vaccari, *Storia dell'Università di Pavia*, rev. ed. (Pavia, 1957); Agostino Sottili, 'Università e cultura a Pavia in età visconteo-forzesca', in *Storia di Pavia*, vol. 3, part 2 (Milan, 1990), pp. 359–451; Agostino Sottili, 'L'Università di Pavia nella politica culturale sforzesca', in *Gli Sforza a Milano e in Lombardia e i loro rapporti con gli Stati italiani ed europei (1450–1535)* (Milan, 1982), pp. 519–80; Maria Carla Zorzoli, 'Interventi dei Duchi e del Senato di Milano per l'Università di Pavia (secoli XV–XVI)', in *Università e società nei secoli XII–XVI* (Pistoia,

Padua itself was badly affected by the wars during the first decades of the sixteenth century. Prior to 1509 it was second only to Bologna in terms of size and prestige; Padua probably had about 60 professors and between 900 and 1,000 students. It was decimated following the Venetian defeat at Agnadello on 14 May 1509. Although the rebellion of the local elite lasted only until Venetian troops recaptured the city in mid-July, outstanding professors such as Pietro Pompanazzi and Carlo Ruini left Padua for Bologna. The Venetians believed that several professors had joined the revolt; Bertuccio Bagarotti, who taught canon law, was hanged as a rebel. The university's activities were reduced to a minimum whilst the *terrafirma* was reconquered. Finally, in September 1517 the Venetian Senate approved the appointments of nineteen professors and during the next decade the university was rebuilt to its pre-war position. From 1525 to 1560 its annual income was between 8,000 and 10,000 florins and this was spent on an average of about sixty professors.⁷

Together with famine and plague, war contributed to the sufferings of another northern university, Ferrara. Forty-nine professors had taught there in 1473/74 and during the late fifteenth century there may have been as many as 500 students a year, including Aldus Manutius, Rudolf Agricola, and Girolamo Savonarola. By 1492 the university was absorbing about 44 per cent of the communal bud-

1982), pp. 553–73; Maria Carla Zorzoli, *Università, dottori, giureconsulti: L'organizzazione della 'facoltà legale' di Pavia in età spagnola* (Padua, 1986); Simona Negruzzo, *Theologiam discere et docere. La facoltà teologica di Pavia nel XVI secolo* (Bologna and Milan, 1995). For French students shifting their allegiance from Pavia to Padua, see Nicole Bingen, 'Studenti francofoni nelle università italiane del Rinascimento', *Annali di Storia delle Università italiane* 8 (2004) [Available online at www.cisui.unibo.it/annali/08/testi/15Bingen_frameset.htm; accessed 14 April 2005]. Whilst the situation for Pavia and Padua is clear, Bingen's research is work in progress and her preliminary findings for the rest of Italy should be treated with caution, as she herself advises.

⁷ Grendler, *Universities*, pp. 29–33; Jacopo Facciolati, *Fasti Gymnasii Patavini*, 3 vols (Padua, 1757; rept. Bologna, 1978); Lucia Rossetti, *L'Università di Padova. Profilo storico* (Milan, 1972; rept. Trieste, 1983); François Dupuigrenet Desroussilles, 'L'Università di Padova dal 1405 al Concilio di Trento', in *Cultura veneta*, vol. 3, part 2, (1980), pp. 604–47; Tiziana Pesenti, *Professori e promotori di medicina nello Studio di Padova dal 1405 al 1509: Repertorio bio-bibliografico* (Padua and Trieste, 1984); Annalisa Belloni, *Professori giuristi a Padova nel secolo XV: Profili bio-bibliografici e cattedre* (Frankfurt am Main, 1986); Antonio Favaro, 'Lo Studio di Padova nei Diarii di Marino Sanudo', *Nuovo archivio veneto*, 3rd ser., 36 (1918), pp. 65–128; Francesco Piovan, 'Lauree edite e inedite in un diario padovano della prima metà del Cinquecento', *Quaderni per la storia dell'Università di Padova* 30 (1997), pp. 95–109.

get (11,000 out of about 25,000 lire marchesini). It was closed by famine from 1505 to 1506, by the costs of war between 1511 and 1513, and by plague from 1523 to 1529. The university was formally reopened by Duke Alfonso I in November 1529 and it slowly recovered. From the 1540s, 45 to 50 professors were being appointed at a cost of between 10,000 and 14,000 lire marchesini.⁸

The other university which declined during the wars was Perugia. In this case, decline had begun before the outbreak of war and cannot be attributed to military activity. The University of Perugia simply could not compete with the other universities in the papal states, Bologna and Rome. In the later fifteenth century there were repeated attempts to increase the funding of the University of Perugia beyond 2,500 florins, but the university's income was still 2,550 florins in the mid-sixteenth century. Whilst income remained steady, the size of the faculty fell from about 35 in the 1440s to about 28 in the sixteenth century. The number of students likewise dropped from around 400 in the fifteenth century to between 200 and 300 in the sixteenth century.⁹

For other universities, including Naples, Rome, Florence-Pisa and Siena, the period of the Italian Wars brought phases of expansion and of contraction. Fluctuating fortunes were not new to the University of Naples; in the fifteenth century it was shut as often as it was open. It closed again, probably in 1496, following Charles VIII's invasion of the kingdom. After Naples came under the rule of Ferdinand of Aragon, the university reopened in 1507. Its government was unchanged by Spanish rule: it continued to be subject to a state-appointed official, now called the major chaplain. Although war and plague interrupted teaching from 1527 to 1529, in 1531,

⁸ Grendler, *Universities*, pp. 100–05; Angelo Solerti, 'Documenti riguardanti lo Studio di Ferrara dei secoli XV e XVI conservatio nell'Archivio Estense', *Atti della deputazione ferrarese di storia patria* 4 (1892), pp. 5–51; Giuseppe Pardi, *Lo Studio di Ferrara nei secoli XV e XVI* (Ferrara, 1903; rept. Bologna, 1972); Alessandro Visconti, *La storia dell'Università di Ferrara (1391–1950)* (Bologna, 1950); Adriano Franceschini, *Nuovi documenti relativi ai docenti dello Studio di Ferrara nel secolo XVI* (Ferrara, 1970); *I maestri di medicina ed arti all'Università di Ferrara 1391–1950*, ed. Francesco Raspadori (Florence, 1991); Bernardino Zambotti, 'Diario ferrarese dall'anno 1476 sino al 1504', ed. Giuseppe Pardi, *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*, rev ed., vol. 24, part 7 (Bologna, 1937).

⁹ Grendler, *Universities*, pp. 66–69; Giuseppe Ermini, *Storia dell'Università di Perugia*, rev. ed. (Florence, 1971).

and probably in 1547, the Spanish brought a new stability to the university. Yet this stability may have come at a cost. The expenditure on professors did rise from 560 ducats in 1507 to an average of 1,000 ducats in the 1530s but this was still much less than the average of 1,900 ducats in the late fifteenth century. The average of thirteen to nineteen professors in the sixteenth century also represented a decline from the average of eighteen to 26 in the late fifteenth century. Despite the fall in income and faculty, however, the number of students rose from about 300 in the late fifteenth century to about 400 in the first half of the sixteenth.¹⁰

The University of Rome reached both its peak and its nadir during the wars of Italy. In the mid-1490s it had between 42 and 49 professors; by 1514/15 it had eighty-seven and there was one post vacant. Expenditure rose accordingly. The faculty of 1514/15 cost almost 16,000 florins, an increase of 200 to 400 per cent from the 1470s and 1480s. Yet, although Leo X and Clement VII spent heavily on the university, it is unlikely that the number of students in Rome reflected the size of the faculty. Furthermore, the golden age was shortlived—it ended with the Sack of Rome. The university was closed from 1527 to 1535 and its income was used to repair Rome's walls. When it was reopened by Paul III the university was a more modest institution. Its faculty rose from eighteen professors in 1535 to 24 in 1539 and 21 in 1542.¹¹

Of all the universities during the Italian Wars, the experience of the University of Florence-Pisa was the most complex and perhaps the most interesting. This is only fitting since its professors included Francesco Guicciardini, the greatest historian of the wars.¹² The uni-

¹⁰ Grendler, *Universities*, pp. 43–44; Ercole Cannavale, *Lo Studio di Napoli nel Rinascimento (2700 documenti inediti)* (Naples, 1895; rept. Bologna, 1980); Riccardo Filangieri di Candida, 'L'età aragonese', in *Storia dell'Università di Napoli* (Naples, 1924), pp. 151–99; Nino Cortese, 'L'età spagnola', in *Storia dell'Università di Napoli* (Naples, 1924), pp. 201–431; Carlo De Frede, *I lettori di umanità nello Studio di Napoli durante il Rinascimento* (Naples, 1960); Nino Cortese, *Cultura e politica a Napoli dal Cinque al Settecento* (Naples, 1965).

¹¹ Grendler, *Universities*, pp. 58–61; Filippo Maria Renazzi, *Storia dell'Università di Roma*, 4 vols (Rome, 1803–06; rept. Bologna, 1971); Maria Cristina Dorati da Empoli, 'I lettori dello Studio e i maestri di grammatica a Roma da Sisto IV ad Alessandro VI', *Rassegna degli Archivi di Stato* 40 (1980), pp. 98–147; *I maestri della Sapienza di Roma dal 1514 al 1787: I rotoli e altre fonti*, ed. Emanuele Conte, 2 vols (Rome, 1991).

¹² Francesco Guicciardini, *Scritti autobiografici e rari*, ed. Roberto Palmarocchi

versity had been reorganised in 1473, with most of the teaching conducted in Pisa and only the humanist chairs remaining in Florence. When the Medici fled Florence in November 1494, Pisa rebelled against Florentine rule. The university was moved to Prato in 1495, but when plague arrived in 1497 it was relocated to Florence, where it remained until 1503. It then closed following the expiry of the papal privilege allowing a tax on clerical benefices to be used to pay for the university. It reopened in Florence in 1505, only to close again in 1506 or 1507. Although Pisa was reconquered in 1509, the university remained closed until 1515 when it was reopened, in Pisa, by the restored Medici. Leo X renewed the papal privilege and the university received an annual income of 3,000 ducats. The number of professors rose from 32 in 1515/16 to 42 in 1525/26. Closed by plague in 1526, the university remained shut until 1543. It was then reopened with the strong personal support of Duke Cosimo I and it embarked on its period of greatest prosperity. By 1567 the annual expenditure was about 7,200 florins. Local politics had as much effect on the University of Pisa-Florence as the wars did. From the 1430s the university was one of the main channels of Medicean cultural patronage. It is not surprising, therefore, that it was supported more strongly by the Medici governments of 1473–94, 1512–27, and 1530 onwards than by the republican regimes of 1494–1512 and 1527–30. Finally, looking back to the 1460 debate on the possible security threat posed by students in Pisa, the optimists were proved right. Although the Medici supported the emperor against the French, they guaranteed safe passage to French students wishing to go to Pisa after 1543.¹³

(Bari, 1936), p. 56; Francesco Guicciardini, *Selected Writings*, ed. Cecil Grayson, trans. Margaret Grayson (London, 1965), pp. 132–33; Grendler, *Universities*, pp. 149–50.

¹³ Grendler, *Universities*, pp. 72–75, 81; Jonathan Davies, *Florence and its University during the Early Renaissance* (Leiden, 1998); Armando F. Verde, O.P., *Lo Studio fiorentino, 1473–1503*, 5 vols to date (Florence and Pistoia, 1973–); Armando F. Verde, O.P., ‘Aspetti della storia dello Studio fiorentino tra ’400 e ’500’, *Anazetesis* 2–3 (1980), 62–87; Armando F. Verde, O.P., ‘Vita universitaria nello Studio della Repubblica fiorentina alla fine del Quattrocento’, in *Università e società nei secoli XII–XVI* (Pistoia, 1982), pp. 495–522; Robert Black, ‘Higher Education in Florentine Tuscany: New Documents from the Second Half of the Fifteenth Century’, in Peter Denley and Caroline Elam, eds, *Florence and Italy: Renaissance Studies in Honour of Nicolai Rubinstein* (London, 1988), pp. 209–22; Osvaldo Cavallar, ‘Francesco Guicciardini and the “Pisan Crisis”: Logic and Discourses’, *Journal of Modern History* 65 (1993), pp. 245–85; Armando F. Verde, O.P., ‘Dottorati a Firenze e a Pisa, 1505–1528’, in *Xenia medi*

The University of Siena continued to operate during the sixteenth century. This was a significant achievement, given the wars and the changes of government which Siena had to endure. The university even functioned during the war and siege of 1553 to 1555 which led to Siena's ultimate loss of independence. There was a decline in the size of the faculty from 52 professors earning a total of 4,625 florins in 1500/01 to an average of 39 professors earning between 3,400 to 4,000 florins from 1531 to 1543. If one looks at the number of doctorates awarded, however, it appears that the university experienced a recovery towards the mid-sixteenth century. An annual average of 26 doctorates were awarded between 1540 and 1549, rising to 33 a year between 1550 and 1552. As with Bologna, the determination of Siena to maintain its university may be attributed to the university's importance to the city.¹⁴

The remaining university, Turin, cannot be classified for most of the period of the Italian Wars. The dearth of records from the early sixteenth century makes it impossible to determine exactly when the university was open and when it was closed. We do know that it suffered during the French occupation from 1536 to 1562: teaching was suspended from 1536 to 1538, 1546 to 1556, and 1558 to 1560.¹⁵

Aevi historiam illustrantia oblata Thomae Kaeppli, O.P. (Rome, 1978), pp. 607–785; Peter Godman, *From Poliziano to Machiavelli: Florentine Humanism in the High Renaissance* (Princeton, NJ, 1998); Giovanni Cascio Pratilli, *L'Università e il Principe. Gli Studi di Siena e di Pisa tra Rinascimento e Controriforma* (Florence, 1975); Jonathan Davies, *Culture and Power: Tuscany and its Universities, 1540–1609* (forthcoming); Rodolfo Del Gratta, ed., *Libri matricularum Studii Pisani 1543–1609* (Pisa, 1983); Rodolfo Del Gratta ed., *Acta Graduum Academiae Pisanae, I (1543–1599)* (Pisa, 1980).

¹⁴ Grendler, *Universities*, pp. 47–52; Giovanni Minnucci and Leo Košuta, eds, *Lo Studio di Siena nei secoli XIV–XVI: documenti e notizie biografiche* (Milan, 1989); Peter Denley, 'Dal 1357 alla caduta della Repubblica', in *L'Università di Siena. 750 anni di storia* (Siena, 1991), pp. 27–44; Cascio Pratilli, *L'Università e il Principe*; Davies, *Culture and Power*; Giovanni Minnucci, *Le lauree dello Studio senese alla fine del secolo XV* (Milan, 1981); Giovanni Minnucci, *Le lauree dello Studio senese all'inizio del secolo XVI (1501–1506)* (Milan, 1984); Giovanni Minnucci, *Le lauree dello Studio senese all'inizio del secolo XVI, II (1507–1514)* (Milan, 1985); Giovanni Minnucci and Paola Giovanna Morelli, eds, *Le lauree dello Studio senese nel XVI secolo. Registri degli atti dal 1516 al 1573* (Florence, 1992). Despite the war, university governors (*savi dello studio*) were appointed from 1553 to 1555, see Archivio di Stato di Siena [hereafter ASS], Consiglio Generale 246, fols. 199v, 243v–244r, 279v–280r. Professors were paid for the academic year 1556/57, see ASS, Balìa 1037, fols. 70v, 109v–110r. I am grateful to Dr Fabrizio Nevola for the last reference.

¹⁵ Grendler, *Universities*, pp. 95–96; Tommaso Vallauri, *Storia delle Università degli Studi del Piemonte*, 2 vols (Turin, 1845–46; rept. Bologna, 1970); Ernesto Bellone, *Il primo secolo di vita della Università di Torino (sec. XV–XVI). Ricerche ed ipotesi sulla cultura*

Totalling up the balance sheet, what conclusions can we draw? Above all, there was the importance of geography. The universities of northern Italy were the losers, while the universities of central and southern Italy had a mixed experience, with gains as well as losses. Bologna was a clear winner. This picture is unsurprising, given the location of military activity with its focus in the north.¹⁶ War's companions, famine and plague, also played important parts in the travails of the universities. Apart from their immediate impact, the Italian Wars had long-term consequences for universities, as the political control of the Italian states altered. This can be seen most clearly in the case of Pavia, which lost its French students to Padua once the Empire gained control of the duchy of Milan. Nor should the influence of local factors, such as those which shaped the universities of Perugia and Florence-Pisa, be overlooked.

Rather than any cause particular to them as universities, it was these wider issues which decided their destinies. Contrary to the fears expressed in the debate in Florence in 1460, the universities did not pose a threat to the internal security of the Italian states. Students from enemy powers continued to be welcomed. Whilst it is not possible to give an all-embracing explanation of the influence of the Italian Wars on the fortunes of the universities, it is clear that their experience in the wars was more complex than previously thought.

nel Piemonte quattrocentesco (Turin, 1986); Paul F. Grendler, 'How to Get a Degree in Fifteen Days: Erasmus' Doctorate of Theology from the University of Turin', *Erasmus of Rotterdam Society Yearbook* 18 (1998), pp. 40–69; Mario Chiaudano, 'La restaurazione della Università di Torino per opera di Emanuele Filiberto', in *L'Università di Torino nei sec. XVI–XVII* (Turin, 1972), pp. 51–67; Annamaria Catarinella and Irene Salsotto, 'L'università e i collegi', in *Storia di Torino, vol. 3, Dalla dominazione francese alla ricomposizione dello Stato (1536–1630)*, ed. Giuseppe Ricuperati (Turin, 1998), pp. 523–67.

¹⁶ For the wars, see Michael Mallett, *The Italian Wars, 1494–1559: War, State and Society in Early Modern Europe* (forthcoming).

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