Edward M. Anson



PHILIP II
THE FATHER OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT

Themes and Issues

BLOOMSBURY

Philip II, the Father of Alexander the Great

Also available from Bloomsbury

Alexander the Great by Edward M. Anson
Alexander the Great in the Early Christian Tradition: Classical Reception and Patristic Literature by Christian Thrue Djurslev

Philip II, the Father of Alexander the Great

Themes and Issues

Edward M. Anson

BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC
LONDON • NEW YORK • OXFORD • NEW DELHI • SYDNEY

BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC
Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK
1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA

BLOOMSBURY, BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc

First published in Great Britain 2020

Cover image: Head of King Philip II of Macedonia, Roman copy in marble from the 1st century from a Greek original. Chiaramonti Museum. Photo by DeAgostini/Getty Images.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Anson, Edward M., author.
Title: Philip II, The Father of Alexander the Great : Themes and Issues / Edward M. Anson.
Description: London ; New York : Bloomsbury Academic, 2021. | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Summary: "Philip II was not only the father of Alexander the Great, but in many respects was also the father of his son's incredible career. It was the father who unified Macedonia into the first European nation and who created the army with which his son conquered the Persian Empire and inaugurated the Hellenistic Age. This volume is not the standard biography, but rather an examination of the major controversies concerning his life and reign. How did Philip in roughly twenty years transform a divided territory and little more than a geographical conception into a national state? How did he change the very nature of ancient Western warfare? How did he transform this formerly exploited region into the master of the Greek world? Each chapter discusses one of the major academic controversies surrounding this transformative figure, bringing new clarity to the career of a man whose reputation has been so overshadowed by his illustrious son."– Provided by publisher.
Identifiers: LCCN 2020022272 (print) | LCCN 2020022273 (ebook) | ISBN 9781350103948 (paperback) | ISBN 9781350103931 (hardback) | ISBN 9781350103955 (epub) | ISBN 9781350103962 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Philip II, King of Macedonia, 382 B.C–336 B.C. | Philip II, King of Macedonia, 382 B.C–336 B.C.–Influence. | Greece–Kings and rulers–Biography. | Generals–Greece–Biography. | Greece–History–Macedonian Expansion, 359-323 B.C. | Macedonia–Kings and rulers–Biography. | Macedonia–History–To 168 B.C. | Macedonia–History, Military.
Classification: LCC DF233.8.P59 A67 2021 print) | LCC DF233.8.P59 (ebook) |
DDC 938/.07092 [B]–dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020022272
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020022273

ISBN: HB: 978-1-3501-0393-1
PB: 978-1-3501-0394-8
ePDF: 978-1-3501-0396-2
eBook: 978-1-3501-0395-5

Typeset by RefineCatch Limited, Bungay, Suffolk

To find out more about our authors and books visit www.bloomsbury.com and sign up for our Newsletters.

For Jeanne

Contents

Preface

On 8 November 1977, Manolis Andronikos of the University of Thessaloniki discovered at the village of Vergina, long claimed by Nicholas Hammond to be the site of the ancient capital of Aegae and the tombs of the Macedonian kings, an unlooted Macedonian tomb of a size and magnificence to suggest a royal tomb. The tomb was tentatively dated to the second half of the fourth century BC, and Andronikos proclaimed that this was indeed the final resting place of Philip II. The tomb brought forth an explosion of interest in ancient Macedonia, the discovery of many more tombs, and clear evidence of the Hellenized nature of fourth-century Macedonia. It has also created a whole new area of investigation: who is really in 'Philip's' tomb? Or, perhaps, simply which Philip? While the majority of scholars accept Andronikos' original identification, there is a sizable minority who have opted to identify the inhabitant as Philip III, Philip II's son. There is no inscriptional evidence that supports either candidate; there are simply no inscriptions found in the tomb. Forensics specialists have entered the controversy, but the result has only brought forward more questions. The inhabitant has one leg shorter than the other. Philip had a leg wound. The corpse's short leg may, however, turn out to correspond to his uninjured leg. There could be damage about an eye socket confirming the injury Philip received at the siege of Methone, but other experts say the damage was due to the corpse being burned. The controversy, whatever the ultimate conclusion, if there ever is one, of the tomb's true inhabitant has sparked wide interest among archaeologists, historians and the general public on the career of one of the most influential figures in history. This work is structured like my previous work on Alexander the Great, *Alexander the Great: Themes and Issues* (2013), and like that volume this book is not a standard biography but an examination of Philip's career through his creation of a Macedonian nation as a force that changed the world.

I would like to thank the staff at Bloomsbury for their diligence in editing and ferrying this project to completion. I especially want to thank Ms Lily Mac Mahon and Mr Ronnie Hanna.

I wish to especially thank my wife Jeanne, to whom I dedicate this book, for so many things, but with respect to this particular volume for reading it a number of times, correcting its many grammatical and syntactic errors, but in particular for putting up with my writing regimen which she has described as a crazed man communicating with a demonic computer, both of which are encased in a protective wall of books.

Map of Ancient Greece.

Map of the Peloponnesus.

Map of Asia Minor.

Map of Ancient Macedonia.

Abbreviations

Ael.	Aelian, *Varia Historia*
Aesch.	Aeschylus, *Persians* (*Per.*), *Supplicant Women* (*Supp.*)
Aeschin.	Aeschines, 1 (*Against Timarchus*), 2 (*On the Embassy*), 3 (*Against Ctesiphon*)
Apollod.	Apollodorus, *Library* (*Bibl.*)
App.	Appian, *Illyrian War, (Ill.), Syrian Wars* (*Syr.*)
Ar.	Aristophanes, *Lysistrata* (*Lys.*)
Arist.	Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution* (*Ath. Pol.*), *Nicomachean Ethics* (*Nic. Eth.*), *Politics* (*Pol.*), *Rhetoric* (*Rhet.*)
Aristid.	Aristides, *Orations* (*Or.*)
Arr.	Arrian, *Anabasis of Alexander* (*Anab.*), *Ars Tactica*, *Indica* (*Ind.*), *Successors* (*Succ.*)
Athen.	Athenaeus, *The Banqueteers*
Athen. Mech.	Athenaeus Mechanicus. *On Machines*
BNJ	*Brill's New Jacoby*
Caes.	Caesar, *Civil War* (*BC*), *Gallic War* (*BG*)
Cic.	Cicero, *Letters to Friends* (*Ad fam.*)
Curt.	Curtius, *The History of Alexander the Great of Macedon*
D. H.	Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Letter to Ammaeum* (*Amm.*)
Dem.	Demosthenes, 1 (*First Olynthiac*), 2 (*Second Olynthiac*), 3 (*Third Olynthiac*), 4 (*First Philippic*), 5 (*On the Peace*), 6 (*Second Philippic*), 8 (*On the Chersonese*), 9 (*Third Philippic*), 10 (*Fourth Philippic*), 11 (*Reply to Philip*), 16 (*For the Megalopolitans*), 17 (*On the Accession of Alexander*), 18 (*On the Crown*), 19 (*On the False Embassy*), 20 (*Against Leptines*), 23 (*Against Aristocrates*)
[Dem.]	Hyperides, 7 (*On the Halonnesus*), *Philip of Macedonia*, 12 (Philip)
Didymus	*In Demosthenes*
Din.	Dinarchus, 1 (*Against Demosthenes*)
Diod.	Diodorus, *Library of History*
D. H.	Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *De Isaeo*

D. L.	Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*
Esther	*Book of Esther* (*Est.*)
Eur.	Euripedes, *Heraclids* (*Heracl.*)
Euseb.	Eusebius, *Chronica* (*Chron.*), *Praeparatio evangelica* (*Praep. Evang.*)
Ezra	*Book of Ezra* (*Ezra*)
FGrH	*Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker*
Frontin.	Frontinus, *Strategems* (*Str.*)
GHI	*Greek Historical Inscriptions 404–323* bc. Rhodes, P. J. and R. Osborne (eds.), Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2007
Hes.	Hesiod, *Theogony* (*Theog.*), *Works and Days* (*WD*)
Hdt.	Herodotus, *Histories*
Hom.	Homer, *Iliad* (*Il.*)
Hyp.	Hyperides, 5 (*Against Demosthenes*), 6 (*Funeral Oration*)
IG	*Inscriptiones Graecae*
Isoc.	Isocrates, 3 (*Niocles*), 4 (*Panegyricus*), 5 (*To Philip*), 6 (*Archidamus*), 12 (*Panathenaicus*), 15 (*Antidosis*): *L. (Letter)*
Just.	Justin, *Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus*
Lib.	Libanius, *Orations*
Liddell and Scott	*A Greek–English Lexicon. Ninth Edition with Revised Supplement*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996
Liv.	Livy, *From the Founding of the City*
Nep.	Nepos, *Life of Eumenes* (*Eum.*), *Life of Iphicrates* (*Iph.*)
Paus.	Pausanias, *Description of Greece*
Pind.	Pindar, *Isthmian Odes* (*Isth.*)
Pl.	Plato, *Alcibides* (*Alc.*), *Gorgias* (*Grg.*), *Ion*; *Laws* (*Leg.*), *Republic* (*Rep.*)
Pliny	*Natural History* (*NH*)
Plut.	Plutarch, *Life of Alexander* (*Alex.*), *Life of Antony* (*Ant.*), *Life of Brutus* (*Brut.*), *Life of Camillus* (*Cam.*), *Life of Demosthenes* (*Dem.*), *Life of Demetrius* (*Demetr.*), *Life of Eumenes* (*Eum.*), *Life of Lysander* (*Lys.*), *Life of Pelopidas* (*Pelop.*), *Life of Pericles* (*Per.*), *Life of Phocion* (*Phoc.*), *Life of Pyrrhus* (*Pyrrh.*), *Life of Solon* (*Sol.*), *Life of Themistocles* (*Them.*), *Life of Theseus* (*Thes.*), *Moralia* (*Mor.*)
Polyaen.	Polyaenus, *Stratagems*
Polyb.	Polybius, *Histories*

Scholia	Demosthenes: *Scholia Graeca ex codicibus aucta et emendata*. New York: Arno Press, 1983
SEG	*Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum*
StephByz	Stephanus of Byzantium, *Ethica*
Stobaeus	*Florilegium* (*Flor.*)
Str.	Strabo, *Geography*
Suda	*Suda online: Byzantine Lexicography* (https://www.cs.uky.edu/~raphael/sol/sol-html/citation.shtml)
Thuc.	Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*
Tzetz.	Joannis Tzetzes, *Ad Lycophron*
Val. Max.	Valerius Maximus, *Memorable Words and Deeds*
Vitr.	Vitruvius *De Architectura*
Xen.	Xenophon, *Anabasis* (*Anab.*), *Hellenica* (*Hell.*)
[Xen.]	*Athenian Constitution* (*Ath. Pol.*)

Philip II: A Chronology

Determining the chronology of Philip II's reign is based substantially on Diodorus' archon dating system and logical speculation. Some dates can be confirmed with inscriptional evidence and/or chronological references in the speeches of the Greek orators. Our other sources for Philip by and large do not note chronology. Additionally, the Parian Marble, an inscription found on the island of Paros, which is a chronological listing by Athenian archon years of events from the time of the kings of Athens down to 264/263, exists for most of this period only in fragments. While having some problems of its own, it would have been useful. For these years, the name of the archon when Philip became king is missing from the stone and most of the rest is too fragmented down to the noting of Philip's death (*Marm. Par.* B1). While Diodorus may be commended for attempting to establish a chronology of events, he based his system on a chronological framework of archon years, Rome's annual consuls, and Olympic years. The first difficulty is that archon years began around the middle of July, consuls took office in March during the period covered in Philip's career, and the Olympic Games began in August. Additionally, his sources used different dating systems which Diodorus with only some success fit into his own system. Diodorus (12.38.1–41.5) places the attack on Plataea in the archon year 431/430, the event which began the Peloponnesian War and which is precisely dated by Thucydides to March 431 (Thuc. 2.2.1; Gomme 1956: 2). Sphrodrias' attempt on Peiraeus and Phoebidas' death are placed by Diodorus in 377/376 (15.29.5–6, 33.6), while these events actually both occurred in 378 (Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.20–1, 45; Stylianou 1998: 46, 261).

The two critical dates for Philip are those for his accession to the throne and for the time of his death. These bracket the roughly twenty years of his reign. Diodorus (16.2.1) places the accession in 360/359. Militiades Hatzopoulos (1982: 21–42), basing his conclusion on an inscription (*The Royal Letter of Oleveni*), has argued that Perdiccas' disastrous battle against Bardylis and the Illyrians and Philip's accession occurred in October of year 360/359, but see Nicholas Hammond (1994: 196–7, n. 12) and Emiliano Arena (2003: 49–82), who convincingly argue that the King Philip noted in the inscription is in reality Philip V, not Philip II. It seems unlikely that Bardylis mounted the

invasion and fought the battle against Perdiccas in October of 360 (as argued by Hatzopoulos), when the weather was usually deteriorating. It is more reasonable to assume that Bardylis invaded in the spring or summer of 359. This victory was then followed by his securing control of much of Upper Macedonia (Diod. 16.4.4, 7). The Illyrians then encamped in Upper Macedonia and did not continue their invasion into Lower Macedonia, nor did they return to Illyria. See Chapter 2.

Further complicating the determination of the date of Philip's accession is Justin (7.5.9–10), who reports that prior to becoming king, Philip was regent 'for a long time' for his nephew, Amyntas Perdicca. This notice may have some apparent confirmation in an inscription from Lebadaea in Boeotia, part of which can be reconstructed as 'Amyntas, the son of Perdiccas, King of the Macedonians'. Moreover, a fragment of the late third- or early second-century BC philosopher and historian Satyrus (*BNJ* 429 F-21=Athen. 13.557b) claims that Philip II reigned for twenty-two years. Diodorus (16. 1.3, 2.1) and the Scholiast on Aeschines 3.51, however, state that Philip became king in the archonship of Callimedes in the first year of the 105th Olympiad (360/359) and reigned for twenty-four years (Diod. 16.1.3; 95.1). Neither mention any regency. Justin (9.8.1) further puts his own claim of a regency in doubt when he reports that Philip reigned for twenty-five years. Also, the context of Justin's mention of the regency follows that author's description of King Perdiccas III's death as the result of an assassination plot directed by his own mother Eurydice (7.5.6). This testimony is unsupported and is generally rejected. Our other sources are clear that Perdiccas died fighting the Illyrians. Philip was assassinated in 336 during the archonship of Pythodelos[1] (Diod. 16.91.1; cf. 17.2.1; Arr. *Anab.* 1.1), at forty-seven years of age (Just. 9.8.1). This leaves no time for a regency of any length and certainly not the 'long time' indicated by Justin or even the two years postulated by Satyrus. On the nature of Macedonian regencies, see Chapter 1 and Anson (2009A: 276–86). In addition, there is no reference to such a regency in either Demosthenes or Aeschines, where, especially in Demosthenes' case, this would appear a singular omission. Perdiccas was killed and Philip came to power *c.* May/June 359, in the Macedonian year 360/359 and just shortly before the end of that archon year, 360/359.

Philip was likely assassinated in the late summer or autumn of 336. This dating relies heavily on the chronology of his son Alexander. Arrian (*Anab*. 1.1) records that Alexander was 'about twenty' when Philip died, and Plutarch (*Alex.* 11.1) confirms this, stating that Alexander was in his twenty-first year at his father's death. Diodorus (16.91.1) places the death in the archon year 336/335.

Cuneiform evidence places Alexander's death on 11 June 323 at the age of thirty-two in his thirty-third year (Depuydt 1997: 117–35). Justin (12.16.1) reports that Alexander died at the age of thirty-three years and one month. The tablet is to be preferred. This date compares favourably with Plutarch's statement (*Alex.* 3.5) that Alexander was born in an Olympic year (356) on the sixth day of the Macedonian month of Lous, which begins at the first new moon of July and roughly corresponds with the Athenian month Hecatombaeon, perhaps on 20 July. While the dates of each new moon in each month for each year beginning in 605 BC to AD 308 have been calculated astronomically by Bickerman (1969: 110–42), these will not always be reflected in the actual calendars. Ancient Greek calendars were based during our time frame on phases of the moon and hence a lunar year did not correspond with a solar year and periodically and often haphazardly days needed to be inserted to adjust the year accordingly. Plutarch (*Alex.* 3 8) states that Philip received on the same day three announcements: the birth of this son, the victory of his horse at Olympia and news of Parmenion's victory over the Illyrians. An inscription (*GHI* 53 ll. 4–5) places an alliance of the Paeonians, Thracians, Illyrians and the Athenians on 24 July 356. Shortly thereafter came Parmenion's victory over the Illyrians. This would likely then have occurred in early August (Hamilton 1969: 8). Diodorus (16.22.3) reports the creation of this alliance and also its ineffectiveness due to Philip's quick reaction to its formation. With respect to the birth being tied to the Olympic Games, while it is not impossible for the Olympic Games to be held in July, it is more likely that they occurred in August, but the Olympic year given the context still must be 356. This synchronization of the three events is likely forced, but they do all apparently take place in the summer of 356, confirming Philip's death in the autumn of 336.

Chronology

383 or 382	Phanostratus? (Diod. 15.15.1)
	Birth of Philip
370/369	Dysnicetus was archon
	Death of Amyntas III
370–368	Alexander II, King of Macedonia
369 or 368	Philip a hostage in Illyria
367	Philip a hostage in Thebes
368–365	Ptolemy of Alorus, regent

365 or 364	Philip returns to Macedonia
368–359	Perdiccas III, King of Macedonia
360/359	Callimedes (Diod. 16.2.1)
	Late spring/early summer: Battle of Death of Perdiccas in battle against Bardylis and the Illyrians; accession of Philip
	Summer: Withdrawal of troops from Amphipolis; defeat of Argaeus; peace with Athens
359/358	Eucharistus (Diod. 16.4.1)
	Spring: Defeat of Paeonians; defeat of Illyrians; marriage with Audata; annexation of Upper Macedonia,
	Intervention in Larissa; marries Philenna
358/357	Cephisodotus (Diod. 16.6.1)
	Winter: Outbreak of Social War[2]
	Spring: Successful Athenian expedition in Euboea
357/356	Agathocles (Diod. 16. 9. 1)
	Summer: Alliance with Epirus; marriage to Olympias
	Winter: Capture of Amphipolis; Athenian declaration of war on Philip
	Spring: Capture of Pydna; alliance with Chalcidians; appeal from Crenides
	Summer: Founding of Philippi; Phocians seize Delphi
356/355	Elpines (Diod. 16.15.1)
	Birth of Alexander (20 July);[3] capture of Potidaea
	24 July: Alliance of Athens, Thracians, Paeonians and Illyrians[4]
	August?: Parmenio's victory over the Illyrians
	Spring: Third Sacred War
355/354	Callistratus (Diod. 16.23.1)
	Summer: End of Social War
	Autumn: Amphichtyony declares war on Phocis
	Winter/spring: Siege and destruction of Methone
	Summer: Agreement with Cersobleptes
354/353	Diotimus (Diod. 16.28.1)
	Autumn: Onomarchus takes over Phocian command
	Summer: Philip enters Thessaly; initially successful against Phocians and Pheraeans
353/352	Thudemus (Diod. 16.32.1)
	Late Summer: Onomarchus defeats Philip twice; Philip withdraws to Macedonia

	Autumn: Cersobleptes allies with Athens; Athens sends cleruchs to Chersonese; alliance of Athens and Olynthus
	Spring: Philip becomes Thessalian Archon; Crocus Field; Philip defeats Onomarchus; Philip captures Pherae and expels tyrants; marries Nicesipolis
352/351	Aristodemus (Diod. 16.37.1)
	Summer: Philip advances to Thermopylae, but pass blocked
	Autumn: Alliance with Byzantium and Perinthus against Cersobleptes
	Winter/early spring: *First Philippic*[5]
351/350	Theellus (Diod. 16.40.1)
	Summer: Philip ill; withdraws from Thrace; warning to Chalcidians
	Spring: Campaigns in Paeonia and Illyria
350/349	Apollodorus (Diod. 16.46.1)
	Spring: Tyrants return to Pherae
349/348	Callimachus (Diod. 16.52.1)
	Summer: Philip invades Chalcidice
	Autumn: Demosthenes delivers his three Olynthiacs; Athens and Olynthus alliance; expulsion of tyrants from Pherae
348/347	Theophilus (Diod. 16.53.1)
	Summer: Fall of Olynthus[6]
	Autumn: Macedonian Olympic Games in Dion
347/346	Themistocles (Diod. 16.56.1)
	Winter: Athenian invitation to Greek states to meet in Athens to discuss issues; Athenian embassy to Philip
	March: First Athenian embassy arrives in Pella
	17 April: Athenian Assembly votes for peace and alliance, but wishes to include others in a common peace[7]
	6 July: Second embassy returns to Athens[8]
	9 July: Peace and alliance (Peace of Philocrates) solely between Athens and Philip[9]
	16 July: Phocis surrenders[10]
346/345	Archias (Diod. 16.59.1)
	August: Meeting of Amphictyonic Council; Athens forced to support decisions
	Spring: Philip invades Illyria
	Late spring/early summer: Populations moved about Macedonia

345/344	Eubulus (Diod. 16.66.1)
	Spring: Pherae garrisoned; tetrarchic system established
344/343	Lyciscus (Diod. 16.69.1)
343/342	Pythodotus (Diod. 16.70.1)
	Late Summer: Philocrates flees Athens
	Winter: Alexander placed on Epirote throne
	Spring: Philip aids Cardia
342/341	Sosigenes (Diod. 16.72.1)
	Late summer/autumn: Philip forms an alliance with the Getae and marries Meda
341/340	Nicomachus (Diod. 16.74.1)
	Summer: Cersobleptes removed from throne
	Spring: Philip attacks Perinthus
340/339	Theophrastus (Diod. 16.77.1)
	Autumn: Philip besieges Byzantium; Philip captures Athenian grain fleet; Athens declares war on Philip
339/338	Lysimachides (Diod. 16.82.1)
	Autumn: Fourth Sacred War; Athenian–Theban alliance
338/337	Charondes (Diod. 16.84.1)
	30 August: Battle of Chaeronea[11]
	Autumn: Meeting in Corinth; Common Peace of Corinth
337/336	Phrynicus (Diod 16.89.1)
	Winter: Second meeting in Corinth; war declared on Persia
	Spring: Pixodarus affair; advance force to Asia
336/335	Pythodorus (Diod. 16.91.1)
	Autumn: Marriage of Cleopatra; Philip's assassination

Philip the Great:[1] An Introduction

In 359, the Kingdom of Macedonia stood in disarray. An invading force had defeated a Macedonian army and was encamped within the country; the Macedonian king, Perdiccas III, along with 4,000 of his soldiers, lay dead on the field of combat. The new king was the dead king's younger brother, Philip. These new circumstances were then added to the traditional problems of the Kingdom of Macedonia. The land itself was dominated by a powerful, land-holding aristocracy; the northern, eastern and western neighbours often interfered in the affairs of the Macedonian kingdom; and the coast was dominated by independent Greek cities or Athenian colonies. Macedonia had long been subject to frequent invasion and attack by both the tribal peoples to the west, north and east, and the forces of the city-states, primarily the Athenians, Spartans and Thebans, in the south. Despite all of these limitations, twenty-one years after Philip came to the throne Macedonia was the most powerful state in the Greek world and her king the most powerful individual of his time in the Western world. Philip had also transformed the Macedonian economy. This can be seen in the many gold and silver coins coming from Macedonian mints during his reign (Price 1974: 230–41). Regarding his two predecessors, his brothers Alexander II and Perdiccas III, the former coined only in bronze and the latter had only limited silver production.[2] At the heart of this dramatic change in fortunes was this new king, the monarch who had taken power under those most dire of circumstances, who came to be hailed by a subsequent Roman historian as 'the greatest king of his time' (Diod. 16.95.1), and it was claimed by a contemporary historian that to that time 'Europe had never born such a man' ([Theopompus] *BNJ* 115.T-19, F-27). At the time of his death, Philip had organized the Greek states into an alliance under his authority and was preparing for a full scale invasion of the Persian Empire to follow up an advance force already operating in western Anatolia. While his achievements were to the ancients and most moderns as well eclipsed by the subsequent conquests of his son, Alexander, long to be heralded as 'the Great', it was the accomplishments of the father that made possible all that

Alexander was later to achieve. One recent commentator even titled his biography of Philip, *Philip II of Macedonia, Greater than Alexander.*[3] Much of Philip's achievement was due to his revolutionary reforms of the Macedonian military. Philip created a heavy infantry where previously only light-armed foot soldiers had existed in the Macedonian forces. This national infantry force, when combined with the region's long-standing excellence in cavalry, enabled Philip most often to be victorious in battle where previously the lack of heavy infantry had doomed Macedonian armies to defeat. This newly created Macedonian force swept all before it first in Greece and then on Alexander's expedition of conquest which carried Macedonian arms even beyond the Indus River.

While the importance of Philip has been noted frequently in the scholarship of recent years, the extent of his accomplishments has not been recognized as fully as it deserves. Philip created the Macedonian nation, uniting this very fractured land that was little more than a geographically identified region called Macedonia with its polyglot population into a national state. The word Macedonian itself originally simply connoted 'highlander' (Anson 1985C). While various Greek writers from Hesiod to Herodotus to Thucydides had come to recognize a Macedonian ethnicity based on a common descent from a mythical ancestor and belief in a tribal history of migration,[4] it is unclear how many of those living in the region in the early fourth century identified as Macedonia by these Greek writers recognized themselves as Macedonians. Those living in the plain which dominated the south and southeastern part of the region likely knew they were part of a kingdom termed Macedonia, but those in the mountainous areas to the north and west, which existed most often independently of the Macedonian king's authority and with their own rulers, may have found the concept foreign, identifying themselves as Lycestians, Orestians and so on. It was Philip who united the areas so identified by the Greek writers as Macedonia into a true physical nation. Whatever the divisions that had existed before, the population came readily to embrace a new Macedonian nationalism. It was this transformation of Macedonia that enabled Philip to achieve hegemony for himself and Macedonia in the Greek world.

Philip had first used his new army to create defensible borders for his nation and subsequently this military prowess enabled Macedonia to dominate her neighbours rather than being subject to these entities' continuous interference. Philip was also primarily responsible for transforming the Macedonian economy from one too often dominated by outside parties to one benefitting the Macedonian nation. One of the curious aspects of Macedonian history prior to Philip II is the general poverty of the nation and its king. This was the case despite the region

including one of the broadest and richest plains in the Greek peninsula and also being rich in mineral and timber resources. It was Philip who brought the resources of Macedonia under the control of the king for the benefit of himself and the Macedonians. Those Greek cities along Macedonia's coast were brought under this king's control and incorporated into Macedonia. These communities previously had dominated Macedonian commerce for their own benefit, but with Philip their economies now benefitted Macedonia and its monarch. Additionally, within Macedonia, Philip created cities and a new, landed, Macedonian middle class where previously there had been mostly villages and a serf-like peasantry. Indeed, he created what was to be the model for the relationship between Hellenistic monarchs and their cities. In this respect, it was also Philip who began what was also to characterize the Hellenistic age: city creation.

As a direct result of the accomplishments of Philip II, augmented by those of his son Alexander III, Macedonians eventually came to be seen as part of the larger Greek nation. While the ruling family was generally acknowledged to be immigrants from the Greek city of Argos, the Macedonians themselves were regarded as at best distant cousins of the Greeks. Even though there were close ties between the cultures of Macedonia and the southern Greek world, the absence of cities, and indeed city-states, led many Greeks to reject the Macedonians as true Greeks. For many Greeks the institutions of the city-state form of government were tied directly to Greek ethnicity (Anson 2009B: 22–4). Direct participation by voting citizens in sovereign assemblies was seen as the mark of a free people, whereas rule by a monarch was more commonly associated with non-Greek peoples, pejoratively referred to by the Greeks as barbarians. Moreover, the Macedonians are not listed in the Homeric catalogue of ships sent to Troy and they had fought on the side of the Persians during the great Persian invasion of the Greek peninsula in 480–479. It was through Philip's urbanization programmes and his creation of a middle class, along with the dramatic change in Macedonian power brought about by this father and his son that would eventually lead to the general acceptance of the Macedonians as true Greeks (Anson 2015: 234).

In spite of Philip's importance, little is known of his life prior to his accession to the throne. He was born in 383 or 382,[5] the third son of Amyntas III and his wife Eurydice. The year of Philip's birth was certainly not an auspicious one for either his father Amyntas III or for Macedonia. The Olynthians, the dominant power in the Chalcidic peninsula, had driven the royal family out of the kingdom (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.12–13, 38).[6] Philip's mother was either a princess from the royal house of Lyncestis in Upper Macedonia (Str. 7.7.6),[7] or of Illyria

(*Suda*, s.v. *Karanos*; Libanius *Dem.* 9; Plut. *Mor.* 14c).[8] The best argument for an Upper Macedonian origin comes from Philip's last marriage. In the party that followed, Attalus, the bride's uncle and a prominent Macedonian noble, proclaimed that with this marriage there might be produced a legitimate heir (Plut. *Alex.* 9.6; [Satyrus] *BNJ* 429 F-21=Athen. 13.557d). The comment would appear to be aimed at Alexander who was then the presumptive heir and whose mother was a foreign, Epirote, princess. Certainly, Alexander took the comment to be an insult, hurling a cup at Attalus and proclaiming, 'what then am I, a bastard!'(Plut. *Alex.* 9.6). However, if Philip's mother was an Illyrian, then the jibe would appear to be insulting to both father and son.[9] Unless the comment was supposed to imply that Philip was not Alexander's father. There was a rumour of Olympias' infidelity, but the supposed lover was a god (Plut. *Alex.* 2.3–5)! Philip, who responded hostilely to Alexander's actions during this incident, appeared not in the least offended by Attalus' remark. Of course, it is clear that, as often happened in Macedonian parties, the participants in this incident were inebriated. That Philip and Attalus at least were is a certainty.[10] It is, therefore, not entirely clear if the implication drawn by Alexander himself and by later historians as well of the actual words, was the true intent of the speaker. Of course, it could also have been an accurate reflection of Attalus' true feelings, which thanks to alcohol slipped from personal thought to open expression.

Philip's father died in 370 (Diod. 15.60.3; cf. Diod. 15.67.4; *Marm. Par.* 72), when Philip was either twelve or thirteen. His accession to the throne came only after the deaths of both of his older brothers: the oldest died by assassination (Diod. 16.2.4) and the other on the battlefield (Diod. 16.2.4–5). Twice he was given as a hostage to foreign powers, respectively to the Illyrians and the Thebans (see Chapter 2), and in 367, he and his brother were briefly placed under the protection of the Athenian commander Iphicrates (Aeschin. 2.26–9). While in Thebes he became a 'zealous' admirer of Epaminondas, the famous Theban general (Plut. *Pel.* 26.5). During his years in Thebes (367–365) (Just. 7.5.3), he lived with the Pythagorean philosopher and military commander Pammenes (Plut. *Pelop.* 26.5; Diod. 15.94.2; 16.34.1–2). In addition to his two full-brothers, Philip also had three half-brothers by his father's other wife, Gygaea,[11] one of which contested Philip's accession and was executed, while the other two fled into exile in Olynthus and later with Philip's capture of that city lost their lives (Just. 7.4.5; 8.3.10–11).[12] The preference for Eurydice's sons, as noted by Bill Greenwalt (1989: 27), was either due to the prominence of Eurydice or to the youth of Gygaea's sons, but in any case providing for some interesting family dynamics.[13] A child psychologist would likely see much in the events of Philip's

childhood as influences on the life of the youthful Philip. In fact, Nicholas Hammond (Hammond and Griffith 1979: 205–6) suggests that given a choice, Philip might well have chosen to spend these years in Thebes away from the chaos of his homeland.

Our sources for Philip are, as so often with topics of antiquity, less than we would hope. As seen earlier, information for his life prior to becoming king is very sparse. Even with respect to his career as king our sources are hardly expansive. Those narrative histories written during his lifetime or shortly thereafter have not survived. These include those written by Ephorus of Cyme (*BNJ* 70), whose universal history carried down to 340/339; Anaximenes of Lampsacus (*BNJ* 72), a philosopher and orator from Lampsacus who was later to accompany Alexander on his expedition; Marsyas of Pella (*BNJ* 135/136), a native Macedonian historian; and Theopompus of Chios (*BNJ* 115), who among a number of works most importantly wrote a history of the eastern Mediterranean during the reign of Philip in fifty-eight books and was a member of Philip's court. Also, no ancient biography survives either, although Plutarch's biographies of the Athenians Phocion and Demosthenes, while dealing primarily with Athenian affairs, were contemporaries of Philip and in the case of the latter, Philip's most vocal opponent, and, consequently, these do offer information that is helpful. This is also the case with his *Life of Eumenes*, who was made royal secretary by Philip and remained as such with Alexander in addition to becoming a cavalry commander in the latter part of Alexander's expedition.[14] Plutarch's *Life of Alexander* gives insights into Philip's late history and also into the relationship between father and son. The other Roman period biographer, Nepos, is less useful, but certain of his biographies touch on the career of Philip. These include his *Lives* of *Iphicrates*, *Timotheus*, *Eumenes* and *Phocion*. Fragments from one of the missing narrative histories – that by the contemporary and member of Philip's court, Theopompus – number in the hundreds,[15] and there survive contemporary speeches by Athenian orators. Two narrative accounts do survive from the later Roman period. The earliest of the two is the *Bibliothece* of Diodorus of Sicily, written three centuries after the events of Philip's life. Diodorus' sixteenth book of his universal history contains an account of the reign of Philip commingled with an account of events in the author's home of Sicily. The other surviving narrative history of Philip is found in Justin's *Epitome of Pompeius Trogus' Philippic History*, beginning near the end of Justin's book seven and continuing to the end of book nine of this universal history. While Trogus wrote during the time of the Emperor Augustus, claims for his epitomator's dates range from the second to the fourth century AD.[16] These surviving histories and biographies are most likely based on

those of the lost historians, but much argument has been expended on *which* ones – without much resolution.[17] The many surviving speeches of a number of Athenian orators, and in particular Demosthenes and Aeschines, give contemporary views of the Macedonian king by both his most vocal opponent, but also other orators like Isocrates and Aeschines who present a more positive view of Philip. Now, if it was merely the interpretation of facts in which the Athenian orators were in conflict, these speeches would be incredibly useful, but unfortunately there is also great disagreement with respect to the facts as well (Harris 1995: 7–16). As is the case with contemporary political speeches delivered to contemporary audiences, these speeches offer a host of problems from bias and exaggeration to straight-up falsehood. In his defence in *On the Crown*, Demosthenes (18.129–30) declares falsely that Aeschines' father had been a slave and his mother a prostitute. The same author in his *On the False Embassy* (249, 281), delivered in 343, presents a different portrayal of Aeschines' parents. Here the father is a teacher and his mother the leader of a bacchanal cult. With respect to this particular speech given by Demosthenes, unlike on the crown where Aeschines as prosecutor presented his case first and had no opportunity to respond. Aeschines (2.147; cf. 3.191) in his response to Demosthenes' attack on his parents presents a far different and far more believable picture of his father Atrometus: 'When he was a young man, before the war destroyed his property, he was so fortunate as to be an athlete; banished by the Thirty, he served as a soldier in Asia, and in danger he showed himself a man; by birth he was of the phratry[18] that uses the same altars as the Eteobutadae, from whom the priestess of Athena Polias comes; and he helped in the restoration of the democracy.' With respect to his mother, Aeschines (2.78, 148) proclaims all of her family to be freeborn citizens and speaks of her brother's patriotic service in the fleet. Mostly he presents his mother as a good supportive wife to his father.

In addition to the contemporary speeches, there survive a number of inscriptions contemporaneous to the events of Philip's career and a number directly relating to these events. These include the treaties of the Athenians and the Thracian kings (dated 357) (*GHI* 47); an alliance between Philip and the Chalcidians (357/356) (*GHI* 50); another alliance between the Athenians and the Thracians, Paeonians and Illyrians (356/355) (*GHI* 53); and the Peace of Corinth (338/337) (*GHI* 76). Others record the expulsion of Philip's opponents from Amphipolis (357/356) (*GHI* 49) and the Athenian honouring of a Thessalian king expelled by Philip (343/342) (*GHI* 70).

These sources do, however, in many respects present a fairly common picture of a very capable and brilliant individual, but one lacking in moral or ethical

principles. Pausanias (8.7.5), the second-century AD geographer, summarizes ancient opinion on the matter: 'Philip may be supposed to have accomplished exploits greater than those of any Macedonian king who reigned either before or after. But nobody of sound mind would call him a good general, for no man has so sinned by continually trampling on oaths to heaven, and by breaking treaties and dishonoring his word on every occasion.' Or, to put it another way, he was a highly successful politician. His true character was likely more complicated. In searching for those acts described by Plutarch (*Alex.* 1.2) as those that might reveal true character, there are few not coloured by contemporary politics, most of which was hostile. It is known that in his last years Philip was estranged both from his soon-to-be-very-famous son and that son's mother. He was murdered by a young man who had been seriously wronged and whose wrong was not corrected by Philip. Diodorus (16.95.1) describes a parade at the end of the king's life in which he had himself depicted with the twelve Olympian gods, which speaks to a certain measure of arrogance.

Contemporary sources, especially Theopompus, who, given his position at the Macedonian court, should have been in a position to know, speak of his deceit, his drunkenness, his manipulation of friends and allies, his injustice, treachery and his womanizing ([Theopompus] *BNJ* 115.T-19, F-27, F-81, F-163, F-225a, F-236, F-282). Demosthenes (2.18–19) describes Philip's companions as debauched, drunk, and as bandits and flatterers. To Theopompus (*BNJ* 115 T-19, F-162), Philip was 'a drunk, a buffoon by nature', 'a womanizer', 'a mischief-maker', even proclaiming that Philip 'won over the Thessalians more by parties than by bribes'. Polyaenus (4.2.6) states that when Philip became surrounded by his soldiers who were demanding their back pay, the king yelled, 'You are right my fellow soldiers . . . and I have been preparing myself . . . to pay my respects to you, for the credit you have been so obliging as to give me.' He then ran through their midst and plunged into a pool. The Macedonians then laughed at the humour of the prince who continued amusing himself in the water, till the soldiers were tired out with the neglect he paid to their complaints and went away. It is further stated that Philip often used to mention this incident, that by 'a stroke of buffoonery [he] got rid of the demands'. It is also claimed that Philip liked to dance when drunk ([Theopompus] *BNJ* 115.F-163). In fact, according to Demosthenes (2.18), drinking and lewd dancing were daily activities. Both Philip and his son Alexander are depicted as drinking heavily, with one modern commentator on the son describing him as an alcoholic (O'Brien 1992: 192). Apparently, Macedonian *symposia* were characterized by heavy drinking. The literary evidence supports this along with archaeological

confirmation. Gene Borza (1990: 270) states that 'thus far, the archaeological evidence seems to support the notion that the Macedonian gentry was a hard drinking lot'. Our only descriptions of these affairs certainly tend to support the conclusion that Macedonians drank more during such social affairs than was considered decent in the city-states of the south (Diod. 16.87.1; Plut. *Dem.* 20.3). 'Civilized' *symposia* were to be conducted with a degree of formality in which the wine would be mixed with water to dilute its strength and where moderation was to be observed as the guests reclined and engaged in polite conversation (Davidson 1997: 43–9).[19] This is not to say that *symposia* in the supposedly more civilized Greek south could not get out of hand, but such occurrences were considered deviations from the ideal. Davidson (1997: 44–5) calls attention to one very immoderate *symposium* tale found in the fragments of Timaeus (*BNJ* 566 F-149). In this get-together the participants became so drunk that they imagined they were on a ship in a storm and began to lighten the 'ship' by throwing their belongings out of a window much to the joy of a gathering crowd outside. Macedonian '*symposia*' in truth have more in common with the feasts described in the *Iliad* – and perhaps for the same reasons (Carney 2007A: 139).

These were both warrior societies. Rough-and-ready would be a better description of the majority of those at the royal court than cultured sophisticates. Theopompus describes the *Hetairoi*, Philip's mostly aristocratic companions, as 'man killers by nature' (*BNJ* 115 T-44=F-225c). Macedonian court life, as shown by Frances Pownall (2010: 55–65), had more in common with a symposium/feast than a court in the Persian or the early modern European sense. But, in the case of the Macedonians, serious business would not be conducted at these *symposia*. The real business of government was carried out by the king meeting with his chief advisors in a very sober setting. Even though most of our evidence for these sober royal councils comes from the reign of Alexander the Great,[20] there are indications of these during Philip's reign as well (cf. Diod. 16.3.1, 4.2, 59.4). Plutarch's (*Alex.* 23) view of Alexander's drinking if applied to both father and son is certainly more cautious: 'To the use of wine also he was less addicted than was generally believed. The belief arose from the time which he would spend over each cup, more in talking than in drinking, always holding some long discourse, and this too when he had abundant leisure.' Of course, there are those moments when the only possible description would be drunkenness. In the get-together connected with Philip's last marriage (Plut. *Alex.* 9.6–7) and Alexander's murder of Cleitus (Arr. *Anab*. 4.8.1–9; Curt. 8.1.20–52; Plut. *Alex*. 50–2; Just. 12.6.1–18), these bear little resemblance to sober discussions. These were indeed feasts.[21] Certainly, in addition to the drinking that categorized the traditional Greek

symposium, food was most often a part of these Macedonian gatherings, whereas in the classic Greek form food preceded the *symposium* (Davidson 2011: 45). It was a way to strengthen the ties between the Macedonian king and his warrior companions, the aristocratic *Hetairoi* (Pownall 2010: 55–65). In this atmosphere the aristocrats as companions exercised free speech and deferred to the king as the ruler of the feast (cf. Polyb. 5.27.5–7), not as their sovereign lord. Drinking then would be a social convention with broad political implications, but the drinking occurred after business had been accomplished (Dem. 19.139). There is no evidence that Philip was drunk at other times, such as in battle or during the day when engaged in governmental activities. In spite of Justin's (9.8.11) claim that while intoxicated Philip 'would rush from a banquet to confront the enemy, fight with him', our descriptions of Philip's heavy drinking are typically on occasions that were to mark celebratory events. What is known is that Philip abided by the traditions of Macedonian kings in battle. He was in the front lines. Indeed, Isocrates (*L.* 2.3) comments, 'In truth there is no one who has not condemned you as being more reckless in assuming risks than is becoming to a king, and as caring more for men's praise of your courage than for the general welfare.' Philip's drunkenness is noted at the feast celebrating his victory over the Olynthians (Diod. 16.55.1–3), later that over the Greeks at Chaeronea (Diod. 16.87.1; Polyaen. 4.2.2, 7; Just. 9.3; Frontin. *Strat.* 2.1.9) and during the celebration of his seventh marriage, described earlier (Plut. *Alex.* 9.6–10).

J. R. Hamilton's conclusion regarding Alexander and drinking would also appear valid for the father as well: 'That Alexander was a drunkard devoid of self-control is, of course, a figment of the rhetorical and philosophic imagination, an unwarranted generalization' (Hamilton 1974: 165). Also, the major source for the list of Philip's short comings, Theopompus of Chios, is especially critical of excessive drinking in general (*BNJ* 115.F-62, F-114, F-130, F-143, F-213, F-227, F-233), even composing a now lost list of heavy drinkers (F-283). But, while he strongly criticizes Philip for these shortcomings, he also wrote an *Encomium of Philip* (F-256). Here, as in his *Philippica*, he praises Philip as a politician and general. Heavy drinking was clearly part of Macedonian feasts and therefore may have been more of an aristocratic Macedonian cultural flaw than a personal one (Carney 2007A: 143–4; Sawada 2010: 393).

All of our sources recognize Philip's many abilities. Diodorus (16.1.6) states that 'King Philip excelled in shrewdness in the art of war, courage, and brilliance of personality.' It is unclear how many of the complaints about his bribery were true and how many may simply be due to a pleasing and ingratiating personality. He was noted for being gracious (Diod. 16.3.3, 60.4, 91.6, 95.2) and also generous

(see Chapter 4). Diodorus (16.1.4, 64.3) and Justin (8.2.5–6) also describe Philip as pious. He fought two sacred wars: one against the Phocians and the other against the Amphissians. The Phocians had seized the site of the Delphic Oracle and did eventually seize the god's offerings for their military activities. In the final analysis it was Philip and the Macedonians near the end of the conflict who virtually alone rallied to Delphi's defence. In the Battle of Crocus Field in 352 (see Chapter 3), he had his troops crown themselves with laurel sacred to the god Apollo, much as the later Christian crusaders wore the sign of the cross on their foreheads or the front of their garments to show themselves as holy warriors. Justin attributes Philip's victory to the Phocians being 'terror stricken' at the sight of the holy emblems and the memory of their sacrilege (Just. 8.2.2–4). The defeated here were executed as 'temple robbers' (Diod. 16.35.6).

Any claims for Philip's piety are, perhaps, challenged in other areas. Polybius (5.10.8) offers praise for Alexander when he comments, 'when [Alexander] crossed into Asia to avenge on the Persians the impious outrages which they had inflicted on the Greeks, he did his best to exact the full penalty from men, but refrained from injuring places dedicated to the gods; though it was in precisely such that the injuries of the Persians in Greece had been most conspicuous'. This was the case also when Alexander destroyed Thebes but left sacred areas standing (Arr. *Anab.* 1.9.9–10). Philip is recorded as destroying Olynthus, Methone, Apollonia and thirty-two cities in Thrace (Dem. 9.26). Demosthenes declares that these communities were razed to the ground, with nothing left standing. In the case of Olynthus, the archaeological evidence supports Demosthenes' claim (Cahill 2001: 45–61). It is especially noted that no sanctuaries were preserved (Cahill 2000: 499), nor is it clear if the priests avoided slavery, as with Alexander and the Theban priests (Plut. *Alex.* 11.12).[22] In the case of Philip's capture of Potidaea, while the city remained intact and was given to the Olynthians, its resident population was sold into slavery by Philip, with no reference to priests being excluded (Diod. 16.8.5). The absence of any such reference could simply be an oversight, but Justin (8.3.4–5) declares that Philip 'spared neither the temples of the gods, nor other sacred structures, nor the penates, public or private, before whom he had recently presented himself as a guest; so that he seemed not so much to avenge sacrilege as to seek a license for committing it'. Perhaps, the father was not then, by the standards of Polybius, as pious as his son.

In addition to the brutality shown the 'temple robbers', as seen earlier he enslaved the conquered inhabitants of Potidaea (Diod. 16.8.5) and also those of Pydna (Diod. 16.8.3; Dem. 1.5; 20.63) and Olynthus as well (Diod. 16.53.3; Dem. 8.40; 9.56; 19.265). After the conclusion of the Third Sacred War, Philip invaded

Phocis and, while garrisoning those Phocian communities that voluntarily surrendered, those cities that resisted were razed to the ground with their populations sold into slavery (Dem. 18.39). Of course, this was the decision of the Amphictyony, the Hellenic commission in charge of the protection of the sacred Delphic site. But, this was not a decision resisted by Philip.

The Macedonian king was certainly pursuing in the north a form of ethnic cleansing. Given Macedonia's history of dealing with those cities connected to the former Athenian Empire or the new Athenian Confederacy, his actions though brutal were purposeful. In the case of Olynthus, Philip himself may have said it best: 'Either they must cease to reside in Olynthus, or he in Macedonia' (Dem. 9.11). One of the worst accusations against Philip comes from a confusing fragment of Theopompus and concerns his treatment of the defenders of the Greek city of Naupactus. Here by most interpretations of the admittedly confusing source, Philip supposedly ordered that the defenders of Naupactus have their throats slit (*BNJ* 115 F-235; cf. Dem. 9.34; Str. 9.4.7).[23]

Philip could also be generous, as in his releasing Athenian prisoners after his victory at Chaeronea without ransom or other demands (Demad. 1.9; Diod. 16.87.3). While the Athenian prisoners were released, the Thebans were not (Diod. 16.86.6; Demad. 1.13). The reason is that Philip had need of the Athenians if he wished to successfully campaign against the Persian Empire. The Athenian navy was essential. However, prior to this generosity Philip is also recorded as becoming drunk and dancing with his companions through the ranks of these same prisoners, jeering at their misfortune (Diod. 16.87.1). When called to task by the Athenian Demades, however, he quickly changed his attitude (Diod. 16.87.1). He also did not enslave the people of Amphipolis when he captured that city (Diod. 16.8.2). This was, perhaps, because of that community's long hostility to Athens. Philip made these decisions regarding the status of conquered peoples on the basis of their previous relations with the Macedonians or their connection with those hostile to Philip. Those cities that were perceived as threats, especially those with connections to Athens and the Second Confederacy, had their populations either expelled or enslaved. One can claim that these actions represented standard practice in Greek warfare, but that hardly excuses them. The ferocity shown by Greeks towards their neighbours both literally and figuratively is appalling. Philip's actions may have been intended to frighten others into compliance, or because of his anger at the particular peoples who had opposed him, or to make certain that dangerous populations and communities would never again endanger either himself or Macedonia. Alexander acquiesced in the destruction of Thebes, and given the same situation, his father would likely

have done the same. He had destroyed Olynthus and other cities. Philip also moved some communities to border regions (Justin 8.5.7–8.6.2; Polyaen. 4.2.12). Also, like father like son, when Alexander was regent of Macedonia in his father's absence, he captured a Maedian city in Thrace, drove out the inhabitants and replaced them with a mixed population (Plut. *Alex.* 9.1).

Probably the charge most levied against Philip by his contemporary Demosthenes is what the Athenian orator saw as his penchant for engaging in suborning treason through bribery (Dem. 1.5; 18.19, 21, 32, 42, 44–50, 61, 177, 236, 261, 284; 19.20; cf. Diod. 16.53.3). In fact, Demosthenes (18.295–6) attributes Philip's hegemony in the Greek world to corrupt individuals who cared nothing for their cities, but only for their own personal gain. In Philip's presence, however, Demosthenes is reported to have proclaimed Philip to be the 'Δεινότατον' of all mankind (Aeschin. 2.41). Diodorus (16.54.3) claims that Philip once asked, when told a city was impregnable, 'whether its walls could not be scaled even by gold'. Diodorus (16.54.4, 55.4) continues that Philip called those who accepted his gold 'guests' and 'friends', but in truth, says Diodorus, they were traitors to their cities. But this conclusion is more nuanced by the nature of political life in the peninsula (see Chapter 4). Philip was adept at playing on the fears of the Greek cities with respect to the ambitions of neighbouring city-states. In the Peloponnesus, Spartan ambition led many states to look for a powerful ally, and in northern Greece and the Aegean, Athenian desires to resurrect in some form her old fifth-century empire and the pressure on Greek cities in the north from Thracian tribes enabled Philip to serve in the role of protector. To many, Philip appeared less a threat to their independence than these more traditional powers. Moreover, in the internal world of city politics, personal rivalries among the leaders were exploited as well as the historic hostility between democrats and oligarchs.

What is most remarkable about Philip's career is what he accomplished in his first year. So remarkable in fact, that one is left to believe that he already had a plan in place and was just waiting to put it in play. In fairly short order he proceeded to establish a secure border in the northwest through his defeat of the Illyrians, in the north through his acquisition of Paeonia, and in the south through his alliance with the Thessalian city of Larissa and his eventual domination of the entire region. His attention was then drawn to the west and Epirus and to the east with respect to the Athenians, Olynthians and eventually the Thracians and the Greek cities in that region. Peter Brunt (1965: 207–8) has commented on Philip's opportunism, but in securing the borders this was less the acceptance of what favourably came his way and more the result of deliberate

planning and execution. However, his hegemony in the Greek world was the result of successful opportunism. As Justin (8.1.3) says, 'as from a watch-tower' Philip scanned the horizon for opportunities. The Third Sacred War with its rise of the Phocians and the decline of the Thebans presented Philip with an opportunity that he did not miss. Herein lies the great difference between the father and the son. The father began and ended his career as a Macedonian nationalist. His desire for personal glory was tied to his home country and to his family. His son Alexander lived ever in pursuit of personal glory. In the end, even his capital was to be Babylon, not Pella (Str. 15.3.9–10).[24]

Alexander's father was in many ways a man of mythical proportions, but his myth was eclipsed by that of his son in part because Philip's son had a much better publicist – himself. 'It was an evolving and complex image he [Alexander] wished to project in life to demonstrate that he was not an ordinary man. It was complex in that it was a combination of a number of base beliefs that changed little over time and his desire to project himself in ways that would be receptive to whoever was his current audience, and evolving in his view of his exceptionality, an image enhanced by every success' (Anson 2020). That he wished to control his image can hardly be doubted given his employment of an historian, Callisthenes (Arr. *Anab.* 4.10.1–2), whose work apparently continued as late as seven months before the author's death in 328 (Str. 11.14.13); a personal sculptor, Lysippus (Plut. *Alex.* 4.1–2); a painter, Apelles (Cic. *Ad fam.* 5.12.7); and an engraver, Pyrgoteles (Plin. *HN* 7.125, 37.8). He created many cities named Alexandria scattered throughout his conquests that were to echo his name throughout the ages.[25] He founded two Nicaeas to emphasize his victories, a Bucephala to honour his horse,[26] and, perhaps, even a Peritas after his dog (Plut. *Alex.* 61.1). The result is that Alexander became 'the Great' and his legend found its way into over eighty versions of the Alexander Romance and in more than twenty languages.[27] Philip's image on the contrary was created either by his opponents or by those who wished to extol his accomplishments but in many cases to belittle the man himself. Probably the most comprehensive and laudatory comments concerning Philip from antiquity are attributed to his son Alexander in a controversial speech delivered in 324 (Arr. *Anab.* 7.9.2):[28]

> Philip took you over when you were helpless vagabonds, mostly clothed in skins, feeding a few animals on the mountains and engaged in their defense in unsuccessful fighting with Illyrians, Triballians and the neighboring Thracians. He gave you cloaks to wear instead of skins; he brought you down from the mountains to the plains; he made you a match in battle for the barbarians on your borders, so that you no longer trusted for your safety to the strength of your

positions so much as to your natural courage. He made you city dwellers and established the order that comes from good laws and customs. It was due to him that you became masters and not slaves and subjects of these very barbarians who used previously to plunder your possessions and carry off your persons. He annexed the greater part of Thrace to Macedonia, and by capturing the best placed positions by the sea, he opened up the country to trade; he enabled you to work the mines in safety; he made you rulers of the Thessalians, who in the old days made you dead with terror; he humbled the Phocian people and gave you access into Greece that was broad and easy instead of being narrow and hard. The Athenians and Thebans were always lying in wait to attack Macedonia; Philip reduced them so low, at a time when we were actually sharing in his exertions, that instead of paying tribute to the Athenians and taking orders from the Thebans it was we in our turn who gave them security. He entered the Peloponnese and there too he settled affairs, and his recognition as leader with full powers over the whole of the rest of Greece in the expedition against the Persians did not perhaps confer more glory on himself than on the commonwealth of the Macedonians.[29]

1

Macedonia before Philip

As noted previously, prior to the reigns of Macedonia's two most famous kings, Philip II and his son Alexander III, the Great, the term Macedonian had not achieved a national status. The terms used by the Greek historians referred to little more than a politically disunited geographic expression. The region was a diverse land stretching from the Strymon in the east (Hdt. 5.17.2; 7.25),[1] Thessaly and the Vale of Tempe to the south (Hdt. 7.173.1), to the north mostly south of the Erigon River, and to the west the Lakes Kastoria and Lyncus (Thuc. 2.99.1–5). By the fifth century, Herodotus and Thucydides both speak of the plain as Lower Macedonia and the surrounding plateau as Upper Macedonia. One modern commentator has described Macedonia as having 'an inner core and an outer rind'.[2] The term Macedon itself probably derives from a Greek word for highlander,[3] the name possibly arising from a tribal origin in the mountainous area of western Pieria.[4]

Macedonia possessed the largest alluvial plain in the Greek peninsula, formed by the Haliacmon, Loudias and Axios rivers, and was also blessed with large mineral deposits, including lead, copper, silver, gold and iron, and the finest timber in the Greek world.[5] The Athenians in particular used the timber from Macedonia to build their warships, the triremes.[6] Macedonia's overall population exceeded that of any of the powerful city-states to the south. Estimates of the population of the region of Macedonia range from 500,000 (Ellis 1976: 34) to Richard Billows' (1995: 203) estimate of between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000.

Yet, despite all of these resources, Macedonia was not a major player in Greek history until the second half of the fourth century BC. For one thing, Upper Macedonia was a land of the independent kingdoms of Orestis, Elimeia, Lyncus, Eordaia and Tymphaia, each typically with its own ruling family (Thuc. 2.99.2). It was only during the reign of Philip II that Upper Macedonia was permanently joined to Lower Macedonia.[7] Prior to this time, although the peoples of Upper Macedonia may have been brought briefly under the control of the Lower Macedonian king during the period of Persian domination (*c.* 513–479), after

the retreat of the Persians in 479, they re-established their full independence, paying at most lip service allegiance to the Lower Macedonian king (Thuc. 2.99.2; *IG* I^{3}89). Many of the Upper Macedonians maintained their independence by armed conflict and alliances with the Lower Macedonian king's enemies. In 433, Derdas I, king of Elimeia, allied himself with the Athenians and a pretender to the throne of Lower Macedonia (Thuc. 1.57.3). Derdas II likewise ruled an independent Elimeia and formed an alliance with the Spartans in 383/382 against the Olynthians (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.38).[8] In the late 420s, Arrhabaeus, the king of Lyncestis, was openly hostile to the Lower 'Macedonian' kings.[9] Making the weakness of the Lower Macedonian kingdom even more peculiar was that the government was theoretically an autocracy, with a king unchecked by serious constitutional limitations. However, a closer examination reveals that the availability of resources and a centralized government structure were potentialities only. The apparent paradox in part is the result of the diverse history of 'Macedonia'. The earliest tradition holds that the original Macedonians were a group of related tribes, part of which moved from the western mountains down into the central plain during the period from *c.* 650 to 550 (Thuc. 2.99.1–3; cf. Thuc. 4.83.1).[10] The Macedonian tribes displaced most of those they encountered from their lands, but not all of these populations. Many Bisaltians and Crestonians are later found living in Pieria (Thuc. 4.109.4), suggesting that the evacuations and expulsions were not as complete as indicated by the sources, with many of these peoples, perhaps, remaining in their original homelands. This may also have been the case with the other peoples who are listed as having been expelled. These included the original Pierians, Bottiaeans, Edonians, Eordaeans and Almopians (Thuc. 2.99.2–6; cf. Ellis 1976: 36).

Moreover, while the Macedonian king was in theory an autocrat, Macedonia was not a bureaucratic state. In fact, there was virtually no bureaucracy at all until the reigns of Philip and Alexander. Foreign *Hetairoi*, like their Macedonian counterparts, would be given large tracts of land by the king (cf. Athen. 6.261a). The king ruled through his *Hetairoi*, his companions. These individuals were mostly members of the powerful landed Macedonian aristocracy, although some were from different lands who owed their status to their appointment by the king ([Theopompus] *BNJ* 115 F-224). Of the eighty-four individuals identified as members of Alexander the Great's *Hetairoi*, nine were Greeks (Stagakis 1962: 79–87). These *Hetairoi*, primarily those native Macedonian aristocrats who owed their status to their birth, were in a very real sense the government (Stagakis 1962: 53–67; 1970: 86–102). They acted as the king's ambassadors, military commanders, governors, religious representatives and personal advisors. Their

relationship with the king, however, was regarded by them as personal, not institutional. The *Hetairoi* were formally tied to the monarch by religious and social bonds; they sacrificed to the gods, hunted and drank with the king and fought alongside him. There was even a religious festival, the *Hetairideia*, honouring Zeus Hetairides, celebrating the relationship between the king and his *Hetairoi* (Athen. 13.572d–e). While there are a number of difficulties with the oft-repeated statement that the Macedonian kingship was Homeric,[11] in the particular case of the *Hetairoi* there are clear parallels. The Myrmidons were the '*Hetairoi*' of Achilles (Hom. *Il.* 2.179; 16.168–70, 269), and the Trojan Aeneas had his own '*Hetairoi*' (*Il.* 13.489–92). With these individuals the respective hero enjoyed a close personal relationship. The hero and his *Hetairoi*, like their Macedonian counterparts, fought and shared their leisure activities, and the interaction of the Macedonian king with his companions could be as fractious as that of the Greek champions in the epic. It was not unusual, in fact fairly common, for Macedonian kings to lose their lives at the hands of disgruntled Macedonian *Hetairoi*.

Land and booty were the means by which a monarch cemented his relationship with his *Hetairoi* (Samuel 1988: 1276; cf. Billows 1995: 137; Borza 1990: 215). This was certainly part of the traditional *Hetairos* relationship. Macedonian kings gave their aristocratic 'cavalry companions' vast tracts of land ([Theopompus] *BNJ* 115F–225b; Plut. *Alex.* 15.3–6). Most of these companions were already the holders of large tracts of land, but the king was expected to share with them whatever new lands might come into his possession. Regarding his other companions, especially his foreign companions, their status as landholders was created by the king. Philip II granted all of the land north of Agora to one Apollonides of Cardia ([Dem.] 7.39; cf. 7.44; Dem. 8.64). Nearchus, Alexander's fleet commander from Crete, and Laomedon, the Mytilenian, are listed as Macedonians from Amphipolis (Arr. *Ind.* 18.4). These foreign *Hetairoi* obviously were the recipients of royal land. Even though the earliest reference to a Macedonian *Hetairos* dates from the reign of Archelaus I (413–399) (Ael. *VH* 13.4) and that it has been claimed that the institution derives from Persian antecedents (Kienast 1973: 248–67), the relationship likely dates back to the Bronze Age (Hammond and Griffith 1979: 158–9).

In Macedonia, then, power was shared between the king, who exercised royal patronage, and his *Hetairoi*, who exercised regional authority. The traditional Macedonian royal court bore a striking resemblance to those depicted in the *Iliad*. For example, there was heavy drinking mingled with feasting: a way to strengthen the ties between the Macedonian king and his *Hetairoi* (Pownall

2010: 55–65). In this environment of drinking and feasting the companions deferred to the king as something akin to the master of ceremonies, the ruler of the feast. Camaraderie ruled the feast. There was little deference paid to their host as sovereign lord with its attendant ceremony (cf. Polyb. 5.27.5–7). As Charles Edson said in 1970 (24), 'It is little wonder that to Greeks of the old Greek city-states this archaic society with its stolid peasantry, boisterous nobles and patriarchal king should seem alien, un-Hellenic . . .'

While the 'Greeks' generally regarded the Macedonians as barbarians, Macedonia at least from the fifth century was part of the Greek cultural milieu. Macedonia and the southern Greeks shared most of the same gods, and the Greek alphabet and language were employed at the very least for written communication.[12] Of the roughly 6,300 inscriptions recovered within the confines of what was ancient Macedonia, approximately 99 per cent were written in Greek (Panayotou 2007: 436), and the legends on all currently discovered Macedonian coins are in Greek (Price 1974). The evidence also suggests that the language spoken by most Macedonians was a dialect of Greek (Voutiras 1996: 678–82; Masson 1996: 905–6; Anson 2009B: 5–30). Yet, even during the reigns of Philip and Alexander and despite the sharing of language, religion and other cultural aspects, Macedonians were not, as noted in the Introduction, seen as true Greeks. That the Greeks generally acknowledged a distinction between themselves and the Macedonians was due primarily to the lack of cities and city-state culture that characterized the more urbanized southern Greek city-states. Macedonia was primarily an agricultural society which lacked much urban development (Millett 2010: 480). Moreover, the region was ruled by kings and powerful aristocrats, not by the assemblies that characterized the governments of the city-states, the *poleis*. There were also significant differences in their respective cultures based on these two very different concepts of government. Macedonian elite society was not tempered by what could be called the middle-class values of the Greek city-states. This was in many ways a warrior society that still possessed many of the attributes of a more tribal society. Even in the fourth century BC, traces of blood feuds still existed (Diod. 19.51.1, 5; Curt. 5.11.20). The major occupation of the Macedonian elite was hunting, and a noble who failed to spear a wild boar without using a net was required to sit, not recline, at table (Athen. 1.18a). A close second to hunting was feasting and drinking. The aristocratic lifestyle that typified upper-class Macedonian society is clearly found in the elaborate tombs of these individuals that have been excavated throughout Macedonia.[13]

Another significant difference between the southern Greek culture of the city-states and that of Macedonia, deriving from the rural, not urban, nature of

Macedonian society, was the lack of heavy infantry in the Macedonian armies.[14] Thanks to their broad plain, both Macedonia and Thessaly to the south had excellent cavalries, and the infantries tended to be lightly armed and ill trained. The basic soldier of the city-state was a heavily armed hoplite. Hoplites by and large represented these communities' middle class. Typically, these heavy infantrymen had to supply their own equipment – the round, three-foot-in-diameter shield, the seven- to eight-foot stabbing spear, greaves and breastplate – since the cities themselves were seldom wealthy enough to do so. Macedonia, although a wealthy region (Millett 2010), with certain products even seen as royal monopolies, especially timber and minerals,[15] possessed few hoplites due to its lack of cities and a middle class. With few cities and hardly any middle class, the Macedonian state would have had to supply each soldier with the hoplite panoply and hence Macedonia until the reign of Philip II was incapable of producing native heavy infantry (see Chapter 2). This lack of a tradition of heavy infantry meant that until the reign of Philip, Macedonian armies lacked the ability to compete with the military forces of the Greek city-states. The dominant military arm of Macedonia was then its aristocratic cavalry, an excellent force, but not effective without the support of heavy infantry. Moreover, these hoplites from the city-states were most often led by those selected by popular assemblies containing the very troops to be led. The Macedonian army, however, whether cavalry or infantry, was built on regional recruitment, with the command structure of the forces, especially those from Upper Macedonia, typically led by members of these areas' local, hereditary nobility. In Alexander the Great's army which crossed to Asia, Perdiccas, from the canton of Orestis (Arr. *Anab.* 6.28.4; *Ind.* 18.5) and descended from the former kings of that upland region (Curt. 10.7.8), commanded the battalion from Orestis and Lyncestis (Diod. 17.57.2); the Elimeian Coenus, that from Elimeia (Heckel 1992: 58–9); and Polyperchon, that from his native Tymphaea (Diod. 17.57.2). In a very real sense, prior to the reign of Philip, the army, whether cavalry or light infantry, was in effect under the control of members of the king's *Hetairoi*.

This lack of an effective infantry force was one factor in the frequent invasions of Macedonia by her tribal neighbours to the west, east and north, chiefly and respectively the Epirotes, Thracians and Illyrians; and also by the forces of the southern Greek city-states. The latter in particular exploited the region for its large resources of minerals and especially timber, which was the mainstay of the naval forces of Macedonia's southern neighbours. This was especially the case with the Athenians. This need to exploit the resources of Macedonia and neighbouring Thrace led the Athenians to the founding of Amphipolis in 437.

This colony, located near the mouth of the Strymon, granted the Athenians access to the rich resources not only of Macedonia's timber, but also her mineral wealth in the area (Thuc. 4.108.1).[16] Even after gaining its independence from its Athenian foundress, Amphipolis continued to exploit its Macedonian neighbour.

Most of the wealth of Macedonia was then effectively in the hands of others rather than the native Macedonians. This was a product of a number of factors besides just the lack of heavy infantry. Much of the trade of the hinterland was exported through the independent Greek cities along the Macedonian coast. The vast majority of the Macedonian population, as claimed by John Ellis (1976: 27) and Richard Billows (1995: 9–10, 136–7, 200–1), was much like that of the *hectemoroi* and the *pelatai* of Solonian Athens (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 2.2; Plut. *Sol.* 13.4–5). As noted in the Introduction, Alexander the Great when facing an unruly army in Asia reminded these troops, 'Philip found you wandering and poor, wearing goatskins and grazing a few goats on the mountains . . . he brought you down from the mountains to the plains . . . and made you dwellers in cities' (Arr. *Anab.* 7.9.1–5). Later, in the Hellenistic states in Asia, the *laoi* were part of the indigenous population, distinct from the Macedonian/Greek settlers. Greeks had often created serf-like populations from those conquered in foreign lands, and both Aristotle (*Pol.* 7.1330a 25–31) and Isocrates (3.5; cf. 4.131) encouraged making 'barbarians' into serfs for the Greeks. The Milesians turned the native Mariandynians into serfs when they colonized Heraclea on the Pontus (Pl. *Leg.* 6.776c–d; Strabo 12.3.4; Athen. 6.263c–d),[17] and the Megarians had enslaved the local Bithynians during the foundation of Byzantium (*BNJ* 81.F-8).[18] Likewise, the *penestai* and the Spartan helots were believed to be a 'foreign' element by the respective 'free' population (Thuc. 1.101.2; [Poseidonios] *BNJ* 87 F-8; Athen. 6.284).[19] Even though there is no reference to a distinct subject class in Macedonia, Ellis's and Billow's conclusion would appear likely, especially with respect to Upper Macedonia. Here the neighbouring Illyrian Dardanians and Ardians had subject populations who apparently tilled the soil (Athen. 6.272d; 10.443c).[20] Much of the population of Macedonia was then under the domination of the Macedonian aristocratic landowners, i.e. the *Hetairoi*. These impoverished tenant farmer and dependent pastoralist *hectemoroi* were Macedonians, and though similar to the Thessalian *penestai*, the *laoi* of Hellenistic Asia and the Spartan helots in their dependent status, they were not an indigenous, conquered population, as were the latter groups.

Politically the government of Macedonia was then in theory an autocracy awaiting the king who could turn theory into practice. Indeed, ostensibly the Macedonian king was the kingdom. While our evidence for earlier reigns is

sparse, it is likely that the theoretical powers of these monarchs was little different from that of Philip II at the beginning of his reign. Philip was eventually able to turn these theoretical into actual powers. Isocrates (5.107–8) notes that Macedonia under Philip was subject to the rule of 'one man', and Demosthenes (1.4) comments that Philip was the sole director of his policy, 'uniting the roles of general, ruler, and treasurer', and 'was responsible to nobody: the absolute autocrat, commander, and master of everybody and everything' (Dem. 18.235). The king again in theory on his own authority determined the taxes to be paid and saw to their collection (Arr. *Anab.* 7.10.4; Plut. *Demetr.* 42.3–4; *Mor.* 178a–179c).[21] A king's control over his population could be profound. Amyntas I in 505 had offered the entire region of Anthemus and its people to the Athenian Hippias (Hdt. 5.94.1).[22] The king controlled much of the kingdom's natural resources (Hammond and Griffith 1979: 157) and conducted its foreign policy. It was the Macedonian king to whom embassies were sent (Hdt. 5.17; Dem. 18.24, 19.12, 229; Aeschin. 2.12, 18), and from whom embassies were dispatched.[23] This is clear in the reports of Demosthenes and Aeschines on the Peace of Philocrates. It was to be a treaty between the Athenians and their allies and Philip and his allies (Dem. 19.159, 278; Aeschin. 2.84, 137; 3.65). The peace was to end a war between Athens and Philip (Dem. 18.235, 19.93), and it was ratified in Pella by solemn oaths taken by the Athenian ambassadors on the one hand and by Philip on the other.[24] Indeed, the Athenian ambassadors had to wait a considerable period of time in Pella for Philip's return before the treaty could be ratified (Dem. 19.155; cf. 19.57).

Moreover, it is always the Macedonian king's name alone, usually without even the suffix 'of the Macedonians', which is mentioned by Greek contemporaries. Philip accepts the surrender of the Phocians at the conclusion of the Third Sacred War (Dem. 19.62), not as the representative of the Macedonians, and it is Philip and his descendants who personally receive the two seats on the Amphictyonic Council formerly held by the Phocians (Diod. 16.60.1; Dem. 19.111). Diodorus, in particular, is very clear that the two seats were Philip's and his heirs.[25] The other seats were held by peoples: the Thessalians, Boeotians, Dorians, Ionians, Perrhaebi, Magnetes, Dolopians, Locrians, Oetaeans, Phthiotians and Malians (Aeschin. 2.116). The omission of any reference to the Macedonians in such circumstances is common. The Pythian Games of 345 were to be held by the Boeotians, the Thessalians and Philip (Dem. 19.128; Diod. 16.60.2). Demosthenes (18.36; 19.83) routinely speaks of Philip without title or reference to the Macedonians. Speusippus, Plato's nephew and his uncle's successor as head of the Academy, wrote his *Letter to Philip* (8), not to the Macedonian people.[26] In the decree

establishing the common peace of 338/337, the signatories agree not to overthrow any existing constitution nor the 'kingdom of Philip and his descendants' (*IG* II^{3}1.318=*GHI* 76). This usage was common practice well before the reign of Philip II. In Thucydides (4.82), the Athenians proclaimed Perdiccas their enemy, not the Macedonians, and at the Congress of 371, it was Amyntas III, the father of Philip II, who was entitled to a seat without reference to the Macedonian state or people (Aeschin. 2.32). In general, prior to Alexander the Great, there are few references even to the title 'King of the Macedonians', and these are meant to be primarily geographically descriptive (Errington 1974: 20).

In the Macedonian theoretical conception of monarchy, it was the king who declared war and made peace, commanded the armies and served as the intermediary between the gods and the people (Anson 1985B: 304–7; Borza 1990: 238; Naiden 2019: 1–2, passim). There was no professional priesthood: the monarch made the sacrifices and obtained the favour of the gods,[27] and presided over the sacred festivals (Arr. *Anab.* 1.11.1; Dem. 19.192; Diod. 16.91.4; Athen. 13.572d–e). This religious aura carried over into the ceremonies performed for a dead king. On the death of a monarch, a lustration was carried out (Just. 13.4.7; cf. Curt. 10.9.11–12) and funeral games and sacrifices were performed (Diod. 18.28.4, 19.52.5; Just. 9.7.11, 11.2.1; Athen. 4.155a). The body would then be formally laid to rest in the royal tombs at Aegae (Borza 1990: 167, 256–60). Thereafter, sacrifices were made to the dead king.[28] This sacral nature of the monarchy likely accounts for the success of the Argead clan in monopolizing the kingship. It was indeed the entire clan that possessed this sacral power (Borza 1999: 14–15; Carney 2000: 7–8; Mitchell 2007: 62–3). In the period prior to the reign of Philip II, the Macedonian 'kingship' had many residual qualities from its original tribal beginnings, and every member of the Argead house was a possible 'charismatic' leader. This was a quality of the kingship that meant that in virtually every succession there would be multiple claimants to the throne. Macedonian kings then were simply the leaders or chiefs chosen from among the extended Argead clan. The selection process was, however, quite amorphous. It was the descent of the clan, not that of any particular individual or family branch, that conferred divine preference. All Argeads were ultimately eligible for the kingship. Each branch of the clan would as a matter of course have their supporters (Anson 2013: 22). Certainly the ability of the Argeads to dominate the monarchy and that in almost every succession there appeared numerous Argead pretenders to the throne supports this position. In 432, Philip, the brother of Perdiccas I, both sons of Alexander I, contended for the throne supported by 600 Macedonian horsemen, likely aristocrats (Thuc. 1.57.3, 59.2, 61.4; 2.95.2).[29] The Thracians invaded Macedonia in the winter of

429/428 and placed their king's favoured Argead, Philip's son Amyntas, on the throne by force (Diod. 12.50.4; 15.50.4–7; Thuc. 2.95.1).[30] Moreover, Philip II's claim to the throne was contested by Pausanias and Argaeus (Diod. 16.2.6),[31] and by Philip's three half-brothers (Just. 7.4.5, 8.3.10; [Theopompus] *BNJ* 115 F-27). Divisions, then, within the aristocracy and the ambitions of various families within the Argead clan could, and most often did, lead to contested successions and frequent challenges to a particular king's authority. No Argead monarch is recorded to have lost his life as the result of a popular uprising. Most Macedonian monarchs lost their lives in palace intrigues. Archelaus (Arist. *Pol.* 1311b 11–12),[32] Amyntas II (Arist. *Pol.* 1311b 4),[33] Pausanias (Diod. 14.89.2), Alexander II (Diod. 15.71.1; *BNJ* 135/6 F-11=Athen. 14.629d) and Philip II himself (Diod. 16.93–4)[34] were all killed in palace conspiracies of a highly personal nature. Their aristocratic companions upon whom most of the actual functioning of government depended were also the most dangerous element in Macedonian society to the life of the king.

The Macedonian kingship during the Argead dynasty did not possess a systematic succession process (Carney 1983: 260–72; Anson 1985B: 306–8; Mitchell 2007: 61–74), but there were, however, elements that suggest the existence of certain *nomoi* (customs) related to the royal succession within the Argead clan. Alexander III (the Great) in addition to being the son of Philip was present at his father's death and was hailed as king by those prominent Macedonians also present (Arr. *Anab.* 1.25.2; Just. 11.2.2).[35] As in this case, most often sons did follow fathers on the throne. This more than anything else was probably due to the influence of the father in inserting his son into the court. Herodotus (8.139) lists the first seven kings of Macedonia: 'From that Perdiccas Alexander was descended, being the son of Amyntas who was the son of Alcetas; Alcetas' father was Aëropus, and his was Philip; Philip's father was Argaeus, and his again was Perdiccas.' In a later period, Alexander I was the son of Amyntas I;[36] Perdiccas II, son of Alexander I (Thuc. 1.57.2); Archelaus, son of Perdiccas (Thuc. 2.100.2; cf. Pl. *Grg.* 471a); Pausanias, son of Aëropus (with, perhaps, the intervening rule of Amyntas (II) [Arist. *Pol.* 1311b 3–15; Diod. 14.84.6]); Alexander II (Diod. 15.60.3; Just. 7.4.8; Aeschin. 2.26), Perdiccas III (Diod. 16.2.4; Schol. on Aeschin. 2.29) and Philip II (Diod. 16.2.1), the sons of Amyntas III. While sons did commonly follow fathers on the throne, most of them faced challengers, such as those faced by Philip II.

It has also been claimed that the practice of marrying a predecessor's wife was a means of proclaiming one's authority over potential rivals.[37] Certainly this was not a regular Greek practice (Wilgaux 2011: 225–6),[38] but then neither was

polygamy except in very exceptional circumstances. Philip was ultimately married to seven different women all at the same time. Ptolemy of Alorus married first his predecessor's daughter and then her mother as well, but he was an unusual claimant. He was not a member of the Argead clan and was seeking a connection to the ruling family. Even though Hammond (Hammond and Griffith 1979: 182) declares that Ptolemy of Alorus was the son of Amyntas II, who was briefly king in 393, and that Diodorus (15.71.1) does state that he was the son of Amyntas, the name was popular in Macedonia and there is no other reference that would suggest that this particular Amyntas was an Argead and a king. Telling against Ptolemy the guardian being the Argead ruler is the frequent reference to Alorus, the demotic, when our sources refer to him. In a society where kings are seldom referenced other than by their name, this use of the regional demotic would be unique. Claims that Argead pretenders to the throne pursued similar marriages is highly doubtful. Other examples are claimed, but the evidence is not convincing. King Archelaus' step-mother was named Cleopatra and the king also married a Cleopatra (Arist. *Pol.* 1311b 15; Pl. *Grg.* 471c). While it is asserted that the step-mother Cleopatra and the wife Cleopatra were the same person,[39] Hammond (Hammond and Griffith 1979: 169, n. 2) argues correctly that this was not the case and that 'Cleopatra was a favourite name for girls in Macedonia.' Cleopatra did become a popular name for Macedonian royal women, but it is difficult to know, given the scarcity of female names in the earlier period, when it became popular. It was a name, however, not unknown in the Greek world, being found as early as in the *Iliad* (9.556). It has been argued that Alexander the Great had sought to marry his dead father's last wife Cleopatra,[40] but there is no such evidence and Alexander's relationship with her uncle was to say the least strained (Plut. *Alex.* 9.7–9; [Satyrus] *BNJ* 429 F-21=Athen. 13.557d).[41] Alexander did criticize his mother for executing the young woman and her infant, but the passage clearly suggests that Alexander was concerned with the brutality of the act, not with the elimination of his potential marriage partner (Plut. *Alex.* 10.8). Besides, Alexander showed a reluctance to marry anyone until 327; after his death there were many attempts to marry the Conqueror's sister, but these individuals like Ptolemy of Alorus were not Argeads.[42] Alexander did not need an additional tie of a marriage to a non-Argead to improve his position. He was Philip's son, the obvious choice given his actions to this point and, in fact was immediately hailed as king.

The kingship was not a constitutional office in a developed state and lacked most of the formality ordinarily associated with royalty. As seen earlier, succession

to the throne lacked anything resembling constitutional formality. Disputed successions were common, with multiple candidates often claiming a royal title through a show of force and often with foreign assistance. Since the succession was tied to membership in the clan and not a particular family, with no express rules for primogeniture, there was also no formal process for the creation of regencies for an immature king. Such regencies would only occur when someone outside of the Argead clan seized power and ruled in the name of such an Argead, otherwise, given the very nature of Macedonian kingship, the child claimant would be set aside and some adult Argead would be proclaimed king. Kings, however, could be guardians for younger male relatives, but the royal authority would rest with the adult Argead (Anson 2009A: 276–86). This would especially be the case if the adult Argead who became king was without sons. It is a misunderstanding of this role of a king as guardian either on the part of Pompeius Trogus, Justin's source, or of Justin himself, that led that author to conclude that Perdiccas' son Amyntas became king and Philip II his regent ('*tutor*') 'rather than king himself' (Just. 7.5.9). A fragment of the late third- or early second-century BC philosopher and historian Satyrus (*BNJ* 429 F-21=Athen. 13.557b) could be seen as supporting Justin's contention.[43] Satyrus claims that Philip II reigned for twenty-two years, while Diodorus (16.3.1) states that Philip ruled for twenty-four years. Diodorus clearly associates Philip's accession to the throne with his brother's death. Satyrus' twenty-two years could just be an error, since no such regency is directly noted in this fragment. Justin (or, perhaps, Pompeius Trogus), like too many modern commentators, in this instance assumes that Macedonia had a formal succession and regency process. *Tutor*, the term used by Justin, then, should not be seen as referring to a formal regent, but rather to a guardian. Philip II, then, at the time of his accession, became the guardian for his potential heir, Amyntas Perdicca, the son of his dead brother Perdiccas. *Tutor* most often has the meaning of guardian.[44] With the birth of Philip's likely first son, Arrhidaeus, the son of Philinna, probably born in 357,[45] Amyntas became only a second-tier heir. This likely accounts for the confusion in Justin. Philip, as king, was the guardian for his young nephew both for the sake of his brother, but also for the sake of the kingdom and his branch of the Argead clan until he produced sons of his own. Why Amyntas was allowed to live even after Philip had heirs of his own can only be speculative. He may have liked the young man. After all, he did arrange his marriage to his daughter Cynanne (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.22). That Alexander apparently had this potential rival executed soon after his father's death (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.22) may show that there was no such affection on the part of the son. Another indicator that Amyntas was never king is that no

coins have been found with his name. Coinage was a way 'of declaring clearly and firmly [one's] sovereignty' (Le Rider: 1980: 48).

In addition to the doubtful regency for Amyntas Perdicca mentioned earlier, there are two other claimed regencies: one for Orestes, the son of King Archelaus I (413–399); and that for the future Perdiccas III by Ptolemy of Alorus (Diod.15.77.5; Plut. *Pelop.* 27.3). In the case of Orestes, while 'still a boy . . . he received the rule' of Macedonia after the death of his father, and was subsequently killed by his erstwhile protector Aëropus (Diod. 14.37.6). As with the case of Philip and his ward Amyntas, the true nature of the situation has been misunderstood. Aëropus became king and guardian for Orestes, but having a son of his own, Pausanias, he eliminated his ward to clear the path to the throne for his own child (cf. Diod. 14.84.6). Coins have been found for both Aëropus and his son Pausanias, even though the latter only ruled for a year (Diod. 14.89.2), but none have been found for Orestes. A true regent, then, in the sense of a place-holder as opposed to a king and guardian of a young ward as noted, would only emerge when someone outside of the Argead family seized power. Such a situation arose with Ptolemy of Alorus' regency for Perdiccas III. Amyntas III had two wives, whether consecutively or concurrently is debated;[46] by his marriage to Eurydice he had three sons, the eldest Alexander, the next Perdiccas, and the youngest, Philip, the father of the future Alexander the Great. After the assassination of King Alexander II,[47] Ptolemy became, according to some sources, the guardian (*epitropos*) for the slain king's brother, Perdiccas III (Aeschin. 2.29; cf. Plut. *Pelop.* 27.3), and in other sources, *basileus* in his own right (Diod. 15.71.1, 77.5; 16.2.4; Euseb. *Chron.* 228). Despite the confusion in the sources, this was a true regency (Anson 2009A: 276–86). Additionally, no coins have been found that were issued in Ptolemy's name (Beloch 1927: 3.2.67; Hammond and Griffith 1979: 183), and his marriage to Eurydice, the wife of Amyntas III, along with his previous one to her daughter by Amyntas, Eurynoe, suggest that Ptolemy needed a marital connection to a member of the royal family to forge a link to the Argead clan (Just. 7.4.7; Aeschin. 2.29). While Ptolemy of Alorus is called both *epitropos* and *basileus* by our sources, the ascription of *epitropos*, but not *basileus*, by the contemporary Aeschines (2.29) indicates, along with the frequent use of the demotic, his marriages into the Argead clan, and the absence of coinage in his name, that he was never officially king, only regent.

While most present-day historians emphasize the informality and lack of institutional character of the pre-Philip II Argead monarchy, certain institutions are claimed to have been inherited rather than created by Philip. Philip clearly in the later stages of his reign was protected by four units regarded as 'guards', with

all being responsible for the king's safety whether on the battlefield, during the hunt, at court or in his bedchamber (Heckel 1986: 279). These were the hypaspists, the royal army guards, or more particularly the 1,000-man *agema* of the 3,000-man hypaspists; the royal Pages were young aristocrats who guarded his bedchamber and hunted and fought with the king; the *Somatophylaces*, the 'Seven' aristocratic bodyguards, were also responsible for the king's bedchamber and were often among his chief advisors; and the *Ilê Basilikê*, the aristocratic 'royal' cavalry squadron of the 'Companion Cavalry', amounting to 300 horsemen, who served as the king's cavalry guard.[48] Of these only the *Ilê* clearly date from early in Macedonian history. While the other three units' origins are debated (see Chapter 3), it is clear these were created by Philip II. The expansion of what was likely a small infantry guard into a large guard unit, the eventual hypaspists, was one of Philip's many military reforms. It is clear that nothing on the scale of the hypaspists or even the *agema* of the hypaspists existed before Philip. Prior to Philip's reign there is no evidence that Macedonia had much in the way of heavy infantry and certainly no elite corps within such infantry. The Seven *Somatophylaces* and the Pages are units that suggest the existence of a very different relationship between king and aristocracy than existed prior to the reign of Philip II and that they could only have appeared later in that monarch's career. The *Somatophylaces* were seven aristocratic bodyguards of the king who fought alongside him (Arr. *Anab.* 1.6.5; 6.28.4). Waldemar Heckel (1978: 226) suggests that this institution predated Philip and 'developed from the machinery of the heroic monarchy'. Here he is following the judgement of W. W. Tarn (1950: 2.137), who proclaimed them to be 'a refinement of the retinue of nobles who rode with the king in battle', and as such, they were chosen from various prominent Macedonian families. One of the duties of these elite bodyguards was to guard the king in his bedchamber (Heckel 1986: 285). The very nature of the relationship of the king's *Hetairoi* with the monarch prior to King Philip was that between near equals. In a warrior world where the king is simply the first among equals, guarding the king's bedchamber is not esteemed an honour, but rather would be seen as beneath the dignity of such individuals. Later, when Philip had dramatically changed this relationship in his favour, such seeming indignities would be viewed as coveted privileges.

The institution of the Pages would be even more demeaning. These were the sons of aristocratic Macedonians. The likely purpose for the creation of this institution was to hold the sons as guarantors of their fathers' good behaviour and secondarily to forge the loyalty of the next generation of aristocrats to the Macedonian king, his heir and the nation. That aristocrats would willingly

surrender their sons as potential hostages would only make sense if, again, the status of the relationship between the king and the nobles had changed strongly in favour of the king and attendance at court had become desirable in order to maintain power and prestige. The number of Pages has been estimated to have been between 85 and 200.[49]

The institution of the Pages like that of the *Somaphylaces* speaks of a time when the king had come to dominate the court. The Pages were modelled more clearly on a similar institution in the Persian Empire. Xenophon (*Anab.* 1.9.3–6) describes the Persian Pages as performing many of the same tasks as their Macedonian counterparts. Even though there are those who doubt that Philip was the institution's initiator, Dietmar Kienast's (1973: 264–6) claim that the programme was initiated by Philip II appears most likely. Arrian (*Anab.* 4.13.1) clearly states that the institution was introduced by Philip.[50] Aelian (*VH* 14.48) appears to support this claim, declaring, 'Philip taking the sons of the noblest in Macedonia, made them wait upon his person, not in contempt of them, or to affront them, but that he might make them prepared and ready for action.' Claims that the institution may not have arisen with Philip routinely argue that it was Philip who dramatically changed the institution. G. T. Griffith (1979: 401) suggests that, while the institution was ancient, Philip 'developed the institution as no king had done before', and Heckel (1986: 281), while stating that no firm conclusion can be drawn as to the origin of the institution, suggests that at the least the recruitment of the sons of Upper Macedonian nobles should be attributed to Philip. The Pages' fathers were in the main prominent aristocratic Macedonians, including those from Upper Macedonia (Arr. *Anab.* 4.13.1; Ael. *VH* 14.48; Curt. 5.1.42; Diod. 17.65.1). While often referred to as '*paides*', it is clear that these were young men, not children. Curtius (5.1.42; 8.2.35, 6.2, 8, 25) routinely calls them *iuveni.* Their duties were to guard the king while he slept or dined (Curt. 5.1.43; cf. 8.6.5), mount the king on his horse 'in the Persian style', attend him in the hunt (Arr. *Anab.* 4.13.1; Curt. 5.1.42; 8.6.4) and, during their final year as Pages, serve with the king in combat (Hammond 1990: 266). The institution came to serve as a sort of school for future military commanders (Curt. 5.1.42; 8.6.6). That these institutions existed before Philip is doubtful given that the ancient *hetairos* relationship between king and nobles was built on camaraderie, not on the basis of royal pre-eminence. It is this argument, more than any particular piece of source evidence, that gives Kienast's (1973: 264–6) claim that this programme was initiated by Philip II the greatest support. As shown, even those who doubt that Philip was the institution's initiator wish to see that monarch as effecting major changes in its recruitment and functioning

(Hammond and Griffith 1979: 401; Heckel 1986: 281). Certainly having the sons of prominent aristocrats at the king's court would encourage those fathers' obedience to the king's wishes. It was the achievements of Philip and Alexander that changed the traditional relationship between king and aristocrats.

The very personal nature of the Macedonian monarchy made the king a charismatic leader subject to constant review by his subjects. Macedonian kingship also lacked most of the formality ordinarily associated with royalty. As Lindsay Adams (1986: 43–52) has noted, Macedonians of any social background believed that they had the right to petition the king personally concerning their grievances. It was part of Macedonian custom for the people to address the king in person and express their opinions openly. There is a reported tale that a Macedonian king (either Philip II [Plut. *Mor.* 179c–d], or Demetrius I [Plut. *Demetr.* 42.11] – the same incident is claimed for both)[51] once begged off hearing the case of a 'poor woman', claiming he was too busy, to which she responded that he should then give up being king. The Macedonians saw themselves as having the right to have their grievances heard (Adams 1986: 32–52). As a result of this great familiarity between ruler and subject, the *de facto* power of the king depended much on the personality and ability of the particular monarch. Even the title of king was apparently not an official part of Macedonian royal nomenclature prior to the reign of Alexander the Great (Errington 1974: 20–37). The king's personal name without official title was sufficient when the circumstances made the position of the Macedonian monarch clear. This personal aspect of rule was especially true in the army, where the king was literally the first to engage and the last to leave the battle. Philip himself was wounded at least four times. He lost an eye at the siege of Methone (Didymus *in Dem.* 11.22. col. 12.43–64; Scholia *in Dem.* 18.67; Dem. 18.67; Diod. 16.34.5), had his right collar bone broken by an Illyrian lance (Dem. 18.67; Didymus *in Dem.* 11.22. col. 12.64–13.2), had his hand damaged (Dem. 18.67), and his right leg received a wound that left him lame thereafter (Didymus *in Dem.* 11.22, col. 13.3–7; Dem. 18.67).[52] Philip's son Alexander received a head wound on the Granicus (Arr. *Anab.* 1.15.7–8; Diod. 17.20.6; Plut. *Mor.* 327a), a thigh wound at Issus (Arr. *Anab.* 2.12.1; Curt. 3.12.2; Plut. *Mor*. 327a) and shoulder and leg wounds at the siege of Gaza (Arr. *Anab.* 2.27.2; Curt. 4.6.17, 23; Plut. *Mor.* 327a). He also suffered a leg wound near Samarkand (Curt. 7.6.1–9; Arr. *Anab.* 3.30.10–11; Plut. *Mor.* 327a), was struck in the head and neck in Bactria (Arr. *Anab.* 4.3.3; Curt. 7.6.22) and had his lung pierced by an arrow in India (Arr. *Anab.* 6.10.1; Curt. 9.5.9–10).

This lack of much social separation between the king and his subjects has suggested to many that ordinary Macedonians had a direct say in their affairs

through the existence of a national Macedonian assembly empowered to elect kings and judge cases of treason. First put forth by Friedrich Granier (1931), the position has in recent years been supported with modifications by Nicholas Hammond (Hammond and Griffith 1979: 161–2), Leon Mooren (1983: 205–40) and Miltiades Hatzopoulos (1996A: 261–322). The evidence for the existence of an assembly, even with these closely confined powers, however, is not convincing (Errington 1978: 77–133; Anson 1985B: 303–16; 1991: 230–47). When supposed incidences of assemblies are examined, they turn out to be not constitutional entities but ad hoc assemblages called by the king for a variety of reasons, but in no case involving any mandatory requirement that they be summoned.

Part of the argument for the existence of an assembly in Macedonia is the presence of some such body in the neighbouring state of Epirus. While the evidence is spotty, the prominence of tribal institutions is here patent. During the time of Philip II there were fourteen Epirote tribes (Str. 7.7.5). According to Thucydides, in his time the Chaonians and the Thesprotians did not have kings (Thuc. 2.80.5). With these tribes members of the royal family were selected 'to the chieftainship for that year'. The Molossians, however, did have a king, who like his counterpart in Macedonia came from one particular clan (Just. 17.3.9; Thuc. 2.80.6). Among the Molossians there was more regularity in the succession process, including the use of regents for underage rulers until they came of age (Thuc. 2.80.6; Just. 17.3.9–10). According to Diodorus (18.36.4), from the time when Neoptolemus, the son of Achilles, was king until the reign of Aeacides (331–316, 313 BC), sons had always succeeded to their fathers' authority and had died on the throne. The Molossians, however, may have additionally had from the earliest times annual officials and a 'senate' (Just. 17.3.12). There was also a common Molossian citizenship in the Commonwealth (*Koinon*) of the Molossians and an assembly (*Ecclesia*) (Larsen 1968: 277; Hammond 1994: 431; 1967: 525–9, 538). In the latter, the king and the people annually exchanged oaths, both swearing to uphold the laws (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 5.4). There is no such direct evidence for similar limitations on the monarchy in Macedonia. Indeed, the only evidence for an oath in Macedonia relates to one sworn by the Macedonian soldiers to their king (Curt. 7.1.29). A reciprocal oath is not noted.

While both states had a tribal migratory history, what may account for the differences in their constitutional development would be the decades of Persian influence in Lower Macedonia. The Persians had a presence in this area beginning in 513 (Hdt. 4.143–4) and reportedly by 511 had subjugated many peoples in the area 'including the Macedonians' (Hdt. 6.44.1). Alexander I's sister was married to the Persian general Bubares, the son of Megabazus (Hdt. 7.22.1), and Alexander

himself was placed in command of the lands of Lower Macedonia by the Persian king (Just. 7.4.1). The Persian presence and apparent alliance with the Argead royal family likely enhanced the powers of the Macedonian kings, but whether this merely augmented an already existing relationship between the king and his kingdom, or was more crucially involved in this process, cannot be determined from the existing evidence. It is also noted by Hammond that Epirus remained a pastoral state far longer than did Macedonia, and in Epirus the author claims that herds and pasture lands were held communally (Hammond 1967: 184–5, 188). Even in Epirus, however, the evidence is that the monarch may have shared power in some fashion with powerful tribal leaders, not with common Molossians (Cross 1932: 17–18). J. A. O. Larsen (1968: 279) long ago recognized that it is unclear who actually participated in the Epirote assembly, but suggested that it was likely only 'the more influential members of the tribes'. Epirus was then a tribal confederacy whose king may have shared power with a tribal council and with a number of lesser constitutional officials (Hammond 1967: 527, 538–9). No such evidence exists for similar tribal bodies in Macedonia.

With regard to the first claimed sovereign right of a Macedonian assembly, the control over the selection of a new king, there is simply no evidence that clearly suggests that apart from the power of a living monarch or powerful members of the *Hetairoi* to influence the selection, this authority rested with an assembly of the army or of the people. Hatzopoulos (1996A: 278–9) believes that the 'Macedonian Assembly' in matters of succession both for the kingship and for a lawful regency had powers ranging from actual selection to simple acclamation. He states that the latter would be the result of a clear successor and where the 'traditional rules of succession' were followed. Franca Landucci Gattinoni (2003: 32–3) suggests that, if there was no clear heir, or where there were conflicting claims, or when the clear heir was incapable of ruling, then the assembly would be called upon to elect a king.

For neither Philip II nor Alexander III, the two monarchs for whose careers a relative abundance of information exists, is there clear evidence for an elective assembly. In the case of Philip II, Diodorus 16.2.4–5 relates that 'when (Perdiccas) . . . fell in the action, Philip . . . succeeded to the kingdom'. There is no clear statement of the procedure by which Philip became king, and the resulting struggle for power involving so many claimants would suggest that there was no clear constitutional process either. However, it is claimed, based on another passage in Diodorus, that the people did formally select Philip as their king (Hammond and Griffith 1979: 160–1). Diodorus 16.3.1 states, 'Philip bringing together the Macedonians in a series of assemblies [*ecclesiai*] and exhorting

them with eloquent speeches … built up their morale,' and Justin 7.5.9, that 'compelled by the people he accepted the rule'. While *ecclesia* most often is used in the sense of a formal sovereign assembly, it is also used by Diodorus (11.26.5–6, 35.2; 13.87.4; 16.79.2) to refer to a meeting called by a military commander for the purpose of exhorting his troops. Moreover, the passage says nothing about an election. Justin's comment involves his unlikely claim that Philip was first regent for his nephew and later became king in his own right. Even if the claim were true, there is no clear reference to an electoral assembly in the quoted passage. That, in the dire circumstances following the death of Perdiccas, popular pressure built demanding that Philip become king is a more valid explanation of the passage.

As shown, what evidence does survive suggests that on the death of a monarch there was little in the way of Macedonian custom to produce an orderly transition of power. Other than that the new king would come from the Argead clan, there were no other requirements. Certainly, the principal *Hetairoi*, or a significant faction of them, would influence the selection. Moreover, if there was a prominent male member of the family available, and especially present, that individual most often succeeded to the throne. While the evidence comes from the later Antigonid dynasty, the influence of a reigning monarch on the succession can be seen in the various machinations of Philip V regarding his successor, and his actions are likely applicable to the Argeads as well (Livy 40.21.10; 41.23.11). The nobility, seeing Philip's preference for his eldest son, abandoned any support for his younger son, Demetrius. After the murder of Demetrius, Philip became disenchanted with his eldest son and attempted to secure the throne for his nephew Antigonus by commending him to the Macedonian '*principes*' (Livy 40.56.7). Livy, likely reflecting Polybius, states that had Philip lived longer he might have realized his project. However, not only did Philip die before he had secured sufficient support for Antigonus, but Antigonus, also, was not present when Philip died. Perseus arrived on the scene first and secured the throne (Livy 40.54.3–4, 40.56.11, 40.57.1). Support generated during the rule of a father and presence at court at the time of a predecessor's death has more to do with the succession of adult sons than with any constitutional basis for the practice. Any and all candidates would then attempt to secure the acquiescence of the general populace. This process might involve some public acclamation before a prominent military unit or some important Macedonian population such as the inhabitants of Aegae or Pella, the former and the current capitals respectively. It is likely that Argaeus, one of Philip II's rivals for the throne, attempted to get the population of Aegae to endorse his kingship, but failed to get their backing

against Philip (see Chapter 2). This would likely be followed by a formal enthronement, if or when the particular candidate was in control of the capital of Pella (Anson 1985B: 307–8; Errington 1978: 99–100). This acclamation was a mere formality (Anson 1985B: 307–8; 1991: 236–7). The acquiescence, if not full support, of the leading aristocrats, the army and the general population, in that order, would determine who would be king. While foreign forces often did attempt and on occasion briefly did impose their candidates, these usurpers would ultimately be replaced by the candidate accepted by the aforementioned groups.

The only detailed description of a royal selection comes from Quintus Curtius Rufus' account (10.6.20–9.21) of the elevation of Alexander the Great's half-brother Arrhidaeus to the throne as Philip III on the death of the Conqueror. Despite the chaos surrounding the events in Babylon where Alexander died, the selection of a monarch is outlined clearly only here. This was certainly not a typical succession. First, there were only three possible Argead candidates available, and of these none was then capable of ruling on his own. Philip and Alexander had effectively culled the ranks of the formerly populous clan. The three possible claimants for the throne were Alexander's half-brother, Arrhidaeus, who was mentally deficient;[53] a three- or four-year-old son, Heracles, the result of an informal liaison with Barsine, the former wife of Memnon of Rhodes, and the daughter of Artabazus, advisor to Darius and Alexander's one-time satrap of Bactria;[54] and the king's as yet unborn child by his Sogdian wife Roxane. She was pregnant, perhaps, and in fact as it turned out, with Alexander's only legitimate son (Curt. 10.6.9; Just. 13.2.5; Arr. *Succ.* 1a.8). Secondly, this selection of a new king occurred well away from the confines and traditions of Macedonia and after slightly more than ten years of campaigning in foreign lands. Also, unusually, there was present a near full complement of the chief *Hetairoi*, as opposed to a small faction or a well-placed few, and with no Argead personally able to lobby for the throne, these individuals planned to meet formally to decide who would become the new monarch.[55] Finally, the monarchy had in many ways been transformed through the activities of Philip and especially Alexander. There was now a bureaucracy and a great deal more formality at court.

Since none of the surviving Argeads was capable of actually ruling, if the ruler was to be a member of the Argead family, there would need to be a regency, which as indicated previously was a rare occurrence in Argead Macedonian history. To complicate the situation even further, after Alexander's death the chief military commanders were not in agreement on the nature of the regency, or if there needed to be a king at all. Apparently the major commanders had

decided to wait on the birth of Roxane's child (Curt. 10.6.9, 7.8–9). Apparently little thought was given to the possibility that the child might not be male, perhaps because the infant would be male either naturally or by substitution (cf. Curt. 10.6.21). There were major disputes among these prominent military commanders over whether there should be a king at all, or rather a council of these prominent individuals, or a regency by a single individual or by a council (Curt.10.6.13–15). Hard negotiation among those who had been closest to Alexander would likely have led to a solution, but closeted deliberations were not to be. After Alexander's death, even though those deliberating the succession and potential regency were to be only the 'chief companions of the king [*principes amicorum*] and the major troop commanders [*ducesque copiarum*]' (Curt. 10.6.1), 'only those summoned specifically by name' (Curt. 10.6.2), the soldiers who had assembled outside the closed-door meeting, curious to know to whom the kingship would pass, burst into the meeting and refused to leave (Curt. 10.6.1–3). The army in Babylon was not the old Macedonian levy tied solely to the traditions of Macedonia: it was the army that had conquered the Persian Empire, a force now in many ways more professional than national (Anson 1991: 230–47; cf. 1980: 56–7). Many of these same troops on the Hyphasis had through their reluctance to proceed stymied Alexander's desire to conquer India (Arr. *Anab.* 5.25.1–29.1; Diod. 17.93.2–95.2; Curt. 9.2.1–3.19; Plut. *Alex.* 62),[56] and had even jeered their king and commander at Opis.[57] They would not be intimidated by his lieutenants. The deliberations that were to be accomplished through the negotiations of the *principes* in relative secret would now take place before an attentive and vocal audience. The closed meeting had become the first true elective assembly in Macedonian history. This assembly did not come about as the result of troops asserting a constitutional right, but rather as the result of circumstance. The outcome was that, against the wishes of the *principes*, Arrhidaeus was acclaimed king (Curt. 10.7.2–14; Arr. *Succ.* 1a.8). Later, after the birth of Alexander's son, the infant was presented to the army and proclaimed King Alexander IV, to rule jointly with his uncle (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.8).[58] This only surviving narrative account presents a royal selection process that is unique in virtually every respect. It does not take place in Macedonia; there is a dearth of possible claimants; and it results from the collapse of whatever was to be the ad hoc selection process. The only part of this unique election assembly that conforms marginally to Macedonian tradition is that the aristocrats assumed that they would do the selection.

The second most frequently claimed power for an alleged Macedonian assembly is the right to hear and act upon capital cases, and most specifically

those involving treason.[59] Some have seen as evidence for this authority a passage in Curtius. Curtius 6.8.25 states, '*de capitalibus rebus vetusto Macedonum modo inquirebat exercitus--in pace erat vulgi--et nihil potestas regum valebat, nisi prius valuisset auctoritas*' ('With regard to capital cases, according to ancient Macedonian custom, the army inquired – in time of peace the people – and the power of the king was nothing, unless his authority was strong before'). While Elias Kapetanopoulos (1999: 117–28) argues that much of the Curtian account of this episode has been invented as well as amplified by that author, Elizabeth Baynham (1998: 45–50) correctly asserts that Curtius likely elaborated on the material found in his sources, but did not invent the content. The clearest interpretation of the Curtian passage in question is provided by Malcolm Errington (1978: 87–90) – that the king's authority might need to be tested before he could exercise his power; that he needed to test his '*auctoritas*' before exercising his '*potestas*'. In this society where rival claimants, disgruntled subordinates and the Macedonian characteristic 'freedom of speech' could result not just in criticism of a monarch's actions, but outright hostility and the emergence of rival candidates for the throne (Adams 1983: 43–52), a king might not always be able to carry out what he had the authority to do without endangering his relationship with his commanders, his army or his people. The critical conclusion to be drawn is that such testing was only necessary where a monarch's relationship with any of the above three was not on a very firm footing. The fact that Macedonian kings could and on occasion did transport entire populations (Ellis 1969B: 9–12) without seeing any need to discuss or 'test' whether or not they had the authority to do so suggests that, under normal circumstances, kings had little recourse to testing their *auctoritas*. Even though Justin (8.5.8–13) records the general dissatisfaction of those forced to move from their homes and the 'tombs of their ancestors', he also notes that no protest, formal or otherwise, was forthcoming from the people. In fact, Justin emphasizes that the desolation of the population was expressed by 'silent dejection' only, for fear that any outward sign of annoyance might show displeasure and risk reprisal. There were obvious limitations on Macedonian free speech.

The very nature of the royal relationship with the Macedonians meant a king's authority depended on the individual monarch's success and personal charisma. Curtius' comment is likely a true assessment of certain situations in the past and also in relation to his history of Alexander. After his victory at Gaugamela, Alexander was moving from a war of retribution to a war of conquest in which he wished to associate the Iranians as allies. His attempt to transform the previously proclaimed enemies of all Greeks of the earlier campaign into

comrades-in-arms did not enjoy great success among his Macedonians. It also needs to be pointed out that Alexander and his army had been campaigning for years away from home. The military camp had become a sizable community on the move, with wives, mistresses, children, slaves, merchants, etc., in addition to the tens of thousands of soldiers. Military units and even the army as a whole were acquiring corporate identities. As part of the new war in which conquest was the objective, the soldiers' role had become increasingly that of mercenaries, and as such these Macedonians were acquiring many of the attributes commonly associated with such hired forces. As seen in Xenophon's *Anabasis* (e.g. 1 .4.12–13, 7.2), the use of assemblies to bolster morale was very common where the commander was leading a force made up primarily of mercenaries, and this is also the case even where the soldiers are not technically hired forces, but rather citizen soldiers long in service. Caesar, for example, often used assemblies to improve his troops' morale and to explain his actions (Caes. *BG* 7.52; *BC* 3.6, 3.73), and no one would suggest that these assemblies had constitutional prerogatives. In fact, in the sources all of these gatherings of the Roman commander's troops are called *contiones*, or non-decision-taking assemblies. All of Alexander's troop assemblies are also called *contiones* by Curtius.[60] Moreover, Curtius was making it clear that these were not constitutional assemblies, for he earlier referred to the Athenian Assembly as a *Concilia Plebis*, one form of a Roman formal assembly of the people (10.2.3; cf. Anson 1985B: 309–10). The natural camaraderie of Caesar's army with its charismatic commander was strengthened by such meetings, and this was often the case with Alexander as well, but not always. Alexander's attempts to reach an accommodation with Persians and other Asiatics along with his flirtation with divinity angered troops who by tradition were free men, not the subjects of a 'great king' or of a godlike ruler (see Anson 2013: 83–120).

As with the claim for elective assemblies, the claim for judicial ones is based primarily on the career of Alexander the Great and only a couple of incidents that take place in Macedonia proper. Even though many scholars assert that assemblies were a traditional part of Macedonian *nomos*, only two judicial assemblies for which there is even a modicum of evidence are claimed to have taken place in Macedonia itself, and neither of these took place prior to the death of Philip II in 336. These are a very dubious trial of someone connected with Philip II's assassination, and the trial of Alexander's mother Olympias in 315.[61] With respect to the first, our narrative sources do not mention any trials. Diodorus (17.94.4) states that Philip's assassin, Pausanias, was cut down as he attempted to flee, and Justin (9.7.10) that the murderer was captured

and crucified. Neither mentions a trial. Others, perhaps, associated with the assassination are executed, but again with no mention of a trial, including Alexander's cousin Amyntas Perdicca (Curt. 6.9.17, 10.24; Just. 12.6.4) and certain brothers from the Upper Macedonian district of Lyncestis (Arr. *Anab.* 1.25.1–2; Just. 11.2.1–2; cf. Curt. 7.1.6). Only a papyrus fragment of unknown attribution (*P Oxy.* 1798) has suggested to some that Pausanias or someone else in some way connected to the assassination was tried by an assembly of Macedonians and then executed (Hammond 1978: 343–9; Hatzopoulos 1996A: 272–3). The authorship, restoration and interpretation of this fragment, however, are all debated (Parsons 1979: 97–9; Kapetanopoulos 1996: 84; Anson 2008A: 137), and Ernst Badian has described the fragment as derived from 'an unimportant Alexander history related to the Romance' (1979: 97), while Brian Bosworth (1971: 94) has declared it 'unreliable evidence'.

The evidence for a trial for Alexander's mother Olympias is, however, substantial, but offers problems of its own. In the first place, this trial takes place during the period of conflict and chaos commonly called the 'Wars of the Successors'. Additionally, at the time of the trial only the six-year-old Alexander IV survived of the dual monarchy created after Alexander's death, and his legal regent was in dispute. In the events leading up to trial, while Polyperchon, the then official regent, was out of Macedonia (Diod. 19.11.2; Just. 14.5.1),[62] Eurydice, the wife of King Philip III, had 'usurped' the role of regent for her husband (Diod. 19.11.1; Just. 14.5.2–3) and had put Cassander, the son of Alexander's regent for Macedonia but now dead, in charge of the army and the 'administration' of the kingdom (Just. 14.5.3). However, at the time of his appointment he was out of the country and prior to this appointment Cassander was officially at war with the official government of the kings, Philip III and Alexander IV (Diod. 18.74.3). Before the new general could come to Macedonia from the Peloponnesus where he was campaigning, Polyperchon returned (Diod. 19.11.1; Just. 14.5.9). Eurydice and Philip raised an army to resist, but the army deserted and the royal couple was captured (Diod. 19.11.2–3). Polyperchon had earlier invited Olympias, Alexander the Great's mother, to return to Macedonia as guardian for the young Alexander and to share the regency (Diod. 18.49.4, 57.2, 65.1; Anson 1992: 39–43). In Macedonia, Olympias now took charge of the kingdom. She appointed generals (Diod. 19.35.4), commanded troops (Diod. 19.35.4–5, 50.1), dispatched orders to garrison commanders (Diod. 18.65.1) and administered justice (Diod. 19.11.8–9). As one of her first acts, she immediately took control of the captured Eurydice and Philip III and after maltreating them for 'many days' saw to their deaths (Diod. 19.11.5–7; Just. 14.5.9–10). Additionally, she selected 100

prominent Macedonians and killed them as well (Diod. 19.11.8). In the following year, Cassander himself invaded Macedonia and by the summer had gained control of the country and was besieging Olympias in the city of Pydna (Diod. 19.35, 36.5; Just. 14.4). After the conclusion of the siege of Pydna and the capture of Alexander's mother, Cassander had charged her *in absentia* with crimes before a 'common assembly of the Macedonians' which was stacked with the relatives of her many victims (Diod. 19.51.1–2; Just. 1 4.5–6).[63] Clearly Cassander was one in need of carefully demonstrating his *auctoritas*. He was prosecuting the mother of Alexander the Great. The assembly then either voted to convict Olympias, or, while leaning towards a guilty verdict, was adjourned. Pierre Briant (1973: 297–9) accepts that Alexander's mother was condemned by the Macedonians, and Hatzopoulos (1996A: 275) asserts that the trial took place before 'the whole "normal" Macedonian Assembly'. It is clear that only those Macedonians loyal to Cassander and likely including many of his soldiers were involved (Carney 1994: 373). Prior to calling the assembly together, Cassander had urged the relatives of those whom Olympias had previously slain to accuse her before this body (Diod. 19.51.2; Just. 14.6.6). Whether the trial had concluded or been adjourned, it was Cassander who saw to her actual execution (Diod. 19.51.5; Just. 14.6.9).

This trial hardly qualifies as evidence for any legal or constitutional procedure. This is clearly a case where the *auctoritas* of the prosecutor is suspect and he was attempting to give some cover for what was in effect the murder of the mother of Alexander the Great. Whatever might be claimed, Cassander's position was acquired on the battlefield. Executing the mother of Alexander the Great on his own authority could be very dangerous. Earlier, without any compulsion, Cassander had seen to the murder of Aristonous, Olympias' commander in Amphipolis (Diod. 19.51.1; cf. 19.50.7) and one of the great Alexander's seven formal bodyguards (Arr. *Anab.* 6.28.4). There was no trial. Moreover, Cassander's respect for Macedonian tradition is highly suspect. Immediately after the death of Olympias he had Alexander IV and his mother Roxane placed under guard in Amphipolis (Diod. 19.52.4; Just. 14.6.13), ordering that the king be treated as a commoner. In 309, Cassander saw to the murders of both mother and king (Diod. 19.105.2–3).

During the much later Antigonid dynasty, Philip V convened a select group of Macedonians in Demetrias in Thessaly to hear charges against Ptolemaeus (Polyb. 5.29.6). While Polybius states that Ptolemaeus was tried before the 'Macedonians', the army had previously been sent back to Macedonia to spend the winter (Polyb. 5.29.5), making it likely that these Macedonians were either the king's councillors (Anson 1985B: 313 and n. 54) or, perhaps, Philip's royal

guard and any other Macedonians who happened to be present (Hatzopoulos 1996A: 302–3). In either case – a trial before his council or before a part of the army – Philip had picked his jury. The king's power to control the prosecution and the selection of the jury here, as in the case of Cassander and Olympias, makes the concept of a 'Macedonian' assembly rather specious. Ptolemaeus had been part of a disturbance among Philip's Macedonian infantry guards and was popular with these troops (Polyb. 5.25.1–4). It would have been in Philip's interests to have a trial to share the guilt of the murder of a popular individual, but the trial would be before safe elements in his regime. Immediately after the disturbance Philip had called an assembly of this elite guard and had found that there was insufficient enthusiasm for punishing those responsible for the riot (Polyb. 5.25.5–6).

The first clear evidence for judicial assemblies appears only in the later part of the reign of Alexander the Great and these take place in Asia (Anson 1991: 231–6). While an argument from silence is never secure, these assemblies do appear in our sources to be connected with Alexander's arrival in the Persian heartland and coincide with his attempts to change the nature of the campaign from one of revenge to one of conquest, in which the conquered would be incorporated into the new polity, the Kingdom of Asia (see Anson 2013: 153–79). Alexander's relationship with his commanders and his soldiers was increasingly strained by his actions in this regard. Under these new circumstances, Alexander came to use assemblies of soldiers in a number of capacities, including as judicial tribunals. If these 'trials', as claimed, do represent regular practice and were part of Macedonian judicial custom, then there must be some regularity to the procedure, a sense of obligation to summon such a body in particular circumstances, the feeling of entitlement on the part of the Macedonians to hear these cases, and the defendant's right to be so tried. As in the previous examination of those trials that took place in Macedonia, none of those involving Alexander can be shown to be required by Macedonian *nomoi*.

In the trials of Philotas,[64] Alexander of Lyncestis (Curt. 7.1.8; Diod. 17.80.2), the sons of Andromenes[65] and the Macedonian Pages (Curt. 8.6.28; Arr. *Anab.* 4.14.2) it is Alexander who summons the 'Macedonians' to hear the particular case. There is one possible albeit peculiar trial – that of the dead Cleitus. In 328, Cleitus was murdered by Alexander during a drunken argument between the two men (Arr. *Anab.* 4.8.8–9; Curt. 8.1.49–52; Plut. *Alex.* 51.9–11; Just. 12.6.3). Afterwards, as Alexander lay in his tent refusing food, in some fashion the 'Macedonians decreed' that Cleitus had been justly put to death (Curt. 8.2.12). Richard Bauman (1990: 139) calls this trial 'a landmark in the evolution of the

new kind of impiety', namely, insulting the king. Our source does not make such a claim, stating only that the Macedonians wished to lessen the king's shame. The punishment for the dead man's crime was to be the denial of a proper burial, but Alexander having recovered from his grief ordered the ceremony to go forward (Curt. 8.2.12). No other source mentions this action by the Macedonians. That such a meeting took place spontaneously has been doubted (Badian 2000: 69). But aside from this 'trial', during the reign of Alexander 'judicial assemblies' were called exclusively by the king.

The principal evidence for the claim that assemblies of Macedonians had judicial competence comes from Curtius' account of the trial of Alexander's childhood companion and then commander of the elite Macedonian cavalry, Philotas (Curt. 6.8.23–11.40). Neither Arrian (*Anab.* 3.26.2–4) nor Diodorus (17.79.6–80.2) give more than a brief outline of the events. The beginning of this affair was a conspiracy involving a number of rather nondescript Macedonians. Only a certain Demetrius, who was a *Somatophylax*, one of the seven elite bodyguards of the king, held a significant position (Curt. 6.7.15; Arr. *Anab.* 3.27.5). Nor is the cause of the plot clear. Diodorus (17.79.1) reports that one of the conspirators 'found fault with the king for some reason, and in a rash fit of anger formed a plot against him', but Justin (12.5.2–3) does mention that at this time Alexander was being criticized for turning from the traditions of his homeland, which likely is a reference to his rapprochement with the Persians. The plot was revealed to Philotas, who kept the information to himself. When the plot was finally discovered, Alexander's 'council' was summoned and this body unanimously concluded that Philotas was guilty of treason (Curt. 6.8.10–15). Philotas was seized and brought before the entire army ('*omnes armati*') and so charged (Curt. 6.8.20–23; Arr. *Anab.* 3.26.2). When the charges were first announced, the soldiers were moved by the alteration in Philotas' fortunes from Companion Cavalry commander to '*damnatum*' (Curt. 6.9.26). The evidence makes it clear that charging Philotas was entirely up to the king, who at any time could have pardoned him (Curt. 6.10.11). In that initial meeting of the council, Craterus advised Alexander not to do so (Curt. 6.8.5). The Macedonian monarch clearly had full authority over those accused of serious crimes. Alexander did not charge Alexander of Lyncestis with complicity in the murder of the former's father, 'even though his guilt was clear', because the latter was the first to salute him as king and also through the intercession of the Lyncestian's father-in-law, Antipater (Curt. 7.1.6), Alexander's future regent for Macedonia. Later the Lyncestian was implicated in a Persian plot to kill Alexander, and while he was placed under arrest, he was not brought to trial for three years.[66] Justin (11.7.2)

adds that the king feared possible rebellion in Macedonia if he killed him. Only a personal justification, however, can explain the lack of punishment for the royal treasurer. Harpalus was that royal treasurer who had been one of Alexander's long-standing companions (Arr. *Anab.* 3.6.5; Plut. *Alex.* 10.4). Shortly before the Battle of Issus, Harpalus had fled to Greece with part of the treasury, but Alexander encouraged his return and when he did come back, his flight was forgiven and he was reinstated as the 'custodian of the funds with Alexander' (Arr. *Anab.* 3.6.4).

With respect to a right to trial by assembly, Curtius (7.2.9) does assert that an accused person had the right either to defend himself or herself, or to be defended by someone else speaking on the accused's behalf. There is no requirement here set forth, however, that this defence is to be before an assembly, and in fact this may be no more than an extension of the Macedonian 'freedom of speech'. When Coenus, one of Alexander's commanders and Philotas' brother-in-law, after the accusations had been made, picked up a stone and was at the point of throwing it at the accused, Alexander intervened, stating that the accused should be given a chance to plead his case ('*prius causae debere fieri potestatem reo nec aliter judicari passurum se affirmans*') (Curt. 6.9.31). Curtius (6.10.30) further claims that it was customary for parents of the accused to plead for the defendant as well, which was clearly in this instance to be before Alexander and his council. While Philotas and his indicted co-conspirators were given the opportunity to defend themselves and in this case before an assembly of soldiers (Arr. *Anab.* 3.26.2; Curt. 6.9.32–11.38), others were not. Parmenion, the father of the convicted Philotas, was not given any opportunity to defend himself (Arr. *Anab.* 3.26.3–4), but was murdered on Alexander's orders.[67] During the first year of Alexander's reign, the Macedonian nobleman Attalus was murdered without the benefit of trial (Diod. 17.2.5–6; Curt. 7.1.3), as were the brothers of the Lyncestian Alexander (Arr. *Anab.* 1.25.1–2; Just. 11.2.1–2; cf. Curt. 7.1.6),[68] and all of these were accused by Alexander of plotting his death (Curt. 6.9.17; 8.8.7). Later in the winter of 325/4, Cleander, Heracon and Agathon, all Macedonian commanders, in addition to 600 regular soldiers, were condemned on Alexander's authority alone (Curt. 10.1.1–9; cf. Arr. *Anab.* 6.27.4), as was one of his *Hetairoi*, Menander (Plut. *Alex.* 57.3). The king acquitted Heracon of the first set of charges against him, but with the appearance of subsequent claims of misconduct, he was executed (Arr. *Anab.* 6.27.5).

On Alexander's arrival at Opis in 324, he called together his Macedonians and announced that he was now discharging and returning to Macedonia all those unfit for service because of age or wounds. Even though Alexander meant

to please his troops, they felt Alexander now despised them. Long-standing grievances now came to the surface. The soldiers complained about Alexander's adoption of Persian dress, his outfitting Asiatic units in Macedonian armament and the introduction of foreigners into the elite Companion Cavalry. But, besides complaints, the troops hurled insults at their commander. Alexander now ordered the arrest of the most conspicuous troublemakers, thirteen in all, who were marched off to immediate execution.[69] There was no trial, no appeal. Moreover, Alexander's authority to condemn Philotas was never questioned. However, Curtius (6.11.39) comments that unless Parmenion and Philotas had been shown to be guilty, they could not have been condemned 'without the indignation of the whole army'. There is no question here of Alexander's right to punish them, only the possible danger of angering his army by this action. Later, many did change their minds and came to regret Philotas' condemnation (Curt. 7.1.1–4). By bringing these charges before an assembly, a sense of transparency could be obtained and the responsibility for the decision would be shared.

In the meeting (*contio*) summoned to hear charges against Philotas' friends (Curt. 7.2.6), the sons of Andromenes (Amyntas, Simmias and Polemon), Alexander's authority again is obvious. Here the troops appealed to Alexander to spare the brothers (Curt. 7.2.7), which Alexander by his '*sententia*' did (Curt. 7.2.8). It was shortly after Philotas' execution and in connection with the charges brought against the sons of Andromenes that the Lyncestian Alexander was bought forward before the troops and after failing to offer a defence was executed (Curt. 7.1.5–10; Diod. 17.80.2). By prearrangement, when the troops assembled, Atarrhias called for the Lyncestian to be brought before them (Curt. 7 .1.5). When he was unable to defend himself, he was killed by those soldiers who were nearest to him (Curt. 7.1.9). Curtius is very clear that no decision to execute was taken by the *contio* as a whole: Alexander of Lyncestis was murdered either by soldiers acting on their own initiative or in response to orders or indications from Alexander.

Moreover, in the '*contio*' called to hear the charges against the sons of Andromenes (Curt. 7.2.6), the 'army' by its tears and shouts demonstrated their desire for an acquittal and appealed directly to Alexander to spare the young men ('*ut insontibus et fortibus viris* [*Alexander*] *parceret*', Curt. 7.2.7), which Alexander by his '*sententia*' did ('*ipse Amyntan mea sententia fratresque eius absolvo*', Curt. 7.2.8). Hammond (Hammond and Griffith 1979: 158, n. 2) argues that the Curtian passage implies that the soldiers were acquitted and that Alexander only pronounced his view 'to show that he was in agreement'. Curtius' language is clear, however, that the troops awaited Alexander's verdict. Arrian (*Anab.* 3.26.2) simply reports that the brothers were tried before the Macedonians

and acquitted. It appears, therefore, from the evidence that the king exercised final authority over life and death regardless of whether there was a trial or not.

In the Conspiracy of the Pages in 327, while Arrian (*Anab.* 4.14.2) states that Hermolaus, one of the conspirators, was brought before the 'Macedonians', without any further specific reference, the more complete narrative in Curtius (8.6.28–8.20) reports that Alexander summoned his regular advisors (*frequens consilium*) 'and the fathers and other relatives of the accused' to hear the charges, not the entire army (Curt. 8.6.28, 8.8.20; cf. Arr. *Anab.* 4.14.2–3; Plut. *Alex.* 55.2). All the accused confessed and the assembled rebuked them. After Hermolaus admitted his role in the plot, Alexander dismissed the *consilium* and turned the accused over to 'soldiers in [Hermolaus'] unit' for execution (Curt. 8.8.20). According to Arrian (*Anab.* 4.14.3), Hermolaus and the other conspirators were stoned 'by those who were present'.

In the final analysis, there is no basis for the supposition that the Macedonians meeting in assembly had the customary and recognized right to hear judicial cases. These recorded 'trials' demonstrate no procedure, are summoned at the whim of the king, demonstrate no apparent right to be tried by anyone other than the king or his representative(s) and exhibit no demands on the part of any group to hear such cases. Alexander in central Asia was in a precarious position. His attempt to unite the Macedonians and Persians into a new imperial people required at the least the acquiescence of the Macedonians, who were reluctant to give it. At this juncture the king was solicitous of their feelings. Given the personal quality of the kingship, Macedonians likely, as suggested by Curtius, did believe that they had a right to plead their case before their king and even for their relatives to participate. Such participation was at the discretion of the king and was part of the Macedonian tradition of freedom of speech before their king. Before Alexander, and to a lesser degree Philip, had increased the social distance between the king and his subjects, there was a great deal more informality at the Macedonian court. Both of these monarchs were changing what had been a virtual lack of social distance previously between king and subjects. Such a transition brought forth discomfort and distress, especially to those in the *Hetairoi* class, but clearly during Alexander's reign there was growing dissatisfaction in the ranks of the Macedonian soldiers as well. In central Asia, Alexander's agenda required that he tread carefully with respect to his Macedonians. Alexander had further conquests in view: all of India lay before him. After the army, due to its reluctance to proceed, ended Alexander's Indian ambitions, there were no more judicial assemblies. As Ernst Badian (1961: 16–43) has noted, opposition was now met by brutal royal autocracy.

In addition to there being no real evidence for a Macedonian assembly, the very nature of Macedonian society prior to the reign of Philip II would have made such a body little more than an assembly of the king's *Hetairoi*. There was no army assembly, because aside from the aristocratic cavalry there was little in the way of an army. Most Macedonians were tenant farmers and dependent pastoralists (Anson 2008B: 17–30). A 'people's assembly' is, consequently, equally unlikely. While Granier claimed that this assembly was similar to that of the migrating Germanic tribes of the late Roman period, the operative word is that these were 'migrating' peoples, not settled dependent populations over widespread territories. The assemblies that begin to appear after 330 in Alexander's army do bear a resemblance to these Germanic tribal assemblies for the simple reason that here again you have an army on the move for a long period of time with a developing identity.

The nature of Macedonia prior to the reign of Philip II was that of a backward state with great resources awaiting someone who could overcome the internal divisions, seize the independent coastal cities that dominated much of the country's trade and achieve defensible borders. Given that the kings had great theoretical powers, it would take a king who could turn the theoretical into reality. With the accession of Philip II to the throne, Macedonia had such a monarch. He would unite Macedonia and turn it into the greatest power in the Western world.

2

Philip II and the New Model Army

To comprehend the extent of Philip II's transformation of the Macedonian army and ancient warfare in general, you only have to remember the state of the Macedonian military when the new king came to the throne.[1] His brother, King Perdiccas, and 4,000 Macedonians lay dead on the battlefield, their deaths coming at the hands of Bardylis and the Illyrians[2] in 359 (Diod. 16.2.1, 4–5).[3] This was not an unusual circumstance. The Macedonians had long suffered from invasions and attacks from their neighbours from the north, west, east and south. Nor was Philip even fully in charge of the territory called Macedonia.

Illyria was a region north of the Aous (Vijosë) river, east of the Adriatic, northwest of Macedonia and mostly south of the Danube.[4] They were tribal in organization, with the second-century Roman historian Appian (*Ill*. 1.2) reporting that the country was named for Illyrius, the son of Polyphemus, who had six sons, Enchelous, Autarieus, Dardanus, Maedus, Taulas and Perrhaebus, and from these and other children sprang, according to Appian, the various Illyrian tribes. The Macedonians throughout their history had frequently been the victims of Illyrian aggression.[5] In addition to the disastrous defeat of Philip's brother in 359, their father Amyntas III had been expelled from his kingdom twice by the Illyrians.[6] Diodorus (14.92.3) reports that in 393/392 the Illyrians invaded Macedonia, and Amyntas, 'giving up hope for his crown', bought an alliance with the Olynthians by surrendering certain border lands that had been in dispute to them and retired to an unspecified part of his kingdom. From the evidence of Xenophon (*Hell.* 5.2.13), it is doubtful that Amyntas had given these lands willingly to the Olynthians, since by 383 they controlled most of the cities of Macedonia including Pella, formerly the capital of Amyntas' kingdom. After two years, during which Macedonia was ruled by Argaeus II (Diod. 14.92.4; Euseb. *Chron.* 200.11), Amyntas was restored by the Thessalians. Diodorus (15.19.2) further reports that ten years later 'Amyntas the king had been defeated by the Illyrians and had relinquished his authority; he had furthermore made a grant to the people of the Olynthus of a large part of the borderland because of his abandonment of political power.'

The striking similarities between Diodorus' descriptions of the two Illyrian invasions has led Gene Borza (1990: 182–4) to declare that these two reported incidents are a doublet. John Ellis (1969A: 3–4) and Nicholas Hammond (Hammond and Griffith 1979: 172–3) properly accept both incidents as factual. Ellis, however, is probably correct that the two references to Amyntas relinquishing control of his 'borderland' to Olynthus is likely incorrect, yet there is sufficient information otherwise to suggest two distinct incidents. It is likely that the Olynthians held this land continuously from 393/2 until 380/379 (Xen. *Anab.* 5.3.26; Diod. 15.23.2–3). Amyntas' first expulsion likely then occurred in 393/2 and that monarch was able to recover his kingdom with the help of the Thessalians a couple of years later (Diod. 14.92.3–4). In the second incident of 383/382, which lasted only three months, Amyntas was forced to pay tribute for the recovery of his kingdom (Isoc. 6.46; Diod. 15.19.2; cf. 16.2.2). It is possible that as part of this agreement Amyntas married an Illyrian princess, Eurydice (*Suda*, s.v. Karanos; Lib. *Vit. Dem.* 9; cf. Plut. *Mor.* 14c), but this is not universally accepted either by our ancient sources (Str. 7.7.8) or by modern commentators.[7] As noted in the Introduction, the best argument against Eurydice being an Illyrian is found in the celebration that followed Philip's seventh marriage. Here, the bride's uncle, Attalus, had implied that Alexander was not a legitimate Macedonian and not a true heir because his mother was not a Macedonian. If Philip's mother was not a Macedonian then the insult would have been directed at the father as well. Philip apparently did not, however, feel insulted by the remark and that would suggest that Philip's mother was Lyncestian and therefore Macedonian.

Diodorus (16.2.2) claims that in 383/382 Philip was surrendered to the Illyrians by his father Amyntas as a hostage, but was subsequently given by the Illyrians to the Thebans. This cannot possibly be correct and likely is mistaken for the incident in 367,[8] when Philip was given as one of thirty hostages to the Thebans as part of an alliance (Diod. 15.67.4; Plut. *Pelop.* 26.4; cf. Aeschin. 2.28–9). In 383, Macedonia was allied to Sparta in a war against Olynthus, and Thebes was likewise a Spartan ally. Moreover, in 382 Sparta was in control of Thebes with a Spartan garrison in the Cadmea (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.29–32; Diod. 15.20.1–3). Therefore, it would be very unlikely that Philip would then remain as a hostage in Thebes for three years (Just. 6.9.7; 7.5.3).[9] As if that was not enough to deny the validity of the episode, Diodorus (16.2.3) also records that, while in Thebes, Philip was taken in by Pammenes and raised with the later great Theban general Epaminondas, with whom he shared the Pythagorean philosopher, Lysis, as a common tutor. Epaminondas was in active military service in 385 (Paus. 9.13.1; Plut. *Pelop.* 4.4) and consequently a grown man in 383, while Philip was

still an infant,[10] since Philip died at the age of forty-six or forty-seven in 336 (Just. 9.8.1; Paus. 8.7.6); in 383/2 he would have been barely born, hardly then of an age to engage in any meaningful conversation with a Pythagorean philosopher. The ultimate origin of the story found in Diodorus and its association with whatever took place in 383 likely lies in Diodorus' confused introduction to his history of the reign of Philip. In actuality, the tale relates to an incident during the reign of Alexander II, Philip's oldest brother, who ruled Macedonia from 370 to 368 (*Marm. Par.* 74; Diod. 15.71.1).[11] Part of the confusion may be that Justin (7.5.1) reports that Philip was given as a hostage to the Illyrians by his brother Alexander before he was passed to the Thebans. Alexander at the start of his reign purchased peace with the Illyrians and gave them as a hostage his youngest brother Philip (Just. 7.5.1).[12] Philip's time in Illyria was apparently short, since soon thereafter Alexander was forced to make an alliance with the Thebans under Pelopidas, and as part of the agreement the Theban commander demanded the teenage Philip as a hostage (Diod. 15.67.4; Just. 7.5.2; Plut. *Pelop.* 26.4). Philip then came to live with Pammenes and became the admirer, not a toddler playmate, of Epaminondas. If Justin's evidence is accepted then Philip had a rather remarkable puberty. No other source mentions this stint by Philip in Illyria, and there is much in this section of Justin which is highly questionable, but Justin's evidence would certainly help explain the origin of Diodorus' or his source's confusion.

Macedonia had a long history of defeat and humiliation at the hands not just of their Illyrian neighbours but practically those of everyone else living in the peninsula. This entire history was reversed in Philip's very first year as king when he defeated the same Illyrians who had so recently all but destroyed the Macedonian army, inflicting 7,000 casualties on this previously victorious army (Diod. 16.4.7). How such a dramatic turnaround could have taken place is answered by our sources. When Philip became king, Diodorus (16.3.1–2) reports, 'Philip was not panic-stricken by the magnitude of the expected perils, but, bringing together the Macedonians in a series of assemblies and exhorting them with eloquent speeches to be men, he built up their morale, and, having improved the organization of his forces and equipped the men suitably with weapons of war . . . he devised the compact order and the equipment of the phalanx . . . and was the first to organize the Macedonian phalanx.' In short, Diodorus is proclaiming that Philip organized the first serious heavy infantry in Macedonian history. While Thucydides (2.100.2) states that King Archelaus, who reigned from 413 to 399, increased the number of available hoplites beyond anything that existed previously in Macedonia, this likely refers to his changing the

armament of his guard, since prior to the reign of Philip II, Macedonian forces are most often listed as cavalry and conscript, light-armed, infantry. The Macedonian *Hetairoi*, the king's 'companion' cavalry, were some of the best horsemen in the world, but the Macedonian infantry was mostly lightly armed and poorly trained (Anson 2013: 17–18). While Herodotus (7.185) does include Macedonians in his enumeration of Xerxes' forces, they appear to be exclusively cavalry and their use minimal. They were employed to protect Boeotian towns so that the Boeotians could join the Persian forces (Hdt. 8.34). The cavalry were also present at the Battle of Plataea, but there is no such evidence for heavy Macedonian infantry (Hdt. 9.31.5). During the Peloponnesian War there are frequent references to Macedonian cavalry, but few to infantry of any kind (Thuc. 1.61.4, 62.2–3, 63.2). While a force of hoplites was mustered in 423 by King Perdiccas II, these are listed separately from 'his Macedonian subjects', as from the 'Hellenes living in Macedonia' (Thuc. 4.124.1), either coming from the Greek coastal cities[13] or representing Greek migrants domiciled in Macedonia.[14] Regardless, these were not native Macedonian hoplites. There is, in fact, little evidence for such a true heavy infantry force until the reign of Philip II.

Philip, however, did not create a traditional hoplite phalanx. Polyaenus, a second-century Macedonian author of eight books of 'Stratagems' culled from many sources, relates that 'Philip [II] . . . made them [the Macedonians] take up their arms . . . carrying helmets, shields, greaves, *sarissai* [σαρίσας] . . .' (4.2.10). The last term, *sarisa* or *sarissa*, is at the heart of Philip's reforms. Prior to this monarch, most land battles involving Greek armies relied on the 'hoplite', heavy infantry, phalanx. These infantrymen had dominated warfare for more than two centuries. By contrast, in actual battle cavalry and light-armed troops played only secondary roles, used primarily to protect the flanks and rear of these heavy-infantry formations, and secondarily to pursue the defeated and fleeing enemy. Light infantry typically wore little armour except usually a helmet and fought as javelin men, slingers or archers. Their formations were open as opposed to the dense, compact, nature of the hoplite infantry phalanx.

Philip's changes included exchanging the seven- to eight-foot hoplite spear and three-foot-diameter circular shield for a fifteen-foot pike (the *sarissa*) and a two-foot-diameter shield hung from the neck and shoulder. While the hoplite was further armed with helmet, greaves and breastplate, Philip's phalangite had little in the way of defensive armour beyond a helmet.[15] In the Hellenistic period, *sarissai* might be as long as twenty-four feet. These troops resembled the later Swiss pikemen of the early modern era, a similarity that Nicolai Machiavelli (1965: 47) recognized in his description of these later infantrymen. Whether

armed with the hoplite panoply or as Macedonian *sarissa*-bearers, these troops formed tight compact units called phalanxes. Philip produced an army in which this phalanx was coordinated with the traditionally superb Macedonian cavalry, along with contingents of light-armed troops and a professional core of infantry trained to fight with the long pikes or as traditional Greek hoplites. His tactics were also different from what had been standard in Greek warfare for over 200 years. No longer would the battle be determined solely by the clash of infantries, but more often by an attack of heavy cavalry. 'Heavy cavalry' wore armour and carried lances, often shortened versions of the infantry *sarissa*, and secondarily swords; light cavalry were typically unarmoured and equipped with bows or javelins, the latter typically used as spears. In what has been described as the 'hammer and anvil' tactic, the new Macedonian infantry pinned down the corresponding enemy force, permitting the cavalry to probe for weaknesses, which they would then exploit to victory. The infantry became the anvil on which the hammer of the cavalry would smash the enemy. It was the cavalry that made the pike phalanx possible. Hoplite phalanxes were notorious for having exposed flanks and rear, but pike phalanxes could be far more vulnerable. With three or four ranks of pikes piercing the front of the formation, turning to meet attacks from the rear or flanks was difficult. In such situations, like their hoplite counterparts, they would often form squares. In comparison, the Swiss pikemen engaged in a *sturmlauf*, a running charge, because they had little cavalry and consequently their pikemen were the hammer in their configuration. Over time, thanks to his increasing revenues, Philip added numerous other units to his newly formed pike phalanx, including hoplites, skirmishers, archers and mercenaries, supplementing the traditionally strong Macedonian cavalry (Dem. 9.49). Along with his military successes came new financial resources. Macedonia had large reserves of minerals including gold and silver,[16] which in the past were outside of the monarch's control, but Philip's military successes gave him ultimately complete access to all of Macedonia's many resources. With this new army, Philip gained hegemony over most of the Greek world and his son Alexander conquered the Persian Empire and became 'the Great'.

Diodorus' implication (16.3.1) that the *sarissa*-bearing phalanx was the product of Philip's first year in command of the Macedonian army has been questioned.[17] Gene Borza (1990: 202) is doubtful that Philip could have instituted a major reorganization of the Macedonian army 'within a brief six or seven months', and Minor Markle believes that Philip did not introduce the *sarissa* until 338.[18] There is very little direct evidence regarding the timing of Philip's military reforms. The earliest reference to a *sarissa* in battle occurs in Didymus'

(*In Dem.* 11.22, col. 13.3–7) account of Philip's leg wound received in the campaign against the Triballi (Just. 9.3.1–2; cf. Plut. *Mor.* 331b; Dem. 18.67), a campaign generally dated to 339.[19] According to Didymus, Philip was stabbed by a '*sarissa*' during an engagement with the enemy. Plutarch (*Mor.* 331b), however, the only other author to mention a weapon with respect to this incident, refers to it simply and amorphously as a *logkê*, a generic spear or even a javelin.[20] It would be curious that Philip would be wounded by the implement most likely only carried by his own troops. The earliest indisputably dated remains of *sarissai* spearheads are associated with the Battle of Chaeronea (Sotiriades 1903: 301–30). Despite the lack of direct evidence to secure the date of the introduction of these reforms, inferential evidence clearly suggests that Philip introduced the *sarissa* into the ranks of his infantry and probably his cavalry as well by 359/358.

At least two of Philip's military innovations must have been incorporated into the Macedonian army in the very first year of his reign or earlier: the *sarissa*-phalanx (Anson 2010: 51–68) and a professional infantry core unit (Anson 1985A: 46–8). Philip had likely been influenced by the longer spears used occasionally in combat by the troops of Macedonia's tribal neighbours and perhaps even by some Macedonians themselves, and very often in hunting. While the evidence regarding the employment of infantry in the north suggests that light-armed infantry armed with javelins dominated, artistic renderings, archaeological finds and the occasional literary reference show Thracian infantry on occasion with long-thrusting spears. It is very possible that given that light-armed infantry, if used primarily as skirmishers, lacked standardized equipment and carried a multitude of offensive weaponry, perhaps even those used primarily for hunting. This evidence of the occasional use of thrusting spears has been collected by J. G. P. Best (1969: 5–7, 41, plates 3–4).[21] The evidence for the armament of another of Macedonia's tribal neighbours, the Paeonians, is even more sparse, but the indications are that they also relied on light-armed infantry. Under Alexander the Great, Paeonians served as light cavalry, skirmishers and scouts (Arr. *Anab.* 1.14.1, 6; 2.9.2; 3.13.3). The evidence for the Illyrians is sparser still and it appears more likely that the Illyrians under Bardylis were using hoplite panoplies, either commingled with light-armed infantry which is less likely or kept as a separate unit in what was predominately a light infantry force armed with javelins. Bardylis' military reforms and his success in battle were tied to his incorporation of hoplites into his force. This innovation was likely due to the alliance between the Illyrians and Dionysius of Syracuse (Diod. 15.13.2). As part of this alliance, Dionysius donated to Bardylis 500 panoplies of 'Greek armour', i.e. hoplite equipment (Diod. 15.13.2). There is no evidence that they

also used long thrusting spears. In any case, long thrusting spears used by individual soldiers would be very ineffective, as is seen in the staged battle between the Macedonian Coragus and the Athenian athlete Dioxippus. In this competition the Athenian with a club defeated the elite, fully armed, sarissa-bearing Macedonian (Diod. 17.100.2–101.2; Curt. 9.7.16–23).

Philip's genius was not the arming of some troops with thrusting spears, it was in creating a heavy infantry primarily of such armed individuals and combining this infantry with peltasts, slingers, archers,and especially light and heavy cavalry. Peltasts were more commonly the infantry force in the north, while in the south the chief infantry force was a hoplite phalanx. Even though the Olynthians in 382 had 800 hoplites, they also had 'many more peltasts' (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.14). The occasional depictions of and references to long-thrusting spears with respect to some of Macedonia's neighbours and even, perhaps, their use by some Macedonians in no way diminishes the achievement of Philip. He is the one who created a phalanx of such individuals and combined them with cavalry and other forces to create his new model army. Other examples can also be found of the use of longer spears before Philip. The Egyptians were known for using long spears (Xen. *Anab.*1.8.9; *Cyr.* 6.2.10, 7.1.33), and Diodorus (15.44.1–4) and Nepos (*Iph.* 1.3–4) report that in Egypt in 374 the Athenian commander Iphicrates also used spears half as long again as hoplite spears, smaller shields and less defensive equipment (Diod. 15.44.2–3).[22] These innovations have been challenged, but even if accurate they apparently did not extend beyond their usage in Egypt (Stylianou 1998: 342–6). Whatever the truth of these possible uses of longer spears prior to Philip, the great innovation was Philip's. Individual peltasts with thrusting spears or with javelins when in battle against supported hoplites lost. Philip, through the use of what has come to be called 'Combined Arms', created an entire new army.[23] His spears were not half as long again, but roughly twice the length of a hoplite spear, and the tactics of battle under Philip's reform were changed dramatically.

Philip saw the advantages of the long-thrusting spear when developing a powerful infantry force that was recruited by necessity from peasants. The *sarissa*, when used primarily for defence, required far less training than did the hoplite panoply, and with the absence of so much defensive armour, the cheapness of the materials and the reduced need for training. Such an infantry was ideal for the political and social circumstances that existed in Macedonia at the time of Philip's accession. While Philip certainly possessed sufficient resources after 356, with the mines at Pangaeum, acquired in 356 (Diod. 16.8.6), alone providing him 1,000 talents of gold a year (Diod. 16.8.7; Dem. 18.235), while he later collected

a tithe from the Thracians (Diod. 16.71.2) and import/export duties in Thessaly (Dem. 6.22; 19.89), in his first couple of years he was strapped for funds. Unlike the southern Greek city-states whose middle-class citizens could afford their own armour and its upkeep, most of the native Macedonians were tenant farmers and dependent pastoralists who could not. The basic pastoral and dependent agricultural economies of much of the northern Greek peninsula meant a limited middle class from which to draw hoplites. Philip's lack of resources also limited the number of mercenaries that he could employ; again, unlike later in his reign when he gave employment to substantial numbers of such troops (Dem. 3.49; 9.58; Diod. 16.8.7, 91.1; Polyaen. 4.2.8; 5.44.4). Yet, even later, his main field army was made up almost exclusively of Macedonians. At Chaeronea, for example, there is no hint of mercenaries in Philip's army (Diod. 16.86). With his later substantial material resources, Philip increased his army from the 10,000 Macedonian infantry and 600 Macedonian cavalry in 358 (Diod. 16.4.3) to 24,000 infantry and 3,300 cavalry (Diod. 17.17.4–5) in 334.[24] He was able to increase his military forces beyond that of any other Greek power.

The *sarissa* had another advantage over standard hoplite spears. Rather than standing 'toe-to-toe' with your enemy, 'close enough to smell the breath of your opponent', the compact *sarissa*-phalanx kept the enemy at some distance. For soldiers unfamiliar with the horrors of heavy infantry combat, where unlike in the case of light-armed troops, the option of throwing or shooting or slinging projectiles at the enemy and then retreating was not available, or, in the case of the survivors of the Illyrian debacle under King Perdiccas, for whom the terrors of combat were all too familiar, this distance from the enemy would give at least a measure of confidence. Philip did, however, drill them extensively in the short time before he engaged them in battle (Diod. 16.3.1).

The one great difficulty noted earlier with the assumption that Philip introduced the *sarissa* so early in his reign is the limited period between his brother's death and his great victory over Bardyllis. This would appear to give Philip too little time to affect such significant changes (Borza 1990: 202; Markle 1978: 486–7). However, in Speusippus' *Letter to Philip* (30.12),[25] it is claimed that Plato, probably through his associate Euphraeus, who was an intimate of Philip's brother Perdiccas, 'laid the basis for Philip's rule during the reign of his brother'. Carystius of Pergamum, a second-century BC writer, may clarify the above statement for he claims that Euphraeus convinced the monarch to give Philip a portion of his kingdom to govern where he maintained a military force (Athen. 11.506e–f). This action likely occurred in 364 (Hammond 1994: 18 and 196, n. 2; Anson 2010B: 58–9), the year after Perdiccas' accession to the throne.[26] In 364,

Epaminondas wished to build a fleet of 200 warships to expand Theban power on the sea and would have been in need of Macedonian timber for these ships (Diod. 15.78.4). This was also likely the year in which Philip returned from Thebes (Just. 7.5.3), where he had been a hostage for Macedonia's good behaviour, and of Euphraeus' appearance at the Macedonian court (Natoli 2004: 32). If it is the case that Philip had an independent command beginning in 364, then he may have been training troops and experimenting with different military equipment and tactics for as long as four or five years before the disaster in 359 (Anson 2010B: 51–68; 2013: 46–51).[27] Indeed, Carystius reports that because of this apportionment of territory, Philip had his forces in a state of readiness when Perdiccas died (Athen. 11.506f).

Even though no source gives the location of the region put under Philip's control, there are indications that it was in the east. The Illyrians had been for some time a danger to western Macedonia, and it was in an attempt to repel their invasion in 359 that Perdiccas met his death. Therefore, it would make sense that, if the monarch was to be heavily involved in western Macedonia, Philip should then have been placed in the east to protect that Macedonian frontier, and there is some evidence to support this assumption. Diodorus (16.2.6) states in the context of the immediate aftermath of Perdiccas' defeat and death that the Athenians were on 'bad terms' with Philip. Given a lack of any further explanation, it could be concluded that this would have involved Amphipolis. At the time of Philip's accession to the throne, there was a Macedonian garrison in place in Amphipolis (Diod. 16.3.3; Polyaen. 4.2.17). Moreover, a pretender to the Macedonian throne, Pausanias, had unsuccessfully invaded Macedonia in 367 and was still alive and preparing, with the support of Cotys, the king of the Odrysian Thracians, to invade once more when the latter died early in 359 (Diod. 16.2.6).[28] Having Philip in the east, probably in Mygdonia, would be a counter to this possibility. Mygdonia along with Anthemus controlled the banks of the Axius in its lower course. Anthemus in particular was apparently regarded as the personal possession of the king. In 505,[29] as previously indicated, Amyntas I had offered the entire region to the Athenian Hippias (Hdt. 5.94.1), and later Philip as king ceded the same region briefly to the Olynthians in 357 to win their favour (Dem. 6.20).

Philip's other great innovation in these early days of his reign was the creation of an expanded Macedonian infantry guard, trained both in the new weaponry of the *sarissa* and the panoply of a traditional hoplite (Markle 1977: 323; Anson 1985A: 246–8; 2010A: 81–90). The *sarissa*-phalanx was not very flexible. It required level and clear ground with no obstacles (Polyb. 18.31.5–6) and was

ineffective in small units or with single soldiers (Polyb. 18.32.9), but 'nothing could withstand the frontal assault of these pikemen' (Polyb. 18.29.1). As with the later Swiss pikemen,[30] the German *Landsnechts*[31] and the Spanish *tercios*, other units protected the men carrying the long lances and vice versa. The Swiss employed troops equipped with halberds, eight-foot-long spears with a point, a hook and an axe blade.[32] Later, these halberdiers were replaced in large part by troops carrying arquebuses, and later muskets, and the German *Landsnechts* and the Spanish *tercios* from their beginning used men carrying primitive firearms to protect the pikemen and also to attack the enemy's flanks,[33] a duty carried out as well by the Swiss halberdiers. Additionally, these other infantry units came into play when the phalanx of pikes had broken the integrity of the opposing infantry formation. In the case of the Swiss, those soldiers equipped with halberds and two-handed swords could then enter the fray most effectively. Hoplites, likewise, while most effective in a closed formation, were also adept at reacting to changed circumstances. Yet, the pikemen anchored the line and were critical to victory in any set battle well into the seventeenth century.[34] On the defence, these pikemen were practically invulnerable to assault by cavalry or infantry, and on the offence, as the result of regular practice and an *esprit de corps*, they could maintain formation while 'steam-rolling' their opponents (Tallett 1992: 21). All commentators marvelled at the speed of the onslaught of the Swiss pikemen.[35] By establishing a strong training regimen, they became masters of handling the long pike on maneuvers and in combat. Such training is also apparent in the new Macedonian infantry created by Philip II (Diod. 16.3.1–2: Polyaen. 4.2.10, 19). In Alexander's Balkan campaign of 335, the Macedonian phalanx executed a number of complicated moves, demonstrating that these Macedonians had developed an expertise equal to that of their later Swiss equivalents (Arr. *Anab.* 1.6.2–3).

If there was any idea that Philip derived from his stay in Thebes it was the necessity of creating expertise imbued with patriotism. One problem with mercenaries was that they tended to be loyal to their pay cheque and not necessarily to their employer. However, citizen soldiers would be more patriotic but they were also usually less skilled. What the Thebans had created was the best of both worlds, a professional, national force (Anson 1985A: 246–8), a crack unit in an otherwise draft army. While the Spartans had done this on a far larger scale, they had also transformed their society into a military camp. What the Thebans created was a professional citizen force of native Thebans within the broader Theban army. In the mid-fourth century, Thebes, at the head of a league of cities inhabiting the Boeotian plain, the Boeotian League, was the greatest military

power in the Greek world. Her infantry had soundly defeated the previously ascendant Spartans (Diod. 11.82.3; Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.33). The Spartans had dominated land conflict due primarily to their professional citizen-army. Trained from the age of seven, a Spartan male's entire adult life was spent in the Spartan army. Other Greek troops had little training other than in actual combat. In part to offset this professional Spartan edge, the Thebans in the fourth century had inaugurated the 'Sacred Band', a body of 300 soldiers, supported by the state as full-time, citizen hoplites (Plut. *Pel.* 18–19). When Philip created his own professional guard unit, he armed them principally as hoplites. Hoplites, even with their limitations, presented a commander with far more flexible infantrymen than would be found with those carrying *sarissai*. As Hammond (1980: 53) states, '[the *sarissa*] was unsuitable for skirmishing, besieging, street-fighting, ambushing, [and] mountaineering'. This combination of *sarissa*-bearers and hoplites in the infantry gave Philip's army great flexibility. Under the command of Alexander in Asia, the infantry guard were often recognized as more mobile than the 'typical' Macedonian phalangite.[36] While the equipment of these units is not specified, the guards were often 'equipped for hand-to-hand warfare' (Arr. *Anab.* 2.20.6).[37]

W. W. Tarn (1948: 148) long ago recognized that the expanded infantry guard derived from 'a standing foot guard, probably small, whose duty was to guard [the king's] person, not only in battle but at all times'. Under Philip this expanded body of professional and national infantry was initially known as the *Pezhetairoi*, his foot companions. The contemporary Theopompus (*BNJ* 115 F-348) uses the term *pezhetairoi* when describing Philip's royal guard: 'Theopompus says that picked men from all the Macedonians, the largest and the strongest, served as the King's guards, and they were called the *Pezhetairoi*.' Demosthenes (2.17) would appear to confirm Theopompus' ascription when he relates that the majority of Macedonians were 'those who had suffered many campaigns', and then goes on to mention 'his mercenaries and *pezhetairoi*' as separate units. This infantry guard later became known as the Hypaspists ('shield-bearers'), perhaps a previous unofficial title reflecting their position as king's guards, and grew in number to 3,000 (Anson 1985A: 246–8). The term 'hypaspist' had a connotation of a personal attendant, as in the retinue or war band of a leader. Euripides in the *Heraclidai* calls Iolaus Heracles' hypaspist (*Heracl.* 215–16). The king of Macedonia's neighbouring Agrianians also had a personal guard called the Hypaspists (Arr. *Anab.* 1.5.2).

It is clear from subsequent history that Philip created the first true Macedonian heavy infantry, introducing an entirely new infantry panoply and tactics. While

most historians claim that the creation was a drawn-out process (Ellis 1980: 53, 58; Griffith 1980: 59; Borza 1990: 202), whose completion may have occurred only just prior to the Battle of Chaeronea in 338 (Markle 1978: 483, 486–9), this dramatic change from a disastrous defeat at the hands of the Illyrians to an overwhelming victory and Diodorus' statement would suggest that Philip's reforms were likely in evidence during the first year of his reign (Hammond 1994: 25–6; Anson 2010B: 51–68). In 358, after he had bribed his northern neighbours the Paeonians to prevent their invasion of Macedonia the previous year, Philip, on the death of the Paeonian king Agis, invaded the country and compelled the Paeonians to obey the Macedonians (Diod. 16.4.2). Prior to his successful battle against Bardylis and the Illyrians, the Illyrian commander had sent ambassadors to Macedonia to arrange a peace with Philip based on the then status quo. Philip would only agree to a peace if the Illyrians completely evacuated Macedonia (Diod. 16.4.4). That Bardylis was anxious to settle with Philip and that Philip was unwilling to do so is certainly suggestive of circumstances much changed from the previous year. Moreover, the Paeonian and Illyrian campaigns were not the only successful ones waged by Philip in the months following his predecessor's defeat and death. In September of 359,[38] a pretender to his throne arose in the person of one Argaeus, a scion of an alternative branch of the Argead clan.[39] This may have been the same Argaeus who ruled earlier as Argaeus II.[40] This was not Philip's only rival for the throne – there was also the Thracian-backed Pausanias (Diod. 16.2.6).[41] Pausanias may have been a son of King Archelaus I, who had earlier, perhaps in 368, attempted to usurp the throne (Aeschin. 2.27) and who now, soon after the death of Perdiccas, was trying his hand again. Philip bribed his rival's Thracian supporters with 'gifts and promises' (Diod. 16.3.4), and the lack of any further reference to this particular claimant suggests that Pausanias was likely assassinated. Here, as with the case of the Paeonians and is evident later, Philip shows that he is adept at subverting his enemies with promises and outright bribes. In particular, Philip over the course of his reign eliminated most of what had been a substantial pool of potential Argead rivals. In 348 he disposed of his three half-brothers, Archelaus, Arridaeus and Menelaus,[42] leaving only himself, his nephew and his sons from what was once a numerous clan. Of these challenges from rival claimants to Philip's rule, that of Argaeus was the most dangerous. He had the support of the Athenians, who sent out Mantias, an Athenian general, to Methone on the Macedonian coast with a force of 3,000 hoplites to aid this pretender (Diod. 16.2.6, 3.5–6).

Athenian interest in the north was tied to three issues: the grain supply from the Black Sea to Athens, timber for her ships, and the reacquisition of the city of

Amphipolis. In the fourth century, grain from the environs of the Black Sea (Dem. 20.31–34) was an important staple of the Athenian food supply, with Athenian fleets often sent north to protect those ships carrying the grain south (Dem. 18.73, 77, 241). It was, claims Demosthenes, also necessary 'to make provision for the passage of our grain-supply along friendly coasts all the way to Peiraeus' (18.301; 19.114), 'for Athens imports more grain than any other nation' (Dem. 18.87; 20.31). Athens had long been a sea power and needed timber for her ships, which was not available in Attica but rather from the north and in particular from Macedonia (Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.11; Dem. 17.28; *GHI* 12.ll.9–10).[43] Amphipolis, a former Athenian colony located on the Strymon river, was seen as critical for access to the interior of Macedonia and, since its gaining of independence from Athens in the Peloponnesian War, its reacquisition had become the centrepiece of Athenian ambitions in the north (Rhodes 2012: 112–21). Perdiccas, Philip's brother, had aided the Amphipolitans by placing a Macedonian garrison in the city to forestall any Athenian attempt to recover the city (Aeschin. 2.29; Diod. 16.3.3). Philip was to play on this Athenian hope of reacquiring Amphipolis right up to the moment he took over the city for himself (see Chapter 4). Soon after becoming king, Philip withdrew the garrison, signalling to the Athenians his willingness to work with them.

As with so many of Philip's actions, this withdrawal served a number of purposes. On the one hand, he was offering an olive branch to the Athenians, but also freeing up troops he desperately needed after his brother's disastrous defeat. This gesture also countered Athenian support for Argaeus and worked reasonably well (Diod. 16.3.3). When Mantius arrived with 3,000 hoplites intending to accompany the pretender to Aegae, the former Macedonian capital, to claim the throne, he discovered that Philip had already withdrawn the Macedonian garrison from Amphipolis (Diod. 16.3.3; Polyaen. 4.2.17) and apparently lost interest in offering full support to the pretender. Mantias himself failed to accompany Argaeus to Aegae and it is unknown how many of the Athenian expeditionary force went with the pretender. At Aegae, the inhabitants failed to endorse Argaeus' kingship (Diod. 16.3.5–6). On his attempt to return to Methone, he was ambushed by Philip and defeated: 'Philip, who suddenly appeared with his soldiers, engaged him in battle, slew many of his mercenaries, and released under a truce the rest, who had fled for refuge to a certain hill, after he had first obtained from them the exiles, whom they delivered to him' (Diod. 16.3.6). These Macedonians had supported Argaeus' attempt and likely were executed along with the pretender himself. G. T. Griffith's claim (Hammond and Griffith 1979: 211), however, that this victory by Philip and his army was a 'small

affair', underestimates it.[44] In the first place, the actual size of the force that accompanied Argaeus, as mentioned, is unknown. Justin (7.6.6) and Libanius (15.42) state that Philip's first battle was with 'the Athenians', and Demosthenes (23.121) and Libanius (20.23) state that 'Athenian prisoners' were taken. Even though it is unclear how many of these troops were actually involved, the psychological value of this victory is emphasized by Diodorus (16.3.6): 'Now Philip by his success in this first battle encouraged the Macedonians to meet the succeeding contests with greater temerity.' This not to mention the elimination of a potentially very dangerous rival.

Diodorus 16.4.1 states that later 'Philip sent ambassadors to Athens and persuaded the Assembly to make peace with him on the ground that he abandoned for all time any claim to Amphipolis.' Polyaenus (4.2.17) might seem to contradict Diodorus, stating, 'When the Athenians demanded of Philip the restitution of Amphipolis; because he was at that time engaged in a war with the Illyrians, although unwilling to give it up to the Athenians, he consented to make it free: and Athenians appeared contented with this.' These two passages appear to be at variance with each other, but it is likely that Philip through his ambassadors vowed not to return the garrison he had evacuated earlier. According to Diodorus' relative chronology and Demosthenes' (23.121) explicit statement, the sending of ambassadors took place after Philip's defeat of Argaeus. Hammond (Hammond and Griffith 1979: 236) accepts the truth of Diodorus' statement, suggesting that given Philip's current weakness, he wanted no part of a war with the Athenians and promised to relinquish any claim on Amphipolis. However, see Geoffrey de Ste. Croix (1963), who argues that Philip never gave up his claim to Amphipolis. Demosthenes (23.121) states that he did, but in reality it is doubtful, and Polyaenus' statement that he would make it free is likely accurate.

After this victory, Philip made a formal truce with the Athenians and proclaimed his intention to form an alliance with them (Dem 23.121). Diodorus 16.4.1 states, 'Philip sent ambassadors to Athens and persuaded the assembly to make peace with him on the ground that he abandoned for all time any claim to Amphipolis' (cf. Polyaen. 4.2.17). Additionally, shortly after the disaster at the hands of the Illyrians, as noted earlier, the Paeonians had invaded Macedonia (Diod. 16.2.6) but had been bought off by Philip (Diod. 16.3.4). Early in 358, the new Macedonian monarch, hearing of the death of the Paeonian king, Agis, invaded Paeonia, defeated the Paeonians in battle and made that state subject to his authority (Diod. 16.4.2; Dem.1.23; Isoc. 5.21). Clearly something dramatic had taken place in the Macedonian army, which likely was the creation of the infantry guards and the introduction of the *sarissa*.

While the ultimate Hypaspists and the pike phalanx may have been suggested by relevant European models, it is argued that many of Philip's other innovations were copied from the Persians. Dietmar Kienast (1973) has presented the most expansive case for the copying of Persian institutions by Philip, while Robin Lane Fox (2007: 269) has argued to the contrary that Philip borrowed next to nothing from them. The former argues that everything from Philip's polygamy (Kienast 1973: 266–7) to the creation of particular military units was copied from the Persians by this monarch (255–8, 261–3), while the latter speaks of 'broad parallelism', but no direct borrowing. The connection between Macedonia and Persia had a long history, going back at least to a time when Macedonia was a dependency of the Persian Empire in the late sixth century, prior to and during the Persian invasion of Greece (Borza 1990: 102–5; Olbrycht 2010: 342–5). While certain elements may, indeed, have been adopted and adapted from the Persians, it is clear that Philip was not attempting to create a Macedonia modelled on that of Persia. There was no harem, although there were seven marriages, no eunuchs, no severely limited access to the king, nor was prostration required of those ushered into the king's presence – all practices associated with the Persian royal court (Briant 2002: 255–86). Kienast (1973: 262–3) claims, however, that the Hypaspists were modelled on the Persian 10,000 Immortals, and the later 1,000-man *Agema* of the Hypaspists on the 1,000 Persian *Melophoroi* (Apple-bearers) (1973: 262–3), drawn from the 10,000 (Athen. 12.514c). Clearly Alexander later recognized the similarity between the Hypaspist *Agema* and the Persian *Melophoroi* when he associated 500 men from each unit and created his guard in the royal reception tent (Athen. 12.539e; Ael. *VH* 9.3; Polyaen. 4.3.24). However, having an infantry guard was hardly unusual. Apparently every tribal chief had his own personal armed retinue, troops who attended the monarch on a permanent basis. Langaras, the king of the Agrianians, possessed just such a personal guard, 'the finest and best armed troops he possessed' (Arr. *Anab.* 1.5.2). The Spartan kings had a guard of at least 100 (Hdt. 5.62), and maybe as many as 300 (Thuc. 5.72.3). After Alexander the Great's death, his Successors created their own separate guards. Eumenes, Antigonus and Pyrrhus created their own personal infantry guards (Diod. 19.28.1; Polyaen. 4.6.8; Plut. *Pyrrh.* 24.3). While it is likely that earlier Macedonian kings had infantry guards (cf. Anaximenes *BNJ* 72 F-4), it was Philip who expanded the corps to 1,000 men and later to 3,000 (Anson 1985: 248).

In addition to the infantry guard likely being common enough in Greek and neighbouring monarchies, the very nature of this unit in Philip's Macedonia was significantly different from any postulated Persian counterpart. These were

professional citizen soldiers, not the mere guardians and subjects of the king but his fellow Macedonians. What Philip had created in his Macedonian infantry guard was Greek to the core. His innovation was his increase in the guard's size and in its comprehensive training. The specific model as noted earlier was the Theban Sacred Band. Philip had spent time as a hostage for his brother Alexander II's 'good behaviour' in Thebes (Just. 6.9.7; Diod. 15.67.4; Plut. *Pel.* 26). Here, Philip would have seen how effective having such a body that combined the expertise of mercenaries with the patriotism of citizens could be. The concept of creating a professional-citizen corps within an otherwise conventionally recruited citizen army, however, did not originate with the Thebans, but rather with the Argives (Diod. 12.75.7; Thuc. 5.67.2).[45] While the '1,000' were militarily effective (Diod. 12.79.4, 6–7; Thuc. 5.73.2–3), they also proved dangerous to the Argive democracy and were eventually put to death (Diod. 12.80.2–3). As noted earlier, Philip's professional citizen-soldiers were the *Pezhetairoi*, who, over time, as Philip's successes mounted and his resources increased substantially, grew to 3,000 men and their name changed to Hypaspists,

In 358, with his throne secure and with the Athenians, Paeonians and Thracians no longer problems, Philip moved against the Illyrians. The two forces probably met north of Lake Lyncestis (present-day Lake Ochrid) in the Erigon river valley, but the actual site is unknown.[46] Both armies consisted of approximately 10,000 infantry, but the Macedonian horsemen numbered 600, likely heavy cavalry, while the Illyrians had 500 cavalrymen whose armament is unknown (Diod. 16.4.3–4). Even though our sources' descriptions of the battle leave much to be desired, the general outline can be discerned. The Illyrian battle line was arranged with the best infantry, likely hoplites (see later), in the centre and weaker elements on the flanks. This arrangement was noted by Philip, who in consequence led 'the pick of his foot soldiers' on his right wing (Diod. 16.4.4–5; Frontin. 2.3.2). These would be his *Pezhetairoi*, the later Hypaspists, who, both in the future battles of this monarch and in those of his son Alexander, typically held this position in the infantry battle line. The rest of the battle line would consist of his new infantry, the *sarissa*-bearers. As seen earlier, Dionysius, the Syracusan tyrant, had sent to his Illyrian allies 2,000 soldiers and 500 suits of Greek armour. The latter were distributed among the best Illyrian warriors. The presence of hoplites within the Illyrian force would explain their previous victory over the Macedonians in 359, and the fact that this subsequent battle was hard fought, with many casualties on both sides (Diod. 16.4.6). During the course of the fighting the Illyrians formed an infantry square (Diod. 16.4.6; Frontin. 2.3). That the Illyrian commander was forced to move his infantry into

a square demonstrates that the Macedonian cavalry had defeated and driven off their opposite numbers. Indeed, Diodorus (16.4.5) states that it was the success of the cavalry attacking the flanks and rear of the Illyrians that led to Philip's ultimate victory. The square was a common formation when defending against cavalry (Xen. *Anab.* 3.1.36, 4.19–20, 28, 43). The triumph of the Macedonian cavalry might suggest that Philip had redesigned his cavalry. Minor Markle (1977: 339) credits Philip with both increasing the size of the Macedonian cavalry and arming them with a cavalry *sarissa*.

However, there could, of course, be other causes for the cavalry's success as well, including numerical superiority. Diodorus (16.4.3–4) does record that the Illyrian cavalry numbered 500 and the Macedonian 600. But the likely real key to victory was that this time the Macedonian infantry did not falter, but stood its ground. The 'hammer and anvil' tactics had proven successful. The likely scenario is that the Illyrians drew up for battle with their best troops in the front. Philip moved his infantry forward against his enemies, advancing in echelon, with his *Pezhetairoi* on the right in the lead. But, after the initial clash of infantries, in what must have been a decisive Macedonian cavalry victory over their counterparts, the Illyrian foot soldiers found themselves surrounded and forced to form a square to protect their exposed flanks and rear from the harassing Macedonian cavalry. The Illyrian formation collapsed before the new Macedonian phalanx, and in the general rout and pursuit 7,000 Illyrians were killed, with the remainder retreating completely from Macedonian territory. The magnitude of the Illyrian losses again suggests that the Macedonian cavalry dominated the field of battle.

It was this victory over Bardylis and the Illyrians that completely reversed forty years of Illyrian supremacy in this region and secured Macedonia's north-western frontier. This defeat and the establishment of fortified towns along the border eliminated the Illyrians as a serious future threat to Macedonian independence. Philip or his generals, however, invaded Illyria at least four more times in order to maintain this situation. In 356,[47] Plutarch (*Alex.* 3 8) and Justin (12.16.6) note a victory over the Illyrians by Parmenion. Other incursions occurred in 350 (Dem. 4.48; cf. Dem. 1.13), 344/343 (Diod. 16.69.7) and 339 (Dem. 18.67; Didymus *In Dem.* 11.22, col. 13; Just. 9.3.2; Plut. *Mor.* 331b and 739b). At no time after 358 during the remaining years of Philip's reign did the Illyrians invade Macedonia. His initial victory in 358 also resulted in his acquisition of Upper Macedonia, which about doubled the territory of the kingdom (Just. 8.6.1–2; Str. 9.5.11). Many of the rulers of these independent Macedonian territories had joined with the Illyrian invaders and now with the

defeat of Bardylis lost their kingdoms to Philip. Additionally, Philip's defeat of the Illyrians had cemented his power in Upper Macedonia. Many of these Macedonian aristocrats had joined with their north-western neighbours and fled with Philip's victory. Others quickly submitted to the victor's authority. After all, they had been unable to expel the Illyrians and owed their liberation to Philip. Sometime after the battle, Philip had made peace with the Illyrians, a peace (Diod. 16.8.1) perhaps cemented by a marriage of the Macedonian king to the granddaughter of the defeated Illyrian king Bardylis (Heckel 2006: 64). In just one year Philip had secured his northern frontier and for the time being had neutralized his greatest threat from southern Greece.

Later, at Chaeronea, Philip led 'the pick of his infantry' again on the right wing (Diod. 16.86.1), and in Asia, Alexander would arrange his phalanx with his Hypaspists on his right (Arr. *Anab.* 1.14.2; 2.8.3; 3.11.9; 4.24.1). While the direct association of the 'pick of the infantry' with the Hypaspists comes from the reign of Alexander, it should be noted that from the time of Philip's death to Alexander's arrival in Asia only approximately eighteen months had passed. During this time Alexander was preoccupied in securing the throne and his position in Greece. It is clear that the army, its commanders and its tactics were basically those of his father Philip (Heckel 1992: 3, passim).

The Hypaspists in this contest were likely armed – as they most often were during Alexander's campaigns in Asia – as hoplites. With Alexander, the Hypaspists were regularly used in situations requiring speed and manoeuvrability. In Hyrcania, Alexander advanced with the Hypaspists and the 'lightest-armed and more nimble of the Macedonian phalanx' (Arr. *Anab.* 3.23.3; cf. Arr. *Anab.* 1.27.8; 2.4.3). The Hypaspists were more mobile than Alexander's 'typical' Macedonian phalangites,[48] and regularly 'equipped for hand-to-hand warfare' as hoplites (Arr. *Anab.* 2.20.6). The *sarissa* was not an ideal weapon in a one-on-one conflict, but was meant to be used in a unit, as already seen in the combat between Coragus and Dioxippus.

Philip over time increased the number of soldiers at his disposal by the grant of lands from those he was acquiring from his enemies. His army was also becoming increasingly professional due to its regular use. The 350s were a time of disorder in the southern Greek city-states. Sparta had been humbled by the Thebans at the Battle of Leuctra in 371 BC.[49] The central Greek city-state of Thebes had seemed poised to dominate the Greek world in the fourth century, but her ambition had exceeded her resources, and her power and influence were now in decline. Philip's great concern after the defeat of the Illyrians was with the city-state of Athens. While defeated in the Peloponnesian War and experiencing

difficulties with her erstwhile confederacy, the Athenian state was still a formidable power, with allies and interests in the north and the best fleet in the Greek world. The Athenians controlled communities along the Macedonian coast and had alliances with many independent states in the north.

Philip had achieved in a remarkably short time more than any of his predecessors on the Macedonian throne. It appears clear from Philip's actions in these early years that whatever his subsequent ambitions, his initial goal was to secure Macedonia's borders. In 357, with the Athenians occupied in a war with their former allies, the so-called Social War (Diod. 16.7.2–3, 8.2), Philip broke the détente with Athens and attacked Amphipolis. The city fell to the Macedonians that same year after an intense siege in which Philip's rams brought down a section of the city's walls (Diod. 16.8.2). This siege and capture of the city represents a dramatic change in previous Macedonian policy with respect to Amphipolis. In the past, Macedonia had defended Amphipolitan independence from Athenian aggression. Now, with Philip's attack, the people of Amphipolis had petitioned Athens to place the city back under Athenian control ([Theopompus] *BNJ* 115 F-42; Dem. 1.8). Demosthenes (1.5) states that the city was betrayed. It is unclear how these two statements can be reconciled,[50] but when Philip had captured the city, he had 'exiled those who were disaffected toward him, but treated the rest considerately' (Diod. 16.8.2; *GHI* 49). This might suggest that he did have supporters who, perhaps, had alerted him to a weakness in the particular wall that his battering rams collapsed. However, there is no such evidence and this speculation is only an attempt to reconcile our sources, which may not be reconcilable. It may indeed be that Demosthenes' accepted propaganda was that no city was taken but with the help of traitors. Philip's siege arsenal was developed by Polyeides of Thessaly, whose disciples Diades and Charias later served Alexander the Great in a similar capacity (Athen. Mech. 4.10; Vitr. 10.13.3), and was far more effective than anything found on the Greek peninsula previously.[51] In his sieges, Philip brought to bear siege engines, launched continuous attacks against the walls and employed battering rams. As with his field army combining the use of differently armed forces simultaneously, Philip likewise employed his siege weaponry in combination.

Philip's capture of Amphipolis led to a declaration of war by the Athenians (Aeschin 2.21; 3.54; Isoc. 5.3). This successful seizure was followed soon after by the capture of another Athenian possession on Macedonia's coast, Pydna (Dem. 1.9, 12; 4.4; Diod.16.8.3), and later, in 354, the last Athenian foothold in coastal Macedonia, Methone, was taken by Philip and razed to the ground (Diod. 16.34.4–5; Dem. 1.9; 4.4; Polyaen. 4.2.15). It was in this last noted siege that

Philip lost his left eye (Dem. 18.67; Just. 7.6.14–15).[52] With the capture of Methone, Macedonia's coast was now entirely in Philip's hands.

The best description of one of Philip's sieges is found in his failed attempt to capture the city of Perinthus, located on the northern shore of the Propontis, in 340 (Diod. 16.74.2–75.4), but it may be assumed that all followed the basic pattern laid out in this failed siege. Perinthus, however, was very well fortified by nature and man. Located on a steep headland protected by walls that ran across the neck of the peninsula on which the city was perched (Borza 2003: 1140), it was well situated to withstand a siege. Against this community Philip brought an army of 30,000 who were organized in relays to assault the walls continuously day and night, built towers about 120 feet in height which easily overtopped the city walls and bombarded the city with projectiles from machines 'of many kinds'. He battered the walls with rams and worked to undermine the walls, which was partially successful, as he had done at Amphipolis (Diod. 16.74.3–5, 75.3). The 30,000 troops, running in relays against the defenders (Diod. 16.74.5), kept the defenders constantly on the alert, while resting numbers of his own troops. These attempts may have proved successful, but the Perinthians had built a stronger secondary wall and were receiving regular assistance from Byzantium, including 'men, missiles, and artillery' (Diod. 16.74.4), and also mercenaries from the Persian satraps of Asia Minor (Dem. 11.5; Diod. 16.75.1). During earlier periods most sieges degenerated into either failure or success through treachery or starvation. Philip did use catapults in his sieges and, while Diodorus does not note what specific machines were used, given what was available at the time, these were likely arrow-shooting *gastrophetes*, hand-held crossbows and stone-throwing catapults,[53] while very simple torsion arrow-shooters were perhaps first used by Philip in sieges.[54] These had been first introduced by Dionysius I of Syracuse early in the fourth century.[55]

According to Aeschines (2.70), Philip in his career captured more than seventy cities, while Demosthenes reports that the Macedonian king destroyed thirty-five communities (Dem. 9.26). Given his failure to capture Perinthus, Philip turned his attention to Byzantium (Diod. 16.76.3–4). His siege of this city brought an outpouring of support from the Athenians, Chians, Coans, Rhodians and certain others (Diod. 16.77.2; Plut. *Phoc.* 14.3–8). Both his siege of Perinthus and that of Byzantium occurred over the spring, summer and autumn of 340.[56]

His later siege of Olynthus (348), even though it ended with the city being betrayed, is a clear example of the Macedonian king's growing power. The Athenians sent out three relief expeditions to save the city and these all failed. The first included 2,000 peltasts and thirty triremes ([Philochorus] *BNJ*

238 F-49); the second, eighteen triremes, 4,000 peltasts and 150 horsemen ([Philochorus] *BNJ* 238 F-50); the third, 'in addition to the troops already there', seventeen triremes, 2,000 hoplites and 300 horsemen, this last force composed entirely of citizens ([Philochorus] *BNJ* 238 F-51). Here, as elsewhere, Philip treated the acquired territory as 'spear-won' land ([Dem.] 7.28),[57] his personal possession by right of conquest, and rewarded not only his aristocratic and Greek supporters but common Macedonians as well with lands of their own (Diod. 16.34.5). Philip's acquisition of the coastal cities and his control of many other areas gave him resources on a scale that no one in the Greek world to this time had ever witnessed (Isoc. 5.5). With these he was able to increase the size of the Macedonian army. By the end of his reign the Macedonian *Pezhetairoi* numbered roughly 30,000, the Hypaspists 3,000 and the Macedonian heavy cavalry 2,000 (Diod. 16.85.5).[58]

While the Social War had freed Philip from Athenian interference, which had allowed him to secure Macedonia's coast with the taking of Amphipolis, Pydna and Methone, another war in the 350s would bring Philip directly into the affairs of southern Greece. In 356, the Phocians, a tribal federation of autonomous cities in central Greece, seized the site of the Delphic Oracle,[59] which, while physically located within the region regarded as Phocis, was, however, a national Greek religious institution under the control of the Amphictyonic Council, a body representing twelve different national groups. In 357, at the urging of Thebes, which then dominated the Council and was hostile to the Phocians, the latter were convicted of cultivating sacred land belonging to the sanctuary, a vague accusation whose acceptance or rejection in reality depended on political considerations more than on actual facts. The Phocians were heavily fined for this sacrilege, but in the summer 356 they seized the Oracle, with the result that the majority of the other members of the Council declared a sacred war (the Third Sacred War) against Phocis (Diod. 16.23.1, 3–5).[60] The Spartans and Athenians, primarily because they both were hostile to the Thebans, backed the Phocians and did not join the majority in supporting the war. This left the conduct of the war primarily in the hands of the Thebans and the majority of the Thessalians, the latter a loose league of city-states inhabiting the wide plains formed by the Peneus river and its tributaries and claiming a common heritage and ethnicity. The Phocians, having received little help from their allies and facing powerful forces, plundered the riches of Apollo's sacred treasury and hired mercenaries.[61] Consequently, this mercenary force soon numbered 20,000 infantry and at least 500 cavalry (Diod. 16.35.4). While initially successful, the Thebans and Thessalians were hampered in their pursuit of victory by the

Phocian ability to repeatedly replenish their forces through the use of the sacred coffers. Additionally, the Thessalian League was not united in its support of the war. The Thessalian city of Pherae in fact had joined in alliance with the Phocians.

With the Phocians and the Pheraeans forming an alliance and the Thebans unable even to defend their own home region of Boeotia from the Phocians, both the Thebans and those Thessalians opposed to Pherae turned to Philip and the Macedonians – the only viable power available to those fighting the Phocians. With the Athenians and the Spartans supporting the Phocians, in the summer of 353, Philip answered the call and marched south, joining his Thessalian allies, and as overall commander of the combined forces began a siege of Pherae (Diod. 16. 35.1). The Pheraeans then summoned their Phocian allies. Philip now faced a regularly constituted hoplite army. While an initial Phocian attempt to relieve the siege failed (Diod. 16.35.1), Onomarchus, the Phocian leader, then campaigning in Boeotia, invaded Thessaly with his full army. The two forces met in two battles in which Philip's new model army and his Thessalian allies suffered dual defeats. Little information is provided by our surviving sources, with the specific location of neither battle being known. The Phocian force is described only as larger than that of Philip's (Diod. 16.35.2). Any reconstruction of this conflict then must be guarded at best. It is to be noted, however, that the Phocian force was not a conscript army but 20,000 battle-hardened mercenaries who had already defeated the best fighting force in central Greece, that of the Thebans. In a very real sense these two battles were the first in which Philip engaged with a professional hoplite force. The exploits of Xenophon's 10,000 have only to be remembered to know how good such an army could be. The first defeat is simply mentioned with no details, but it could not have been decisive, since a second and more serious engagement occurred soon thereafter (Diod. 16.35.2). The Phocians occupied a position in the Thessalian plain, with a crescent-shaped mountain in their rear, on which they placed a number of stone-throwing catapults. Macedonian light infantry began the attack with a rain of javelins. The Phocians pretended to flee, with the Macedonian light and heavy infantry in pursuit. When the Macedonians came within range, a rain of stones ensued, making this the first successful use of field artillery in Western history (Polyaen. 2.38.2). Field artillery was too cumbersome to be used on a regular basis except in sieges (Wrightson 2019: 26, 168–9). Onomachus followed the rain of rock from his catapults with a counterattack of the Phocian hoplites on the beleaguered enemy. The barrage from the heights apparently broke the integrity of the phalanx and created a broad panic. With difficulty, Philip extricated his beaten army and retreated back to the safety of his homeland with his badly shaken and

near mutinous soldiers (Diod. 16.35.2). The fact that he was able to retreat safely likely shows that his cavalry was intact. The panic had been in the ranks of his infantry. Onomarchus apparently continued to campaign in Thessaly, but accomplished nothing of further significance, and the next year his concern was directed back towards Boeotia and the Thebans.

In the spring of 352, Philip returned to Thessaly with his Macedonian forces, again in command of the allied Thessalians, and began the siege of the port of Pagasae, located on the northern shore of the Bay of Pagasae and then controlled by Pherae. The appearance of Philip forced the Phocians to break off their activities in Boeotia and return to Thessaly. Here Onomarchus planned to rendezvous with his Pheraean allies and an Athenian fleet on its way to relieve the besieged city (Diod. 16.35.4). Near Pagasae, somewhere on the broad coastal plain, the two forces met in what came to be called the Battle of Crocus Field (352), so named for the abundance of these plants in the area. The Phocian force numbered 20,000 infantry, but contained only 500 cavalry. Philip and his Thessalian allies had more than 20,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry (Diod. 16.35.4). It is unclear if, in his haste, Onomarchus did not wait to assemble a larger cavalry force, or if he assumed that his Thessalian ally would supply a sufficient force. Philip had already captured Pagasae and had moved to a position between the arriving Phocians and the Pheraeans.

Prior to the battle, Philip ordered his troops to crown themselves with laurel which was sacred to the god Apollo, much as the later Christian crusaders wore the sign of the cross on their foreheads or the front of their garments to show themselves to be holy warriors (Just. 8.2.3). While Justin attributes Philip's victory to the Phocians being 'terror stricken' at the sight of the holy emblems and the memory of their sacrilege, the battle was in the final analysis determined by Philip's cavalry superiority. Here the Macedonian king's 'hammer and anvil' strategy was put to good effect. The result is what one modern commentator has called the 'bloodiest land engagement in classical Greek history' (Buckler 2003: 418). Pinned down by Philip's phalanx, the combined Macedonian and Thessalian cavalry attacked the vulnerable flanks and rear of the enemy, who then ran to escape to the sea and the Athenians. Here, the Athenian fleet had appeared, too late to save the besieged city or to participate in the battle. Few survived the attempt to swim to safety. Some 6,000 of the Phocian army perished, including their commander, with another 3,000 taken prisoner. Onomarchus' dead body was recovered and crucified and the 3,000 survivors thrown into the sea to drown as impious 'temple-robbers' (Diod. 16.35.5–6).[62] Philip proceeded to garrison Pagasae, expelled the ruling tyrants from Pherae, marrying a Pheraean

wife in the bargain, and brought the various hostilities among the Thessalians to a close. In 352, he was elected the leader, or archon, of the Thessalian Confederacy (Just. 11.3.2; Diod. 17.4.1; cf. Isoc. 5.20), and the Third Sacred War concluded with a Phocian surrender in 346 (Diod. 16.59.2–60.4).

In 339, a Fourth Sacred War broke out, this time involving the city of Amphissa in western Locris, near the Delphic oracular site. Again, the charge against the Amphissians was that they had cultivated sacred land and refused to pay a fine (Aeschin. 3.107–29). As before, Philip was called in and once again used the war as a legitimate entrée into central Greece. This time he faced a grand coalition put together by the Athenian Demosthenes (Dem. 18.237; Plut. *Dem.* 17.5; *GHI* 77). The coalition had little to do with the actual new sacred war, but rather reflected the fact that the participants had come to see Philip as a great threat to their freedom. With war already in existence between the Athenians and Philip since the previous year and with the Thebans leery of Philip's growing influence in central Greece, the Athenian orator Demosthenes engineered an alliance between the two long-standing enemies (Diod. 16.85.1–2). The Thebans had watched as their erstwhile ally Philip had improved his position in central Greece mostly at their expense. They had long been allied with Thessaly (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.28; Diod. 15.54.5), which was now controlled by Philip, and they had championed those Peloponnesian states hostile to Sparta (Diod. 15.62–67.1; Plut. *Pelop*. 31.1), but these states were now allied with the Macedonians (Dem. 9.72; Aeschin. 3.97). Even hints of Philip's growing interest in an expedition against Persia would have aggravated the Thebans, who had long benefitted from Persian help (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.33–37; Plut. *Pelop.* 30–31.1). The coalition forces, consisting primarily of the citizen armies of the Athenians and the Thebans, met near the Boeotian city of Chaeronea. While the details of the Battle of Chaeroneia,[63] like with all of Philip's battles, are hidden in the abbreviated accounts of all of our sources, with the resulting diversity in modern reconstruction, the success of Philip's innovations can nonetheless clearly be seen.

The Greeks chose the ground, which was about two miles wide, anchored on both flanks by a river, with marshes on one side and a mountain on the other side, which from the Greek point of view would negate Philip's great advantage in cavalry. Philip's army numbered roughly 30,000, mostly Macedonian heavy infantrymen, 2,000 heavy Macedonian cavalry and an unknown number of light infantry and cavalry, many of whom may have been supplied by his allies (Diod. 16.85.5).[64] While no source gives the numbers of the opposing Greeks, this force was probably similar in size or perhaps even larger (Just. 9.3.9),[65] but very different in experience. The Theban and Boeotian contingents were made up of

the veterans of many campaigns, as were a large number of mercenaries; the Athenians and many of the other allies, the Euboeans, Achaeans, Corinthians, Megarians, Leucadians, Corcyraeans (Dem. 18.237; cf. Just. 9.3.8) and the Acarnanians (*GHI* 7), however, had not engaged in a large-scale infantry battle in over two decades. The Athenians took up position on the left wing, the Thebans on the right, with the other allies in the centre, but their numbers were probably small in comparison to the Athenian and Theban contingents, and therefore the centre was smaller than either the left or right wings (Diod. 16.86.1–2). The Greek army was arranged in a defensive position, with its left flank anchored by the rising foothills of Mount Thurion, while the right rested against the Cephisus river. The foothills and the river bed were to be covered by light-armed infantry and cavalry. The Greek line, averaging eight to ten ranks in depth, was thus relatively secure on both flanks, leaving little room for the unopposed operation of enemy cavalry or light-armed troops, and thus seemingly negating what was Philip's distinct advantage in cavalry, possessing as he did both the Macedonian and Thessalian cavalries. The Greek position being defensive gave the initiative to Philip. Facing this strong Greek defensive position, the Macedonian king decided on a complicated series of manoeuvres to take advantage of the inexperienced Athenians. At first, he advanced his forces in echelon, with his right, under his personal command, containing the elite Hypaspists, 3,000 strong, poised to engage the Athenians before committing the Macedonian left against the more experienced Thebans. The presence of the Hypaspists on the right appears evident from a reference to hoplite shields (Polyaen. 4.2.2). The Hypaspists in this battle were then armed not with *sarissas*, like the majority of the Macedonian infantry,[66] but with the hoplite panoply. The battle began on the morning of the seventh of *Metageitnion*, or 30 August 338 (Plut. *Cam.* 19.5).

Given the nature of the battlefield and the size of the respective armies, the battle would be fought at least initially with full frontal infantry assaults. However, during actual combat the integrity of the long infantry line was difficult to maintain. The terrain was uneven, injuries or deaths caused gaps, while someone simply tripping and falling could create problems. In the particular case of the Greek allies, the different contingents had not previously fought together and were assembled according to nationality. Forces so arranged would tend under pressure to gravitate towards their compatriots and cause gaps in the line. Philip's goal was to enable his eighteen-year-old son Alexander, the commander of the Macedonian left, to penetrate with the Macedonian cavalry and attack the enemy's unprotected rear. Whatever opposition cavalry appeared would be easily overcome by the combination of the superior Macedonian and

Thessalian cavalry detachments. To accomplish the goal of penetrating the Greek line, Philip planned, after initial contact with the Athenians, for the Macedonian right, at his command, to begin a slow withdrawal up some rising ground near the foothills of the mountain. This would serve the dual purpose of wearing out the inexperienced Athenians and more importantly cause the Greek line to stretch to the left, as the Athenians attempted to overwhelm their opponents (Polyaen. 4.2.2, 7; Frontin. 2.1.9).

During the battle, Philip's line would be pivoting on its centre. At first, the right wing would move ahead of the left, and then, as the left advanced, the right would retreat. The Athenians, finding the enemies before them giving ground, began what was an overenthusiastic and disordered charge. With the Athenians attacking wildly to their left and the Boeotian right maintaining its position along the riverbed, as Philip had planned, the allied centre made up of different national units began to separate as these troops found themselves pulled in two directions: towards the Athenians moving to the left and the Boeotians standing firm on the right. For a time the battle was a struggle of competing infantries all along the line, but under the continuous probing of the Macedonian *sarissas* a gap appeared through the thinning allied line through which Alexander and the cavalry successfully charged (cf. Arr. *Ars Tactica* 16.6–7), turning to attack the exposed Boeotian–Theban flank. Macedonian cavalry was so expert that in a wedge formation it could punch through a weakened or gapped infantry line. Without stirrups, heavy cavalry could only attack infantry under special circumstances, when fleeing, where gaps or thinning occurred in the enemy line, or by assaulting the vulnerable flanks or rear. Carolyn Willekes considers Chaeronea to be a good example of a successful heavy cavalry attack on infantry. She has performed experiments that have demonstrated that a horse will charge an infantry formation if it believes there is a sufficient gap for the horse's head and neck to fit through. In a wedge, rhomboid or diamond formation with a dominant horse in the lead, the 'simple herd mentality will ensure the rest of the cavalry horses follow' (Willekes 2016: 187). Under these circumstances the momentum of the group served both to keep the pack in formation and to hit the line with tremendous force. However, the dangers in such an operation were great. If one horse in the front went down, it could lead to a cascading effect. Also, if the infantry line was not broken by the initial charge, the cavalry was likely to be surrounded and overwhelmed by the opposing infantry. The right wing, including the Sacred Band, after Alexander's breakthrough now found themselves fully engaged frontally by their Macedonian heavy infantry counterparts and being simultaneously attacked on their left and rear by the

Macedonian Companion Cavalry. On the Macedonian right, Philip, having withdrawn to higher ground, stopped his staged retreat and charged, breaking the spirit and the coordination of the Athenian phalanx. With the Athenians in full flight, Philip's right pivoted and attacked the allied line, which now broke and fled. The result of the battle was a crushing defeat for Philip's enemies. Some 1,000 Athenians lay dead, with 2,000 captured (Diod. 16.86.4–5). While numbers are not given for the Theban, Boeotian and other allied dead, the totals were probably equally high, and the Sacred Band of Thebes had been destroyed, with no one from this unit surviving (Plut. *Pelop.* 18.5). The Battle of Chaeronea established Philip as the dominant force in the Greek world, in a position to dictate the future course of Greek history. While his army was, with its successes, most responsible for this result, it was also done in conjunction with very skilful political manoeuvring. Philip was as adept at the game of politics as he was in the art of war. While his new model army would put the Macedonian king in a position to dominate the Greek world, it was his clever use of his political skills that would change the course of Greek history forever.

3

Philip and the Creation of the Macedonian Nation

Philip II transformed the power of the office of King in Macedonia in many ways, but the fundamental aspect of royal authority remained unchanged. While there was slightly more bureaucracy than with previous holders of the office, monarchy under the reigns of both Philip II and his son Alexander III was still largely personal. The king led his troops personally in battle, often the first to engage and the last to leave. However, without a bureaucracy and with a rather amorphous succession process, the Macedonia that became the domain of the new king was not a powerful or even a united nation. The population was a combination of many peoples. By tradition the original Macedonians had moved into the area and while the tradition is that the previous inhabitants were expelled, there were many holdovers. Over the years many migrated to Macedonia, coming from southern Greece, Illyria, Paeonia, Thrace and elsewhere. From at least the time of Alexander I, migration of Greeks from the south to Macedonia was encouraged. Even though many of these refugees came as communities, they are not found subsequently as distinct entities in Macedonia. When Mycenae was destroyed by Argos, over half the population came to Macedonia on Alexander I's invitation (Paus. 7.25.6). Similarly in 446, when the Athenian Pericles captured Histiaea on Euboea, the inhabitants took refuge in Macedonia ([Theopompus] *BNJ* 115 F-387). After the victory over Bardylis and the Illyrians, those living in Upper Macedonia were added to the Kingdom of Macedon regardless of their perceived ethnicity or long independent status.

Macedonia traditionally was a land with a powerful aristocracy which historically made up the true government under the theoretical authority of the king. As seen previously, much of the kingdom was composed of large noble estates peopled by a dependent peasantry. These aristocrats were the king's *Hetairoi*, his companions. The more youthful adults of this class made up the principal arm of the Macedonian army, its highly expert cavalry. More senior and prominent representatives became the king's advisors and his generals.

Regional government was mostly and practically in the hands of these *Hetairoi*. Theopompus (*BNJ* 115 F-225b) reports that 800 of Philip's *Hetairoi* possessed as much land as 10,000 of the richest Greeks. Perhaps an exaggeration, but Macedonia was by Greek standards a large and resource rich land. The ancient *hetairos* relationship between king and nobles was built on camaraderie, not on the basis of royal absolutism (Anson 2013: 24–5). Aristotle (*Nic. Eth.* 8.1161a. 25–7, 1161b33–1162a) declares that ideally *Hetairoi* are like brothers and share in all things. Even Philip's bureaucratic innovations were minimal, relying as so many Macedonian monarchs had relied before on the landed aristocrats of their realm. Philip likely introduced a more complex chancellery which was headed by the Cardian Greek, Eumenes. Eumenes was one of many of the king's 'Greek' *Hetairoi*.[1] Royal authority in what was a personal relationship could be enhanced through appointing loyal individuals to the ranks of the *Hetairoi*, in short 'packing the court'. Non-Macedonians appointed as *Hetairoi* would be especially loyal, since their status was entirely tied to the king. Their lands in Macedonia were given to them by the king, not due to hereditary possession. The fluidity of the *hetairos* institution was such that many were *Hetairoi* because of their power, while others obtained power through their selection as *Hetairoi*. As Waldemar Heckel has emphasized, actual power was indirectly negotiated often on the basis of powerful personalities and shifting coalitions (Heckel 2003: 198).

In the past, often powerful coalitions of nobles limited the actual power of the monarch, but Philip dramatically altered this relationship in the king's favour. Part of this new emphasis on the power of the monarch is found in the fact that, while the upland regions had long maintained their practical independence from their Lower Macedonian neighbours, once joined to the state of Macedon there is little evidence of dissatisfaction with the union in these formerly independent districts. In the centuries following Philip II's annexation of Upper Macedonia (Diod. 16.8.1; cf. 16.1.5) right up to the Roman conquest, there is only one attested revolt of an area roughly corresponding to a former Upper Macedonian kingdom, and that, if it occurred at all, took place in 197 (Polyb. 18.47.6), one and a half centuries after its annexation. While A. B. Bosworth (1971: 105) believes this is evidence that 'the incorporation of the mountain kingdoms [Upper Macedonia] proved ultimately unsuccessful', Miltiades Hatzopoulos (1996A: 103) challenges the very existence of the revolt, calling it, perhaps, 'a pious fiction invented by the Romans'.[2] In any case, a single revolt is hardly evidence of ongoing hostility to the merger of the Macedonian upland districts with their southern neighbours. If these areas had retained any sense of loyalty to their former rulers, it is very unlikely that Alexander would have brigaded troops from Upper Macedonia according to their

specific regions (Diod. 17.57.2). That the union was so successful relates to the accepted belief, certainly after the reigns of Philip and his son Alexander, in a common Macedonian ethnicity. This was certainly due to the basic changes in the very structure of Macedonian society introduced by Philip II.

Philip's achievement in creating a single kingdom alone would have been sufficient to establish his greatness given the state of 'Macedonia' at the start of his reign. The theoretical powers of the king were significantly compromised by the embedded aristocracy. The concept of camaraderie and barely first among near equals meant kings were most often little better than figureheads. The relationship between king and aristocrats would change with Philip and be significantly transformed during the decade-long expedition in the East of Alexander the Great. The changes brought about during Philip's reign were the result primarily of his success in securing Macedonia from her enemies and his own authority from potential rivals. Through his acquisition of Paeonia, the defeat of the Illyrians, the subjection of the Thracians and the hegemony over the southern Greeks, Philip upset what had been the power relationship between the king and these aristocrats. His defeat of Bardylis, as seen, also included that of many Upper Macedonian aristocrats who had joined with the Illyrian king. Many of these individuals fled, leaving Philip to confiscate their lands. Others quickly submitted to the victor's authority.[3] His defeat of the Illyrians permitted him to annex Upper Macedonia (Ellis 1976: 59–60). The nature of the annexation is unclear and has to be pieced together from bits and pieces of information, some of which comes from the time of his son. The best piece of evidence comes at the very beginning of Alexander's reign. Here, as is generally acknowledged, the army and the officer corps that accompanied Alexander to Asia were that of his father. Perdiccas from Orestis (Arr. *Anab.* 6.28.4) commanded the infantry units from Orestis and Lyncestis (Diod. 17.57.2) and Polyperchon from Tymphaea (Tzetz. ad Lycophron 802) led that district's battalion (Diod. 17.57.2). While numbers of new communities were established, especially along the frontiers with Illyria, much of the practical organization of these regions must have stayed reasonably close to what had been the case when they were independent kingdoms, but now those controlling these regions were Philip's subordinates. Philip would, through patronage, through the establishment of his court as a nerve centre for the kingdom and his creation of a vibrant middle class as a counterpoise to these nobles, maintain his control over the Macedonian aristocrats and hence his nation.

Philip's success in defending his country and in expanding its borders made him a most popular king. As a result of his victories and annexations, he was possessed of more land and booty to distribute to his supporters than any

previous Macedonian king. Here, as elsewhere, Philip treated the acquired territory as 'spear-won' land, his personal possession by right of conquest.[4] As he supposedly proclaimed to the Athenians with respect to his seizure of Amphipolis, it was his 'by the right of conquest in war' (Dem. 12.22). His son Alexander was later to claim all of Asia as his by this same doctrine (Diod. 17.17.2; Just. 11.5.10). With these conquered lands, he rewarded not only his aristocratic and Greek *Hetairoi*, but also common Macedonians with lands of their own (Anson 2008B: 17–30). Philip's granting of land and *Hetairoi* status to aristocrats and land to commoners from Upper Macedonia was likely at least in part responsible for the ease of annexation of these regions to Macedonia proper and their loyalty to Philip in particular and to the Argead dynasty in general. One indication of the prosperity brought to many by Philip's granting of land to those who formerly had been serfs and dependent pastoralists is seen in the career of his son. King Alexander on campaign in Asia remitted for the families of Macedonian deceased soldiers all property taxes and personal liabilities (Arr. *Anab.* 1.16.5; cf. Diod. 17.21.6). Helmut Berve (1973: 1: 307) and Miltiades Hatzopoulos (1996A: 437) have pointed out that the remission of tax indicated that the dead and their families held royal land. The connection between land grants and military service appears clear. The practice of granting land in return for military service was certainly a common practice in the Hellenistic period (Billows 1995: 146–69), and such grants were 'a powerful inducement to future loyalty' (Billows 1995: 132–7). It was obviously common practice in Philip's and Alexander's Macedonia as well (Anson 2008B: 17–30; 2013: 67–71).

It was this transformation of much of Macedonia's dependent population from tenants and dependent pastoralists into landowners that also in part was responsible for an explosion in the Macedonian economy. While Nicholas Hammond's claim (1992B: 153, 165) that Philip changed Macedonian agriculture from transhumance to settled agriculture, transhumant pastoralism did not disappear or suffer a 'steep decline' (Skydsgaard 1988: 78–82). New lands, however, were brought under cultivation, the population through territorial expansion increased and new cities emerged (Billows, 1995: 29). Yet, Philip's revolution involved so much more. Much of the subsequent economic transformation of Macedonia was the result of the efforts of these new landowners. Non-landowning agricultural workers are not likely to make significant improvements to the land they work (Hanson 1995: 35). They tend to plant annual crops, avoiding those that require years of nurture before they become productive from fear that the ultimate profits will benefit others (Barlett 1980: 555). Now, these new Macedonian landowners had a vested interest in improvement. They also now had a vested

interest in defending the king. Protecting their king now meant also protecting their lands. The king had granted these and it was the monarchy that would guarantee continued possession. Through his creation of a landed peasant class, Philip was also creating a powerful ally in his relationship with his own *Hetairoi*. These new landowners now formed a powerful infantry where before only an aristocratic cavalry and their light-armed dependents existed. These holders of King's land became 'citizen soldiers' (*stratioton politikon*) (Diod. 18.12.2). Early modern rulers often sided or pretended to side with their peasantry against the aristocratic landlords, and these small landholders often became staunch supporters of royal regimes.[5] In a speech quoted in the Introduction purportedly given by Alexander to his troops at Opis, the king emphasized how his father had transformed the population of Macedonia (Arr. *Anab*. 7.9.2).

Philip's military reforms therefore were also responsible for breaking the personal ties between the rulers/landlords and their formerly dependent populations, and replacing these bonds with attachments to himself. Through extensive grants of land to individuals, Philip created a manpower pool for both the cavalry and heavy infantry. With land he rewarded his supporters and built a new army. During Philip's reign the Macedonian cavalry grew to more than five times its size under his predecessors, and a Macedonian heavy infantry appeared virtually out of nowhere (Diod. 16.3.1–2). With respect to cavalry, in 358 in the Battle of the Erigon Valley, Philip had 600 horsemen (Diod. 16.4.3). At Chaeronea, Philip had 2,000 heavy cavalry (Diod. 16.85.5), and Alexander crossed to Asia with 1,800 Macedonian cavalry (Diod. 17.17.4), having left 1,500 behind in Macedonia (Diod. 17.17.5). Also, in 358 Philip had 10,000 infantry (Diod. 16.4.3), but at Chaeronea Philip's army contained 30,000 infantry (Diod. 16.85.5). Alexander took 12,000 Macedonian infantry with him to Asia (Diod. 17. 17. 3–4), leaving behind in Macedonia 12,000 infantry with his regent Antipater (Diod. 17.17.5). There was also an advance force in Asia, but its size and composition are unknown (Diod. 16.91.2; Just. 9.5.8; Polyaen. 5.44.4). While Alexander may have added some numbers to the forces he inherited from his father, it is clear that this was basically the army assembled by Philip (Heckel 1992: 3, passim).

While Alexander is seen as the great founder of cities, Philip had also used cities as a means to control territory, and this is another lesson that Alexander owed to his father. Alexander created a large number of cities in Asia, which according to Plutarch (*Mor*. 438e) numbered seventy. While no source gives us a total of Philip's foundations, the number would have been significant.[6] While Xenophon describes Pella in 383 as the largest city in Macedonia (*Hell.* 5.2.13), Strabo (7. frg 20) later comments that prior to Philip II it was a 'small city'. Philip

is also recorded as founding 'strong cities at key locations' in Thrace (Diod. 16.71.2; Dem. 8.44), with specific references to Philippopolis ([Theopompus] *BNJ* 115 F-110; Pliny *NH* 4.18), Drongilus, Calybe and Mastira (Dem. 8.44; Str. 7.6.320c). In Thrace, Alexander, while acting as regent for his father, even founded his own city, Alexandropolis, with a mixed population (Plut. *Alex.* 9.1).[7] Philip further established communities along the Macedonian frontier with Illyria (Dem. 4.48).[8] Harry Dell (1970: 117) has commented regarding Illyria, 'In the early period Macedonia was generally unable to maintain the fixed borderline of later years and to prevent Illyrian incursions, particularly into upper Macedonia. Under Philip new policies for dealing with the Illyrians appear along with a heavily fortified and clearly marked frontier.'

Additionally, many Greek cities along the coast became part of the kingdom during Philip II's reign (Diod. 16.8.2–3).[9] The population of cities would frequently be augmented by the incorporation of Macedonians, or of settlers from surrounding areas, into the existing population. With respect to conquered Greek cities, Demosthenes comments that in 'some Greek cities he overthrows the constitution, putting a garrison in them, others he razes to the ground, selling the inhabitants into slavery, others he colonizes with barbarians instead of Greeks' (Dem. 18.182).[10] Philip was invited to come and protect the Thasian colony of Crenides from pressure from the Thracian tribes (Diod. 16.3.7) in 356 and refounded the city as Philippi, creating a bulwark against the tribal peoples of Thrace (App. *BC* 4.105).[11] Its acquisition was encouraged and this was a peaceful occupation – there was no siege, nor were any of those living there expelled. What is noted is that Philip increased its population (Diod. 16.8.6, cf. 16.3.7). There is no mention of the origin of these new settlers, but Griffith may well be correct that they came from the surrounding area and, perhaps, included numbers of Chalcidians (Hammond and Griffith, 1979: 360–1), but it is also likely that many Macedonians were included as well. Diodorus (16.71.2) states with respect to Thrace that Philip followed a policy of 'founding strong cities at important places' to control the Thracians. Even though Diodorus presents these foundations as protection for the Greek communities from Thracian aggression, these were not solely for the suppression of the Thracians, but also served as strategic Macedonian inroads into the territory of Thrace and as such would be likely settled by large contingents of loyal Macedonians. Previously, in 357, when Amphipolis was taken by siege, much of the population of the city remained and was subsequently supplemented by a large number of Macedonian settlers (cf. Diod. 16.8.2–3; Dem. 18.182; Aeschin. 3.27). Hatzopoulos (1996B: 99–105; 1996A: 182) has shown through an examination of deeds of sale from Amphipolis

that Macedonians from both Upper and Lower Macedonia became settlers in Amphipolis, joining with much of the original population. This polyglot population all became citizens of the city. A similar situation apparently also applied to Pydna.[12] Pydna is described during the reign of Perseus (179–167) as a city of numerous nationalities (Livy 44.45.6).

Certainly much can be made of Philip's city foundations and refoundations, but the evidence suggests that the vast majority of Upper Macedonians continued to live in villages and hence individuals from these areas were denoted by their regional designations (Hatzopoulos, 1996A: 70, 77–9, 92, 103). At least three of the six heavy infantry battalions came from this area and were called by their region of origin (Diod. 17.57.2). It is also true that evidence exists that the lands given to formerly landless Macedonians were not always associated with city foundations or refoundations, but that much of the land that was taken may have been distributed viritane. Griffith (1965: 136)[13] has argued that, when Methone was destroyed and its land given out to 'Macedonians' (Diod. 16.34.5; Dem. 4.35; Justin 7.6.14–16), these recipients were ordinary Macedonians, not aristocrats. This was probably also the case with Apollonia, Olynthus and thirty-two other communities in or near Thrace (Dem. 9.26; Diod. 16.53.2–3; Just. 8.3.14–15; Hatzopoulos 1996A: 190–2, 195–6). These towns and villages are associated by Demosthenes with Methone as having been destroyed by Philip, and while he does not state that the land was given to Macedonians, it would, given the example of Methone, appear likely. After Philip's acquisition of Amphipolis, in addition to the extensive grants of land to prominent members of the Macedonian aristocracy (Arr. *Ind.* 18.4), land was also given to a broad range of non-aristocratic Macedonians (Hatzopoulos 1996A: 182). Although from a later time, an inscription records Alexander's gifts to individual 'Macedonians' of lands associated with the Bottiaean towns of Calindoea, Thamiscia, Camacaea and Tripoatis (Hammond 1988: 383, 385–6; Hatzopoulos 1996A: 121–2; 1996B: 84–5). As noted, the practice of granting land in return for either infantry or cavalry service was certainly a common practice in the Hellenistic period. Antigonus in 316 attempted to undermine the loyalty of Eumenes of Cardia's army, in part, by offers of 'large gifts of land' (Diod. 19.25.3).[14]

The whole of Chalcidice was annexed to Macedonia. Where cities did not exist and were not created by Philip, the villages of these new, landed Macedonians became increasingly independent of their former overlords. The inhabitants were no longer tenants – they were landowners. Whether originally from Thrace, Epirus, Upper Macedonia, southern Greece or believing themselves to be part of the original migrating Macedonians, in Philip's Macedonia *all* became

Macedonians. Those holding real property became part of his army and consequently hard-core believers in and defenders of the new Macedonian nation. During Philip's reign tens of thousands of formerly landless men were given land. The growth in the size of the Macedonian heavy infantry in particular gives a rough estimate of the growth in the numbers of Macedonian landowners. Within Macedonia, Philip began immediately upon his accession to the throne to reward soldiers with land. Richard Billows (1995: 202–4) estimates the overall population of Philip's kingdom at between 1 million and 1.5 million. John Ellis estimates substantially fewer, at about 500,000 (1976: 34). If Billows' estimate is accepted and roughly one-fourth of his total was eligible for military service, or 250,000 to 375,000 men, then Philip's grants of land could potentially have gone to between 10 and 15 per cent of the families of Macedonia. With respect to the size of these grants, no evidence exists for Macedonia. However, an inscription from Attalid Pergamum lists three sizes of military land grants. The largest includes 125 *plethra* (a *plethron*=10000 sq. ft.) of cleared land and 12.5 of vineyard; the smallest is 100 *plethra* of cleared land and 10 of vineyard (Welles 1934: 51).

While a few of the inhabitants of the cities and villages continued as herdsmen, the dominant occupation of city dwellers was farming. Greek animal husbandry in general appears not to have been a sedentary activity, but a transhumant one.[15] In spite of Philip's reforms, it is likely that the vast majority of Macedonians at the time of Philip still remained in some form of tenancy or serfdom, especially with respect to Upper Macedonia.[16] This is clear from the large number of Macedonians during and after Philip's reign who controlled vast territories and the people inhabiting these lands. Plutarch (*Alex.* 15.3; cf. Justin 11.5.5) reports that Alexander gave to various members of his *Hetairoi* farms and villages. As noted earlier, Theopompus (*BNJ* 115 F-225) reports that 800 of Philip's *Hetairoi* possessed as much land as 10,000 of the richest Greeks. This land would not be unoccupied. Economic dependency did not disappear with Philip's reforms.

The importance of land to a mostly rural population has not changed from antiquity to the modern day. The desire for land on the part of the landless or the small landowner encumbered by debt or obligation has sparked revolution across the centuries. Peter Brunt (1988: 240–75) has demonstrated that it played a significant role in the so-called Roman Revolution that saw the overthrow of the Republic and the installation of the regime of Augustus, and it has become a truism among commentators on modern rural revolutions that what the peasants want is unencumbered land, and that they very often employ violence

to obtain it.[17] They would, as a result, support anyone who would promise them such possession and be exceedingly loyal to whomever was responsible for actually making them landowners. Moreover, land possession in Macedonia was controlled by the king and consequently such loyalty to the monarch would be seen as essential for their continued possession. Even though the lands granted by the king could be inherited, bought and sold, they were still subject to repossession by the king (Billows 1995: 132–7). This royal power apparently applied to all land. Macedonian monarchs even had the recognized authority to transfer populations almost at will from one region to another. While the transfer of populations was not infrequent during the reign of earlier Argead kings, the number of such forced movements of peoples into and within Macedonia was unprecedented during the Philip's rule (Justin 8.5.7–8.6.1; Polyaen. 4.2.12).[18] Such movements were not only frequent in relation to conquered cities (Dem. 18.182), but also employed with existing Macedonian communities (see later). Indeed, Justin (8.5.7) in a general statement records that Philip 'capriciously transplanted whole people and cities as he felt regions needed to be populated or depopulated'. According to Justin, these population transfers were especially common after the conclusion of the Third Sacred War (Just. 8.5.1–6). What Justin emphasizes is the hardships, both physical and emotional, that this placed on those targeted people, indicating the power of the king in these matters. There were, however, no revolts and no outward criticism.

> On his return to his kingdom, as shepherds drive their flocks sometimes into winter, sometimes into summer pastures, so he transplanted people and cities hither and thither, according to his caprice, as places appeared to him proper to be peopled or left desolate. The aspect of things was everywhere wretched, like that of a country ravaged by an enemy. There was not, indeed, that terror of a foe, or hurrying of troops through the cities, or seizure of property and prisoners, which are seen during a hostile invasion; but there prevailed a sorrow and sadness not expressed in words, the people fearing that even their very tears would be thought signs of discontent. Their grief was augmented by the very concealment of it, sinking the deeper the less they were permitted to utter it. At one time they contemplated the sepulchres of their ancestors, at another their old household gods, at another the homes in which they had been born, and in which they had had families; lamenting sometimes their own fate, that they had lived to that day, and sometimes that of their children, that they were not born after it. Some people he planted upon the frontiers of his kingdom to oppose his enemies; others he settled at the extremities of it. Some, whom he had taken prisoners in war, he distributed among certain cities to fill up the number of

> inhabitants; and thus, out of various tribes and nations, he formed one kingdom and people.
>
> Just. 8.5.7–8.6.2[19]

More than a century later, Philip V transferred Macedonians and their families from the 'chief cities' of Macedonia to Emathia and replaced them with Thracians and 'barbarians' (Polyb. 23.10.4–7). Earlier, Amyntas I had offered the entire region of Anthemus in western Mygdonia to the Athenian Hippias as a gift (Hdt. 5.94.1). Philip II ceded the same region briefly to the Olynthians (Dem. 6.20). What is clear from these examples is that, while common Macedonians expected a degree of familiarity with their monarch, there were clear limits to their ability to influence a monarch's desires. It also makes clear in part why Philip's grants of land and later official companionship with these individuals had such a great impact on their support for the king. Such gifts were unexpected and, given the common Macedonian's previous lack of status before the aristocrats and king, much appreciated.

With respect to the forces of Philip and Alexander, their loyalty appears more closely connected to their regard for Philip than to that for his son.[20] When in difficulties with his soldiers at Opis, Alexander reminded them that Philip, his father,[21] had brought them prosperity, safety and power (Arr. *Anab.* 7.9.1–5). In the disturbance in Babylon after the great Conqueror's death, the troops turned not to Alexander's offspring, nor to his generals, but rather to Alexander's half-brother, Philip's son, Arrhidaeus (Curt. 10.7.1–10), who immediately after his elevation to the throne changed his name to Philip (Curt. 10.7.7; Diod. 18.2.4). A similar situation occurred with Cynanne, Philip's daughter and Alexander's half-sister. In 321, she had raised her own Macedonian force (Polyaen. 8.60) and led it to Asia, where she demanded a marriage between her daughter Adea and the new king, Philip III, the former Arrhidaeus (Arr. *Succ.* 1.22–3; Polyaen. 8.60; Diod. 19.52.5). When Cynanne was murdered, the royal army rioted and forced their leaders to acquiesce to the marriage (Diod. 19.52.5; Arr. *Succ.* 1.22–3; Polyaen. 8.60). Cynanne's connection to Philip II is clear, but that to Alexander is ephemeral at best. She was, however, an Argead, which was now a very small clan after the elimination of so many of its members by Philip and Alexander. After her marriage, Adea changed her name to Eurydice (Arr. *Succ.* 1.23; Polyaen. 8.60; Diod. 19.52.5), which, while a common Macedonian female name, was more importantly the name of Philip II's mother (Just. 7.4.5). In her new role, Adea/Eurydice's personal influence was profound. She sparked riots in the royal army (Arr. *Succ.* 1.31; Diod. 18.39.1–2) and was

even briefly the self-proclaimed regent for her husband in Macedonia (Justin 14.5.1–3; Diod. 19.11.1).[22]

During Philip's reign, in addition to the many cities created by him in his kingdom, there were many Greek cities along or near the coast which were incorporated by that monarch into Macedonia (Diod. 16.8.2–3; Dem. 1.5; 20.63). Cities, either acquired by conquest or created by Philip or a hybrid of both, typically had a great deal of autonomy, with their own magistrates and local assemblies (Hatzopoulos 1996A: 129–65; Gauthier 1993: 211–12). There was, however, no doubt who had overall authority. In 357, when Philip captured Amphipolis, the city maintained many of its institutions (cf. *GHI* 49) and its assembly was able to pass decrees of exile (*GHI* 49.ll.1–15). However, this last power was likely done at the insistence of the Macedonian king, for Diodorus (16.8.2) reports that after capturing the city, Philip exiled those who were disaffected by his acquisition. It is likely that Philip simply chose to have the people of Amphipolis do his bidding in this regard. One of the two individuals banished, Stratocles (*GHI* 49.ll.1–2), presumably is the same ambassador who with Hierax had earlier led an embassy to Athens offering to surrender the city in exchange for Athenian protection ([Theopompos] *BNJ* 115 F-42j). Unfortunately, while there is additional surviving inscriptional evidence which supports the general autonomy of these communities, it dates from after Philip's death and often a century or more later. An inscription from the last quarter of the fourth century from the Macedonian religious centre of Dion lists magistrates, selected committees, the 'voting and publishing of decrees, erecting statues, and being responsible for the organization of festivals and games' (Hatzopoulos 1996A: 129; 1996B: 73–4). A second-century BC inscription from Pydna lists its own magistrates and revenues and even indicates that the city sent out its own embassies (Hatzopoulos 1996A: 130–1; 1996B: 72).

During Hellenistic times, the presence of a royal official called the *epistates* became common in the cities (Sherwin-White and Kuhrt 1993: 165–6) and may date from the reign of Philip II (Hatzopoulos 1996A: 388–9; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 476). The origin of this official might, perhaps, arise from the practices of certain Greek cities on Macedonia's coast. In Athens, an *epistates* was a supervisory official with authority over a variety of different tasks and might serve for anything from one day to a year (Hammond 1999: 370). Certain inscriptions recording deeds of sale from Amphipolis are dated by an annual, eponymous *epistates* (Hatzopoulos 1996A: 99–104). Hatzopoulos argues that these magistrates may have been elected by the citizens of Amphipolis, but because of their position they were answerable to the central government

(1996A: 426–9): 'It seems improbable that the citizens of any Macedonian community would dare elect a candidate unacceptable to the king' (Hatzopoulos 1996A: 429). It is even more likely that this official was 'a *philoxenos* [a friend resident in the city] of the royal family, and who acted as intermediary' (Strootman 2011: 146; see also Chapter 4). While coming from the time of Alexander the Great, an inscription accepted as a letter from Alexander to the Chians may show how such arrangements were made by his father. In this surviving inscription, a Chian by the name of Alcimachus is praised to the people of Chios and more importantly for the current discussion he is called Alexander's 'friend' (*GHI* 84B l.13; Piejko 1985: 242 l.13).

> Inasmuch as this (man) Alcimachus protested that he had departed led by force, and he became my friend and was well disposed toward your folk, for he made continuous efforts to restore the exiles and was instrumental in the freeing of your city from the oligarchy which had previously been set up among you, and since both in words and in deeds he acted in your interests, I believe it would be fair in return for all he has done on behalf of the people, whether by himself or on all those occasions when he cooperated with me in matters concerning you, to rescind the things voted against his father, to restore to him as the first among those who are returning what the city took away, and to treat him and his friends with (all) honor and trust, as a man who has always been devoted to the city. Such action on your part would please me, and if you should require anything of me I would be even more disposed to succor you.
>
> Translation, Piejko 1985: 243

Whether control was achieved through elected or imposed officials, autonomy was limited, especially in the area of foreign affairs, and often subject to the ruler's whims, but in the day-to-day life of the city the king and his officials appear not to have been intrusive. 'Urban autonomy was probably allowed in certain limits, depending on the Crown's interests' (Errington 2002: 9). In the case of Philippi, a very fragmentary inscription does indicate that land disputes were routinely submitted to the king or his representative (Hatzopoulos 1996B: 26–7). Much of the autonomy of these cities was not due to any philosophical belief, but rather to the lack of complex bureaucracy. This was an issue for any ancient government. The Persian Empire permitted extensive local autonomy in the cities of its empire.

What appears to be clear is that, even though Philip and later Alexander favoured oligarchy in the cities of Greece or even tyranny, Macedonian cities operated more-or-less democratically, under the ultimate control of the monarch.

Philip and Alexander's typical support of oligarchies in Greece had little to do with personal preference and more to do with the linkage of most democratically organized Greek cities especially on the mainland with democratic Athens. In Asia, under Persian pressure, Greek cities were oligarchic and hence the Macedonians supported the opposition, and those democrats in these communities supported the Macedonian 'liberators'. This practice certainly carried on after Alexander's death in Asia, where democratic governments were installed routinely in the Hellenistic Age (Billows 1995: 70–80). We know little about the level of control previous kings had over cities in Macedonia, but given their scarcity and the limited power of these kings over their own country, it was certainly less than that exercised by Philip. The imposition of democratic government in Macedonia likely resulted not only from the general lack of bureaucracy within the kingdom but also from the king's close connection to the newly created middle class.

Philip's innovations in Macedonian urbanization carried over into his son Alexander's foundations. In an inscription usually dated in 334 (*GHI* 84; Heisserer 1980), when Chios was 'liberated' from her Persian oligarchic rulers, Alexander imposed conditions on the restored democracy. He recalled those Chians who had been expelled by the previous pro-Persian government (*GHI* 84A.l.3); ordered that a democratic constitution be created and that this document be sent to him for approval; commanded that the Chians supply 'twenty manned triremes at their own expense' to the allied fleet (*GHI* 84A.ll.8–9); and 'until the Chians are reconciled' he placed a garrison in their city (*GHI* 84A.ll.18–19). Later, in a second communication to the Chians, Alexander ordered prosecution of those who supported the Persians and, as noted, interceded on behalf of a 'friend' (*GHI* 84B.ll.10–27; Heisserer 1980: 101). Alexander concluded this second communication with the words, that 'by doing these things you will gratify me, and if you were to request anything from me I should be more enthusiastic towards you' (*GHI* 84B.ll.26–9; cf. Rhodes and Osborne 2007: 422–3). All of these actions were taken even though Chios was made a member of the League of Corinth, first established by Philip and then subsequently by Alexander (see Chapter 5), of which all members were to be free and autonomous (*GHI* 76.ll.12–16). League membership appears clear from the mandate that those who had supported the previous, pro-Persian, administration were liable to seizure and trial before the 'assembly [*synedrion*] of the Greeks', which can only be a reference to the League's *synedrion* (*GHI* 76.l. 21). Other surviving inscriptions bear out the relationship expressed in the Chian decree. Eresus had to deal with its exiles as Alexander determined (Heisserer 1980:

36–45), and at Priene, Alexander declared the people to be autonomous, but certain surrounding villages and the 'countryside around' were proclaimed to belong to Alexander (*GHI* 86; Rhodes and Osborne 2007: 432). These cities were free in their internal affairs only and even that was subject to Alexander's dictates (Bickerman 1934: 346–7). All were subject to the will of the Macedonian king.

One of the interesting questions that arises from the continuation of Greek rule in Asia after Alexander's death is the scarcity of local attempts during the wars of the Successors to drive the Greeks back to their shores. Why were there not numerous uprisings? The answer would appear to be that the introduction of Hellenic-style cities transformed that world. These were cities that were not controlled by imposed governments of aristocratic elites or tyrants, but rather communities where the middle class tended to dominate – at least in local matters – the affairs of their communities. As Philip had transformed Macedonia into a world where the countryside might still in large measure be under the control of local aristocrats, cities were by and large independent of such domination and were tied to central governments in part to maintain their relative independence and prosperity. Philip's creation of what amounted to a middle class of small land owners provided him with his infantry and was the key to his success in controlling not only his *Hetairoi*, but also his entire country. However, as shown in Philip's transferring entire populations from one part of Macedonia to another and later Alexander's actions respecting supposedly autonomous communities, the king maintained his authority over these cities, and when he deemed it necessary he intervened at will. It was Philip who created what was to become the standard for the relationship between Hellenistic kings and their 'Greek' cities, whether these were new foundations or refoundations.

Philip altered his relationship with both aristocratic and common Macedonians, but kept the basic nature of royal authority personal. He clearly strengthened his position vis-a-vis the aristocrats in Macedonia by achieving greater control over the resources of his kingdom, and these resources gave him great advantages as a patron. The mines he had acquired in Thrace gave him 1,000 talents of gold a year (Diod. 16.8.7; Dem. 18.235), he collected a tithe from the Thracians (Diod. 16.71.2), and royal power came from an extension of this personal bond. In addition to changing the nature of the Macedonian military by creating a new infantry force, he also established a previously non-existent relationship with these troops. He accomplished this early in his reign by extending the traditional *hetairos* relationship to infantry soldiers, at first to his infantry 'bodyguard', but later to his entire heavy infantry, thus strengthening the personal bond with these troops. They owed the monarch their lands and new

economic status and now they were given the further honour of being acknowledged as companions, *Pezhetairoi*, foot companions. The question arises as to what did such a personal relationship entail? Common soldiers did not routinely participate in the more intimate symposia/feasts of the *Hetairoi*, although Alexander did organize a great feast at Opis where his Macedonians formed an inner circle about the king (Arr. Anab. 7.11.8–9). From the evidence from the reign of Alexander, it is clear that this personal relationship with the Macedonian soldiers was most often connected with religious activities. Alexander often summoned the troops for sacrificial events (Arr. *Anab.* 1.18.2; 2.5.8; 3.5.2; 5.20.1; 6.28.3), which often included athletic competitions (Arr. *Anab.* 2.5.8; 3.5.2; 5.20.1). Before the assembled troops he would also honour particular soldiers with rewards (Arr. *Anab.* 2.12.1). In the case of Philip, he typically led the *Pezhetairoi* directly in combat (Diod. 16.4.5, 86.1). Previous Argeads rode with the cavalry into battle (Hdt. 9.45.3; Thuc. 1.61.4, 62.2, 4), as did Alexander at Chaeronea and in his Asian campaigns as well. Philip was, after all, the individual who had created the Macedonian phalanx. This was another reason the rank and file were especially loyal to him and to his memory.

The identity of the king who actually extended the relationship to the infantry is, however, disputed (Anson 2009C: 88–98), since there are few direct references to the *Pezhetairoi* in the surviving sources before the reign of Alexander the Great, and the majority of those are from scholiasts and lexicographers.[23] In the *Second Olynthiac* (2.16–17), Demosthenes differentiates between the Macedonians, Philip's mercenaries and the *Pezhetairoi*.[24] Demosthenes thus indicates that the personal relationship between king and foot soldier had, as of 349, not been extended to the infantry as a whole, but was reserved for his infantry guard. The scholiast commenting on this particular passage and quoting Theopompus (*BNJ* 115 F-348) makes it clear that perhaps as late as 340 this term only referred to Philip II's royal guards: 'Theopompus says that picked men from all the Macedonians, the largest and the strongest, served as the King's guards, and they were called the *Pezhetairoi*.' Demosthenes' and Theopompus' description of these foot-companions as an elite guard says nothing of the relationship's extension to the entire infantry, but does associate the concept with Philip. A fragment from Anaximenes' history of Philip (*BNJ* 72 F-4=Harpocration *Suda* s.v. Πεζέταιροι) has most often been interpreted as crediting another king both with the creation of the concept and the broadening of the relationship to include all of his heavy infantry. Anaximenes was a contemporary and had accompanied Alexander on his invasion of Asia (*Suda* s.v. Αναξιμένης). The fragment in question is as follows:

> Anaximenes in Book 1 of his *Philippika* when talking of Alexander states: 'Then, after training the most renowned men to serve as cavalry, he gave them the name of *Hetairoi*; but the majority, that is, the foot, he divided into *lochoi* and *dekades* and other commands, and designated them *Pezhetairoi*. He did this in order that each of the two groups, by sharing in the royal Companionship, should be always exceedingly loyal to him.'

The association of these changes with an unspecified Alexander has produced all manner of speculation. Some commentators believe that Alexander the Great is being referenced.[25] Of course, if this is the case, then, since the term is found in the contemporary speeches of Athenian orators and is associated with Philip, it is doubtful that this Alexander could be responsible for the creation of the concept. Indeed, those who argue it could be none other than the great Conqueror himself, contend that the source is referring to the companion status being broadened to include the entire infantry and the entire aristocratic Macedonian cavalry, suggesting that previously the status had applied solely to the infantry guard and only to the most prominent aristocrats (Develin 1985: 493, 496). Other historians have suggested Alexander I (Edson 1970: 30; Brunt 1976: 151, 153), Alexander II (Hammond 1980: 26; Greenwalt 2017: 80–9) and even Archelaus (Lock 1974: 18–24). It is more than likely that this quotation has become corrupted. It is a citation in the *Suda* from Harpocration, making it twice removed from its original author. The context is a gloss on the Demosthenic reference to the *Pezhetairoi* from the *Second Olynthiac* (17), but the fragment associates the passage with the *Philippics* instead. Additionally, there were attacks in antiquity on Anaximenes' integrity. Since he had a quarrel with Theopompus, he wrote a treatise abusing the Athenians, the Spartans and the Thebans, imitating the style of Theopompus and ascribing that author's name to this spurious production. Theopompus then became a hated figure throughout the Greek world (*BNJ* 73 T-6). Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*De Isaeo* 19) remarks that Anaximenes was 'feeble and unconvincing', 'a jack-of-all-trades, and a master of none'.

Perhaps the best answer to all the questions raised by the passage ostensibly from Anaximenes was given by Peter Brunt. 'It is a piece of fiction' (1976: 153). Given the connection in our sources between the creation of the *Pezhetairoi* and Philip's military successes, whatever may have been the origin of the term, it was Philip who was responsible for the actual military reforms. This is especially the case when considering the military failures of his predecessors. As Joseph Roisman (2010: 152) remarks, if the reforms had begun before Philip II they had been dismal failures given the army's performance in 359 against the Illyrians. Without

much doubt, prior to Philip's reign the Macedonian army contained but few heavy infantry soldiers and these were unlikely to have been Macedonians (Thuc. 2.100.5, 124.1; Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.38–3.6). The best evidence that Philip was the individual most likely to have established this relationship with the Macedonian heavy infantry in its entirety is that he was the individual who created the first effective and numerous Macedonian heavy infantry. He was also the first king to have the financial wherewithal to equip such a force. While the exact timing of this expansion of the concept is unclear, such an extension of the companion relationship to the heavy infantry could only have occurred after such a force had come into existence. Therefore, this expansion must have occurred during the reign of Philip or that of his son Alexander. Moreover, Philip had years to accomplish this transformation, while Alexander only a bit more than a year. In addition, it was Philip who freed thousands of native Macedonians from their dependence on the aristocratic class. As the passage from Arrian, ostensibly quoting Alexander concerning his father, indicates, many new landholders came from the landless class of Macedonia.[26] Philip's liberation of these individuals from their landlords bound them to him as their benefactor. Given these actions by this king, the likelihood that he created this status for his guard, the eventual Hypaspists, and then extended it to the entire infantry appears certain. With Philip, the entire Macedonian heavy infantry became companions, the 3,000-member guard acquiring the new title of Hypaspists (Anson 1985A: 246–8). In conclusion, it would then appear most likely that the individual who created the Macedonian heavy infantry and led his infantry units in battle would be the king who expanded the personal companion relationship first to his infantry guard and subsequently to his entire heavy infantry. In the *Second Olynthiac* (2.16–17), Demosthenes makes a tripartite distinction in the Macedonian military between the Macedonians, the mercenaries and the *Pezhetairoi*. The scholiast commenting on this passage and quoting Theopompus (*BNJ* 115 F-348) clearly associates the term *pezhetairoi* with Philip II's royal guards. The expansion of the companion status to the entire Macedonian infantry then likely occurred after the fall of Olynthus, or perhaps as late as the victory at Chaeronea. Moreover, as noted earlier, while the evidence is, indeed, sparse, no Argead king prior to Philip II is credited with routinely leading infantry into battle. Macedonian kings other than Philip were cavalry commanders. There are also certain indications of Philip's camaraderie with the rank and file, such as the description of him wrestling with a certain Menegetes in the presence of his troops (Polyaen. 4.2.6).

Anaximenes' claim respecting the Companion Cavalry is certainly inaccurate. In Theopompus' diatribe (*BNJ* 115 F 225b=Athen. 260d–261a) against the king's

companions, he numbers them at 800 and lists them as the richest individuals in the Greek world. The only hint as to the chronological context of this fragment is that the author notes that he is speaking of a time after 'Philip had become possessor of a large fortune'. Theopompus also clearly identifies these individuals as soldiers by profession, 'man-slayers', though proclaiming that they do not live up to this standing. Demosthenes (11.10) also implies, although rather backhandedly, the military nature of the *Hetairoi*, stating that they 'have some repute for valor'. The wealth of these *Hetairoi* and their military nature suggest that these were prominent aristocrats and cavalrymen. The young aristocrat Hermolaus believed he had been degraded when his horse was taken from him (Arr. *Anab.* 4.13.2), and Amyntas, the son of Andromenes, an infantry battalion commander and *Hetairos*, was outraged when ordered to give some of his horses to others who had lost theirs, and threatened the individual making the request (Curt. 7.1.15). These are indications of the close connection between an aristocrat and cavalry service. The position of *Hetairos* as both courtier and cavalryman appears to have been very ancient, even though the first confirmed reference comes from the reign of Archelaus (Ael. *VH* 13.4). It is doubtful then that any of the kings named Alexander was responsible for its creation and that the concept of companionship had been present, perhaps, from the beginnings of the Argead dynasty.

Perhaps the most common bond between the Macedonian king and his subjects involved the king as commander of the army, and here Philip's connection to his new infantry was much closer than that of his son's. In Macedonia, the king literally led his troops into battle. In the days prior to Philip's innovations, it was as commander of the aristocratic cavalry that the king shared the dangers and hardships of war (cf. Thuc. 1.61.4, 62.2–3, 63.2; 4.124.1), but with the creation of the *Pezhetairoi*, the king now shared this same bond with the foot soldiers. It is interesting that Philip is most often associated with direct leadership of the infantry. Philip led the 'pick of his foot soldiers' on his right wing (Diod. 16.4.5; Front. 2.3.2) in the battle in the Erigon river valley, and at Chaeronea again he was in control of the infantry (Polyaen. 4.2.2). This association with his new model infantry further cemented his ties to this group. It would appear a simple evolution of Philip's relationship with his infantry to expand the personal relationship to those with whom he most closely shared the dangers of combat.

The heavy infantry, now the *Pezhetairoi* or 'foot-companions', formed a third rail in the political structure of Philip's Macedonia, a counterbalance to the aristocratic cavalry and clear supporters of the king. The infantry would no longer be the dependents of the great landlords, but holders of the king's land.

These new companions would be especially loyal to the king, who was not just their paymaster but also the source and protector of their new status. Billows (1995: 132–7), however, sees this loyalty as stemming from the inherent revocability of the royal grants, which, as seen earlier, was true of Philip and Alexander's grants, but with respect to these particular kings – and especially the father – the allegiance seems one of devotion rather than of fear.

Other innovations, such as *Basililoi Paides*, the royal Pages and the *Somatophylaces* (see Chapter 1), likewise emphasized the personal nature of the monarchy, but also enhanced the power of the king vis-à-vis his *Hetairoi*. Part of the responsibilities of both groups was to guard the king's bedchamber, the Pages handling the outside duties, with the *Somatophylaces* given the inside duties. Prior to Philip, the relationship between the king and his companions was one of near equality. In a warrior world where the king is the first among equals, guarding the king's bedchamber is not typically esteemed to be an honour. It is only with Philip that the court takes on the importance associated with royalty. With Philip, the source of power, wealth and increasingly of honour was the king. This change in the relationship of king and the aristocrats can be overemphasized, however. Much of the countryside, however, was still dominated by the king's aristocratic *Hetairoi*. The position of the *Hetairoi* was not then entirely or, perhaps, even majorly tied to the king. They had political power already and continuously in Macedonia. In Macedonia, then, power, even in the reign of Philip II, was an interplay of royal patronage and regional authority. The best insights into the actual workings of the Macedonian state are to be found in the operations of the traditional Macedonian court, which, as Frances Pownall (2010: 55–65) has shown, was more a symposium than a court in the Persian or the early modern European sense. In anthropologic jargon the term 'feast' is probably even more appropriate than symposium,[27] since in addition to the drinking that characterized the traditional Greek symposium, food was most often a part of these Macedonian get-togethers. It was a way to strengthen the ties between the Macedonian king and his *Hetairoi* (Pownall 2010: 55–65). This was part of the traditional shared government between king and *Hetairoi.* In this court/feast atmosphere the aristocrats as companions exercised free speech and deferred to the king as the ruler of the feast (cf. Polyb. 5.27.5–7). Even with Philip II and the growing pre-eminence of the monarch in this setting, the tradition of speaking freely remained.[28] The most famous example of this freedom of speech in the court of Philip is found in the feast arranged to celebrate the last of Philip's seven marriages (Plut. *Alex.* 9.6–10, Athen. 13.557d–e). During the drinking, Attalus, the uncle of the bride Cleopatra, insulted Alexander, the heir apparent to

Philip's throne, by proclaiming his hope that a legitimate heir might come from this new union. Alexander immediately rose, exclaiming 'do you then take me for a bastard' and hurled a cup at the offender. Philip angrily drew his sword and approached his son, but fell. Alexander then declared 'here is the one who was preparing to cross from Europe to Asia and he is upset in attempting to cross from one couch to another' (Plut. *Alex.* 9.5). The situation was clearly the result of too much wine, but there is some truth to the phrase *in vino veritas*, when inhibitions are loosened by drink. Attalus was also the indirect cause of Philip's later murder. He had caused a young Macedonian aristocrat, Pausanias, to be made drunk and turned over to be molested by some muleteers. When the young man appealed to Philip for redress, nothing was done, and Pausanias came to blame Philip for the grave insult and subsequently assassinated him (Plut. *Alex.* 10.4).[29] Both incidents involving Attalus show that Philip gave special deference to important aristocrats. Now, this may indeed have been because this particular king had married the man's niece, but Attalus was also one of the commanders sent with the vanguard of troops preparing for Philip's impending invasion of Asia.

Philip altered the very course of Macedonian history and society. He transformed Macedonia from what could charitably be described as a second-rate power into the dominant state in the Western world and changed Macedonian society from one of aristocrats and dependents to one having a flourishing middle class, from one with an overwhelmingly rural society to one with a significant urban presence. Philip in the space of two decades moulded what was a geographic region into a nation – a nation inexorably tied to the monarchy. Philip's methodology was personal. As far as he was concerned, *he* was Macedonia. He signed treaties with foreign powers as Philip, not as Philip the King of the Macedonians. The extension of the *hetairos* relationship to his new army was another example of the personal nature of his rule of Macedonia, but by this action he was also curtailing the power of these aristocratic companions by creating a powerful ally tied to the king economically and personally.

4

Philip II and the Safeguarding of Macedonia

Diodorus (16.95.2–4) states that '[Philip] won for himself the greatest empire in the Greek world, while the growth of his position was not due so much to his prowess in arms as to his persuasive abilities and friendliness in communication [ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὁμιλίας καὶ φιλοφροσύνης].' It would be hard to argue with his conclusion. Philip himself is said to have been prouder of his grasp of persuasion and strategy than of his valour in actual battle. While ὁμιλία is often translated as diplomacy, such a translation connotes more formality and professional state involvement than actually existed in the fourth century.[1] Philip's 'diplomacy' was always personal. While he did introduce a chancellery in 342 (Plut. *Eum.* 1.4; Nep. *Eum.* 1.5),[2] it was very basic and may indeed have been little more than a single individual, with a limited staff, who was primarily concerned with correspondence not with formal diplomacy (Anson 1996: 503–4; 2015A: 45–7). There were no permanent foreign embassies in the various states (Perlmann 1958: 187). At a formal level, states established connections with foreign governments through local individuals given the honour of representing a foreign state's interest in a relationship between the two states. This was called *proxenia*.[3] Here a state would contract a relationship with a *proxenos*, a person representing the interests of the contracting state in their own community (Antiphon frg 67). These were usually prominent individuals who took active roles in the political life of their own cities. These individuals were not, however, supposed to be foreign agents who were to sacrifice the interests of their homeland to accommodate the contracting party. However, in the words of Plato (*Leg.* 642b), 'Stranger of Athens, you are not, perhaps, aware that our family is, in fact, a "*proxenus*" of your state. It is probably true of all children that, when once they have been told that they are "*proxeni*" of a certain state, they conceive an affection for that state even from infancy, and each of them regards it as a second mother-land, next after his own country.' The duty of this individual was to look out for the interests of the contracting party, where those did not conflict with his home state's interests. For the rendering of such services, a *proxenos* could

expect some reciprocation. This could include citizenship, immunity from taxation, the right of access to the contracting community at any time, and front seats at theatrical events (*GHI* 55, 56). These relationships were formalized in decrees and most often seen as hereditary (Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.4); for example:[4]

> Resolved by the council of the Arcadians and the Ten Thousand Phylarchos son of Lysicrates of Athens shall be *proxenos* and benefactor of all the Arcadians, himself and his descendants.
>
> *GHI* 32.ll.1–8

> Drimon proposed, Resolved by the assembly, for good fortune: Amyntas son of Antiochus of Macedon shall be a *proxenos* and benefactor of the Oropians, and there shall be immunity and inviolability both in war and in peace, and the right to acquire land and house, for himself and his descendants.
>
> *GHI* 75B[5]

In the case of city-states, it was assemblies that usually established these relationships formally, but in Macedonia, given the position of the king, it was he who determined who would be *proxenoi* for the Macedonian state and, therefore, act in fact in the king's interests with the various governments in the Greek world. In treaties with the various Greek states, the signatory ostensibly representing the Macedonian state was always listed simply as Philip, not as the King of Macedonia. Treaties were made with the king – not technically with the Macedonians.[6] The monarch was the state.[7] In these situations, *proxenoi* were in fact *xenoi*. Philip established a number of personal alliances with key individuals and families throughout the Greek world. The elites of the various communities, certainly from the Archaic Age and continuing into the fourth century, established relations based on the institution of *xenia*, guest-friendship. *Proxenia* was a more formal and state-oriented form of this ancient practice. *Xenia* was a form of hospitality which established reciprocal, hereditary relationships between individuals and families in which significant services would be provided as a matter of courtesy.[8] These services could be as little as personal generosity or more importantly the provision of political or military support (Mitchell 2002: 13). Philip established such relationships throughout the entire peninsula. In most respects, this was the true nature of Philip's diplomacy. Philip's *proxenia* was in actuality truly *xenia*. *Xenia* historically had a greater personal element than *proxenia*. The former was what united elites from different communities, while the latter represented the community limiting and regulating these relationships (Herman 1987: 138). Plato's injunction that the relationship was always secondary to the individual's home city did not always apply in the more

personal guest-friendship form of *xenia*. Philip's relationships with states were often carried out through these third parties. *Xenoi* (guest-friends) were expected to exchange gifts, and usually such relationships were begun with an exchange of gifts.

Most of these relationships were between aristocrats. What is clear is that *xenoi* and *proxenoi* even in the fourth century were prominent individuals and often aristocrats. As Victor Ehrenberg expressed with respect to the fifth century, but likely just as true in the fourth, 'the noble class longed for a life like that of their ancestors . . .) To these individuals Philip must have seemed a powerful ally. The traditional power of clan and family is seen clearly in Cleisthenes' reforms, which were intended to curb such influence. That politician, who it should be remembered turned to democratic policies only after losing out in the aristocratic contest for power (Hdt. 5.66; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 20.1), created the fundamentals of Athenian democracy in part by changing the basis for citizenship from membership in a clan and family to birth in a locality called a *deme*[9] and by substituting for the four traditional Ionian tribes of Attica, ten artificial tribes, each made up of populations from the three traditional and often combative regions of Attica (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 21.1, 46.1; Hdt. 5.69).[10] In the words of Aristotle (*Pol.* 6.1319b), 'different tribes and brotherhoods must be created outnumbering the old ones, and the celebrations of private religious rites must be grouped together into a small number of public celebrations, and every device must be employed to make all the people as much as possible intermingled with one another, and to break up the previously existing groups of associates'. With the Cleisthenic reforms, 'The clans and brotherhoods and priesthoods belonging to the various demes he allowed to remain on the ancestral plan.' However, he created new eponymous tribal deities for each of his ten tribes selected after consultation with the Delphic Oracle (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 21.6). This redefining of citizenship, as well as the establishment of democratic political institutions, limited the authority of the traditional nobility. It is questionable, however, whether other democratic states in the Greek world were as thorough in the remodelling of their societies, or whether oligarchic ones ever altered their definition of citizen from family, clan and tribe affiliation. While the Athenian ideal of democratic political institutions was followed, the corresponding restructuring of society was seemingly not so frequently implemented even by democracies. In the case of the Athenians, these societal changes certainly by the fourth century had done much to emasculate the old aristocratic clans, creating new leaders with oligarchic sympathies coming from new families with 'a mixture of ideas and objectives' (Rhodes 2000: 136). Even in Athens, those

subsets of the traditional tribes, the phratries, did not disappear and met officially on certain matters including the admission of new members (*GHI* 5.ll.68–126). Phratry membership was still part of the definition of Athenian citizenship (Hansen 1985: 74–6): 'Phratry membership is regularly included in Athenian citizenship grants to individuals . . . would-be archons were asked about their ancestral shrines of Apollo Patroos,[11] which was probably tantamount to asking about their phratry membership (Ath. Pol. 55.3), and Athenians repeatedly used membership in a phratry to bolster claims to citizenship when challenged in the courts' (Rhodes and Osborne 2003: 34). Demosthenes was voted out of his deme in what he describes as a fixed vote orchestrated by a personal enemy and in order to demonstrate his citizenship appealed to, among others, members of his phratry (Dem. 57.23–4, 54). Clearly elements of the old system of tribes, clans and families was not dead even in Athens.

Though the evidence is limited, it is clear that many, if not most, independent *poleis* retained the traditional tribal designations, either the three Dorian or four Ionian tribes (Hansen 2004: 124), which, although lacking conclusive evidence, would imply that the older system of phratry registration was still the basic requirement for state citizenship. One such example is the island of Tenos which used phratry membership to establish citizenship (*SEG* 40.699). This suggests that there was in these groups no attempt to reorganize society contrary to the traditional basis of citizenship definition based on tribe, clan and family. While in the Athenian state 'in the fourth century, there were still some prominent individual aristocrats . . . there were theories and ideas of truly aristocratic life and mind, but there was no longer an aristocracy worthy of the name' (Ehrenberg [1943] 2013: 112), this was unlikely to be the case in smaller and less developed urban societies, even democratic ones. In the words of the 'Old Oligarch', in Athens, 'the poor and the people generally are right to have more than the highborn and wealthy for the reason that it is the people who man the ships and impart strength to the city; the steersmen, the boatswains, the sub-boatswains, the look-out officers, and the shipwrights – these are the ones who impart strength to the city far more than the hoplites, the high-born, and the good men. This being the case, it seems right for everyone to have a share in the magistracies, both allotted and elective, for anyone to be able to speak his mind if he wants to' ([Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 1.2). However, even in Athens *proxenoi* were chosen by the foreign power and represented powerful elements in the state in which they were resident. The Athenian Meidias was *proxenos* for Plutarchus, the tyrant of Eretria (Dem. 21.110, 200). While our information about this individual comes from his personal enemy Demosthenes, certain parts of the evidence can be accepted as

accurate. Meidias was wealthy (Dem. 21.66, 98, 109, 112, 133, 137, 153, 155, 157, 158, 159, 195 and 211; Plut. *Dem.* 12.5) and from a good family (by adoption according to Demosthenes 21.78, 149–50).

Philip appealed to the more traditional elements in Greek society who wished to return to the aristocratic principles of life and rule. He served as a conduit for those seeking to change or at the least to increase their influence in their societies and his heritage emphasized personal relationships in preference to state alliances. It should be noted, however, that while Philip may have been more comfortable working through traditional aristocratic conduits, he was not above working with the 'lower classes' when it was in his interest to do so. Despite his general support of oligarchic government, Philip, by his actions both inside and outside of Macedonia, had gained a reputation as a friend of the common man. Polyaenus (4.2.19) reports that Philip was 'a friend to the people', and Strabo (9.5.19; cf. [Theopompus] *BNJ* 115 F-81) had this monarch freeing the *penestai* of Perrhaebia from the control of Larissa and eliminating their tribute.[12] This occurred when Philip annexed Perrhaebia to Macedonia and, along with his settlement of Macedonians in this area, was a way to cement his hold on a region that controlled important passes into southern Macedonia.[13] In a similar fashion in Asia, Alexander supported democracies. The Persians had favoured oligarchies, so in Asia Alexander became a supporter of Greek democracies (Arr. *Anab.* 1.18.2). There is no question that Philip meddled in the affairs of other states and supported factions loyal to himself without respect to their political philosophy, but it is clear that he preferred to practice his diplomacy through the principles of *xenia*.

For one aspect of the *xenia* relationship Philip was famous, or infamous, depending on one's view of the practice. He became particularly noted for his generosity, once hosting a banquet for some 200 ambassadors from a number of states (Aeschin. 2.162). For Demosthenes and many of Philip's detractors, these personal relationships, Philip's *xenoi* and *proxenoi*, were little more than the free flow of bribes from Philip to various traitorous individuals who in return for these gifts were willing to betray their states. Demosthenes (18.41, 295; 19.145, 167, 265, 306; cf. Diod. 16.3.3) refers to the large number of traitors who were so bribed, naming twenty-seven of them specifically: 'Philip, observing these conditions, which were apparent enough, spent money freely in bribing traitorous persons in all the cities, and tried to promote embroilment and disorder' (Dem. 18.19, 61; 19.139–40). Of course, one man's bribes are another's gifts, or examples of *xenia*. While Demosthenes has no doubt that these are bribes, even his verb is unsure. The Greek verb he employs (δοροδοκέω) can be used for both offering a

gift or offering a bribe. Philip became one of the richest men in the Greek world, and gifts (?) flowed freely from him to his *xenoi* in many different forms. When threatened in 359, after the death of his brother, with an invasion from Paeonia, Philip forestalled the threat by presenting gifts and making promises to the Paeonian king (Diod. 16.3.4). Similarly, when a threat was posed by the Thracians supporting the pretender Pausanias, Philip again eliminated the danger by the very same technique (Diod. 16.3.4). This was a traditional diplomatic ploy long exercised by the Macedonian kings. As seen, Amyntas I had offered the entire region of Anthemus to the Athenian Hippias (Hdt. 5.94.1), and later Philip himself as king ceded the same region briefly to the Olynthians in 357 to win their favour (Dem. 6.20). It should be remembered that Philip at the very least hinted to the Athenians that he was willing to give them Amphipolis ([Theopompus] *BNJ* 115 F-30a; Dem. 2.6–7; 23.121). Philip was very generous with individuals who were not kings or those acting in official capacities for their state. The Olynthians Lasthenes and Euthycrates received from Philip respectively a gift of timber to roof his house and a large herd of cattle, and still others had received a flock of sheep or a breeding stallion (Dem. 19.265).

Demosthenes was not always wrong in his description of these individuals as traitors. Many supported Philip for reasons of loyalty to their state or because of their hatred of political rivals, but there were those who were, in the classic sense, *bought*. It is clear that to achieve his ends, Philip was willing to do whatever was necessary, playing on national rivalries and personal animosities, but also appealing to individuals' baser instincts. The evidence is pretty clear that in the case of Lasthenes even Philip is supposed to have acknowledged that this individual at least was a bought traitor (Plut. *Mor.* 178b). Demosthenes also accuses Aeschines and Philocrates of receiving farms in Chalcidice from Philip (Dem. 19.114–15, 145–6). Of course, Demosthenes himself was accused by his rivals of taking bribes (Aeschin. 2.23; 3.58). The evidence that Demosthenes later did accept bribes seems clear in his behaviour with respect to Harpalus, Alexander the Great's long-time companion and later treasury official, who fled to Athens in 325 with 5,000 talents from the Babylonian treasury and 6,000 mercenaries (Curt. 10.2.1; Diod. 17.108.6). Demosthenes was charged with bribery, convicted, ordered to pay a 50-talent fine and fled the city in 330 (Din. 1.1–13; Plut. *Dem*. 26.1–5; Plut. *Alex.* 41.8). Despite whatever truth there may be in the charges respecting bribery, the evidence is fairly clear that these particular Athenians did not work to betray their city. They did, however, pursue policies that differed from each other with respect to Philip. The three orators for whom

we have the most surviving material, Aeschines, Demosthenes and Isocrates, all had different views of Philip. Isocrates saw Philip as the conduit for Hellenic unity; Demosthenes viewed him as the greatest threat to Greek, and in particular Athenian, freedom; and Aeschines, whose initial position regarding the Macedonian king differed little from that of his later rival, did come to the conclusion that working with Philip could be to Athens' advantage. In essence, Aeschines became little different from so many other Greeks who hoped to use Philip to achieve advantages over long-time rivals or secure their city against long-standing enemies. As noted, Philip was most adept at playing on these rivalries to secure his supremacy in the Greek world.

While Demosthenes proclaimed all approaches to Philip different from his own as examples of treachery, in truth such decisions were very often the result of what turned out to be at worst short-sightedness, not treasonous acts. An example of Demosthenes' attempt to blacken all those who sided with Philip as traitors without consideration of other possible explanations is provided by the episode when Demosthenes accused Simus of betraying his home city of Larissa to Philip (Dem. 18.48), without acknowledging that Simus was a member of the ruling Aleudae clan of Larissa (Plut. *Mor.* 178b) and his alliance with Philip was tied to Thessalian politics and could be interpreted as protecting Larissan independence from her rival the Thessalian city Pherae. Pherae through a series of tyrants had attempted to unite Thessaly (Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.33–7; Diod. 16.14.1).[14] Timolaus was accused of betraying Thebes (Dem. 18.48, 295; Din. 1.74) and there appears to be little to forgive his clearly treasonous behaviour. He was later found in the Cadmeia with the Macedonian garrison (Arr. *Anab*. 1.7.1). The only thing that supports his championing of Philip was personal. Philip won and he personally benefitted, while Thebes lost its independence.

Philip showed that he was a keen observer of the political situation in the various areas of the Greek world and very capable of using these divisions to his advantage, but he was also a keen judge of character. Theopompus (*BNJ* 115 F-210) commented on Timolaus' wantonness, and Philip was certainly not above appealing to individuals' baser instincts. He was also very able to play on the conflict between traditional *xenia* and the loyalty due to one's state. Often the loyalty to the state was submerged in the ongoing contests for power within the state. This is true in relation to a number of those defended with hindsight by Polybius. In reviewing Demosthenes' charges, Polybius (18.14) states:

> Demosthenes … rashly and indiscriminately launched an exceedingly bitter charge at the most illustrious Greeks. For he asserted that in Arcadia, Cercidas, Hieronymus, and Eucampidas were traitors to Greece for making an alliance

> with Philip; in Messene the sons of Philiades, Neon and Thraylochus; in Argos, Mystis, Teledamus, one Mnaseas; in Thessaly, Daochus and Cineas; in Boeotia, Theogeiton and Timolaus [Dem. 18.295]: and many more besides he has included in the same category, naming them city by city; and yet all these men have a weighty and obvious plea to urge in defence of their conduct, and above all those of Arcadia and Messene. For it was by their bringing Philip into the Peloponnese, and humbling the Lacedaemonians, that these men in the first place enabled all its inhabitants to breathe again, and conceive the idea of liberty; and in the next place, by recovering the territory and cities which the Lacedaemonians in the hour of prosperity had taken from the Messenians, Megalopolitans, Tegeans, and Argives, notoriously raised the fortunes of their own countries. In return for this they were bound not to make war on Philip and the Macedonians, but to do all they could to promote his reputation and honour. Now, if they had been doing all this, or if they had admitted a garrison from Philip into their native cities, or had abolished their constitutions and deprived their fellow-citizens of liberty and freedom of speech, for the sake of their own private advantage or power, they would have deserved this name of traitor. But if, while carefully maintaining their duty to their countries, they yet differed in their judgment of politics, and did not consider that their interests were the same as those of the Athenians, it is not, I think, fair that they should have been called traitors on that account by Demosthenes. The man who measures everything by the interests of his own particular state, and imagines that all the Greeks ought to have their eyes fixed upon Athens, on the pain of being styled traitors, seems to me to be ill-informed and to be laboring under a strange delusion, especially as the course which events in Greece took at that time has borne witness to the wisdom, not of Demosthenes, but of Eucampidas, Hieronymus, Cercidas, and the sons of Philiades.[15]

What Polybius notes and what Philip clearly understood is that Greeks were primarily loyal first to themselves and their families but then to their cities and the maintenance of those cities' independence and conversely their dominance of others. If an alliance with Philip appeared to be to a particular city's advantage over her rivals, then such an alliance was a good thing whatever might be the future implications for the Hellenic world. The sons of Philiades were tyrants who were supported by Philip (Dem. 17.4), and Cercidas, Eucampidas and Hieronymus likely saw Macedonia as a protector against Sparta. The great accomplishment of Demosthenes was convincing a number of Greek states, many of whom were rivals, that Philip was a danger to them all. Unfortunately for Demosthenes, it took him too long to convince even his fellow Athenian citizens that Philip was a greater danger than their historic rivals.

Philip's success in securing Macedonian's borders and in putting the Macedonians in control of their own destiny was due to his new model army and other reforms, but also to his ability to understand and take advantage of the nature of Greek politics.[16] If the big three of fourth-century Greece, the Athenians, the Spartans and the Thebans, had been able to put aside their differences in the presence of the greatest threat to their independence since the Persian invasion of 480, they could have stopped Philip from achieving hegemony in the Greek world. But, as Peter Londey (1990: 258) has observed, 'the rich texture of Greek inter-state conflict, the myriad hostilities, jealousies and petty disputes . . . served to ensure that inter-state relations were based primarily on antipathy'. Moreover, for many smaller Greek cities the choice between control by an Athens, or a Thebes or a Sparta, or the distant Macedonian king, must have appeared to favour the Macedonian king. As seen in the previous chapter, Philip's direct control of Macedonian cities was minimal, and many smaller Greek states might have seen this as clearly preferable to the type of interference that usually came with submission to another Greek city-state. After Alexander's capture of the city of Thebes, it was many of the Thebans' neighbours – the Orchomenians, Thespians, Plataeans and Phocians (Diod. 17.13.5; Arr. *Anab.* 1.8.8; Plut. *Alex.* 11.11; Just 11.3.8) – who voted to raze the city and enslave its inhabitants.

Even at the Battle of Chaeronea when Philip's threat must have been apparent to all, the Spartans failed to join the Thebans and the Athenians to confront him. Their hatred of the Thebans was all consuming. In the Peloponnesus, after the collapse of the Athenian Empire in 404, the city-states of Arcadia, Messenia and those in the Argolid and the Elean plain had experienced Spartan hegemony, and that was followed after the great defeat of the Spartan army at Leuctra in 371 by Theban hegemony, which was more brief and was followed by a partial return of Spartan power after 362 and the Second Battle of Mantinea.[17] After the Battle of Leuctra, the Thebans had marched successfully into the Peloponnesus and set many of the states free from Spartan domination. In particular, Messenia, which had been enslaved by the Spartans for more than three centuries, became independent. Much of Spartan policy in the later fourth century was an attempt to re-enslave Messenia and to re-establish Spartan domination over the other states in the Peloponnesus. This gave these threatened cities a vested interest in finding a powerful ally to resist the Spartans. Initially this had been the Thebans, but with the decline in Theban power by the middle of the fourth century, for the states in the Peloponnesus Philip fit the bill. Perhaps one of the best examples of the often inexplicable character of Greek politics is found in fourth-century Arcadian history. With the initial collapse of Spartan hegemony, the cities

of Arcadia joined together to create an Arcadian federal state. The union of the Arcadian cities created a powerful force in the Peloponnesus, but the two major Arcadian cities, Mantinea and Tegea, which formed the core of the union, had long been rivals and their association quickly collapsed. Moreover, in great measure because of this rivalry, the federation at its beginning had created a new federal capital, Megalopolis. The ultimate result of the collapse of the federation was the replacement of two powerful Arcadian city rivals with three, now including Megalopolis (Roy 1971: 569–99; 1972: 129–36). Philip played on these rivalries like a fine musician.

Politics could be an all-consuming Greek preoccupation. It was not just the rivalry between states that often fogged the perception of external threats, but rivalries within states could and did overwhelm any feeling of patriotism. This strife within the cities was also taken advantage of by the Macedonian king. Alcibiades was not an aberration among the Greeks. 'Stasis, whose application ranged from sedition to outright civil war, was a continuous, serious and ultimately unresolved problem in the polis' (Manicas 1982: 680–1), and according to Moses Finley, 'a prerogative of free men' (Finley 1971: 130). Unfortunately for the Greeks, it was stasis that was endemic. Isocrates (5.52) laments that within the cities there was often violent discord:

> They feel such distrust and such hatred of one another that they fear their fellow-citizens more than the enemy; instead of preserving the spirit of accord and mutual helpfulness which they enjoyed under our [Athenian] rule, they have become so unsocial that those who own property had rather throw their possessions into the sea than lend aid to the needy, while those who are in poorer circumstances would less gladly find a treasure than seize the possessions of the rich.
>
> Isoc. 6.67

Victory over the opposing party was at times more important than preserving the city's autonomy. One of the worst examples was in 370 in the city of Argos where the leaders of the democracy instigated the massacre of propertied individuals in the city. This was apparently in response to a conspiracy by these same individuals to overthrow the democracy. In all, approximately 1,200 citizens were killed (Diod. 15.58). Philip became a recognized supporter of oligarchies and as a result many of those hostile to democratic government turned to him (cf. Dem. 1.5). After his victory at Chaeronea, Philip encouraged or saw to the overthrow of democracies in a number of states (Lott 1996: 34–5). In Ambracia, he established a garrison, with the democratic leaders fleeing to

Athens (Diod. 17.3.3), while Thebes suffered a similar fate (Just. 9.4.6–10; Diod. 16.87.3; Paus. 9.1.8). In the case of Thebes, the imposition of an oligarchy is clear: a council of 300 was put in charge of the city (Just. 9.4.8). Given that Thebes and Athens were both democratic states and supported democracies elsewhere, Philip was an obvious ally of those pursuing oligarchic political arrangements. It is also clear that in most cases prior to the Battle of Chaeronea it was the oligarchic parties that initiated Philip's intervention (Hammond and Griffith 1979: 496). Pausanias (4.28, 4) notes that Philip 'corrupted with money' the 'leading men' in Elis. Demosthenes (19.260; cf. 9.27, 19.294) states that in 343 the Elean democracy was overthrown 'in such delirious insanity that, to overmaster one another and to gratify Philip, they stained their hands with the blood of their own kindred and fellow-citizens'. Demosthenes (19.295; cf. 18.48) accuses the Megarians Perillus[18] and Ptoeodorus of plotting with Philip to overthrow the Megarian government, a plot thwarted by the intervention of the Athenian general Phocion (Plut. *Phoc*. 15). At Eretria on the island of Euboea, Philip sent troops to help overthrow the democracy and install the tripartite rule of Hipparchus, Automedon and Kleitarchus (Dem. 9.57–8). After Chaeronea, oligarchies replaced democracies in Acarnania, Ambracia (Diod. 17.3.3),[19] Thebes, Megara, Corinth, Achaea and Euboea (Ael. *VH* 6.1; Just. 9.4.7–10).[20] In these communities Philip's personal diplomacy had created many loyal *xenoi*.

Marriages between elites was another way of cementing alliances between families or a more elaborate form of *xenia*. In Macedonia, royal wives were not formally queens. Whatever powers they might possess came through their husbands, and in polygamous situations there was not a clear hierarchy of wives nor of possible successors (Carney 1992: 171; 2000: 18); in other words there was no chief wife. Indeed, Philip was polygamous and married seven times for what could be argued were always political reasons, cementing personal relationships with powerful individuals in a variety of societies. It is unclear whether polygamy was a common Macedonian practice only with respect to aristocrats, an Argead family practice or unique to the monarchy. Even though the only clear evidence for Argead polygamy comes from the reigns of Philip and Alexander, it is likely that this was not the innovation of Philip II. As Elizabeth Carney (2000: 23) comments, 'It is striking that neither Philip nor Alexander were criticized for originating the practice of polygamy or simply for being polygamous.' Satyrus, a Peripatetic philosopher and historian, wrote a series of now lost biographies, one of which was a life of Philip II. A fragment of this life lists Philip's wives ([Satyrus] *BNJ* 631 F-21=Athen. 13.557b–e):

> Philip … was always marrying new wives in war time. For, in the twenty-two years which he reigned, as Satyrus relates in his history of his life, having married Audata the Illyrian, he had by her a daughter named Cynanne; and he also married Phila, a sister of Derdas and Machatas. And wishing to conciliate the nation of the Thessalians, he had children by two Thessalian women; one of whom was Nicesipolis of Pherae, who brought him a daughter named Thessalonice; and the other was Philinna of Larissa, by whom he had Arrhidaeus. He also acquired the kingdom of the Molossians, when he married Olympias, by whom he had Alexander and Cleopatra. And when he subdued Thrace, there came to him Cothelas, the king of the Thracians, bringing with him Meda his daughter, and many presents: and having married her, he added her to Olympias. And after all these, being violently in love, he married Cleopatra, the sister of Hippostratus and niece of Attalus … And Cleopatra bore to Philip a daughter who was named Europa.

This list is generally believed to be complete, but Nicholas Hammond has postulated that there was yet another wife.[21] There is, however, no such reference in the sources. Hammond postulates such a wedding based on Justin 9.2 and certain military accessories found in the antechamber of Tomb II of the tombs at Vergina. Justin reports on Philip's Scythian campaign of 339:

> The king of the Scythians at that time was Atheas, who, being distressed by a war with the Istrians, sought aid from Philip … on the understanding that he would adopt him for his successor on the throne of Scythia … But in the meantime, the king of the Istrians died, and relieved the Scythians both from the fear of war and the want of assistance … Philip broke up the siege of Byzantium, and entered upon a war with the Scythians … Though the Scythians were superior in courage and numbers, they were defeated by the subtlety of Philip. Twenty thousand young men and women were taken, and a vast number of cattle, but no gold or silver.

Hammond believes that it is likely that Philip obtained possession of the princess either before or after his defeat of Atheas. There is, however, no source that even implies such a marriage. Nothing in Justin suggests that Altheas was interested in an alliance. His argument from the contents of the so-called Philip's tomb depends on this indeed being Philip II's last resting place and the remains in the tomb's antechamber being those of this Scythian princess. Included in this antechamber was a gold diadem, a gold pin of Illyrian style and a bow and arrow case (*gorytus*) of Scythian design. It has been pointed out that the same evidence could be used to support the inhabitant as Audata, Meda or Adea Eurydice (Carney 2016: 137).

Despite what might appear to be a chronological listing of Philip's wives, this is not claimed by Satyrus or Athenaeus in the fragment. It is likely that he has listed them according to both chronological aspects and also ethnic associations as well.[22] While Philip and Alexander married mostly to forge alliances with foreign peoples (Satyrus 631 F-21=Athen. 13.557b–e; Plut. *Comp. Demetr. et Ant.* 4), two of Philip's wives, Phila and Cleopatra, were Macedonian. Even though two of Philip's marriages, those to Olympias and to Cleopatra, were described as love matches, a political reason can be adduced for both. Monarchs in Macedonia and elsewhere seldom married for love (Carney 2006: 12–13), but according to Satyrus and Plutarch (*Alex*. 9.6–7), Philip fell in love and married Cleopatra, the niece of Attalus, one of Philip's generals and from Lower Macedonia (Diod. 16.93.9; Plut. *Alex.* 9.4; Just. 9.5.8–9). Cleopatra was young and that may certainly be all there was to this marriage. A middle-aged man infatuated with a much younger woman is hardly unknown, and given that Philip was planning to march to Asia, it becomes difficult to see what would be gained by allying with one of the many powerful Macedonian aristocratic families, and perhaps then angering the others. John Ellis claims (1981: 99–117) that Philip wished for more heirs, given that for the most part his other marriages were unproductive and what might result from Alexander's death in the near future.

But why at this late date did Philip decide that he needed additional male heirs? Waldemar Heckel (2003: 199, n. 9) comments that there was no need for Philip to marry again. If he needed additional alliances, these could have been formed through marriages arranged for his sons Alexander and Arrhidaeus. He was later to attempt a marriage between the latter and a daughter of the dynast in Caria (Plut. *Alex.* 10). What if the child produced by Cleopatra had been a boy, as Pausanias mistakenly reported? Would this child be any more a threat to Alexander's succession than Amyntas Perdicca or Arrhidaeus? Given the vagaries of the royal succession process, until the boy came of age it was very unlikely he would even be considered as heir to the throne (Anson 2009A: 280–2). In addition to his sons, Philip's nephew, Amyntas, the son of his brother the former King Perdiccas III, was also available and did, indeed, marry Philip's and Audata's daughter Cynanne (Arr. *Succ.* 1a.22). Elizabeth Carney (2000: 73) believes that both politics and love were involved in Philip's last marriage. It is just possible that the king was not thinking of additional heirs, or an alliance with the family of Attalus, or about love, but rather was attempting to cement his ties to the Macedonian aristocracy as a whole. Philip had undermined the power and even the prestige of the Macedonian nobles. He had asserted his authority over the once independent Upper Macedonian kingdoms; had created a Macedonian

middle class that was tied directly to the king and royal family; and had alienated members of the aristocracy with the changed nature of the *hetairos* relationship. Philip was no longer simply a first among equals: he was simply first and utterly foremost. Though not to the extent of his son Alexander after him, he had moved beyond the traditional role of a Macedonian king. The marriage may have been an attempt to reconnect with this still powerful constituency. This may have been what was ultimately behind Attalus' unfortunate comment following Philip's marriage to Cleopatra, praying to the gods that 'from Philip and Cleopatra there might be born a legitimate successor to the kingdom' (Plut. *Alex.* 9.6–7). In the confusion of unmixed wine, the real point may not have been directed at Alexander, but rather at all the marriages to foreign women in general and all the connections with foreign states. By the time of his marriage to Cleopatra, Philip was more than the king of Macedonia. He had become the Archon of Thessaly, the *de facto* leader of the Amphictyonic Council and the Hegemon of the League of Corinth. The foreign marriages may have come to be seen as one aspect of the reduction of Macedonia's influence and especially of the *Hetairoi* in Philip's world. The marriage then could be a rather simple and albeit pleasant way to alleviate some of the distrust of his nobles.

Any claims that the marriage was part of Philip's plan to set aside Alexander are unfounded. Philip never seems to have intended to marginalize or disinherit his very accomplished offspring. Alexander had proved himself already in 340 as regent of Macedonia when he had put down a Maedian revolt on the upper Strymon (Plut. *Alex.* 9.1), again at Chaeronea and was sent with Antipater and Alcimachus after Chaeronea to confirm the treaty of peace between Philip and the Athenian people (Just. 9.4.5; Hyp. B19. Frg. 77; Polyb. 5.10.4). In addition, the statue group inside the Philippeum at Olympia, an offering to Zeus for his victory at Chaeronea commissioned by Philip, includes images of himself and Alexander.[23] The statue group symbolized the dynastic image Philip sought to create. There can be little doubt that Alexander was to be Philip's heir.[24] Arrhidaeus was unfit, Amyntas Perdicca, virtually unknown in the historical record, apparently was not involved in Philip's wars or politics, and any baby boy produced by Cleopatra was at least a decade and a half away from being able to rule. Philip's greatest adventure awaited him and despite all of his problems with his troublesome son, he knew that son's ability. Ian Worthington (2008: 185–6; cf. Hammond 1997: 24) believes that Alexander was to be left behind as regent when Philip and the expeditionary force left for Asia. While Worthington states that it is unlikely that Philip intended 'to marginalize' his son, given what we know of Alexander, that individual certainly would have taken it as such. There

is no clear statement concerning whether Alexander was to accompany the expedition or not, but it would appear very likely that he was. To leave Alexander behind with his mother and his 'friends' could be disastrous. What better way to repair the father and son relationship than to campaign together away from the personalities and jealousies of the court in Pella, and especially away from one particular wife and mother. Fathers and sons often have their difficulties and I doubt that has changed much over time. Alexander had proved his mettle as regent in 340 and as cavalry commander at Chaeronea. The father's legacy and the future of Macedonia needed a successor worthy of the father.

Philip's first marriage to Audata may either have been arranged when he first became king and needed to reach an agreement with Bardylis to forestall any invasion of Lower Macedonia by the Illyrians and thereby acceding for a time to their occupation of much of Upper Macedonia (Ellis 1976: 47–8), or as part of an alliance arranged after Bardylis' defeat (Carney 2000: 57–8). It is more likely that the alliance came after the defeat as a way of cementing the victory. There is no evidence that points to the exact timing of the marriage, nor to the bride's exact parentage. It has even been argued that the true first marriage was not to Audata but rather to the Elimiote princess Phila (Ellis 1976: 38; Worthington 2008: 19). In this scenario, the marriage to Phila would have been arranged by the then King Perdiccas.[25] It certainly fits in with the use and abuse of Philip by his family (see the Introduction). However, after Philip's victory over Bardylis, those rulers of Upper Macedonia who may have sided with the Illyrians or had remained neutral would have been eager to acknowledge Philip's sovereignty; those who had supported the Illyrians even more so. Our sources state that Philip by his victory over the Illyrians annexed the kingdoms of Upper Macedonia including 'Elimiotis' [Elimeia] (Str. 9.5.11).[26] Likely it was following his victory that Philip made peace with Bardylis (Diod. 16.8.1) and created what proved to be a short-term alliance by marrying the possible granddaughter of the defeated Illyrian king.[27] It appears more probable that these two marriages then occurred in 358 and in the order found in Satyrus. Philip's second marriage then was to Phila, a member of the now formerly royal family of Elimeia.[28] Carney (2000: 59) speculates that she was the daughter of Derdas II, who by the time of the marriage was the former king of Elimeia. Satyrus only states that she was the sister of Derdas and Machatas. This may be the Derdas who is later found serving Alexander the Great (Arr. 4, 1.1–4; Curt. 8.1.7; Heckel: 2007: 111). The second listed brother is interesting. Alexander's friend and treasurer Harpalus was the son of a Machatas (Arr. *Anab.* 3.6.4) and may very well have been the nephew of Phila (Heckel 2007: 129). Tauron (*IG* 9.9.197) and Philip

(Arr. *Anab.* 5.8.3) are also noted as sons of Machatas and may, therefore, be the brothers of Harpalus and also nephews of Phila. Clearly Philip's arrangements with this family proved successful.

His next two wives in Satyrus' list represent Philip's extension of Macedonian influence into Thessaly, but have been joined in the list according to their ethnicity not their correct chronological order. Philip's fifth wife is listed as Nicesipolis from the Thessalian city of Pherae. While Satryrus places this marriage in his narrative ahead of both that of Philinna, another Thessalian from the city of Larissa, and Olympias from Macedonia's western neighbour Epirus, this is very unlikely.[29] For one thing, he notes that these marriages were to 'conciliate the nation of the Thessalians',[30] which implies that Philip is in a position of dominance. This statement hardly fits the situation at this early a date. Moreover, Nicesipolis' daughter was named Thessalonice, which would fit more easily in the period of Philip's victory over Pherae and her Phocian allies. Nicesipolis died twenty days after the birth of her daughter (StephBy z s.v. 'Thessilonice'). Since the daughter married for the first time in 315 (Diod. 19.52.1, 61.2), she was not likely of the generation of Cleopatra, Philip's and Olympias' daughter, who married in 336 (Diod. 16.91.1–4; Just. 9.1–3, 7.7). Thessalonice's birth date then was probably in 345/344 (Heckel 2006: 137).[31] Having secured his northern and north-western frontiers through his defeat of the Illyrians and the Paeonians, many historians conclude that he now turned to make safe his southern border by involving himself in the affairs of Thessaly in 358 (Diod 16.14.1–2; Just. 7.6.6–10).[32] However, Philip's actual entrance into Thessalian affairs was not initiated by him, but rather by the Thessalians (Diod. 16.14.2).[33] This connection to Thessaly was also not something new in the activities of Macedonian kings. There may have been historical connections between the Argead clan and those powerful families found in the Thessalian cities dating, perhaps, from the fifth century (Thuc. 4.132.2).[34] In 375, Jason of Pherae became the tyrant of Pherae and probably in the next year became *Tagos*[35] or overlord and commander-in-chief of the Thessalian League[36] and ruled over Thessaly and exercised control over other areas apparently including Epirus (Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.5–19, 4.21–32; Diod. 15.60.1–5). He controlled a mercenary army of 6,000 men (Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.5) and may have forced Amyntas III into a dependent alliance with him (Diod. 15.60.2; Isoc. 5.20; cf. Arr. *Anab.* 7.9.4).[37] Jason had forced the Aleudae, the long-standing ruling aristocratic family of Larissa, into exile. The *Tagos* had earlier contemplated conquering Macedonia and even Persia (Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.11–12). He was assassinated in 370.[38] In 369, Philip's eldest brother, Alexander II, reinforced the Aleuadae of Larissa and others in their

struggle to free themselves from the grip of Alexander of Pherae, Jason's successor as *Tagos* (Diod. 15.60.3–6).[39] It was certainly in Macedonia's interest to see that Thessaly did not unite under a powerful leader. Pherae was the state most likely to unite the region and Larissa was Pherae's most consistent opponent.[40]

In 357, Philip married Olympias by whom he had Alexander and Cleopatra.[41] Olympias was the niece of Arybbas, the king of Epirus (Just. 7, 6.10–11) and a member of the Aeacidae clan,[42] the ruling house of Epirus. With his defeat of Bardylis, the capture of Paeonia and his marriages to Elimean, Illyrian and Larissan princesses, Philip had come a long way in securing his northern, north-western and southern frontiers. His attention now turned to the west and the region of Epirus. Theopompus (*BNJ* 115 F-382=Str. 7.7.5) notes that there were fourteen Epirote tribes and of these the principal ones were the Chaonians, Molossians and Thesprotians. The sources indicate that the Molossians dominated Epirote affairs most of the time from at least the beginning of the fourth century. The Epirotes, like their Macedonian neighbours, were under constant pressure and attack from the Illyrians. They, therefore, shared a common interest in opposing Illyrian aggression. It has been suggested that what brought on the fateful invasion in 359 was the creation of an alliance between the Molossians and Perdiccas which was cemented by the betrothal of a Molossian princess to Perdiccas' brother, Philip (Heckel 1981: 79–86; Greenwalt 2010: 288). Our only source for the betrothal is Plutarch, *Alex.* 2.1–2: 'And we are told that Philip, after being initiated into the mysteries of Samothrace at the same time with Olympias, he himself being still a youth and she an orphan child, fell in love with her and betrothed himself to her at once with the consent of her brother, Arybbas.' Of course, the claim then puts this betrothal during the reign of Philip's brother Perdiccas, but from the little we know of these years, it would not be unusual for senior members of Philip's family to use him for their own purposes. It is also to be remembered that Philip when king was involved in an attempt to arrange the marriage of his son Arrhidaeus with a Carian princess (Plut. *Alex.* 10.1–2).

While it is hard, given our scarcity of information, to discount any available source, this passage offers a number of difficulties. One of these is the dating of the betrothal. The marriage itself took place in 357 (cf. Plut. *Alex.* 3.7),[43] so when might this betrothal have taken place? The years from 367 to 357 itself are excluded: Philip was a hostage in Thebes, then in charge of Macedonia's eastern frontier where he was reforming the Macedonian army, and finally a very busy king in his own right in his first year on the throne. The earliest that this episode in Samothrace could have taken place was when Philip was fifteen or sixteen.

Olympias would then likely be still younger, perhaps as young as between five and eight years of age.[44] Plutarch (*Alex.* 2.1) does call her a παιδός and Philip a μειράκιον. Justin (7.6.11) confirms that Arybbas was there to arrange the marriage on behalf of the Aeacid family. The truth is likely that the time between Philip's betrothal and his marriage was very short. That the arrangements were made on Samothrace suggests that the driving force for this marriage and alliance was Philip.[45] Samothrace was patronized by Philip and it was clearly closer to Macedonia than it was to Epirus (Carney 2006: 13). What then is unlikely to be correct is that this arrangement was made prior to Philip becoming king and was a romantic arrangement of a pedophilic young man and pre-prepubescent girl.[46] Philip would later, in 342/341, use this familial connection with the Molossian royal house to place Olympias' brother Alexander on the throne of Epirus, and subsequently this Alexander would marry Philip and Olympias' daughter Cleopatra (Diod. 16.91.4; Just. 9.6.1; cf. Aeschin. 3.242). These connections between the two royal houses secured Philip's western frontier (Diod. 16.72.1). This alliance would not only serve both against future Illyrian incursions, but also secure for Philip a strong ally against any recalcitrance from the former independent kingdoms of Upper Macedonia (Greenwalt 2010: 293).

When Philip subdued Thrace,[47] he formed an alliance with a tribal king, Cothelas, and to bind the families Philip married his daughter Meda (Satyrus *BNJ* 631 F-21=Athen. 13.557d). The Macedonian king had campaigned successfully in Thrace in 342 (Diod.16.71.1–2) and Satyrus makes it clear that this incursion brought Thrace under Philip's domination. Moreover, the alliance with Cothelas, the king of the Getae, was not one between equals. The king not only offered Philip his daughter but also brought 'many presents' (Satyrus *BNJ* 631 F-21=Athen. 13.557d). While the Satyrus passage describes Cothelas as king of the Thracians, he was in reality king of the Getae, a tribal people living south of the Lower Danube (StephByz s.v. Getia; Elis 1976: 284, n. 37).[48] While Philip had long been campaigning in Thrace, his campaign of 342 would be his last and his most successful. By this point in time, Philip was certainly no longer seen as some existential threat by the Greeks.

Philip was adept at establishing personal relationships and his persuasive prowess became legendary. Philip had the ability to give the impression to his hearers of what they wanted to hear. This is probably responsible for the fact that he was able apparently to promise to do what he never had any intention of doing and yet his promises continued to be believed. This is also likely responsible for many of the disagreements in our sources about his intent. In truth, it was never that clear in the first place. Philip was also very skilful at playing on the

various political rivalries, so often personal, in the Greek city-states. Ancient politics did not revolve around political parties and, except for the occasional tyrant or king, in most states decisions were made by sovereign assemblies. There were no political whips, no party leaders. Their assemblies did not have formal speakers or prime ministers. In these states there was no diplomatic organizational structure, certainly no diplomatic corps. In democracies, in particular, leaders were those with personal rhetorical and political skills. Many with these skills rose to be statesmen, others mere panderers to popular fears and interests. Philip was able to influence both sorts.

When Philip came to the throne the politics of the Greek world, with the advantage of hindsight, presented this capable leader with some great advantages. The three Hellenic powers, the Athenians, the Thebans and the Spartans, were in competition with one another. All three, when given half a chance, attempted to establish their hegemony over the Greek world. This created great unease among the lesser Greek states. In order to protect their independence, these latter states were willing to ally with anyone offering them security against the ambitions of these traditional powers. Justin (8.1.1–2) said it best: 'The states of Greece, while each sought to gain the sovereignty of the country for itself, lost it as a body. Striving intemperately to ruin one another, they did not perceive, till they were oppressed by another power, that what each lost was a common loss to all.' That Philip was able to navigate what was an incredibly complex political world is further testimony to his political skills.

In the north, the great powers were the Chalcidic League, a federation of cities headed by the city of Olynthus, and the city-state of the Athenians and her Confederacy. Olynthus was created in 432 when 'Perdiccas induced the Chalcidians to abandon and demolish their towns on the seaboard, and settling inland at Olynthus, to make that one city a strong place' (Thuc. 1.58.2).[49] Its creation reflected the mutual opposition of the Macedonian king Perdiccas II and the Chalcidians to the Athenians. Olynthus became the leading city of a Chalcidic League. After the end of the Peloponnesian War the development of the league was rapid and it ultimately comprised thirty-two cities. By 382 it had absorbed most of the Greek cities west of the Strymon river, and had even taken possession of Pella, the chief city in Macedonia, and there was a real prospect that Lower Macedonia in its entirety might be annexed (Xen. *Hell*. 5.2.12). In this same year, Sparta was induced by an embassy from Acanthus and Apollonia, two cities that were threatened with forced incorporation into the league, to march north and see to the league's disbandment (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.11). The Spartans, after their victory in the Peloponnesian War, had become the dominant power in the

Greek world, especially so after the Corinthian War (395–387),[50] and were continually interfering in the various city-states from the Peloponnesus in the south to those in the northern Aegean. In the expedition against Olynthus they were joined by the Macedonians. After a long siege, compelled by famine, Olynthus agreed to dissolve the confederacy (379) (Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.26). It is clear, however, that the dissolution was little more than a formality, as the 'Chalcidians' appear, only a year or two later, among the members of the Athenian naval confederacy of 377 (*GHI* 22.l.101; cf. Diod. 15.28.1–4). This Second Athenian Confederacy had been established in 377 as an alliance to protect the members from Spartan aggression. The Second Athenian Confederacy at its height comprised much of the northern Aegean, including the Chalcidians (*GHI* 22.l.101). The Athenians stood forth as a clear counterpoise to these activities in the north, with the strongest fleet in the Greek world. To ensure that Athens did not turn this Confederacy into another Athenian Empire, it was stated in the treaty that all states were to be free and autonomous, secure in their existing governments and free from tribute:[51]

> In the archonship of Nausinikos, when Callibius the son of Cephisophon, of the deme Paeania, was Secretary, in the seventh prytany, that of the tribe Hippothontis [i.e. in February/March 377]: Resolution of the Council and the Demos, when Charinus of the deme Athmonon was epistates; Aristoteles proposed this motion: In the name of the good fortune of the Athenians and of the allies of Athens, in order that the Spartans may leave the Greeks in peaceful enjoyment of liberty and autonomy and in secure possession of [the whole of their territory], and so that [the joint peace sworn to by the Greeks] and the King [of the Persian Empire] according to the agreements may be valid and [lasting forever,] the demos has resolved by vote: if any Greek or barbarian, whether he lives on [the mainland] or is an Islander, and is not subject to the King, so wishes, he is permitted to be a free and autonomous ally of the Athenians and of their allies, keeping to whatever constitution he wishes, neither admitting a [garris]on nor resident official nor paying tribute.
>
> *GHI* 22, 23, 24

This alliance appealed to the Chalcidians, given the Spartan campaign against Olynthus. However, with the demise of Sparta as the leading power in the Greek world and the Athenian acquisition of Potidaea, Methone, Torone, Pydna and other communities[52] in Timotheus' campaign of 364 to 361 (Isoc. 15.108, 113; Din. 1.15; Diod. 15.81.6), many states including Olynthus and the league became hostile to the Athenians. Moreover, while the Athenians had proclaimed that the new Confederacy would not engage in any of the abuses of the old Athenian

Empire, they now began to infringe on the rights of their allies. In particular, while members did not pay tribute, they were to give 'contributions', often enforced.[53] Indeed, for a little more than a decade the Athenians operated in the northern Aegean almost as if their goal was to recreate their empire. Their goal was to obtain control of Amphipolis and protect their holdings in the Chersonese. In neither case did their efforts succeed.[54] In 357, the so-called Social War broke out between Athens and her allies (Dem. 15.3; Diod. 16.7.3). The fear of Athenian aggression in the north was used by Philip to prevent what could have been a most formidable alliance between the Athenians and the Chalcidians from forming. The Olynthian League had a powerful army, which may have included 800 hoplites (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.14), thousands more peltasts (Dem. 19.26.3) and perhaps 1,000 horsemen (cf. Xen. *Hell*. 5.2.43–3.6, 4.54).

The Second Athenian Confederacy at its height encompassed much of the northern Aegean including the Chalcidians (*GHI* 22.l.101). At the Social War's end in the summer of 355, the Confederacy was barely alive, with far fewer members (Diod. 16.7.3) and Athenian revenues down to 137 talents (Dem. 10.37). By the time of the conclusion of the Social War, Philip was receiving 1,000 talents just from the mines near Philippi (Diod. 16.8.6). Even though by 341[55] Athenian revenues had grown to 400 talents (Dem. 10.37), Philip's income far exceeded that of the Athenians.

The Athenians from the fifth century on had been continuously active in the north to guard the grain supply routes leading from the Black Sea to Athens and to supply the timber required for the Athenian fleet provided by Macedonia. It was always in the Athenian interest to maintain some sort of presence in Macedonia. In addition to a number of communities along the Macedonian and Thracian coasts, the most important of these colonies had been Amphipolis. The Athenians founded a first colony at Ennea-Hodoi ('Nine Ways'), near the mouth of the Strymon river in 465, but the colonists were massacred by the Thracians (Thuc. 1.100.3). In 437, on the same site a new settlement took the name of Amphipolis (Thuc. 4.102). The relationship between the mother city and the colony became strained and during the Peloponnesian War the city was delivered to the Spartans in 424 (Thu. 4.103). While Thucydides calls this a betrayal, it is very debatable whether the description is merited. Athenian control had clearly provoked antagonism, with most of the population made up of settlers from Chalcidice, while 'only a small number of the citizens were Athenian' (Thuc. 4.106.1; cf. 103.3–4; Arist. 5.1303b. 1). Brasidas, the Spartan general who received the city's surrender, was subsequently honoured as the city's official founder and was celebrated with annual games and sacrifices (Thuc. 5.11.1; Dem. 12.21).[56]

Amphipolis precariously survived many Athenian attempts to retake it, maintaining its independence by allying usually with whomever was in conflict with the Athenians – and often this was the king of Macedonia. During the period of Timotheus' campaign in the north there was in existence an alliance between Amphipolis and Olynthus (Dem. 23.150). Shortly after Philip came to the throne he removed the Macedonian troops who were serving as a garrison in Amphipolis, an action that impressed many Athenians and convinced the Council of 500 to discontinue support for Argaeus, a rival claimant to the Macedonian throne previously supported by Athens (Diod. 16.2.6, 3.3, 5–6).[57] Philip's father Amyntas had recognized the Athenian claim to the city in 371 (Aeschin. 2.32), but in 367, now allied with the Thebans, the Macedonian regent, Ptolemy Alorus, attempted to gain control of the city (Plut. *Pel.* 27.2–4). In 364, the new king Perdiccas III formed an alliance with the Athenians, agreeing to help them recover Amphipolis (Dem. 2.14; Polyaen. 3.10.14). Later, perhaps in 362,[58] this same Perdiccas broke with Athens and placed a Macedonian garrison in the city (Diod. 16.3.3; Aeschin. 2.30). After his defeat of Argaeus, Philip freed all of his Athenian prisoners and indicated that he wished to make an alliance with the Athenians (Dem. 23.121; Just. 7.6.6; Lib. 15.1 42), sending ambassadors to Athens where they 'persuaded the *demos* to make peace with him on the ground that he abandoned for all time any claim to Amphipolis' (Diod. 16.4.1). Since Theopompus and Demosthenes (*BNJ* 115 F-30a; Dem. 2.6–7; 23.121) refer to a 'secret treaty', Diodorus' implication that the Assembly discussed this issue and voted on an actual treaty is therefore inaccurate. Did Philip ever promise to hand over Amphipolis, giving up all claims (Diod. 16.3.4), or only to evacuate his troops (Polyaen. 4.2.17)? Theopompus (*BNJ* 115 F-30) claims that the Athenian ambassadors, Antiphon and Charidemus, who in 359/358 came to Philip to arrange an alliance, also tried to persuade Philip to exchange Amphipolis for Pydna.[59] Did Philip agree to this exchange? Theopompus said they tried to make this bargain, implying it was not agreed to. Demosthenes, however, says that the agreement later was hinted at by Philip at a time when Olynthus was seeking an Athenian alliance. The effect of bringing up this proposal, which had been discussed in the recent past, was to create a movement in Athens to block discussions with the Olynthians so as not to anger Philip (Dem. 2.6). Of course, neither Philip nor the Athenians possessed the former Athenian colony at the time. Philip captured Amphipolis in 357, but instead of turning it over to the Athenians, early the next year conquered Pydna, making any discussion of a transfer moot.

The 'secret treaty', or more accurately the 'secret discussion', left certain prominent Athenians with the impression that Philip was considering it and

hence stifling any discussion between the two powers in the north, Olynthus and its League and Athens and its Confederacy. Clearly the so-called secret was not very secret from the Athenians – while not formally discussed, it was certainly alluded to. Geoffrey De Sainte Croix (1963: 113) is correct in describing it as just a suggestion by the ambassadors alone, without official authorization. The Athenian ambassadors reported nothing of this to the people because 'they did not want the Pydneans to know that they were going to turn them over', but 'arranged it secretly with the council' ([Theopompus] *BNJ* 115 F-30). In the Athenian system, all laws had to be approved by the voting citizens meeting in open assembly, but the Council of 500, which consisted of 500 citizens chosen by lot, fifty from each of the ten tribes, could issue decrees on its own on certain limited issues, but its main function was to prepare the agenda for meetings of the Assembly. Each tribal delegation, or prytany, served as the active subcommittee of the Council and it is likely that the ambassadors reported to a prytany and not to the full Council. Later, when Demosthenes (23.116; cf. [Dem.] 7.27) refers to the time when Philip was actually besieging the city and the Amphipolitans were requesting help from the Athenians, he states that 'he pretended to be doing so in order to hand the place over to you, but that, when he had got it, he annexed Potidaea into the bargain'. Philip got a great deal of mileage from this 'secret suggestion'. Given that only the Athenian Assembly could ratify such a treaty and given the open nature of diplomacy in the Athenian state,[60] Philip, by appearing to be open to the proposal, created an unofficial faction in Athens who believed that any aggression on his part towards Athenian allies or even Athens itself was in furtherance of this plan and therefore they would oppose any Athenian interference. They believed that Philip was intending to secure Amphipois for them (Dem. 2.6; 23.116).

While the existence of such a secret pact is mostly denied by modern scholars,[61] they are only correct to the extent that it was never an official treaty. Demosthenes (1.4) makes the curious statement that Philip was the 'sole director of his own policy, open or secret'. In the case of this so-called agreement, its true nature was officially kept secret from the Athenian Assembly. A faction in Athens convinced themselves – and Philip did not disabuse them of their belief – that such an arrangement was tentatively agreed. Even after the city was being besieged by Philip, there were still those in Athens who believed Philip's claim in a letter to the Assembly that he would turn the city over to them (Dem. 7.27; 23.116). Even when two emissaries from Amphipolis, Hierax and Stratocles, came before the Athenian Assembly and pleaded with the Athenians to come and take over the city, the Athenians failed to act (Dem. 1.8; [Theopompus] *BNJ*

115 F-42). If this was an official delegation, the desperation in this embassy is obvious. Having spent the last six decades fighting to avoid Athenian control, to now invite it suggests that the Amphipolitans saw no other course and judged Philip's occupation to be more dire than would be that of the Athenians. However, there is some debate over whether these individuals were official envoys of the people or of just representing one faction.[62] While Demosthenes simply proclaims that these two are Amphipolitans and does not state that they were officials of the city, Theopompus refers to them as 'ambassadors sent by the Amphipolitans to the Athenians' and Diodorus (16.8.2) states that 'the people of Amphipolis were ill-disposed toward [Philip]'. Amphipolis was put under siege and taken either by direct assault or by direct assault combined with betrayal (Diod. 16.8.2; Dem. 1.5; see Chapter 2). With the Social War breaking out in 357, the Athenians were too occupied to be concerned with Philip's actions in the north. In 357–356, Philip captured Amphipolis, Pydna and Potidaea (Diod. 16.8.2–7, 34.4–5; Dem. 1.12) and completed his conquest of the Greek communities on Macedonia's coast with the capture of Methone in 354 (Diod. 16.31.6, 34.4–16.8.2–7, 34.4–5; Dem. 1.125).[63] With his capture of Amphipolis and his failure to surrender the city to the Athenians, the Athenians declared war.

What is especially indicative of the effect of Philip's couched promises is that shortly before the siege began the Thebans had invaded Euboea. After 371 and the defeat of the Spartans at Leuctra, the Euboeans had left the Second Athenian Confederacy for an alliance with the Boeotian League. The Boeotian League was an organization of communities in the Boeotian plain which consisted of eleven groups of ostensibly sovereign cities, each of which elected one official called a Boeotarch, contributed sixty delegates to the federal council at Thebes and supplied a contingent of about 1,000 infantry and 100 cavalry to the federal army. Throughout most of the fourth century and very clearly in the period of Philip's reign, Thebes dominated this alliance.[64] Given that at this time the Confederacy and the Boeotian League were allies, this was not given that much thought by the Athenians. The four major cities on the island – Carystus, Chalcis, Eretria and Oreus – may have seen no need to continue in the Athenian alliance, which partially compromised their autonomy and required that they pay 'contributions' to the Confederacy, now that the original reason for the alliance, the fear of the Spartans, was gone. Perhaps they hoped that Theban protection would be less onerous. Oreus and Eretria together had paid ten talents in annual contributions to the Athenians (Aeschin. 3.94). Euboeans did serve with the Theban army in 370/369 and in 362 (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.23; 7.5.4). Diodorus (16.7.2–3) reports that in 357, war broke out throughout the island with one

party calling in the Athenians and the other the Thebans.[65] Given the military superiority of the Thebans in this period, it does appear strange that the war lasted only thirty days and was won by the Athenians (Aeschin. 3.85). The likelihood is that Theban support proved just as or even more onerous than that of the Athenians. Timotheus (Dem. 8.74) declared that the Athenians had to save the Euboeans from being enslaved. Aeschines also says that the Thebans were seeking to enslave the island and that they had been the first to invade it (Aeschin 3.85). With the conclusion of the campaign, the Euboeans rejoined the Athenian Confederacy (*GHI* 48).[66] The Euboean campaign, as brief as it was, added to the problems faced by the Athenians in the ongoing Social War. It also marked a clear break with Athens' former ally Thebes and her Boeotian League. In 342, Euboea rebelled and the Euboean cities seceded from the Athenian Confederacy once more. Euboea had approached Philip about the creation of an Euboean League as a counterpoise to Athens and Thebes.

Philip's actions along the Macedonian coast must have been seen as a possible threat by Olynthus and her League, but Philip allayed these fears by promising to conquer the Athenian colony and Chalcidian city of Potidaea for them (Diod. 16.8.3; Dem. 23.107), which he did soon after his capture of Pydna (Dem. 1.9, 12; 10.64, 66; 2.7, 14; 6.20). He also ceded Anthemus to them as well (Dem. 6.20). It is likely that the gift of Potidaea had been promised prior to his assault on Amphipolis in anticipation of an Athenian declaration of war, which came after the seizure, and was meant to make certain that Olynthus did not join the Athenians. While there is no such evidence, it is likely that Philip explained to the Chalcidians that he was only taking back what had been at one time – and what was geographically – part of Macedonia. Pydna had been part of the Macedonian king's domains during much of the fifth century (Thuc. 1.137.1; Plut. *Them.* 25–6; Diod. 13.49.1–2) and well into the fourth. In 364/363, it was seized by Timotheus and held thereafter by the Athenians (Din. 1.14, 3.17; Isoc. 15.113). At this critical juncture there would be no alliance between the Athenian Confederacy and Chalcidian League and in fact around the time of his attack on Amphipolis an alliance was formed between Philip and the Chalcidians (*GHI* 50). With Athens involved in its Social War and without the assistance of the Chalcidians, there was little likelihood that the Athenians could do much about Philip's aggression or, perhaps looked at from a different Macedonian perspective, liberation.

In 354, Philip completed his control of the Macedonian coast when the last Athenian foothold in coastal Macedonia, Methone, was taken and razed to the ground (Diod. 16.34.4–5; Dem. 1.9; 4.4; Justin 7.6.13–16; Polyaen. 4.2.15).

Methone had become the main base for Athenian operations in the north. Demosthenes (4.35; cf. 1.9) states that an expedition was sent to relieve the siege, but it arrived too late. He further explains why the Athenians appear to be always late when it comes to military response: 'In what pertains to war and its equipment, everything is ill-arranged, ill-managed, ill-defined. Consequently we wait till we have heard some piece of news, and then we appoint our ship-masters, and arrange suits for exchange of property,[67] and go into committee of ways and means, and next we resolve that the fleet shall be manned by resident aliens and freedmen.' These were the disadvantages of city-state government, or perhaps just the complaints of a politician who was frustrated by the decline of Athenian power and influence, not to mention his desire to enhance his own personal power and influence. This is a common complaint about democratic government in general. Philip as an autocrat had none of these difficulties.

Despite the war with Athens, Philip's alliance with the Chalcidians also made possible his advance into western Thrace. In 356, after the capture and transfer of Potidaea and surrounding territory to the Chalcidians (Diod. 16.8.5–6), the Macedonian king received a call for aid from the Greek city of Crenides (Steph. Byz. *Philippos*), a city founded by colonists from the island of Thasos (Diod. 16.3.7), which apparently was not able to safeguard their former colony from the assaults of the Thracians (cf. Dem. 23.10, 179). This advance into Thrace would help secure Philip's eastern border and would also establish him as a protector of Greek communities from the Thracians who surrounded them. It also brought him control of the gold and silver mines of Mount Pangaeum (Xen. *Hell.* 7.2.17; Polyb. 22.8; Str. 7.34). While the silver mines at Damastium (Str. 7.326c) likely came under Philip's control with his victory over Bardylis (McQueen 1995: 76; Ellis 1976: 60, 67), the acquisition of the mines of Pangaeum increased his revenues, as seen previously, by more than 1,000 talents a year (Diod. 16.8.6). Philip fortified the community as a bulwark against the Thracians, and renamed it after himself, Philippi (Diod. 16.3.7; App. *BC* 4.13.105). The capture of Amphipolis and the movement into Thrace had, however, led the Athenians in July 356 to join the existing coalition of the kings of Thrace, the new king of the Paeonians and the Illyrians in a war against Philip (*GHI* 53; cf. Diod. 16.22.3). In this treaty, the Athenians promised to fight alongside their allies and specifically to capture Crenides for the Thracians (*GHI* 53.ll.38–46). This alliance came to nothing, with the Paeonians and the Illyrians falling again under Philip's control, the Macedonian king having moved against them before they could combine their forces, defeating the Illyrians personally while his general Parmenion dealt with the Paeonians (Diod. 16.22.3; Just. 12.16.6; Plut. *Alex.* 3.8). With his

acquisition of Amphipolis, Pydna, Methone and Crenides and the defeat of this coalition of peoples, along with a number of his marriages, Philip had succeeded in securing the borders of Macedonia. For Selene Psoma (2014: 144), all of Philip's efforts to this point were 'explained by the interest of Athens to control Macedonian natural resources, mainly timber. For Athens it was a matter of power and for the Argeads before Philip II, of survival. All Philip II wanted from the Athenians was "to maintain their friendship and not to allow them to strengthen their position to the point where they could challenge Macedonian power."' While there is certainly evidence that Philip's actions were in response to the historical threats to Macedonian independence offered by the Athenians, it is also clear, especially from subsequent events, that Philip was not solely interested in defending Macedonia from outside aggression, but also in the emergence of Macedonia as a major player in Greek affairs. Athenian aggression and imperial ambitions were clearly one cause for Philip's actions, but not the only one driving his activities. The threat of Athenian aggression was used by Philip to great effect. Events in the south and east provided opportunities to extend his power and influence throughout the north and well into the south.

5

The Creation of Macedonian Hegemony in the Wider World

While Philip was initially seeking through creative warfare, shrewd realpolitik and traditional *xenia* to ensure the security of his kingdom, a war which broke out in the south was to rouse far wider ambitions. It would also occur at a time when numerous wars were exhausting the Athenian treasury. With the conclusion of the Social War in 355, Athens even decided that conflicts needed to be avoided as much as possible to let the treasury recover. This policy of financial restraint was promoted by the Athenian politician Eubulus.[1] This restraint would be tested when in July of 356 the Phocians seized control of the Delphic Oracle and in the next year a Sacred War was declared against the Phocians for this sacrilege (Diod. 16.14.3–4; Paus. 10.2.3).[2] This war would last for ten years (Aeschin. 2.131; 3.148; Paus. 9.6.4, 10.3.1).[3] Sacred Wars were declared by the Amphictyonic Council, a league of twelve Greek peoples,[4] dedicated to maintaining and defending Delphi, the sacred site of the Delphic Oracle.[5]

The First Sacred War (*c.* 590–*c.* 589) arose from the attempt by a neighbouring city, Cirrha (Crisa), to levy excessive tolls on Delphic pilgrims. Cirrha was charged with sacrilege and destroyed (Aeschin. 3.107–112; Diod. 9.16). The Second Sacred War began with the seizure of the sacred site in 453 by the Phocians, and ended with the Oracle's liberation in 446 (Thuc. 1.112.5; Plut. *Per.* 21; [Philochorus] *BNJ* 328 F-88).[6] The seizure of the site again by the Phocians sparked the Third Sacred War. The Phocians had long argued that the location of the religious site in their territory should give them at least special prominence in the Amphictyony. The origin of this seizure, however, lies in the rivalries of the city-states. The Athenians and the Spartans were at this time united in their hostility towards the Thebans, while the Thebans, in addition to their hostility towards the Athenians and the Spartans, had long been hostile towards their neighbours the Phocians. Consequently, in 356, at the urging of Thebes, who then dominated the Amphictyonic Council, the Phocians were convicted of cultivating sacred land belonging to the sanctuary and fined heavily for this

'sacrilege' (Diod. 16.23.3; Just. 8.1.4; Buckler 1989: 16–18). In the summer of 356, the Phocians, unwilling and possibly unable to pay the fine (Just. 8.1.7; Paus. 10.2.2), seized the Oracle, and the majority of the other members of the Council declared a sacred war against Phocis (Diod. 16.23.3–6). It was also rumoured that the real reason for the charge and fine was Thessalian 'ancient hatred' of the Phocians (Paus. 10.2.1). Among those not voting for this war were the Spartans and the Athenians who supported the Phocian position primarily because of their rivalry with the Thebans (Diod. 16.27.3–5, 29.1; Just. 8.1.11). The Athenians, while secretly helping the Phocians (Diod. 16.57.1–2), were not in any position to offer much in the way of assistance due to the association of the Phocians with sacrilege, but also due to their own financial straits. The conduct of the war fell primarily to the Thebans and the Thessalian League (Diod. 16.28.3–29.1),[7] but Thessalian participation in the war was hindered by conflict within the confederacy itself. The state of Pherae sought to dominate all of Thessaly, while the majority of Thessalians fought to maintain their independence within the traditionally loose Thessalian federation. Phocis was an ally of the tyrants of Pherae, Lycophron and Peitholaus, who had claimed the leadership of the Thessalian League. Those Thessalians opposing Pherae, including the long-standing Macedonian ally Larissa, backed Thebes (Diod. 16.35.1; Buckler 1989: 48). The Phocians, correctly expecting little help from their allies (i.e. the Athenians and Spartans), plundered the rich sacred treasury of Apollo and hired mercenaries (Diod. 16.24.3, 30.1; Just. 8.1.9–10). By 354, this mercenary force numbered 20,000 infantry and 500 cavalry (Diod. 16.35.4). In the war the Thebans were unable even to defend their own home region of Boeotia from the Phocians let alone assist the Thessalians. The majority of the latter, unable to resist Pherae on their own and without active support from their Theban allies, turned to Philip and the Macedonians (Diod. 16.35.1; Polyaen. 4.2.19). This request came from both the Thessalians and the Thebans (Just. 8.2.1–2). For Philip the request for aid was welcome primarily because he did not wish to see Pherae dominate all of Thessaly. Such an eventuality would have endangered Macedonia.

Philip's first invasion of Thessaly in 353 led to two defeats and a hasty retreat back to Macedonia (see Chapter 2), but in the spring of 352, Philip, in command of the Macedonians and the allied Thessalians as well, met the Pheraeans and their Phocian allies somewhere on the broad coastal plain near the port of Pagasae in the Battle of Crocus Field. The battle was an overwhelming victory for Philip. In the final analysis, victory was determined by Philip's cavalry superiority. While each force contained roughly 20,000 infantry, the Phocian and Pheraean

force contained only 500 cavalry (Diod. 16.35.4); Philip and his Thessalian allies had more than 3,000. The combined Macedonian and Thessalian cavalry overcame the enemy's horsemen and then turned on the enemy phalanx. Philip's victory was total, with 6,000 enemy dead, including Onomarchus, and 3,000 taken prisoner. These 3,000 survivors were thrown into the sea to drown as impious 'temple-robbers' (Diod. 16.35.4–6, 61.2; Paus. 10.2.5). Philip proceeded to garrison Pagasae, expelled the ruling tyrants from Pherae, married a Pheraean wife in the bargain (Satyrus 631 F-21=Athen. 13.557c) and brought the various hostilities among the Thessalians to a close, while establishing his authority over the region. Sometime after 348, Philip began to mint gold coins showing the head of Apollo to emphasize his services to the god.[8]

After this victory, Philip now wished to end the Sacred War by entering Phocis and, if he had not been blocked from moving south through the pass at Thermopylae, the Sacred War might have ended soon after this battle (Just. 8.2.8; Dem. 19.84). While the Athenians and the Spartans had not been active in the war alongside their Phocian allies earlier, they now sent their forces to join the remnant of the Phocian army that yet survived. The Spartans sent 1,000 soldiers north, the Achaeans, 2,000 and the Athenians 5,000 and 400 cavalry under the command of Nausicles. The tyrants of Pherae, Lycophron and Peitholaus, after surrendering Pherae as part of a truce, fled with 2,000 mercenaries to Phayllus, the new Phocian commander (Diod. 16.37.3). Finding the pass blocked by these forces, Philip returned to Macedonia, with the result that the Sacred War would drag on for another six years (Diod. 16.38.1–2; Just. 8.8.8). There were other passes into Boeotia, but Philip chose not to force the issue, perhaps, as Henry Westlake suggested (1935: 177), because he did not wish to tarnish the image he had gained at Crocus Field as a defender of Apollo and as a friend of the Greeks. It is more likely, however, given those states that had sent support to the Phocians after his victory, that he did not wish to initiate hostilities with Sparta and Achaea while still at war with the Athenians. Philip's victory at the Crocus Field had cleared the Phocians out of Thessaly. The war had also seen the exhaustion of the Thebans, the most powerful Greek city-state on land, and the first intervention into southern Greece by Philip.

In 352, the Macedonian king was elected the leader of the Thessalian Confederacy. This organization began in the sixth century with the Thessalians representing themselves as a political entity able to negotiate treaties and alliances (Hdt. 5.63.3, 94, 1). Officially termed the *Koinon*, this organization had a chief executive originally called the *Tagos*, but subsequently (at least from 361) *Archon*.[9] Philip was elected Archon (Just. 11.3.2; Diod. 17.4.1; cf. Isoc. 5.20),[10]

and as such acquired a measure of control of Thessaly itself and also control of the Thessalians' two seats on the Ampictyonic Council.[11] The revenues of Thessaly were appropriated and Philip established 'Councils of Ten' in the various cities, thus expelling tyrants but also democratic governments (Dem. 6.22).[12] At some point, perhaps following a further intervention in Thessalian affairs that occurred after the conclusion of the Third Sacred War, Philip reorganized Thessaly along the lines of its most ancient organization system, dividing the country into four tribal divisions, tetrarchies, under the control of governors that the Macedonian king appointed (Westlake 1935; Ryder 1994: 248). Edward Harris (1995: 175–6) argues that 'there is no evidence showing that Philip was archon of Thessaly', yet he admits that Philip did collect the harbour dues and market duties in Thessaly (Just. 11.8.2). There is also the matter of the tetrarchies and the loss of Thessalian freedom mentioned by Demosthenes. These all suggest Philip's full power over the Thessalians. Control of Thessaly made that region a secure buffer between the southern Greeks and the Macedonians. More importantly, Philip now had access perhaps to the best or second best cavalry in the Greek world, depending on one's view of the relative quality of the Macedonian and the Thessalian horsemen. This was also the beginning of Philip's dominance in the Greek world through his control of existing Hellenic institutions. He was the Archon of the Thessalian League and now a major player in the most Hellenic of all institutions, the Amphicyonic Council. His role as the new champion of Apollo and the Council gave him legitimacy for future activities in the south. However, it is unclear if after his success at Crocus Field he had any desire to establish a dominant position in the south. While the Athenians had blocked his entrance at Thermopylae, as seen there were other ways to proceed. These included the pass between Mt Parnassus and Mt Hedylion (cf. Polyaen. 4.2.14) and the Gravia Pass which Philip did use prior to the Battle at Chaeronea in 338 (Polyaen. 4.2.8). With respect to both of these passes, in later years when Philip found his passage initially blocked, he did not let that deter him, but entered the south by one of these other routes.

At this point in time, Philip's ambitions were fluid, and more important than his new status in the wider Greek world was securing his hold on the north, nor was it entirely in his interests to end a war that was weakening the forces of central Greece. After securing his victory in Thessaly and ensuring a degree of control of that region, Philip turned his attention to the east. Here a number of Greek communities in the Thracian region reached out to Philip to protect them against the Athenian ally and Thracian king, Cersobleptes (Dem. 3.5; [Theopompus] *BNJ* 115.F-101). The expansion of Philip's authority in the Greek

world was a study both in opportunism and in establishing himself in a personal way in various regional and international Greek organizations. Again, this is a feature of the personal aspect of his rule in general. It would not be the Macedonian state that would dictate to the Thessalians or the Amphictyony, but rather it would be Philip – who just happened to also be the king of Macedonia. Greek fear of losing power or status to some other state was to a degree ameliorated. Individuals in the various communities that found themselves under the control of Philip would console themselves that they were not in danger from any ancestral rivals and also that their personal bond with Philip promised support for their state and also his assistance in the rough and tumble political infighting in the Greek states.

In 349, Philip turned against the Chalcidian League, at first by attacking its smaller members and ending in 348 with the capture of Olynthus itself. According to Justin (8.3.10), the war broke out because the Olynthians had given shelter to two of Philip's half-brothers and refused to surrender them to him. The causes for Philip's actions are clear. On the one hand these half-brothers were potential rivals for his throne, although at this point it is doubtful that they would have been able to challenge Philip. More importantly their asylum in Olynthus was a most convenient excuse for war. For Philip to secure Macedonia proper from dangerous nearby neighbours, the Chalcidic League needed to be eliminated. While Philip's reasons for going to war are clear, one wonders what the Olynthians thought they were doing. They must have known that housing potential rivals for the Macedonian throne could incite Philip. Justin (8.3.10) says that they harboured the brothers out of pity. Perhaps, since it appears that they may have been there since 352 (Ellis 1973: 350–4), they thought the Macedonian king did not care, and, perhaps in truth, at that time he did not. Nonetheless he was now in a position to deal with a possible threat. Despite three speeches delivered by Demosthenes, the *Olynthiacs*, supporting the Olynthians and three Athenian relief expeditions that were sent to relieve the siege, Olynthus fell to the Macedonian forces. These Athenian expeditions were not mere tokens. The first included 2,000 peltasts and thirty triremes ([Philochorus] *BNJ* 328 F-49); the second, eighteen triremes, 4,000 peltasts and 150 horsemen ([Philochorus] *BNJ* 328 F-50); the third 'in addition to the troops already there', seventeen triremes, 2,000 hoplites and 300 horsemen, this last force entirely composed of citizens ([Philochorus] *BNJ* 328 F-51). In 348 the city was betrayed to Philip and was razed to the ground and the population sold into slavery (Diod. 16.53.2–3; Dem. 8.40; 9.56; 19.265–6). Those Athenians discovered in the city were enslaved and taken to Macedonia (Aeschin. 2.15, 100). These captives

would now serve as a bargaining chip for Philip in any future conversations with the Athenians. Athens tried to call Greece to arms against Philip over the destruction of Olynthus, but the *poleis* responded indifferently. Here, as elsewhere, Philip treated the acquired territory as 'spear-won' land and in this instance incorporated the area into Macedonia proper (Dem. 7.28).

On 18th or 19th of Elaphebolion (16 or 17 April 346),[13] the Athenian *demos* resolved to adopt a proposal from the Athenian politician Philocrates to conclude peace and make a bilateral alliance with Philip: the ultimate result was the so-called Peace of Philocrates (Aeschin. 1.174; 3.54, 57, 58; Just. 8.4, 1–2). The war with Philip had been disastrous for the Athenians (Aeschin. 3.70–3). Many of their citizens had been taken prisoner by Philip when he captured Olynthus. They had not regained Amphipolis, the stated cause for the Athenian declaration of war in the first place, and had lost additional territories. For Athens, peace was essential. Athenian holdings in the north were now limited to the Chersonese. Euboea was, with Philip's assistance, now independent of the Athenians.[14] Athens apparently at Demosthenes' suggestion had invited the various states to come to Athens to discuss issues of peace or war with respect to Philip (Aeschin. 2.57–61), but for whatever reason this meeting never occurred and the Athenians voted to send ambassadors to Philip seeking peace instead (Aeschin. 2.18). What may have been responsible for this development was a shift in Athenian Phocian policy. With the Thebans and the Phocians exhausted, both called on their allies for help. Thermopylae was, however, now held by the Phocians under their commander Phalaecus, who had succeeded to the overall Phocian command (Paus. 10.2.7). Thebes appealed to Philip and the Phocians called on the Spartans for assistance, promising to surrender to them the three forts that controlled the pass (Diod. 16.59.1; Aeschin. 2.132). Philip gathered his army and headed for the pass, and Phalaecus, in return for a safe conduct for himself and his mercenaries to the Peloponnesus, surrendered the pass to Philip (Diod. 16.59.1–3). Once before Philip's advance into central Greece had been blocked by the Athenians at Thermopylae, but it would not be this time.

This was a dramatic change in policy, but rooted in turmoil within the Phocian camp. In the winter of 347/346, Phalaecus, the fourth in the succession of Phocian tyrants, following Philomelus, his brother Onomarchus and Phayllus, was accused of personally stealing from the Delphic treasury and deposed. He was replaced by three commanders, Deinocrates, Callias and Sophanes, who, facing a possible attack from Philip, made plans to defend Thermopylae and requested assistance from their allies the Spartans and the Athenians (Diod. 16.56.3–5; Paus. 10.2.7). The Spartans dispatched 1,000 hoplites, with the

Athenians ordering the mustering of every eligible male for military service under the age of forty to be sent to the Phocians' assistance. All these arrangements were abandoned when Phalaecus took charge again and refused to surrender the forts to his supposed allies (Diod. 16.59.1–2; Aeschin. 2.132–3). It is not clear from the sources how Phalaecus returned to power, nor why he adopted this dramatic change of policy. A possible implication of the Diodoran account is that while he was initially accused, he was later found to be innocent. Diodorus says that the individual who managed the treasure revealed under torture the names of the thieves, all of whom were subsequently executed (Diod. 16.56.4–5). Again, while it is not made explicit by Diodorus, since Phalecus was not executed, maybe he was innocent.

The Phocians were no longer united, as the attempt to set Phalaecus aside showed. It is also likely that now back in charge of the army, Phalaecus realized that the Phocians were no match for Philip and the Macedonians (Diod. 16.59.2–3). Aeschines (2.135–6; cf. 2.130) states that the Phocian commander had lost faith in the Athenians and the Spartans, which is why he failed to follow through on the earlier agreement, refusing to hand over the fortresses to the Spartans. It is also clear that the Athenians had lost faith in their ability to defend the Phocians or to continue their war with Philip and hence opened the negotiations with Philip which would lead to the Peace of Philocrates. The Phocians were also short of funds and the mercenaries were mutinous as a result (Aeschin. 2.131–2). In any case, these circumstances certainly contributed to the Athenian decision to respond to Philip's appeals for peace. Moreover, Demosthenes (5.10) claims that Philip had enticed elements in Athens with promises of support: 'That time there were some who assured us that Thespiae and Plataea would be rebuilt,[15] that Philip, if he gained the mastery, would protect the Phocians and break up Thebes into villages, and that you would retain Oropus and receive Euboea in exchange for Amphipolis. Led on by these false hopes and cajoleries, you abandoned the Phocians against your own interests and against justice and honor.' There were certainly rumours floating around that Philip would do just as Demosthenes states (Aeschin. 3.80), but with the Phocians distancing themselves from the war they had caused, there was really no alternative for the Athenians but to seek peace. Thermopylae was no longer blocked and the road to Athens was literally wide open. While the Athenian need for peace with Philip is clear, primarily due to necessity, it is not so obvious what sparked Philip's interest in securing an end to hostilities. He appeared poised to end the Sacred War, which would effectively isolate Athens and leave it with little hope of receiving support from elsewhere in the Greek world. The Athenians had

attempted to arrange a general peace which had come to nothing. It has been suggested that Philip was concerned to contain Theban power in central Greece,[16] but at this point it is fair to ask, 'What power?' The Sacred War had sapped most of what remained of Theban strength. Of course, if Phocis was crushed, Thebes would be able to recover over time. Thebes, however, had been Philip's ally since, perhaps, 354 or 353 (Paus. 10.2.5), even though Diodorus (16.59.2) insists the actual alliance came about in 346; either way, Philip in 346 had either renewed the former alliance or concluded a new one. There is no sign of a rift. The Athenians on the other hand had been his enemy since 357. Philip wished now, that he had in effect neutralized her power in the north, to end hostilities for a couple of reasons. The Athenians had blocked his entrance to central Greece by occupying the pass at Thermopylae in the past, even though that was not currently a possibility, and it is certainly possible that Philip was beginning to envision an invasion of western Asia which would require the use of the Athenian fleet – but such an enterprise lay in the future. Most likely Philip's plans in the north were not complete and neutralizing the Athenians would eliminate the only Greek power with the naval capability to block his advance across Thrace to the Hellespont.

It was Philip who had first floated the idea of peace and alliance (Aeschin. 2.17; contra Just. 8.4.1). Philocrates, or perhaps Demosthenes (Aeschin. 3.57), proposed that the Athenians hear what Philip's terms were and on two occasions Athenian embassies, each of ten men and both including Philocrates, Demosthenes and Aeschines, went to Pella and one Macedonian embassy travelled to Athens (Aeschin. 2.18; 3.54, 63). The first embassy returned with certain of Philip's agents to finalize a peace to be approved by the Athenian Assembly. The Athenians attempted to make the proposed peace open to other parties to join, the idea being that various Athenian allies, including Cersobleptes, the Thracian king and the Phocians, would then join and be saved from any further attacks by Philip. The Macedonian king, however, wanted this peace and alliance to be bilateral between Philip and Athens and the remaining members of her Confederacy, but not to include either the Thracians or the Phocians. The Athenians swore to the terms of the treaty in the presence of the Macedonian ambassadors and dispatched a second embassy to Macedonia to receive Philip's oath. The embassy waited for three months in Pella while Philip completed his conquest of Cersobleptes' kingdom (Aeschin. 2.90–2; Dem. 19.156): so much for claims that he was willing to accede to Athenian interests. Given that we have contemporary accounts on the negotiations from two of the actual Athenian participants, it might seem that the major issues debated would be clear. Unfortunately, the two Athenians were

the politicians Demosthenes and Aeschines and based on their political speeches concerning the peace that was eventually signed it is almost as if the two had been engaged in entirely different peace negotiations. The problem was that the Athenians had high hopes which Philip initially did nothing to discourage. Demosthenes (7.23–5) was later to claim continually that it was this peace treaty that lost the Athenians Amphipolis, which is, of course, nonsense. Amphipolis was lost in 357. While both Demosthenes and Aeschines put the blame on Philocrates for the peace, there is wide disagreement regarding their respective roles. For Aeschines (2.15, 18–20, 54–6, 68, 109; 3.54, 57, 62, 73), Demosthenes strongly supported Philocrates' proposal. Demosthenes, however, says it was Aeschines who stood with Philocrates on the peace (3.19; 18.21; 19.8, 23, 49, 94, 97, 144–5, 150, 174, 316, 333). The truth is that both accusations are likely true and the denials prevarications. When none of the pipe dreams of the Athenians (Aeschin. 3.74, 80; Dem. 5.10; cf. 6.30) was included in the final settlement, the recriminations began. Demosthenes in his speech *On the False Embassy*, given after the second Athenian embassy returned and reported to the Council on 13th of Scirophorion (6 July) (19.58), attacked Aeschines and other members of the embassy and advised the Council not to leave the Phocians to face the Macedonian army without help (19.18).

In 1974, Minor Markle (253–68), recapitulating his 1970 Princeton dissertation, 'The Peace of Philocrates', declared that Philip was attempting to favour the Athenians, humble the Thebans and preserve the Phocians.[17] This was a return to an earlier view[18] which was also based on Aeschines' presentation of the Peace of Philocrates in his speech commonly called *On the Embassy*. Philip hoped, says Markle, that the Athenians would join in an alliance against Thebes (in essence what Aeschines believed was Philip's purpose in offering the alliance), but, if the Athenians were not willing to join with him in such an operation, then he would perform an about face and join with Thebes to crush the Phocians. In this scenario, Philip hoped to gain a measure of control over the Greek states so that he could invade Persia, with his own kingdom secure from invasion by powerful enemies in his rear. Elimination of the Thebans as a leading state was an essential step in his plan, because, continues Markle, he could foresee that the only combination sufficiently strong to thwart him would be Athens and Thebes. This to a great degree is an argument based on subsequent events. At the time it is doubtful that anyone had the foresight to envision such an alliance. Using the same sort of argument, the past judged by future events, wouldn't an alliance between the Athenians and the Spartans have seemed at least as dangerous and more likely given their then political affiliations?

Following Markle's scenario, Philip insisted on a bilateral alliance with the Athenians as a necessary condition for the peace. He hoped that on the basis of this alliance the Athenians would send hoplites to Thermopylae who would aid him in the suppression of his Theban allies. This argument presupposes quite a lot, and as George Cawkwell (1978B: 102) has pointed out, it overlooks the enmity between the Phocians and the Thessalians. Any rapprochement with Phocis would not have sat well with the Thessalians. As it was, there was dissatisfaction in Thessaly when the Third Sacred War ended because the Thessalians had granted Philip so much authority due to their opposition to Pherae's ambitions and also due to the power of the Phocians. Neither was now a concern, but Philip was. Moreover, earlier in 349 Philip had transferred the communities of Magnesia and Pagasae from Pherae to himself (Dem. 2.11; Isoc. 5.21).[19] There was strife in many Thessalian cities with a return of tyranny to many of them, including Larissa and Pherae (Diod. 16.69.8). In 344, Philip intervened and re-established his hold on Thessaly, garrisoning various communities (Dem. 19.260), including Pherae (Dem. 6.22; 7.32; 9.12), and dividing the land into four districts under governors that he appointed (Dem. 9.26; [Theopompus] 115.F-208; cf. Dem. 6.22).[20]

By the time the Athenians were debating what to do respecting Philip's invoking the alliance and requesting military assistance, after the return of the second embassy, Philip was already at the Gates. The fortresses which guarded them had been turned over to Philip earlier, which made any attempt to prevent his passage untenable. Additionally, Philip was allied with Thebes and up to this point the Thebans had not given him any cause for complaint. This has been suggested on the basis of Demosthenes' *Second Philippic* (14), which was delivered in 344/343,[21] and in which Demosthenes rather sarcastically attacks the claims that Philip was truly interested in crushing Thebes.[22] Here Demosthenes is arguing that if Philip wanted to destroy Thebes then why didn't he? After listing possible reasons that 'someone pretending to know all about it' might suggest, he concludes (6.16) by noting how Philip has been unremittingly opposed to Thebes' enemies. Philip also had clearly shown that he was working in the interest of the Amphictyony's sacred war. The punishment of the Phocians could not be denied – only its severity was in question. Various Phocian allies were also in the crosshairs. These included another long-time Athenian ally: the Boeotian city of Orchomenus. After the surrender of the Phocians, Aeschines (2.141) states that, if Philip had saved Orchomenus, a Boeotian city that joined the Phocians, he would anger the Thebans and Thessalians, but this hostility would only have arisen then if Philip had interfered to save Orchomenus, which

he did not. The fact that both the Phocians and Cersobleptes were excluded from the Peace of Philocrates and that the peace was to be between the Athenians, their confederacy and Philip, and not a common or general peace, shows that the first alternative suggested by Markle, which supposes the reality of the hopes of those Athenians who believed that Philip would do as suggested, was false. Philip was again playing on Athenian pipe dreams. That anyone in Athens would think that Philip would alter his policies so radically as to accommodate his recent enemy was the height of wishful thinking. Philip wanted to end his war with Athens, but on terms favourable to himself. Philip's role as the defender of the holy site and Apollo had become too great a part of his projected persona.[23] Moreover, his recent renewal of his alliance with Thebes in 346 was likely premised on the promised benefits that would accrue to Philip if he ended the Sacred War. One of these benefits was the likelihood that he would replace Phocis on the Amphictyonic Council and perhaps even extend to the promise that he would be President of the upcoming Isthmian Games. These both came to pass after acceptance of the Phocian surrender and may have been offered as enticements to get Philip to end the war.

The Athenian peace and alliance would be useful in Philip's acquisition of Thrace, even advancing his aim of a possible invasion of Persia. But that would be in the future after the complete conquest of Thrace and the Hellespont. Philip could make peace with Athens and surrender nothing, but receive a respite from his war with that state and obtain a clear path to an isolated Phocis. Demosthenes later suggested that the peace was to drive a further wedge between the Thebans and the Athenians; to forestall any reconciliation based on Thebes' current weakness: 'When it was evident that the Thebans, now fallen from arrogance to disaster, and much distressed by the prolongation of the war, would be compelled to seek the protection of Athens, Philip, to forestall such an appeal and coalition, offered peace to you and succour to them' (18.19). It was Philip who initiated the peace talks, but his action was not due to any desperate need on his part, but rather a recognition of the exhaustion of both Thebes and Athens, their lack of allies and their desperation. Demosthenes' later hindsight may indeed have occurred to Philip, but it was not the major reason for the peace. That Thebes would turn to Athens at this point in time after the conclusion of the Sacred War, a war in which Athens had helped the Phocians, would have appeared virtually impossible. Demosthenes is likely telescoping back to the past the situation and conditions that led to the grand coalition that went down to defeat at Chaeronea in 338. But the conditions in 338 were much different from those immediately after the Peace of Philocrates. Thebes saw the demise of an old foe, Phocis, and

the elimination of a potential one, Orchomenus, as a result of the end of the Third Sacred War. Theban power in central Greece and her influence in the Peloponnesus had not rebounded after the Sacred War as she probably had hoped it might, but the power of Philip had increased in both areas. What is also clear with respect to the Peace of Philocrates is that the Athenians were not tricked or bribed by Philip into acceptance. The Athenians were in great need of peace and were not in any position to offer much support to anyone. Demosthenes in this later speech is forgetting the desperation among the Athenians in 346 which led them and him to seek peace. In a speech Didymus cites from Theopompus attributed to Philocrates, that politician accurately describes Athens' circumstances at the time when introducing the terms of the peace to the Athenian Assembly:

> Consider, moreover, how there is no chance at all for us to seek victory and that our city is in no fortunate state; rather many and great are the dangers surrounding us. We know that the Boeotians and Megarians are ill-disposed toward us, of the Peloponnesians, some lean towards Thebes[24] and others toward Sparta, as for the Chians and Rhodians and their allies, they are hostile to our city; indeed, they talk friendship with Philip.
>
> [Theopompus] *BNJ* 115.F-164

Nothing obtained by Philip in this agreement was crucial to his plans. While the pass of Thermopylae if unblocked was the easiest passageway into central Greece, it was not the only one. It is debatable if at this point in time Philip was actually planning to invade Persia; thinking about the possibility maybe, but actually planning the campaign, unlikely. While Diodorus (16.60.4–5) places this desire immediately after the demise of Phocis, it is doubtful that the campaign became a real objective until the conclusion of the Battle of Chaeronea, although Persian assistance to cities in the area of the Hellespont may have sparked his interest in an invasion. For Markle, what Demosthenes proclaimed to be empty promises delivered by a gullible or, even worse, treasonous Aeschines from Philip were in fact real, and if the Athenians had sent troops to back Philip's play at Thermopylae, he would have humbled Thebes and gone easy on Phocis. This is a very unlikely scenario, akin to the wishful thinking that for so long continued in the minds of many Athenians that Philip would ever return Amphipolis. The Athenians had attempted to bind him to these very promises by urging a general peace encompassing others such as the Phocians and those allies in Thrace and in the Chersonese, but Philip insisted on a bilateral treaty and he held all the cards. In short, for Markle, Philip was serious about an alliance

with the Athenians and willing to grant these concessions: 'The evidence, therefore, suggests that Aeschines not only reported the promises of Philip to the assembly, but also that he believed them to have been made in good faith' (Markle 1974: 254). It was Athens then, according to Markle, that reneged on the agreement. This argument assumes that Philip was anxious to break his alliance with Thebes. But for this there is no evidence. Philip had been the leader of the Amphictyonic Council's army against the Phocians. Part of his projected image was as Apollo's champion and the leader of the Hellenic world. The problem with Markle's scenario is that the residual hostility towards Philip in Athens was substantial and it was unlikely that any such peace would last and that breaking the alliance with Thebes would in effect drive them to seek other allies, perhaps even the Athenians. After all, Greek city-state policy in the fourth century was not entirely unlike that of the world of the second half of the twentieth century. Former enemies did become friends and allies, and old allies, enemies. For example, the Athenians and the Thebans were hostile towards one another from 431 to 404, allies from 395 to 386, and again from 378 to 371, and then at war or on bad terms until 338. Yet, in spite of the possibility of such a rapprochement, which did in fact actually happen, the likelihood of it taking place in 346 would seem to have been zero.

Perhaps the best evidence against Markle's thesis is that Aeschines denied that any real promises were ever made. According to Demosthenes in his prosecution of Aeschines, *On the False Embassy* (19), in 343[25] the latter had reported to the Assembly that Philip planned to besiege Thebes, rebuild Thespiae and Plataea, cities destroyed by the Thebans, and break up the Boeotian League. The reparations due for the sacrilege committed against the shrine at Delphi would be paid by the Thebans. Philip would also give the Athenians Euboea in exchange for his having taken Amphipolis and restore Oropus to the Athenians, a border town between Boeotia and Attica whose possession was in continuous dispute between the two states (Dem. 19.20–2, 35, 42, 53, 63, 74, 112, 220, 325–7).[26] This list does appear to be incapable of being true, and Aeschines (2.119–20) responded to Demosthenes' charges by declaring that he never claimed that Philip had agreed to them. These were only suggestions offered to him. In fact, the Macedonian ambassador declared that Philip would not promise to do any of these things (Aeschin. 3.71–3).

In the end, the Athenians sent no help to either side. The Council had passed a resolution to send a force to Phocis (Dem. 19.50), but the Assembly (Dem. 19.58), at Aeschines' urging to keep the troops at home, did so (Dem. 19.19–23, 34–5). Demosthenes claims that Aeschines convinced the Assembly that Philip

would do what the Athenians wanted. The news of the Assembly's action reached Phocis on 13 July and so on the16th, the Phocians, in despair, surrendered (Dem. 19.59).[27] In short, the Athenians by their inaction guaranteed that the Phocians were doomed and their demise gained the Athenians nothing. Markle's bad actor in his presentation was Demosthenes, who made certain that the Athenians did not come to Philip's support. In one sense he is correct. What was gained by not joining Philip – given that he had already to all intents and purposes passed the Gates – is unclear. Whatever leverage the Athenians might have had was gone and the fate of the Phocians was in no way ameliorated, although it should be pointed out that there were those on the Amphictyonic Council who wanted even more severe penalties levied against the Phocians than were actually enacted by Philip: 'The representatives from Oetaea went so far as to say that they ought to cast the grown men over the cliffs' (Aeschin. 2.142). Moreover, the populations of those Boeotian cities that had joined with the Phocians (Diod. 16.56.2, 58.1) – Orchomenus, Coronea and Corsiae – were sold there into slavery by the Amphictyony (Dem. 19.325; cf. Diod. 16.60.1). If Philip was truly concerned with the role of Thebes in central Greece, it is unlikely that he would have seen to the destruction of Thebes' greatest rivals in Boeotia. It was more likely that Philip spoke against such extreme measures. He had already promised Phalacus safe passage and it is therefore unlikely that an Athenian presence would have changed anything. Philip had ended the Sacred War without a concluding battle.

The peace briefly ended hostilities between the two parties. In the agreement the Athenians recognized Philip's conquests on the coast and gave up any hope of regaining Amphipolis. In return, Philip released his Athenian prisoners taken at Olynthus (Aeschin. 2.100) and promised to spare Athens' settlements in the Thracian Chersonese. Almost from the time of the final agreement, recriminations began to embroil the Athenians. In 343, Philocrates was put on trial for his efforts in concluding the agreement (Hyp. 4.29; Aeschin. 2.6, 18; 3.79; Dem. 8.21; 19.8, 116). Having fled, he was sentenced to death *in absentia*. Philip had hoped to conclude a détente with the Athenians that would give him a virtual free hand in dealing with the Thracians. No longer would making alliances with conflicting Thracian tribes be sufficient. His stated purpose for his invasion was to curtail the attacks of the Thracian king Cersobleptes on the Greek city-states in the region (Diod. 16.71.1–2). Philip defeated the Thracians in several battles and made them a tributary, required to pay a tithe to the Macedonians. He also founded a number of cities at key places to forestall further Thracian interference and the Greek cities in Thrace willingly joined their 'saviour' in alliances (Diod. 16.71.2).

In a meeting of the Amphictyonic Council, a decree was passed admitting Philip and his descendants to that body, thus giving Philip the two votes which formerly had been held by the Phocians (Diod. 16.59.4). Again, it should be noted that the seats were not given to the Macedonians. The Phocians were to have no further participation either in the Oracle or on the Amphictyony (Diod. 16.60.1). Philip now controlled four votes on the Council, those of the Thessalians and those formerly held by the Phocians. The Amphicyony came down hard on the Phocians, but, as noted earlier, not as hard as was urged by certain members of the Council. The Phocians were not permitted to acquire either horses or arms until they had repaid to the god the monies they had pillaged. Those of the Phocians who had fled and any others who had had a share in robbing the sanctuary were to be under a curse and subject to arrest wherever they might be. All twenty-two cities[28] of the Phocians were to be razed and the men moved into villages, none of which was to have more than fifty houses. Each year the Phocians were required to pay the god a tribute of sixty talents until they had paid back the sums entered in the registers at the time of the pillaging of the sanctuary. Furthermore, Philip was to hold the Pythian Games together with the Boeotians and Thessalians (Diod. 16.60.2–4).[29] The Athenians expressed their discontent initially by refusing to recognize Philip's membership on the Council and further by refusing to attend the Pythian Games over which he presided that year (Dem. 19.123–8). When Philip to all intents and purposes ordered their attendance, Demosthenes argued that although the peace was a bad one the Athenians should adhere to it and attend the Pythian Games lest Philip call for a sacred war against them (Dem. 5.13–14). While the general feeling among the Athenians after the fact was that the treaty with Philip was a mistake, there were those Athenians who saw Philip's career as a hopeful sign for all of Greece. In his *To Philip*, written shortly after the Peace of Philocrates, the Athenian orator Isocrates proposed that the Macedonian ruler become the leader of a Panhellenic campaign to 'liberate' the Greeks in Asia Minor.[30]

After the Pythian Games, Philip returned to Macedonia and over the next few years secured and consolidated his hold on the north. In Thessaly he installed an oligarchy and a garrison at Pherae (Dem. 7.32; 8.59; Diod. 16.69.8). He even needed to intervene in the affairs of his old ally Larissa (Arist. *Pol.* 5.1306a30). Dissatisfaction with Philip's hegemony in Thessaly may have much to do with the Macedonian king's elimination of the Phocian threat. In Epirus, Arybbas was deposed and replaced by Olympias' brother Alexander (*GHI* 70; [Dem.][31] 7.32; Just. 8.6.3–5)[32] and in 342/1, Cersobleptes was deprived of the throne and his kingdom was annexed (Diod. 16.71.1–2). Philip now began to seek alliances

throughout the Greek world. Clearly, Philip was now, if not earlier, seeking to extend his influence throughout Greece. If there was the ulterior motive of preparing for an invasion of Persia, it was not yet obvious. Likely in 342/341, Philip had also made overtures to the Aetolians, promising them Naupactus, a traditional object of their ambitions ([Theopompus] *BNJ* 115 F-235; Dem. 9.34; Str. 9.427c), and similar approaches to various states in the Peloponnesus, playing on their fear of Sparta (Dem. 19.260–1). All of these approaches were favourably received. In the Peloponnesus this was certainly due at least in part to the standard fear of Sparta, but it is interesting that these same Peloponnesians formed alliances with the Athenians as well (Schol. Aeschin. 3.83; *IG*^{2} 1.308). With Thebes now a much lesser power than a couple of decades earlier, instead of relying on the Athenians and/or the Thebans to check Spartan aggression, the Peloponnesians chose Philip to fill the space previously held by Thebes. At this time, although the relationship was strained, the Athenians and Philip were still formally allies. The strained relations were seen especially in Athenian attempts to save both Cersobleptes and his kingdom from Philip by granting him Athenian citizenship and then declaring that any attack on the Thracian king was a violation of the Peace of Philocrates. In a letter to the Athenian Assembly, Philip rejected all of these Athenian assertions: 'In your decrees you order me in so many words to leave Thrace to the rule of Teres[33] and Cersobleptes, because they are Athenians. But I am not aware that these two had any share with you in the terms of peace, or that their names were included in the inscription set up, or that they are really Athenians. On the contrary, I know that Teres fought with me against you, and that Cersobleptes was quite ready in private to take the oath of allegiance to my ambassadors, but was prevented by your generals, who denounced him as an enemy of the Athenians' ([Dem.] 12.8).[34] At this point in time, Cersobleptes had already been expelled from his kingdom and, therefore, what the Athenians were demanding was that he be restored. Clearly, Philip was not having any of this. In 340, he began his sieges of Perinthus and Byzantium, both of which received Persian support and survived the attacks (Diod. 16.74.2–76). Earlier, in response to a Theban request, the Persians had given Thebes 300 talents of silver for their campaign against the Phocians (Diod. 16.40.1–2).

Philip's continuous eastward advance and the general and growing Athenian unhappiness with the Peace of Philocrates led the Athenians to act repeatedly in contravention of the peace. In his letter, Philip protested against these violations, but expressed his willingness to submit all disputes to arbitration ([Dem.] 12.1–23). These alleged violations ranged from the kidnapping, imprisonment and torture of Philip's heralds and ambassadors ([Dem.] 12.2), and attacks on Philip's

allies ([Dem.] 12.3, 5, 12), to the sending of an embassy from the Athenian Assembly requesting that Artaxerxes III, Great King of Persia, enter into a defensive alliance with the Athenians and declare war on the Macedonian king ([Den.] 12.6–7).[35] The Athenians were also even now still actively contesting Philip's possession of Amphipolis ([Dem.] 12.20–21). Philip declared to the Athenians that he considered friendship with them his upmost priority ([Dem.] 7.21) and even proposed expanding the bilateral Peace of Philocrates to the entire Greek world ([Dem.] 7.30–1), something he had previously ruled out. Of course, now his immediate objectives had been realized: Much of Thrace was under his control and the Phocians had been dealt with. The proposal to extend the reach of the Peace of Philocrates appears to anticipate the later League of Corinth and may give an insight into Philip's ultimate plans. The proposal even included a section stating that those Greeks not party to the peace 'should remain free and independent, and that if they are attacked, the signatories should unite to defend them' ([Dem.] 7.30). In offering to defend the independence of all the Greek states and bring them into a formal alliance and peace, Philip appears to be creating a Panhellenic alliance that he would dominate. Close ties with the Athenians would ensure that the alliance had teeth, with the two currently dominant powers in the Greek world united in maintaining it. If indeed this was Philip's purpose, his frustration with the Athenians is clearly understandable. He was offering them a partnership: true, the Athenians would be the lesser partner, but a partner nonetheless in the domination of the Greek world. The constant Athenian obsession with Amphipolis and their inability to let loose of their former glory as events turned out, were both short-sighted. Too often Philip's imperialism was paralleled by Athenian actions that suggested that this was a contest for hegemony between the two and not the fight for freedom often proclaimed by Demosthenes. Athens' inability to accept a secondary role in the leadership of the Greek world or a true stance for freedom and autonomy of all Greeks gave Philip great leverage in his dealing with the other Greek states. Even though in the Treaty of Philocrates, Philip's possession of Amphipolis was recognized, the Athenians continued to challenge his right to that city ([Dem.] 7.23, 26–7; Aeschin. 7.21; Dem. 8.66; 23.14), basing their case in part on the Common Peace of 366 handed down by the King of Persia ([Dem.] 7.29; Dem. 19.137; Diod. 15.76.3).[36] And in 341,[37] the Athenians sent a force to aid their cleruchs in the Chersonese who had become involved in a conflict with Philip's ally the Cardians ([Dem.] 12.3).

The Athenian role in such a new common peace proposed by Philip was proclaimed by those pushing for a confrontation with the Macedonian king as

simply a means for Philip to use the Athenian navy to gain control of the sea for his own benefit ([Dem.] 7.14–15, 17). There were also Athenian complaints about some of Philip's actions being in contravention of the Peace of Philocrates: 'I assert that when he [Philip] lays hands on Megara, sets up tyrannies in Euboea, makes his way, as now, into Thrace, hatches plots in the Peloponnese, and carries out all operations with his armed force, he is breaking the peace and making war upon you' (Dem. 9.17). In his *Third Philippic* (30–1), Demosthenes makes an interesting argument with regard to Philip's 'imperialism', proclaiming, 'You know this also, that the wrongs which the Greeks suffered from the Lacedaemonians or from us, they suffered at all events at the hands of true-born sons of Greece . . . Yet they have no such qualms about Philip and his present conduct, though he is not only no Greek, nor related to the Greeks, but not even a barbarian from any place that can be named with honor, but a pestilent knave from Macedonia, whence it was never yet possible to buy a decent slave.' The virtues of freedom and autonomy are then only truly important when threatened by someone who is not Greek. Better to be enslaved by a cousin than some stranger. Much of Philip's success was due to the fact that most states failed to see the distinction offered by Demosthenes. Most often their decisions were based on whichever appeared at the time to be the lesser threat. A case in point is that when Philip was besieging Perinthus and Byzantium in 340, an Athenian rescue expedition was refused because they suspected the Athenian commander's intent (Plut. *Phoc*. 14.3–8). While this was later rectified with the dispatch of a different commander, it is evident that these Greek cities preferred to get assistance from the Persians rather than risk bringing within their walls Athenian troops (Diod. 16.74.2–76). Of course, it needs to be noted that had the Battle of Chaeronea gone the other way and proven to be as decisive for the Athenians and Thebans as it was for Philip, historians today would be marvelling at another Hellenic victory over an apparently overwhelming external force.

While Philip was provoked by the accusations of the Athenians that he had violated the Peace of Philocrates, it was the Athenians who officially declared war on Philip because of attacks on two former members of the Athenian Confederacy: Perinthus and Byzantium ([Theopompus] *BNJ* 115 F-292; Dem. 18.87–8, 90–3; Plut. *Phoc*. 14.2–3).[38] Philip began his sieges of Perinthus and Byzantium in the spring and autumn of 340 respectively, but both cities received Persian support and survived the attacks (Diod. 16.74.2–76). A further Athenian complaint concerned the Macedonian king's seizure of the Athenian grain fleet. John Buckler (1996: 87–9)[39] argues that the war had already been declared before he seized the grain fleet. The fleet was to be escorted through the strait from the

Black Sea by an Athenian war fleet, but the commander Chares was called away to deliberate with the Persian satraps in the area about common action against Philip. In the absence of Chares, apparently with most of the fleet, the much smaller Macedonian fleet captured the Athenian grain ships ([Philochorus] *BNJ* 238.F-162; Dem. 18.139; Frontin. *Strat.* 1.4.13; Just. 9.1.5–6). Also, in the previous year, the dispute between Cardia and the Athenian cleruchs in the Chersonese had seen Philip intervene on behalf of the Cardians ([Dem.] 7.41–4), and the Macedonian king had performed an alleged 'outrage' on the Athenian ally in Peparethus ([Dem.] 12.12).[40] Byzantium was assisted in its defence by Chios, Cos and Rhodes, her old allies in the Social War, as well as by the Persians (Diod. 16.77.2). Certainly, as seen in Philip's letter ([Dem.] 12) to the Athenians, the Macedonian king claimed that he had received sufficient provocation to justify declaring war on them, but there is no clear evidence that he acted on this provocation. Griffiths argues that it was the Athenians who first declared war, and his argument appears the more persuasive (Hammond and Griffith 1979: 567–8). While Buckler (1996: 87–9) argues in effect that Philip's letter was a declaration of war, it reads more like a justification and a threat than an actual declaration. It is even unclear if this is, indeed, the letter to which Philochorus (*BNJ* 328.F-55, 162) refers that led directly to the Athenian declaration of war, but it does appear likely. Diodorus (16.77.2) is emphatic that it was the Athenians who declared war, and even Demosthenes cites a letter from Philip that confirms this conclusion:

> Philip, King of Macedonia, to the Council and People of Athens, greeting. – Your ambassadors, Cephisophon and Democritus and Polycritus, visited me and discussed the release of the vessels commanded by Leodamas. Now, speaking generally, it seems to me that you will be very simple people if you imagine that I do not know that the vessels were sent ostensibly to convey corn from the Hellespont to Lemnos, but really to help the Selymbrians, who are being besieged by me and are not included in the articles of friendship mutually agreed upon between us . . . Therefore the vessels now in my harbors I hereby release to you; and for the future, if, instead of permitting your statesmen to pursue this malicious policy, you will be good enough to censure them, I too will endeavor to preserve the peace. Farewell.
>
> Dem. 18.77–8[41]

The Athenians officially declared war on Philip in the autumn of 340.[42] This new conflict between the Macedonians and the Athenians lasted two years. It is unknown how this conflict would have progressed, if at all, beyond the hostile actions that now occurred during the time of the supposed peace, if it had not

been for the outbreak of another war. In 339, a Fourth Sacred War was declared, this one against Amphissa, accused, like the Phocians before them, of cultivating sacred land. The actual hostilities began when the Amphissans refused to pay the fine levied by the Council (Aeschin. 3.107–29). Philip as the current leader of the Council was ultimately selected to lead an Amphictyonic army to punish Amphissa for the sacrilege.[43] The true origins of this sacred war were to be found in the long-standing and continuing rivalry between the Athenians and the Thebans. The Amphissians, 'who were at that time dominated by the Thebans and were their abject servants' (Aeschin. 3.116), brought forth a resolution to fine the Athenians fifty talents for having gilded the shields that were part of an Athenian dedication commemorating the Battle of Plataea, taken from the spoils of the actual battle, in the new temple at Delphi (whose reconstruction had been paid in part by the Athenians)[44] before the new temple had been officially consecrated (Aeschin. 3.116). The Thebans were especially annoyed by the inscription attached, which read, 'The Athenians, from the Medes and Thebans when they fought against Greece' (Aeschin. 3.116). The Thebans were not thrilled to be reminded that in the great war to save Greece from subjugation to the Persians they had been on the Persian side. The Amphissians also pointed out that in the most recent sacred war the Athenians had supported the temple violators, the Phocians (Aeschin. 3.118). In return, the Amphissians were accused by the Athenian representative, Aeschines, of tilling sacred lands and intercepting port dues (3.119). The Council failed to indict the Athenians, but did physically begin to destroy Amphissian buildings on the sacred land, which in turn led to an invasion from Amphissa and the declaration of the new sacred war by the Amphictyony (Aeschin. 3.122–5; Dem. 18.143). The Council having declared a sacred war against Amphissa would ultimately select Philip as their military leader.

According to Demosthenes, this entire war was the creation of Philip and his Athenian agent Aeschines, designed to give Philip an excuse to enter central Greece (Dem. 18.143–4), not to mention that it would put the Thebans and Athenians on opposite sides of the conflict. Indeed, the end result seems to G. T. Griffith (Hammond and Griffith 1979: 586) too convenient to be chance and he suspects that Demosthenes was correct that this came about by Philip's design. However, Joseph Roisman (2006: 133–4, 144–5) is undoubtedly correct in asserting that Philip, as clever as he was, did not create this war. One major weakness in the theory that Philip manufactured the war is that at the time he was not immediately available to lead the forces of the Amphictyony; he was in Scythia, and hence another commander was selected (Aeschin. 3.128–9). The

Council initially chose Cottyphus of Pharsalus, who was at the time President of the Amphictyons. When Cottyphus entered the territory of Amphissa and had met no resistance, he dealt very leniently with the Amphissians. The Athenian Assembly failed to join in this Sacred War. Ian Worthington (2008: 138) has stated that this was because of Demosthenes' intervention to preclude any direct conflict with the Thebans; instead, he was now preparing to seek an alliance with Athens' old enemy. Thebes, as expected, abstained from the vote as well. While the fine imposed by Cottyphus was relatively small, the Amphissians failed to pay it in the allotted time, nor did they banish those accused by the Council of sacrilege. The result was that a second campaign had to be waged and this one was led by Philip. In the convoluted back and forth between Demosthenes and Aeschines concerning this conflict, Aeschines (3.125) accused Demosthenes of taking bribes to defend Amphissa and that when the leadership for the campaign was offered to the Athenians, '[Demosthenes] had prevented us [from accepting the commission]' (Aeschin. 3.58, 129). Demosthenes (18.143) asserted that the war was nothing more than a pretext for Philip to invade central Greece. The charge is unfounded, since Philip was at war with Athens and therefore had a perfectly valid reason, if one were needed, to invade central Greece.[45] In defence of her ally Amphissa, Thebes expelled a Macedonian garrison from Nicaea at the Pass of Thermopylae in the summer of 339 ([Philochorus] *BNJ* 238 F-56), while Philip demanded that Nicaea be turned over to the Locrians as ordered by the Amphictyonic Council (Didymus *On Demosthenes* 11.37; D. H. *Amm.* 1.11). These actions had made the Thebans wary of their Macedonian ally. In addition to the dispute over Nicaea, Philip in his march south entered Locris, bypassing Thermopylae, and seized Elatea. Elatea controlled the way into Boeotia and Attica, not to Amphissa. Theban dominance in central Greece had been sapped by the Third Sacred War and that void was being filled by Philip.

Fear now spread that the Macedonian king planned to invade Attica (Dem. 18.177–9), and in response to the threat Demosthenes now formed a coalition of Greek *poleis* consisting of Athens, the Euboean cities and the Achaeans, Corinthians, Thebans, Megarians, Leucadians, Corcyraeans (Dem. 18.237; Plut. *Dem.* 17.5) and the Acarnanians (*GHI* 77). Philip had requested that the Thebans join him for an attack on the Athenians ([Philochorus] *BNJ* 238 F-56), and both he and the Athenians had sent embassies to Thebes (D. H. *Amm.* 1.11). The head of the Athenian delegation was Demosthenes. This was clearly the Athenian orator's finest hour, even if, as Dina Guth declares, it was the actual appearance of the Athenian army that convinced the Thebans to join in the coalition against Philip.[46] Also, as Guth explains, the initial probe for a possible alliance may have been

Theban. Demosthenes, however, still deserves credit for the alliance. First, he had convinced his fellow citizens to ally themselves with this old enemy, and second, had pushed for the army to be sent immediately to show Athenian conviction. Demosthenes had carried the day in both assemblies (Diod. 16.84.2–85.1; Plut. *Dem.* 18.136). Once before a coalition of Greek states had defeated an invader, but not this time. The alliance was routed at the Battle of Chaeronea in August 338 (Diod. 16.84–6; Plut. *Alex.* 9.2–3; see Chapter 2). It marked the pinnacle of Philip's career, for it put him in a position to become the master of Greece.

The question then became how would he handle this current success? While successful on the battlefield and with no Greek state in a position to oppose him militarily, Philip had still not conquered the Greek world. To do so would entail numerous sieges and the possible successful intervention by the Persians. After their invasion of 480–479, the Persians had settled on a policy of supporting whichever Greek coalition arose to challenge the dominant Greek power at that particular time. They had in effect kept the Greeks fighting one another for half a century. Philip's settlement had to be imaginative. Of those Greeks who had stood with the Athenians, many would have garrisons imposed on them and oligarchic parties put in charge, including the Thebans, Megarians, Corinthians, Achaeans and the Euboeans (Ael. *VH* 6.1; Just. 9.4.6–10; Diod. 16.87.3, 17.3.3; Paus. 9.1.8, 6.5).[47] The Thebans in particular were treated severely. In addition to the imposition of a garrison, they were forced to purchase those taken captive or the bodies of those killed at Chaeronea. Many of the Theban leaders were put to death, others banished, while the property of those executed or banished was confiscated (Just. 9.4.6–7). The Macedonian king also created a Theban oligarchy of 300 drawn from those exiled by the Theban democratic government (Just. 9.4.8). Philip's partisans likely came to power in Corcyra, Leucas, Acarnania and Cephallenia as well (Roebuck 1948: 76–7). The Macedonian monarch also reworked the territorial holdings of some states and dissolved or reordered various alliances and confederacies. The Orchomenians were restored to their city (Paus. 4.27.10; 9.37.8), as were the Plataeans (Paus. 9.1.8; 4.27.10), and the Aetolians were given Naupactus (Dem. 9.34; *BNJ* 115 F-235; Str. 9.4.7). Although the Athenians maintained their independence (Diod. 16.87.3; Paus. 7.10.5; Just. 9.4.4–5) and even received Oropus back from Thebes, a present from the Macedonian king ([Demades] 1.9; Paus. 1.34.1; Diod. 18.56.7), their maritime confederacy was now formally dissolved (Paus. 1.25.3) and Athenian holdings in the Thracian Chersonese were surrendered to Philip.[48]

Only Sparta remained outside the dominance of the Macedonian monarch (Just. 9.5.3). In the late autumn of 338, the Macedonian king moved into the

Peloponnesus to solidify his hold on his allies and attempt, at the least, to intimidate the Spartans, who, though they had not joined the forces arrayed against Philip at Chaeronea, were hostile to Macedonian interests (Diod. 16.89.3; Roebuck 1948: 84–9). While he was able to reward certain of his Peloponnesian allies at Spartan expense and laid much of Laconia waste (Paus. 3.24.6; 5.4.9; 7.10.3; Polyb. 9.28.6–7, 33.8–12; Plut. *Mor.* 235a–b), Philip was unable to convince the Spartans to join in alliance and believed that to attempt to force them to do so would be too costly. Therefore, he left the Spartans isolated and bitter. Philip's treatment of Athens, given all of the hostility not to mention outright wars with that people, appears incredibly mild. The reason most often suggested by scholars for this behaviour was that Philip needed the Athenian navy if he was planning on invading Asia. For such a campaign he needed their cooperation, goodwill and, of course, their fleet. Unlike Thebes, Athens had not been Philip's ally up to this last campaign and there was likely just a bit of anger at this betrayal by the Thebans. Worthington (2008: 156) postulates still another reason for Philip's approach. The Macedonian king's principal plank of propaganda for any action against Persia would be to avenge the Persian attack on Greece, which included the burning of Athens, not once but twice. To attack Athens, says Worthington, would have appeared to emulate the Persians. In line with this reasoning, I would add that the punishment of Thebes would correspond to punishing them for their former support of the Persians. I believe, however, that while this might have come into consideration, it could not have been that important a reason. Philip had tried earlier to get Athens to join with him, but the matter was now simply more pressing since he was actively planning an attack on the Persian Empire. He needed the fleet and Athenian cooperation.

It is interesting that what Aeschines had earlier proposed during the negotiations of the Peace of Philocrates was similar to what actually resulted from the Battle of Chaeronea. The Phocians had many of their restrictions withdrawn prior to the campaign through the actions of the Spartans and the Athenians. Pausanias (10.3.3) says that these long-standing allies brought the exiles back to Phocis, and even though some of them had joined with the Athenians at Chaeronea, it appears that Philip did not reimpose what had been previously applied.[49] The Boeotian League remained, but with the restoration of Orchomenus and the humbling of Thebes. While this might suggest that Markle's thesis was correct with respect to the Peace of Philocrates, as noted, times had changed.

Philip needed to leave behind a secure and passive Greece if and when he started his Asian venture, and to that end he now turned. He concluded a separate

peace treaty with Athens (Diod. 16.87.3), as he did with several other Greek *poleis* after Chaeronea. There was still the opposition of Sparta and for the future a still dangerous Athens. The latter, however, was living in the euphoria that followed Philip's settlement with the city. They had expected to be treated much in the same way Philip had dealt with Thebes. Now those leaders who had supported reaching some accommodation with Philip had the ear of the people. If Philip could follow up his success in Greece with similar triumphs in Asia, by the time the Athenians recovered from the failure at Chaeronea and the loss of 1,000 men, the Macedonian king's position would be unassailable. However, with respect to the attitude of the Athenian public, it is interesting to note that after the battle the general Lysicles was charged and condemned to death (Diod. 16.88.1; Dem. 18.300–4), yet Demosthenes was not indicted, which suggests that there was no complete repudiation of his policy. In short, while the victory on the battlefield meant there was no strong opposition to Philip in Athens, there was still suppressed antagonism.

Philip himself believed that war and oppression only achieved temporary dominance. As seen in his actions as a member of the Amphictyony, there was a way to exert control without constant recourse to force. Apollo's champion now had the *auctoritas* to achieve his immediate goals. After his post-battle impositions, Philip called representatives from throughout Greece to a meeting in Corinth where he outlined a general peace which he hoped would ensure that the internecine wars that had plagued the Greek world would cease, which in reality meant an end to any disruption of Philip's new world order. What Philip here proposed was strikingly similar to what he proposed to the Athenians back in 342. Then the Macedonian king had recommended expanding the bilateral Peace of Philocrates to the entire Greek world ([Dem.] 7.30–1). This peace had also claimed to guarantee autonomy to those signatories of the peace.

Deputations from virtually all Greek cities came to Corinth and joined the new Hellenic organization (Just. 9.5.3). Only the Spartans stayed away (Just. 9.5.3),[50] clinging to the hope that they could resist submitting to what they regarded as servitude. However, Philip's incursion into the Peloponnese had left Sparta isolated, so its defiance meant little. At the first meeting at Corinth, the common peace (*koine eirene*), as seen later, was proclaimed, which was to be maintained by a council (*synedrion*) of this new Hellenic community, known in its modern terminology as the League of Corinth. The peace was signed in 338. There is also a list of signatories at the end of the inscriptions, which, like the inscription itself, is fragmentary but does include the Thessalian, Ambraciots, Phocians, Locrians, Malians and others.

> I swear by Zeus, Gaia, Helios, Poseidon and all the gods and goddesses. I will abide by the common peace and I will neither break the agreement with Philip, nor take up arms on land or sea, harming any of those abiding by the oaths. Nor shall I take any city, or fortress, nor harbor by craft or contrivance, with intent of war against the participants of the peace. Nor shall I depose the kingship of Philip or his descendants, nor the constitutions existing in each state, when they swore the oaths of the peace. Nor shall I do anything contrary to these agreements, nor shall I allow anyone else as far as possible. But If anyone does commit any breach of the treaty, I shall go in support as called by those who need and I shall fight the transgressors of the common peace, as decided (by the council) and called on by the hegemon and I shall not abandon . . .
>
> *GHI* 76

The decree begins with a religious oath which is also found in other decrees (*GHI* 76.ll.2–3).[51] The main points are (1) that all who have taken the oath are to live in peace with one another; (2) existing governments at the time of the oath including the monarchy of Philip and his descendants are to remain unchanged; (3) all oath takers are duty bound to enforce the previous provisions; (4) and wars against those who violate the peace will be declared by the 'Council' and led by the Hegemon, Philip or his descendant. As in his other treaties and commitments, Philip is signatory with no reference to the Macedonians. He had used much of the time prior to the assembly in Corinth to settle affairs in Greece to his satisfaction. As noted, this was achieved through the establishment of garrisons in key cities and the installation of favourable governments in many others. The Peace was designed to keep his settlement in place, ostensibly in perpetuity. Apparently, other provisions were added in 337, or these may merely have been clarifications of the existing charter. As part of a state's autonomy, its justice system was inviolate (Dem. 17.12), with Demosthenes (12.15) also claiming that 'it is provided in the compact that it shall be the business of the delegates at the Congress and those responsible for public safety to see that in the states that are parties to the peace there shall be no executions and banishments contrary to the laws established in those states, no confiscation of property, no partition of lands, no cancelling of debts, and no emancipation of slaves for purposes of revolution'. Freedom of the seas was also declared to have been a part of the agreement: 'For the compact, of course, provides that all the parties to the peace may sail the seas, and that none may hinder them or force a ship of any of them to come to harbor, and that anyone who violates this shall be treated as an enemy by all the parties to the peace' (Dem. 17.19).

Philip was ever in pursuit of power through existing institutions and traditions. On the Amphictyonic Council, he enjoyed the authority of a religious

leader, the successful champion of Apollo in two sacred wars. In Thessaly, he recreated the old tribal divisions, thus minimizing the power of the various city-states, and had assumed the title of Archon in the Thessalian League. Pherae, the most dangerous of the Thessalian cities, was under the control of those loyal to Philip and for good measure also garrisoned. This system of domination was multifaceted but demonstrated that Philip worked within existing traditions. He was a pragmatist. Where necessary he imposed garrisons, but he wished to dominate the Greek world and knew that any attempt to do so would need more subtlety than that employed by the previous dominant powers. Athens, then Sparta, and finally Thebes were seen by other Greeks as tyrannical states who took everything but offered little in return. Philip hoped that by limiting his interference to a minimum and leaving most of Greece autonomous in their domestic affairs, much as he had in Macedonia with respect to the cities there, and as partners in the League overseeing foreign policy, he could control the Greek world through influence and not by command. With a bow to Malcolm Errington (1978: 87–90), the League of Corinth could be seen as Philip's way of securing his agenda through *auctoritas*, not simply through *potestas*. It was likely that he was already moving towards something like the League, hoping for an ending such as had concluded the Third Sacred War, a common peace without the need for a final decisive battle. His ideal was something modelled on the Amphictyony but with a permanent President with hegemonial authority. His victory at Chaeronea had given him greater leverage in his construction of this peace settlement and the league than might have resulted from a similar peace and league without the military victory. Certainly there would have been fewer Macedonian garrisons and likely more opposition.

At Corinth, despite the emphasis on a shared peace and alliance, the Greeks had no choice but to accept that they were now living under Philip's hegemony, and despite guarantees in the common peace of independence and freedom, Philip's imposed garrisons remained in Thebes, Corinth, Chalcis, Elis and Ambracia (Diod. 16.87.3). On the other hand, Philip had put an end to the internal wars that had plagued the Greeks throughout their history. Ultimately this was, however, to be an aggressive peace (Badian 1967: 62). In the year after the peace, Philip called a second meeting in Corinth in the spring of 337, and here a formal alliance was created with the express purpose of attacking the Persians and freeing those Greeks still under Persian domination in the islands and on the Asian mainland (Justin 9.5.1–7, Diod. 16.89.1–2).[52] Diodorus (16.89.2–3) states:

> [Philip] spread the word that he wanted to make war on the Persians in the Greeks' behalf and to punish them for the profanation of the temples, and this won for him the loyal support of the Greeks . . . he represented to the cities that he wished to discuss with them matters of common advantage. A general congress was, accordingly, convened at Corinth. He spoke about the war against Persia and by raising great expectations won the representatives over to war. The Greeks elected him the general plenipotentiary of Greece, and he began accumulating supplies for the campaign. He prescribed the number of soldiers that each city should send for the joint effort, and then returned to Macedonia.
>
> Translation is from the Loeb Classical Library

This was a crusade against those who had invaded Greece and defiled its religious sanctuaries and who through their subsidies to various states in the Greek world had kept the peninsula almost in a constant state of war, for which deeds they would be punished. Success would conceivably achieve all that Isocrates had desired in his famous letter to Philip. While Polybius (3.6.12–13) states that the religious justification for the war was merely a 'pretext', and that the war was really about Philip conquering the Persian Empire, this was more than a pretext. Philip had associated himself with two sacred wars and in one of the last acts of his life paraded an image of himself with the twelve Olympians (Diod. 16.92.5).[53] While the full meaning of his action is debated, it is clear that Philip was heavily invested in his religious role.

The war of revenge would then follow in Philip's position as the defender of the gods and leader of the Greeks. Justin (8.2.7) comments with respect to Philip's defeat of Onomarchus at the Battle of Crocus Field that 'the man who had championed the majesty of the gods deserved to be regarded as second only to the gods'. The expedition against the old enemy would galvanize most Greeks behind the proposed leader of this expedition, Philip. Many would be pleased to punish the Persians for their past actions; many more would see the riches that might be gained from a successful campaign, and many would see this as the best way to get Philip out of Greece, and who knew but that the Persians might not get lucky and kill the individual who had so turned the Greek world upside down? While the League of Corinth might appear on the surface to be a national Greek organization, it was in practice not a free association of allies but rather one of dependencies under the authority of the Macedonian king. Would Philip's attempt to paper over this reality with a common purpose and common institutions become the basis for Greek unity? In the short run, it worked sufficiently to permit Alexander to leave Greece, conquer the Persian Empire and change the course of Greek and world history. In the long term, the actual

result was not just the expansion of Greek culture to a far wider world, but also to bring Greek divisiveness to this same expanded reality.

Philip now prepared to lead the League as Hegemon on a joint Macedonian–League invasion of the Persian Empire (Just. 9.5.1–5; Diod. 16.89.1–3). It is disputed when Philip started to plan this invasion of Asia. Diodorus first mentions it at the same time as the Peace of Philocrates (16.60.4–5). Isocrates' *To Philip* was also written to the king at this time, but it is debated whether his call for Philip's leadership of a Panhellenic campaign actually was responsible for Philip's plan.[54] Was it only after the Persians had interfered in his attempted capture of Perinthus and Byzantium (Diod. 16.75.1–2, Arr. *Anab*. 2.14.5)? Alarmed, the Persian king had ordered his satraps on the coast of Asia Minor to send mercenaries and supplies to help the Perinthians. One may conclude that the consolidation of the Persian Empire and Philip's expansion might have raised fears on both sides that the balance of power in the Aegean was changing. In any case, the securing of Thrace in 342 was a precondition for the Asian war, even if Philip's plan was not fully revealed until 337. His reason for attacking the Achaemenid Empire has been explained as simply an attempt to expand his empire, or to profit from Asian wealth[55] or to keep his army continuously on campaign. The Panhellenic message served him well in order to legitimize this war as the leader of a united Greece against the Persians (See Squillace 2010: 69–80). Was this little more than propaganda, a way for Philip in essence to wage war for his own advantage under the guise of fulfilling Isocrates' dream? Was Philip, like his son Alexander, entirely consumed by his own desire for personal glory?[56] I do not think so. Philip, like his son, was interested in creating an image of himself both to others but also to himself. He associated himself with Heracles and Apollo, and he wished to be seen as Isocrates proclaimed: 'The champion of concord among the Hellenes and of a campaign against the barbarians' (Isoc. 5.16). His involvement in the Third and Fourth Sacred Wars in particular and his expedition against the Persians was a complete package. Philip achieved supremacy in Greece through his defence of Apollo and would cement that role with his liberation of the Greeks of Asia. This image was also part of his accentuation of his Olympic victory. When his horse won in the games of 356, he had the image of Zeus emblazoned on the obverse side of newly minted tetradrachmas and a jockey on a horse with the inscription *Philippou* (of Philip) on the reverse (Le Rider 1977: 287).

In the spring of 336, Philip sent an advance force to Asia Minor (Diod. 16. 91.2; Polyaen. *Strat*. 5.44.4). Their mission was primarily to secure a beachhead for the invasion that was to follow the next year. The Macedonians controlled the

European Hellespontine coast, while the Persians, due to the success of Philip's advance force, were not in complete command of their own side of the Hellespont. By 335 the Macedonians had secured much of the Hellespontine coast including Ionia and Aeolia (cf. Diod. 17.7.10). The Persians possessed the superior fleet, but they lacked the essential element to even attempt to block Alexander's crossing: a friendly shore. No ancient fleet could operate for long periods far from a harbour or a beach. Ancient warships being galleys, with their large crews and cramped quarters, could carry food and water only for one or, at most, two days; galleys needed to be beached at least every twenty-four hours for the preparation of meals. Furthermore, there was no room for sleeping comfortably on board, nor were the ships especially seaworthy. Therefore, a blockade in the modern sense was not possible. A fleet could not stand off the coast to intercept an opposing naval force. The importance of control of the coast was consequently critical for a successful invasion.[57]

In the autumn of 336, Philip invited the Greeks to attend both the lavish wedding feast of his daughter Cleopatra and a grand celebration of the coming invasion of Asia. At this gathering, Philip , in the forty-seventh year of his life and the twenty-fifth of his reign, was assassinated by a disgruntled nobleman.[58] Whatever he had planned was now moot. The expedition was now his son's and he would go on to conquer the Persian Empire.

Philip's success has been seen as the result of the ineffectiveness of the Greek *poleis*' response to his aggression. Philip, it is claimed by Demosthenes, had absolute control of policy and could act however he pleased without interference. This was not entirely true, but there was certainly no sovereign assembly to be convinced as there was in Athens.[59] Demosthenes asserts that Athenian democratic deliberations gave Philip an advantage that could not be overcome. It has even been claimed that the city-state was a failed form of government and hence doomed to failure. Of course, this same basic city-state structure of government had defeated the Persians in 480/479, and the Athenian state, democratic as it was, had created an empire. The same potentiality which Philip utilized to become master of the Greek world had also existed for earlier Macedonian kings but had not been exploited. Philip created his own situation in Macedonia. He also played masterfully on the rivalries of the city-states and their internal divisions. Philip's success was not a foregone result of 'Greek' weaknesses, nor of inherent Macedonian strengths. It was Philip's exploitation of these so-called weaknesses and his fulfilling of Macedonian potentialities that made his success possible. In short, the key element in Philip's success was Philip.

Appendix 1: Philip's Ambitions

While it is generally recognized that Alexander the Great owed much of his success to his father Philip II, the latter having provided his son and heir with the best army in the Western world, part of which was encamped in Asia; a loyal and united Macedonia; and hegemony over most of mainland Greece, it is debated whether he also was responsible for his son's ambition to conquer the entire Persian Empire, if not 'the entire world' (Diod. 17.93.4, 94.3; Curt. 9.2.11; Just 12.7.4), or whether the father's ambitions were far more limited than those of the son. Diodorus (16.92.4) proclaims Philip's desire to overthrow the Persian king. However, his ambition at the beginning of his reign would not have been so grandiose as the conquest of the Persian Empire. On becoming king, Philip's ambition was to save Macedonia and his own rule from what might have been oblivion. After his first year and his incredible successes, Philip began the process of safeguarding Macedonia's frontiers. This goal made necessary confrontation with the Athenians. Most of the new Macedonian king's activities turned towards excluding the Athenians from the Macedonian coast and the north Aegean in general. While the Third Sacred War clearly opened up possibilities in the south of the Greek peninsula, Philip had already begun to interfere in Thessaly, which demonstrated that very early in his reign he had already turned his sights on the wider Greek world, although Thessaly was on his southern border and consequently also part of his defensive concerns. The real question with respect to Philip's ambitions is not whether he had them or not – he clearly did – but were these for his own personal glory or was this personal pursuit intimately tied to the national interests of Macedonia?

Fritz Schachermeyr and Jack Ellis set forth the argument that Philip's ultimate goal was the acquisition of Asia Minor and that his concern was always focused on the needs of Macedonia (Schachermeyr 1973: 62, n. 39; Ellis 1976: 228–9, 232). However, Ernst Fredricksmeyer's 1982 chapter 'On the Final Aims of Philip II', in Lindsay Adams and Gene Borza's *Philip II, Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Heritage*, considerably broadened this earlier view and argued for a

more expansive assessment of Philip II's intentions, asserting that Philip's ambitions and Alexander's were in the main the same and grand in scope, in both cases seeking at least the conquest of the Persian Empire. The more traditional view, that Philip was more circumspect and Macedonian in his intentions, has recently been supported by Ian Worthington in his *Philip II of Macedonia* (2008: 167–8, 179, 204). P. A. Brunt presented the position that Philip was an opportunist and whatever his initial intention may have been, depending on his success, conquering the entire Persian Empire would not have been beyond his expectations (1965: 207–8).[1] It then needs to be asked, would he, as did Alexander, centre his empire in Babylon (Str. 15.3.9–10; Diod. 17.108.4), making the empire *his* and not that of his homeland Macedonia?[2] At least in terms of his relations with foreign peoples, Philip *was* Macedonia. However, his relations with the Macedonians were personal. His aristocrats were *Hetairoi*; his infantry, his *Pezhetairoi*.

Philip II's initial designs, and likely those had he lived, were far more circumspect than those of his famous son and designed in the main to benefit Macedonia and the Argead dynasty as well as himself. His position on the Amphictyonic Council and with the League of Corinth was hereditary. His campaign against Persia may even have had an element of preventive war, designed to inhibit Persian interference in his hegemony over the Greek world, rather than to secure Philip's control of any part of Asia (Brosius 2003: 234–5, 237). The Persians had responded to a Theban request for aid during the Third Sacred War (Diod. 16.40.1–2) and in the summer of 340, Philip's attacks on Perinthus and Byzantium were thwarted by Athenian and Persian intervention (Dem. 11.5; 18.80, 88–90;[Philochoros] *BNJ* 328 F-54–5; Diod. 16.75). In the past, the Persians had used their wealth to keep Greece occupied in its internecine wars (Aeschin. 3.173; Diod. 17.4.8), and in the case of Perinthus and Byzantium, the Persian satraps of Asia Minor had responded with mercenaries to support the cities under Macedonian siege (Dem. 11.5–6; Diod. 16.75.2).

What has greatly influenced the discussion of Philip's aims is, of course, both his death before his Asia plan was much advanced and the success enjoyed by his son. Was Persia the 'pushover' that it is so often assumed to have been? 'All his contemporaries knew that the Persian Empire was weak in everything but money' (Brunt 1965: 207; cf. Frye 1984: 130–1). This last statement often appears virtually as a truism throughout the literature. However, how ripe for the plucking was the Persian Empire in reality? More recent scholarship would suggest that Persia was not the carcass it has been claimed to be (Wieshöfer 1993; Kuhrt 1995: 647–701; Briant 2002: 762–8, 866–70, 875–6). It had weathered

a number of storms in the past but had always emerged victorious even when it had taken years to bring the problems under control. It is also to be noted that, while Alexander conquered the empire, his Successors could not hold it together. When considering Philip it needs to be remembered that simply the magnitude of the empire was daunting to any but the most committed conqueror, stretching as it did from western Asia and Egypt to the Indus. Moreover, while Alexander's brilliance on the battlefield is unquestioned, at any time he might have been killed, and as it was, he was frequently wounded; the battle in the Aegean could have gone against him, the Greek alliance that faced Antipater in Alexander's absence might have been more successful, and any of the three main battles fought by Alexander in Asia could have turned out differently. Philip's concerns with his homeland, which he had built into a nation (Anson 2013: 43–81; see Chapter 3), would have precluded any attempt to conquer the entire Persian Empire. Would Philip really have been willing to stake everything in pursuit of glory and immortality? Would he have been willing to leave Macedonia and Greece for a decade of campaigning in a far-off land? My own belief is that he would not have done so, and here lies the patent difference between father and son. Philip had concerns that exceeded his personal ambitions; Alexander did not (Anson 2013: 10–11; 119–20; 188; see Anson forthcoming, 2020).

More limited expectations in any invasion of the Persian Empire would have been significant for Macedonia. As Isocrates (5.120) states in his urging of Philip to invade the Persian Empire, his focus should be on 'Asia from Cilicia to Sinope', which was apparently the sphere that was considered a feasible expansion of Hellenic power. To only include what was settled mostly by Greek speakers would be even smaller. A successful, but limited, campaign would have created a powerful Macedonia, whose king would be hegemon of Greece, controlling the Aegean Sea, Thessaly, Thrace and the western coast of Asia Minor. Most importantly, without the emergence of the rival states that marked the Age created by Alexander's conquests, Macedonia would have become the unchallenged power in the eastern Mediterranean.

While, as Brunt has pointed out, Philip was an opportunist, his policies followed a fairly consistent pattern. He united Upper and Lower Macedonia into a single state under his authority and created a special bond with the people of Macedonia (Anson 2013: 67–71, 88, 127–8; see Chapter 3). 'Philip converted what had been almost exclusively a dependent population of herdsmen and tenants into a nation containing tens of thousands of loyal landowners' (Anson 2008B: 18; see Chapter 3). He did this through the distribution of land to those

who previously had been tenant farmers and dependent pastoralists. Thanks to his early military successes, expelling the Illyrians from Upper Macedonia and securing control of that region, gaining domination of the Macedonian coast and so on, Philip was in a position to treat much of his realm as 'spear-won' land, royal land. Reiterating what has been previously shown (see Chapter 3), by transforming thousands of landless, dependent peasants into land-owning Macedonians, Philip created a confident and exceedingly loyal population – loyal both to the individual monarch who had given them their land and on whom their possession depended, but also to the institution of monarchy itself, which would perpetuate their ownership. By this action, Philip was able to limit the authority of the Macedonian aristocracy by creating this loyal middle class. These newly endowed individuals would now form the best infantry force in the Western world, a counterpoise to the elite, aristocratic Macedonian cavalry, and the anchor of his new model army (Anson 2010B: 51–68; 2013: 47–9; see Chapter 2). Richard Billows' claim that the creation of this army necessitated almost constant conquest is unfounded. In his words, Macedonia was 'an army that had a state' (1995: 18). Philip's army was tied to Macedonia and the land that these soldiers had received from the king. After the Battle on the Granicus, Alexander rewarded the families of his dead soldiers with the remission of taxes and other financial obligations tied to the land (Arr. *Anab.* 1.16.5; cf. Diod. 17.21.6; cf. Arr. *Anab.* 7.10.4). The true professional armies arose as a result of Alexander's ten plus years of campaigning and the wars of his Successors. Under Philip, the Hypaspists were professionals, but his other troops were drafted when needed. Alexander frequently had to deal with the stated desire of his soldiers to return to their homes in Macedonia,[3] and with the death of Darius, the Macedonians under Alexander showed a strong desire to return to Macedonia (Diod. 17.74.3; Curt. 6.2.15–3.18; Just. 12.3.2–3; Plut. *Alex.* 47). Alexander won these troops back by stating that their victories were not yet secure. It was later that Alexander began to appeal to his Macedonians with promises of riches, but early in the campaign he emphasized national interests (Anson 1991: 230–47).

All of Philip's early military operations can be tied to an attempt to safeguard his homeland. As with his political and social reforms, in his dealings with other political entities, he tied them directly to himself and his heirs but granted a high degree of autonomy. This is seen in his relations with the northern state of Paeonia, a threat to Macedonian security early in Philip's reign. Shortly after the disaster at the hands of the Illyrians that had seen the death of Philip's brother, the previous Macedonian king, the Paeonians had invaded Macedonia

(Diod. 16.2.6), but had been bought off by Philip (Diod. 16.3.4). Early in 358, the new Macedonian monarch, hearing of the death of the Paeonian king, Agis, invaded Paeonia and defeated the Paeonians in battle, making that state subject to his authority, but granting it a degree of autonomy (Diod. 16.4.2; Dem.1.23; Isoc. 5.21). Paeonia would have its own native king and currency (Merker 1965: 44–5) and was not to be formally incorporated into Macedonia, though the area apparently remained loosely tied to the Macedonian king and likely paid him tribute. In 356, the Paeonians joined with the Illyrians and the Athenians, but this proved ineffective in weakening Philip's control of the region (*GHI* 53; cf. Dem. 1.23). Paeonia was fully incorporated into the Macedonian state only during the later Antigonid dynasty (Merker 1965: 44). As a result of these actions, along with the defeat of the Illyrians, Macedonia's northern border was given far greater security. This was furthered by his planting of settlements along these frontiers. In Thessaly, Philip became the Archon for life of the Thessalian League (Dem. 1.22; 2.7; 19.318; Diod. 17.4.1; Just. 8.2.1–2; 11.3.2), thereby enhancing his own personal power but also securing Macedonia's southern flank. Most of Philip's actions served this dual purpose: they enhanced his power, but they also strengthened and secured Macedonia. Included in his authority in Thessaly was overall command of the armed forces of Thessaly (Dem. 8.26), control of customs duties and market fees (Dem. 1.22), the power to appoint regional officials ([Theopompus] *BNJ* 115 F-208) and likely international representatives of the Thessalian people as well, as was the case with respect to the Amphictyonic Council. Later, in addition to the two Thessalian seats that he controlled, Philip and 'his heirs' were granted the two seats formerly held by the Phocians at the conclusion of the Third Sacred War (Diod. 16.60.1), and Philip was recognized, at least in a *de facto* sense, as the leader of that Council (cf. Diod. 16.60.5; 17.4.2).

In the treaty that created the League of Corinth, the participants swore 'not to overthrow the kingdom of Philip and his descendants, or the constitutions existing in each place when they swore the oaths about the Peace' (*GHI* 76.ll.11–16). Philip apparently had no desire to conquer Greece *per se*, and claims that he was responsible for the Fourth Sacred War are without merit (Roisman 2006: 133–4, 144–5). At the beginning of this war he was unavailable to command the troops of the Amphictyony. Even more significant is his reluctance to force a confrontation with his chief rivals for power in Greece: Thebes and Athens. In addition to the fact that the combination of these two states had the potential to derail Philip's dominant position in southern Greece, he tried in earnest, though unsuccessfully, to save his alliance with the Thebans, having sent ambassadors to

them to try to persuade them to remain in alliance (see Chapter 4). That he won at Chaeronea was not a foregone conclusion. That he made the most of his victory supports Brunt's argument for Philip's opportunism. Philip's ultimate goal was hegemony. Apparently he adopted this same policy with respect to those Greek cities that came over to him after his dispatch of an advance Macedonian force to Asia in 336, enrolling them in the League (Rhodes and Osborne 2007: 422–3). Philip's policy then was close to that enunciated by Isocrates (5.154): to rule over the Macedonians and to act as hegemon of a vast array of states and peoples. Philip himself, supposedly in response to a suggestion that he place a garrison in all the Greek cities, said 'No, I had rather be called merciful a great while, than lord a little while' (Plut. *Mor.* 177d). He did, however, place garrisons in Ambracia, Thebes, Corinth and probably Chalcis, but most often Philip was adept in employing traditional methods of control through the use of accepted Hellenic organizations, such as the Thessalian League, the Amphictyonic Council and the League of Corinth as guarantor of the Peace of Corinth (Roebuck 1948: 90). The League of Corinth in particular gave Philip all the cover he needed to deal with those who wished to break free from Philip's hegemony.

This policy changed dramatically under Alexander. While, after the death of his father, Alexander had initially continued those arrangements established by Philip, especially in the islands, he did not extend membership in the League to the newly 'freed' cities of Asia (Rhodes and Osborne 2007: 423). Those communities that prior to Alexander's invasion had fallen back under Persian control after either their 'liberation' by Philip's advance force, or as the result of popular revolutions sparked by the presence of this force in the general area, when once again 'freed' during Alexander's campaign were placed in a very qualified position, even though one that recognized their previous standing as members of the League of Corinth. In an inscription dealing with the liberation of Chios, it is made clear that Chios was still regarded as a member of the League.[4] However, the island was hardly fully autonomous even with respect to local affairs. Alexander demanded a democratic government (Heisserer 1980: 80, ll.3–4; *GHI* 84.ll.3–4), restored those exiled by the previous administration (ll.4–7), demanded that the Chians supply him with 'twenty manned triremes at their own expense' (ll.8–9) and placed a garrison in the city 'until the Chians are reconciled' (ll.17–19). The islands were permitted to join the League with much limited rights, while the mainland Greek communities were not so enrolled. Ephesus had her democracy restored and was ordered to give the tribute earlier paid to the Persians to the Temple of Artemus (Arr. *Anab.* 1.17.12). The cities

taken or retaken by Alexander only enjoyed the same limited autonomy that had existed under the Persians. In the case of Hellespontine Phrygia, Alexander ordered that the cities pay the same 'tribute' to Alexander as they had paid to the Persians (Arr. *Anab.* 1.17.1–2). When in 335 Parmenion took the Aeolic city of Grynium by storm, the inhabitants were sold into slavery (Diod. 17.7.9), and the example of Thebes' destruction was certainly known. Alexander, however, had made his point at Thebes. When Aspendus, after first agreeing to Alexander's terms and then reneging on them, subsequently surrendered, Alexander doubled the sum originally demanded, ordered them to deliver hostages, to abide by the dictates of his satrap and to pay annual 'tribute' to Macedonia (Arr. *Anab.* 1.26.2–27.4).

Alexander was very different from his father in his uncompromising pursuit of personal glory (Anson 2013: 187–8). That he wished to control his image can hardly be doubted, given his employment of an historian, Callisthenes (Arr. *Anab.* 4.10.1–2), whose work apparently continued until his death in 329 (Str. 11.14.13); a personal sculptor, Lysippus (Plut. *Alex.* 4.1–2); a painter, Apelles (Cic. *Ad fam.* 5.12.7); and an engraver, Pyrgoteles (Plin. *HN* 7.125, 37.8). He also named many cities Alexandria after himself,[5] created two Nicaeas to highlight his victories, named one new foundation Bucephala after his horse,[6] and possibly even a Peritas, to honour his dog (Plut *Alex.* 61.1). Even as a sixteen-year-old, Alexander founded Alexandropolis in Thrace (Plut. *Alex.* 9.1), demonstrating that even at this early age he was already concerned with emphasizing his importance. It is also certain that Alexander, at least in the later stages of his expedition, wished to be viewed as divine (Anson 2013: 83–120). He certainly did not curtail his flatterers' allusions to his divinity, but rather welcomed their exuberance. Curtius (8.5.7–8) records that Alexander rewarded them when they publically proclaimed 'that Heracles, Father Liber, and Castor and Pollux would make way before the new divinity'. Would Philip have followed the same path here as Alexander, with equal success? While it is difficult to know for sure, it is important to bear in mind that Philip did not have Olympias for a mother, nor a tutor who called him Achilles when he was growing up. Olympias told Alexander that his birth was divine and that he needed to perform deeds 'worthy of his birth' (Plut. *Alex.* 3.3). Plutarch (*Alex.* 2.4–6) relates a number of stories in which lightning strikes Olympias' womb, Philip observes her copulating with a snake, later identified as Ammon, or dreams he seals his wife's womb with the sign of the lion, but he also asserts that 'others' state that she denied these claims (*Alex.* 3.4). The 'expedition's historian' Callisthenes is supposed to have commented that, 'if Alexander was to have a share of divinity, it would not be owing to

Olympias' absurd stories about his birth' (Arr. *Anab.* 4.10.2; Plut. *Alex.* 3.3; Just. 11.11.3–4). One of Alexander's early tutors, Lysimachus, encouraged him to emulate his ancestor Achilles (Plut. *Alex.* 5.8; 24.10; 15.7–8), and Alexander's imitation of Achilles became a lifelong pursuit (Arr. *Anab.* 7.14.4). On arriving in Asia at the beginning of his expedition of conquest, he first sacrificed at Elaeus at the tomb of Protesilaus, the first Achaean to die on the Trojan expedition (Arr. *Anab.* 1.11.5), and later at Ilium offered sacrifices to Achilles, Ajax and the other heroes (Diod. 17.17.3; Just. 11.5.12). At Ilium, he even offered sacrifice to Priam at the altar of Zeus, seeking forgiveness for his forebear Neoptolemus, the son of Achilles and Priam's murderer (Arr. *Anab.* 1.11.8). Philip's youth was spent being shopped around to various peoples as a hostage.

In addition to the more pronounced interest in his homeland demonstrated by Philip and his apparent quest for hegemony above outright conquest, there is also additional circumstantial evidence of that ruler's more limited ambitions. When Parmenion, supposedly in response to Darius' offer to cede all the territory west of the Euphrates to Alexander after that commander's victory at Issus, and the Persian king's offer of the hand of one of his daughters to Alexander as part of an alliance, stated that he would have taken the offer refused by his king (Diod. 17.54.1–6; Just. 11.12.9–16), perhaps he was reflecting what he knew of Philip's original intentions. Parmenion had long served Philip prior to his role with Alexander (Heckel 2006: 190) and had clearly been one of Philip's closest confidants (Plut. *Mor.* 177c, 179b).

The most intriguing indication of Philip's goals is provided by the controversial 'Pixodarus Affair', in which the dynast then ruling Caria, Pixodarus, offered his daughter in marriage to Alexander's half-brother Arrhidaeus (Plut. *Alex.* 10.1). Pixodarus was a member of the traditional ruling dynasty of Caria and officially the satrap of Caria from 339 until his death in 335/4 (Bosworth 1980: 152–3; Heckel 2006: 223). This alliance would have secured a strong ally for Philip's coming Asian invasion. However, Alexander was convinced by his friends and his mother, that Philip 'by means of a brilliant marriage . . . was trying to settle the kingdom upon Arrhidaeus', and contacted the Carian satrap himself, offering to marry the young lady (Plut. *Alex.* 10, 1–3). So much appears peculiar in this episode that the very incident is denied by some scholars (Hatzopoulos 1982B: 59–66; Hammond 1994: 174), but is generally accepted by most others (Develin 1981: 94–6; Bosworth 1988: 22; Carney 2000: 76, 98; Heckel: 2006: 223).

The Pixodarus affair certainly shows a lack of trust on the part of Alexander towards his father. That Alexander could believe that Arrhidaeus would be considered for the throne is a sure sign of this. From early childhood Arrhidaeus

had suffered from some mental deficiency (Diod. 18.2.2; Plut. *Mor.* 337d; Just. 13.2.11; 14.5.2; App. *Syr.* 52), and while there has been some attempt to rehabilitate Arrhidaeus (e.g. Greenwalt 1984: 69–77), throughout his life he is found being led, never leading. Alexander must surely have known Arrhidaeus' limitations. Indeed, that Alexander could ever believe that his father was planning to establish his half-brother as heir to the throne is primarily what makes this whole episode of doubtful veracity. Yet, friends and mother can be a strong influence on a young man, especially after the incident that occurred at the celebration of Philip's last marriage, to the niece of his general Attalus. Philip's response to the incident involving Pixodarus is what one would expect of a good, but exasperated, father: Alexander was not exiled, but his friends were (Plut. *Alex.* 10.1; Arr. *Anab.* 3.6.5–6). Philip's concern for his kingdom and his Argead heritage would have precluded any thought of making Arrhidaeus his heir. Philip had created the Macedonian nation and had joined most of Greece to his nation as dependants of the Macedonian hegemon (Anson 2013: 43–81), and he would not have entrusted what he had spent most of his life constructing to a subpar successor. All indications are that Philip saw in his son Alexander all of the ingredients necessary to continue the work that he himself had started. He had selected Alexander, though only sixteen years of age, to be his regent in 340 (Plut. *Alex.* 9.1) and to lead the vaunted Companion Cavalry at Chaeronea (Diod. 16.86.1). While in both cases he had attached competent advisors to Alexander, these were still great responsibilities carried out successfully, if not to say brilliantly. The statues at the so-called Philippeum at Olympia were a homage to the Argead ruling family and included Alexander, not Arrhidaeus (Paus. 5.20.10).[7] Prior to entering the theatre alone in Aegae and meeting his death, Philip was flanked by his new son-in-law, Alexander of Epirus, and his son Alexander (Just. 9.6.3). In spite of his problems with this son by his wife Olympias, Philip planned on making Alexander his heir. He had no other option between his two sons, and the virtual absence of any mention of Amyntas, the son of Perdiccas, suggests he was not, in Philip's mind, a serious candidate for the throne either.

The Pixodarus affair supplies two clues as to what Philip's intentions in Asia may have been. In the first place, he was preparing to form an alliance with the satrap of Caria through this marriage. It is doubtful that such an alliance would have included the satrap's abject submission to Philip. An alliance between near equals would appear more likely, thus suggesting a southern limit on Philip's plans in Asia. Moreover, it was in the context of the Pixodarus affair that Philip is reported to have commented regarding Alexander's interest in marrying the

Carian, that Alexander was too good to be married to 'a Carian and a slave of the Great King' (Plut. *Alex.* 10.3). Given that Philip and Alexander were preparing to leave soon for Asia and with no wedding in sight for the latter,[8] if the quotation is substantially correct, the only viable candidate for such a marriage in the immediate future would have been a daughter of the Great King himself, since in the Persian Empire everyone was regarded as 'a slave of the Great King'. Such a marriage was also part of the Persian king's proposal to Alexander made after Issus, which Parmenion thought should be accepted. If Philip's response to his son with respect to the Carian marriage is accurate, this would imply much with regard to Philip's intentions with respect to his proposed expedition. Moreover, if, as Maria Brosius declares, Philip was only interested in Asia as a way of protecting his hegemony in Greece, then an alliance would have been mutually beneficial. The Persian king would agree to leave at a minimum the coast of Asia Minor and the Aegean to Philip, while the Macedonian king would agree not to involve himself in Phoenicia or Egypt. Given that the Persians, after the debacle that was their expedition of 480/79 into the Greek peninsula, pursued a policy primarily designed to keep the Greeks from interfering outside of the mainland of Greece, the loss of even the entirety of Greek Asia Minor might have been regarded as a small price to pay for a promise of non-interference by Greeks elsewhere in the empire. Part of the difficulty that the Great King faced on an ongoing basis was from his satraps who would revolt with the aid of Greek mercenaries and at times direct assistance from certain mainland Greek city-states. With Philip in control of Greece and in an alliance with Persia, such difficulties would be things of the past for the Persian ruler. The lack of corresponding interference in the Greek mainland by the Persians would also be a boon for the Macedonian king, remembering their effective interference in Philip's earlier sieges of Perinthus and Byzantium.

If the Macedonian king had lived and had met with the successes enjoyed by his son in Asia, perhaps his plans would have changed. Schachermeyr (1973: 62) suggests that Philip may have desired to secure Syria and Egypt. Philip's inclusion of himself in a parade of statues featuring the twelve Olympians shortly before his death (Diod. 16.92.5) does suggest a fair measure of ego,[9] but even though, as Brunt has declared, he was often an opportunist, his goals were most often national as well as personal and dynastic. Claims that this Macedonian king wished to become the absolute, god-king of an empire stretching from Macedonia and Greece to the borders of the Persian Empire or even beyond, while certainly, given our lack of information and Philip's death before he could even join his forces in Asia, remaining a possibility, the likelihood is that Philip's ambition was

not as grandiose as that of his son. Alexander's pursuit of glory was paramount from a very early age and his virtual abandonment of his homeland for an empire based in Asia should not have been unexpected (Anson 2013: 121–2). In the case of Philip, such an abandonment of the homeland would have been very unexpected.

Appendix 2: Philip a God?

Various incidents both involving Philip's own actions and those of others regarding him bring forth some questions concerning his own views of himself as divine. Certainly it was not long after the death of his son Alexander that the practice of worshipping living individuals became common. Many would attribute the origin of this regular practice of worshipping the living to the aspirations to divinity of Alexander the Great, but did the practice begin with the father, Philip? Did Philip believe he was the thirteenth Olympian? The answer, given the evidence of Diodorus, would appear at first blush to be that he did. Diodorus (16.92.5, 95.1) states, 'Philip included in the procession statues of the twelve gods wrought with great artistry and adorned with a dazzling show of wealth to strike awe in the beholder, and along with these was conducted a thirteenth statue, suitable for a god, that of Philip himself, so that the king exhibited himself enthroned among the twelve gods.' Such divine pretentions are accepted by Ernst Badian (1963: 247; 1981: 71) and E. A. Fredricksmeyer (1979: 57–8; 1981: 150–6).

That Philip meant to be the thirteenth god, however, apparently conflicts with ancient reports that Alexander desired that honour and that this desire arose well after his father's procession and death (Ael. *VH* 5.12; cf. Athen. 6.251b). This episode is only mentioned by Diodorus. It is curious that, if it had taken place there is no reference to the action by Demosthenes, nor is it found in any of the over 300 fragments of Theopompus' often very unflattering *Philippica*. While Demosthenes is reported by the professional speechwriter Dinarchus to have made a proposal 'forbidding anyone to believe in any but the accepted gods' (Din. 1.94; cf. Polyb. 12.12b. 3), which might have been a reference to Philip's action, it is very clear from the context that Demosthenes' proposal actually related to Alexander's desire in 324 to be given divine honours.[1] Dinarchus' career in Athens is generally thought to have begun with the accession of Alexander to the Macedonian throne,[2] so his quotation regarding the gods should be associated with Alexander's later claims, not any pretentions by Philip. Dinarchus

is presenting two statements in an attempt to show Demosthenes' 'continuous changes in policy'. The supposed quotation of Demosthenes proclaiming his opposition to new gods is paired with one where Demosthenes is alleged to have stated 'that the people must not question the grant of divine honors to Alexander' (Din. 1.94). The first statement likely refers to an earlier attempt to offer such worship to Alexander. Demades (Ael. *VH* 5.12) made such a proposal with respect to Alexander and it was rejected as sacrilege by the Assembly. The second statement comes later and should be associated with increasing pressure to deify Alexander in some fashion. Hyperides (5.7) makes it clear that Demosthenes' second quoted statement was not a change in attitude, but merely a clever retort to the inevitable.[3] Hyperides declares that Demosthenes actually said the following: '[Demosthenes] conceded in the Assembly that Alexander might be the son of Zeus and Poseidon too if he wished.' The change in heart came as the result of Alexander's Exiles Decree, issued in 324, which ordered all Greek exiles, with certain notable exceptions, to be accepted back in their home cities (Diod. 17.109.1; 18.8.2; Curt. 10.2.4–7; Just. 13.5.2–5). Only those guilty of sacrilege and murder were to be excluded (Diod. 17.109.1), or those expressly exiled by Alexander's or Alexander's regent Antipater's commands (Diod. 18.8.4). This was of great concern to the Athenians who had expelled the Samians from their island and replaced them with Athenian settlers. To obey the decree would mean to give up the island (Diod. 18.8.7). Demades is reported to have said after the failure of his initial proposal, 'see that in keeping heaven safe you do not lose your land' (Val. Max. 7.2.13). The turnaround was therefore the direct result of the issuance of the Exiles Decree. In some fashion connected to this official decree was a 'suggestion' that Alexander was to be honoured as a god (Anson: 2013: 117). The passage in Dinarchus, then, does not relate to Philip, but rather to his son. There are therefore no contemporary comments on what would appear to be a sign of Philip's impiety. If the passage in Diodorus is to be accepted as true, this would suggest that something else was intended and perceived with respect to this procession.

There are several possible explanations for the absence of references to Philip's inclusion in the display of the Olympians as an apparent thirteenth. It is possible that Diodorus has either got this horribly wrong or that his source is responsible for an inaccurate statement.[4] The passage has been described as exhibiting an 'apocryphal flavour' (Ellis 1976: 307, n. 58; cf. Bosworth 1971: 95). However, the context, the events leading up to and including Philip's murder, appear accurate and it is likely that the procession of Philip's image with the twelve Olympians is then accurate as well (Baynham 1994: 35–43). It is possible that there was no official objection raised to Philip as the thirteenth Olympian, because Philip was

worshipped in Athens after Chaeronea (Apsines *Rhet. Graeci* 1: 221; Clem. Al. *Protr.* 4.54.5). While Fredricksmeyer accepts this evidence (1979: 59–61), most do not – and with good reason (Habicht 2017: 9). The two sources proclaiming this worship are both late. Apsines of Gadara was a third-century AD rhetorician and Clement of Alexandria, a late second-/early third-century AD Christian philosopher. Apsines declares that Demades proposed that Philip be recognized as a thirteenth god. This would appear to be a confusion with Demades' later proposal to make Alexander the thirteenth god (Ael. *VH* 5.12; Athen. 6.251b). In fact, similar actions by Alexander did result in the objections that are not found with respect to his father. Plutarch (*Mor.* 219e; cf. Ael. *VH* 2.19) reports that Damis, an otherwise unknown Spartan (Heckel 2006: 102), received letters from Alexander requesting deification, and that the Athenian Lycurgus stated that 'worshippers of the new god would have to purify themselves after every act of worship (Plut. *Mor.* 842d). Demosthenes, as seen, at first objected strenuously to this act of impiety, but later changed his mind when conscious that resistance might lead to the Athenian loss of the island of Samos.

Alexander had demanded from the Greek cities that they worship as a 'hero' his dead friend Hephaestion (Hyp. 6.21; Arr. *Anab.* 7.14.7; Diod. 17.115.6; Plut. *Alex.* 72.1–3). From Alexander's point of view this would have appeared to be the perfect time to acknowledge this Macedonian king's exceptionalism. There had been earlier examples of worship of living men. 'Altars were erected and sacrifice offered as to a god' to Lysander by a number of island cities, specifically Samos, at the conclusion of the Peloponnesian War ([Duris] *BNJ* 76 F-71; Plut. *Lys.* 18.3–4); Agesilaus is recorded as refusing similar honours offered by the Thasians (Plut. *Mor.* 210d; Flower 1988: 123–34); and Dion in the middle of the fourth century BC received 'heroic honors' from the Syracusans (Diod. 16.20.6; Plut. *Dion*; contra: Badian 1981: 42–3). These examples were presented and analyzed by Christian Habicht in his original 1956 publication and his second edition published in 1970 (*Gottmenschentum und griechische Städte*), subsequently translated and published with added supplementary material in 2017. Habicht correctly accepts these earlier incidents as authentic (2017: 179–80).

If there are no additional comments from contemporaries concerning Philip's procession and there is no true reason to reject Diodorus' account, the question becomes why is evidence of outrage not to be found when it is found with respect to Alexander? Would this not be a clear act of impiety? There is additional evidence of Philip acting in a way that again could suggest religious connotations. When Philip occupied the community of Crenides, he changed the name to Philippi after himself (Diod. 16.3.7, 8.6; Str. 7. Frg. 34). As founder of the city, as

indicated by the new name, Philip would expect to receive worship after his death within the city and he apparently did (Hatzopoulos 1996A: 155–6; 1996B: 83). When Alexander was only sixteen, in 340, he also named a city after himself (Plut. *Alex.* 9.1). Again, there is no outrage expressed here either. Later, certainly Alexander himself and many of his successors regularly named cities after themselves. Philip's naming a community in this way appears unusual and some have declared that Philip initiated the practice,[5] but his action was not unique in Greek history. Irad Malkin (1985: 116–17) points out that Thera bears the name of its founder and hence Philip was not an innovator of this practice. However, it had not been done in some time. While Herodotus (4.147) and Strabo (8.3.19) are ambiguous concerning when the name Thera came to be applied to the island, Pausanias (3.1.8) is not: 'And Theras changed the name of the island, renaming it after himself, and even at the present day the people of Thera every year offer to him as their founder the sacrifices that are given to a hero.' What can be said is that the practice was not common and was unknown beyond the Archaic Age until Philip's naming his refounded city Philippi. Certainly Philip did not engage in the practice to the extent that his son used it to advertise his accomplishments. Alexander created many cities named Alexandria scattered throughout his conquests that were to echo his name throughout the ages.[6] As noted earlier, Alexander also founded two Nicaeas, a Bucephala to honour his horse[7] and maybe even a Peritas after his dog (Plut *Alex.* 61.1). It is possible that Philip named another city after himself: Theopompus (*BNJ* 115 F-110) reportedly stated that Philip founded in Thrace a small city called Poneropolis ('City of Degenerates'), where some 2,000 miscreants were settled. According to Pliny (*HN* 4.11.41), Philippopolis was the later name of Poneropolis. Tacitus (*Ann.* 3.38) also states that Philippopolis was founded by 'the Macedonian Philip'. It is unclear whether the community changed its name during the lifetime of Philip II, or perhaps was renamed for Philip V. Whether the naming of a city after oneself was for the purpose of becoming in some sense a god in death or simply a way to publicize one's achievements is difficult to say. However, in the case of the former, such recognition would come after death, while having a city named after one would at the least highlight one's status in life.

Philip is reported to have been worshipped at Amphipolis 'as a god' while he yet lived (Ael. Ar. *Orat.* 38.480), as was his father Amyntas III (Schl. Dem. 1.5; Ael. Ar. *Orat.* 38.480). Ernst Badian (1981: 40) dismisses these claims for the worship of Amyntas at Pydna and Philip at Amphipolis to be fabrications. In both cases it is difficult to explain the context in which such worship began. The evidence for the worship of Philip in Amphipolis during his lifetime is doubted,

given that the context suggests a time frame for its establishment to be between 359 and the fall of the city to Philip in the winter of 357. The Amphipolitans in this period were seriously divided, with a faction willing to welcome even Athenian control in order to block that of Philip (Habicht 2017: 6). The history of Amphipolis up to shortly before the time of its surrender to Philip would suggest that this would be the exact opposite of their policy since their freedom from Athens in 422, suggesting greater fear of Philip than their old adversary Athens. The only possibility would be when Philip withdrew his garrison from the city to assuage the Athenians, but that would hardly be seen by the Amphipolitans as a good thing. Philip's predecessor had placed the garrison there to protect the city from the Athenians and now with its withdrawal and Philip's promises to restore the city to the Athenians it is difficult to see why the Amphipolitans would have been pleased with the Macedonian king. Robin Lane Fox (2011: 345) accepts the cult, but argues that its purpose was to curry Philip's favour and support to resist Athenian aggression. In fact, the only thing giving any credence to the Aelian passage is that for Amyntas' cult in Pydna there is additional support. A scholiast commenting on Demosthenes *Olynthiac* 1.5 states that Amyntas III had an 'Amyntaion' in the city of Pydna. That Philip may have been worshipped in both places at some future time is more than plausible – it is the context of our late sources that makes it doubtful. The other alleged cults of Philip II in Thasos, Maroneia, Nikiti, Berge, Philippi and Philippopolis are either references to an unspecified Philip or actually references to later cults of Philip V (Habicht 2017: 181–3). With the exception of the references to Amphipolis and Pydna, these cults may have been for dead kings. The worship of dead kings was not unknown – for example, the honouring of dead kings with a hero cult appears to have been practised in Sparta (Cartledge 1987: 331–43) – so it would not be so unusual in another state with a long-standing royal family also claiming descent from Heracles to have established a cult to dead Macedonian kings. There is evidence that this was indeed the case (Hammond 2000: 150–1).

But, while the worship of dead kings may not have been that unusual, there is clear evidence that in at least two places there was some form of worship offered to Philip while he yet lived. In Eresus, on the island of Lesbos, altars to 'Zeus Philippios' were established (*GHI* 83, rev.ll.4–5; Heisserer 1980: 38, l.5), likely in 336 (Lott 1996: 26–40), in recognition of Philip's assistance in the overthrow of the tyranny that had previously dominated the city, and a statue of Philip was also placed in the temple of Artemis in Ephesus, also likely in the same year (Arr. *Anab.* 1.17.11). As Brian Bosworth (1980: 133) has shown, such honours

were not unknown in Ephesus' past: the Ephesians had given similar honours to Lysander and to the Athenians Conon and Timotheus (Paus. 6.3.15–16). As a preliminary to what was to be Philip's grand invasion of the Persian Empire, an advance force, sent out under the command of Parmenion in 336, managed to liberate briefly from Persian domination a number of Greek cities on the islands and along the Aegean coast of what is today Turkey. The precise meaning of these honours is much debated (Habicht 2017: 9–10; Badian 1996: 13; Fredricksmeyer 1979: 39–61; Lott 1996: 32). At the least, these were an acknowledgement of Philip as a benefactor. In later Hellenistic and Roman imperial ruler cult, sacrifices were offered more frequently on behalf of the honouree and less frequently to that individual personally (Price 1980: 28–43). These honours may have been of this sort. However, at Ephesus in the temple of Artemis the king was honoured as the *synnaos*, 'temple sharer', of the goddess (Arr. *Anab.* 1.17.11), but his statue is called an *eikôn* and not an *agalma*. The latter was a cult statue, an object of worship; the former, simply a representation of the individual, an honour but not necessarily an object of worship. Recent scholarship, however, has questioned if such distinctions were truly recognized by the ancient Greeks (Bettinetti 2001: 25–63). In any case, not all statues received cult, but often the distinction between a statue as commemoration and a statue to be venerated was unclear. It is interesting to note that Plutarch (*Them.* 22.1–2) states that in the Temple of Artemis the Best Counsellor built by Themistocles was to be found an *eikôn* of that famous Athenian. It is unclear from the passage, however, whether this was placed there by Themistocles himself or at some later date. Plutarch does remark that it was present in his time. In later Hellenistic cases of *synnaos*, the mortal recipient of the honour did often receive sacrifice and incense (Nock 1930: 21–3).

In the two incidents involving Philip, nothing is mentioned of an actual ritual. This may, indeed, have been the key to understanding the lack of comment on Philip's action with respect to the procession of himself with the twelve Olympians, which may have been seen simply as an act of *hubris*, not impiety, because it did not involve the actual worship of a living man. An example of the difference may be seen again from the career of Philip's son. Alexander was declared to be the son of Zeus Ammon when he visited the Temple of Zeus Ammon (Anson 2013: 97–109). The first sign of hostility to this claim came three years later in the incident that left his long-time companion Cleitus dead. Arrian reports that following a heated discussion on the conferring of 'honors' on 'living men', Alexander killed Cleitus (Arr. *Anab.* 4.8.3). During this discussion Alexander was compared to the Dioscuri and to Heracles and in both cases was

found to be superior (Arr. *Anab.* 4.8.3). Heracles and Castor were both mortals who achieved divine status. Cleitus complained of the *hubris* shown in comparing Alexander to the gods and demeaning the heroes (Arr. *Anab.* 4.8.4). It would appear that in this context the question was less one of impiety, but more one of extreme vanity and narcissism. Indeed, what most seemed to upset Cleitus was the belittling of the accomplishments of Alexander's 'mortal' father Philip and Alexander's increasing aping of the Persian court.[8] Macedonian tradition, as noted, made the king the first among near equals. The Macedonian aristocrats were concerned that their king was turning into an autocrat, as opposed to their leader and companion. The claim of divine parentage was a further controversy to be added to this greater concern. This was also the case later at Opis in 324 when the common Macedonian soldiers, hearing from Alexander that many would now be sent home and believing that the king had lost all confidence in their military abilities, suggested that he continue his campaign with the help of his 'father', meaning Ammon (Arr. *Anab.* 8.1–3). When in 327 Alexander attempted to introduce *proskynesis*, there were vigorous objections (Arr. 4.9.9, 10.5–12.6; Curt. 8.5.5–24; Plut. *Alex.* 54.2–6). The difference is that the first was a claim that required no action on the part of others, while the second, prostration, did require action. Whether it was perceived as worship or simply humiliation, it was not well received by the Macedonians and had to be abandoned.[9]

By tradition, Philip was acknowledged as descended from Heracles, the heroic son of Zeus and eventual god himself (Plut. *Alex.* 2.1), and, as seen, there is some evidence that Macedonian kings were deified after their deaths. Justin (8.2.7) says of Philip after his defeat of Onomarchus at the Battle of Crocus Field, that 'the man who had championed the majesty of the gods deserved to be regarded as second only to the gods'. Peter Green (1990: 402) observes that in the Hellenistic period, honours usually reserved for the gods became an extravagant recognition for the living: 'Sacrifices, sacred enclosures, tombs, statues, prostration (*proskynesis*), hymns, altars, and other such divine appanages are all, as Aristotle [*Rhet.* 1361a34–6] specifically states, simply marks of honor, the gesture itself, not its recipient (whether god or man), is the important thing'; that is, mortals were simply receiving 'some of the gods" divine prerogatives. Certainly, not that long after Alexander's death, this was very clearly the case. It is doubtful if the elaborate honours paid to Demetrius Poliorcetes by the Athenians were given because the Athenians believed they were in the presence of a true divinity. Rather, they were obsequiously honouring a 'Savior', a powerful individual who had promised them their autonomy and had freed them from the rule of a tyrant in 307 (Diod. 20.46.1; Plut. *Demetr.* 10.1). Both Demetrius and his father

Antigonus were proclaimed 'Savior Gods' and honoured with gold statues, a cult and a priest (Diod. 20.46.2–3; Plut. *Demetr.* 10). Even two of Demetrius' mistresses, Lais and Leaina, received sanctuaries, and certain of his companions (*philoi*), altars and libations ([Democharес] *BNJ* 75 F-1=Athen. 6.253a). However, in Philip's day most Greeks and Macedonians regarded such 'marks of honour' as altars and sacrifices as meant for gods only. The beginning of the change to offering to mortals what was previously only offered to the gods is not surprisingly associated with Philip and Alexander. In the past, it was rare that a general, king or the like would have the power to be some city's or people's saviour. The earlier examples of Lysander, Timotheus and so on show the same characteristics as those connected with Philip and Alexander, but on a more limited basis. For example, Lysander had freed Samos from Athenian control and had invited those exiled by the Athenians to return after an absence of approximately thirty-five years. To such individuals, Lysander did indeed appear to be a saviour worthy of the greatest honours.

For ancient Greeks, there were actually three main religious categories of sentient beings: mortal, god and hero – though not always very distinct categories. Heroes have with some accuracy been described as an intermediary stage between the other two: the intersection of mortal and immortal, man and god (Kearns 1989: 125). While the actual distinction between mortal and divine was conceived as fixed (Badian, 1996: 14–15), it was in practice quite flexible. As Elizabeth Carney (2000: 22) has commented, 'literature nagged Greeks to remember the distinction between human and divine (e.g. Pind. *Isthm.* 5.14). They needed reminding.' Heroes were mortals who through their accomplishments were seen as being elevated in the chain of being. Most often, heroization only came after the death of the individual, and such a deity was most often seen as having only a very localized power. It was the tomb where that power would be concentrated.[10] While the tombs of city-founders were traditionally accorded religious honours, their cult was associated with the actual tomb of the founder, unless the honouree's bones were distributed. A good example from the fifth century BC was the case of the Spartan Brasidas and the city of Amphipolis. Here, after his death, Brasidas was honoured 'as a hero', with a public funeral, annual contests and sacrifices and the creation of a *temenos*, that is, a sacred enclosure (Thuc. 5.11.1). Brasidas had fought and died in a battle that ensured Amphipolis' independence from the Athenians and he came to be regarded as the new founder of the city and also as the city's *Soter* (Saviour).

In such cases, the heroic dead were seen as still able to affect the living. Yet here the distinction is not clearly defined. The worlds of the living and the dead

are not distinctly separated in the minds of even fifth-century Greeks. Tales of heroes visiting the underworld and of those simply classed as dead affecting the living are common in the literature, from dead frustrated virgins and homicide victims seeking revenge to loving ancestors, the dead could interact with this world for good or for ill (Johnston 1999). In Greek paganism, there was a strong belief in the presence of beings – whether gods, heroes, spirits of the dead or local 'deities' – who had limited power over particular areas. The numbers here are impressive. When Cleisthenes (508), in his constitutional restructuring of the Athenian state, had created ten new tribes, he sent a list of 100 ancestral heroes to the Delphic oracle, which then selected ten from the list to give their names to the tribes and to be worshipped as 'founders' (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 21.6). The territory of the Athenian state was divided up into areas called demes, each of which had its own sanctuaries and founder deities. Families were also seen as having protective spirits associated with the home, the field and the members of the household. A surviving calendar of the Deme Erchia from the fourth century BC lists more than thirty deities and about as many local sanctuaries. To these would then be added family and state deities.

Another feature of Greek religion that further complicates the picture is that, while this religion was conservative with few cults once established being abandoned or dramatically altered, the very nature of polytheism made possible the addition of heroes, gods and cults, without endangering the authenticity of existing heroes, gods and cults. Radicalism was seen in the alteration of existing religious practices, not much in the addition of new ones. Gods received worship when they were seen to be in a position to confer benefits or inflict harm on the worshipper (Mikalson 2005: 21–6). Confusing the issue even further was the extravagant treatment of prominent individuals during their lifetimes. Athletes were not only often heroized in death (Currie 2005: 120–3), but also received aspects of these honours while they lived. Often statues were erected, hymns composed extravagantly extolling their 'godlike' virtues, and legends developed of miraculous births and superhuman feats (Currie 2005: 151–7): 'When he departed this life, one of those who were his enemies while he lived came every night to the statue of Theagenes and flogged the bronze as though he were ill-treating Theagenes himself' (Paus. 6.11.6). However, in Philip's time most Greeks and Macedonians regarded such 'marks of honour' as altars and sacrifices as meant for gods only. For most of the 'great', such honours only awaited them after their deaths. Statues of living men were not uncommon, however, and hyperbole was ever present.

In the case of Philip, what was likely being suggested by all of these seemingly religious measures late in his life was that he wished to be seen, and apparently

was seen, as an individual especially dear to the gods, one who was then honoured with statues and sharing temples because the gods were seen as working through him. This desire went beyond being 'the most important person present, the most important man alive in the world, the greatest king that Macedonia had ever had or that the Greeks had ever seen or were ever likely to see' (Hammond and Griffith 1979: 683). Philip was not just the greatest man alive, he was the agent of the gods, their general and defender. Diodorus (16.91.4) states that Philip believed the gods supported him, whose honouring would both acknowledge his power and through him the gods themselves. This would explain the lack of comment with respect to his placing his statue with the twelve Olympians. He was their agent. He had fought as Apollo's commander in two successful sacred wars. He was the hegemon of the Greek nation. He was the most powerful man of his age able to award or punish the peoples of Greece. Moreover, there was no cult attached to his naming of cities after himself or of having his statue included among the Olympians. Such honours would be fully awarded after his death. What the Athenians objected to when the call came from Alexander was that he wanted cult. With respect to Philip, while he did place his image with the twelve Olympians, there is no evidence that his statue was meant to be a permanent object of veneration, nor is there any evidence that cult was performed either during or after the procession. His *hubris* might be criticized, but this hardly equated to impiety for a contemporary audience. Nor is there any evidence that Philip ordered or encouraged the actions of the Ephesians or the Eresians. With no evidence to the contrary, these actions appear to have been spontaneous on the part of the inhabitants. Philip's propaganda presented his coming invasion of Asia as a religious war of revenge. To have his statue following the gods in a procession would simply appear to be emphasizing his role as their avenger.

Appendix 3: The Death of a King

Every seat in the theatre was taken when Philip appeared wearing a white cloak, and by his express orders his bodyguard held away from him and followed only at a distance, since he wanted to show publicly that he was protected by the goodwill of all the Greeks, and had no need of a guard of spearmen. Such was the pinnacle of success that he had attained, but as the praises and congratulations of all rang in his ears, suddenly without warning the plot against the king was revealed as death struck.

Diod. 16.93.1–2 (Translation is from the Loeb Classical Library)

Philip's assassination in 336 at the hands of a disgruntled Macedonian aristocrat paved the way for his son Alexander to make himself 'the Great'. While Elizabeth Carney has declared that with respect to the assassination we 'should not treat the murder of Philip II as a puzzle to be solved – a Macedonian Agatha Christie with stock characters' (Carney 1992: 169), it is difficult not to do so. The king's death has given rise to numerous conspiracy theories. These were as rife in antiquity as in the writings of modern historians. Justin (9.7.1) reports, 'It is even believed that he [the actual murderer Pausanias] was instigated to the act by Olympias, Alexander's mother, and that Alexander himself was not ignorant that his father was to be killed' (cf. Plut. *Alex.* 10.6.7). There was, indeed, a general purge of individuals after Philip's death, many of whom were charged with conspiracy to kill the king. The sons of Aeropus – Heromenes and Arrabaeus – were executed supposedly for their part in the assassination (Arr. *Anab.* 1.25.1), while another brother, Alexander, being one of the first to hail Alexander as the new king, was at least for a time spared (Arr. *Anab.* 1.25.1–2). Such charges may have been no more than a means to justify the elimination of potential rivals by Alexander and his adherents. For example, Alexander's cousin, Amyntas Perdicca, and Attalus, the uncle of Philip's last wife, were all part of this purge even though they were never accused of Philip's murder, but were seen as dangerous to Alexander's succession as king (Curt. 9.17, 10.24; Just. 12.6.14).

While there is evidence that Philip's assassin may not have acted alone, our sources primarily describe the murder as of a very personal nature. Diodorus (16.93.2–94.4; cf. Just 9.6.4–8) presents the most complete account of the incident. Here, it originates in a rivalry between two young men, both named Pausanias, for the affections of King Philip, and the death of one and the outrage of the other. Pausanias, the son of Cerastus, a Macedonian from Orestis, had as a young man been an *eromenos* of the Macedonian king, but was later replaced in the king's affections by the other Pausanias. Berated by the former, the latter Pausanias, having first confided his intentions to the prominent *Hetairos* Attalus, the uncle of the king's future wife Cleopatra, later sought his death willingly and met it gloriously defending the king in battle with the Illyrians. Given the relative chronology of Diodorus' account, which seems to place these events in Philip's final years, this campaign in which the younger Pausanias lost his life is likely to be Philip's campaign in 337 against Pleurias, the then king of the Illyrian Autariatae (Str. 7.5.1, 6, 7, 11, 12; Hammond 1966: 245). The only reference to Pleurias, however, is found in Diodorus 16.93.6, but without even an approximation of when this campaign took place. The campaign is routinely associated with one mentioned in Diod. 16.69.7, but this one Diodorus associates with the archon year 344/343 (16.69.1). The battle has been dated to early 344 (Berve 1973: 2.308). While the campaign connected by Diodorus with the death may not be recorded elsewhere, those of which we are aware would put the incident almost a decade before Philip's death, which, although not impossible, does seem to be too long a delay between the insult and the retaliation. After the young man's death, Attalus, to avenge his friend, got the surviving Pausanias drunk and handed him over to some muleteers to be abused. Having recovered, Pausanias told Philip of the incident, but the king did nothing to punish Attalus, but did give the young man substantial presents and made him one of the elite *Somaphylaces*. Unmollified, Pausanias now turned his wrath against Philip.

In his assessment that the assassination was solely the act of an outraged lover, Diodorus is supported by the comments of the contemporary and tutor of Alexander, Aristotle (*Pol.* 5.1311b1). Aristotle includes Philip's death among those done for personal, not political, reasons: 'In some cases the attack is aimed at the person of the ruler, in others at their office. Risings provoked by insolence are aimed against the person; and though insolence has many varieties, each of them gives rise to anger, and when men are angry they mostly attack for the sake of revenge, not of ambition' (5.1311a). Justin (9.6.4–7.3, 9), however, while following in the main Diodorus' account, adds that Olympias had not only encouraged the assassin, but had even provided the getaway horses. As seen

earlier, it is further claimed by Justin (9.7.1) that 'Alexander himself was not unaware of the plot.' A fragmentary papyrus dealing with the events immediately after Philip's assassination, as noted earlier (Chapter 1), speaks of a trial and an execution (*P Oxy.* 1798).[1] This has suggested to some that Pausanias or someone else in some way connected to the assassination was tried by an assembly of Macedonians and then executed. While it has been accepted by some scholars (Hammond and Griffith 1979: 343–9; Hatzopoulos 1996A: 272–3), it has not found wide acceptance. Ernst Badian has accurately described the fragment as derived from 'an unimportant Alexander history related to the Romance' (1979: 97) and Brian Bosworth (1971: 94) has dismissed it as 'unreliable evidence'. Most accept Diodorus' account of the assassin's death, but many see underlying conspiracies behind Pausanias' actions.

Certain of our sources proclaim that Pausanias was part of a conspiracy revolving around the three sons of Aeropus from Lyncestis (Arr. *Anab.* 1.25.1–2, Plut. *Mor.* 327c), members, or at least affiliates, of the former royal house of Upper Macedonian Lyncestis (Diod. 17.32.1, 80.2; Curt. 7.1.5; 8.8.6; Just. 11.2.2, 7.1; 12.14.1).[2] While two of the brothers, Arrhabaeus and Heromenes, were executed immediately as co-conspirators with Pausanias, the third brother, Alexander, though assumed guilty, was spared (Arr. *Anab.* 1.25.2; Justin 11.2.2, Curt. 7.1.6–7). Not being Argeads themselves, it is possible they hoped by means of the assassination to bring Amyntas Perdicca, Philip's nephew, to power (Arr. *Succ.* 1.22; Just. 12.6.14; Polyaen. 8.60). Plutarch (*Mor.* 327c) reports that after Philip's death, 'all Macedonia was festering with revolt and looking toward Amyntas and the children of Aëropus'. Other evidence of any connection between the brothers and the would-be king Amyntas is even more problematic. An inscription (*IG* 7.3055) listing those who had consulted the Oracle of Trophonius in Lebadaea, Boeotia, includes 'Amyntas, the son of Perdiccas, King of the Macedonians'. While the inscription has been associated with Amyntas II, who has an unknown patronymic and reigned briefly in 394/3 (March 1995: 275, 277, 279), it most likely does refer to Philip's nephew. But even if this is the case, the inscription is undated and may be associated with 359 (Hatzopoulos 1986: 280), and, indeed, its likely date is shortly after Philip's assassination (Ellis 1971: 15–24; Anson 2009A: 276–86). It is possible that the young man consulted the oracle to know if he was ever fated to be king, and in the confusion after Philip's death and as an Argead he presented himself as king.

Brian Bosworth further suggests that all three Lyncestian brothers may have favoured the assassination, but differed as to what would be its result. Two brothers, according to Bosworth, perhaps wished for a restoration of the

independence of Lycestis, their Upper Macedonian home, while the other simply wanted Philip's death (1971: 102). The evidence for a political conspiracy is, however, weak. There are indications that there was a conspiracy involving Pausanias and the brothers, but it was personal, not political. There is a chance – and a good one – that their father 'Aeropus' is the same Aeropus who was exiled by Philip (Polyaen. 4.2.3). While Elizabeth Carney (1980: 23; cf. Hammond and Griffith 1979: 15, n. 3; Heckel 2007: 5) finds it 'difficult to say' whether such an identification is accurate, Robin Lane Fox (1973: 37) accepts this identification and very plausibly suggests that Aeropus' exile may well have been a motive for revenge by the three brothers. The passage in Polyaenus, however, is too ambiguous to make a definite determination: 'Philip, while encamped against the Thebans, was informed that two of his generals, Aeropus and Damasippus, had taken a singing girl from an inn, and introduced her into the camp: and the fact being proved, he banished both of them from the kingdom.' The tale is found nowhere else and Aeropus is a common Macedonian name, making the identification difficult. In 334/333, a Persian Sisines had been found with a letter from King Darius to the Lyncestian Alexander offering him 1,000 talents of gold to kill King Alexander (Arr. *Anab.* 1.25.3). The last of the three brothers was put under arrest and executed in 330 (Curt. 7.1.5–9; Diod. 17.80.2; Just. 12.14.1). The truth of this particular conspiracy theory involving the young men from Lyncestis rests on that positive identification of the Aeropus who was exiled with the father of the 'sons'.

That Pausanias may have had associates is possible. There are the references to getaway *horses*, plural; the actual execution of two sons of Aeropus for the crime along with the claimed involvement of the third brother; and Diodorus' use of ἐπιβουλή to describe the murder, which all suggest that Pausanias did not act alone. What may have actually taken place, however, is that the brothers and Pausanias had been communicating their complaints and desires to one another but without any clear plan of action. When the opportunity presented itself to Pausanias, it was seized without any serious thought about its aftermath or consultation with anyone else. When did Philip decide to enter the theatre alone – the night before, days before, moments before? It is likely that this entrance was decided very close to its actual occurrence. In that case, Pausanias being a bodyguard seized the moment with little thought other than escape. The precipitous action of Pausanias caught all concerned unprepared, which would explain why there was no clear plan for what to do after the assassination. In this speculative account, there was only one true conspirator in the murder: Pausanias. The others were assumed to have been involved because of their

association with Pausanias and their critical conversations with him concerning the king. Whether ultimately the conspiracy involved just one person or if more were involved, it is very probable that all those implicated were motivated by personal grievances rather than constitutional objectives. This would also explain the success of the assassination and the lack of any apparent follow-through. Revenge was the motive, not the future of Macedonia.

As indicated, Plutarch (*Alex.* 10.6–7) reports that Olympias had promoted the assassination. Olympias' estrangement from her husband is well documented and her revenge on his last wife Cleopatra and her infant daughter was savage, murdering both of them (Paus. 8.7.6–7; Just. 9.7.12). Much of the turmoil in the royal household in the last year of Philip's life revolved around the last of his many marriages. Philip married Cleopatra, the niece of Attalus, a prominent Macedonian and one of the two commanders preparing to lead the king's advance force into Asia (Plut. *Alex.* 9.6–11; Diod. 16.93.9). Olympias' later actions towards the new wife suggest that this one of Philip's marriages upset her profoundly (Plut. *Alex.* 9.5–6). Olympias' anger may, however, have arisen primarily because of comments made by Attalus during the symposium following the marriage. As noted in Chapter 4, these comments also led to an estrangement between father and son. In toasting the couple, Attalus prayed that 'from Philip and Cleopatra there might be born a legitimate successor to the kingdom' (Plut. *Alex.* 9.7). Although Pausanias (8.7.7) reports that the child born of this new marriage was a boy, the infant was in fact a daughter: Europa (Athen. 13.557e; Just. 9.7.12; Diod. 17.2.3). As also previously noted, in the confusion of unmixed wine, there may have been no insult intended, but Alexander took offence and threw a cup at Attalus. Philip then drew his sword and advanced on his son, but in his drunken state tripped and fell (Plut. *Alex.* 9.9–10), in response to which Alexander quipped that 'here is one who was preparing to cross from Europe into Asia; and he is upset in trying to cross from couch to couch'. Subsequently, Alexander took his mother to Epirus while he went into voluntary exile in Illyria (Plut. *Alex.* 9.8–11; Just. 9.7.5–7). It took the intervention of Demaratus, the Corinthian guest-friend, to reconcile the two (Plut. *Alex.* 9.12–14). The importance of the incident cannot be discounted, since after Philip's death, Alexander arranged for the murder of Attalus (Diod. 17.2.3–6), and it is fairly certain that he had had no part in the assassination and, therefore, that his death was the result of the hostility between the two men.

Olympias returned to Macedonia along with Alexander, or did so sometime later but likely before Philip's assassination (cf. Plut. *Mor.* 179c). She was apparently present in Pella during the Pixodarus affair (see Appendix 1), where

along with Alexander's friends she sowed suspicion about Philip's intentions towards his apparent heir (Plut. *Alex.* 10.1). Olympias is even accused by Justin (9.7.9–10) of assisting in the murder of her husband. Certainly, Alexander's mother did have a tendency to be ruled by her passions. In addition to the murders of Cleopatra and her infant daughter, Olympias would later murder Alexander's half-brother Arrhidaeus, who in partnership with Alexander's infant son had succeeded Alexander as joint monarchs; Eurydice, the wife of Arrhidaeus and daughter of Cynanne; Nicanor, one of the sons of the former regent Antipater; and 100 other noble Macedonians (Diod. 19.11.5–8). Indeed, Ian Worthington (2008: 186) claims that her involvement in King Philip's assassination 'does not seem so far-fetched'. Plutarch (*Alex.* 10.4) does not accuse Olympias, but does say she was suspected, while Justin (9.7.1–14) does state that she was involved. Olympias' marriage to Philip was ultimately just one of seven. Why then did this last one so upset her? Olympias was Philip's fourth wife. Her only reported action involving any of Philip's other marriages concerned his marriage to Philinna. This did not concern Philinna directly, but rather her son, Arrhidaeus. Olympias supposedly poisoned the young man, leading to his mental deficiency (Plut, *Alex.* 77.7–8).[3] The poisoning like the encouragement and more with respect to Pausanias' plot are plausible, but very far from certain. According to Justin (9.7.8– 9, 14), Olympias provided the getaway horses and encouraged Pausanias to kill Philip. Much of the suspicion of her involvement arises from her reaction to Philip's death. In addition to murdering Philip's last wife, Cleopatra, and her infant daughter, she supposedly put garlands on Pausanias' grave (Paus. 8.7.6–7; Just. 9.7.12). In Epirus, she had attempted to get her brother the King of Epirus to invade Macedonia and, according to Justin (Just. 9.7.7), this was the ultimate reason for the marriage between the Epirote Alexander and Philip and Olympias' daughter Cleopatra. This was a means of safeguarding the relationship between the two monarchs against the machinations of Olympias.

Even though, after the death of her son Alexander, Olympias exercised considerable influence, at one point even becoming the official guardian for her grandson, Alexander IV, and regent for Macedonia (Anson 1992: 40–1; 2015A: 74, 159), her influence with Philip was limited to her influence over her son. Given the role of royal women assigned by the traditions of Macedonian monarchy (Carney 1992: 172), for a woman obviously possessed of leadership qualities and ambition this must have been galling. Olympias may, indeed, have been an influence on Pausanias and perhaps even aided and abetted him, but it is unlikely. Though her anger was palpable and readily expressed after the

assassination, this was likely the result of her pent up frustration and not the actions of one whose plot has triumphed. Her anger with respect to Cleopatra does appear to indicate that this marriage was far more significant than the others. It may have represented her fears for her son's ultimate succession, but it does appear to be far more personal. Her 'long-standing' enmity towards Antipater, which was reciprocated, may indicate that she had attempted maybe initially through Philip and later through her son to insert herself into court affairs (Diod. 17.118.1; Plut. *Alex.* 68.4, 77.2; cf. Arr. *Anab.* 7.12.5). As a woman and as a foreigner this would have been resented by the *Hetairoi*. Indeed, the main argument against her involvement in the assassination is that Philip's sudden death actually threatened her son's succession. It would appear for Olympias to have been involved in any assassination plot, she would have had to have worked with significant elements in the *Hetairoi* (on the involvement of the *Hetairoi* in successions, see Chapter 1), in particular Antipater, to guarantee that her son would be the beneficiary of the murder. Antipater was one of Philip's closest associates, a much trusted subordinate. If after Philip's death Antipater had supported Amyntas for the throne, Alexander's succession would have been seriously in jeopardy. It is very doubtful that Olympias would have endangered her son's succession for the sake of revenge. After all, estranged from her polygamous husband, her position in Macedonia depended on her son. While it is possible that the estrangement between Olympias and Antipater came later, it is doubtful that such an alliance existed and, consequently, it is highly doubtful that Olympias had any role in the actual assassination.

In our sources the King of Persia is also reported to have had a hand in the murder. The evidence for Darius' involvement comes from a reported letter sent by King Alexander to the Persian ruler. The letter was a general condemnation of Persian policy dating back to the Persian War and a personal indictment of Darius himself as the unlawful king of Persia. Alexander also in this communication accuses Darius of boasting that he had financed the murder of Philip (Arr. *Anab.* 2.14.5; Curt. 4.1.12). The last might be a plausible charge at least chronologically given that Darius according to the 'Royal Canon' had become king sometime after November 337 but before November 336 (Depuydt 1995: 112), and Diodorus (17.7.1) states that Darius came to the throne before Philip's death, but that the two events happened about the same time.[4] In this same letter, Darius is also credited with the murder of his predecessor Arses (Artaxerxes IV) (Diod. 17.5.4–6; Arr. *Anab.* 2.14.5), though Diodorus (17.5.3–6) places this murder and others clearly at the feet of the Chiliarch Bagoas. While the letter may be authentic, the charge of complicity in the death of Philip,

although just barely plausible, is not that credible.[5] That the Persians were likely sending money to Greece is a given. They had interfered in Philip's sieges at Perinthus and Byzantium and their usual practice was to upset other attempts at hegemony in Greece by providing financial support for the perspective hegemon's rivals. The best evidence for possible involvement of the Persians in Philip's assassination comes from the reign of Alexander. Once in Asia there were a number of recorded plots to kill him supposedly having their origin at the Persian court. Alexander, the son of Aeropus, was accused of plotting the king's death in coordination with the Persians (Curt. 7.1.5–9, 8.8.6; Arr. *Anab.* 1.25.3–9; Diod. 17.32.1, 80.2; Just. 11.7.1–2, 12.14.1). That Pausanias, Philip's assassin, was receiving direct assistance from the Persians is not mentioned in the sources, nor is it likely to have occurred. Diodorus is clear that Pausanias was not a hired assassin. Alexander the son of Aeropus initiated his contact with the Persians with a letter delivered by his possible 'father' (Arr. *Anab.* 1.25.3).

Modern arguments for Alexander's involvement are even less plausible. According to Plutarch (*Alex.* 10.7), Alexander, when informed of the outrage by Pausanias, recited a phrase from Euripedes' *Medea* (5.289), 'the giver of the bride, the bridegroom, and the bride', suggesting that recourse lay in the assassination of Attalus, Philip and even Philip's new bride, Cleopatra. Plutarch (*Alex.* 10.8), however, concludes by casting doubt on this last report, pointing out that Alexander did seek out those who were involved in the murder and saw to their deaths, and also expressed outrage with his mother for her murder of Cleopatra. Indeed, the arguments for Alexander's involvement rely less on direct evidence from the sources, which hardly exists, and more on highly speculative supposition. The often strained relations between the king and his heir apparent along with Alexander's rapid and successful accession to the throne are most often cited. Ernst Badian (1963: 245–6; 1966: 42; 2000: 54–6) suggests that Philip's deteriorating relations with Alexander led him to increasingly favour Amyntas Perdicca. In this way, argues Badian, he would be able to rid himself of Alexander and provide a guardian for the son whom Philip was expecting his new wife Cleopatra to bear (accepted by Ellis 1971: 24). The king had given Amyntas in marriage to Cynanne, Philip's daughter by the Illyrian Audata (Carney 2000: 80). Amyntas' increasing importance is possibly reflected in an inscription at Oropus honouring him as *proxenos* (*GHI* 75 obv.ll.4–5). However, Badian's chief evidence for Philip's alleged dissatisfaction with Alexander as his heir is actually the best evidence that Philip had no such displeasure, the infamous Pixodarus affair: the attempted marriage between Arrhidaeus and the daughter of the Carian dynast Pixodarus (Plut. *Alex.* 10.1).

Pixodarus was a member of the traditional ruling dynasty of Caria and officially the satrap of Caria from 339 until his death in 335/4 (Bosworth 1980: 152–3; Heckel 2006: 223). This would have secured a strong ally for the coming invasion. However, Alexander was convinced by his friends and his mother that Philip 'by means of a brilliant marriage . . . was trying to settle the kingdom upon Arrhidaeus', and contacted the Carian satrap himself, offering to marry the young lady (Plut. *Alex.* 10, 1–3). Stephen Ruzicka (2010: 3–11) places the overture from Alexander to Pixodarus before his official reconciliation with Philip over the episode at the king's last marriage, and the dressing down by the father of his son after the latter's return. While this is certainly possible, Plutarch's account gives the impression that all of the Pixodarus affair occurred after the reconciliation. With respect to these points, Robert Develin (1981: 94–6) has presented an excellent case for the episode's authenticity and its placement in the chronological order. The Pixodarus affair certainly shows a lack of trust on the part of Alexander towards his father, but all the evidence shows that Philip maintained his support of his son (see Appendix 1). Philip declared that he was angry at Alexander's interference in the possible marriage, but his stated reason was that a marriage to the satrap's daughter was not worthy of Alexander's station (Plut. *Alexelet* 10.3). The clear implication is that Alexander was his intended successor. In 338, Philip commissioned statues of his parents, himself, Olympias and Alexander to be placed in the so-called Philippeum at Olympia (Paus. 5.20.9–10).[6] Prior to entering the theatre alone in Aegae and meeting his death, Philip was flanked by his new son-in-law, Alexander of Epirus, and his son Alexander (Just. 9.6.3). There is no evidence that Philip was intending to set aside Alexander as his heir. Ian Worthington (2008: 185–6; see also Hammond 1997: 24) believes that Alexander was to be left behind as regent when Philip and the expeditionary force left for Asia. As seen, Philip planned on taking his son to Asia and in all likelihood leaving Antipater behind as his regent. When Alexander left for Asia, he simply followed his father's plan and Antipater became his regent in Macedonia.

While Alexander did gain the throne and was the chief beneficiary of the murder, this success was hardly a foregone conclusion. Additionally, Alexander is never accused of participation in the death of his father even when in the later stages of his campaign in Asia many of his subordinates accused him of a great many crimes. Prior to being led off for execution for his part in the so-called Pages conspiracy, Hermolaus accused Alexander of the 'unjust' executions of Philotas and Parmenio, and his outright murder of Cleitus, but does not include the murder of Philip in this list of alleged crimes (Arr. *Anab.* 4.14.2). Moreover,

to murder one's father was among the most heinous of crimes, calling down pollution not only on the perpetrator but also on the entire community (Mikalson 1991: 168–73). Aeschylus (*Suppl.* 707–9) lists reverence for parents as the third of the Laws of Justice. From any reasonable reading of the evidence, by the standards of his time Alexander was a pious man.[7] He offered daily sacrifices to a host of deities (Arr. *Anab.* 7.25.2–6) and special sacrifices before every important action: for example before crossing the Danube (Arr. *Anab.* 1.4.5), in the midst of the Hellespont (Arr. *Anab.* 1.11.6), once in Asia (Arr. *Anab.* 1.11.7–8) and before the Battle of Gaugamela (*FGrH* 124 F 36; Arr. *Anab.* 3.7.6). The king faithfully performed those religious practices associated with his homeland (Arr. *Anab.* 1.11.1; 4.8.1–2) and honoured many foreign deities as well. In Memphis, Alexander sacrificed to Apis (Arr. *Anab.* 3.1.4) and planned temples in Alexandria 'to both Greek gods and Egyptian Isis' and in Babylon to Bel, and, indeed, 'carried out all sacrifices suggested to him by the Chaldaean priests' (Arr. *Anab.* 3.16.5). Alexander believed in prophesy, holding in high regard Aristander of Telmissus (Arr. *Anab.* 1.11.2; 2.18.1, 26.4; 3.6.1; 4.4.3; Curt. 4.6.12, 13.15; 5.4.2; 7.7.8, 22–9). For someone imbued with belief, as Alexander was, a crime such as patricide would have been unthinkable. Even Zeus, the greatest of the Olympians, shied away from such an offence even given the greatest provocation.

The personal nature of the crime may explain why it succeeded in killing Philip, but failed in any possible loftier goals. The conspirators were more concerned with revenge than with the aftermath. The death of a Macedonian king at the hands of an aristocratic assassin was not uncommon (see Chapter 1). Most Macedonian monarchs lost their lives in palace intrigues. Amyntas II's death was even the result, at least in part, of a lovers' quarrel (Arist. *Pol.* 5.1311b). As Elizabeth Carney (1983: 272) has commented, 'attempted regicide was common because primogeniture was insecurely established, because the king's power was perceived as essentially personal rather than institutional, and because the Macedonian court preserved a rather explosive relationship between the monarch and young aristocrats [pederasty] which often led to violence'. If there was a conspiracy, then it was one of individuals with personal grievances. This was a matter of honour, whether the deed of one individual or of more. Again, as Aristotle states, 'when men are angry they mostly attack for the sake of revenge, not of ambition' (*Pol.* 5.1311a). Such a reason would explain why there seemed to be no follow-through, no great plan to put in place after the king's death. It was revenge. Philip's assassination caught Alexander by surprise. Brian Bosworth's thesis that the assassination was an attempt to liberate any Upper Macedonian state from Argead domination is without any real evidence

(Bosworth 1971: 93–105). Alexander's rapid accession to the throne is a testimony to his ability to make quick decisions, not to any participation in or foreknowledge of the event. Antipater's immediate reaction to the crime in proclaiming Alexander king was the response of a Macedonian patriot to the crisis. Delay would have led to problems not just in Macedonia but throughout the Greek world. As it was, Alexander had to more or less retrace his father's steps through the Greek world and beyond, re-establishing relationships. With respect to Antipater's support for Alexander, it was clear that of all the candidates for the throne, Alexander was the most capable. Amyntas Perdicca may have been a viable candidate, but, given the dearth of information concerning his activities other than his marriage during Philip's reign, very likely only as a figurehead for others. The lack of information regarding his career probably reflects the *lack* of a career, whether through an absence of ambition and ability or his early retirement from public affairs by his guardian Philip. It is doubtful that this lack of information is simply due to an oversight by our sources. Arrhidaeus, the half-brother of Alexander, as noted, was not very visable either, except later after Alexander's death as a prop for others. Antipater had the measure of the young Alexander. At just sixteen years of age Alexander had been regent of Macedonia and he led the charge that destroyed the Theban Sacred Band at Chaeronea. Antipater had cultivated his favour as the likely heir while Philip lived. There was no conspiracy here, just the reactions of two very competent and gifted leaders.

Notes

Philip II: A Chronology

1 Diodorus mistakenly says Pythodoros. There were three archons by this name; the closest to the time of Philip was archon 404/403. Arrian records the archon's name as Pythodemos, who is not found among the Athenian archons.
2 On the date, see Cawkwell 1962B: 34–40.
3 See above. The year 356 began on July 14 (Bickerman 1968: 119).
4 There is an inscription recording this treaty which is dated the eleventh day of the first prytany (first tenth of the Athenian year) in the archonship of Elpines (356/355) (*GHI* 53 ll. 4–5). This would give a date of 24 July. Athenian months began with the new moon which occurred on 14 July in 356 (Bickerman 1968/1969: 119).
5 For the date, see D. H. Amm. 1. 4.
6 See Greswell 2012 (1862): 66–7.
7 For the date, 18 Elaphebolion, see Rhodes and Osborne 2007: 322–3. The new moon of this month in 346 occurred on 29 March (Bickerman 1968: 119).
8 Dem. 19.58.
9 Dem. 19.58.
10 Dem. 19.59.
11 The seventh of Metageitnion (Plut. *Cam*. 19.5). The new moon occurred on 24 August (Bickerman 1968/1969: 119).

Philip the Great: An Introduction

1 Pompeius Trogus may have been the first to refer to Philip as 'the Great' (Prolog. 7, 8).
2 Hammond and Griffith 1979: 192; Ritter 2002: 139, 143.
3 Gabriel 2010.
4 Hammond 1972: 430–41; King 2018: 10–12.
5 See Philip II: A Chronology.
6 See Borza 1990: 185–6; King 2018: 58–9.
7 Greenwalt 1989: 37–44; Hammond 1972: 1.15.
8 Carney 2000: 40–6; 2006: 154, n. 91; Papazoglou 1965: 150; Bosworth 1971: 99; Ellis 1976: 42, 249–50; Badian 1982: 103.

9 Ellis 1976: 303, n. 23; Worthington 2008: 178; Anson 2004: 44, n. 47; 2015: 50–1.

10 'Attalus, now, was the girl's uncle, and being in his cups, he called upon the Macedonians to ask of the gods that from Philip and Cleopatra there might be born a legitimate successor to the kingdom . . . Philip rose up against [Alexander] with drawn sword, but, fortunately for both, his anger and his wine made him trip and fall. Then Alexander, mocking over him, said: "Look now, men! here is one who was preparing to cross from Europe into Asia; and he is upset in trying to cross from couch to couch"' (Plut. *Alex.* 9.7–10). Philip had clearly passed out, given that Alexander could stand over him and say what he did.

11 Greenwalt (1989: 27) argues convincingly that Amyntas was polygamous and that these two wives overlapped. Philip himself had seven wives without a divorcing any of them (Satyrus 631 F-21=Athen. 13.557b–e).

12 See Hammond and Griffith 1979: 699–700.

13 See also Carney 2000: 47.

14 On the career of Eumenes of Cardia, see Anson 2015A.

15 These are collected in Felix Jacoby's *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* as Theopompus *FGrH* 115; and Ian Worthington's *Brill's New Jacoby* as *BNJ* 115.

16 Ronald Syme (1988: 358–71; 1992: 11–20) holds for the fourth century; Yardley and Heckel (1997: 10–13) support the second-century dating.

17 See Shrimpton 1991: xv–xviii; Hammond 1994: 12–16; Worthington 2008: 212–13.

18 A phratry was a division of one of the four old ethnic tribes of Athens, which at the time of Philip served mostly as a religious association with a designated shrine. Prior to Cleisthenes' reforms of 508, enrolment in a phratry determined Athenian citizenship.

19 Davidson (1997: 40) suggests that Greek wine may have had a higher alcohol content because they tended to be sweet.

20 The following partial list comes from one created by F. S. Naiden and presented at the conference on *The Courts of Philip II and Alexander the Great: Monarchy and Power in Ancient Macedonia*, held on the campus of the University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada, 2–4 May 2018: Arr. *Anab.* 1.25.4; 2.6.1, 7.3–9, 16.8–18.1, 25.1–3; 3.9.3–4, 5–8; 5.25.2–28.1, 28.2–3; 6.2.1; 7.25.2, 4, 5; Curt. 3.5.11–6.3, 7.8–10; 3.10.4–7; 4.11, 13.4–11, 17–20, 37; 5.4.1, 6.1, 13.4–5; 6.2.18–21, 7.17, 8.1–17, 11.9–33; 7.5.9–12, 7.5–29; 8.6.28–8.8.20; 9.6.4–26, 7.14.

21 Dietler and Hayden 2001: 3; Wright 2004: 133.

22 Plutarch also states that all the saved priests in Thebes were guest-friends of the 'Macedonians'. Were they saved because they were priests or because they were guest-friends? Another curiosity is that given the brevity of Alexander's reign, would these not be Philip's guest-friends rather than Alexander's?

23 With respect to this action, Jacek Rzepka (2004: 162–3) states, 'When Philip captured the city, he punished the Achaeans in a perfidious way: the Achaeans were obliged to impose a death penalty on all the members of [the] garrison and their commandant.'

24 There are also indications of this in other sources although not as starkly stated as in Strabo. Alexander had ordered Antipater to bring the new Macedonian recruits and himself to Alexander in Babylon, where Alexander remained until his death, and Craterus was to proceed to replace Antipater in Macedonia (Arr. *Anab.* 7.12.4; Just. 12.12.9). Also, after Alexander's death, the new regency government remained in Babylon until drawn to the west by the insubordination of certain of the conqueror's successors there (Plut. *Eum.* 3; Diod. 18.16.1).

25 See Anson 2013: 134–6.

26 Arr. *Anab.* 4.22.6; 5.19.4; Diod. 17.95.5; Curt. 9.3.23.

27 See Stoneman 2008.

28 The authenticity of this speech in Arrian has been challenged by many (e.g. Wüst 1953/4: 177–88; Carney 1996: 29, 33, 38). Elizabeth Carney (1996: 33) argues, 'We need not believe a word of any of the speeches included in our surviving sources . . . like most speeches preserved in ancient historical writers, these deserve little credence,' and A. B. Bosworth proclaims this particular speech 'an absurdity' (1988: 108). D. B. Nagle (1996: 151–72) has declared that 'the substance of the speech was spoken by Alexander at Opis' (152), but that it was a piece of propaganda summarizing the 'official version of Philip's reign' and hence not necessarily reflective of reality (153, 169–70). Hammond (1999: 249–50) correctly accepts the content of the speech. It fits the situation which is a serious questioning of Alexander's authority by his long-suffering veterans. The content is accurate and clearly reflects a Macedonian perspective. The concluding emphasis on the glory of Philip's achievements also presents what would clearly be Alexander's view of the world (on Alexander's obsession with personal glory, see Anson 2020 (forthcoming)). Without a doubt, these are not verbatim transcriptions, but are meant to dramatize the material, often to serve as editorials by the author, and always to demonstrate the rhetorical skills of the historian in whose text they occur. In the latter case, even where a speech had appeared in a work being used by one of our surviving sources, the historian would still likely rewrite the material to exhibit his own stylistic ability (Brunt 1983: 529). While special care needs to be taken with respect to these rhetorical flourishes, they are part of our surviving narrative. That surviving narrative itself is subject to the same framing, selection of material, interpretation and interpolation as are the speeches. As a consequence, while great care should be taken in accepting this material, each speech should be analyzed on its own merits.

29 Translation is from the Loeb Classical Library.

1 Macedonia before Philip

1 After the defeat and retreat of the Persians after 479, Alexander I moved the traditional border of Macedonia to the Strymon (Hdt. 5.17.2; cf. 8.116).
2 Hammond 1981: 199.
3 Liddel and Scott s. v. μηκεδανός.
4 See King 2018: 16–60 on the history of Macedonia prior to the sons of Amyntas III.
5 Borza 1982: 1–20; 1987: 32–52; 1990: 50–7; Hammond 1972: 93, 312, 411; Hammond and Griffith 1979: 69–73.
6 Meiggs 1982: 126–9; Psoma 2014: 134–44.
7 Diod. 16.8.1; Dell 1963: 62–99; 1970: 115–26; Hammond and Griffith 1979: 14–31, 650–6.
8 See Hammond and Griffith 1979: 177; King 2018: 58.
9 Arist. *Pol.* 5.8.1311b; Borza 1990: 150–1, 163–4.
10 See Hammond and Griffith: 1979: 56–64; Borza 1990: 87. According to Strabo (7.7.8–9; 9.5.11), a geographer of the early Roman imperial period, the tribes that came to inhabit Upper Macedonia were not Macedonian at all, but from the western neighbouring area of Epirus. However, Thucydides (2.99.2) clearly saw these groups as different Macedonian tribes in an ethnic sense.
11 For the many differences in the literary Homeric kingship and real Macedonian one, see Carlier 2000: 259–68.
12 On the cultural commonalities, see Anson 2015A: 213–40.
13 Tomlinson 1987: 305–12.
14 While Hammond (1995: 126, n. 20) argues on the basis of Thucydides 4.124.1, 'Perdiccas meanwhile marched . . . to Lyncus . . . [leading] a force of Macedonians . . . and a body of Hellenic hoplites domiciled in that country,' that these Greeks migrants maintained their identity, A. W. Gomme (1974: 612) rightly sees these 'Hellenic hoplites' as coming from the independent Greek coastal cities, such as Pydna.
15 Hammond and Griffith 1979: 157; Borza 1987: 39–40; 1982: 11–12; Hatzopoulos 1996A: 43.
16 Psoma 2014: 134–44.
17 Ducat 1990: 31–3.
18 Ducat 1990: 35.
19 See Garlan 1988: 95.
20 See Garlan 1988: 104.
21 Hatzopoulos (1996A: 431–5) argues that the king was only the trustee of the 'people's' money. Even if this were technically true, there is no evidence of any formal regulatory body overseeing or disciplining the king.
22 While it appears unlikely, Anthemus may not have been in Amyntas I's possession at the time (Hatzopoulos 1996A: 174).

23 Thuc. 4.83.4; Dem. 18.211, 244; 19.44, 113, 150, 235, 330; Aeschin. 2.85, 109; 3.63, 67–8, 71, 74.

24 Dem. 18.25, 27, 30, 32; 19.20, 44; Aeschin. 2.83, 129.

25 Pausanias (10.3.3, 8.2) states that the two votes were given to the Macedonians. However, Pausanias wrote 500 years after the events he is describing, whereas Demosthenes and Speusippas were contemporaries, and Diodorus is here likely following a fourth-century source (Markle 1994: 69).

26 On this letter, see Markle 1974; Natoli 2004.

27 Arr. *Anab.* 3.16.9; 5.3.6; 6.3.2; 7.25.2; Plut. *Alex.* 23.2; Diod. 17.16.3, 18.1; Just. 7.2.9–12; 9.4.1; on this topic in general, see Naiden 2019.

28 Schol. Dem. *Olyn.* 1.5; Aristid. *Or.* 38.480; cf. Just. 9.7.11; 11.2.1; Diod. 18.28.4; Hammond 1970: 64–7.

29 Perdiccas, Philip and Alcetas were all sons of Alexander I (Thuc. 1.57.3; Diod. 15.60.3; Gomme 1945: 202). Philip is described in Thucydides as possessing an ἀρχή along the western border of Macedonia (Thuc. 2.100.3), and Alcetas another (Pl. *Gorg.* 471A–B). As Gomme (1945: 202) notes, it is unclear whether this arrangement was made by their father Alexander or by Perdiccas, but given the difficulties Perdiccas had with his brothers, it is most likely that the former is the case.

30 Later the Thracian king Sitalces made peace with Perdiccas I and withdrew with his candidate (Diod 12.51.2).

31 Pausanias may have been a son of Archelaus I, who had earlier in 368 attempted to usurp the throne (Aeschin. 2.27). Hammond, in Hammond and Griffith 1979: 175–6 (see also Heskel 1996: 39–40), argues that Argaeus was one of the three sons of King Archelaus who may have ruled with Illyrian support as Argaeus II from 393/2 to 392/1 (Diod. 14.92.4; Euseb. *Chron.* 200.11).

32 It is also possible that Archelaus' death was due to an accident (Diod. 14.37.6), but see Borza (1990: 177) and Hammond (Hammond and Griffith 1979: 167–8), who prefer Aristotle's account.

33 Orestes, the son of Archelaus, is also reported to have been killed by his guardian (Diod. 14.37.6), but Eusebius does not include Orestes in his listing of 'the Kings of the Macedonians'.

34 See Appendix 2.

35 Bosworth (1980: 160) argues that a reference in this passage to Calas being sent to Thrace implies that there were armed factions and conflict immediately after Philip's death. This appears unlikely.

36 Hdt. 5.19.1–2; 7.173.3; 8.136.1, 139.1, 140a. 1; 9.144.1; Just. 7.4.1.

37 See Ogden 1999: xix–xx, 3–40; 2011: 99–104; Howe, Müller and Stoneman 2017: 114–17.

38 One of the 'offences' claimed as being committed by Alcibiades was incest with his sister (Lys. 14.28, 41).

39 Carney 2000: 21.

40 Howe, Mūller and Stoneman 2017: 114–17.

41 See the Introduction.

42 On the importance of Cleopatra in the early Diadoch era, see Meeus 2009: 63–88.

43 In another reference to *tutor*, Justin makes it clear that he is using the term as guardian, not regent. Justin 28.3.9 refers to Antigonus as *tutor* for Demetrius II's young son Philip, but makes it very clear that Antigonus (Doson) was already acting as king. 'Antigonus, being appointed his "*tutor*," and marrying his mother, did his utmost to get himself made king. But sometime after, being besieged in the palace by an alarming insurrection of the Macedonians, he walked forth publicly unattended by his guards, and *throwing his diadem and purple robe among the mob*, bade them "give those to somebody else, who either knew not how to rule them, or whom they knew how to obey; for that he had found regal authority enviable, not for its pleasures, but for its toils and dangers." He then mentioned his own services; "how he had punished the defection of their allies; how he had put down the Dardanians and Thessalians, when they were in exultation at the death of king Demetrius; how he had not only maintained the honor of the Macedonians, but added to it. Yet, if they were displeased at such services, he was ready to resign the government, and to return what they had conferred upon him; and they themselves might look out for a prince whom they could govern." The people, overcome with shame, bade him resume the regal authority; but he refused to do so till the leaders of the insurrection were delivered up to punishment.' It can be noted that this member of this new Antigonid dynasty did marry his predecessor's wife and did preserve the life of his ward, the future Philip V.

44 Lewis and Short, s.v. 'tutor'.

45 For the date, Griffith 1970: 69–72, 79; Greenwalt 1984: 70; contra, Ehrhardt 1967: 296–301.

46 Hatzopoulos 1986: 281 argues that Gygaea and her sons were set aside; but Greenwalt (1989: 27) argues convincingly that Amyntas was polygamous and that these two wives overlapped.

47 Diod. 15.71.1; [Marsyas] *BNJ* 135/136 F3=Athen. 14.629d; cf. Dem 19.194–5. Whether Ptolemy directly assassinated him (Diod. 15.71.1), or was in some way responsible (*BNJ* [Marsyas] 135/6 F3=Athen. 14.629d), Ptolemy appears to have been behind the assassination.

48 Hammond and Griffith 1979: 409; Rzepka 2008: 49–50.

49 Hammond 1990: 266; Griffith 1972: 401.

50 Bosworth (1995: 90–1) argues that Arrian 'does not state in so many words that the pages originated with Philip'. Even Bosworth's translation of the passage – 'It had been customary since the time of Philip' – does not appear very ambiguous.

51 Stobaeus (*Flor.* 13.8), a fifth-century AD collector of 'valuable and instructive' sayings, records the incident as taking place not with either king, but rather with Antipater, Alexander's and subsequently his heirs' regent.

52 On Philip's wounds, see Riginos 1994: 103–19. For discussion of the close connection between the Macedonian king and his troops, see Carney 1996: 28–31.

53 Diod. 18.2.2; Plut. *Mor.* 337d; Just. 13.2.11; 14.5.2; App. *Syr.* 52; cf. Badian 1964: 264; Greenwalt 1984: 69–77.

54 Barsine had been captured in Damascus by Parmenion and subsequently had become intimate with Alexander (Curt. 3.13.14; Plut. *Alex.* 21.7; Just. 11.10.2). Heracles had been the result of this liaison (Curt. 10.6.11; Diod. 20.20.1). Diodorus lists his age in 310 as seventeen (Justin (15.2.3) says fifteen).

55 At one time I believed (Anson 1985B: 303–16; 1991: 230–47) that there was a bit more formality in the process, but the evidence, however, suggests that there was no formal or usually even an informal meeting of the so-called *principes*, but rather a far more amorphous process in which powerful personalities dominated.

56 It has been claimed that Alexander staged the episode at the Hyphasis because he wished to turn around, but was afraid he would be held responsible for not conquering all the way to the ocean (Spann 1999: 62–74; Heckel 2003: 147–74). For an endorsement of our sources' explanation, see Anson 2015B: 65–74.

57 Curt. 10.2.12–4.3; Arr. *Anab.* 7.8.1–11.9; Diod. 17.109.1–3; Just. 12.11.1–12.12; Plut. *Alex.* 71.2–9.

58 W. Schwahn (1931: 313) correctly assumes that while both were royal, Philip was to rule until Alexander came of age. This would appear to follow from Diodorus 18.57.2, where Polyperchon invites Olympias to return to Macedonia 'to take charge of the son of Alexander, and to assume responsibility for him until he should become of age and receive his father's kingdom'.

59 Granier 1931: 87–8; Aymard 1950: 115–37; Briant 1973: 297–9; Hammond and Griffith 1979: 390–2; Hatzopoulos 1996A: 271–6; Landucci Gattinoni 2003: 43.

60 Curt. 6.2.21, 9.1, 28, 36, 11.8, 9; 7.1.5, 2.1, 3; 7.2.6, 11; 9.1.1, 2.12; 10.2.18, 3.1, 6, 5.11, 7.3, 13, 8.7.

61 The dating here is controversial. See Anson 2006: 1–8; 2015A: 206–12; Boiy 2007A; 2010: 1–13.

62 Polyperchon was appointed by the previous holder of that office, Antipater, prior to that individual's death in 319 (Diod. 18.48.4–5, 49.1; cf. Plut. *Phoc.* 31.1; *Eum.* 12.1; Just. 14.5.5.Anson 2014: 83).

63 Justin calls the meeting a *contio*, but this is without significance. Justin (11.2.8) also calls an Athenian Assembly a *contio*. In general on this trial and others, see Anson 2008A.

64 Curt. 6.9.23; Arr. *Anab.* 3.26.2; Diod. 17.79.6, 80.1; Plut. *Alex.* 49.9–12.

65 Curt. 7.1.10; Arr. *Anab.* 3.27.1–2; Just. 11.7.1–2; 12.14.1.

66 Curt. 7.1.5–9, 8.8.6; Arr. *Anab.* 1.25.3–9; Diod. 17.32.1, 80.2; Just. 11.7.1–2, 12.14.1. Diodorus Siculus (17.32.1) suggests that the Lyncestian was not even arrested until almost a year after his involvement in the Persian plot.

67 Diodorus Siculus (17.80.1) and Curtius (6.11.39) state that Parmenion was convicted by the same assembly that found Philotas guilty. However, Arrian (*Anab.* 3.26.4), following Ptolemy, relates that Alexander had that commander killed either because he could not believe that he had not been involved in the conspiracy or because he might react violently to the death of his son. In either case, in Ptolemy's account of the incident there was no guilty verdict on the part of Parmenion. Badian (1960: 324–38) argues solely on the supposition that the death of the father was the ultimate goal of Alexander's trial of Philotas.

68 Bauman (1990: 133) assumes that Amyntas the son of Perdiccas III stood trial, but there is no evidence of any adjudication (Curt. 6.9.17, 10.24).

69 Arr. *Anab.* 7.8.1–12.4; Diod. 17.108.3, 109.1–3; Plut. *Alex.* 71.1–5; Just. 12.11.5–12.10; Curt. 10.2.8, 4.2.

2 Philip II and the New Model Army

1 While Justin (7.5.9) states that the dead king Perdiccas' son Amyntas became king and Philip his regent ('*tutor*'), this is an error. See Chapter 1.

2 While it is generally believed that Bardylis was the king of the Illyrian Dardanians (for example, Ellis 1980: 38; 1976: 45, 48; Hammond 1966: 239–53), Fanula Papazoglu (1978: 137, n. 18) believes that the Dardanians and Illyrians were two different peoples. Appian, however, says that those called Illyrians by the Greeks included all peoples who dwell beyond the borders of Macedonia and Thrace all the way to the Danube (App. *Ill.* 1.1).

3 Militiades Hatzopoulos (1982: 21–42) has argued that the battle and Philip's accession occurred in 360, but see Hammond 1994: 196–7, n. 12. See Philip II: A Chronology.

4 John Wilkes' (1992: 87) view probably best states the circumstances: 'The idea of major undifferentiated peoples such as Celts, Dacians, Thracians and Illyrians still remains useful as a general concept but attempts to define more precisely such groups lead to confusion and disintegration. . . . In the case of the Illyrians the tendency of modern historical and linguistic researches has been to define Illyrians as a name applied by Greeks to a group of Indo-European-speaking peoples in Albania and Montenegro.'

5 During the reign of Aeropus I (Just. 7.2–12) or Argaeus II (I?) (Polyaen. 4.1).

6 For a recent review, see Frigo 2007: 118.

7 See Greenwalt 1989: 37–44; Carney 2000: 40–1.

8 Diodorus (15.61.1) places this event in the archon year 369/368.
9 Justin (7.5.3) associates this event with Diodorus' description of those of 383.
10 See McQueen 1995: 63.
11 Alexander ruled for three years and Philip was a hostage for three years and was only freed after Perdiccas III came to the throne in 365.
12 See McQueen 1995: 63; Frigo 2007: 118–19.
13 Gomme 1974: 612.
14 Hammond 1995: 126, n. 20.
15 Markle 1977: 326–7.
16 Hammond 1972: 93, 312, 411; Hammond and Griffith 1979: 69–73; Borza 1990: 53–4; King 2018: 31–3.
17 J. R. Ellis 1980: 53, 58; Griffith 1980: 59; cf. G. T. Griffith, in Hammond and Griffith 1979: 421.
18 Markle 1978: 483, 486–9; cf. Markle 1977: 323.
19 Hammond 1994: 137; Hammond and Griffith 1979: 583.
20 Hammond 1994: 136–7 concludes that Philip was wounded by one of his own soldiers, apparently basing this argument on the description of the weapon as a *sarissa*. However, the weapon may have been a long thrusting spear employed by one of the Triballi (see above), or the use by Didymus of the term *sarissa* could then simply be anachronistic.
21 His conclusions have been challenged by Stylianou (1998: 346), who states that Best has not made sufficient allowance for 'artistic license'. In reviewing the evidence that Best presents, the artistic representations appear to be purely descriptive. The depictions are correct in other respects and the presentation of thrusting spears appears natural.
22 Griffith (1981: 162–6), arguing from the absence of any such references in Xenophon, suggests that to meet the Egyptians 'longer spears' Iphicrates' innovation was to lengthen his hoplites' spears accordingly.
23 Most recently on combined arms, see Wrightson 2019.
24 Less than two years after Philip's death, Alexander took 12,000 Macedonian infantry and 1,800 cavalry to Asia, leaving behind with his regent Antipater 12,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry.
25 For this letter, see Natoli 2004: 108. The letter is generally thought by scholars to be authentic, even called by one, 'unhappily authentic' (Brunt 1993: 292). For a full bibliography, see Natoli 2004: 17, n. 11.
26 Diodorus (15.77.5) states that Perdiccas ruled for five years, counting incorrectly from the assassination of his regent Ptolemy of Alorus, and at the beginning of his reign Philip returned to Macedonia. His predecessor, Alexander II, ruled for three years and was assassinated in 368 by his brother-in-law Ptolemy of Alorus, who was subsequently assassinated by his ward and king, Perdiccas, in 365 (Diod. 15.71.1;

[Marsyas] *BNJ* 135/136 F ll=Athen. 14.629d). On Ptolemy of Alorus, see Anson 2009A: 280–3.

27 Ellis 1976: 46. Hammond 1994: 18–19 states without evidence that Perdiccas gave Philip the 'King's forces, consisting of excellent cavalry and hoplite infantry'.

28 Diodorus does not mention the Thracian king by name, and while Griffith (Hammond and Griffith 1979: 208) believes that Cotys was already dead and had been succeeded by his three sons, Ellis (1976: 250, n. 5) is surely correct that the former was still alive, but was assassinated in 359, thus forestalling the proposed invasion.

29 For the date, see Hammond and Griffith 1979: 59.

30 Nicoli Machiavelli remarks in his *The Art of War* (1965: 45) that 'the Macedonian phalanx was like the Swiss regiments of today'. See Kurz 1962: esp. 69–135; Miller and Embleton 1979: 13–17.

31 Richards 2002: 8–9, 19–22, 63.

32 Oman 1969, repr. 1924: 254–5; Snook 1998: 24.

33 Tallett 1992: 23–4.

34 On the nature of warfare with pikes in the late Middle Ages and early modern period, see Oman 1969, repr. 1924: 252–80; Tallett 1992: 21–8; Jurz 1977; Albi de La Cuesta 1999.

35 Oman 1969, repr. 1924: 255–6. Machiavelli, however, pointed out the vulnerability of the pikemen when not supported by heavily armed swordsmen and arquebusmen (1965: 49, 51–2).

36 Milns 1971: 187–8.

37 As the later Argyraspids of the Age of the Successors, they also engaged in such activities (Diod. 19.43.1). These troops were in fact the same troops as Philip's Hypaspists (Anson 1981: 117–20).

38 The date again comes from Hammond (1992A: 367–8).

39 Hammond in Hammond and Griffith 1979: 175–6.

40 See Heskel 1996: 39–40.

41 See Frigo 2007: 119; McQueen 1995/2001: 65.

42 Just. 8.3.10–11; cf. Just. 7.4.5; Philip's father had two wives and three sons by each (Ellis 1973: 350–4; Hammond and Griffith 1979: 699–701).

43 See Borza 1987: 45–7; Meiggs 1982: 118–32, 487–8.

44 See Heskel 1996: 37–56.

45 For the date, see Diod. 12.75.1 (421/420).

46 On the battle, see Hammond 1989: 1–9; Anson 2010B: 51–68; 2008B: 17–30; 2017: 484–5.

47 On the date, see the Chronology.

48 Milns 1971: 187–8; Markle 1977: 323, 329; Anson 2010A: 82–3.

49 Buckler 2003: 289–93; Buckler and Beck 2008: 111–28.

50 Worthington (2008: 42) rejects Demosthenes' information.
51 See Kern 1999: 198–9; Keyser 1994: 27–49.
52 On this wound, see Müller 2008: 469–87.
53 Marsden 1971: 21, 61, 68–77, 98, 270, diagrams 1 and 5; Kern 1999: 177.
54 Marsden 1971: 56–9, 270.
55 Schramm 1928: 216–17; Marsden 1969: 48–52; Garlan 1974: 19–153; Keyser 1994: 35–8.
56 On the duration, see Demosthenes, *On the Chersonese* 8.14; on the date, see D. H. *Amm.* 11.
57 While found in Demosthenes' corpus and accepted as one of his speeches by Dionysius of Haricarnassus, modern opinion, based on analyses of the style, vocabulary and other internal evidence, believes that the speech was given by Hegesippus, a contemporary of Demosthenes and a supporter of his anti-Philip policies (see Trevett 2011: 113).
58 See Anson 1985A: 247–8; 2013: 55–6.
59 On the Third Sacred War, see Chapter 5; Buckler 1989; Hammond 1994: 45–8; Worthington 2008: 62–6.
60 On the nature of sacred wars, see Pownall 1998: 35–55.
61 Initially the Phocians had kept the sacred treasury intact, but probably early in 354 they saw that the only way to conduct the war successfully would be to employ large numbers of mercenaries which their resources alone could not provide (Diod. 16.28.2, 39.1, 56.5–7).
62 Pausanias (10.2.5) reports that the Phocian commander was killed by his own troops; Diodorus (16.35.5) states that he was hanged or crucified, perhaps after his death (16.61.2); Eusebius (*Praep. Evang.* 8.14.33) states that he did drown.
63 Diod. 16.86; Polyaen. 4.2.2, 7; Just. 9.3.8, 4–11; Frontin. *Strat.* 2.1.9; Plut. *Pelop.* 18.5; *Cam.* 19.5; Dem. 18.237; cf. Arrian *Ars Tactica* 16.6–7. Modern discussions: Anson 2017: 480–95; Hammond 1938, recounted briefly in Hammond 1994: 151–4; Pritchett 1958: 307–11, pls. 80, 81; Markle 1977: 338–9; Cawkwell 1978C: 144–9; Worthington 2008: 147–51; Buckler and Beck 2008: 254–8; Ma 2008: 72–91; Sabin 2009: 125–8.
64 While Diodorus (16.85.5) states that Philip waited for his allies to arrive before proceeding to battle, it is likely that these were light-armed troops. When Alexander proceeded to Asia in 334 his army consisted of 12,000 Macedonian infantry and 1,800 cavalry, with an equal number of troops left behind in Macedonia (Diod. 17.17.3–4). Also, at the Battle of Crocus Field, Philip's force combined with the Thessalians numbered 20,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry (Diod. 16.35.4). It is unlikely that the Thessalians supplied heavy infantry, but they did supply a substantial cavalry force.
65 McQueen (1995: 160) estimates that the allies had 25,000 hoplites; Worthington (2008: 147) says 30,000 hoplites and 3,800 cavalry. All we know for sure is that the

Theban Sacred Band was present (Plut. *Pelop.* 18.5) and 15,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry from the Euboeans, Achaeans, Corinthians, Thebans, Megarians, Leucadians and Corcyraeans, 'not counting their citizen-soldiery' (Dem. 18.237).

66 It should be remembered that it is at the battle site of Chaeronea that the first actual spear heads associated with the *sarissa* were found (Sotiriades 1903: 301–30).

3 Philip and the Creation of the Macedonian Nation

1 On the establishment of the chancellery by Philip, see Anson 1996: 501–4.

2 Recently Waldemar Heckel (2017: 73–4) has examined the evidence for regional conflict after the unification and has likewise found none.

3 Bosworth 1971: 101–2.

4 In general, with respect to 'spear-won' land, see Funck 1978: 45–55; Mehl 1980–1: 173–212.

5 See Rebel 1983: 3–4.

6 See Ellis 1976: 34; Billows 1995: 9–11; Hammond 1993: 19–20.

7 See Hammond and Griffith 1979: 558.

8 Dell 1970: 121–2; Hammond and Griffith 1979: 654.

9 The relationship between the coastal cities and the Macedonian kings was complicated. Pydna, at least, had been part of the Macedonian king's domains during much of the fifth century (Thuc. 1.137.1; Plut. *Them.* 25–6; Diod. 13.49.1–2) and well into the fourth (*cf.*, Isoc. 15.113).

10 Justin (6.8.1) even records that Philip II increased city populations with prisoners of war.

11 See Hammond and Griffith: 1979: 358.

12 See evidence collected by Griffith (Hammond and Griffith 1979: 356–7; cf. Hatzopoulos 1996A: 180).

13 See also Hammond and Griffith 1979: 361–2; Papazoglou 1988: 105–6.

14 See Billows 1995: 146–69.

15 See Skydsgaard 1988: 78–82. Cf. Howe 2008. Vitruvius (*De Arch.* 2, Pref. 3) has Alexander put forth the maxim about ancient Greek cities. 'For as a newborn babe cannot be nourished without the nurse's milk, nor conducted to the approaches that lead to growth in life, so a city cannot thrive without fields and the fruits thereof pouring into its walls, nor have a large population without plenty of food, nor maintain its population without a supply of it.' Aristander, according to Arrian (*Anab.* 3.2.2), said of the founding of Alexandria in Egypt that the city would be prosperous 'especially in the fruits of the earth'.

16 See Skydsgaard 1988: 78–82 and earlier in this chapter.

17 Huntington 1968: 375; Ellis 1969B: 12–15; Prosterman and Riedinger 1987: 10; Migdal 1974: 158–9, 201. For specific studies, see especially Harvey 1998 and Wiegersma 1988.
18 In general, see Ellis 1969B: 9–16; Hatzopoulos 1996A: 70.
19 Translation is from Yardley 1994: 84. Brian Bosworth's contention that Justin only refers to 'a redistribution within existing settlements' is not borne out by the text (1973: 250). See Hammond and Griffith 1979: 661, n. 2.
20 A point noted by Hatzopoulos 1996A: 270.
21 In this incident nothing is mentioned of his proclaimed divine father Zeus Ammon (on Alexander's claimed ties to divinity, see Anson 2013: 83–120) – and for good reason. Alexander's adoption of many non-Macedonian practices had engendered dissatisfaction from virtually all sectors of the Macedonian military (Anson 2013: 157–9, 166–72).
22 The role of women in Argead politics has been carefully examined by Elizabeth Carney (1992; 1995; 2000; 2006).
23 These are collected by Erskine 1989: 385–8.
24 Griffith (Hammond and Griffith 1979: 439, n. 1, 705) believes that Demosthenes is here confusedly referring to the *Hetairoi*, but Demosthenes gave this speech in 349 and the Athenians had been at war with Philip since 357. Even though this passage is followed by clear allusions to Philip's *Hetairoi*, it is unlikely that after three years of conflict Demosthenes would be unaware of the true nature of the *Pezhetairoi*. Moreover, this speech would have been edited by its presenter prior to publication.
25 Develin 1985: 493–6; Griffith (Hammond and Griffith) 1979: 707–9; Errington 1990: 243–4; Hatzopoulos 1996A: 269–70.
26 As was seen in the note at the end of the Introduction, this speech is discounted by Carney (1996: 33) and many others as being unworthy of credence. While the actual words probably do owe much to Arrian, what it claims for Alexander's father is accurate as indicated in this chapter (see also Anson 2013: 44–52, 66–71).
27 Dietler and Hayden 2001: 3; Wright 2004: 133.
28 Adams 1986: 43–52.
29 The turning of hostility towards Philip may have been heightened, since Attalus was in Asia Minor leading Philip's advance force in Asia and unavailable for retribution.

4 Philip II and the Safeguarding of Macedonia

1 On the problem of modern and ancient definitions of similar terms, see Rubincam 1992.
2 See Anson 2015: 43, 45–6.
3 On *proxenia* in general, see Perlman 1958: 185–91.

4 One of the stranger examples of this hereditary factor is found in the *proxenia* of Alcibiades, who represented the interests of the Spartans at the same time he was encouraging the dissolution of the Peace of Nicias and the formation of an anti-Spartan alliance in the Peloponnesus (Thuc. 5.43.2).
5 See Appendix 1.
6 *GHI* 30.l.3, 50.ll.9, 11, 12, 67; 1: l.23, 76.ll. 5, 10–11; see Errington 1974: 20–1, 36–7.
7 See Chapter 3.
8 On guest friendship and city-state politics, see Mitchell 2002; Herman 2002.
9 'Citizenship belongs to persons of citizen parentage on both sides, and they are registered on the rolls of their demes at the age of eighteen. At the time of their registration the members of the deme make a decision about them by vote on oath, first whether they are shown to have reached the lawful age, and if they are held not to be of age they go back again to the boys, and secondly whether the candidate is a freeman and of legitimate birth; after this, if the vote as to free status goes against him, he appeals to the jury-court, and the demesmen elect five men from among themselves to plead against him, and if it is decided that he has no claim to be registered, the state sells him, but if he wins, it is compulsory for the demesmen to register him' (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 46.1).
10 Bradeen 1955: 23–4.
11 Apollo Patroos was the founder of the Ionian race and was worshipped in Athens by the phratries and other kinship groups.
12 For the identification of the Perrhaebians as *penestai*, see Ducat 1994: 67, 97.
13 Hampl 1934: 37; Hammond and Griffith 1979: 656; Hammond 1988: 387.
14 Sprawski 2006.
15 Translation from Loeb Classical Library.
16 To get some idea of the complexity of Greek politics in the fourth century, an examination of Athenian and Theban relations is indicative. They were hostile to one another from 431 to 404, allies from 395 to 386, and again from 378 to 371, and then at war or on bad terms until 338.
17 On Thebes in the fourth century, see Bakhuizen, 1994: 307–30; Buckler and Beck 2008.
18 This individual may be the same one who requested dowries for his unmarried daughter from Alexander the Great after the Battle on the Granicus (Plut. *Mor.* 179ff.) and possibly also one of the three who after Alexander's death negotiated on behalf of the infantry with the cavalry (Curt. 10.8.15).
19 Earlier Philip had attempted to take the city, but had been thwarted (Dem. 18.244). His position after Chaeronea provided him with the opportunity to realize his previous goal.
20 The Eleians are also mentioned by Aelian, but they had not joined the Athenian coalition and were allies of Philip (Dem. 9.27, 18.295; Paus. 5.4.9). While Philip's

allies, they did not join him at Chaeronea (Paus. 5.4.9). It may have been for this reason that they had a garrison imposed on them (Diod. 17.3.5).

21 Hammond 1978: 336; 1989: 1–9; 1994: 182; cf. Antikas and Wynn-Antikas 2015: 682–92.

22 Many do accept the chronological nature of the passage. See Carney 2000: 60.

23 It has been argued that this structure was erected by Alexander III, not by Philip (Ellis 1976: 307, n. 58). The argument for Alexander comes from an interpretation of two passages in Curtius (9.6.26; 10.5.30) that state that Alexander wanted to immortalize his mother. This is not sufficient to overturn the plain statement of Pausanias.

24 On the Philippeum in general, see Palagia 2010: 33–41; Carney 2007B: 27–60.

25 Kings routinely arranged marriages for their relatives. Philip married his daughter Cleopatra to Alexander of Epirus (Diod. 16.91.4) and attempted to marry his son Arrhidaeus to a daughter of the Carian dynast Pixodarus (Plut. *Alex.* 10.1).

26 See Bosworth 1971: 98.

27 Satyrus (631 F-21=Athen.13.557b) places Phila after Audata.

28 Carney 2000: 59.

29 Accepted by Carney 2000: 60–1.

30 Satyrus BNJ 631 F-21=Athen. 13.557c. The actual Greek verb is οἰκειόω: to make a person a kinsman.

31 Ellis (1976: 212, 302, n. 10) suggests 352, but this seems to be too early. It is, of course, possible that Thessilonice was in her mid-thirties when she married for the first time and had her children in her later thirties, but this would appear less likely than late twenties when married and early thirties for her sons' births.

32 For this early date, see Griffith 1970. Much of the dating is based on Philip's marriage to Philinna of Larissa, by whom he had a son Arrhidaeus (Satyrus 631 F-21=Athen. 13.557c). Arrhidaeus was old enough in 337 to be sought in marriage by Pixodarus of Caria for his daughter and despite statements in the sources to the contrary, Philinna likely came from an Aleudae clan.

33 Griffith (1970: 68) rejects Hertlein's emendation of δὲ παρελθών for δ' ἐπανελθών of the original ms.

34 See Sordi 1958: 77; Graninger 2010: 310.

35 Stylianou 1998: 360–3, 418 places his acquisition of this title in 371/370, 'after Leuctra'.

36 On the Thessalian League, see Sordi: 1958; Bouchon and Helly 2015: 231–49.

37 King 2018: 60.

38 The death occurred in the archon year of 370/369 (Diod. 15.57.1; cf. Stylianou 1998: 421).

39 On the date, see Stylianou 1998: 420–1.

40 Graninger 2010: 312–13.

41 At the time of her birth her name was Polyxena; at her marriage to Philip, Myrtale; and later Stratonike, but most famously, Olympias (see Heckel 2006: 181).
42 On the Aeacidae, see S. Funke, *Aiakidenmythos und epeirotisches Königtum. Der Weg einer hellenischen Monarchie* (Stuttgart, 2000).
43 Alexander was born either in July 356 (Plut. *Alex.* 3.5) or in October of that year (Arr. *Anab.* 7.28.1).
44 For the time of Olympias' birth, see Carney 2006: 12. On the ideal age for a woman to marry, see Plut. *Mor.* 753a–b; Hes. *WD* 696–8.
45 Griffith (Hammond and Griffith 1979: 215) even suggests, without any real evidence, that part of Olympias' dowry was the Upper Macedonia kingdom or Orestis.
46 For those who accept the anecdote except for the 'love at first sight' element, see Greenwalt 2008: 85, and Cole 1984: 17.
47 See Ellis 1976: 166–7, 284, n. 37. On Meda, see Carney 2000: 68.
48 After Philip's death, Alexander made a demonstration against them, crossing the Danube and destroying their city (Arr. *Anab.* 1.3.5–1.4.5).
49 See Zahrnt 1971.
50 The Corinthian War was an attempt to break the Spartan hegemony. A coalition of Greek states, including Thebes, Athens, Corinth and Argos, was joined by the Persian Empire. The war stalemated, at which point the Spartans, who were also fighting to free the Greek cities of Asia from Persian control, decided that fighting on two fronts was too costly and came to terms with the Persians, doing much as they had done during the Peloponnesian War, turning from the liberators of Greeks from Athenian oppression to the betrayers of Greek freedom in return for Persian support. The new alliance with Persia forced the allies to submit to a peace dictated by Persian and Spartan interests. This peace became known as the King's Peace or the Peace of Antalcidas, the latter title honouring the Spartan who concluded the peace on behalf of the Spartans. Sparta was made the guarantor of the peace, a position which the Spartans aggressively used to interfere in the affairs of the Greek city-states. On the Corinthian War, see Hamilton 1979.
51 Cf. Diod. 15.28; see Rhodes and Osborne 2007: 98–112.
52 Isocrates (15.113) says he captured twenty-four Chalcidian cities and in fact inaccurately claims that he captured all of Chalcidice as well.
53 Plut. *Phoc.* 7.1, 11; Isoc. 7.2; 8.29; 15.123; [Dem.] 1.53; Dem. 8, 25; Aeschin. 2.71; for other forms of interference, see *GHI* 40; Athenian interest in regaining control of Amphipolis (Aeschin. 2.31), the capture of Pydna and Methone (Din. 1.14; 3.17; Dem. 4.4), and sending cleruchs to Potidaea, although not a member of the Confederacy (Tod 3.146), all created distrust among the members.
54 For these wars in the northern Aegean, see Heskel 1997; Buckler 2003: 351–77.
55 On the date, see Trevett 2011: 24.

56 Later there was even some who thought that 'the Athenians had given up Amphipolis to him, and that he has agreed to hand over Euboea to you' (Dem. 19.22, 326).
57 This individual may be that Argaeus who occupied the Macedonian throne in 385–383 (Ellis 1969A: 1–8), following the expulsion and before the return of Amyntas III (Diod. 14.92.4). Our sources do use the word 'restore' with respect to Argaeus (see Heskel 1996: 40).
58 For the date, see Heskel 1996: 42.
59 Antiphon has not been otherwise identified (Kirchner 1901: 1280), nor has Charidemus (Schmitz 2006: *Charídēmos*). He is not to be identified with the Charidemus, the mercenary commander from Oreus in Euboea, who was outside of Athenian employ from 360 until 357 (Dem. 23.149–50; Heckel 2006: 84).
60 Ian Worthington (2008: 41) regards the 'secret' treaty as 'an instance of oratical falsehood on the part of Demosthenes'.
61 De Sainte Croix (1963: 118) even suggests that the pact may have been a fiction invented by Philip.
62 See Ellis 1976: 63–4. Stratocles was subsequently exiled from the city. While it is generally believed that this decree was issued after the city's surrender to Philip, Errington (1990: 272–3) mentions the possibility that it may have been issued before the surrender.
63 For the date, see Martin 1981: 191.
64 See Bakhuisen 1994: 307–30.
65 Diodorus (16.6.1) places the start of the war in 358/357, and the conflict lasted only thirty days according to Aeschines (3.85). The war took place in 357. Diocles was the Athenian commander (Dem. 21.174) and he was general in 357/356 (*GHI* 48).
66 On this history, see Rhodes and Osborne 2003: 240–1; Cawkwell 1978A: 44–6; Brunt 1969: 247–8.
67 This relates to an aspect of the Athenian tax system in which a citizen nominated for a 'liturgy', and believing that an eligible and richer individual had been passed over, could challenge that person to undertake the burden or exchange properties.

5 The Creation of Macedonian Hegemony in the Wider World

1 On Eubulus' career, see Cawkwell 1963: 47–67.
2 In general on the war, see Buckler 1989.
3 On the date of the start of the war, see Green 2011: 364–6.
4 The Ortaeans or Aenianians, Boeotians, Dolopians, Dorians, Ionians, Achaeans, Locrians, Magnesians, Malians, Perrhaebians, Phocians, Pythians and the Thessalians (Aeschin. 2.116; Paus. 10.8.2).

5 On Sacred Wars in general, see Pownall 1998: 35–55.
6 See Gomme 1945: 337–8.
7 On the Thessalian League, see Westlake 1935; Bouchon and Helly 2015: 231–49.
8 Ritter 2002: 139, 143.
9 See Bouchon and Helly 2015: 231–40; *GHI* 2007: 222–3.
10 While the year is not given, it would appear that this power was conferred prior to Philip's incursion in 352, for Justin (8.2.1) states, 'To oppose Onomarchus, the Thebans and Thessalians chose as general, not one of their own people, lest they should not be able to endure his rule if he should conquer, but Philip, king of Macedonia, voluntarily submitting to that power from a foreigner which they dreaded in the hands of their own countrymen.'
11 Roebuck 1948: 79; Müller 2010: 173.
12 These would then be similar to the narrow oligarchies created in many of the cities of the former Athenian Empire by the Spartan Lysander after the Battle of Aegespotami (Xen. *Hell.* 3.5; Isoc. 12.68).
13 On the date, see Rhodes and Osborne 2007: 322–3 and the Chronology at the front of this book.
14 On Euboea, Athens and Philip, see Mattingly 1961: 124–32; Brunt 1969: 245–65; Carter 1971: 418–29.
15 These were former Boeotian allies of the Athenians, but both cities had been destroyed by the Thebans.
16 Markle 1974: 253–68; Ellis 1982: 43–59; Sawada 1993: 21–50; Worthington 2008: 84–5.
17 That Philip was attempting to form an alliance with Athens to the detriment of the Thebans and the benefit of the Phocians is accepted by many scholars (Ellis 1976: 90–124; 1982: 43–59; Hamilton 1982: 72–3; Worthington 2008: 97–8). Those opposed to this scenario include Cawkwell (1978B: 93–104) and Hammond and Griffith (1979: 345–7).
18 This position was apparently first put forth by Rohrmoser 1874: 789–815.
19 The reference occurs in Demosthenes' *Second Olynthiac*, and that speech was delivered in 349/348 (Trevett 2011: 29–30, 41).
20 Buckler (2003: 420) believes this arrangement was created in 352. It was a rather drastic step and it can more easily be understood in the context of 349. At this time Philip had ended the Sacred War, giving him far greater power than in 352 and, in the face of revolts against his authority, greater frustration with the Thessalian cities.
21 On the dating, see Trevett 2011: 100.
22 See Worthington 2008: 100; for the date, see Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Amm.* 1.10).
23 Diodorus (16.64.3) even states that it was because of Philip's reverence for the gods that he was later selected to lead the war against Persia.

24 These would include Argos, Achaea, Sicyon, Messenia, Megalopolis and Arcadia (Diod. 16.39.2; Isoc. 5.74).
25 For the date, see D. H. *Amm.* 1.10.
26 In the case of Oropus, it was, indeed, granted to the Athenians by Philip after the Battle of Chaeronea (Demad. 1.9; Paus. 1.34.1).
27 See the Chronology.
28 For the number of the cities, see Dem. 19.123.
29 The Corinthians were also punished for 'sharing with the Phocians in the sacrilege committed against the god' (Diod. 16.60.2). What the Corinthians did is not stated, but it may refer to the fact that Phalaecus and his mercenaries were spirited out of Greece on Corinthian ships (Diod. 16.61.4).
30 On the support of many intellectuals for Philip, see Markle 1976: 80–99; Weißenberger 2003: 99–103.
31 While found in Demosthenes' corpus, modern opinion believes that the speech was given by Hegesippus, a contemporary of Demosthenes and a supporter of his anti-Philip policies (see Trevett 2011: 113).
32 Diodorus 16.72.1 inaccurately states that Alexander became king on the death of Arybbas and that it was the latter's son who was deposed. See *GHI* 70.
33 Teres is a common Thracian name, but here likely refers to Teres III, the ruler of western Thrace, who had joined forces with Cersobleptes in 341. Cersobleptes also had a son of that name (see Delemen 2006: 261).
34 While part of the Demosthenic corpus, as the title itself states, this was a *Letter of Philip* sent to the Athenian Assembly.
35 This request was made in 343; see [Philochorus] *BNJ* 238.F-157.
36 On the peace, see Ryder 1957: 199–205.
37 On the date, see Trevett 2011: 212–13.
38 Demosthenes (18.92) has inserted the following decree issued by the Byzantines and the Perinthians in honour of the Athenian assistance: 'It be resolved by the People of Byzantium and Perinthus to grant to the Athenians rights of intermarriage, citizenship, tenure of land and houses, the seat of honor at the games, access to the Council and the people immediately after the sacrifices, and immunity from all public services for those who wish to settle in our city; also to erect three statues, sixteen cubits in height, in the Bosporeum, representing the People of Athens being crowned by the Peoples of Byzantium and Perinthus; also to send deputations to the Panhellenic gatherings, the Isthmian, Nemean, Olympian, and Pythian games, and there to proclaim the crown wherewith the Athenian People has been crowned by us, that the Greeks may know the merits of the Athenians and the gratitude of the Byzantines and the Perinthians.' The translation is from the Loeb Classical Library. Similar official recognition was given by the peoples of the Chersonese (Dem. 18.92).
39 This position is supported by Worthington (2008: 128–9).

40 An island off the coast of Thessaly.
41 Translation from the Loeb Classical Library.
42 This dating is based on D. H. *Amm.* 1.10 and his dating of Philip's letter.
43 Roisman 2006; Londey 1990: 239–60.
44 The temple of Apollo at Delphi had been heavily damaged by an earthquake in 373. Repairs had been interrupted by the Sacred War.
45 Londey (1990: 239–60) has shown fairly conclusively that Demosthenes' charge is without merit and that 'the 4th Sacred War grew out of purely local rivalries and jealousies'.
46 In a speech by Hyperides, *Against Dionidas*, recovered from a palimpsest and published in 2005 (Tchernetska 2005: 1–6), the role of Demosthenes in securing the alliance with Thebes is downplayed. Here it is the quick dispatch of the Athenian army into Boeotia that was crucial to the acceptance of the alliance by the Thebans, not Demosthenes' brilliant oratory. On the implications, see Guth 2014: 151–65.
47 The Eleians are also mentioned, but they had not joined the Athenian coalition and were allies of Philip (Dem. 9.27, 18.295; Paus. 5.4.9). Despite this fact, the Eleians did not join Philip at Chaeronea (Paus. 5.4.9), perhaps because three of their colonies had been occupied in Epirus by Philip (Dem. 7.32). It may have been for not joining him at Chaeronea that the Eleians received a garrison (Diod. 17.3.5).
48 See Roebuck 1948: 81.
49 See Rhodes and Osborne 2007: 341.
50 The Arcadians are identified by Diodorus (17.3.4) as resisting Philip's authority, but this is likely a mistake for the Spartans (see Rhodes and Osborne 2007: 376).
51 The same oath invoking at least the first four of these self-same gods is found in Philip's alliance of 357 with the Chalcidians (*GHI* 50.l. 5), with all the same gods in the Athenian alliance with the Thracian, Paeonian and Illyrian kings in 356 (*GHI* 53.ll.38–9).
52 See Schmitt 1969: no. 403. On the Greek common peace, see Jehne 1994 and Ryder 1965.
53 As to the implications of this act, see Appendix 2.
54 Weißenberger 2003: 108–10; Hammond and Griffith 1979: 460–1.
55 It is argued that Philip was broke and needed the campaign in Asia to replenish his coffers (Worthington 2008: 168–9). When Alexander finally did set out to conduct the campaign against the Persians that he had inherited from his father, he was also said to have been without funds (Plut. *Alex.* 15.4–6). Of course, Plutarch attributes this to Alexander's personal generosity. However, if Philip had remained at peace after Chaeronea, it is likely that his revenues would have been more than sufficient. After all, up to this time he had carried on without any apparent financial difficulties.

56 See Anson 2013: 188; forthcoming 2020.
57 On the nature of ancient blockades, see Anson 1989: 44–9.
58 Philip died at the age of forty-seven in 336 (Just. 9.8.1); or at forty-six as in Paus. 8.7.6. While Justin (7.5.9) states that the dead king Perdiccas' son Amyntas became king and Philip his regent ('*tutor*'); see Chapter 1.
59 As noted in Chapter 1, there are scholars who believe that there was a Macedonian national assembly of some kind, but even the most stalwart supporters of such an assembly's existence only claim that it could select a new king and handle certain legal cases. There was in fact no such traditionally based assembly to do anything (see Anson 1985B: 303–16; 2013: 26–42).

Appendix 1: Philip's Ambitions

1 See Buckler 1996: 77–97, who expresses a similar view but focuses his analysis on Philip's acquisition of hegemony in Greece.
2 On Alexander's ambitions, see Anson 2013: 183–8.
3 Diod. 17.74.3; 93.1–95.2; Curt. 6.2.15–4.1; 9.2.1–3.18; Just. 12.3.2–4; Plut. *Alex.* 47.1–2; Arr. *Anab.* 3.29.5; 5.2.1, 24.8–29.5; *Ind.* 6.25.2; 20.4.8.
4 Those who had supported the previous, pro-Persian administration were liable to seizure and trial before the 'assembly [*synedrion*] of the Greeks', which can only be referring to the League's *synedrion* (*GHI* 84.l.10).
5 See Anson 2013: 134–6.
6 Arr. *Anab.* 4.22.6; 5.19.4; Diod. 17.95.5; Curt. 9.3.23.
7 Palagia 2010: 38–41; Heckel 1978B: 157–8.
8 Ian Worthington (2008: 185–6; see also Hammond 1997: 24) believes that Alexander was to be left behind as regent when Philip and the expeditionary force left for Asia. See Chapter 4. As noted in Chapter 4, while there is no clear statement concerning whether Alexander was to accompany the expedition or not, to leave him behind with his mother and his 'friends' would have been disastrous. Campaigning together would have been a good way to repair the relationship between father and son, far away from his mother.
9 See Appendix 2.

Appendix 2: Philip a God?

1 See Anson 2013: 114–19.
2 Worthington 1992: 4–6.
3 See Worthington 1992: 264.

4 For a summary of the sources postulated by modern scholars for Diodorus' Book Sixteen, see McQueen 2001: 8–12.
5 'The very name Philippi contained something special; for no one in the Greek world had ever before given his own name to the city of which he was *oikistes* (founder)' (Hammond and Griffith 1979: 360).
6 See Anson 2013: 134–6.
7 Arr. *Anab.* 4.22.6; 5.19.4; Diod. 17.95.5; Curt. 9.3.23.
8 See Anson 2013: 169–70.
9 See Bosworth 1988: 285–6; Cawkwell 1994: 264; Badian 1996: 15–16; Anson 2013: 110–14.
10 See Coldstream 1976: 8.

Appendix 3: The Death of a King

1 [Anonymous] *FGrH* 148 F1; Parsons 1979: 97–99.
2 Badian 1963: 248; Bosworth 1980: 159.
3 See Greenwalt 1985: 69–77.
4 For Diodorus' lack of precision, as in the use of such phrases as 'about the same time', see Anson 1986: 209–10.
5 On the implausibility of Darius being involved in the murder, see Briant 2002: 769–71.
6 Olga Palagia (2010: 38–41) believes that the 'Eurydice' in the statue group did not represent Philip's mother, but rather his new wife, who may also have been named Eurydice (Arr. *Anab.* 3.6.5). Waldemar Heckel (1978: 157–8) argues that 'Eurydice' was becoming a dynastic name for the chief wife and it was Philip's assignment of this name to Cleopatra that was responsible for Olympias' anger. However, Audata, Philip's first wife, was also called Eurydice (Arr. *Succ.* 1.22). The critical statue in the argument above, however, is that of Alexander.
7 In general, on Alexander's religiosity, see Edmunds 1971: 363–91.

Bibliography

Adam, A. M. 1941. 'Philip "Alias" Hitler'. *Greece & Rome* 10: 105–13.

Adams, W. L. 1983. 'The Dynamics of Internal Macedonian Politics in the Time of Cassander'. In *Ancient Macedonia III. Papers read at the Third International Symposium held in Thessaloniki, September 21–25, 1977*, 17–30. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies.

Adams, W. L. 1986. 'Macedonian Kingship and the Right of Petition'. In *Ancient Macedonia IV. Papers read at the Fourth International Symposium held in Thessaloniki, September 21–25, 1983*, 43–52. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies.

Albi de La Cuesta, J. 1999. *De Pavía a Rocroi, Los Tercios de infantería Española*. Madrid: Balkan ediciones.

Andronikos, M. 1984. *Vergina: The Royal Tombs and the Ancient City*. Athens: Ekdotike Athenon.

Anson, E. M. 1980. 'Discrimination and Eumenes of Cardia'. *Ancient World* 3: 55–9.

Anson, E. M. 1981. 'Alexander's Hypaspists and the Argyraspids'. *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 30: 117–20.

Anson, E. M. 1985A. 'The Hypaspists: Macedonia's Professional Citizen-Soldiers'. *Historia: Zeitschrift für alte Geschichte* 34: 246–8.

Anson, E. M. 1985B. 'Macedonia's Alleged Constitutionalism'. *Classical Journal* 80: 303–16.

Anson, E. M. 1985C. 'The Meaning of the Term Macedones'. *Ancient World* 10: 67–8.

Anson, E. M. 1986. 'Diodorus and the Date of Triparadeisus'. *American Journal of Philology* 107: 208–17.

Anson, E. M. 1989. 'The Persian Fleet in 334'. *Classical Philology* 84: 44–9.

Anson, E. M. 1991. 'The Evolution of the Macedonian Army Assembly (330–315 B. C.)'. *Historia: Zeitschrift für alte Geschichte* 40: 230–47.

Anson, E. M. 1992. 'Craterus and the Prostasia'. *Classical Philology* 87: 38–43.

Anson, E. M. 1996. 'The Ephemerides of Alexander the Great'. *Historia: Zeitschrift für alte Geschichte* 45: 501–4.

Anson, E. M. 2006. 'Dating the Deaths of Eumenes and Olympias'. *Ancient History Bulletin* 20: 1–8.

Anson, E. M. 2008A. 'Macedonian Judicial Assemblies'. *Classical Philology* 103: 135–49.

Anson, E. M. 2008B. 'Philip II and the Transformation of Macedonia: A Reappraisal'. In T. Howe and J. Reames (eds.), *Macedonian Legacies: Studies in Ancient Macedonian History and Culture in Honor of Eugene N. Borza*, 17–30. Claremont, CA: Regina Books.

Anson, E. M. 2009A. 'Philip II, Amyntas Perdicca, and Macedonian Royal Succession'. *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 58: 276–86.

Anson, E. M. 2009B. 'Greek Ethnicity and the Greek Language'. *Glotta. Zeitschrift für griechische und lateinische Sprache*: 5–30.

Anson, E. M. 2009C. 'Philip II and the Creation of the Macedonian *PEZHETAIROI*'. In P. Wheatley and R. Hannah (eds.), *Alexander & His Successors: Essays from the Antipodes*, 88–98. Claremont, CA: Regina Books.

Anson, E. M. 2010A. 'The Asthetairoi: Macedonia's Hoplites'. In E. Carney and D. Ogden (eds.), *Philip II and Alexander III: Father, Son and Dunasteia*, 81–90. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Anson, E. M. 2010B. 'The Introduction of the *Sarissa* in Macedonian Warfare'. *Ancient Society* 40: 51–68.

Anson, E. M. 2013. *Alexander the Great: Themes and Issues.* London and New York: Bloomsbury.

Anson, E. M. 2014. *Alexander's Heirs: The Age of the Successors.* Malden, MA, and Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Anson, E. M. 2015A. *Eumenes of Cardia: A Greek Among Macedonians.* 2nd. Leiden: Brill.

Anson, E. M. 2015B. 'Alexander at the Beas'. In W. Heckel, S. Müller and G. Wrightson (eds.), *The Many Faces of* War, 65–74. Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishers.

Anson, E. M. 2017. 'The Rise of Macedon, 359–336 BC'. In M. Whitby and H. Sidebottom (eds.), *The Encyclopedia of Ancient Battles*, 484–5. Malden, MA, and Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Anson, E. M. 2020. 'Alexander the Great: A Life Lived as Legend'. In E. Baynham and J. Walsh (eds.), *Alexander the Great and Propaganda*. Abingdon: Taylor and Frances.

Antikas, T. G. and Wynn-Antikas, L. K. 2015. 'New Finds the Cremains in Tomb II at Aegae Point to Philip II and a Scythian Princess'. *International Journal of Osteoarchaeology* 26: 682–92.

Arena, E. 2003. 'La lettera di Oleveni. Fra Filippo II et Filippo V di Macedonia'. *Revue des Études Anciennes* 105: 49–82.

Aymard, A. 1950. 'Sur l'assemblée macédonienne,' *Revue des études anciennes* 52: 115–137.

Badian, E. 1960. 'The Death of Parmenio'. *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 91: 324–38.

Badian, E. 1961. 'Harpalus'. *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 81: 16–43.

Badian, E. 1963. 'The Death of Philip II'. *Phoenix* 17: 244–50.

Badian, E. 1964. 'The Struggle for the Succession to Alexander the Great'. In E. Badian (ed.), *Studies in Greek and Roman History*, 262–70. Oxford: Blackwell.

Badian, E. 1967. 'Agis III'. *Hermes* 95: 170–92.

Badian, E. 1979. 'The Burial of Philip II?'. *American Journal of Ancient History* 4: 97.

Badian, E. 1981. 'The Deification of Alexander the Great'. In H. J. Dell, (ed.), *Ancient Macedonian Studies in Honor of Charles F. Edson*, 27–71. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies.

Badian, E. 1982. 'Eurydice'. In W. L. Adams and E. N. Borza (eds.), *Philip II, Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Heritage*, 99–110. Lanham, MD, and London: University Press of America.

Badian, E. 1996. 'Alexander the Great Between Two Thrones and Heaven: Variations on an Old Theme'. In A. Small (ed.), *Subject and Ruler: The Cult of the Ruling Power in Classical Antiquity*, 11–26. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Badian, E. 2000. 'Conspiracies'. In A. B. Bosworth and E. J. Baynham (eds.), *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction*, 50–95. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Bakhuizen, S. C. 1994. 'Thebes and Boeotia in the Fourth Century B. C'. *Phoenix* 48: 307–30.

Banks, M. 1996. *Ethnicity: Anthropological Constructions*. London: Routledge.

Barlett, P. 1980. 'Adaptive Strategies in Peasant Agricultural Production'. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 9: 545–73.

Barth, F. 1969. 'Introduction'. In F. Barth (ed.), *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference*, 9–38. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

Bauman, R. A. 1990. *Political Trials in Ancient Greece.* London: Routledge.

Baynham, E. 1994. 'The Question of Macedonian Divine Honours for Philip II'. *Mediterranean Archaeology* 7: 35–43.

Baynham, E. 1998. *Alexander the Great: The Unique History of Quintus Curtius*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Beloch, K. J. 1927. *Griechische Geschichte*. 3 vols. 2nd ed. Berlin and Leipzig: De Gruyter.

Berve, H. 1973 (repr. 1926). *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage*. 2 vols. New York: Arno Press; Munich: Beck.

Best, J. G. P. 1969. *Thracian Peltasts and their Influence on Greek Warfare*. Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff.

Bettinetti, S. 2001. *Status di culto nella pratica ritual greca*. Bari: Livante.

Bickerman, E. J. 1934. 'Alexandre le Grand et les villes d'Asie'. *Revue des études grecques* 47: 346–74.

Bickerman, E. J. 1968–9. *Chronology of the Ancient World*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Billows, R. A. 1995. *Kings and Colonists: Aspects of Macedonian Imperialism*. Leiden and New York: E. J. Brill.

Boiy, T. 2007A. *Between High and Low: A Chronology of the Early Hellenistic Period*. Frankfurt: Verlag Antike.

Boiy, T. 2007B. 'Cuneiform Tablets and Aramaic Ostraca: Between the Low and High Chronology of the Early Diadoch Period'. In W. Heckel, L. Trittle and P. Wheatley (eds.), *Alexander's Empire: Formulation to Decay*, 199–207. Claremont, CA: Regina Books.

Boiy, T. 2010. 'Royal and satrapal armies in Babylonia during the Second Diadoch War. The Chronicle of the Successors on the events during the seventh year of Philip Arrhidaeus (=317/316 BC)'. *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 130: 1–13.

Borza, E. N. 1982. 'The Natural Resources of Early Macedonia'. In W. L. Adams and E. N. Borza (eds.), *Philip II, Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Heritage*, 1–20. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Borza, E. N. 1987. 'Timber and Politics in the Ancient World: Macedon and the Greeks'. *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 131: 32–52.

Borza, E. N. 1990. *In the Shadow of Olympus: The Emergence of Macedon*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Borza, E. N. 1999. *Before Alexander: Constructing Early Macedonia*. Claremont, CA: Regina Books.

Borza, E. N. 2003. 'Perinthus'. In S. Hornblower and A. Spawforth (eds.), *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*. 3rd rev. ed., 1140. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bosworth, A. B. 1971. 'Philip II and Upper Macedonia'. *Classical Quarterly* 21: 93–105.

Bosworth, A. B. 1973. 'ASTHETAIPOI'. *Classical Quarterly* 23: 245–53.

Bosworth, A. B. 1980. *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander.* Vol. 1. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Bosworth, A. B. 1988. *Conquest and Empire: The Reign of Alexander the Great*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

Bosworth, A. B. 1995. *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander.* Vol. 2. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Bouchon, R. and Helly, B. 2015. 'The Thessalian League'. In N. Beck and P. Funke (eds.), *Federalism in Greek Antiquity*, 231–49. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bradeen, D. W. 1955. 'The Trittyes in Cleisthenes' Reforms'. *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 86: 22–30.

Briant, P. 1973. *Antigone le Borgne: les débuts de sa carrière et les problèmes de l'Assemblée macédonienne*. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.

Briant, P. 2002. *From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire*. Translated by P. T. Daniels. Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbruns.

Brosius, M. 2003. 'Why Persia became the enemy of Macedon'. In W. Henkelman and A. Kuhrt (eds.), *A Persian Perspective: Essays in Memory of Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg*. Achaemenid History 13, 227–37. Leiden: Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten.

Brosius, M. 2007. 'New out of old? Court and court ceremonies in Achaemenid Persia'. In A. J. S. Spawforth (ed.), *Court and Court Society in Ancient Monarchies*, 17–57. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

Brunt, P. A. 1965. 'The Aims of Alexander'. *Greece & Rome* 12: 205–15.

Brunt, P. A. 1969. 'Euboea in the Time of Philip II'. *Classical Quarterly* 19: 245–65.

Brunt, P. A. 1976. *Arrian. Anabasis of Alexander, Books I–IV, with English Translation by P. A. Brunt*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Brunt, P. A. 1983. *Arrian. Anabasis of Alexander, Books V–VII, Indica, with English Translation by P. A. Brunt*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Brunt, P. A. 1988. 'The Army and the Land in the Roman Revolution'. In P. Brunt (ed.), *The Fall of the Roman Republic*, 240–75. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Brunt, P. A. 1993. 'Plato's Academy and Politics'. In P. A. Brunt (ed.), *Studies in Greek History and Thought*, 282–342. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Buckler, J. 1989. *Philip II and the Sacred War.* Leiden: Brill.

Buckler, J. 1996. 'Philip II's Designs on Greece'. In R. W. Wallace and E. M. Harris (eds.), *Transitions to Empire. Essays in Greco-Roman History, 360–146 B. C., in honor of E. Badian*, 77–97. Norman and Lincoln: University of Oklahoma Press.

Buckler, J. 2003. *Aegean Greece in the Fourth Century BC.* Leiden and Boston: Brill.

Buckler, J. and Beck, H. 2008. *Central Greece and the Politics of Power in the Fourth Century BC.* Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

Cabanes, P. 1957. *Les Illyriens de Bardylis à Genthios (IV^e–II^e siècles avant J.-C.)*. Paris: Sedes.

Cahill, N. 2000. 'Olynthus and Greek Town Planning'. *Classical World* 93: 497–515.

Cahill, N. 2001. *Household and City Organization at Olynthus*. London and New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Cargill, J. 1981. *The Second Athenian League: Empire or Free Alliance?* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Cargill, J. 1995. *Athenian Settlements of the Fourth Century B.C.* Leiden: E. J. Brill.

Carlier, P. 2000. 'Homeric and Macedonian Kingship'. In R. Brock and S. Hodkinson (eds.), *Alternatives to Athens: Varieties of Political Organization and Community in Ancient Greece*, 259–68. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Carney, E. 1980. 'Alexander the Lyncestian: the Disloyal Opposition'. *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 21: 23–33.

Carney, E. 1983. 'Regicide in Macedonia'. *La parola del passato* 211: 260–72.

Carney, E. 1987. 'Olympias'. *Ancient Society* 18: 350–62.

Carney, E. 1992. 'The Politics of Polygamy: Olympias, Alexander and the Murder of Philip'. *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 41: 169–89.

Carney, E. 1994. 'Olympias, Adea Eurydice, and the End of the Argead Dynasty'. In I. Worthington (ed.), *Ventures into Greek History*, 357–80. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Carney, E. 1995. 'Women and Basileia: Legitimacy and Female Political Action in Macedonia'. *Classical Journal* 90: 367–91.

Carney, E. 1996. 'Macedonians and Mutiny: Discipline and Indiscipline in the Army of Philip and Alexander'. *Classical Philology* 91: 19–44.

Carney, E. 2000. *Women and Monarchy in Macedonia.* Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Carney, E. 2006. *Olympias: The Mother of Alexander the Great*. London and New York: Routledge.

Carney, E. 2007A. 'Symposia and the Macedonian Elite: The Unmixed Life'. *Syllecta Classica* 18: 129–80.

Carney, E. 2007B. 'The Philippeum, Women, and the Formation of Dynastic Image'. In W. Heckel, L. Tritle and P. Wheatley (eds.), *Alexander's Empire: Formulation to Decay*, 27–60. Claremont, CA: Reginia Books.

Carney, E. 2016. 'Commemoration of a Royal Woman as a Warrior: The Burial in the Antechamber of Tomb II at Vergina'. *Syllecta Classica* 27: 109–49.

Carter, J. M. 1971. 'Athens, Euboea, and Olynthus'. *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 20: 418–29.

Cartledge, P. 1987. *Agesilaus and the Crisis of Sparta*. London: Duckworth.

Cawkwell, G. L. 1960. 'Aeschines and the Peace of Philocrates'. *Revue des Études Grecques* 73: 416–38.

Cawkwell, G. L. 1962A. 'Aeschines and the ruin of Phocis in 348'. *Revue des Études Grecques* 75: 453–59.

Cawkwell, G. L. 1962B. 'Notes on the Social War'. *Classica et Mediaevalia* 23: 34–40.

Cawkwell, G. L. 1963. 'Eubulus'. *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 83: 47–67.

Cawkwell, G. L. 1978A. 'Euboea in the Late 340's'. *Phoenix* 32: 42–67.

Cawkwell, G. L. 1978B. 'The Peace of Philocrates Again'. *Classical Quarterly* 28: 93–104.

Cawkwell, G. L. 1978C. *Philip of Macedon*. London and Boston: Faber and Faber.

Cawkwell, G. L. 1994. 'The Deification of Alexander the Great: A Note'. In I. Worthington (ed.), *Ventures in Greek History: Essays in honour of N. G. L. Hammond*, 293–306. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Coldstream, J. N. 1976. 'Hero-Cults in the Age of Homer'. *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 96: 8–17.

Cole, S. G. 1984. *Theoi Megaloi: The Cult of the Great Gods at Samothrace*. Leiden: Brill.

Cross, G. N. 1932. *Epirus: A Study in Greek Constitutional Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Currie, B. 2005. *Pindar and the Cult of Heroes*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Davidson, J. 1997. *Courtesans and Fishcakes: The Consuming Passions of Classical Athens*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Delemen, İ. 2006. 'An Unplundered Chamber Tomb on Ganos Mountain in Southeastern Thrace'. *American Journal of Archaeology* 110: 251–73.

Dell, H. J. 1963. 'The Illyrian Frontier to 229 B. C'. Unpub. PhD diss., University of Wisconsin, Madison, 62–99.

Dell, H. J. 1970. 'The Western Frontier of the Macedonian Monarchy'. In B. Laourdas and Ch. Makaronas (eds), *Ancient Macedonia I. Papers read at the first international symposium held in Thessaloniki, August 26–29, 1968*, 115–26. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies.

Depuydt, L. 1995. '"More Valuable than all Gold": Ptolemy's Royal Canon and Babylonian Chronology'. *Journal of Cuneiform Studies* 45: 98–117.

Depuydt, L. 1997. 'The Time of Death of Alexander the Great: 11 June 323 B.C. (–322), ca. 4:00–5:00 PM'. *Die Welt des Orients* 28: 117–35.

De Sainte Croix, G. E. M. 1963. 'The Alleged Secret Pact between Athens and Philip II concerning Amphipolis and Pydna'. *Classical Quarterly* 13: 110–19.

Develin, R. 1981. 'The Murder of Philip II'. *Antichthon* 15: 86–99.

Develin, R. 1985. 'Anaximenes ("F Gr Hist" 72) F-4'. *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 34: 493–6.

Dietler, M. and Hayden, B. 2001. *Feasts: Archaeological and Ethnographic Perspectives on Food, Politics, and Power*. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institute.

Droysen, J. G. 2012 (repr. 1917). *History of Alexander the Great* [*Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen*]. Translated by F. Kimmich. Philadelphia: American Philological Society; Berlin: Decker.

Ducat, J. 1990. *Les Hilotes*. Paris: Diffusion de Boccard.

Ducat, J. 1994. *Les Pénestes de Thessalie*. Paris: Belles Lettres.

Edmunds, L. 1971. 'The Religiosity of Alexander'. *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 12: 363–91.

Edson, C. F. 1970. 'Early Macedonia'. In B. Laourdas and Ch. Makaronas (eds), *Ancient Macedonia I. Papers read at the first international symposium held in Thessaloniki, August 26–29, 1968*, 17–44. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies.

Ehrenberg, V. 2013 (repr. 1943). *The People of Aristophanes*. London and New York: Routledge; Oxford: Blackwell.

Ehrhardt, C. 1967. 'Two Notes on Philip of Macedon's First Interventions in Thessaly'. *Classical Quarterly* 16: 108–11.

Ellis, J. R. 1966. 'The Date of Demosthenes' First Philippic'. *Re vue des Études Grecques* 79: 636–9.

Ellis, J. R. 1969A. 'Amyntas III, Illyria and Olynthos 392/3–380/79'. *Makedonika* 9: 1–8.

Ellis, J. R. 1969B. 'Population-Transplants by Philip II'. *Makedonika* 9: 9–17.

Ellis, J. R. 1973. 'The Step-brothers of Philip II'. *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 22: 350–4.

Ellis, J. R. 1976. *Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism*. London: Thames and Hudson.

Ellis, J. R. 1980. 'The Unification of Macedonia'. In M. B. Hatzopoulos and L. D. Loukopulos (eds.), *Philip of Macedon*, 36–46. Athens: Ekdotike Athenon S. A.

Ellis, J. R. 1981. 'The Assassination of Philip II'. In H. J. Dell (ed.), *Ancient Macedonian Studies in Honor of Charles F. Edson*, 99–117. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies.

Ellis, J. R. 1982. 'Philip and the Peace of Philocrates'. In W. L. Adams and E. N. Borza (eds.), *Philip II, Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Heritage*, 43–59. Lanham, MD, and London: University Press of America.

Eriksen, T. H. 1993. *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives*. Boulder, CO, and London: Pluto Press.

Errington, R. M. 1974. 'Macedonian "Royal Style" and Its Historical Significance'. *JHS* 94: 20–37.

Errington, R. M. 1978. 'The Nature of the Macedonian State under the Monarchy'. *Chiron* 8: 77–133.

Errington, R. M. 1981. 'Alexander the Philhellene & Persia'. In H. J. Dell (ed.), *Studies in Honour of C. F. Edson*, 139–43. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies.

Errington, R. M. 1990. *A History of Macedonia, trans. by C. Errington*. Berkeley, Los Angeles and Oxford: University of California Press.

Errington, R. M. 2002. 'Recent Research on Ancient Macedonia,' *Analele Univ. Galati, s. Istorie* 1: 9–21, http://www.istorie.ugal.ro/anale/1/101%20ERRINGTON.pdf.

Erskine, A. 'The πεζέταιροι of Philip II and Alexander III'. *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 38: 385–94.

Faraguna, M. 1998. 'Aspetti administrativi e finanziari della monarchia macedone tra IV e III secolo A.C.'. *Athenaeum* 86: 349–95.

Finley, 1971. *Uses and Abuses of History*. New York: Viking Press.

Fishman, J. A. 1983. 'Language and Ethnicity in Bilingual Education'. In W. C. McCready (ed.), *Culture, Ethnicity, and Identity: Current Issues in Research*, 127–38. New York: Academic Press.

Flower. M. A. 1988. 'Agesilaus of Sparta and the Origins of the Ruler Cult'. *Classical Quarterly* 38: 123–34.

Forbes, H. 1995. 'The Identification of Pastoralist Sites within the Context of Estate-Based Agriculture in Ancient Greece: Beyond the "Transhumance versus Agro-Pastoralism" Debate'. *Annual of the British School at Athens* 90: 325–38.

Fought, C. 2006. *Language and Ethnicity*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

Fredricksmeyer, E. A. 1979. 'Divine Honours for Philip II'. *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 109: 39–61.

Fredricksmeyer, E. A. 1981. 'On the background of the Ruler Cult'. In H. J. Dell (ed.), *Ancient Macedonian Studies in Honor of Charles F. Edson*, 145–56. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies.

Fredricksmeyer, E. A. 1982. 'On the Final Aims of Philip II'. In W. L. Adams and E. N. Borza (eds.), *Philip II, Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Heritage*, 85–98. Lanham, MD, and London: University Press of America.

Frigo, T. 2007. *Diodoros. Griechische Weltgeschichte. Buch XVI. Bibliothek der griechischen Literatur*. Stuttgart: Hiersemann.

Frye, R. N. 1984. *The History of Ancient Iran*. Munich: C. H. Beck.

Funck, B. 1978. 'Zu den Landschenkungen hellenistischer Könige'. *Klio* 60: 45–55.

Funke, S. 2000. *Aiakidenmythos und epeirotisches Königtum. Der Weg einer hellenischen Monarchie*. Stuttgart: Steiner.

Gabriel, R. A. 2010. *Philip II of Macedonia: Greater than Alexander*. Washington, DC: Potomac Books.

Garlan, Y. 1974. *Recherches de Poliorcetique Grecque. Bibliotheque des Ecoles Franfaises d'Athenes et de Rome*. Paris: Diffusion de Boccard.

Garlan, Y. 1988. *Slavery in Ancient Greece*. Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press.

Gauthier, Ph. 1993. 'Les cites hellénistiques'. In M. H. Hansen (ed.), *The Ancient Greek City-State: Symposium on the occasion of the 250th anniversary of the Royal*

Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters, July, 1–4 1992, 211–31. Munksgaard and Copenhagen: Commissioner.

Giles, H. R., Bourhis, Y. and Taylor, D. M. 1977. 'Towards a Theory of Language in Ethnic Group Relations'. In H. R. Giles (ed.), *Language, Ethnicity and Inter-group Relations*, 307–48. London, New York and San Francisco: Academic Press.

Gomme, A. W. 1945/1971. *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*. Volume 1. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Gomme, A. W. 1956/1969. *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*. Volume 2. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Gomme, A. W. 1956/1974. *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*. Volume 3. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Granier, F. 1931. *Die makedonische Heeresversammlung: Ein Beitrag zum antiken Staatsrecht*. Munich: Beck.

Graninger, D. 2010. 'Macedonia and Thessaly'. In J. Roisman and I. Worthington (eds.), *A Companion to Ancient Macedonia*, 306–25. Malden, MA, and Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Green, P. 1990. *Alexander to Actium: the Historical Evolution of the Hellenistic Age*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Green, P. 2011. 'Diodorus Siculus and the Third Sacred War'. In J. Marincola (ed.), *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography*, 363–70. Oxford and Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

Greenwalt, W. 1984. 'The Search for Arrhidaeus'. *Ancient World* 10: 69–77.

Greenwalt, W. 1989. 'Polygamy and Succession in Argead Macedonia'. *Arethusa* 22: 19–45.

Greenwalt, W. 2008. 'Philip and Olympias on Samothrace: A Clue to Macedonian Politics During the 360s'. In T. Howe and J. Reames (eds.), *Macedonian Legacies: Studies in Ancient Macedonian History and Culture in Honor of Eugene N. Borza*, 79–106. Claremont, CA: Regina Books.

Greenwalt, W. 2010. 'Macedonia, Illyria and Epirus'. In J. Roisman and I. Worthington (eds), *A Companion to Ancient Macedonia*, 279–305. Malden, MA, and Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Greenwalt, W. 2017. 'Alexander II of Macedon'. In T. Howe, S. Müller and R. Stoneman (eds.), *Ancient Historiography on War and Empire*, 80–91. Oxford: Oxbow Books.

Grenfell, B. P. and Hunt, A. S. 1922. *The Oxyrynchus Papyri*. Vol. 15. London: Egyptian Exploratory Fund.

Greswell, E. 2012 (1862). *Origines Kalendariæ Hellenicæ: Or, the History of the Primitive Calendar Among the Greeks, Before and After the Legislation of Solon*. Vol. 3. Charleston, SC: Ulan Press; Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Griffith, G. T. 1965. 'The Macedonian Background'. *Greece and Rome* 12: 125–39.

Griffith, G. T. 1970. 'Philip of Macedon's Early Interventions in Thessaly (358–352 B. C.)'. *Classical Quarterly* 20: 67–80.

Griffith, G. T. 1980. 'Philip as General and the Macedonian Army'. In M. B. Hatzopoulos and L. D. Loukopulos (eds.), *Philip of Macedon*, 58–77. Athens: Ekdotike Athenon.

Griffith, G. T. 1981. 'Peltasts, and the Origins of the Macedonian Phalanx'. In H. D. Dell and E. N. Borza (eds), *Ancient Macedonian Studies in honor of Charles F. Edson*, 161–79. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies.

Guth, D. 2014. 'Rhetoric and Historical Narrative: The Theban–Athenian Alliance of 339 BCE'. *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 63: 151–65.

Haarmann, H. 1986. *Language in Ethnicity: A View of Basic Ecological Relations*. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter.

Habicht, Ch. 1970 [1956]. *Gottmenschentum und griechische Städte*; Zetemata, Heft 14. Munich: C.H. Beck.

Habicht, Ch. 2017. *Divine Honors for Mortal Men in Greek Cities. The Early Years*. Translated by J. N. Dillon. Ann Arbor: Michigan Classical Press.

Hamilton, C. D. 1979. *Sparta's Bitter Victories: Politics and Diplomacy in the Corinthian War*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Hamilton, C. D. 1982. 'Philip II and Archidamus'. In W. L. Adams and E. N. Borza (eds), *Philip II, Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Heritage*, 61–83. Lanham, MD, and London: University Press of America.

Hamilton, J. R. 1969. *Plutarch: Alexander, A Commentary*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Hamilton, J. R. 1974. *Alexander the Great*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Hammond, N. G. L. 1938. 'The Two Battles of Chaeronea (338 B. C. and 86 B. C.)'. *Klio* 31: 186–218.

Hammond, N. G. L. 1966. 'The Kingdom in Illyria Circa 400–167 B. C'. *British School at Athens Annual* 61: 239–53.

Hammond, N. G. L. 1967. *Epirus: The Geography, The Ancient Remains, The History and the Topography of Epirus and Adjacent Areas*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hammond, N. G. L. 1970. 'The Archaeological Background to the Macedonian Kingdom'. In V. Laourdas and Ch. Makaronas (eds.), *Ancient Macedonia I*, 53–67. Thessalonki: Institute for Balkan Studies.

Hammond, N. G. L. 1972. *A History of Macedonia*, Vol. 1: *Historical Geography and Prehistory*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Hammond, N. G. L. 1978. '"Philip's Tomb" in Historical Context'. *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 18: 343–9.

Hammond, N. G. L. 1980. *Alexander the Great, King, Commander and Statesman*. Park Ridge, NJ: Noyes Press.

Hammond, N. G. L. 1981. 'The Western Frontier in the Reign of Philip II'. In H. J. Dell (ed.), *Ancient Macedonian Studies in Honour of C. F. Edson*, 199–217. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies.

Hammond, N. G. L. 1983. 'The Role of the *Epistates* in Macedonian Contexts'. *Annual of the British School at Athens* 94: 369–75.

Hammond, N. G. L. 1988. 'The King and the Land in the Macedonian Kingdom'. *Classical Quarterly* 38: 382–91.

Hammond, N. G. L. 1989. 'The Battle between Philip and Bardylis'. *Antichthon* 23: 1–9.

Hammond, N. G. L. 1990. 'Royal Pages, Personal Pages, and Boys Trained in the Macedonian Manner during the Period of the Temenid Monarchy'. *Historia* 39: 261–90.

Hammond, N. G. L. 1991. *Philip of Macedon*. London: Duckworth.

Hammond, N. G. L. 1992A. 'The Regnal Years of Philip and Alexander'. *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 33: 355–73.

Hammond, N. G. L. 1992B. *Alexander the Great, King, Commander, and Statesman*. Park Ridge, NJ: Noyes Press.

Hammond, N. G. L. 1993. 'The Macedonian imprint on the Hellenistic world'. In P. Green (ed.), *Hellenistic History and Culture*, 12–23. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Hammond, N. G. L. 1994. *Philip of Macedon.* Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Hammond, N. G. L. 1995. 'Connotations of "Macedonia" and "Macedones"'. *Classical Quarterly* 45: 120–8.

Hammond, N. G. L. 1997. *The Genius of Alexander the Great*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Hammond, N. G. L. 2000. 'The Continuity of Macedonian Institutions and the Macedonian Kingdoms of the Hellenistic Era'. *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 49: 141–60.

Hammond, N. G. L. and Griffith, G. T. 1979. *A History of Macedonia*, Vol. 2: *550–336 B. C.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Hammond, N. G. L. and Walbank, F. W. 1988. *A History of Macedonia*, Vol. 3: *336–167 B. C.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hampl, F. 1934. *Der König der Makedonen*. Leipzig: Weida i. Druck von Thomas & Hubert.

Hansen, M. H. 1985. *Demography and Democracy: The Number of Athenian Citizens in the Fourth Century B.C.* Herning, Denmark: Systime.

Hansen, M. H. 2004. 'The Use of Sub-Ethnics as Part of the Name of a Greek Citizen of the Classical Period: The Full Name of a Greek Citizen'. In T. H. Nielsen (ed.), *Once Again: Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis*, 117–29. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner.

Hanson, V. D. 1995. *The Other Greeks: The Family Farm and the Agrarian Roots of Western Civilization*. New York: Free Press.

Harris, E. M. 1995. *Aeschines and Athenian Politics*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Harvey, N. 1998. *The Chiapas Rebellion: The Struggle for Land and Democracy*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Hatzopoulos, M. B. 1982A. 'The Oleveni Inscription and the Dates of Philip II's Reign'. In W. L. Adams and E. N. Borza (eds.), *Philip II, Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Heritage*, 21–42. Lanham, MD, and London: University Press of America.

Hatzopoulos, M. B. 1982B. 'A Reconsideration of the Pixodaros Affair'. In B. Barr-Sharrar and E. N. Borza (eds.), *Macedonia and Greece in the Late Classical and Early*

Hellenistic Times. Studies in the History of Art 10, 59–66. Washington, DC: University Press of New England.

Hatzopoulos, M. B. 1986. 'Succession and Regency in Classical Macedonia'. In *Ancient Macedonia IV. Papers read at the Fourth International Symposium held in Thessaloniki, September, 21–25, 1983*, 279–92. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies.

Hatzopoulos, M. B. 1996A. *Macedonian Institutions under the Kings*, Vol. 1: *A Historical and Epigraphic Study*. Paris: Diffusion de Boccard.

Hatzopoulos, M. B. 1996B. *Macedonian Institutions under the Kings*, Vol. 2: *Epigraphic Appendix*. Paris: Diffusion de Boccard.

Heckel, W. 1978A. '"Somatophylakes" of Alexander the Great: Some Thoughts'. *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 27: 224–8.

Heckel, W. 1978B. 'Kleopatra or Eurydike?'. *Phoenix* 32: 155–8.

Heckel, W. 1981. 'Polyxena, the mother of Alexander the Great'. *Chiron* 11: 79–86.

Heckel, W. 1986. '"Somatophylakia": A Macedonian "Cursus Honorum"'. *Phoenix* 40: 279–94.

Heckel, W. 1992. *The Marshals of Alexander's Empire*. London: Routledge.

Heckel, W. 2003. 'Alexander and the "Limits of the Civilised World"'. In W. Heckel and L. A. Tritle (eds.), *Crossroads of History: The Age of Alexander*, 147–74. Claremont, CA: Regina Books.

Heckel, W. 2006. *Who's Who in the Age of Alexander the Great*. Malden, MA, and Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Heckel, W. 2007. *The Conquests of Alexander the Great*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

Heckel, W. 2017. 'Geography and Politics in Argead Macedonia'. In S. Muller, T. Howe, H. Bowden and R. Rollinder (eds.), *The History of the Argeads, New Perspectives*, 67–78. Wiesbaden: Harassowitz.

Heisserer, A. J. 1980. *Alexander the Great and the Greeks of Asia Minor*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Herman, G. 1987. *Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Heskel, J. 1996. 'Philip II and Argaios. A Pretender's Story'. In R. W. Wallace and E. M. Harris (eds.), *Transitions to Empire: Essays in Greco-Roman History, 360–146 B. C. in honor of E. Badian*, 37–56. Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press.

Heskel, J. 1997. *The North Aegean Wars, 371–360 B.C.* Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.

Hodkinson, S. 1988. 'Animal Husbandry in the Greek Polis'. In C. R. Whittaker (ed.). *Pastoral Economies of Ancient Greece and Rome*. Suppl. 41, 35–74. Cambridge: Cambridge Philological Society.

Howe, T. 2008. *Pastoral Politics: Animals, Agriculture and Society in Ancient Greece*. Publications of the Association of Ancient Historians 9. Claremont, CA: Regina Books.

Howe, T., Müller, S. and Stoneman, R. 2017. *Ancient Historiography on War and Empire*. Oxford: Oxbow Books.

Huntington, S. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Jehne, M. 1994. *Koine Eirene: Untersuchungen zu den Befriedungs- und Stabilisierungsbemühungen in der griechischen Poliswelt des 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr. (Hermes Einzelschriften, 63)*. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.

Johnston, S. I. 1999. *The Restless Dead: Encounters Between the Living and the Dead in Ancient Greece*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Jones, N. F. 1987. *Public Organization in Ancient Greece: A Documentary Study.* Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society.

Jurz, H. R. 1977. *Schweizerschlachten.* Bern: Francke.

Just, R. 1989. 'Triumph of the Ethnos'. In E. Tonkin, M. McDonald and M. Chapman (eds.), *History and Ethnicity*. ASA Monographs 27, 71–88. London and New York: Routledge.

Kapetanopoulos, E. 1996. 'Philip II's Assassination and Funeral'. *Ancient World* 27: 81–7.

Kapetanopoulos, E. 1999. 'Alexander's *Patrius Sermo* in the Philotas Affair'. *Ancient World* 30: 117–28.

Kearns, E. 1989. *The Heroes of Attica*. London: Institute of Classical Studies, University of London.

Kern, P. B. 1999. *Ancient Siege Warfare*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Keyser, P. 1994. 'The Use of Artillery by Philip II and Alexander the Great'. *Ancient World* 25: 27–59.

Kienast, D. 1973. *Philipp II. von Makedonien und das Reich der Achamieniden*. Munich: Wilhelm Fink.

King, C. J. 2018. *Ancient Macedonia*. London and New York: Routledge.

Kirchner, J. 1901. *Prosopographia Attica*. Berlin: Berolini.

Kuhrt, A. 1995. *The Ancient Near East*. London and New York: Routledge.

Kurz, H. R. 1962. *Schweizerschlachten*. Bern: A Francke.

Landucci Gattinoni, F. 2003. *L'arte del poteen: vita e opera di Cassandro di Macedonia*. Stuttgart: Steiner.

Lane Fox, R. 1973. *Alexander the Great*. London: Folio Society.

Lane Fox, R. 2007. 'Alexander the Great: "Last of the Achaemenids"'. In C. Turpin (ed.), *Persian Responses: Political and Cultural Interaction with(in) the Achaemenid Empire*, 267–311. Swansea: Classical Press of Wales.

Lane Fox, R. 2011. 'Philip of Macedon: Accession, Ambitions, and Self-Preservation'. In R. Lane Fox (ed.), *Brill's Companion to Ancient Macedon: Studies in the Archaeology and History of Macedon 650 B C-300 AD*, 335–66. Boston and Leiden: Brill.

Larsen, J. A. O. 1968. *Greek Federal States: Their Institutions and History*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Le Rider, G. 1977. *Le monnayage d'argent et d'or de Philippe II*. Paris: Bourgey.

Le Rider, G. 1980. 'The Coinage of Philip and the Pangaion Mines'. In M. B. Hatzopoulos and L. D. Loukopoulus (eds.), *Philip of Macedon*, 48–57. Athens: Ekdotike Athenon S.A.

Lock, R. 1974. 'The Army of Alexander the Great'. PhD diss., University of Leeds.

Londey, P. 1990. 'The Outbreak of the 4th Sacred War'. *Chiron* 20: 239–60.

Lott, J. B. 1996. 'Alexander, and the Two Tyrannies at Eresos of "IG" XII.2.526'. *Phoenix* 50: 26–40.

Ma, J. 2008. 'Chaeroneia 338: Topographies and Commemoration'. *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 128: 72–91.

Machiavelli, N. 1965. *The Art of War*. Translated by E. Farneworth. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.

Malkin, I. 1985. 'What's in a name? The eponimous founders of Greek colonies'. *Athenaeum* 63: 114–30.

Manicas, P. T. 1982. 'War, Stasis, and Greek Political Thought'. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 24: 673–88.

March, D. 1995. 'The Kings of Macedon: 399–369 B. C.'. *Historia: Zeitschrift fur alte Geschichte* 44: 257–82.

Markle, M. M. 1970. 'The Peace of Philocrates'. Unpub. PhD diss., Princeton University.

Markle, M. M. 1974. 'The Strategy of Philip in 346 B. C.'. *Classical Quarterly* 24: 253–68.

Markle, M. M. 1976. 'Support of Athenian Intellectuals for Philip. A Study of Isocrates' *Philippus* and Speusippus' *Letter to Philip*'. *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 96: 80–99.

Markle, M. M. 1977. 'The Macedonian Sarissa, Spear, and Related Armor'. *American Journal of Archaeology* 81: 323–39.

Markle, M. M. 1978. 'Use of the Sarissa by Philip and Alexander of Macedon'. *American Journal of Philology* 82: 483–97.

Marsden, E. W. 1969. *Greek and Roman Artillery: Historical Development*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Marsden, E. W. 1971. *Greek and Roman Artillery: Technical Treatises*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Martin, T. R. 1981. 'Diodorus on Philip II and Thessaly in the 350s B.C.'. *Classical Philology* 76: 188–201.

Masson, O. 1996. 'Macedonian Language'. In S. Hornblower and A. Spawforth (eds), *Oxford Classical Dictionary*. 3rd rev. ed., 905–6. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Mattingly, H. B. 1961. 'Athens and Euboea'. *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 81: 124–32.

McQueen, E. I. 1995/2001. *Diodorus Siculus: The Reign of Philip II. The Greek and Macedonian Narrative from Book XVI*. London: Bristol Classical Press.

Meeus, A. 2009. 'Kleopatra and the Diadochoi'. In P. Van Nuffelen (ed.), *Faces of Hellenism: Studies in the History of the Eastern Mediterranean (4th Century B.C.–5th Century A.D.)*, 63–92. Leuven, Paris and Walpole, MA: Peeters.

Mehl, A. 1980–1. 'ΔΟΡΙΚΗΤΟΣ ΧΩΡΑ'. *Ancient Society* 10/11: 173–212.

Meiggs, R. 1982. *Trees and Timber in the Ancient Mediterranean World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Migdal, J. S. 1974. *Peasants, Politics, and Revolution; Pressures Toward Political and Social Change in the Third World*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Mikalson, J. D. 2005. *Ancient Greek Religion*. Malden, MA, and Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Miller, D. and Embleton, G. 1979. *The Swiss at War 1300–1500*. Oxford and New York: Osprey Publishing.

Millett, P. 2010. 'The Political Economy of Macedonia'. In J. Roisman and I. Worthington (eds), *A Companion to Ancient Macedonia*, 472–504. Malden, MA, and Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Milns, R. D. 1971. 'The Hypaspists of Alexander III – Some Problems'. *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 20: 186–95.

Mitchell, L. 2002. *Greeks Bearing Gifts: The Public Use of Private Relationships in the Greek World, 435–323 BC*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mitchell, L. 2007. *Panhellenism and the Barbarian in Archaic and Classical Greece*. Swansea: Classical Press of Wales.

Mooren, L. 1983. 'The Nature of the Hellenistic Monarchy'. *Studia Hellenistica* 27: 205–40.

Moretti, L. 1957. *Olympionikai, i vincitori negli antichi agoni Olimpici. Memorie Accademia nazionale dei Lincei. Classe di scienze morali, storiche e filologiche*. Vol. 8. Ser.8. Fasc. 2. Rome: Accademia nazionale dei Lincei.

Müller, S. 2008. 'Fremdkörper – Entstellungen in antiker Wahrnehmung'. In C. Hoffstadt (ed.), *Der Fremdkörper*, 469–87. Freiburg: Bochum.

Müller, S. 2010. 'Philip II'. In J. Roisman and I. Worthington (eds), *A Companion to Ancient Macedonia*, 166–85. Malden, MA, and Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Murpurgo Davies, A. 2002. 'The Greek Notion of Dialect'. In T. Harrison (ed.), *Greeks and Barbarians*, 153–71. New York: Routledge.

Nagle, D. B. 1996. 'The Cultural Context of Alexander's Speech at Opis'. *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Society* 126: 151–72.

Nagy, G. 1990. *Pindar's Homer: The Lyric Possession of an Epic Past*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Naiden, F. S. 2019. *Soldier, Priest, and God: A Life of Alexander the Great*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Natoli, A. F. 2004. *The Letter of Speusippus to Philip II: Introduction, Text, Translation and Commentary.* Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.

Nock, A. D. 1930. 'ΣΥΝΝΑΟΣ ΘΕΟΣ'. *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 41: 1–62.

O'Brien, J. M. 1992. *Alexander the Great: The Invisible Enemy.* London and New York: Routledge.

Ogden, D. 1999. *Polygamy, Prostitutes and Death: The Hellenistic Dynasties*. London: Duckworth, with the Classical Press of Wales.

Ogden, D. 2011. *Alexander the Great: Myth, Genesis and Sexuality*. Exeter: University of Exeter Press.

Olbrycht, M. J. 2010. 'Macedonia and Persia'. In J. Roisman and I. Worthington (eds), *A Companion to Ancient Macedonia*, 342–69. Malden, MA, and Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Oman, C. 1969 (repr. 1924). *A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages*. New York: Burt Franklin.

Palagia, Olga. 2010. 'Philip's Eurydice in the Philippeum at Olympia'. In E. Carney and D. Ogden (eds.), *Philip II and Alexander the Great: Father and Son, Lives and Afterlives*, 33–41. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Panayotou, A. 2007. 'The Position of the Macedonian Dialect'. In A.-F. Christidis (ed.), *A History of Ancient Greek: From the Beginnings to Late Antiquity*, 433–58. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

Papazoglou, F. 1965. 'Les origines et la destinée de l'État illyrien: Illyrii proprie dicti'. *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 14: 143–79.

Papazoglou, F. 1978. *The Central Balkan Tribes in Pre-Roman Times: Triballi, Autariatae, Dardanians, Scordisci and Moesians*. Translated by M. Adolf Stansfield-Popović. Amsterdam: Hakkert.

Papazoglou, F. 1988. *Les villes de Macédoine à l'époque romaine*. Athens: Ecole française d'Athènes; Paris: Diffusion de Boccard.

Papazoglou, F. 1998. 'L'inscription d'Olévéni'. *Tekmeria* 4: 89–100.

Parsons, P. J. 1979. 'The Burial of Philip II?'. *American Journal of Ancient History* 4: 97–101.

Perlman, S. 1958. 'A Note on the Political Implications of Proxenia in the Fourth Century B. C.'. *Classical Quarterly* 8: 185–91.

Perlman, S. 1958/1976. 'Panhellenism, the Polis and Imperialism'. *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 25: 1–30.

Piejko, F. 1985 '"Second Letter" of Alexander the Great to Chios'. *Phoenix* 39: 238–49.

Pownall, F. 1998. 'What Makes a War a Sacred War?'. *Echos du monde classique: Classical views* 42, no. 17: 35–55.

Pownall, F. 2010. 'The Symposia of Philip II and Alexander III of Macedon: The View from Greece'. In E. Carney and D. Ogden (eds.), *Philip II and Alexander the Great: Father and Son, Lives and Afterlives*, 55–65. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Price, M. J. 1974. *Coins of the Macedonians*. London: British Museum.

Price, S. R. F. 1980. 'Between Man and God: Sacrifice in the Roman Imperial Cult'. *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 70: 28–43.

Pritchett, W. K. 1958. 'Observations on Chaironeia'. *American Journal of Archaeology* 62: 307–11, pls. 80, 81.

Prosterman, R. and Riedinger, J. M. 1989. *Land Reform and Democratic Development*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Psoma, S. 2014. 'Athens and the Macedonian Kingdom from Perdikkas II to Philip II'. *Revue des études anciennes* 116: 133–44.

Rebel, H. 1983. *Peasant Classes: The Bureaucratization of Property and Family Relations Under Early Habsburg Absolutism, 1511–1636*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Renfrew, C. A. 1998. 'From here to ethnicity'. Review of J. Hall, *Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity*. *Cambridge Archaeological Journal* 8: 275–7.

Rhodes, P. J. 2012. 'The Alleged Failure of Athens in the Fourth Century'. *Electrum* 19: 111–29.

Rhodes, P. J. and Osborne, R. 2007. *Greek Historical Inscriptions 404–323 BC*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Richards, J. 2002. *Landsknecht Soldier 1486–1560*. Oxford: Osprey Publishing.

Riginos, A. S. 1994. 'The Wounding of Philip II of Macedon: Fact and Fabrication'. *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 114: 103–19.

Ritter, S. 2002. *Bildkontakte. Götter und Heroen in der Bildsprache griechischer Münzen des 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr*. Berlin: Reimer.

Roebuck, C. 1948. 'The Settlements of Philip II with the Greek States in 338 B.C.'. *Classical Philology* 43: 73–92.

Rohrmoser, J. 1874. 'Kritische Betrachrunger ūber die philokrateischen Frieden'. *Zeitschrift für die österreichischen Gymnasien* 25: 789–815.

Roisman, J. 2006. *The Rhetoric of Conspiracy in Ancient Athens*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Roisman, J. 2010. 'Classical Macedonia to Perdiccas III'. In J. Roisman and I. Worthington (eds.), *A Companion to Ancient Macedonia*, 145–65. Oxford and Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

Romaine, S. 2000. *Language in Society: An Introduction to Sociolinguistics*. 2nd ed. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Roy, J. 1971. 'Arcadia and Boeotia in Peloponnesian Affairs, 370–362 B.C.'. *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 20: 569–99.

Roy, J. 1972. 'Arcadian Nationality as Seen in Xenophon's "Anabasis"'. *Mnemosyne* 25: 129–36.

Rubincam, C. 1992. 'The Nomenclature of Julius Caesar and the Later Augustus in the Triumviral Period'. *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 41: 88–103.

Ryder, T. T. B. 1957. 'The Supposed Common Peace of 366/5 B. C.'. *Classical Quarterly* 7: 199–205.

Ryder, T. T. B. 1965. *Koine Eirene: General Peach and Local Independence in Ancient Greece*. London: Oxford University Press.

Ryder, T. T. B. 1994. 'The diplomatic skills of Philip II'. In I. Worthington (ed.), *Ventures in Greek History*, 228–57. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Rzepka, J. 2004. 'Philip II of Macedon and The Garrison in Naupactus: A Re-Interpretation of Theopompus *FGrHist* 115 F 235'. *Tyche: Beiträge zur Alten Geschichte, Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 19: 157–166.

Rzepka, J. 2008. 'The Units of Alexander's Army and the District Divisions of Late Argead Macedonia'. *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 48: 39–56.

Sabin, P. 2009. *Lost Battles: Reconstructing the Great Clashes of the Ancient World*. London and New York: Hambledon Continuum.

Said, S. 2001. 'The Discourse of Identity in Greek Rhetoric from Isocrates to Aristides'. In I. Malkin (ed.), *Ancient Perceptions of Greek Ethnicity*, 275–99. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Samuel, A. E. 1988. 'Philip and Alexander as Kings: Macedonian and Merovingian Parallels'. *American Historical Review* 93: 1270–86.

Sawada, N. 1993. 'A Reconsideration of the Peace of Philocrates'. *Kodai: A Journal of Ancient History* 4: 21–50.

Sawada, N. 2010. 'Social Customs and Institutions: Aspects of Macedonian Elite Society'. In J. Roisman and I. Worthington (eds.), *A Companion to Ancient Macedonia*, 392–408. Oxford and Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

Scaife, R. 1989. 'Alexander I in the Histories of Herodotos'. *Hermes* 117: 129–37. Source: Hermes, 117. Bd., H. 2 (1989), pp. 129–37.

Schachermeyr. F. 1973. *Alexander der Grosse: Das Problem seiner Persönlichkeit und seines Wirkens*. Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.

Schmitt, H. H. 1969. *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums*. Munich: Beck.

Schmitz, W. 2006. 'Charidemos'. In *Der Neue Pauly.* Leiden: Brill.

Schneidel, W. 2011. 'Monogamy and Polygyny'. In B. Rawson (ed.), *A Companion to Families in the Greek and Roman World*, 108–15. Malden, MA, and Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Schramm, E. 1928. 'Poliorketik'. In J. Kromayer and G. Veith (eds.), *Heerwesen und Kriegfiihrung der Griechen und Romer*. Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft, Sec. 4, Part III, Vol. II, 209–47. Munich: n.p.

Schwahn, W. 1931. 'Die Nachfolge Alexanders des Grossen'. *Klio* 24: 306–32.

Sherwin-White, S. and Kuhrt, A. 1993. *From Samarkhand to Sardis: A New Approach to the Seleucid Empire*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Shrimpson, G. S. 1991. *Theopompus the Historian*. Montreal, Kingston, London and Buffalo: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Skydsgaard, J. E. 1988. 'Transhumance in Ancient Greece'. In C. R. Whittaker (ed.), *Pastoral Economies in Classical Antiquity*, 75–86. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Smith, A. D. 1986. *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*. Oxford and New York: Blackwell.

Snook, G. A. 1998. *The Halberd and Other Polearms, 1300–1650*. Alexandria Bay, NY, and Bloomfield, Ontario: Museum Restoration Service.

Sordi, M. 1958. *La lega tessala fino ad Alessandro Magno.* Studi pubblicati dall'Istituto italiano per la storia antica fasc. 15. Rome: n.p.

Sotiriades, G. 1903. 'Das Schlachtfeld von Chaeronea'. *Mitteilungen des deutschen Archaologischen Instituts, Athenische AbteilungthMitt* 28: 301–30.

Spann, P. O. 1999. 'Alexander at the Beas: Fox in a Lion's Skin'. In F. B. Titchener and R. F. Moorton (eds.), *The Eye Expanded: Life and the Arts in Greco-Roman Antiquity*, 62–74. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press.

Sprawski, S. 1999. *Jason of Pherae: A Study on History of Thessaly in Years 431–370 bc*. Krakow: Electrum.

Sprawski, S. 2006. 'Alexander of Pherae: Infelix Tyrant'. In S. Lewis (ed.), *Ancient Tyranny*, 135–47. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.

Squillace, G. 2010: 'Consensus Strategies under Philip and Alexander: The Revenge Theme'. In E. Carney and D. Ogden (eds.), *Philip II and Alexander III: Father, Son and Dunasteia*, 69–80. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Stagakis, G. S. 1962. 'Institutional Aspects of the Hetairos Relation'. Unpub. PhD diss., University of Wisconsin, Madison.

Stagakis, G. S. 1970. 'Observations on the *Hetairoi* of Alexander the Great'. In B. Laourdas and Ch. Makaronas (eds), *Ancient Macedonia I. Papers read at the first international symposium held in Thessaloniki, August 26–29, 1968*, 86–102. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies.

Stoneman, R. 2008. *Alexander the Great: A Life Lived in Legend.* New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press.

Strauss, B. S. 1984. 'Philip II of Macedon, Athens, and Silver Mining'. *Hermes* 112: 418–27.

Strootman, R. 2011. 'Kings and Cities in the Hellenistic Age'. In O. van Nijf and R. Alston (eds.), *Political Culture in the Greek City after the Classical Age*, 141–55. Leuven: Peeters.

Stylianou, P. J. 1998. *A Historical Commentary on Diodorus Siculus. Book 15.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Syme, R. 1988. 'The Date of Justin and the Discovery of Trogus'. *Historia: Zeitschrift für alte Geschichte* 37: 358–71.

Syme, R. 1992. 'Trogus in the H. A., Some Consequences'. In M. Christol et al. (eds.), *Institutions, société et vie politique dans l'empire romain au IV^e^ ap. J.-C: actes de la Table ronde autour de l'ouvre d'André Chastagnol, Paris, 20–21 janvier 1989.* Collection de l'ecole française de Rome 159, 11–20. Rome: Ecole française de Rome.

Tallett, F. 1992. *War and Society in Early-Modern Europe, 1495–1715.* London and New York: Routledge.

Tarn, W. W. 1948. *Alexander the Great*. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tarn. W. W. 1950. *Alexander the Great*. Vol. 2: *Sources and Studies.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tchernetska, N. 2005. 'New Fragments of Hyperides from the Archimedes Palimpsest'. *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 154: 1–6.

Toland, J. 1993. 'Dialogue of Self and Other: Ethnicity and the State Building Process'. In J. Toland (ed.), *Ethnicity and the State*, 1–20. New Brunswick, N J: Transaction Publishers.

Tomlinson, R. A. 1987. 'The Architectural Context of the Macedonian Vaulted Tombs'. *Annual of the British School at Athens* 82: 305–12.

Trevett, J. 2011. *Demosthenes, Speeches 1–17, translated by Jeremy Trevett*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Tronson, A. 1984. 'Satyrus the Peripatetic and the Marriages of Philip II'. *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 104: 116–26.

Ujes-Morgan, D. 2018. 'Damastion – Its foundation and the beginning of its coinage'. *Numismatic News* 60: 22–39.

Voutiras, E. 1996. 'Revue des études grecques: À propos d'une tablette de malédiction de Pella'. *Revue des etudes grecques* 109: 678–82.

Weißenberger, M. 2003. 'Isokrates und der Plan eines panhellenischen Perserkrieges'. In W. Orth (ed.), *Isokrates: Neue Ansätze zur Bewertung eines politischen Schriftstellers*, 95–110. Trier: Wissenschaftlicher.

Welles, C. B. 1934. *Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Era*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

West, M. L. 1985. *Hesiodic Catalogue of Women: Its Nature, Structure, and Origins*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Westlake, H. D. 1935. *Thessaly in the Fourth Century BC*. London: Methuen.

Wiegersma, N. 1988. *Vietnam: Peasant Land, Peasant Revolution. Patriarchy and Collectivity in the Rural Economy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Wieshöfer, J. 1993. *Das antike Persien von 550 v. Chr. vis 650 n. Chr*. Zurich: Artemis & Winkler.

Wilgaux, J. 2011. 'Consubstantiality, Incest, and Kinship in Ancient Greece'. In B. Rawson (ed.), *A Companion to Families in the Greek and Roman Worlds*, 217–30. Malden, MA, and Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Wilkes, J. 1992. *The Illyrians*. Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

Willekes, C. 2016. *The Horse in the Ancient World: From Bucephalus to the Hippodrome*. New York and London: I.B. Tauris.

Worley, L. J. 1994. *Hippeis: the cavalry of Ancient Greece*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Worthington, I. 1992. *A Historical Commentary on Dinarchus: Rhetoric and Conspiracy in Later Fourth-Century Athens*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Worthington, I. 2008. *Philip II of Macedonia*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Wright, J. C. 2004. 'A Survey of Evidence for Feasting in Mycenaean Society'. *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens* 73: 133–78.

Wrightson, G. 2019. *Combined Arms Warfare in Ancient Greece from Homer to Alexander the Great and his Successors*. London and New York: Routledge.

Wüst, F. R. 1953–4. 'Die Rede Alexanders des Grosswen'. *Opis* 2: 177–88.

Xydopoulos, I. K. 2012. 'Anthemus and Hippias: The Policy of Amyntas I'. *Illinois Classical Studies* 37: 21–37.

Yardley, J. C. 1994. *Justin Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus*. Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press.

Yardley, J. C. and Heckel, W. 1997. *Justin: Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus, Books 11–12: Alexander the Great, translation and appendices by J.C. Yardley; introduction and commentary by Waldemar Heckel*. New York and Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Zahrnt, M. 1971. *Olynth und die Chalkidier; Untersuchungen zur Staatenbildung auf der Chalkidischen Halbinsel im 5. und 4.Jahrhundert v. Chr.* Munich: Beck.

Zahrnt, M. 1996. 'Anthemus'. In *Der Neue Pauly Enzyklopädie der Antike*, 1: 731. Leiden: Brill.

Index