



Second Edition

Peer Prejudice and Discrimination

The Origins of Prejudice

HAROLD D. FISHBEIN

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AND DISCRIMINATION

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Harold D. Fishbein
University of Cincinnati



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*To Diane, Nuera, and Nieta,
with the hope of a
more compassionate world*

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Preface

My overall goal for this book is to give the reader genetic/evolutionary, cultural/historical, and developmental analyses of the development of prejudice and discrimination. These analyses also emphasize how certain of the genetic/evolutionary mechanisms can be utilized either to prevent prejudice and discrimination from occurring, or to modify these behaviors once they are established. The mechanisms are simple, yet powerful. And if applied systematically, they may have the desired effects of increasing tolerance and acceptance of the outsider.

I've been mulling about and "mining" a genetic/evolutionary view of human development for more than 30 years, since I started writing my first book, *Evolution, Development, and Children's Learning* (1976). It's an exciting area of research, and many in the field of psychology have now incorporated an evolutionary view into their writing.

Peer Prejudice and Discrimination is intended both for the individual scholar and for advanced undergraduates and graduate students for classroom use. I've used the first edition for both groups of students, both in the United States and India, where I was a Fulbright lecturer in 1994. After a short period of uneasiness or uncertainty about a genetic/evolutionary approach, most students come to both appreciate it and value it. It was very gratifying also that my peers in Developmental Psychology at the American Psychological Association awarded the first edition of this book the first Eleanor Maccoby Book Award in 1996.

This second edition gave me the opportunity to make some improvements on the first edition, as well as to incorporate new material whose shape was unknown to me when the first book was published. There are

three broad significant changes to the original text. First, a number of readers and reviewers of the first edition wondered why I hadn't incorporated the historical material with the development of prejudice material. In the first edition, there was a single chapter dealing with "cultural histories" of females, African Americans, education of the deaf, and education of the mentally retarded. This chapter was followed by discussions, in separate chapters, concerning opposite-sex prejudice and discrimination, race prejudice and discrimination, discrimination toward the deaf, and prejudice and discrimination toward the mentally retarded. In the present edition, I placed the historical and prejudice and discrimination material in the same chapter and treated each type of prejudice and discrimination separately. I believe that the chapters are much better than the previous ones because of these mergers.

The second significant change got its start in 1998 when I was on sabbatical leave at the University of Chicago and having lunch with Professor Sander Gilman. I was describing to him the three genetic/evolutionary factors that predispose us to prejudice and discrimination against outgroups, when he casually mentioned that sometimes we're attracted to outgroups. After a brief pause I said "You're right." I mulled about that for a couple of years and finally got around to discussing it with Professor Bert Huether of the Biology Department at the University of Cincinnati. I wondered aloud to Bert what the genetic mechanisms might be that underlay outgroup attractiveness. After a brief pause he said "gene flow." And I said, "That's incredibly simple and elegant." I then proceeded to do some serious genetics reading and often consulted with Bert about aspects that I didn't fully grasp. He was very patient with me, and several times he edited the material I wrote about it, which appears in chapter 2 of this edition. The concept and implications of outgroup attractiveness appear in most of the remaining chapters of the book.

The third significant change mainly deals with the work of my students, Megan O'Bryan and Kim Case, my colleague Neal Ritchey of the Sociology Department of the University of Cincinnati, and myself on the bases of individual differences in prejudice and discrimination. For several years, we had been investigating this issue systematically, focusing on the influences of parents, peers, and personality on adolescents' prejudice. We were repeatedly astounded by our results, and we surprised our friends and colleagues when we conveyed these findings to them. I concluded that a discussion of this research would make a fine addition to the book. All this material comprises chapter 9, Parents, Peers, and Personality.

The various changes to the book resulted in a very substantial reorganization and the inclusion of substantial new material in both the new and original chapters. My estimate is that there are approximately 15% new references in the present edition.

The publisher of the first edition gave me the copyrights to it. I then called Lawrence Erlbaum, described what I wanted to do with a revision, and asked if he was interested in publishing it. Larry was the publisher of my second book and was familiar with my work. He said he'd be pleased to publish it, but said that it had to go through the normal acquisition process. That was fine with me, and the latter went smoothly. I was delighted by their speedy response and am very pleased that Lawrence Erlbaum Associates is the new publisher. I had planned to complete the revision in about a year and a half, but unfortunately a recurrence of Non-Hodgkins Lymphoma, aggressive type, and the subsequent high dose chemotherapy put a crimp in those plans. But, 9 months after the initial due date, I did finish the book, and here it is.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I've always liked the Beatles song "A Little Help From My Friends." For this edition of the book, several years of collaboration with Neal Ritchev provided the basis for much of the new writing. Discussions over the years with my graduate students, Jan Baker, Ron Hoover, Kim Case, and Megan O'Bryan allowed all of us to test out new ideas, expanding their views and mine about the area of prejudice and discrimination. Bert Huether was nearly always available to discuss evolution with me and answer questions about genetics. I'm not sure what Bert got out of all of this, but I surely gained a lot. Maybe that's what friends are for sometimes.

Along the way I became part of a discussion group on anti-bias education put together by the American Jewish Committee of Chicago. While associated with this group I got to know and to talk extensively with the social psychologists Jack Dovidio, Waiter Stephan, and Cookie Stephan. This was stimulating and put me in touch with materials with which I wasn't very familiar. Bill Dember of the Psychology Department of the University of Cincinnati and Bob Sala, architect and writer, edited the new chapter 9. I'm very grateful for that, especially in light of the tight time schedule I asked them to comply with. What are friends for? Finally, Dr. John Bealle, folklorist and writer, rearranged the original chapters 3, 4, and 5 into the new chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. I worked closely with John on this revision, but the writer and editor in him led to some unanticipated innovations. Thank you, John, and thank you, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

-Harold D. Fishbein

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The Nature of Prejudice

The summer after I graduated college in 1959, I took a temporary job as a swimming pool attendant at a Chicago Recreation Commission park in the southwest side of Chicago. The park was located in a rough, working-class neighborhood whose population had shifted during the preceding 10 years from extensively Slavic origin to mixed Slavic and Latin American. The transition, I was told, had been very tense and many fights had occurred between teenagers of the two ethnic groupings. The Slavs were still in the majority, and many of their adolescents and young adults were strongly anti-Negro. (In 1959, African Americans and European Americans referred to the former as "colored" or "Negroes," not "Blacks" or "African Americans." In fact, referring to a Negro as a Black was considered a potentially prejudiced statement.) The pool was open to the public, free of charge, with no official age, race, ethnic, or gender restrictions.

The lifeguards were male, recent high school graduates of Slavic origin, and residents of the neighborhood. I was the only outsider who worked at the pool, in that I was Jewish and lived in a Northside neighborhood. I had some concerns about my own safety, especially when I worked late and took the evening bus home. I felt fortunate that I was never verbally or physically attacked.

One day at the pool, I was talking with two of the lifeguards when one of the Slavic male teenagers approached the guards with a serious problem. There was a young "colored girl" in the children's pool area. What should they do? The lifeguards told me that colored children weren't "allowed" in the pool and the last one who came in, a teen-age male several years ago, was thrown out, over the fence. In fact, I never saw an African American in

the park itself during the entire summer. The dilemma the guards faced was that the child, though very dark-skinned with strongly African features, was young-and a girl. Should they throw her out now, wait until the end of the hour when everybody had to leave the pool for 10 minutes, or do nothing? Just then another male Slavic teenager approached and said there was no problem, the girl was Cuban and spoke Spanish. Everybody breathed a sigh of relief. The girl was not colored, she was Cuban.

The girl was not colored, she was Cuban. What an extraordinary experience. The girl was not seen as a Cuban *and* colored, despite the fact that she had very pronounced Black African features. She was a Cuban, which meant she was a Latin and thus okay. The neighborhood consisted of Slavs and Latins. The battle over that piece of integration had been settled, though I was not aware of any particular friendships between the two groups. They had a working relationship that the majority Slavs were unwilling to challenge. Both groups could peacefully reside in the neighborhood, use the park and pool, and even compete with each other in softball games. But, colored people had better stay clear of the park and the neighborhood. And they did, in 1959.

All of us probably have stories to tell about prejudice and discrimination among children and adolescents. Many of us "ethnics" have been on the receiving end of prejudice. Certainly our parents or grandparents, if they were immigrants to the United States, experienced prejudice either here or in their country of origin. We are told in our high school history books that the English pilgrims came to the New World to escape religious persecution in their homeland. They were welcomed by native Americans-the Indians. Ironically the descendants of those victims of prejudice and the descendants of other immigrants developed a virulent prejudice and discrimination that nearly destroyed the Indians. That story is not clearly told in the history books used to teach our children.

DEFINITIONS OF PREJUDICE AND ATTITUDES

Arguably the best and most influential book written on prejudice since World War II is Allport's *The Nature of Prejudice* (1954). The scope of this book is awesome and the intelligence and sensitivity conveyed are inspiring. Allport starts the book with some anecdotes about "ethnic" prejudice and notes two essential ingredients of it: (a) hostility and rejection, and (b) the basis of the hostility is the target individual's membership in a group. These two ingredients are dearly seen in the story of the Cuban colored girl.

Allport discusses the difference between "ordinary prejudgments," which all of us periodically engage in, and prejudice, a special type of pre-

judgment. Allport concludes: "Prejudgments become prejudices only if they are not reversible when exposed to new knowledge" (p. 9). He argues that we emotionally resist evidence that contradicts our prejudices unlike that which occurs with ordinary prejudgments. Thus, we have a third key ingredient of prejudice-resistance to new knowledge. The swimming pool story indirectly supports this ingredient-the girl couldn't be colored-she was a Cuban. Colored children would have to be hostilely rejected, but Cubans were okay.

Allport summarizes his discussion about the characteristics of prejudice with the following definition: "... prejudice is an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization. It may be felt or expressed. It may be directed toward a group as a whole, or toward an individual because he is a member of that group" (p. 9).

A more recent book on prejudice, Ehrlich's *The Social Psychology of Prejudice* (1973) provided an excellent discussion of the concept of *prejudice*. He quotes 16 definitions of prejudice from works published between 1950 and 1966 of highly regarded sociologists and social psychologists. Nearly all the definitions have the following in common: It is an unfavorable attitude directed toward others because of their membership in a particular group.

Ehrlich concurs with this consensus and defines prejudice simply as "... an attitude toward any group of people" (p. 8). Attitudes may be positive or negative. We view prejudice as a negative attitude. But what's an attitude? He defines attitude as follows. "An attitude is an interrelated set of propositions about an object or class of objects which are organized around cognitive, behavioral and affective dimensions" (p. 4).

There are four principle cognitive dimensions of propositions (or fundamental beliefs). The first is *salience*, which is the degree to which the belief is assumed to accurately characterize all the members of a group. Thus, "All Jews are miserly" is more salient than "Most Jews are miserly." The second is *intensity*, which is the degree to which beliefs are accepted and agreed with, or rejected and disagreed with. Thus, "I sort of agree with that belief" is less intense than "I strongly agree with that belief." The third is *evaluative direction*, which is the extent to which the belief about a person or group is good/favorable/desirable or bad/unfavorable/undesirable. Thus, "All Arabs are mildly deceitful" is less negative than "All Arabs are very deceitful." The fourth is *centrality*, which is the extent to which a belief is important to an individual's attitude about others. Central beliefs capture the core or essential aspects of attitudes, whereas more peripheral beliefs can be readily changed without having much of an effect on an attitude.

The behavioral dimension of attitudes refers to the extent to which one's beliefs are linked with intentions to behave in particular ways. Some beliefs only indirectly relate to behavior; for example, an American employer might say, 'Japanese mothers are very nurturing to their children.' Others

more directly relate to behavior, for example, the same employer saying, 'Japanese workers are energetic and diligent.' Ehrlich indicates that the aforementioned four cognitive dimensions of beliefs can be applied to behaviors.

The *affective dimension of attitudes* is basically how a person feels about or emotionally reacts to the object of her attitudes. One pole of these feelings is love/liking/attraction, and the other is hate/disliking/repulsion. People may be strongly attracted to others they evaluate as bad, and conversely may be repulsed by someone they evaluate as good. With prejudices, negative beliefs are usually accompanied by negative feelings.

I have spent this much time dealing with Ehrlich's work, not because I accept his definition of prejudice, but rather because he shows us how complex the concept of *attitude* is. Prejudice does involve attitudes, and to discuss them, they must be measured. Yet, in virtually none of the studies dealing with children's attitudes is there even a faint approximation to Ehrlich's analysis.

Before I give my definition of prejudice, it would be useful to present two others, those by Milner (1983) and Aboud (1988), who have written books dealing with children's racial prejudices. Milner's definition is:

Prejudiced attitudes ... are irrational, unjust, or intolerant dispositions towards other groups, and they are often accompanied by stereotyping. This is the attribution of the supposed characteristics of the whole group to all its individual members. Stereotypes exaggerate the uniformity within a group and similarly exaggerate the differences between this group and others. (p. 5)

Like other writers in this arena, Milner maintains that from a psychological viewpoint, there are no essential differences between racial prejudices and other forms of prejudice. He notes that the occurrence of physical differences between groups may facilitate stereotyping and prejudice, but those are certainly not necessary. Milner's definition is similar to Allport's, especially if we equate "irrational, unjust, or intolerant" with "faulty and inflexible." Additionally, Milner's "stereotyping" is equivalent to Allport's "generalizing" about groups.

Finally, Aboud (1988) defined racial prejudice as "... an organized predisposition to respond in an unfavorable manner toward people from an ethnic group because of their ethnic affiliation" (p. 4). This definition fits closely with the core definition of prejudice found in Ehrlich's group of 16. What distinguishes it from Allport's and Milner's definitions is that it lacks the idea of "faulty and inflexible." Thus, a well-founded unfavorable generalization about a group, according to Aboud's definition, would be prejudice.

Based on this discussion, I adopted a definition of prejudice that closely follows the ideas of Allport and Milner: *Prejudice* is an unreasonable nega-

tive attitude toward others because of their membership in a particular group.

The quality that makes an attitude unreasonable is that it does not readily get modified when exposed to new and conflicting information. Prejudice is not an all-or-none phenomenon. Rather, like other attitudes, it is graded, as Ehrlich pointed out. The extent to which children will be prejudiced at any point in time depends on (a) their genetic endowment, (b) their specific experiences of the target group, (c) their own personalities, (d) the prejudiced attitudes expressed to them by family and friends, and (e) the cultural portrayal of the target group by television, books, and schools. Prejudice, of necessity, will change over time, because children gain new information and their cognitive, social, and emotional understandings and capacities change with maturation and experience.

The measurement of prejudice, as already defined, has rarely been successfully accomplished with children and adolescents. The major stumbling block has been assessing the unreasonable aspect of the negative attitudes. There appear to be no relevant studies that have directly attempted this assessment. The research efforts seem to assume, as an example, that negative attitudes directed toward Blacks or Whites are unreasonable. From an adult viewpoint, they may be, but from a child's viewpoint, the negative attitudes may be reasonable. In a simple case, a child is told by her parents that drinking milk is good, crossing streets without looking both ways is bad, policemen can be trusted, strangers in cars are dangerous, and that Whites will try to hurt you. Is it reasonable to have positive attitudes toward police, negative attitudes toward strangers in cars, and yet unreasonable to have negative attitudes toward White children?

In another simple example, if a child has had a number of unpleasant encounters with hearing impaired children, are negative attitudes toward hearing impaired peers reasonable or unreasonable? Categorization is inevitable, normal, and necessary for adaptive functioning (Allport, 1954). It could be concluded that in the second example, the child's negative attitudes toward the hearing impaired were reasonable in that they were based on a consistent generalization. Is the child prejudiced? Allport would argue, and I concur, that if the attitudes were inflexible and didn't change with new and conflicting information, then the child would be considered prejudiced (because the attitudes are not reasonable). To state that negative attitudes toward a particular group are reasonable is *not* to say that they are desirable. Frequently, responsible members of a community will try to get children and others to change their negative attitudes. If successful, that probably is an indication that these attitudes were flexible and hence, *not* prejudiced.

Finally, there is an important area of human beliefs that may appear to lead to prejudice, but technically does not—religion. There are many

contemporary and historical examples in which "nonbelievers" have been treated with extreme prejudice by members of fundamentalist religious groups (e.g., Jews and Protestants during the Spanish Inquisition). To the atheist and agnostic, the beliefs held by fundamentalists are unreasonable; however, within the latter's belief system, they are being reasonable. For example, in a conversation I had with a recent convert to Christian fundamentalism, I was told that, as a Jew, I was "an agent of the devil." I was relieved that this person didn't plan to organize any action against me or my fellow Jews.

In our definition of prejudice, an *unreasonable attitude* is one whose cognitive component can be disproved by contradictory information. If such disproof is not possible, then despite horrible acts carried out against others by religious fundamentalists, it can not be asserted that prejudice underlies these behaviors. Religious faith and belief are rarely susceptible to proof or disproof. If nonbelievers are thought of as being agents of the devil, and thus treated with suspicion and distrust, there is no obvious way that that belief can be contradicted. Thus, beyond chapter 1 in this book, religious-based attitudes about the religious beliefs of others will not be dealt with.

DEFINITION OF DISCRIMINATION

Prejudices are particular kinds of attitudes that, according to Ehrlich (1973) have three major dimensions—cognitive, affective, and behavioral. The behavioral dimension reflects a disposition to act negatively toward others, and not the behavior acts themselves. It is thus tempting to define discrimination in relation to prejudice. However, it frequently happens that people who are not prejudiced toward a particular target group may act negatively toward members of that group because of their group affiliation. For example, some nonprejudiced real estate agents may not show houses in certain neighborhoods to members of particular ethnic groups, for example, Jews, African Americans, or Hispanics, because the agents have been instructed by their employers or the homeowners to not do so. Or some female employment managers may not hire women for particular jobs, such as those in construction, because of cultural norms indicating that women do not have the physical capacity to do the work.

Thus, acting negatively (discriminating) toward individuals because of their group membership may or may not be based on prejudice. Accordingly, we adopt the following definition of discrimination. It is similar to definitions offered by Allport (1954) and Marger (1991): *Discrimination* involves harmful actions toward others because of their membership in a particular group.

The discrimination can be mild, for example, ignoring someone, calling someone a derogatory name behind his or her back, or it can be extreme,

for instance, the mutual killing by ethnic groups in the 1990s in what was formerly Yugoslavia, or the slaughter of Jews by the Nazis in the 1940s. With children, discrimination is usually manifested by avoidance, rudeness, name calling, and, on occasion, fighting.

Although discrimination is not always based on prejudice, it frequently is, especially if the perpetrator is acting on his own as opposed to on behalf of some institution or authority. Children, for example, may be coerced into discriminatory acts by their parents or neighbors. But when they're freely interacting without adult control, it is likely that discrimination and prejudice go hand-in-hand.

Which comes first, prejudice or discrimination? Frederickson and Knobel (1980) answered in the following way:

Discrimination may appear to be simply acting out of prior prejudice, but there is evidence to suggest that prejudice becomes fully developed and formally sanctioned only *after* the process of differential treatment is well under way. Attitude and action tend to feed on each other, creating a vicious circle that works to enhance the power and prestige of one group at the expense of the other. (p. 31)

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PREJUDICE AND BEHAVIOR

In the early 1930s, R. T. La Piere, a White American, traveled widely in the United States with a Chinese couple. The three of them stopped for food at 184 restaurants and for lodging at 66 hotels and motels. Only once did the manager refuse to provide service for them. After completing the trip, La Piere wrote to the proprietors of each establishment, enclosing a questionnaire that included an item asking whether they would take "members of the Chinese race as guests." One hundred twenty-eight returned the questionnaires and more than 92% of them stated that they would not accept Chinese people as guests (La Piere, 1934).

On the basis of their questionnaire responses it appears that over 92% of these establishments were prejudiced against Chinese. Yet, in a face-to-face interaction, less than 1% behaved in a prejudiced manner. How can we understand this dramatic discrepancy?

Milner (1983) and Wicker (1969) discussed this issue in the broader context of the relation between attitudes and behavior; in general, there is a relatively weak correlation between the two. Milner and Wicker identified two groups of factors that play a part in mediating behavior: personal factors and situational factors. Salient among the personal ones are other attitudes held by people and competing motives. Thus, the proprietors in La Piere's study may have disliked Chinese but may have held strong attitudes toward treating strangers with courtesy. Further, they may have wanted to

reject the Chinese couple but were also motivated to make money. Among situational factors two of the salient ones are the presence of other people and social norms for proper behavior. The Chinese couple weren't alone, but rather with a White, male friend. Additionally, restaurants and hotels are supposed to care for guests, not turn them away.

W. G. Stephan (1985) summarized much of the empirical research dealing with the relationship between prejudice and behavior. There are several clusters of findings for which accurate generalizations can be made. In one group of studies involving no direct contact between people, for example, voting behavior and signing petitions, there was a fairly strong relationship between prejudice and discrimination. For example, White Americans who are prejudiced against Blacks do sign documents opposing housing integration. In studies involving direct contact between prejudiced people and the targets of prejudice, the findings are more complex. One of the largest sets of these studies involves "helping" behaviors, for example, Blacks versus Whites making an emergency call to seek assistance. In these studies, Whites who receive these calls and who express little prejudice often discriminate the most against Blacks. W. G. Stephan (1985) suggested that two opposing attitudes are in play—sympathy for the underdog and feelings of aversion. In responding to a questionnaire, sympathy wins out, but when asked to take action, aversion predominates.

In a third group of interaction studies, where the measures of prejudice are quite specific and the behavior measured is specific, there is a moderate correlation between prejudice and degree of discrimination. W. G. Stephan (1985) interpreted all the findings from the view of how individuals evaluate the relative costs and benefits of expressing particular opinions and acting in particular ways in particular social contexts. So, the link between prejudice and behavior will be strong in situations where individuals believe they will benefit from being consistent in their beliefs and actions, but the link will be weak where the benefits favor inconsistency.

Finally, Schutz and Six (1996) carried out a meta-analysis of 60 studies that examined the relationship between prejudice and discrimination. The correlations ranged from about .20 to about .60, with the average being .28. This indicates that although prejudice and discrimination are modestly related, they are generally highly independent of each other. Thus, conclusions drawn from prejudice research can not readily be applied to discrimination research, with the converse holding also.

STEREOTYPES

We saw in the previous discussion of Milner's (1983) work that stereotypes are closely related to prejudices. The current use and meaning of the term, *stereotypes*, was originated during the 1920s by the American journalist, Wal-

ter Lippmann (Bethlehem, 1985). Most contemporary psychologists define the term in a similar way to Lippmann. For R. Brown (1986), it is "... a shared conception of the character of a group" (p. 586). Milner (1983) defined the term as "overgeneralizations" about the characteristics of a group, usually undesirable, which function to exaggerate the differences between groups. For Ehrlich (1973), stereotypes are "... a set of beliefs and disbeliefs about any group of people" (p. 20). Finally, D. L. Hamilton and Troler (1986) defined a stereotype "... as a cognitive structure that contains the perceiver's knowledge, beliefs, and expectancies about some human group" (p. 133). It is clear from the psychological literature that the development of stereotypes, as categories of beliefs about groups of people, is inevitable, normal, and necessary for adaptive functioning.

Stereotypes may be positive or negative. Negative stereotypes, for example, "All Asians are secretive," may differ from prejudices in three ways: (a) They may not be "unreasonable" as that term has been defined; (b) They may not have an affective component, for example, that Asians are secretive may be felt about with indifference; and (c) They may not dispose one to behave in any particular way. However, because of the ways that stereotypes and prejudices are measured, it is sometimes difficult to determine which one is being assessed. Strongly held negative stereotypes certainly have the look and feel of prejudices. However, in an analysis of a number of experiments that measured both prejudice and stereotypes, Dovidio, Brigham, B. T. Johnson, and Gaertner (1996) found the average correlation between the two to be about .25.

Given the facts that, at a minimum, stereotypes and prejudices share the belief component of attitudes, and that a substantial amount of research has been carried out with stereotypes, we can profit by examining this research. In the following discussion it is likely that the conclusions drawn are applicable to prejudices.

Roger Brown (1986) raised two interesting issues about stereotypes that are pertinent to the purposes of this book. The first deals with consequences of the way stereotypes have usually been measured. The second deals with the relation between stereotypes and how we behaviorally deal with individual members of the stereotyped group. The latter discussion gives an explanation of the "some of my best friends are ..." phenomenon.

In 1933, two social scientists, Katz and Braly, asked Princeton University undergraduates to select from a large list of traits those that were "typical" for each of 10 ethnic groups. This technique was the way Katz and Braly measured stereotypes. The procedure was repeated in 1951 and 1967 by different researchers for the then current Princeton undergraduates. Table 1.1 contains part of the summary by Karlins, Coffman, and Walters (1969) of the data for four ethnic groups for the three testing periods. As you can see, for most of the groups, there is some, but not complete, continuity

TABLE 1.1
The Five Most Frequently Cited Stereotypes for Americans,
Germans, Jews, and Negroes: 1933, 1951, 1967

1933	1951	1967
Americans		
Industrious	Materialistic	Materialistic
Intelligent	Intelligent	Ambitious
Materialistic	Industrious	Pleasure loving
Ambitious	Pleasure loving	Industrious
Progressive	Individualistic	Intelligent
Germans		
Scientifically minded	Scientifically minded	Industrious
Industrious	Industrious	Scientifically minded
Stolid	Extremely nationalistic	Efficient
Intelligent	Intelligent	Extremely nationalistic
Methodical	Aggressive	Aggressive
Jews		
Shrewd	Shrewd	Ambitious
Mercenary	Intelligent	Materialistic
Industrious	Industrious	Intelligent
Grasping	Mercenary	Industrious
Intelligent	Ambitious	Shrewd
Negroes		
Superstitious	Superstitious	Musical
Lazy	Musical	Happy-go-lucky
Happy-go-lucky	Lazy	Lazy
Ignorant	Ignorant	Pleasure loving
Musical	Pleasure loving	Ostentatious

Note. From "On the Fading of Social Stereotypes: Studies in Three Generations of College Students," by M. Karlins, T. L. Coffman, and G. Walters, 1969, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 13, 1-16. Copyright © 1969 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted with permission.

from generation to generation. Americans became viewed as less progressive and more pleasure loving from 1933 to 1967; Germans, in the same period, were viewed as more aggressive and nationalistic and less intelligent and stolid. The Jews came to be seen as less mercenary and grasping, and more materialistic and ambitious—more American. Negroes lost the stereotype of "ignorant" in 1967, but not those of being lazy and musical.

Nearly everyone knows that all these stereotypes are incorrect in the sense that they do not characterize all or even most of the members of the various ethnic groups. As a consequence, we tend to discount them, at least when held by others. Part of the problem stems from the way the data were

collected-students were asked to identify traits typical of each group. No one knows how "typical" was understood, but there is good reason to believe that the students were forced to make absolute judgments about groups rather than relative ones. For example, what does it mean that Negroes are musical? Relative to what or whom?

Subsequent research by C. McCauley and Stitt (1978) and others corrected this problem and presented us with a more palatable view of stereotypes. The essential idea is that a trait is seen to characterize an ethnic group if it is more typical of that group than it is for people in general. Subjects were asked the following kinds of questions: What percentage of Germans are extremely nationalistic? What percentage of people in the world generally are extremely nationalistic? What percentage of Germans are superstitious? What percentage of people in the world generally are superstitious? C. McCauley and Stitt (1978), for the first question, found that the average percentage for people in general was 35.4, and for Germans, 56.3. For the second question, the percentages were 42.1 for people in general, and 30.4 for Germans. By computing the ratio for each pair of percentages, you can determine how much more or less typical each stereotype is for Germans, or for any ethnic group. Thus Germans are viewed as much more nationalistic than others (the ratio is much greater than 1.0), but appreciably less superstitious (the ratio is much less than 1.0).

Are these stereotypes valid? Are Germans really more nationalistic and less superstitious? There is no way to determine the answers. How do you find out how many people in general are superstitious? Stereotypes function to help us bring conceptual order to our experiences, and periodically to make decisions on the basis of them. We assume that the ones we hold are, more or less, valid.

Do we always act on the basis of our stereotypes? Most of us have heard people deride a particular ethnic group, and soften their stance by saying, "Some of my best friends are ..." Some of their best friends may really be members of that group. R. Brown (1986) helped us understand this phenomenon by casting it in the framework of decision-making theory. He points out an important distinction between general *base rate* knowledge about a group of which a person is a member, for example, lawyers, engineers, women, Jews, and *individuating information* (specific information) about a particular member of that group. Stereotypes are what is believed to be base rates about groups, for example, that Germans are more nationalistic than people in general. Suppose you wanted to hire a person for international work and it was very important to you that the employee not be nationalistic. All things being equal, if you believed the German stereotype, you would not hire a German for that job. But, you interview several people, and one of whom is a German who does not appear to be in the least nationalistic. What do you do?

There is a rule in decision theory, Bayes' Rule (Goldberg, 1960), which states that the optimal decision we can make will take into account both base rates and individuating information. Intuitively this makes sense. The individuating information is usually based on a small, potentially inadequate sample of behavior for one particular person, whereas the base rates tell us something based on many people across many situations. It turns out, in a wide variety of laboratory studies dealing with such stereotypes as the relative assertiveness of men, the political conservatism of engineers, and the relative emotional instability of "night" people, that most of us do not use Bayes' Rule. Surprisingly, people do not use stereotypes either. When subjects in experiments have relevant individuating information, they ignore the stereotype and make their decisions on the individuating information. Thus the aforementioned employer might very well hire the German applicant.

The social psychology literature has many examples of prejudices overriding individuating information, and of the converse. Nevertheless, laboratory research makes it clear that persons are not necessarily hypocrites or liars when they tell you that "some of their best friends are...."

As we noted, stereotypes are some of the ways we categorize people in order to help bring order to our concepts about them, and to reduce the enormous amount of social information we are exposed to in our daily lives. D. L. Hamilton and Trolier (1986) asked what are the psychological consequences of categorizing others.

When the person is a member of one group (the ingroup) and is making comparisons between her or his group and members of another group (the outgroup), five interesting effects occur:

1. People believe they are more similar to ingroup members in a host of unrelated ways than they are to outgroup members.
2. Yet ingroup members believe that there is more personal diversity in the ingroup than in the outgroup, for example, "They're all alike in that group (the outgroup)."
3. On the other hand, almost in contradiction to the aforementioned, when a person rates members of an ingroup and an outgroup on various psychological characteristics, outgroup members receive more extreme ratings, for example, "They're tremendous artists, whereas we're pretty good."
4. Individuals are more likely to remember more positive information about ingroup than outgroup members and more negative information about outgroup than ingroup members.
5. Individuals are more likely to perceive more favorable causes for the same behavior of ingroup than outgroup members, for example, "We

do it because we're good-hearted. They do it because they want to look good."

It should be clear from Hamilton and Trolier's research that categorizing people does more than bring order and reduce information flow of our experiences. Categorizing also biases the way we perceive, remember, and understand others, thus reinforcing the categories themselves. As a consequence when new and potentially contradictory information is presented, individuals often unconsciously distort it so that it will be experienced as consistent with their categories. For example, Bigler and Liben (1993) presented 4- to 9-year-old European-American children stories dealing with traits and social relations that were either consistent with or inconsistent with cultural stereotypes about African Americans. Children generally had poorer memory for the culturally inconsistent than consistent stories. Moreover, those who held strong racial stereotypes had the poorest recall, overall.

We develop beliefs about others because of their group membership; and has been seen, it makes a big difference whether they are ingroup or outgroup members. In the next two sections we explore some of consequences of more extreme beliefs about outgroup members.

STIGMAS

During World War II, the Jews in Nazi-occupied countries were required to wear six-pointed stars (the Star of David) on their outer garments. This identified them as Jews, who were considered by the Nazis to be less than human, but indistinguishable from non-Jews in nearly all other ways (male circumcision was another way, but not readily observable). The Jews were stigmatized by the Nazis, and the Star of David was the outward sign. Unlike the topic of stereotyping, there is no ambiguity about the relationship between stigmas and prejudice. Moreover, unlike other forms of prejudice, in which the connection between attitudes and behavior is not strong, stigmatized groups are nearly always discriminated against, sometimes fatally.

Goffman, one of the most imaginative social scientists of our time, wrote a book on this topic, *Stigma, Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity* (1963). Goffman tells us that the Greeks originated the term *stigma* whose meaning referred "... to bodily signs designed to expose something unusual and bad about the moral status of the signifier" (p. 1). The current meaning of the term is derived from its Greek origins but deals with the "disgrace" itself—some characteristic or attribute of an individual that

spoils, discredits, or disqualifies him-and not so much to the physical sign itself. Stigmas help define the social identity of individuals and should be seen in a social context. Thus, a stigma to one group, for example, a criminal record to middle-class people, may not be a stigma to another group, for example, a criminal record to members of the Mafia. In fact, for the latter group, it may be a positive characteristic.

Stigmas are based on objective characteristics of people, for example, being Jewish, African American, physically deformed, deaf, mentally retarded, homosexual, an ex-mental patient, but these characteristics usually have no inherent stigmatizing effect. The stigmatized characteristic gets identified as such by one or more groups in a culture and comes to stand for, or signify the person himself, for example, "He's an African American," "She's deaf." Being stigmatized is to be dehumanized or depersonalized, which leads to being treated in often discriminatory, predictable ways. The person with the stigma becomes an object, a special devalued one.

Goffman (1963) described three broad types of stigma: (a) physical deformities or incapacities; (b) "blemishes of individual character," such as imprisonment, mental disorder, radical political behavior; and (c) "tribal" ones of race, nation, and religion. The latter are "inherited" either genetically, or through one's family of origin. Goffman views these as having more or less equivalent effects on adults, but I think they may have very different developmental paths for children. As an example, there may be characteristics such as physical deformities or behavioral abnormalities that are readily stigmatized by children. Stigmas for more purely, culturally defined characteristics such as religious or sexual preference may be acquired more slowly or with greater difficulty because they are not readily observable. There may be developmental differences for acquiring stigmas for which the person is blameworthy, for example, criminality, as contrasted with those for which a person is blameless, such as race or ethnicity.

The causes for stigmatizing others are probably no different than those underlying prejudice in general. As has been noted, forming social categories is a natural consequence of processing social information. Certainly stigmas "aid" in that process. I. Katz (1979) indicated that there is a fair amount of evidence to support a "scapegoating" cause. That is, individuals or groups are periodically frustrated or provoked in their attempts to attain certain goals and blame others for their failures, for example, "The Blacks are getting all the good jobs, now." Scapegoating is essentially displaced aggression. I. Katz (1979) suggested another related cause that deals with attempts to assuage guilt or moral discomfort based on our knowledge of the existence of stigmatized groups. We see that it is wrong to mistreat homosexuals, or Blacks, or whomever. In order to justify that treatment *and* our failures to get others to change that mistreatment, we come to believe that the stigmatized group really deserves it—they *are* morally inferior. This is es-

entially a dissonance explanation. Still one more possible explanation is that the existence of stigmatized groups makes us feel better about ourselves. We may see ourselves as morally superior, or alternatively, as fortunate that we are "not one of them." Psychologically and socially, status is a powerful motivator of behavior.

One of the consequences of stigmatizing others is that it produces "ambivalent" feelings in us toward members of the stigmatized group (I. Katz, 1981). The concept of ambivalence has its roots in early 20th century psychoanalytic and sociological theory. It refers to dual or opposing feelings we occasionally have towards others, such as love and hate, attraction, and repulsion. In the realm of stigmas, the opposing feelings are hostility or aversion versus acceptance or sympathy; when these dual feelings are aroused during interactions with stigmatized others, we try to resolve the incompatibility or conflict through a variety of behavioral strategies. One of the important consequences of ambivalence is that our positive or negative feelings get exaggerated or amplified, depending on the situation. Thus moderate concern can get transformed into deep compassion and moderate dislike into marked rejection.

I. Katz (1981) developed and tested these ideas through research involving two stigmatized groups in the United States: Blacks and those who have physical disabilities. The dominant feeling many Whites have toward Blacks is rejection, and by able-bodied toward disabled persons, sympathy. But rejection toward Blacks is often accompanied by feelings of positive concern about racial discrimination; and sympathy toward the handicapped is often accompanied by avoidance or patronization.

In a typical racial experiment, Katz brings White adult subjects into a laboratory setting and they are met by a Black or White confederate of the experimenter (This partnership is unknown to the subjects) and a White experimenter. Some activity is carried out in which the subjects are asked to do something, for example, helping or insulting the confederate. Then the subjects are asked to fill out an impression rating scale about the confederate. Similar procedures are used with nonhandicapped adults as subjects and confederates who are either normal appearing or in wheelchairs. The basic measure in all these cases is the subjects' responses to the two types of confederates.

Based on the theory that ambivalence causes exaggerated responses to stigmatized persons, Katz predicted that both positive and negative reactions to Black relative to White confederates and to handicapped relative to nonhandicapped confederates would be more marked. These predictions were supported in nearly all experiments. For example, in one study, White subjects were asked by the researcher to make highly critical statements to the Black or White confederate about the latter's personality. Subsequently, the subjects were asked by the confederate to help him with a te-

dious task. The Black confederate received much more help than the White ones, which indicates greater sympathy for the Black than White persons.

We can see from this scenario that the ramifications of prejudice and discrimination are complex, but occasionally predictable in surprising ways. Stigmatizing others is perhaps the most debasing form of prejudice and thus the most psychologically destructive for the targets. The physical consequences of stigmatization can also be enormous as seen in the nearly total annihilation of European Jews by the Nazis during World War II.

Official stigmatization of certain groups within a culture does not usually lead to their physical destruction. In fact, it leads to their continuity over time because of the important functions the stigmatized groups serve for the larger society. We can learn a great deal about the study of prejudice by examining such situations.

UNTOUCHABILITY AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF BEING STIGMATIZED

This section is based on Passin's (1955) article dealing with outcasts in India and Japan, the books by DeVos and Wagatsuma (1966) on the Japanese, and Isaacs (1965) on the Asian Indians. Although the existence of "untouchable" castes in India is well-known in Western culture, comparable groups have existed in Japan for over 1,000 years. There are marked similarities in the origins of these groups in the two cultures as well as in the social and psychological consequences of being untouchable. Unlike the idea of social class, which implies the long-term possibility of upward or downward movement, castes are more or less permanent inherited characteristics of people.

In both countries, *untouchability* was a legally sanctioned status for substantial portions of the population. In India these groups comprised about 15% of the society and in Japan, about 2%. People of untouchable castes literally could not be touched by other groups without the other groups running the risk of being contaminated or defiled themselves. Untouchables lived in segregated villages or neighborhoods and were generally isolated from others. In both cultures, untouchables were often viewed as not quite human. In Japan the name for the major untouchable group, *Eta*, refers to four-legged animals. Legally, they were often restricted in the clothes they could wear, the way they could decorate their houses, and the way they could behave publicly. They could not share public facilities with the higher castes. Their legal rights were greatly reduced, and they could not attend school. Also, until present times they could not own land, which in agrarian societies would be a powerful hindrance to overcoming poverty.

The category of untouchability was first officially banned in Japan in 1871, and in India, in 1949. But, similar to the effects of abolition of slavery

in the United States, the Japanese and Indian ex-untouchables remain stigmatized in their societies, socially and physically separated from their countrymen.

Passin (1955) suggested, and Isaacs (1965) and DeVos and Wagatsuma (1966) concurred, that there were three essential elements required for the evolution of untouchability. The *first* was that the society have a rigid and hereditary caste system. In both societies, historically there were three to four hierarchically arranged caste groups and below them, the untouchables. The *second* was the belief that status differences between people are inherent in the nature of the universe; and moreover that these differences are based on an underlying inherited moral state. For the Indian culture, the concept of transmitting one's moral state across generations is based on religious beliefs. For the Japanese, transmission of a "good" or a "base" moral state is not directly based on religious principles.

The *third* element was the existence of a religious belief that associates the concept of pollution and ritual impurity with certain substances, usually dirt, blood, and dead animals and people. Excrement falls in the polluted category in India but not in Japan. The key aspect here is that people with certain occupations regularly and necessarily come in contact with polluted substances, for example, street cleaners, butchers, undertakers, and thus become polluted themselves. The "fact" of this pollution indicates that they have a base moral state received from their ancestors, which will transmit to their offspring. Thus, even if untouchables are no longer in contact with polluted substances they are still polluted, and "contagious" to others. Indeed, in both Japan and India, the majority of ex-untouchables do *not* engage in jobs that put them in contact with these substances.

Despite the unproven beliefs many Indians and Japanese have that the untouchables come from different racial stocks than the higher castes, there are essentially no physical differences between the groups. In Japan the untouchables, officially called *Buraku*, look exactly like their neighbors. There are behavioral differences, however, but these are related to education and social class differences. In India there are a number of regional differences in physical appearance. Generally, lighter skin is more valued than dark skin. Although the untouchables, now officially referred to as *scheduled castes*, may often be darker than the higher castes, there is substantial overlap in skin color. Thus, a very dark-skinned or very light-skinned Indian may be from the highest as well as from the lowest castes. In both countries, there are generally no language or religious differences between the untouchables and those of the higher castes.

The original creation of untouchable castes, and their unofficial maintenance today is largely based on economic, social, and psychological reasons. Economically, the nonoutcaste groups are assured that many of the least desirable work activities will be carried out, likely for relatively low

wages. High status or high paying jobs in no cultures go to the lowest social classes. For the untouchables, however, employment in these undesirable jobs is guaranteed because they have a monopoly on them. Further, these occupations are essential to the maintenance of the society so that the likelihood of unemployment is often less for them than for individuals in the higher caste groups.

Socially, the ex-untouchable groups are given a great deal of autonomy in governing their own segregated communities. They are well-known to each other and mutually supportive. This geographic segregation gives the higher caste some assurance that they will not come in contact with ex-untouchables. Psychologically, there are the benefits to the non-outcasts that we previously noted in our discussion of stigmas. The status of the ex-untouchables is enormously degrading. Apparently, nearly all ex-untouchables carry the emotional scars of this degradation throughout their lives.

In Japan and India, the official elimination of untouchable status came about through changes in the government. In Japan, the Tokugawa rulers were replaced by the Meiji, and in India, the British were replaced by the Indians themselves. The elimination of slavery in the South in the United States occurred after the start of the Civil War, not before it. In all three cases, a humane philosophy overcame entrenched cultural practices at times of political revolution. Thus powerful conservative forces had to be overcome to produce these humane changes.

Both Isaacs (1965) and DeVos and Wagatsuma (1966) wrote in depth about the psychological consequences of being born into an ex-untouchable caste. They have pointed out some obvious parallels to being born African American. In both Japan and India, the ex-untouchable children usually perform more poorly in school and have a higher dropout rate than other groups. In segregated schools, it is often difficult to find higher caste teachers to instruct them, and in integrated schools, the higher caste children often discriminate against the ex-untouchables. Ex-untouchable children, adolescents and adults are somewhat apprehensive about leaving their communities for fear of being ostracized. As a consequence of persistent hostility or the threat of it from the larger culture, many, perhaps most ex-untouchables come to view themselves as contaminated. Because of this persistent discrimination, their expectations about future success in the larger culture are minimal. The safety net is the segregated neighborhood, but at the same time, that is the "spider's web."

Education and moving to the cities offer some prospect of escape from untouchability. But escape can be accomplished mainly through "passing"-pretending to be a higher caste individual. The psychological costs are enormous. One loses his support system because he has cut himself off from family and friends, has a constant fear of discovery, and cannot live a normal social life. Moreover, in these two cultures, people are very con-

cerned about "family of origin" and make inquiries about it. You have to lie, but there is a fair chance that it will be discovered.

Isaacs (1965) and DeVos and Wagatsuma (1966) reported that some progress has been made against this stigmatization, but it has been slow. No one anticipates that it will be erased before several generations have passed. If the history of prejudice and discrimination toward the Jews and the Blacks is any indicator, several generations is an optimistic speculation.

PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN SLAVERY

As noted, several writers have pointed out the parallels between ex-untouchability in Asia and ex-slavery in the United States. This section explores some of the socialization consequences of being raised as a slave and of being descended from African-American slaves. Two will be emphasized here—the positive and negative consequences—feeling worthy versus feeling unworthy. The slaves and their descendants have a heritage of being free people from African societies rich in cultural traditions. They were captured by other Africans, and uprooted from their sources of nurturance, protection, and identity. A new imposed definition of self was given them, a definition that attempted to strip them of dignity. There were contradictions, the most salient, perhaps, being Christianization. As slaves, they were perceived by their masters and society as being human enough, worthy enough to accept the Christian bible and God. Most developed two personas, the humble, usually obedient, self-effacing presentation of self to White people, and freedom-loving, self-respectful, mutually supportive presentation of self to their Black relatives and friends. A mistake often made by the White population was believing that the persona shown to Whites was the true persona. The slaves' frequent attempted escapes and disobedience were attributed to alleged Black subhuman qualities, as opposed to natural human responses to forced enslavement.

But did the slaves, to some extent, accept the White view of themselves? There is a psychoanalytic concept, *identification with the aggressor*, that has been used to understand the apparently contradictory reactions of prisoners toward their guards (Bettleheim, 1943). In the Nazi concentration camps, Jews, Poles, and other ethnic groups occasionally accepted the values of their prison guards toward themselves. Some viewed the guards as superior beings, and themselves as inferior, deserving of their dehumanization.

A more recent theoretical view of comparable phenomena is referred to as the *Stockholm Syndrome* (Graham & Rawlings, 1991). The syndrome derives its name from observations of value and affectional shifts by hostages leading to bonding with their captors. There are four major conditions that

are prerequisites to developing this syndrome: (a) an individual's survival is threatened by "others," (b) he is unable to escape from those "others,"! (c) he is isolated from people who are not similarly threatened, and (d) the others periodically show kindness to him. When a person develops the syndrome he comes to adopt the captors' values as his own and to feel strong affection for them. These four conditions often occurred in slavery conditions, which suggests that many African Americans at least partially accepted the White people's views of them. That is, many slaves, operating under the psychodynamics of the Stockholm Syndrome came to see themselves as less worthy than the Whites who controlled them, threatened their lives, but who periodically showed them kindness.

Graham and Rawlings (1991) documented the evidence of this syndrome in abused women and abused children. They are in the process of extending their analyses to women, in general, in American society. Identification with the aggressor or the Stockholm Syndrome likely applies to all oppressed groups in any culture, and not only to hostages, abused people, or slaves. Hence, it makes sense to consider its applicability to many post-Civil War African Americans, who are still oppressed and still engaged in the struggle for freedom. Thus, the theme of feeling worthy versus feeling unworthy is not restricted to slavery. Rather, there is historical evidence indicating that for African Americans, these contradictory feelings live side by side within the group.

THEORIES OF PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION: INDIVIDUAL AND CULTURAL/HISTORICAL INFLUENCES

Where do prejudice and discrimination come from? Many parents are shocked when their children express prejudiced attitudes that are antagonistic to long-standing family values. Contrariwise, how is it that some children from bigoted families are not in the least prejudiced? Is prejudice in the individual, or is it in the culture?

Allport (1954) cautioned us that the law of multiple causation is at play in all social phenomena, especially for prejudice and discrimination. That is, there are nearly always several causes underlying the development and expression of prejudice and discrimination. He identified six major "causes" or theories of prejudice, five of which vary along a dimension bounded by individualistic perceptions and beliefs at one end, and by cultural/historical influences at the other. It should be noted that the six causes are oriented toward understanding ethnic prejudice; but I believe

¹The masculine is used, but the syndrome applies to both genders.

most, if not all, are applicable to other targets of prejudice. I briefly summarize them.

The most transitory and individualistic of the six is called the *phenomenological emphasis*. In this view, the person's current beliefs, perceptions, and the verbal labels he uses regarding any particular group determine how he will react to the situation he is confronted with. There is an immediacy about these reactions, including prejudiced ones, which may be quite different on subsequent occasions.

A more enduring individualistic cause is the *psychodynamic emphasis*. In this view, people develop more or less stable personality characteristics that they bring to all social situations. These characteristics predispose the individual to react in prejudiced ways. Allport (1954) noted three types of these characteristics: *conflict resolution*, *frustration reactions*, and *character structure*. Conflict resolution refers to the persistent attempts of some people to gain power or status over others. Frustration reactions, also known as *scapegoating*, refers to the persistent attempts to direct hostile impulses toward minority groups in order to discharge feelings of frustration and deprivation experienced in daily life. Character structure primarily refers to "... insecure and anxious personalities who take the authoritarian and exclusionist way of life rather than the relaxed trusting democratic way" (p. 216). In the next section, we present an extensive discussion of this type.

The third cause is the *situational emphasis*. In this view, prejudice is seen as arising out of conformity to the current social forces operating in a culture. The focus here is sociopsychological, as opposed to purely individualistic or purely cultural/historical.

The fourth cause, *sociocultural emphasis*, is the principal type of explanation of prejudice offered by sociologists and anthropologists. The total social context is examined with the view of identifying those traditions and conditions that produce conflict among different groups, for example, job and housing competition, and opportunities for upward social mobility. These lead to increased uncertainty about one's values and customs, which in turn leads to prejudice against the groups of people with which one is in conflict.

The fifth cause, *historical emphasis*, recognizes that there is nearly always a long history involved with conflict and discrimination between particular groups in a given culture. This history serves to both justify the prejudices held by dominant groups and to perpetuate them. Many historians believe that economic exploitation is at the heart of the matter. If Blacks, Asians, or Jews are historically seen as morally or "racially" inferior, then negative treatment of them by the economically dominant groups is sanctioned.

The sixth cause, *emphasis on earned reputation* is not on the individualistic-cultural/historical dimension. This cause asserts that there are perceived differences between groups, and that these differences stimulate dislike

and hostility. The notion of *earned reputation* acknowledges that at least some of the perceived differences are based on objective reality. Indeed, in our previous discussion of stereotypes, we implicitly stated that there is often a reasonable basis for the existence of particular stereotypes.

A more recent analysis of theories of prejudice and discrimination by Marger (1991) both simplifies and extends Allport's (1954) conclusions. Marger identifies three types of theories: psychological, normative, and power conflict. These are not mutually exclusive, but rather, the causes described often work together. The psychological theories are exactly the same as Allport's psychodynamic emphasis, and need not be redescribed. Normative theories are combinations of Allport's situational emphasis and historical emphasis. The essence of these theories is that there are social norms in a given culture that tell us the way we ought to perceive and behave toward members of particular outgroups. These norms get transmitted to our children through the processes of socialization. Sometimes socialization practices are subtle, almost unconscious, for example, the parents referring to the African-American cleaning woman as "the girl" and other times quite blatant. Acting with prejudice and discrimination thus became the normal, acceptable ways to act in society. There is some variation in prejudice among the dominant groups because there are a variety of "reference groups," whose values may be emulated. Different socioeconomic classes, for example, may develop somewhat different ways of expressing prejudice toward the same target group.

Power-conflict theories explain how prejudice and discrimination arise, whereas the previous two categories of theories explain how prejudice and discrimination are sustained and transmitted. The essential idea in power-conflict theories is that dominant groups in a culture are continuously working to maintain the power and privileges they hold. These groups create social, political, and economic institutions to protect their interests and to control any tendencies of subordinate groups to modify the social order. Prejudice and discrimination are protective devices that are aroused when a superior position is threatened by subordinate groups. Marger (1991) suggested that there are usually historical traditions within a culture that support the claims and practices of the dominant groups.

In the next two sections of this chapter, we explore aspects of the two endpoints of the individualistic-cultural/historical dimension. **In** the first of these sections, The Authoritarian Personality, both a summary and criticisms of some of the principal research findings on this topic are presented. The material is very important in the history of research on prejudice, and moreover indicates the shortcomings of an individualistic approach. **In** the second section, Patriarchy and Female Socialization, a discussion is presented of how cultural history and socialization practices interact to produce female gender identity. This material is very important in helping us

understand how subordinate groups occasionally operate to perpetuate their own subordination.

THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY

The destruction of the Jewish population in Europe was the culmination of several hundred years of often violent anti-Semitism. The magnitude of the horror was, and is, nearly incomprehensible. That it happened, and that it was directed by the leadership of a highly civilized country, Germany, cannot be denied. But, what kind of people could have permitted this to occur? A number of sociologists and psychologists pursued an answer to this question in the United States shortly after World War II. Their initial research was published in a 990 page book, *The Authoritarian Personality* (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950). Some of the authors continued exploring this area for several more years, and many others joined in. Most of the research and the criticisms of it were completed by the early 1960s. Roger Brown eloquently summarizes this work in the first edition of his book, *Social Psychology* (1965). Other more recent studies support his conclusions, for example, Cherry and Byrne (1977) and Forbes (1985).

The basic premise of Adorno et al. (1950) was that certain personality types were more likely to develop strong prejudices than others. It was possible that particular cultures, for example, those of Germany and Austria, were more conducive to producing these types of people, but it was also clear that anti-Semitism and anti-Negro prejudices were widespread in the United States. Thus, they sought to find the prejudiced personality, and not the prejudiced society. Their work is heavily based on psychoanalytic theory, as was much of the personality research carried out in the 1940s and 1950s, and they used this theory to help us understand the underlying mechanisms of prejudice.

Research on the authoritarian personality used two broad kinds of methods, forced choice questionnaires and the more clinical techniques of projective questions, interviews, and the Thematic Apperception Test. (I am closely following R. Brown's, 1965, summary now.) The subjects for the research were over 2,000 adults from particular organizations, which included college students, teachers, nurses, union members, veterans, prison inmates, and patients of a psychiatric clinic. Most were White, native-born, middle-class, non-Jewish Americans.

The questionnaires consisted of four scales: the Anti-Semitism Scale, the Ethnocentrism Scale, the Political and Economic Conservatism Scale, and the Potentiality for Fascism Scale. The Anti-Semitism Scale consisted of statements designed to measure the extent to which the individual holds "... stereotyped negative opinions describing the Jews as threatening, im-

moral, and categorically different from non-Jews, and of hostile attitudes urging various forms of restriction, exclusion, and suppression as a means of solving the Jewish Problem' " (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 71). All the items were written in such a way that agreement with a statement was supportive of an anti-Semitic view. One of the items was: "The trouble with letting Jews into a nice neighborhood is that they gradually give it a typical Jewish atmosphere" (R. Brown, 1965, p. 512).

The Ethnocentrism scale consisted of statements designed to measure the extent to which individuals rigidly accepted aspects of their own culture and rejected what was different. Ethnocentrism is thus a broader form of prejudice than anti-Semitism. The items dealt with various minority groups, foreigners, socially different persons, and the "American Way." As with the Anti-Semitism Scale, the items here were worded so that agreement with a statement was supportive of an ethnocentric view. One of the items was: "Americans may not be perfect, but the American Way has brought us about as close as human beings can get to a perfect society" (R. Brown, 1965, p. 485).

The Political and Economic Conservatism Scale consisted of statements designed to measure the extent to which individuals held the values of the American conservative right wing. The main components involved keeping things as they were, resisting social change, and valuing ambition, efficiency, and financial success. Unlike the other three scales, the items in the Conservatism scale were *not* all worded in the same direction. One of the items was: "A child should learn early in life the value of a dollar and the importance of ambition, efficiency, and determination" (R. Brown, 1965, p. 485).

The Potentiality for Fascism Scale (the F scale) is considered by many to be the scale that measured authoritarianism as a personality trait. It consisted of statements reflecting nine antidemocratic characteristics, all written so that agreement with a statement supports an authoritarian view. The nine characteristics involve: conventionalism, authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, anti-introspection, superstition and stereotyping, power and "toughness," destructiveness and cynicism, projectivity, and exaggerated sexual concerns. Two of the briefer statements were: "Someday it will probably be shown that astrology can explain a lot of things," and "Familiarity breeds contempt" (R. Brown, 1965, p. 488).

In general, the split-half reliability of each of the scales was quite satisfactory, indicating that each scale measured a cluster of highly related attitudes. Adorno et al. (1950) constructed these scales believing that anti-Semitism, ethnocentrism, conservatism, and authoritarianism were an interconnected set of beliefs, values, and personality characteristics. Were they? Yes, moderately so. The Anti-Semitism and Ethnocentrism Scales' scores correlated on average about .80 with one other. Scores on the Con-

servatism Scale correlated on average with Ethnocentrism and Anti-Semitism scores, .57 and .43, respectively. Finally, F scale scores correlated on average with Anti-Semitism, Ethnocentrism, and Conservatism scores, .53, .65, and .54, respectively.

Following data collection for the questionnaires, 80 subjects, half men and half women, were asked to participate in the clinical part of the study. Half of these scored in the top 25% of the Ethnocentrism scale, and half scored in the bottom 25%. The primary goal of the clinical interviews and tests was to develop a deep understanding of the personalities of prejudiced (top 25%) and unprejudiced (bottom 25%) subjects. This assumes, of course, that the personalities of prejudiced people resemble each other, as do those of unprejudiced people. Prior to the actual clinical sessions, the interviewers knew which group their subjects were from, and were thoroughly familiar with each subject's questionnaire performance. The two judges who coded the interviews were part of the research team and familiar with the general results of the questionnaire.

Some of the major findings of the clinical data were as follows: Prejudiced subjects tended to have an unrealistic positive view of themselves and their parents, whereas unprejudiced subjects were more objective in their appraisals. When prejudiced subjects do criticize themselves or their parents, they do so in a way that almost denies the validity of the criticism. The negativity is treated as an exception, almost externally forced upon the criticized person, and not a true criticism. The authors argue that the glorification of self and parents alongside the denial of criticism indicates the presence of considerable unresolved ambivalence. The prejudiced person deals with this ambivalence by projecting onto (unconsciously attributing to) minority groups the unacceptable negative characteristics. Why are negative characteristics so difficult to "own up to"? The main reason seems to be the excessive concern prejudiced people have with status and external signs of success. The admission of negative characteristics would lower one's perception of himself and his parents' status. Finally, prejudiced subjects seem to have been raised by parents who practiced authoritarian discipline. The aggressive feelings this discipline produced in the subjects could not be directed toward their parents. Instead they were displaced onto minority groups.

Following publication of *The Authoritarian Personality* a deluge of research and criticism occurred. R. Brown (1965) sifts through this for us, and I highlight three aspects of Brown's analysis. The first problem with the study involves the construction of three of the four scales, such that responses that agreed with the statements always led to high anti-Semitism, ethnocentrism, or potential fascism. It has been documented that many subjects have an "acquiescent response set" (a tendency to agree with any kind of assertions). Thus the intercorrelations were spuriously high-so

high that the results are meaningless? No. Careful follow-up research showed that acquiescence accounts for only a minor portion of subjects' scores on these scales.

The second problem involves the objectivity of the clinical interviews. The major issue here is that the interviewers were not only knowledgeable about the theory and the hypotheses, but also very familiar with the questionnaire data of each subject. Thus, there were considerable opportunities for biasing the nature of the material the subjects produced. If you know, for example, that a subject is prejudiced, then you can (and might) continue to ask questions until you get the response consistent with a prejudiced answer. Fortunately, this was not an issue with the other clinical data. These latter data tend to support the conclusions based on the interviews.

The third problem involves the relationship between authoritarianism, education, IQ, and social class (socioeconomic status [SES]). Basically, F scale scores were inversely related to amount of education, IQ, and, SES. Some of the questionnaire differences are striking. For example, 80% of people with a grammar school education, 60% with a high school education, and 35% with a college education agreed with the following statement: "The most important thing to teach children is absolute obedience to their parents." So, is the F scale a measure of personality or is it a measure related to the cluster of IQ, education, and SES? Fortunately, one does not have to choose. The answer is both. Low educated, low IQ, low SES individuals are more likely to develop authoritarian personalities than are others. The fact of this covariation does not undercut the validity of the relations between the four scales. The hopeful aspect of these data is the knowledge that education lessens authoritarianism.

What are we left with? Brown (1965) and others concluded that despite the strong methodological criticisms brought against *The Authoritarian Personality*, there is a personality type, measured by the F scale, that is likely to develop prejudices against outgroup members. More recent research, for example, Cherry and Byrne (1977) showed that the situation or context a person is in is a more powerful determinant of whether prejudice will be expressed than is the F scale scores. Other research, for example, Forbes (1985) showed that political attitudes, especially nationalist ones, may not be globally related to authoritarianism. Rather, subjects with high F scale scores may be ethnocentric in relation to some but not all outgroups, depending on the nature of the outgroup. Thus, knowledge of an individual's F score is not sufficient to predict the degree of prejudice in any particular situation or against any particular group.

There has been a resurgence of research starting in the 1980s and continuing to the present time dealing with the authoritarian personality. This work, spearheaded by Altemeyer (1981, 1988, 1996) and referred to as *right-*

wing authoritarianism overcomes most of the criticisms leveled against the earlier research. I extensively discuss this research in a later chapter.

PATRIARCHY AND FEMALE SOCIALIZATION

Although the first Americans were the American Indians, the most influential Americans in contemporary society were European immigrants and their descendants. Europeans came to this country in increasingly large numbers from the 17th century through the early part of the 20th century, when highly restrictive immigration laws were enacted. These people came from patriarchal societies—societies with an “institutional system of male dominance” (Lerner, 1986)—and brought that mode of social organization with them. Highly supportive of social patriarchy was their Christian religion, with its male dominance and masculine God.

Christianity mainly evolved out of Judaism, but also out of Greek and Roman moral philosophies. Judaism has its roots in the great ancient cultures of the Near East, such as Sumer, Ur, Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Babylonia, all strongly patriarchal cultures. In this religion and these cultures, women attained their status through marriage and motherhood; but it was nearly always a secondary status to that of men and dependent on men.

The Judeo-Christian Fifth and Tenth Commandments are particularly relevant to this discussion. The fifth says: “Honor your father and your mother, that you may have a long life in the land which the Lord, your God, is giving you.” Thus, the masculine God is commanding offspring to honor both their parents. The payoff for which is a long life in the land God gives you. This seeming equality of fathers and mothers is clarified in the Tenth Commandment, which says: “You shall not covet your neighbor’s house. You shall not covet your neighbor’s wife, nor his male or female slave, nor his ox or ass, nor anything else that belongs to him.” Thus, women are counted among the “property” of men, in the same way as slaves and farm animals. Despite this marked subordination of women to men, as mothers they are the rightful recipients of honor from their children.

The Greco-Roman influence on the status of women draws mainly on the writings of Aristotle, who predated Christianity by about 350 years. In the Aristotelian position, women are viewed as morally, intellectually, and physically inferior to men. They are incomplete human beings, without a fully developed soul. They are irrational, and even with extensive schooling could not attain the intellectual status of men. Their main function is to produce males, who are complete, unified human beings, with a fully developed soul. Because of these gender discrepancies, Aristotle maintained that it is a virtue for men to dominate women, and shameful to give women equal treatment (Lange, 1983; Lerner, 1986).

It is clear from reading Lerner (1986) about historical cultures of the Near East, as well as reading contemporary cross-cultural accounts (Freidl, 1975), that the subordinate status of women to men is not restricted to Europe. In general with the advent of intense agriculture (as opposed to simple horticulture) and warfare, status differences between men and women became exaggerated, relatively independent of historical time or place. The significance of the Judeo/Greek/Roman/Christian influence in the United States is that the justification of the treatment of females by males was partly based on religious grounds. Not only are cultural practices difficult to change, but when those practices are involved with religion, change becomes a sacrilege.

There are at least two important lessons related to the present discussion to be learned from reading history. The first is that whatever the party in power is, and whoever constitute its members, there are always some who oppose the party in power. In ancient Greece, there was nearly always a group who sided with the enemy and who did, or who were prepared to open the gates for the attacking army. The second lesson is that many members of subordinate groups take active steps to maintain the status quo. In recent times, many American women fought against passage of the Equal Rights Amendment, arguing in favor of maintaining traditional female roles with such statements as "A woman's place is in the home." The significance of these two lessons is that historically, in the United States, there were nearly always men and women who contested the traditional roles assigned to women. Indeed, feminism, as a clear voice for gender equality, has existed for at least 150 years (S. M. Evans, 1989; Ryan, 1975). Conversely, we can see that most women did not join the feminist movement and many attacked it, using the same arguments as their husbands, brothers, and fathers.

It is thus likely that at any point in history, the majority of men and women accepted the then existing gender status quo. Given that men had the dominant and superior positions in nearly all aspects of society, their acceptance of the status quo is understandable. Losing a preferred place has its practical and emotional costs. But why should women have been accepting of their inferior status? Our socialization experiences tell us who we are. This identity is not like a garment that can be shed for a new occasion. We are deeply tied to, committed to, and defined by our identity. Anyone who has been in psychotherapy, as giver or receiver, knows in very powerful ways the adhesive quality of identity, even when we acknowledge its dysfunctionality. A human being not committed to his or her identity is left very vulnerable to changing circumstances; and circumstances usually do change.

There are also profound cultural/symbolic reasons for the maintenance of the gender status quo, which Lerner (1986) convincingly wrote about. Lerner's argument, on the surface, is about the writing of history. But

Lerner's account should be viewed as both a prime example of how masculine values get transmitted in a culture, and also of how historical writings help maintain those values. The central idea is that men have controlled both the writing of and interpretation of history; they have chosen both what to write about and whom to write about. Not surprisingly they have written about the activities of men, asserting of course that these are the most important features of culture. Where women have been noted, they are identified as exceptional. Indeed, they are the exception that proves the rule: the superiority and centrality of men, and men's interests.

The symbols, the rules of interpretation, the concepts employed for understanding history have all been filtered through and processed by men's understanding of society. Thus, until recently, women's activities and concerns have rarely been mentioned in historical accounts. They are taken for granted, the ground upon which the central, and male, figures act out their major roles. As Lerner (1986) noted, women become invisible. The historical disregard of women even carries over into traditionally masculine realms in which women have been successful. For example, until recent years, art histories and music histories did not even mention women's contributions. If the painting or the score was created by a woman, historians imply it was not good enough to discuss.

Were there not women historians? Why did they not write about women's achievements? There were some, but two factors militated against their presenting a different point of view. First, men have controlled the cultural resources, which include higher education, publishing houses, and the media. Thus, women's productions had to pass through men's cultural filters. Second, women historians were trained by men in male dominant cultures. Thus, the concepts and rules they were taught were those espoused by their male teachers. It is very difficult to break the intellectual and cultural mold into which you have been poured and in which you have been cured. So, women historians have used men's symbolic and interpretative frameworks in understanding society.

Let us move the argument out of the realm of history making and into the realm of children's socialization. Traditionally, mothers and other women have been the primary caretakers in the home. In the schools, especially for young children, teachers have also been women. In Western culture, the "rules" for understanding, perceiving, and categorizing are based on men's values, but these rules are taught to children by women. One consequence is that the same behavior carried out by boys and girls may have different meanings and be treated differently by mothers and teachers. In the extreme, women are full participants in devaluing themselves in support of male-generated values.

Valerie Walkerdine, a developmental psychologist, has documented some of these activities in nursery school settings in England. Below is a

quotation from her 1981 article. The children are a 3-year-old girl, Annie, two 4-year-old boys, Sean and Terry, and the 30-year-old teacher, Miss Baxter.

The sequence begins when Annie takes a piece of Lego to add on to a construction she is building. Terry tries to take it away from her to use himself, and she resists. He says:

Terry: You're a stupid cunt, Annie.

The teacher tells him to stop and Sean tries to mess up another child's construction. The teacher tells him to stop. Then Sean says:

Sean: Get out of it Miss Baxter paxter.

Terry: Get out of it knickers Miss Baxter.

Sean: Get out of it Miss Baxter paxter.

Terry: Get out of it Miss Baxter the knickers paxter knickers, bum.

Sean: Knickers, shit, bum.

Miss B: Sean, that's enough, you're being silly.

Sean: Miss Baxter, knickers, show your knickers.

Terry: Miss Baxter, show your bum off.
(they giggle)

Miss B: I think you're being very silly.

Terry: Shit Miss Baxter, shit Miss Baxter.

Sean: Miss Baxter, show your knickers your bum off.

Sean: Take all your clothes off, your bra off.

Terry: Yeah, and take your bum off, take your wee-wee off, take your clothes, your mouth off.

Sean: Take your teeth out, take your head off, take your hair off, take your bum off. Miss Baxter the paxter knickers taxter.

Miss B: Sean, go and find something else to do please. (p. 15)

This is an amazing script. It is so not just because Sean and Terry, at age 4, are already depreciating females as sex objects; but mainly that Miss Baxter colludes with them in the process. Her good-natured tolerance of their behavior, for example, "You're being very silly," "Find something else to do please," indicates that the behavior is expectable, and to some extent acceptable. Miss Baxter, who is a female authority, and represents other female authorities, continues to educate both the boys and girls in her charge that it is permitted for males to demean females. In her discussion with Walkerdine about this incident, she states that what the boys did was natural and harmless. How did Miss Baxter come to these views? Walkerdine, a former teacher herself, asserts that teachers are trained in a "scientific pedagogy." This is a pedagogy that preaches free and natural expression, but this expression only naturally takes on the characteristics of the society in

which it is embedded. In this case, the messages are that females are sex objects and males, even 4-year-olds, are more powerful than they.

THE PRESENT THEORETICAL VIEW

Prejudice and discrimination, as Allport (1954) assured us, have multiple causes. There appears to be a consensus among social scientists as to their nature. For example, Duckitt (1992) examined the psychological research from a historical perspective and arrived at four categories of causes that are quite similar to those of Allport (1954) and Marger (1991). However, I believe there is an important “cause” that these and many other writers have overlooked—the genetic/evolutionary bases. We are not only creatures of culture. Rather, as the Nobel Prize winner Konrad Lorenz argued in 1969, and I concurred with in my books (Fishbein, 1976, 1984) evolutionary processes have designed us to operate in particular ways in particular environments. The enormously influential sociobiology movement started by Edward Wilson in 1975 makes a similar point.

What is meant by a genetic/evolutionary design? To understand this, we must distinguish between *genotypes*, the set of genes that individuals possess, and *phenotypes*, the physiology, anatomy, and behavior of individuals that develop from the genotypes in specific sequences of environments. Genotypes do not vary over the course of a lifetime, whereas phenotypes do, for example, infancy, childhood, adolescence, adulthood. Moreover, the same genotype can lead to somewhat different phenotypes if the individuals are reared in different environments, for example, identical twins separated at birth. It is genotypes that get inherited, and it is genotypes and environments that determine how phenotypes will develop. Generally there is a close connection between genotypes and phenotypes, for example, identical twins reared apart do resemble each other. More blatantly, no matter what the rearing, chimpanzees remain chimpanzees and never are transformed into humans. Particular genotypes are transmitted from generation to generation because the phenotypes they develop in given environments reproduce more than those developed by other genotypes. Thus, there is a certain indirectness about the relation between successful phenotypes and successful genotypes.

Returning to genetic/evolutionary designs, the basic idea at the species level (as opposed to the individual level) is that the characteristic genotype of any species emerged because members of the species possessing that genotype were more adaptive than members not possessing it, that is, they survived and reproduced more viable offspring than the latter. Eventually, because of this differential reproduction over many generations, nearly all members of the species acquire the successful genotype. This characteristic

genotype is maintained in a species as long as it leads to successful phenotypes. And this will occur if the environments in which individuals develop and reproduce continue to be supportive of the characteristic genotype. Sounds circular? It really is not. Both gradual and dramatic shifts in the environment can change the characteristic genotype of a species, including its extinction.

To say that evolution designed us to operate in particular ways in particular environments does not mean that we act only reflexively or instinctively. We are somewhat plastic or flexible, but not infinitely so. Our development is channeled or "canalized" as the geneticist Waddington (1957) demonstrated for anatomical characteristics, and the psychologist Piaget (1971) for behavior. These behavioral characteristics or patterns emerge provided that individuals are reared in environments falling in a range normal for their species. They are part of the evolutionary design and can be considered as normal, inevitable, and necessary for adaptive functioning. For humans, some of the more obvious ones are language, bipedal locomotion, coordinated use of two hands, but also rule-giving and following, reciprocal helping and harming, and particular family and group social structures (Fishbein, 1976). One major aspect of the human design is in the area of intergroup relations. This is the topic that encompasses the social psychology of prejudice and discrimination (see, e.g., W. G. Stephan, 1985). A central conviction of this book is that evolutionary processes have designed us in such a way that the development of prejudice and discrimination toward outgroup numbers is highly likely, and perhaps inevitable. These ideas are elaborated in the next chapter.

Our genetic/evolutionary heritage provides the initial push toward prejudice and discrimination. We have learned from Allport (1954) and Marger (1991) that cultural norms and values define or identify some of the targets of prejudice and discrimination. Certain outgroups are more likely to be the recipients of prejudice than others. Prejudice toward them becomes expected and normative. However, culture is not static or stagnant, but rather evolves, that is, undergoes historical change. Another central conviction of this book is that in order to identify and understand cultural norms toward particular groups, we must understand their historical evolution. The television portrayal of African Americans, women, or mentally retarded, for example, in 2001, may not be reflective of long-standing, relatively permanent attitudes and values. The latter do change over time; and it is important to document that change in order to accurately assess where we are today. In that the focus of this book is on peer prejudice and discrimination involving differences in race, sex, hearing impairment, and mental retardation, cultural histories are presented for each of the four target groups.

Finally, Allport (1954) and Marger (1991) indicated that cultural and group processes get reflected in the behavior of individuals. To a large ex-

tent individuals' behavior is determined by their socialization experiences. Parts of these socialization experiences are the direct and indirect teaching of cultural norms, including those involving prejudice and discrimination. Our discussion of patriarchy and female socialization in this chapter was an example of this. Given that the focus of this book is on prejudice and discrimination in children and adolescents toward peers, a deep understanding of these topics requires an understanding of their social development. Regarding opposite-sex prejudice and discrimination, we examine how families, peers, and teachers socialize sex-typing. Sex-typing involves behavior, attitudes, and values about one's own and the opposite sex. Children learn what the appropriate and inappropriate behaviors and aspirations are for themselves and others. These valuations set the ground for interactions with and judgments about same- and opposite-sex peers. Regarding race prejudice and discrimination, we examine how ethnic identity is socialized and develops. One's ethnic identity includes patterns of behaviors, expectations, and values about members of one's racial/ethnic group as well as other groups. These valuations have differential effects on Black and White children, which are played out in their prejudice and discrimination. Regarding deaf and mentally retarded children, data comparable to sex-typing and ethnic identity are, unfortunately, not available. This is a lacuna that I hope other writers will hopefully fill in the near future.

SUMMARY

A variety of definitions of prejudice were discussed. Nearly all have in common the idea that it is a negative attitude toward others because of their membership in a particular group. Following the lead of Allport and Milner, an additional component seemed necessary to distinguish prejudices from other types of negative attitudes—unreasonableness. Allport refers to this component as “faulty and inflexible” attitudes and Milner as “irrational” attitudes. Prejudiced individuals resist modifying their prejudices in the face of contradictory information.

Discrimination was defined as harmful actions toward others because of their membership in a particular group. Discrimination may or may not be based on prejudice, although when children are freely interacting without adult control, it is likely that the two go hand in hand. Recent theorizing suggests that prejudice and discrimination feed on and enhance each other.

The relationship between prejudice and behavior is complex. Research shows that when there is no direct contact between people, as in voting situations, there is a fairly strong relationship between prejudice and behavior. However, when people interact with each other, the relationship is weak.

Prejudice is just one factor among many that mediates behavior, for example, other personal attitudes and motives and situational conditions are also influential.

Stereotypes are closely related to prejudices, and sometimes cannot be distinguished from them. Stereotypes are categories of beliefs about groups of people that assist us in sorting out the overwhelming social information we receive. We know that our stereotypes are not completely accurate, yet they are often the most reliable guides for making decisions. When we categorize people into ingroups and outgroups, our perceptions and beliefs about them as individuals and as group members are markedly influenced.

One potential consequence of prejudice is stigmatizing others. Stigmas are characteristics of people—for example, being a member of a particular ethnic group, having a particular disability, being an ex-mental patient—that spoil or discredit them. Some likely reasons for stigmatizing others are: scapegoating, justifying our failures to help particular groups, enhancing our own status. But, as I. Katz's (1981) research shows, we are frequently ambivalent about the groups we stigmatize. This ambivalence often leads us to either exaggerate our negative or positive responses to them.

Historically, there have been groups of people in India and Japan who have been legally stigmatized: the untouchable castes. Although untouchability has been declared illegal in these countries, it still exists and produces profound negative social and psychological consequences. There are some obvious parallels between the treatment of ex-untouchables and that of African Americans in the United States.

One of the consequences of being raised as an African American descended from slaves is the development of feelings of unworthiness. One of the explanations of this phenomenon is called the *Stockholm Syndrome*, derived from the observation of value and affectional shifts by hostages that produce bonding with their captors. It is thought that the conditions leading to the Stockholm Syndrome often occurred in slavery conditions, which suggests that many African Americans at least partially accepted the White people's views of them.

A consensus has emerged among social psychologists concerning the bases of prejudice and discrimination. All believe that there are multiple causes that can be construed as falling somewhere on a continuum, with individualistic or psychological causes at one pole, and cultural/historical causes at the other pole. The initial motivating force for the development of prejudice and discrimination is the attempts of dominant groups within a culture to continue holding the power and privileges they have.

Research on the authoritarian personality was among the most influential programs on the topic of prejudice. It occupies the individualistic pole of the causal dimension. The original impetus for the study of authoritarianism was the destruction of most of European Jewry by the Nazis during

World War II. The research was centered in California and was directed toward identifying a personality type that was likely to show ethnocentrism and anti-Semitism. The original studies had some serious methodological flaws, and the original researchers did not study situational influences on prejudice; but there is a consensus that individuals with authoritarian personalities are likely to be more prejudiced than others.

Research on patriarchy and female socialization occupies the cultural/historical pole. This research tracks historically how male dominance and female subordination emerged in the United States. It shows how females themselves, who take on the value system of the culture, perpetuate their own subordination in both their professional activities and socialization of children.

The one causal factor of prejudice and discrimination that most social scientists ignore is our genetic/evolutionary inheritance. The view is taken that genetic evolution has designed us to operate in particular ways in particular environments. Among these ways are patterns in forming and continuing intergroup relations. Although our genetic make-up predisposes humans to prejudice and discrimination, culture identifies the targets. Cultural norms and values are not static, but rather "evolve" over time. Finally, it is individuals who have prejudiced attitudes and act in a discriminatory fashion. In order to gain a deep understanding of these, we have to understand children's social development.

PLAN OF THE BOOK

One important question this book addresses is whether generalizations about the development of peer prejudice and discrimination can be made. In other words, can we talk about the development of prejudice and the development of discrimination? Or do these processes vary with the target groups under consideration? In order to generalize, it is necessary to compare different groupings. In a very extensive search of the psychological, sociological, and educational literatures of North America, I was only able to find four target groupings for which at least several research articles existed and that covered a relatively wide age span. These involved race, gender, hearing status, and intellectual status, that is, mentally retarded versus nonretarded. Thus, the selection of these four groupings was completely fortuitous and not based on any underlying theory. Fortunately the characteristics that distinguish these groups are sufficiently diverse that some confidence can be placed in any generalizations that may emerge.

The central arguments of the book are as follows. Prejudice and discrimination have an evolutionary basis, rooted in the nature of primate and human subsistence groups. Although the existence of cultures is also evolutionarily based, the particular culture individuals grow and mature in

plays a significant role in determining the values assigned to various groups. Members of certain of these groups become the targets for prejudice and discrimination. As with other cultural values, norms, and beliefs, prejudice and discrimination have to be learned. This is often a long process and depends on the developmental status of the learner, the nature of the prejudice and discrimination to be learned, and the cultural importance of the learning. Prejudice and, to some extent, discrimination, are based on attitudes. These frequently can be modified. What are the best approaches for modifying prejudice?

In chapter 2, *An Evolutionary Model for the Development of Prejudice and Discrimination*, I attempt to tie together a diverse literature that presents the argument that our evolutionary heritage makes it nearly inevitable that children and adults will develop prejudice and discrimination toward outgroup members. It summarizes research on (a) inclusive fitness, which leads to ingroup favoritism; (b) our evolutionary heritage shared with the African apes, which leads to hostility toward outgroups; (c) authority-bearing systems, which lead to adopting the beliefs that authority figures hold; (d) children's group processes, which indicate the conditions under which ingroup favoritism and outgroup hostility will occur; and (e) the development of group identity. The punch line of the latter is that prejudice and discrimination should emerge at about age 4, when children apparently have a well-developed sense of group or social identity. In contrast to the aforementioned, I introduce and discuss another evolutionarily based concept, *outgroup attraction*, which is based on the genetic processes of gene flow. Outgroup attraction has the effect of positively orienting members of ingroups to either certain characteristics of outgroups or to certain individual members of those groups, effects that oppose prejudice and discrimination. These processes can exist side by side with prejudice and discrimination toward those groups.

Chapter 3, *Discrimination Toward Deaf Individuals*, begins our treatment of four target groups—people with a lengthy history of prejudice and discrimination in the United States. Each offers a glimpse at the unique cultural and historical conditions that trigger prejudice and discrimination, and a comparison of the four will illuminate general principles. This chapter begins with a discussion of some general issues in this study—some methodological principles, the genetic/evolutionary hypotheses, and the cultural/historical antecedents of prejudice and discrimination. Next, we turn to the hearing impaired, establishing first the history of discrimination towards the deaf in the United States. Then we examine the experimental approaches, noting the particular conditions that foster discrimination toward the deaf.

Chapter 4, *Prejudice and Discrimination Toward Mentally Retarded Individuals*, is the second in the series on target groups. It begins with a sum-

mary of the cultural history of this group, focusing particularly on the pedagogical issues surrounding mentally retarded children in educational settings. The chapter turns then to contemporary school settings, looking at age-based patterns in prejudice and discrimination toward mentally retarded students. Much attention is given to the various contextual factors, such as mainstreaming, labeling, and behavioral triggers, and the effect of various types of school settings.

Chapter 5 is called *Prejudice and Discrimination Against the Opposite Sex*. It begins with a historical summary of the role of females in American culture, identifying the conditions of subordination in the earliest European-American settlements. The role of American females throughout U.S. history has largely consisted of struggles by women for an expansion of legal rights, social and cultural roles, employment and educational opportunities, position in domestic life, and control over sexuality and childbirth. The chapter then addresses genetic/evolutionary hypotheses, drawing from patterns observed in hunter-gatherer societies. These hypotheses—along with those involved with gender and age patterning, with knowledge of stereotypes, and with cultural acquisition—are the operative themes of the remainder of the chapter.

The treatment of the next selected group, African Americans, spans two chapters. Chapter 6, *A Cultural History of African Americans*, focuses on cultural history, surveying the dramatic struggle that led from forced slavery to the civil rights movement. Next, the chapter devotes a section to the influential *Brown v. Board of Education* ruling, which was based heavily on psychological research and set a decisively psychological course for the civil rights movement. The chapter then turns to a discussion of ethnicity, the general cultural principle underlying race prejudice and discrimination. Finally, this being the last of the chapters on the histories of the selected groups, there is a comparative discussion that notes similarities and differences among them.

Chapter 7, *Race Prejudice and Discrimination*, turns to the experimental data on race prejudice and discrimination. The first subjects under consideration are to establish the particular genetic/evolutionary hypotheses potentially associated with this issue. Then we summarize the literature on race/ethnicity prejudice and discrimination, with an emphasis on Black and White racial groups. The major issues include the measurement of race prejudice and discrimination, age- and gender-based developmental patterns, and racial differences in racial prejudice and discrimination development. Finally, this chapter summarizes and compares the conclusions from this and previous chapters on the target groups.

Chapter 8 is called *Modifying Prejudice and Discrimination*. Arguments are developed and predictions are made based on genetic/evolutionary and cultural/historical considerations. Contact theory and Lewinian theory

(Lewin, 1948, 1951) are also discussed and related to race prejudice and discrimination. The three major sections of the chapter are concerned with the impact of school desegregation on racial prejudice and discrimination, the impact of mainstreaming on prejudice and discrimination toward the handicapped, and cooperative learning as a vehicle for reducing prejudice and discrimination. The next three sections are necessarily brief accounts of the effects of role-playing simulations, the media, and individuation/self-acceptance efforts to reduce prejudice. The final section attempts to integrate these findings.

Chapter 9 is called *Parents, Peers, and Personality*. In this chapter, we focus on the issue concerning the causes of individual differences in prejudice. Research is reviewed and discussed concerning the influences that parents and peers have on transmitting prejudice to children and adolescents. Also the relationship between adolescents' and young adults' personalities and their level of prejudice is evaluated. There is a moderate amount of research on parental influences, but that on peer influences is very limited. The parental research shows, at best, modest influences on children, and the peer literature shows essentially no influence, a very surprising result. On the other hand, strong and consistent relationships have been found between several personality traits and prejudice, suggesting that some traits predispose individuals to accept societal messages about prejudice, and other traits, to reject these messages.

In chapter 10, *Recapitulation*, an attempt is made to pull together the major themes and findings. Primarily this chapter will give the central punch lines of the previous chapters, in a sense, highlighting the summaries. No new material is presented, but I try to integrate what has been previously discussed.

An Evolutionary Model for the Development of Prejudice and Discrimination

The overarching goal of this chapter is to make the argument that our genetic/evolutionary heritage has predisposed us to develop prejudice toward and discrimination against outgroup members. This goal will be reached through the attainment of seven more limited goals. The first is to present an evolutionary based genetic model that accounts for species-wide behavioral constancies. The model draws heavily from the work of Waddington (1957), Fishbein (1976), G. Gottlieb (1991), and Lumsden and E. O. Wilson (1981). The essence of the model is that genes, anatomy, behavior, and social and physical environments operate to direct and correct psychological development. Additionally, genes and culture co-evolve such that species-specific characteristics are sustained across generations.

The second goal is to present some results from behavior genetics research, which show that individual differences in social behavior are strongly influenced by genetic inheritance. This research indirectly supports the argument that genes can control species-wide behavior characteristics, including the development of prejudice and discrimination.

The third goal is to present research describing the evolutionary history of, and linkages between the Old World monkeys, apes, and humans. The focus is on common elements and distinctions concerning social organization and social behavior. The central argument is that humans are socially operating with mental structures evolved for hunter-gatherer modes of existence. Prejudice and discrimination have their roots in this tribal organization.

The fourth goal is to present the three genetic/evolutionary factors that form the bases of prejudice and discrimination, and one factor that tends

to counteract these predispositions. The first three factors are ingroup favoritism based on inclusive fitness, authority-bearing systems based on the emergence of cultural sociogenetic systems, and intergroup hostility, based on intergroup relations of the common ancestors of gorillas, chimpanzees, and human hunter-gatherers. The fourth factor is outgroup attractiveness, based on the necessity of maintaining within-group genetic variability in order to accommodate to environmental changes, and to prevent the deleterious effects of excessive inbreeding and genetic drift.

The fifth goal is to present psychological data bearing on the development in children of a group identity. The principal consideration is the idea that prejudice and discrimination are intergroup phenomena, which have as a prerequisite that individuals can identify with an ingroup. At what age does group identity emerge, and how does this identity change with maturation?

The sixth goal is to describe some of the psychological processes involved in intergroup behavior. Ingroup favoritism and outgroup hostility are two prominent processes that are obviously connected with prejudice and discrimination. What factors control their emergence?

The seventh, and final goal, is founded on the premise that prejudice and discrimination partially stem from genetic/evolutionary processes "inappropriately" applied to groups within a culture. We attempt to identify those processes that lead to successful social interactions within a tribal culture, but to unsuccessful ones in an industrial or postindustrial society.

CANALIZATION

The core assumption of this chapter is that genes determine some aspects of human social behavior. Our genes make *all* of our social behavior possible. But because of our evolutionary design, nearly all humans have inherited a genetic structure that makes certain species-specific kinds of social behavior inevitable. Further, the occurrence of some of these behaviors makes the development of prejudice and discrimination nearly inevitable.

On the basis of the current state of genetic knowledge, it is highly unlikely that the social behaviors themselves are coded in the genes. Rather, particular processes are genetically coded that normally ensure that the evolved social behaviors (phenotypic characteristics) will develop. For example, English or Spanish are not coded in the genes, but language inducing processes are. If a child is reared in an English-speaking community, she or he will learn English. If the child is reared in an American Sign Language (ASL) community, he or she will learn ASL. Either outcome can occur because the language-inducing processes have developed and are in place.

As noted in chapter 1, a likely genetic process controlling the species-specific developmental aspect of evolutionary design is *canalization* (Wad-

dington, 1957). G. Gottlieb (1991) synthesized recent theoretical and empirical research on this topic, which he refers to as “experiential canalization of behavior.” In this view, behavioral development involves a hierarchical system of four mutually interacting components. These components are: genetic activity, neural activity, behavior, and environment. Genetic activity influences neural development, but the activity of the nervous system influences genetic activity by determining which genes will be turned on or shut off. There is a similar bidirectional effect between behavior and neural activity, and indeed, for all other combinations of the four components. Thus, it is not merely genes that ensure that any infant or child attains a species-specific characteristic, for example, language, but rather, the effect of all four components working together. The developmental target is coded in the genes in the sense that for normal rearing environments the genes produce nervous systems that activate behavioral processes that determine that the species-specific behavioral characteristic will be acquired. The genes, the nervous system, the behavior, and the environment all work together to canalize the developing behavior. Thus, as a child starts to speak English in normal English-speaking environments, his English speech is reinforced by others in the environment who continue to speak English to him. And his nervous system continues to develop the necessary connections to sustain and enhance his spoken English.

When the genes and the various environments, for example, intra-cellular, extra-cellular, family social interactions, atmospheric pollution levels, are in a normal range for the species, then the developmental targets will be attained. Infants will nurse, crawl, walk and talk, according to the epigenetic timetable coded in the genes (*Epigenesis* is the emergence of anatomical structures and behavioral and physiological functions produced by the interactions among genes, the developing individual, and the environment). Moreover, canalization processes are self-correcting in addition to being self-directing. Epigenesis works to put back on the evolutionarily designed developmental track any deviations from the species-specific targets. For example, infants will learn to walk at about 1 year of age even if they have had very little opportunity to crawl, as is the case with Hopi infants. As another example, hearing infants reared by deaf, ASL using parents learn to speak normally if they are frequently exposed to others who use spoken language.

GENES, MIND, AND CULTURE

The title of this section is the title of the 1981 book by Lumsden and E. O. Wilson. All humans are reared in and live in cultures. These cultures resemble each other in many ways, and yet there are important differences

between them, for example, language or religious practices. Infants and children are required to learn the cultural practices they are reared in, and canalization processes ensure that they will learn some of them. The process of socializing children into their culture is called *enculturation*. Enculturation makes us uniquely American, or English, or Mexican. From a genetic/evolutionary view, how might this enculturation come about? Lumsden and Wilson provide a very convincing model as an answer to this question.

We should distinguish three kinds of culturally learned behavior. The first is species-specific patterns that are seen in all cultures, for example, nursing by infants, walking, the coordinated use of two hands. The second is variants of species-specific patterns that distinguish cultures from each other, for example, language, religious practices, rules for sharing, tool manufacture, whether the bride or the bridegroom leaves the family of origin. Both the first and second kinds are thus universal patterns of human behavior. The third is relatively unique practices that are cultural specific, for example, piano playing or bungee jumping. All three kinds of learning are possible because humans evolved as cultural animals. In a sense, culture is encoded in our genes.

Figure 2.1 is Lumsden and Wilson's (1981) pictorial representation of how genes and culture coevolved—how systematic changes in human genetic structure led to systematic changes in the nature of human culture and vice versa. In the model, the four principal levels of biological organization are shown: molecular, cellular, organismic, and populational. The first three of these levels constitute the details of epigenesis, as already defined. Note that the arrows follow a particular direction, in contrast to the processes in G. Gottlieb's (1991) discussion. This directionality implies that there is systematic change in each of the levels, as opposed to the maintenance of stable canalized characteristics.

At the molecular level, the genes, which are groups of DNA molecules, produce proteins. These proteins bond together to form all the varied cells in the body. Of particular interest are the brain cells (*neurons*). The structure and functioning of these neurons produce epigenetic rules for acquiring cultural characteristics and for developing individual cognitions and behavior, for example, the names of colors, the qualities of apples. The epigenetic rules are canalized, and if the external environment is highly similar for all individuals, then their cognitions and behavior will be similar. The population of individuals who reside and interact in a given region form a culture and share a language. The linkage between the organismic and populational levels reflects the translation of genes into culture. The linkage of the populational and molecular levels reflects how evolutionary processes operating on a population of individuals influence gene frequencies.




FIG. 2.1. The full circuit of causation in gene-culture coevolution. From *Genes, Mind and Culture: The Coevolutionary Process* by C. J. Lumsden and E. O. Wilson, 1981, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Reprinted by permission of the authors.

Let us further examine these latter two linkages. Lumsden and E. O. Wilson (1981) identified two broad classes of epigenetic rules: (a) those that transform cultural inputs, for example, socialization experiences, into "knowledge structures," and (b) those that transform knowledge structures into behavior. Knowledge structures primarily consist of memory and cognitive processes. Behavior is what individuals do in their social and physical environments. The consequences of behavior are different levels of "genetic fitness," that is, survival and reproduction. If certain types of epigenetic rules lead to behaviors with high genetic fitness within a given population, then those rules will ultimately become the norm for that population. If certain epigenetic rules lead to behaviors with low genetic fitness, then the genes supporting those rules will ultimately disappear. Perhaps the clearest example of this gene-culture coevolution is spoken language. Individuals in a population whose anatomical structure and epigenetic rules led to language behavior had higher genetic fitness than those who lacked these rules. Language is cultural, but language use produced the genetic changes in a population that made language development inevitable.

It is important to distinguish cultural-specific from species-specific canalized characteristics. All canalized characteristics started at the cultural-specific level. If they spread to other cultures through "intermarriage" and had high genetic fitness in the new cultures, then ultimately those characteristics became canalized in the new cultures. The only reasonable way that a characteristic could become canalized for all members of the species is if it had high genetic fitness in every culture on earth. Based on the paleoanthropological record, modern humans emerged at least 40,000 years ago, and probably considerably earlier (Fishbein, 1976, 1984). It is thus highly likely that any cultural changes that have occurred in human populations since then were either purely cultural, that is, not genetic, or were co-evolved, cultural-specific changes.

Recent research by Greenfield and Childs (1991) among the Zinacantecos, a Maya Indian culture, is highly consistent with the Lumsden and E. O. Wilson (1981) model. The Zinacantecos have a relatively distinct culture that distinguishes them from neighboring groups—and, of course, from all non-Mayan cultures.

Moreover, they have a distinctive population genetic structure because marriage is largely restricted to other members of their culture. Greenfield and Childs (1991) asked two questions within a cultural/genetic framework. First, do Zinacanteco infants and children show patterns of psychological development characteristic of non-Mayan cultures? Second, do they show culture-specific patterns that have continuity into adulthood? An affirmative answer to the first question provides support for the existence of universal species-specific gene/culture coevolution. An affirmative answer to the second question provides support for culture-specific coevolution.

The data are based on 4 years of fieldwork carried out in the native language of Tzotzil, but also, 30 years of multidisciplinary studies carried out by other colleagues. Regarding universal species-specific capabilities, the following results were obtained.

1. On mental and motor tests carried out with babies, the sequence of behavioral milestones was the same as for babies in the United States.
2. In a study with young Zinacanteco children who had no familiarity with “nesting cup” toys, Zinacanteco children and U.S. children showed the same developmental sequence of strategies for combining the cups.
3. In several studies using different materials and requiring different cognitive activities, Zinacanteco children between the ages of 4 and 18 showed the same sequences of abilities, at the same ages, as U.S. children, for example, the ability to classify different objects in a variety of ways.

In some of these tasks, the cognitive abilities tapped for the Zinacantecos were quite novel and on the surface, inconsistent with cultural learning. Greenfield and Childs (1991) concluded that the aforementioned pattern of results supports a universal species-specific developmental sequence.

Regarding culture-specific behavior, Zinacanteco babies show very low levels of physical activity. This “restrained” motor activity is also found among Chinese-American, Navajo, and Japanese babies, but not in European-American babies. The four groups who are restrained all have different diets and prenatal care from each other, suggesting the existence of a genetic basis for the restraint. Given that these groups also have Asian roots, the assumed genetic basis makes sense. Focusing on the Zinacantecos, the behavior of mothers reinforces infants’ low activity levels; the babies are swaddled (wrapped) and are nursed at the slightest movement. European-American babies rarely receive this kind of treatment. As a consequence of different starting activity levels and different maternal treatment, the activity levels of the two groups of babies become even more divergent during the first week of life. Moreover, relative to European Americans, this pattern of Zinacanteco motor restraint is observed at all developmental levels, including adulthood. It is not the case that Zinacanteco babies are more listless than European Americans. In fact, the opposite may be the case. Research has found them to be more attentive to their surroundings, for longer time periods, than European-American babies.

Greenfield and Childs (1991) discussed these results from cultural and genetic/evolutionary points of view. They concluded that in the Zinacanteco culture, motor restraint has an adaptive advantage. Given the apparent long-term stability of their cultural practices, it is likely that this motor restraint was a coevolved behavior characteristic.

BEHAVIOR GENETICS

Is there evidence to support the concept of canalization, and by implication, the evolution of species-specific phenotypic characteristics? Yes, a limited amount. Fishbein (1976) summarized some of the genetics research by Fraser and Waddington that clearly demonstrates the existence of canalized anatomical species-specific characteristics in flies and mice. G. Gottlieb (1991) provided a strong demonstration of the species-specific behavior response to maternal calling by mallard ducklings. And Ronald Wilson (1978) showed the existence of canalization of intelligence in human twins. Although the just mentioned research is highly competent and imaginative, none of it is directly concerned with canalized human social behavior. However, there is an allied research area, behavior genetics, which does have a bearing on this issue.

Behavior genetics deals with assessing the relative contribution of genes and environment to the explanation of individual differences in behavior. In a sense, behavior genetics is the opposite of canalization, which is concerned with similarities among individuals, that is, what makes us alike. As Scarr (1992) pointed out, there is no necessary connection between behavior genetics analyses and canalization analyses. The genes and gene activities that make us alike may operate in a different fashion than the genes that make us different. However, behavior genetics analyses demonstrate that genes do, at least partially, control behavior. If it can be shown that genes control individual differences in social behavior, then by analogy the argument is strengthened that genes control similarities in behavior.

Two recent relevant papers are those by Plomin and Daniels (1987) and Eysenck (1992). Plomin and Daniels reviewed their research and that of colleagues concerning the relative contributions of genetic similarity and environmental similarities and differences to variations (individual differences) in personality, psychopathology, and cognitive abilities. Eysenck reviewed his and his colleagues research concerning individual differences in prejudice. Two of the major methodologies for making these assessments are the adoption design and the twin design.

In the *adoption design*, the experimenter compares either identical twins reared apart, fraternal twins reared apart, nontwin siblings reared apart, or nonrelated children reared together (i.e., at least one of whom is adopted). By looking at the correlation in personality, psychopathology, or cognitive abilities in identical twins reared apart, a direct estimate of the genetic contribution to phenotypic variations can be made. For example, a correlation of .50 between identical twins on a personality measure implies that one half of phenotypic differences between people on that measure are caused by genetic variations. Similar comparisons can be made by examining fraternal twins and other siblings reared apart. Phenotypic variations not ex-

plained by genetic variations are assumed to be caused by environmental similarities and differences.

There are two kinds of environmental effects: shared and nonshared influences. The extent to which two nongenetically related siblings reared together are phenotypically similar reflects shared environmental influences. The extent to which they are different reflects both genetic differences and nonshared environmental influences. On the other hand, if pairs of siblings reared together are no more similar than pairs of siblings reared apart, then phenotypic similarities are attributable to genetic similarity, and differences within the sibling pairs are attributed to genetic differences and to nonshared environmental variations.

In the *twin design*, the phenotypic resemblance of identical twins and same-sex fraternal twins is examined. Each set of twins is reared in the same home at the same time. By comparing the correlations for a particular psychological characteristic for these two types of twins, the genetic, shared, and nonshared environmental contributions for that characteristic can be made. If heredity has no effect on that characteristic, for example, then identical and fraternal twins will resemble each other equivalently. Phenotypic variations accounted for by shared environmental influences are determined by subtracting the proportion of phenotypic similarity attributed to genetic similarity from the total phenotypic similarity. For example, if the total phenotypic similarity is 50%, and 40% is attributable to genetic similarity, then 10% is attributable to shared environmental influences. The nonshared environmental contribution is assessed by computing the portion of phenotypic variations that distinguish identical twins from one another. This is done by noting the extent of phenotypic variation remaining after the genetic and shared environmental influences are subtracted. In the current example, this would be 50%.

What are the results of this research? Plomin and Daniels (1987) reported that across a wide variety of studies, the genetic contribution to individual differences in personality, psychopathology, and cognitive abilities ranges from about 30% to 60%. Regarding environmental influences, nearly all of them consist of nonshared environmental effects. That is, environmental differences *within* families produce individual differences in behavior; but environmental similarities within families have little effect on individual differences between related and unrelated individuals. How about prejudice? Eysenck (1992) found a nearly identical pattern as just mentioned for males and females in both England and Australia for six items concerning Blacks and Jews on the Eysenck Social Attitudes Scale. Do Eysenck's results mean that individual differences in prejudice toward Blacks and Jews are coded in the genes? No, but the processes that lead to variations in the development of prejudice probably are. At the present time, we do not know what these processes may be.

HUNTER-GATHERER MINDS IN POSTINDUSTRIAL BODIES

Alice Rossi (1977) wrote:

... the two hundred years in which industrial societies have existed is a short time, indeed, to say nothing of the twenty years in which a few of the most advanced industrial societies have been undergoing the painful transition to a post-industrial stage. Our most recent genes derive from that largest segment of human history during which men and women lived in hunting and gathering societies; in other words, Westernized human beings now living in a technological world are still genetically equipped only with an ancient mammalian heritage that evolved largely through adaptations appropriate to much earlier times. (p. 3)

As noted previously, it is highly likely that the universal species-specific canalizations were in place at least 40,000 years ago, and that evolutionary changes since then have been either purely cultural or genetically culture-specific. We described an example of the latter with motor restraint in the Zinacantecos. There is no evidence of species-specific genetic changes in the past 40,000 years. As a consequence, the assumption being made here is that humans are currently operating with hunter-gatherer epigenetic systems. These systems evolved and supported cultures that were tribal, consisting on average, of approximately 500 men, women, and children. The systems were sufficiently flexible to allow the development of agricultural societies, which have been in existence for about 10,000 years. They also permitted the very recent cultural evolution of industrial and postindustrial societies. The fate of the latter is questionable as can be seen in the mutual destruction in which many societies are engaged.

As Rossi (1977) noted, much of our genetic equipment is based on "an ancient mammalian heritage." While that is certainly true, a more profitable approach for the present purposes is to focus on our more recent primate and hunter-gatherer heritages. In this ancestry lie the keys to understanding the genetic/evolutionary bases of the development of prejudice and discrimination.

The Primate Heritage

The primates evolved about 60 million years ago from mammalian ancestors probably resembling contemporary tree shrews (Andrews, 1985). Four major events occurred within that time span:

1. The New World and Old World primates were separated about 50 million years ago.

2. The Old World monkey–ape split occurred about 40 million years ago.
3. The common Old World ancestors of gorillas, chimpanzees, and humans emerged about 12 to 16 million years ago.
4. The evolutionary lines leading to distinct gorilla, chimpanzee and human species appeared about 6 to 10 million years ago.

There are two chimpanzee species, *Pan troglodytes* known as the common chimpanzee, and *Pan paniscus*, known as the pygmy chimpanzee or bonobo. Of the four species—humans, gorillas, pygmy and common chimpanzees—the two chimpanzee species have the highest degree of genetic relatedness. Among the primates, these four species are apparently more closely related to each other than they are to any other species (Wrangham, 1987).

I indicated that evolution is an experiment in design. What is the nature of the human design? In that our focus is the evolutionary basis of prejudice and discrimination, we are mainly interested in the social aspects of the design. There are three major components of the design: (a) the heritage we share with the Old World monkeys and apes; (b) that which we share with the chimpanzees and gorillas (which we discuss in another section); and (c) our hunter-gatherer heritage. As a consequence, our emphasis here is on those social/behavioral elements that are commonly found among Old World primates and those social/behavioral elements that characterize hunter-gatherer groups. It is noted that the monkey–ape split occurred approximately 40 million years ago, and that the ape–human species have had 6 to 10 million years of independent evolutionary history. All living species are different than the common ancestor. It is thus assumed that any social/behavior commonalities that exist among the monkeys and apes, or among the apes and humans, were part of the design of the common ancestors and continue to be part of the current human design.

Old World Monkeys and Apes

The primary adaptation of nearly all the Old World (African) primate species, including humans, is for life as a member of a group (Fishbein, 1976, 1984; Tooby & DeVore, 1987). These species have evolved so that the group provides the framework for subsistence activities, protection, reproduction, and socialization of the young. In these species, there is a frequent association of members of all ages and both sexes throughout the lifetime of each individual. In all cases, the offspring are typically born singly and are relatively helpless at birth, and they are highly dependent on the adults for a considerable period thereafter. Socialization starts shortly after birth, and occurs primarily through play, observation, imitation, and interactions with

group members. The major task of preadults is to learn to fit into and contribute to the stability of the social group. In order to accomplish this task they have to develop: (a) knowledge of who are group members; (b) a set of social skills important to the group; (c) an enduring set of social relationships with many, if not most members; and (d) knowledge of the rules of interaction and of the roles appropriate to self and others. These rules and roles are both age and sex related. What is tolerated in infants, for example, tugging on the hair of adults, is often treated harshly in juveniles. Male and female infants and juveniles not only act differently from each other—for example, males are more active, females stay closer to their mothers—but adults treat them differently.

If the social development of certain maturing members of the group is abnormal, then as adults they will not be able to contribute to the four vital functions of the social group to which they belong. Natural selection has operated and continues to operate in such a way that individuals who are appropriately socially developed contribute to all four vital functions of the group, and those that are not appropriately socially developed become peripheral members of the group. The latter likely reproduce less than the more central members. This is a negative feedback system involving genes and behaviors. In a stable environment, animals and people who have a genetic structure such that their social development will be normal develop into normal individuals and reproduce (or get their close relatives to do so), thus continuing their genes in the population gene distribution. Those whose genetic structure is such that they do not readily develop into normal adults have low fitness, and hence their genes are diminished in the gene distribution (Fishbein, 1976, 1984).

For the present purposes, one of the most significant social aspects of primate groups is the existence of dominance hierarchies. Dominance refers to the ability of one group member to “supplant” another in order to gain access to preferred or scarce resources. Some of these are particular foods, locations, for example, shade, water, close proximity to certain other group members, sex with specific individuals. There are three typical ways one member gains dominance over another: (a) defeating the other in a fight, or giving the appearance of being able to do so; (b) forming a coalition with another group member against some or all other group members; or (c) being the son or daughter of a mother who is high in the dominance hierarchy. The latter characteristic typically has importance among the Old World monkeys, and not among the apes. The critical factor here is that in monkey and baboon species, males typically leave their natal groups at adolescence, whereas females remain with their group throughout their lives. These females form dominance hierarchies, but the males do not (Hinde, 1983).

Primates do not retain their dominance status by constantly fighting with others, or threatening them. Rather, other group members with which they do not have close positive relations simply avoid them or move away from them when they approach. Two of the consequences of being a highly dominant individual are: Other group members pay attention to you or try to gain your attention (Chance, 1975); and other group members attempt to “groom” you or get you to groom them (grooming involves one individual tactually searching through another’s fur for parasites; Seyfarth, 1983). It has been shown by Strum (1987) and others that one of the consequences of grooming relationships is the development of alliances. These alliances increase one’s effectiveness in accomplishing goals within the group.

Thus, the picture that has emerged in recent years concerning dominance hierarchies is that the most dominant individuals are not only to be feared, but to be favored. Others want to be allied with them and to be responded to affectionately by them. Although there is no evidence that in nonhuman primate groups highly dominant individuals become role models for younger group members, we will see this characteristic emerge in human groups.

The Hunter-Gatherer Heritage

Ernst Mayr (1997) made a useful distinction between ultimate and proximate evolutionary causes. *Ultimate causes* are closely tied to the evolutionary history of a species and get manifested in the structure of the genotype of that species. This leads to the development of genetically specified processes, for example, memory, language acquisition, in the phenotypes of members of the species. The *proximate causes* are the playing out of those processes in the here and now—in the current environment in which the members find themselves. The ultimate causes exist because in the social and physical environments in which the genetically based processes were played out, the individuals manifesting the underlying genotype were reproductively successful. The proximate causes get played out in any environments in which they are triggered, even if these environments differ substantially from those in which the genotype evolved.

As indicated in a previous section, the evolutionary line leading to the hunter-gatherer design is 6 to 10 million years beyond the emergence of the common ancestor of humans, gorillas, and chimpanzees. The hunter-gatherer subsistence mode and social structure has been a relatively constant human feature for 99% of our existence. What are the major aspects of this design that differentiates us from the African monkeys and apes? My summary draws on five sources: Fishbein (1976, 1984), Irwin (1987), Tooby and DeVore (1987), and Wrangham (1987).

At the broadest level, nearly all hunter-gatherer societies consist of a set of genetically related subsistence groups that collectively form a tribe. Each subsistence group resides in a certain region and generally has limited contact with other tribal groups throughout the year. Members of the various groups are often closely related in that sisters and daughters move to other groups for marriage. Their offspring are cousins or nephews and nieces of members of the natal group. Female departure is the norm; however, in some societies the males usually leave the natal group, and in others, males or females may leave. Unlike the African apes, humans maintain bonds between family members in different groups that continue over time and space. Thus, all members develop strong identifications with the tribe as a whole.

Unlike the African primates, subsistence groups are composed of families. The family is the basic social unit, typically consisting of a married adult male, adult female, their preadolescent male and female offspring, unmarried adolescent and adult sons, and often, parents of the father. Polygyny is tolerated, but infrequent. Marriages are relatively permanent. In primate terms, the couple is pair-bonded, a characteristic rare in the African apes. Depending on rate of survival, family size may be small or large, which obviously will affect size of the subsistence group. In times of limited availability of food, which is usually seasonal, the group may split into its family components, each moving to an area with enough food to support it.

Unlike the African primates, fathers identify their wife's offspring as their own. Assuming a relatively low frequency of sexual infidelity leading to "illegitimate" offspring, a wife's offspring are in fact the sons and daughters of her husband. Corresponding to this parental identification, fathers invest a lot of time and energy in helping to raise their children. The extent of this activity is far greater than among the African apes. In addition to mutual involvement in child rearing and sexual fidelity, husbands and wives have extensive reciprocal and cooperative relationships with each other. Food sharing is an integral part of this collaboration.

Hunter-gatherer groups, as groups, share many goals and activities above and beyond those at the family level of organization. Socialization of children is a group responsibility, as are the division of labor, protection, and food sharing along gender lines. In some societies, hunters are not even permitted to eat their own "kills," but must give them to other group members. They, of course, benefit from the successes of their compatriots. Related to food sharing and group organization, there is extensive male-male cooperation, and relative to the African primates, a marked reduction in aggression and competition. The principal group ethics are sharing and reciprocity. These both produce and require extensive interpersonal interdependencies and social cohesion—much more so than in the African apes.

Finally, unlike the African primates, there are very marked cultural differences between tribes, especially those separated by substantial geographic distance. The term *culture* emphasizes here language, dialect, religious practices, moral rules, belief systems, rituals, dress, art, tools and tool decoration, and any or all activities that characterize a given tribe, for example, shaking hands as a greeting, offering particular food or drink to visitors.

Thus, humans and nonhuman primates evolved as members of closely knit subsistence groups. One uniquely human characteristic is that these groups were additionally strongly interconnected through tribal identifications. Members of the same tribe were relatively safe with and could count on nurturance from same-tribe members, even if those members were unknown. Other-tribe strangers, however, were potentially dangerous, especially during the regularly recurring periods of scarce resources. Given the likelihood that the hunter-gatherer tribal mode of living has been in existence for more than 1 million years, it is assumed that genetic/evolutionary processes emerged that led to sustaining tribal autonomy and continuity against neighboring tribes. It is believed that these processes became incorporated into human epigenetic systems and made it nearly inevitable that individuals would be prejudiced toward and discriminate against members of other tribes (ultimate causes). When humans recently shifted to non-tribal, for example, industrial modes of subsistence, our epigenetic systems did not shift. As a consequence, mechanisms that evolved for regulating intertribal contacts became inappropriately applied to within-culture relationships (proximate causes). In other words, humans are predisposed to treat outgroup members of our own cultures as if they were members of different tribes.

I believe that there are at least three genetic/evolutionary factors that have produced this state of affairs. These factors emerged to sustain tribal autonomy and continuity against neighboring tribes. They arose from: (a) the inherent nature of Darwinian selection processes on relatively closed breeding populations (inclusive fitness), (b) the genetic/evolutionary design of authority-bearing systems in human cultures, and (c) the genetic/evolutionary design of intergroup relations among the common ancestors of human hunter-gatherers. We turn now to a discussion of these factors, following which we will discuss a fourth factor, *outgroup attractiveness*, that can serve to moderate prejudice.

INCLUSIVE FITNESS

One of the major recent innovations in evolutionary theory is the elaboration of the concept of *inclusive fitness* and its relationship to social behavior (E. O. Wilson, 1980). The originator of this concept is William D. Hamilton

(1964, 1975), and it has become a cornerstone of the new discipline of "sociobiology." Inclusive fitness refers to the extent to which an individual and her or his close relatives have surviving offspring. Those with high inclusive fitness transmit relatively many genes to the next generation. Those with low fitness (individuals and close relatives) transmit relatively few genes to the next generation. One implication of inclusive fitness is that individuals (whether insects or humans) consciously or unconsciously attempt to get their genes into the next generation. They can do this in basically two ways: reproduce a great deal; or act in ways to get their close relatives to reproduce a great deal. For example, assuming that my sibling and I have in common one half of our genes, my inclusive fitness would be higher by his having five surviving offspring and me, none, than by my having two surviving offspring, and he none. Another implication is that when resources important for survival are limited, individuals will show preferences to relatives and act in ways to decrease the likelihood that non-relatives will successfully reproduce or survive. They may prevent non-relatives from mating, withhold food or shelter from them, or kill their offspring. The latter is a strategy that male langur monkeys usually perform (Hrdy, 1999), but is seen in other primates, including humans.

The most obvious reproductive strategy for getting your genes into the next generation is to mate with your opposite-sex parent or siblings—carry out incest. This level of inbreeding has two negative consequences, one short term and one long term. The short-term consequence is called "inbreeding depression." Basically the more closely related are two mating partners, the greater is the likelihood that lethal recessive genes will become manifest, and their offspring will be stillborn, die early, or have mental or physical defects. These all have the effect of decreasing the likelihood that one's genes will survive beyond the next generation (E. O. Wilson, 1980). The long-term consequence of high levels of inbreeding is that genetic variability across members of a breeding community gets reduced. Thus, when environments change, as they ultimately do, the descendants may not have the genetic resources to adapt to the new environment, and thus die out.

Hence, in attempting to maximize your genes in succeeding generations, a balance has to be struck between degree of incest and breeding depression. One wants to mate with a close relative, but not too close in order to avoid inbreeding depression. There are limited data with humans on inbreeding depression. There is marked depression for immediate family mating (E. O. Wilson, 1980), but in Australian aboriginal tribes, the preferred form of marriage is to first cousins (Tindale, 1974). However, in the United States, first-cousin marriages are uniformly restricted. It can be inferred from the Australian example that inbreeding depression is probably not extensive for first cousins, and is minor for second cousins.

There is another important implication of this line of reasoning. That is, we should prefer that our siblings marry second cousins rather than unrelated persons. Our siblings share on average 50% of our genes, our second cousins share about 6% of our genes, and unrelated persons share close to 0% of our genes. Thus, more of our genes get transmitted to the next generation when our siblings marry a second cousin than when they marry an unrelated person. There are some recent historical data consistent with this analysis. Irwin (1987) analyzed marriage patterns for the Netsilik Eskimos of Canada. They were more likely to marry within the local community than with a member of a nearby Netsilik community, and relatively unlikely to marry a member of another tribe. This pattern of marriages leads to relatively high genetic relatedness in members of the local community.

There are other important genetic, as well as social consequences of this analysis, which Hamilton (1964, 1975) described. In short, Hamilton shows mathematically that natural selection could operate in such a fashion that, given the opportunity, individuals would behave altruistically toward their relatives. *Altruism* refers to the performance of some act that benefits another at some expense to one's self, for example, giving food to your cousin. His analysis demonstrates that behaving altruistically to your relatives (and their like behavior in return) increases the Darwinian fitness of both parties. Hence, over many generations the genes of both parties, including those influencing altruism, would become widespread in any breeding population.

In Hamilton's analysis, the Darwinian success of altruistic behavior depends on being able to direct it toward relatives as opposed to nonrelatives. In small inbreeding communities like that of the Netsiliks, nearly everyone is a relative, so identifying them is not a problem. From the point of view of prejudice and discrimination, the direct implication of Hamilton's analysis is that we are essentially designed to be *ethnocentric*—to favor our own group as opposed to others. Some writers have suggested that inclusive fitness also leads to the conclusion that we should be hostile or antagonistic to non-group members (e.g., Irwin, 1987; Reynolds, 1987). The underlying basis of this antagonism is the need to keep valuable resources within the group of relatives to ensure one's genetic continuity.

AUTHORITY-BEARING SYSTEMS

As emphasized in a previous section, one of the most dramatic shifts human evolution took relative to that of the African primates was in the area of culture. The prominent evolutionary theorist, Waddington (1960) referred to this human characteristic as a "cultural sociogenetic system" (which I will abbreviate by CS-G system). CS-G systems are built on biological hereditary

systems. Lumsden and E. O. Wilson (1981) described the underlying processes of the coevolution of genes and culture. Like biological systems, CS-G systems are fundamentally involved with transmitting information from one generation to the next. The primary processes of doing this are social teaching and learning. CS-G systems evolve over time, but the mechanisms are different than those of biological evolution, for example, no genetic changes occur in the former.

CS-G systems involve the transmission of an enormous amount of information. This is made possible by our highly evolved symbolic and communication abilities, and, Waddington argues, by the evolution of "authority-bearing systems." The essence of these systems is that the receivers of information are designed to accept as true or valid the messages transmitted to them by authorities. Human cultures are so complex, for example, that individuals can not independently test out or evaluate each piece of new information. The mechanism evolution "selected" for overcoming this problem was authority acceptance. Waddington suggests that authority acceptance has its roots in "model-mimic" or "leader-follower" patterns of interaction seen in other animals, but it is dramatically extended to encompass conceptual or symbolic materials.

The notion of "authority" is a relative one. Your older sister or brother may take on the role of authority relative to you, but your mother is an authority to them. In general, an authority is a person who has greater legitimate status or power than another person. We saw in the discussion of monkey dominance hierarchies that high-status individuals are attended to more than others, and are sought out for grooming. They hold privileged positions in the social group and others follow their lead and respect their desires. I think that these primate characteristics form the bases for authority acceptance. The principle shift is from the behavioral (nonhuman primates) to the conceptual (humans).

Waddington (1960) maintained that much of the information transmitted in a CS-G system is "value-laden" or "ethical" and takes the form of beliefs. Thus, not only do children have to know what items not to eat because they are poisonous and what locations to avoid because snakes or leopards reside there (and not personally test out the validity of this information), but they are required to know and accept beliefs and behaviors concerned with other persons and spiritual entities. There are "right" and "wrong" beliefs and courses of action, and these are often highly cultural specific, for example, wearing veils, not eating pork, aiding the poor, facing East while praying.

Waddington (1960) argued that one essential component of authority acceptance is the psychological internalization of what authorities tell us. We personally take on (take in) the beliefs and values of authorities, giving these ideas an obligatory character. This is the superego of psychoanalytic

theory. In psychoanalytic theory, the mechanism underlying internalizing beliefs is the individual's need to identify with authorities in order to prevent punishment by them. We eventually come to extol their values and, in turn, transmit these to others over whom we have authority. Thus, we not only accept as valid what authorities tell us, but also, in a sense, come to maintain that the ideas are what they *should be*.

Waddington (1960) indicated, following psychoanalytic and Piagetian research, that authority acceptance has a developmental path. It appears to peak between the ages of 4 and 7, and to decline somewhat as children mature. One reason for the decline is the growing influence of peers on our thoughts and actions. In Piaget's (1932/1948) research, for example, children under age 7 usually say that game rules can't be changed because the rules were handed down by the elders. After age 7, children start to say that they can change the rules if their playmates agree to it. Although authority acceptance might decline after age 7, it remains a potent force throughout the human lifetime. As an example, young men and women go to war, risk their lives (often zealously) because their leaders tell them that doing so is based on a just cause.

There are at least three types of evidence that support the concept that humans are authority acceptors. The first involves children's ideas about obedience to authority. Basically, the literature indicates that there is little change between the ages of 4 and 11 in children's willingness to obey legitimate authorities, provided that immoral acts are not requested or that the authorities are not intruding in areas of the child's jurisdiction (Braine, Pomerantz, Lorber, & Krantz, 1991; Damon & Hart, 1988; Turiel, 1983). This research shows that some of the reasons children give for obedience change with age. Other research (Smetana, 1986) finds that during adolescence, the area of a child's jurisdiction increases, which has the consequence of narrowing the range of others' legitimate authority.

In Braine et al.'s (1991) study, boys and girls between the ages of 6 and 11 were read stories about children's conflicts with six types of legitimate authority, and two types of nonsanctioned authority; a power move by an older sibling and stealing by armed robbers from a store. After each story was read, the subjects were asked how the child in the story felt, what he (or she) should do, why, and how the authority figure would react if the child was not obedient. The major results were:

1. Although children indicated different levels of obedience to different types of legitimate authority figures, there were essentially no age differences in extent of compliance.
2. In nearly all cases, children of all ages stated that there would be negative consequences, for example, punishment, for noncompliance. This suggests that compliance is largely based on avoidance of these bad outcomes.

3. There was a decrease, with increasing age, in the frequency with which the subjects believed that the children in the stories would feel "sad" when placed in conflict. Older subjects were more likely than younger ones to attribute angry feelings to the children.
4. Older subjects gave more varied reasons for complying with legitimate authorities than younger ones, reflecting greater social knowledge.
5. There were marked differences between older and younger subjects to the robber story, but not to the older sibling story. These differences were based on the relative values the subjects placed on avoiding physical harm and protecting one's money.

The second line of evidence supporting the idea that humans are authority acceptors involves children's modeling behavior. The assumption made regarding authority acceptance is that children will not only accept as valid what authorities tell them, but also what authorities show them. Thus, children should be more likely to model their own behavior after high-status than low-status models. A number of studies support this conclusion. In Hetherington's (1965) experiment, groups of 4½-, 7-, and 10-year-old boys and girls and their parents were the subjects. The relative dominance of each parent was assessed through measuring which parent had the most influence in solving hypothetical child care problems. Two measures of children's identification with their mothers and fathers, respectively, and one measure of imitation of each parent were taken. The identification measures involved strength of masculine and feminine sex roles, and similarity of personality characteristics with parents. The imitation measure involved judgments of the prettiness of pictures, as modeled by each parent. In general, the results strongly support the importance of parental status in identification and imitation. Both boys and girls were more likely to identify with and imitate the more dominant parent; however, girls were relatively less susceptible to variations in mother dominance than boys were to variations in father dominance.

In Grusec's (1971) research, the subjects were 7- and 11-year-old boys and girls who were given opportunities to imitate a same-sex adult with either high or low "power." In the high-power condition, the adult was introduced as a person who was going to select children for an interesting trip. Moreover, after the adult and child finished their tasks, the adult was going to interview the child for possible trip selection. In the low-power condition, the same adults were given no special status or relationship with the children. While the children watched, the adults in both conditions played a bowling game and either conspicuously gave some of their winnings to charity (Experiment 1), or used very stringent performance criteria for re-

warding themselves (Experiment 2). The adults left the room and the children played the same game. In both experiments, children were found to imitate the high-power models to a greater extent than the low-power ones.

Finally, Brody and Stoneman (1981, 1985) showed that children are more likely to imitate high-status than low-status children. In these experiments, the subjects were either second- or third-grade boys and girls who watched a same-sex “model” child choose his or her favorite foods from pairs of pictures. The model was either younger (low status), the same age, or older (high status) than the subjects, who were informed about the model’s age. After the models made their choices, the subjects selected their favorite foods. In both studies, the subjects imitated the choices of the same-age or older children much more frequently than they did the younger ones.

The third line of supporting evidence deals with the general question of the relationship between understanding ideas and either believing or disbelieving them (Gilbert, 1991). Gilbert reviewed and integrated a large number of empirical and theoretical papers concerned with this issue. Interestingly, the framework of Gilbert’s study is philosophical, contrasting Descartes’s view that a person’s decision to believe or disbelieve an idea occurs after he or she has attempted to understand it, with Spinoza’s view that believing an idea and understanding it occur at the same time. Spinoza thought that disbelieving an idea requires additional mental processing. Authority acceptance is highly consistent with Spinoza’s view, although neither Descartes nor Spinoza qualify their positions regarding the status of the person who transmits the information. Simply put, Spinoza says that we believe what others tell us. Gilbert concludes that Spinoza’s view, or one similar to it, is correct. At a minimum, belief of ideas precedes disbelief.

The connection between authority acceptance and the development of prejudice and discrimination is fairly obvious. Children believe what their parents and other authorities—for example, teachers, political figures, athletes, actors, older siblings—tell them. They also believe what they read in books, magazines, and newspapers, and what they hear and see on television. Much of what they learn conveys consistent messages about various outgroups, for example, those based on race or gender or mental status. Children not only believe these messages but they incorporate them into their own value systems. As we saw in chapter 1, adults (and presumably children) may hold beliefs that are not readily modified by particular counterexamples. Thus a Black child may have a White child as a best friend and still believe, as his peers, parents and other family members have instructed him, that Whites are not trustworthy. If this same Black child develops a large number of friendships with Whites, however, these experiences may transform the beliefs he has acquired from his family and friends.

INTERGROUP HOSTILITY—HERITAGE FROM THE COMMON ANCESTOR OF APES AND HUMANS

Richard Wrangham (1987) provided an enormously useful integration of research concerned with the social organization of the African apes (both chimpanzee species and gorillas) and hunter-gatherers. These four species share a common ancestor that lived 6 to 10 million years ago. It is assumed that if the common ancestor possessed a given social characteristic, then there is a 6- to 10-million-year genetic/evolutionary continuity of that phenotype. We infer this possession if all of the descendants—all four of these species—share the given social characteristic.

Wrangham's (1987) analysis of the ape species is based on all the long-term (2 or more years) major field studies that exist. There are only 10 such studies, two each for the gorilla and pygmy chimpanzee, and six for the common chimpanzee. Thus, there may be serious problems with sampling, but this is what we have, and Wrangham's comparative analysis seems to be the most complete available. For the hunter-gatherer data, Wrangham reviewed several sources that dealt with their social organization. These include well over 150 ethnographic analyses of different hunter-gatherer societies. Sampling does not seem to be a problem here.

Wrangham (1987) chose 14 categories of social organization that he believes captured the essence of the structure and functioning of the groups formed by the four species. For six of these, he concluded that the common ancestor of all four species had the characteristic being considered, and for two, he concluded that the common ancestor did not have the characteristic. For the remaining six, there is considerable variability across the four species and no conclusions could be made. I summarize his results of the eight "conclusive" characteristics.

The first, "social network," refers to whether or not the subsistence group is relatively closed or relatively open to outsiders. The critical observation involves whether nongroup members are excluded from the activities of the ingroup. As a point of reference, subsistence group size averages about 25 for hunter-gatherers, 13 for gorillas, 60 for common chimpanzees (Jolly, 1972), and probably about 60 for pygmy chimpanzees (this is inferred from Wrangham's, 1987, discussion). A distinguishing feature of hunter-gatherers is that they typically are members of a "tribe" averaging about 500 members, which consists of many subsistence groups. All three African ape species have closed social networks, and hunter-gatherers are closed with respect to the tribe, and semiclosed with respect to the subsistence group. Wrangham (1987) concluded that the common ancestor formed groups with closed social networks.

The second characteristic, "lone males," refers to whether males ever travel alone. Traveling alone is potentially dangerous in that it may put one

in contact with neighboring groups. This occurs with all four species. As a consequence, Wrangham (1987) concluded that this activity occurred for the common ancestor.

The third deals with whether "females breed in their natal group" (the group they were born into). In all four species, females generally leave the natal group, join another nearby subsistence group, or in the case of humans, of their tribe, and mate therein. This is a very different pattern than is seen in African monkeys and baboons, where the females generally stay in the natal group from birth to death (Hinde, 1983). Wrangham (1987) concluded that in the common ancestor, females rarely bred in their natal group. By contrast, the fourth characteristic in both chimpanzee species and hunter-gatherers is that males generally remain in the natal group. The picture is unclear for gorillas, however.

The fifth through eighth characteristics, perhaps most important in terms of the development of prejudice and discrimination, deal with "intergroup relationships." These are concerned with how adult members of one social network react to members of other social networks. For the apes, there is one subsistence group in relation to outsiders and for the hunter-gatherers there is one tribe in relation to outsiders.

The fifth characteristic, "quality of the interaction," involves the dimension of friendliness versus hostility. For the gorilla, common chimpanzee, and hunter-gatherer species, reactions to outsiders typically are hostile. Violent attacks, occasionally leading to killings, have been observed. In one study of 50 hunter-gatherer societies, tribal warfare typically occurred on average every 2 years. The major function of hostility toward outsiders is to protect group members from attack or capture. An important secondary function is the protection of scarce resources, for example, food and water. Few observations have been made of the pygmy chimpanzee, but these indicate at least tense interactions with outsiders. Wrangham (1987) concluded that hostile intergroup relations were the norm for our common ancestor.

The sixth characteristic deals with the "identity of the active participants in hostile interactions." Insufficient data are available for the pygmy chimpanzees, but for the other three species, the adult males and occasionally adolescent males, are the usual interactants. In the Old World monkeys, by contrast, adult females often participated in the violence. Wrangham (1987) concluded that "males only" was the pattern for the common ancestor.

The seventh characteristic, "stalk/attack," refers to whether the adult and adolescent males of a group will actively seek out, stalk, and attack outsiders, in addition to reacting hostilely during chance encounters. Again, limited data are available for the pygmy chimpanzees, but stalking and attacking have been observed for the other species. In one study, a group of male chimpanzees were observed stalking and killing a female chimpanzee who had formerly been a member of their group (Goodall et al., 1979).

Thus, violence is not only directed toward strangers, or toward adult males. Wrangham (1987) concluded that these activities characterized the common ancestor.

The eighth characteristic, "territorial defense," refers to whether these species stake out a particular group territory and attempt to prevent outsiders from entering it. The most common observation is that they occupy a home range that overlaps with that of neighboring groups. It is rare for any of them to patrol the perimeter to prevent incursions of outsiders. When outsiders penetrate too deeply into the home range, they will be repelled. Wrangham (1987) concluded that the common ancestor did not engage in territorial defense.

Let me summarize the Wrangham (1987) material. The human evolutionary social heritage from the common ancestor of pygmy and common chimpanzees, gorillas, and human hunter-gatherers is that we were designed as members of relatively closed subsistence groups. The permanent members of these groups are typically the males who defend the group against outsiders. These encounters are usually hostile, and occasionally violent. Males periodically travel alone, and with other males, may stalk and attack nongroup members. Females migrate out of their natal group and join other nearby groups. When they do so, they are vulnerable to attack by stalking adult males.

These observations suggest that the evolutionary basis for prejudice and discrimination differs for males and females. The key data are these: Males usually stay with their natal group, whereas females leave at adolescence and join another group; and adolescent and adult males, but not females, defend the group against outsiders, and even stalk and attack them. These behavior patterns show that males are more hostile to nongroup members than are females, and older males, more so than younger ones. The observations may mean that males are more predisposed than females to form a strong group identification and to develop commitments to many group members, and older males more so than younger ones. Adult females form close bonds with their offspring and with only a small number of adult males and/or females. Using evidence consistent with these findings, Lever (1978) showed that boys in Western cultures are more likely than girls both to be members of large groups and to play in competitive games. Pre-adolescent and adolescent females must even have a more tenuous identification with the natal group than same-age males, in that they eventually leave it to join another group. Perhaps weaker group identification on the part of females is a necessary condition for their permanent departure. The link between strength of group identification and prejudice and discrimination is that a stronger identification may lead to stronger negative reactions to outsiders, and hence, to stronger prejudice.

Although the aforementioned prediction about gender differences in prejudice is speculative, the idea of genetically or evolution-based differences in male and female social behavior has been confirmed by David Buss (1994) and colleagues in a series of cross-cultural studies. The central organizing thesis of this research is that males and females have different degrees of parental investment in their offspring—females are vastly more invested in both time and energy. This differential investment leads to hypothesized differences in men's and women's short-term and long-term mating strategies. Buss (1994) listed nine hypotheses that have been consistently confirmed in up to 37 different cultures, for example, short-term mating is more important for men than for women; women will be more selective than men in choosing a short-term mate. The confirmation of these hypotheses in one area of social behavior—mating strategies—certainly does not prove hypothesized gender differences in prejudice, but it does make the argument plausible.

Finally, the genetic/evolutionary factor of intergroup hostility fits very well with the recent psychological model of intergroup relations by W. G. Stephan and C. W. Stephan (2000), which they refer to as "An integrated threat theory of prejudice" (p. 23). The model consists of four types of threat that are posed by outgroups, including those within a culture and those from different cultures. The first type is called "realistic threats" (p. 25), and include threats to the physical, economic and political well-being of the ingroup by an actual outgroup. The second type is called "symbolic threats" (p. 25), and these "primarily involve perceived group differences in morals, values, standards, beliefs, and attitudes" (p. 25) between the ingroup and specific outgroups. The third type is called "intergroup anxiety" (p. 27), and refers to the personal threats, for example, embarrassment, ridicule, or rejection that individuals may experience when they are involved in interactions with members of outgroups. The fourth type is called "negative stereotypes" (p. 27), and refers to the fear of negative consequences that individuals will experience with outgroups, in large part because of the negative stereotypes they hold about the outgroups. These four types of threat collectively shape the prejudices that we hold toward particular outgroups.

GENE FLOW AND OUTGROUP ATTRACTIVENESS

In this section, the genetic analyses come primarily from five sources: Cavalli-Sforza and Bodmer (1971), Dobzhansky (1962), B. C. Lamb (2000), Thompson (1999), and Thrall, Richards, McCauley, and Antonovics (1998). The concept of outgroup attractiveness based on these analyses is mine.

In monkeys and apes, mating rarely occurs with individuals that have been reared together. At sexual maturity, depending on the species, either the adolescent male or female leaves the natal group and migrates to another subsistence group. In turn, each subsistence group accepts migrants from other groups. For example, adolescents from Group A generally migrate to Group B or Group C; those from Group B generally migrate to Group A or Group D; and those from Group C generally migrate to Group B or Group E; and so on. In that these subsistence groups are relatively small in number, this has both the short- and long-term effect of decreasing the likelihood of incest and inbreeding. It also has the long-term effect of keeping within-group genetic variability at a sufficiently high level to accommodate environmental changes that inevitably occur. These may include such diverse events as the introduction of new diseases and long-term drought. In a relatively inbred population, phenotypic variation may not be wide enough for individuals to survive and reproduce in the changed environment.

In human hunter-gatherers, mating nearly always occurs outside the subsistence group, but within the tribe. On average, tribes consist of about 500 men, women, and children, divided into ten or more subsistence groups. Assuming that at any one time no more than half the tribal members have reproductive capacities, this yields a number of about 125 mating couples. There are at least three potential problems with such a relatively small mating population.

The first is *inbreeding depression*. Inbreeding depression is a phenomenon seen in a wide variety of animal and plant species. It is a loss of Darwinian fitness in populations that have increased homozygosity for many genes; that is, both alleles for a given gene location are identical. Sometimes this homozygosity leads to valued phenotypic outcomes, as can be attested to by plant and animal breeders. But this homozygosity also leads to increased recessive genetic diseases that are deleterious to survival or reproduction. The problem with homozygosity is that many recessive alleles are lethal or deleterious, but are not problematical when paired with another allele that is dominant and not deleterious. There are hundreds of known human genetic diseases caused by recessive alleles in a homozygous state, for example, Sickle cell anemia, Tay Sachs, cystic fibrosis, phenylketonuria (PKU), hypothyroidism. It is believed that humans carry, on average, at least three lethal recessive alleles. Thus, close relatives who mate are at increased risk for homozygosity of these harmful alleles among their offspring.

Let us assume that mating with very close relatives (e.g., brother-sister, uncle-niece) was forbidden in ancestral hunter-gatherer groups, as it is in essentially all contemporary societies (some allow first cousin marriages, but in the United States, about one half of the individual states prohibit it). Because of the small size of the mating population, if mating only occurred

within the tribe, and if first- or second-cousin marriage was the preferred norm, this would lead, over time, to population increases in homozygosity at numerous gene loci. Because some of these alleles would be deleterious, this would lead to a loss of Darwinian fitness for the tribe as a whole. Although we have no studies of the effects of increases in homozygosity in hunter-gatherer tribes, careful large-scale studies in France and Japan after World War II comparing offspring of genetically related (primarily first and second cousins) versus unrelated parents showed that the rates of stillborns, neonatal, and early infancy deaths were much greater for related parents. Small populations can not tolerate this mortality. Eventually they will become extinct.

What can be done to prevent the inbreeding problem? The answer is simple—gene flow. *Gene flow* is the introduction of new genetic material from members of outside groups. The usual way this occurs is through migration of some outsiders to the host tribe, where they set up residence and mate with one or more members of the tribe. Computer simulations of the process indicate that the numbers of outsiders need not be large in order to accomplish the goal of maintaining genetic heterozygosity both within and among members of the population.

The second problem with small mating populations is *genetic drift*. Even assuming random mating in the population, as contrasted with first- and second-cousin preferences, one or more alleles at various particular genetic loci will be lost over generations due to the random effects of small population size. Thus other alleles will become fixed in the population, thereby increasing homozygosity. Because this is a random process, the alleles affected were probably at a low frequency in the population to begin with and can never get passed on to the offspring. If this random loss of some alleles occurs in most generations, then many of them will eventually become eliminated from the population. Again, the fixing of other alleles in the population means homozygosity at a number of genetic loci in the population. There may be no noticeable short-term effect of this occurrence. However, the population gene pool loses variability and many, perhaps most individuals become less able to adapt to environmental changes. What can be done to prevent the genetic drift problem? The answer is, again, simple—gene flow. Immigrants bring in new genetic material, perhaps the lost alleles, but certainly different alleles, and this increases genetic variability in the host tribe.

The third problem has already been noted in the cases of inbreeding depression and genetic drift—reduced genetic variability associated with small mating populations. Small populations with limited variability in the gene pool may be well adapted to the normal range of environments to which they are immediately exposed. However, due to both genetic drift and previous Darwinian selection in response to environmental change,

the loss of a significant number of alleles probably occurred. Indeed evolution itself involves the weeding out of maladaptive or nonadaptive alleles and their replacement by alleles that are more adaptive. But as already noted, once those alleles are lost, then their potential for future adaptation is also lost. They may be maladaptive in the present environment, but highly adaptive in other environments. An important balance has to be struck between the weeding out of currently nonadaptive or maladaptive alleles, and their retention as a hedge against future environmental changes.

The obvious answer to the problem of limited genetic variability is gene flow. Outsiders bring in additional genetic variation that increases genetic variability of the host tribe. This process also has the advantage that it brings in some "tested" variation—some different genes that already have some selective value in the outgroup population. It should be pointed out that too much gene flow, especially from outgroups operating under different selection pressures than the host tribe, can be problematical in that it may disrupt the existing genetic adaptation that the host tribe has attained. Thus, a balance has to be maintained between retaining the current gene pool of a population and admitting new genes into that pool.

To summarize the argument just made, there are two significant and interrelated problems associated with small populations, which have different effects. The first is an increase in homozygosity brought about by inbreeding, leading to the expression of deleterious genes. The second is the loss of genetic variation brought about by genetic drift, leading to the reduced ability of members of the population to adapt to new environments. Adequate gene flow from migrants will counter both negative effects.

Similar to the argument in the discussion of inclusive fitness, I assume that there are psychological consequences to the tribal need for gene flow. In order to accept migrants into the host tribe, members of that tribe must overcome the wariness and hostility they feel toward outsiders and be willing to bring one or more of them into the group. As is discussed in the next section, each of us carries *badging mechanisms* that lead us to note differences and similarities between ingroup and outgroup members. Where differences are perceived, psychological processes are assumed to exist that evaluate these differences. As a consequence, positive evaluations lead to a decision to either include the outsiders into the ingroup, or to incorporate some of their different characteristics into the ingroup. It is obvious that this attractiveness occurs even in warring societies, where some members of opposing groups marry and have children. And certainly this mutual attractiveness occurs between ingroup and outgroup members who are not at war or in a state of conflict. When these different characteristics are valued, and there are barriers to migration, then those characteristics may be adopted by the host tribe, for example, new tools or weapons or other cultural artifacts. Of course, as we take on the characteristics of outgroups, we become

more similar to them and this breaks down barriers for friendship and perhaps intermarriage. Incorporating valued characteristics into the host tribe produces phenotypic plasticity, but does not directly affect genetic variability. It is only when mating occurs that genetic variability is influenced.

The long term outcome of incorporating outsiders into the tribe is increased gene flow, which has the effect of maintaining adequate genetic variability and reducing homozygosity. But the psychological mechanisms produced by the adaptive need for gene flow—outgroup attraction—are incompatible with those produced by inclusive fitness and intergroup hostility—prejudice and discrimination directed toward the outgroup. We have learned from Freud (1917) and other psychoanalysts (Horney, 1945; Sullivan, 1953) that incompatible unconscious motives or urges can exist side by side in our mind. Depending on their relative strength, our moral values, and external reality, one or the other of these motives or urges will win out in conscious thought or action. Based on the widespread prevalence of intercultural conflict, I believe that the psychological forces underlying prejudice and discrimination are relatively stronger than those underlying outsider attraction. However, gene flow does not depend on every tribal member mating with outsiders. It only takes a few persons in each generation to ensure adequate gene flow for maintaining genetic variability, and keeping homozygosity at an acceptable level. Despite the relatively weaker role of outgroup attractiveness in intergroup relations, it may be valuable to consider gene flow in finding ways to modify prejudice and discrimination.

IDENTIFICATION OF TRIBE MEMBERS AND MULTIGROUP MEMBERSHIP

From the perspective of the development of prejudice and discrimination in contemporary society, two related issues must be addressed: identification of tribe members (or conversely, outsiders); and multigroup memberships. The issue of identification of tribe members relates to two of the three evolutionary factors discussed in this chapter: inclusive fitness and intertribal hostility. It can be assumed that preadolescent hunter-gatherers know relatively few members of the tribe outside their primary subsistence group. How can the young identify strangers who are tribal members (and thus, safe) as opposed to outsiders of nearby tribes, who are potentially dangerous?

Irwin (1987) suggested that this is accomplished through the evolutionary mechanism known as “badging.” Certain groups of birds, for example, identify potential mates through identification of a particular song that only members of their breeding population have learned. Irwin plausibly argues that the young in any tribe readily learn to identify and differentiate

most, if not all, of the cultural characteristics that they and fellow tribesmen share. If the stranger speaks the same language, with the same dialect, dresses the same, carries the same tools, for example, as do members of the subsistence group, then the stranger is not seen as an outsider, but rather a tribesman. The issue of tribal member identification and inclusive fitness has been extensively examined by Van den Berghe (1981) in the context of ethnic prejudice. Van den Berghe discusses three categories of *ethnic markers* that can potentially serve to determine group membership: (a) genetically transmitted "racial" characteristics such as skin color, stature, facial features; (b) human-made artifacts that are "worn" such as clothing, body painting, tattooing, or circumcision; and (c) behavioral characteristics such as speech, manners, knowledge of particular myths, or histories. Many of these are similar to Irwin's (1987) badges.

The most blatant markers are the genetically transmitted racial differences. As Van den Berghe (1981) pointed out, from a genetic/evolutionary view, race differences between neighboring tribes were rare occurrences and could not have been the basis for inclusive fitness choices. Members of nearby tribes are usually racially the same, primarily because they evolved in essentially the same environment and tribal intermarriage (forced or voluntary), occasionally occurred. For example, there is a gradient in Europe from north to south, of hair and eye color. Residents of neighboring territories show essentially the same pattern, but Scandinavian (blue and blond) and Southern Italy (brown and brown) are very different. Inclusive fitness choices occurred in relation to the nearby tribes, not between Scandinavians and Italians.

Racial differences as tribal markers only became important during the postagricultural period, when city-states were founded, armies were formed, and territorial expansion occurred. Black-White hostile encounters are even more recent, perhaps only about 500 years. Van den Berghe (1981) indicated, however, that with relatively few exceptions such as in South Africa and the United States, where there are strong barriers to interracial marriage, race as a basis for ethnic identity was short-lived. Typically, within several generations, enough intermarriage occurs in a society to obscure racial bases of ethnicity. As a related aside, in historical times, the first contacts between members of different races were occasionally friendly, at least in the New World. The Pilgrims in Massachusetts and the Spaniards in Mexico and Peru were initially met with curiosity and not hostility by the various indigenous groups. It was only when the Europeans waged war that the native Americans became hostile and fought back. The Pilgrim stories even indicate that the Indians were friendly and saved the lives of those first European Americans. Thus, it appears that racial differences as a basis for prejudice is purely cultural/historical and not genetic/evolutionary.

In his discussion of the “worn” and behavioral ethnic markers, Van den Berghe (1981) argued that the behavioral differences were the most reliable and most difficult to fake. By donning the clothes, hair style, and body paint of a neighboring tribe, it was easy to look like a member of that tribe. But to affect the mannerisms of the neighboring tribe, especially their language dialect, was often very difficult. Van den Berghe (1981) suggested, and I strongly concur, that language differences and similarities were probably the primary ways that tribal membership was assessed. This suggests that there is a genetic/evolutionary basis for strong sensitivities to and responses to speech.

Hunter-gatherers are simultaneously members of a number of groups: a tribe, a subsistence group, an extended family, an immediate family, an age-related group of peers (Eisenstadt, 1956), and a same-sex group (“We are boys,” “We are girls”). Multigroup membership is much more extensive in hunter-gatherers than in the African apes, probably even greater among urban humans than hunter-gatherers. The existence of multigroup membership raises two problems. First, how are children able to understand and act on multigroup membership? Second, what happens when conflict occurs between groups of which one is a member? Regarding the first, it is likely that the tremendous growth in cognitive abilities, especially symbolic ones, relative to the African apes, permits adults as well as children to simultaneously identify with several groups. Symbolic labeling is a very powerful social and intellectual tool, especially if it is reinforced by the behavior of other persons.

Regarding the second question, children and adults form a hierarchy of preferred groups, or a rank-ordering of group allegiances. If the groups are in frequent conflict, a person may have to choose to disaffiliate from one or more of the groups, and thus become an outsider to them. In hunter-gatherer societies, which are relatively closed to people outside the tribe, and where there is a strong need for social cohesion, these within-tribal conflicts are probably infrequent. But in urban societies, they are more common. Tonnesmann (1987) suggested that individuals get more strongly attached to groups where multiple memberships are not possible than to those where membership conflicts may arise. Examples of the former are groups based on race and gender where a person can't simultaneously be a male and female or a Black and White.

DEVELOPMENT OF A GROUP IDENTITY

The aforementioned research and theorizing indicates that three interconnected evolutionary mechanisms are involved with our negative reactions to ingroup and outgroup members. They are: (a) inclusive fitness, which

leads to strong ingroup preferences; (b) primate intergroup mechanisms, which lead to hostility toward outgroup members; and (c) authority acceptance, which often leads to ingroup preferences and outgroup hostility. According to this model, individuals who view themselves as members of different groups will react in the just described ways. If a child, for example, does not see himself or herself as a member of a particular dominant group, then the child will not react in prejudiced and discriminatory ways toward members of groups who are subordinate to that dominant group. In other words, individuals must develop a group identity before they will develop prejudice and discrimination toward particular outgroups.

At what age do children begin to identify with a group? This question presents issues different from those concerned with the age at which children identify certain self-characteristics such as gender. A child may view herself as being a girl, see herself as being similar to other girls, and yet not identify herself as a member of the girls' group. To be a member of a group, at a minimum, entails the social cohesion of group members—bonding and ingroup favoritism.

There appear to be only three experiments in the English language that directly evaluate the age-related development of group identity for young children. Abramenkova (1983) compared 5- to 6-year-olds with 6- to 7-year-olds; Strayer and Trudel (1984) compared children between the ages of 1 and 6; and Yee and Brown (1992) compared 3½-, 5-, 7-, and 9-year-olds. There are several other studies, however, dealing with the development of children's knowledge of group functioning that bear indirectly on group identity. The assumption is made that if children have knowledge of group processes, then it is likely that they have experienced group identification.

Strayer and Trudel's (1984) research has its origin in the study of primate groups in naturalistic settings. Their subjects were 10 day care groups, whose average ages ranged from approximately 1½ to 5½ years. There were two groups at each age level. The researchers focused on dominance and affiliative behavior within the group because these are central features of primate group social cohesion. Affiliation includes close-in interactions such as touching, holding and kissing, as well as more distant interactions; dominance includes attacks, threats, competition, submission, and retreat. The central idea of the research, from the present view, is that if children interact with each other in stable and systematic ways—ways that support social cohesion—then they are operating as members of a social group. This implies that they experience a group identity. If these dominance and affiliative interactions are unstable or unsystematic, the children probably have not attained a group identity.

Strayer and Trudel (1984) measured several types of behavioral interactions that relate to this issue: (a) frequency of conflict, (b) stability of dominance relations, (c) number of dyadic encounters in which dominance is

depicted, (d) the relation between dominance status and the amount of affiliation directed toward the child, and (e) the relation between dominance status and number of unreciprocated affiliation behaviors received. The results are straightforward: Children under age 3 do not operate as if they were members of groups, for both dominance and affiliation. Groups comprised of 3-, 4-, or 5-year-olds behave similarly regarding dominance relations, but there are more conflicts and more struggles over dominance within groups of 3-year-olds than within the older groups. This means that the dominance hierarchy for 3-year-olds is not functioning as effectively as it is for 4- and 5-year-olds. For affiliation, there is a trend from the 3-year-olds to the 5-year-olds for affiliation to be more frequently directed toward the high status members. In stable human and nonhuman primate groups, high status members receive more attention and/or affiliation than low status members. These patterns of results indicate that group identity starts to emerge at age 3 and is well developed by age 5. In general, the group interactions of the 4- and 5-year-olds were more similar to each other than to the younger children.

Abramenkova's (1983) study, carried out in the Soviet Union, assessed whether 5- to 7-year-old children would work as hard on a task when only the group leader would be punished for poor group performance as compared to when each individual would be punished. The assumption made is that if individuals identify themselves as members of a group, they will act in a "humane" way toward other members of the group—that is, they will work as hard to protect their group leader as to protect themselves. Moreover, this humane attitude should more likely occur when the members have to interact cooperatively with each other, as opposed to when they work alone, parallel to each other.

The children were placed into groups of four, based on age and gender, and tested on either a brief interactive task or a brief parallel task. For each task, two conditions were compared: Only the experimenter-appointed leader could be punished versus all members could be punished. The measure of a humane attitude compared speed and accuracy of performance when only the leader could be punished relative to when the entire group could be punished. The results indicate that a humane attitude was much more likely to occur on the interactive than parallel task; groups of 6- to 7-year-olds showed more of this attitude, and more stably, than groups of 5- to 6-year-olds; but the humane attitude was present in even the younger groups. These findings indicate that by 5 years of age, children readily develop and identify with a group that is externally formed and lasts for only a brief time period. It would not be surprising to find evidence of a humane attitude in younger children, especially for long-standing groups in non-laboratory settings.

In Yee and Brown's (1992) experiment, children of ages 3½, 5, 7, and 9 years were first tested on their ability to play the egg and spoon game. In

this game, players are asked to carry as many eggs balanced on spoons as possible, in a fixed period of time. The timing was rigged such that each child succeeded in carrying exactly 3 eggs. The children were then assigned as a member to either a "green" team or a "blue" team. The three other members of the green team each carried more than 3 eggs, whereas the three members of the blue team each carried only 1 or 2 eggs. The children were shown their teammates' scores and hence could readily note that the green team was fast and the blue team was slow. The children were then asked to make self and team evaluations, and to indicate whether they would like to switch teams. Children did not meet their "teammates" nor did they play the game again. The authors assumed that if children identified with their assigned team, they would tend to evaluate it more highly than they would the other team. However, it was predicted that children assigned to the slow team would indicate a desire to switch teams.

The results are rather complex, in that boys and girls differed somewhat on the various measures. In general, children at all age levels and on both fast and slow teams liked their team better than the opposing one. This was especially pronounced for the 5-year-olds. Children generally were accurate in assessing the performance capabilities of the two teams, although the 5-year-olds on the slow team overevaluated their team's performance capabilities. Finally, most children on the fast team did not want to switch teams, and with the exception of the 5-year-olds, most children on slow teams did want to switch. The authors conclude that children as young as 3½ years of age can identify themselves as members of ingroups and manifest some intergroup processes. A notable change occurs at about 5 years of age in which children show particular attachment to their groups.

The remaining studies only indirectly bear on the development of a group identity. Sluckin and P. K. Smith (1977) were interested in the way 3- and 4-year-olds in two preschool play groups formed a dominance hierarchy. Pairwise dominance was measured by observing the ability of one child to win in aggressive encounters with another. Children's perception of dominance was measured by asking each child to evaluate the "toughness" of each member in his or her playgroup by ranking photographs of all the playmates.

In both groups, a clear dominance hierarchy was found, in the sense that all dominance relations were transitive. That is, if A was dominant over B, and B over C, A was found to be dominant over C. The toughness rankings were carried out twice in the same day, as a check on reliability. Only 8 of the 20 children were reliable, that is, consistently rank-ordered their peers in the two evaluations. Seven of these eight children were over 4 years old. Only one of the ten 3-year-olds was consistent in his rankings. Especially important was the validity of the rankings, that is, the statistical relationship between toughness rankings (the two reliability rankings were averaged)

and the observed dominance hierarchy. If children can accurately perceive this important dimension of group functioning, it may be inferred that they both perceive their playmates as a group, and identify with that group. The data analyses showed that the children who were reliable in their rankings (predominantly 4-year-olds) also had valid rankings and that the children unreliable in their rankings (predominantly 3-year-olds) did not have valid rankings. These findings, consistent with the Strayer and Trudel (1984) findings, indicated that group identity emerges between 3 and 4 years of age.

The study by Watson and Fischer (1980) dealt with the development of an understanding of social roles in children between 1½ and 7½ years of age. In their research, children were presented with a sequence of eight different levels describing social understanding in preschool play settings. Of particular importance is the distinction made between the *behavioral role* and *social role* understanding levels. The former concept means that a child can perform several actions in play that fit a particular social role, for example, doctor, nurse. The latter concept means that a child can do the same, but additionally understands the complementary nature of social roles, for example, that doctors and nurses interact with each other in particular ways. A child who demonstrates knowledge of a behavioral role may not understand that the role coordinates with other roles. It can be argued that in order for groups to function properly, social roles and not merely behavioral roles must be understood. If a child understands social roles, it may be inferred that he or she has knowledge of group functioning. It is further assumed that the child has probably experienced membership in a group.

The basic technique used by Watson and Fischer (1980) to study these issues was a modeling and imitation procedure. The experimenter would act out a brief story using dolls and then ask the child to act out her or his own similar story using the same dolls. The portrayed story reflected each of the eight levels in social understanding. If a child could successfully imitate the experimenters' story at a particular level, then it was assumed that the child had social understanding at that level. The results were reliable and straightforward: The maximum level attained by 3- and 3½-year-olds was that of behavioral roles, and for 4- and 4½-year-olds, social roles. Thus, consistent with Sluckin and Smith (1977) and Strayer and Trudel (1984), 4 years of age appears to be the age at which a group identity emerges.

The last research to be discussed was carried out by Piaget in the areas of symbolic play (1962) and games with rules (1932/1948). Piaget divides the development of symbolic play into two periods—from 1½ to 4 years, and from 4 to 7 years. The first period involves the simple and often haphazard, but novel use of language and nonverbal symbols with objects. For example, a child places a doll in a pan, covers it with a postcard and says "Baby, blanket, cold." The pan is symbolic of a bed, and the postcard, of a blanket.

In the second period, relative to the first, the symbolic combinations are more orderly; the characters and objects used are more realistic, and collective symbolism appears. That is, children can now play together using the same symbols, all taking on roles that complement each other, such as that of mother and father. Thus, in this latter period, there is evidence consistent with the findings of Watson and Fischer (1980) that the use of complementary roles emerges at about age 4 years.

In the practice of rules of games, Piaget (1932/1948) again distinguished between behavior characteristics of 1½- to 4-year-olds and those of 4- to 7-year-olds. For the purposes of this discussion, the importance of games with rules is that they provide symbolic guides for group interaction. To play a game with other children implies that each player sees the rules binding in relation to their collective behavior. Because the rules are somewhat abstract, young children could be expected to have difficulty with them. And they do. But Piaget points out substantial differences between the pre- and post-4-year-olds in their use of rules. Younger children evidence no understanding of a game governed by rules. Older children play together, claim they are playing by the rules, and even state some of the rules, but they don't play as if the rules were binding, or even shared. It is not until children are about 7 years old that rules regulate their play interactions.

In all the mentioned research, the age of 4 continues to appear as the age at which understanding of group functioning clearly occurs. These findings support the conclusions based on the Strayer and Trudel (1984) experiment that a sense of group identity emerges by that age. Because understanding of group processes grows appreciably over the next 3 years, it might be expected that the nature of group identity also changes considerably between the ages of 4 and 7.

Two predictions are thus made based on the aforementioned conclusions: The appearance of prejudice and/or discrimination against specific target groups will first reliably appear in 4-year-olds, and the nature of this prejudice/discrimination will change in systematic ways between the ages of 4 and 7.

INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR

In the previous section, we found that between the ages of 3 and 4 years, children are capable of developing a group identity. Based on evolutionary considerations, we concluded that group identity is a prerequisite for the manifestation of certain intergroup processes, that is, preferential treatment of ingroup members and hostility toward outgroup members. We further argued that genetically based intergroup processes are one of the three building blocks of prejudice and discrimination.

What do we know about the development of intergroup behavior in children? And how does this knowledge fit with what we would predict from primate intergroup relations? Surprisingly, little research has been carried out in this area. Fortunately, the work that has been done is considered classical in the field of social psychology. The Sherifs' experiments (M. Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood & C. W. Sherif, 1961; M. Sherif & C. W. Sherif, 1953) are among the most imaginative and important in the field of group development and intergroup relations. From the point of view of the subjects, they were not participants in experiments, but rather, participating in real-life experiences shared with other preadolescent or adolescent boys. In the first experiment (M. Sherif & C. W. Sherif, 1953) a number of middle-class boys were invited to attend an overnight camp. In the first phase, which lasted less than 1 week, the children participated in the usual camp activities, ate together, and were given great freedom in choosing their friends. The counselors/experimenters paid special attention to friendship patterns and social networks.

In the second phase, which also lasted less than 1 week, close friends were placed into two separate groups. The groups were kept isolated from each other as much as possible, eating, sleeping, and carrying out activities in separate locations. One group named itself the Bulldogs, the other, the Blue Devils. Each of the groups developed a set of norms that distinguished it from the other group. For example, the Bulldogs refused to use the color blue, which they associated with the Blue Devils. Most of the boys talked in an "us versus them" fashion and deprecated the other group. Boys who attempted to socialize with members of the other groups were called "traitors" by their own group. Within each group, status hierarchies emerged. This system served to further enhance group identification and cohesiveness, and to produce at least mild antagonism toward the other group.

In the third phase, the two groups were brought into competition with each other in order to win points for the group as a whole and prizes for its individual members. The boys competed in sports, tournaments, and camp chores. During this phase, intergroup antagonism escalated to such a degree that the Sherifs made strong attempts to create intergroup harmony. They accomplished this by assigning the groups cooperative tasks necessary for the betterment of the camp as a whole.

In the second experiment (Sherif et al., 1961), two groups of boys were brought into the camp separately, unaware of each others' presence during the first phase. As in the earlier experiment, status hierarchies emerged, which included the development of group norms, cooperation, group identity, and group loyalty. In the second phase, the groups were brought together for a number of athletic competitions. As in the first study, strong negative attitudes and behaviors developed toward the other group. Even neutral contacts turned into conflict, such as a garbage-throwing war fol-

lowing a meal together. At the same time, ingroup feelings were strengthened, often leading to overestimates of the group's competitive abilities. As in the first experiment, the third phase involved having the two groups work together cooperatively, which had the effect of improving intergroup relations.

In summary, the results of these experiments are completely consistent with the findings of the studies on primate intergroup relations. In the process of group formation, preadolescent and adolescent boys developed strong bonds with other group members. A status hierarchy emerged, they developed and adhered to group norms, and then reacted negatively to outgroup members, some of whom were previously friends. Competition between groups served to exaggerate these effects. The Sherifs' research indicates that for preadolescents and adolescents, antagonism toward outgroup members is an integral part of group formation and group functioning.

These results raise two important questions about group formation and intergroup relations. First, the Sherifs built into their camp situation a large number of social components designed to create a strong sense of group identity. Are all these components necessary? To phrase it differently, what are the minimum requirements for establishing a group identity (as assessed by ingroup preferences)? Second, the campers showed both strong ingroup preferences *and* outgroup hostility. Do the two classes of behavior always occur together? If not, what does it take to produce both?

The research by Henri Tajfel and colleagues, for example, Tajfel (1981), and Tajfel and Turner (1986), known as "minimal" group experiments, were designed to answer the first of these questions. Their results indicate that for adolescents, ingroup preferences are produced even when group identification is based on trivial characteristics and the members of the groups have never, nor would ever, meet. In one of the experiments, the adolescents were individually shown slides of paintings by Klee and Kandinsky (the subjects were not art students), and asked for their preferences. They were then told that they were being placed in the group who preferred the same painter that they preferred. In another experiment, the adolescents were shown pictures of dots and asked to state their number. The subjects were then told that they were being placed into a group that had either underestimated or overestimated the number shown in the same manner as they had done. The adolescents were then individually tested on a number of tasks in which they had to determine the monetary rewards for one other member of their group as well as for one member in the other group.

In all the experiments (at least 30 had been performed), a consistent preference was shown to more highly reward ingroup as opposed to outgroup members. Moreover, in order to discriminate against the outgroup, the adolescents frequently made choices that were less than optimal for

their own group. That is, in assigning rewards, they maximized the difference between what the ingroup and outgroup members received rather than trying to give the largest reward possible to the ingroup member. The readiness with which we identify ourselves with a group is astonishing as evidenced by the experiment of Locksley, Ortiz, and Hepburn (1980). They created two groups on an explicitly random basis, the members of which were unknown to each other and would never meet. The researchers still found strong ingroup preferences. Thus, the answer to the first question: The minimal requirements for establishing a group identity is merely assigning people to a group. The results of Yee and Brown (1992) were consistent with this conclusion.

It should be noted that in the minimal group experiments, there was no evidence of hostility toward outgroup members. Discriminating against outgroup members by showing favoritism toward ingroup members often occurs outside as well as inside the laboratory. Indeed, we may even like and show preferences on other occasions to outgroup members against whom we have just discriminated. This leads us to the second, previous question: Under what conditions will outgroup discrimination involve hostility? The results from the Sherif experiments suggest that competition may be a key factor. Recall that stereotyping and hostility escalated when the two groups were placed in head-to-head competition. Subsequent research has shown, however, that one critical factor is the legitimacy or fairness of the competition (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). If the losers feel that they lost fairly, they may even elevate their positive feelings toward the winners.

Roger Brown (1986) suggested that intergroup hostility is related to fairness and places the issue into the context of equity theory. If two groups, for example, feel that the actual or potential distribution of rewards or resources between them is fair, then they will not feel hostility during or after competition. But if a group feels that the distribution is unfair, then that group will express hostility. The two key components of equity are the actual or potential rewards gained in relation to the actual or potential costs involved in attaining the rewards. *Rewards* are any outcomes that groups find desirable, for example, winning prizes, enhancements in respect or status, or new privileges. *Costs* involve two components: (a) any undesirable outcomes, for example, hard work, pain, threat; and (b) the "assets" or entitlements groups bring with them, for example, age, status, years of experience, gender. Hence, an advantage given to older, more experienced teenagers relative to younger, less experienced ones, may be seen by both groups as justified, because the older group has more assets. When rewards are scarce, for example, winner takes all, then the pressure increases to closely evaluate equity. Consequently, the likelihood of perceiving unfairness also increases. The issue is not what the real state of affairs is, but rather, the perceived state of affairs.

When groups engage in competition, for example, the Bulldogs and the Blue Devils, they compare themselves with each other in light of the conditions in which they are placed. If they have negative stereotypes about each other, if there is a winner-take-all competition, if there is some ambiguity about the rules, they each may feel that the competition is unfair and initially feel anger. The winner, of course, will likely change views, and the loser may feel even more wronged.

When the equity analysis is extended into the realm of prejudice and discrimination, some powerful insights emerge. For example, many in the untouchable castes feel that the distribution of rewards, that is, their treatment, is fair because the assets they have (their caste) justifies the treatment they receive. Parallel arguments can be made for the treatment of Blacks, women, and the mentally retarded or physically disabled in Western cultures. When the untouchables, Blacks, women, or disabled challenge the way their assets have been evaluated, they then perceive the treatment received as being prejudiced and discriminatory. In other words, prejudice and discrimination are experienced if the treatment is perceived as unfair or unjustified. What often happens is that the higher status group feels entitled to the distribution of rewards they receive, for example, better jobs, better pay, more and better housing opportunities; whereas the lower status group feels cheated, that is, they reject the old views of their assets. The former group believes that they are being fair, and hence, acting in an unprejudiced manner; whereas the latter group feels the opposite. Obviously, this is a potentially explosive state of affairs, which all too often gets transformed into violent actuality.

HUNTER-GATHERER MINDS REVISITED

The preceding material in this chapter leads to the conclusion that several of the processes underlying prejudice and discrimination are genetic/evolutionarily, based on tribal and intertribal interactions. These processes get triggered through "normal" interactions, and are inappropriately applied to groups within a culture. Why might this have occurred? Stated another way, why are ingroups and outgroups within a culture prejudiced against each other? There are a number of possible, and not mutually exclusive explanations.

First, members of a hunter-gatherer tribe have a strong identification with and commitment to other members of the tribe. These cultural commitments and identifications are generally lacking in industrial and post-industrial societies except in times of war, or when one is being mistreated in a foreign land by the locals. In other words, the pull of nationalism is very weak relative to the pull of tribal identity. Second, members of hunter-

gatherer tribes are very homogenous in appearance and behavior, which promotes group identification. In industrial and postindustrial societies, there is usually considerable heterogeneity in appearance and behavior primarily because of immigration and by the incorporation of tribes residing great distances from each other. Hence, badging mechanisms leading to a societal identity are very weak.

Third, the different groups (family and/or task-related) within a hunter-gatherer tribe are highly compatible with each other. If they don't pull together, they will surely be pulled apart. In industrial and postindustrial societies, groups we identify with are often incompatible with each other in that they pursue incompatible goals. Fourth, hunter-gatherer tribal members on a day-to-day basis are rarely in competition with each other. Competition is antagonistic to the norms of sharing and reciprocity. If one wins, everyone wins, for example, someone killing a zebra. If one loses, then all are diminished. In industrial and postindustrial societies, competition is the norm, both within and between groups.

Fifth, hunter-gatherer cultures are highly egalitarian across families, and between parents within a family. Status and power differences between adults would likely be destructive to effective group functioning. There are leaders for particular activities, for example, hunting, religion, but this leadership does not cut across all other activities, nor does it give the leaders general power advantages. In industrial and postindustrial societies, there are obvious power and status differences. Those in power strive to maintain it at the expense of those in subordinate positions. Sixth, competition and status differences in industrial and postindustrial societies are mutually reinforcing. They create "haves" and "have-lesses," and by forming alliances, members of these cultures form ingroups and outgroups. The ingroups are dominant and the outgroups, subordinate.

Seventh, in hunter-gatherer tribes, the goals of socialization are to make the children similar to the adults, who have equal status with each other, but higher status than the children. But if some groups of adults have higher status than other groups, as is the case in industrial and postindustrial societies, then the children will be drawn to and influenced by those higher status groups. This differential attractiveness reinforces group status differences. Eighth, it is possible that in hunter-gatherer tribes opposite-sex prejudice and discrimination do exist in children. But these are necessarily modified and redirected during adolescence in order to maintain group cohesiveness and an egalitarian form of functioning. In industrial and postindustrial societies, power differences in gender are the norm and would thus be reinforced in adolescence. Racial differences do not exist in hunter-gatherer tribes, and infants with obvious physical abnormalities are usually put to death. Thus, in hunter-gatherer societies, there are essentially no opportunities for prejudice based on race or physical handicap.

Finally, authority acceptance in hunter-gatherer tribes is based on authority figures who are the elder members of the family and tribe. They maintain the cultural values, and if necessary, redirect them to benefit the tribe. In industrial and postindustrial societies, there are a large number of authority figures outside of the family. When children go to school, the number increases. Generally, authority figures directly or indirectly instruct the young to accept the values that sustain the status and power of the dominant groups. These values thus reinforce the existence of ingroups and outgroups.

SUMMARY

Our genes determine some aspects of human social behavior. One likely genetic process controlling species-specific development of this behavior is canalization. Experiential canalization involves a hierarchical system of four mutually interacting components: genetic activity, neural activity, behavior, and environment. All four components work together to ensure that developmental targets are attained, buffering developing individuals from genetic and environmental abnormalities.

Humans are a cultural species. Our genes make culture inevitable, but genes and culture co-evolved. Systematic changes in human genetic structure led to systematic changes in the nature of human culture and vice versa. At the heart of this co-evolution are epigenetic rules that transform experiences into behavior. Genetic fitness can be assigned to different rules. Some sets of rules led to culture-specific, canalized behavioral characteristics. Where the culture-specific characteristics had high genetic fitness across all cultures, they ultimately became universally species-specific.

Behavior genetics research attempts to account for the contribution of genetic and environmental variations to individual differences in behavior. In a sense, this research is the opposite of canalization, which is concerned with the genetic bases of similarities across people. The importance of behavior genetics for the present argument is that it clearly demonstrates the role of genes in controlling social behavior and prejudice.

The essential argument in the chapter is that three sets of genetic/evolutionary processes that lead to prejudice and discrimination evolved in hunter-gatherer tribes. They were appropriate and necessary for that subsistence mode, which characterizes 99% of human existence. These three sets of processes are put into motion in nonhunter-gatherer contexts because they have been incorporated into our epigenetic systems. A fourth set of processes, outgroup attractiveness, which is based on the necessity of gene flow, to some extent counteracts those processes leading to prejudice and discrimination.

The theory of inclusive fitness leads to the prediction that members of a breeding community will show preferences toward their relatives compared to nonrelatives. In primate evolution, "close relatives" is nearly synonymous with "members of the subsistence group." That is, in general, a primate has more close relatives in his or her subsistence group than in other groups. Thus, primates are evolutionarily predisposed to show ingroup favoritism. The existence of scarce resources may, in addition, lead to outgroup antagonism.

Owing to the great complexity of tribal cultures, humans developed authority-bearing systems for readily transmitting information to the young. These systems are probably based on the primate group characteristic of dominance hierarchies, but extend into the realm of concepts and values. In authority-bearing systems, we not only accept as valid what authorities tell us but also internalize this information. There may be a developmental trend in decreasing authority acceptance that is related to the increasing autonomy associated with adolescence. Obviously, authority acceptance is one major basis for the cultural transmission of prejudice and discrimination.

Primate intergroup relations are usually tense and frequently hostile. The evolutionary bases of this hostility are closely linked with protecting the young and females from harm by outgroup members, and secondarily with controlling food resources and maintaining group cohesion. Close examination of intergroup relations among the African apes and human hunter-gatherers suggests that males may be predisposed to develop stronger outgroup prejudices than females. There is also a suggestion that pre-adolescents will develop weaker prejudices than adolescents.

Owing to the often deleterious effects of genetic drift and inbreeding, there is a necessity for gene flow into the tribe in order to maintain its viability, especially in times of marked environmental changes. The most likely source of gene flow is migration from other tribes. In order to psychologically support this migration, processes must have developed that made aspects of the outsider seem attractive to the host tribe. This led to either acceptance of the outsider into the tribe, or occasionally, incorporation of specific attributes of the outsider into the tribe. The net effect of outgroup attractiveness is to mitigate outgroup hostility.

Unlike the African apes, for hunter-gatherers, the tribe and not the subsistence group is the ingroup. Tribes differ from each other culturally and children acquire knowledge of their own culture through "badging" mechanisms. These mechanisms readily allow children to identify outgroup members. It is very unlikely from a genetic/evolutionary view that race differences were significant. Unlike other primates, individual hunter-gatherers are members of several groups, which normally operate in a non-conflictual manner.

The development of prejudice and discrimination is tied to the development of a group identity. The psychological literature suggests that a group identity emerges between the ages of 3 and 4 years and increases for at least several years.

The social psychological study of intergroup relations in preadolescents and adolescents indicates that identification with a group, as measured by ingroup preferences, can occur merely by random assignment of individuals to groups that have no function. Intergroup hostility, however, is based on the existence of unfair competition. An equity model seems to capture the essential features of this phenomenon and leads to valuable insights into the nature of prejudice and discrimination.

Finally, several possible explanations were given as to why the genetic/evolutionary processes underlying appropriate tribal and intertribal interactions are inappropriately applied to groups within a culture. All the explanations acknowledge the fact that industrial and postindustrial societies differ in very significant ways from tribal cultures.

Discrimination Toward Deaf Individuals¹

There are three goals of this chapter. The first is to understand the methodological issues involved in the study of prejudice and discrimination. As noted in chapter 1, prejudice and negative stereotypes are not equivalent. To what extent can they be distinguished in the published research? Regarding discrimination, several techniques have been employed in its study. What are the unique characteristics of these techniques, and how is generalizability affected? How are prejudice and discrimination measured, and what methodological concerns characterize their study?

The second goal is to summarize the cultural history of discrimination toward the deaf in the United States. Much of this discrimination has arisen in the arena of education, where for much of two centuries, the hearing norm governed the design of pedagogical systems. This discussion is preceded by a theoretical overview illustrating the necessity of historical perspective in assessing prejudice and discrimination toward minority groups. We will see that societal norms, which influence normative behavior and establish power–conflict relations, are important components of prejudice and discrimination and develop over time. Historical tradition itself can be drawn on as a source of cultural authority for prejudice and discrimination. So cultural history will be the starting point of our examination of discrimination toward the deaf and will comprise a similarly prominent place in consideration of other culture groups in later chapters.

¹In the recent literature on hearing impairment, the word *deaf* is quite acceptable, as is *hearing impaired*. *Hearing* is preferred to *normal*, but is equivalent in meaning to *normal hearing*.

The third goal is to examine the development of discrimination toward the deaf. Succeeding chapters will address the mentally retarded, the opposite sex, and African Americans. In comparison with studies of other such American minorities, the deaf have received little attention in the psychological literature. Most studies have been conducted in school settings; consequently, most of what we know of discrimination toward the deaf has pertained to children. This bias is warranted in part because the educational context has been an important site of development of societal norms regarding the interaction of deaf and hearing culture. Moreover, studying discrimination among children will allow us to see its earliest development and to track its likelihood for various age groups. What, we will want to ask, are the particular conditions that lead to discrimination toward the deaf. What are the conditions, if any, of its absence? These questions will frame our discussion of discrimination in this chapter.

METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Prejudice

As was noted in chapter 1, prejudice, as defined in that chapter, has rarely been measured. In virtually every study in which the attitudes of children and adolescents were assessed no attempt was made to determine their "unreasonableness," that is, the resistance of the negative attitudes to new and conflicting information. Thus, it is not clear whether the "prejudice" research is about prejudice or about negative stereotypes, or some combination of the two. On theoretical grounds, this methodological issue is important; on pragmatic grounds, it may or may not be.

Related to this consideration is the strong bias in the literature toward the assessment of "beliefs" as contrasted with the "affective" and "behavioral disposition" components of attitudes. Prejudicial beliefs and negative stereotypes closely resemble one another, as just noted. If all three attitudinal components were highly intercorrelated and relatively stable across age, then the belief bias would not be a serious issue. McGuire (1985) indicated that with adults, the three components are moderately correlated. Hoover and Fishbein (1999) found for gay and lesbian prejudice, assessed with junior and senior high school students and young adults that the three components were highly correlated. Apparently, no other comparable developmental research has been carried out. However, a number of developmental studies have contrasted several similar measures of prejudice (e.g., Brand, Ruiz, & Padilla, 1974; P. A. Katz, Sohn, & Zalk, 1975) and have found the intercorrelations among them to be low. Aboud's (1988) review concurs in this judgment. The major implication of these findings is that

developmental patterns across a variety of studies should be examined, with relatively little weight given to any particular experiment.

A third methodological concern is that the testing context has been shown to influence children's expressed attitudes. For example, P. A. Katz et al. (1975) found that the race of the examiner (Black vs. White), the age of the child, and the race of the child (Black vs. White) had interactional effects on children's assessed prejudice. Hence, even experiments that have used the same testing materials with the same-age children, carried out in school settings, may have reached different conclusions because the race of the examiners was different. Analogously, Brand et al. (1974) showed that different results may occur as a function of geographic region, social class of the children, and construction of the test materials, for example, intensity of skin color differences between "White" dolls or pictures and "Black" dolls or pictures. Thus, caution must be observed in interpreting conflicting results from highly similar experiments.

A fourth methodological concern is that "forced choice" materials and methods have typically been used in assessing prejudice, for example, the *Projective Prejudice Test* developed by P. A. Katz et al. (1975) and the *Preschool Racial Attitude Measure, Second Version (PRAM II)* developed by Williams and Morland (1976). With these methods, children must choose between two stimulus materials, for example, a drawing of a White child versus that of a Black child concerning some physical or psychological attributes ("Which is the ugly child?", "Which is the naughty child?"). Aboud (1988) identified three problems with these methods: (a) No index of intensity of prejudice can reliably be inferred from differences in preferences; (b) group frequencies or percentages are often interpreted as if they were mean scores of individuals; and (c) most critically, forced choice confounds preference of one group with rejection of the other. Children may like both White and Black children, but showing a consistent preference for one race will give the impression of prejudice toward the other.

A fifth methodological concern was raised by Soder (1990) about tests assessing prejudice toward the disabled; however, this concern readily generalizes to other groups. Specifically, the tests fail to distinguish between reactions to the disability, for example, deafness, versus reactions to disabled persons, for example, deaf people. Nondisabled individuals do not want to be disabled and do not envy those who are—disabilities as such are devalued. Research shows that disabled people evoke strong feelings of sympathy and altruism among the nondisabled, which indicates that *disabled persons* are not devalued. Analogously, given the history of African Americans, it is highly unlikely that many European Americans want to trade places with them. As was noted in I. Katz's (1981) research in chapter 1, White adults often show stronger sympathy for Blacks than for Whites, similar to findings regarding disabled individuals. Soder (1990) suggested, consistent with I.

Katz's views, that "ambivalence" may be a more appropriate description of dominance/subordinate attitudes than "prejudice."

A sixth methodological concern, raised by Spencer and Markstrom-Adams (1990) dealt with the issue as to whether tests of prejudice assess children's attitudes toward various target groups as opposed to their knowledge of social stereotypes. In North America, Whites have higher status than Blacks. If children, Black or White, choose the White doll as smarter, more helpful, less ugly than the Black doll, they may merely be indicating to the examiner that they know the socially correct answer.

The last methodological concern, somewhat related to the aforementioned, is that apparent developmental decreases in prejudice may reflect changes in knowledge of social desirability and not changes in prejudice (Aboud, 1988; P. A. Katz et al., 1975). Research findings suggest that prejudice assessments that are relatively transparent in purpose indicate greater age-related decreases in prejudice than do less transparent measures. However, all the data are not consistent with these findings, especially those that show that older children are less likely than younger ones to be concerned with social approval on a general measure of social desirability. Thus, as with the other methodological concerns, caution should be used in drawing conclusions about developmental trends.

Discrimination

Discrimination was defined in chapter I as "involv[ing] harmful actions toward others because of their membership in a particular group." As far as I can determine, this has never been systematically assessed in North American children or adolescents. What has been measured and used as a "proxy" for discrimination is playmate or friendship choices. It has been assumed if children of one gender, for example, exclude children of another gender from their circle of friends, that the exclusion was based on gender differences. The exclusion is considered harmful, and hence, discriminatory. Obviously, any particular child for a variety of nondiscriminatory reasons, may have a circle of friends restricted to the same race, gender, or absence of disability. However, when opportunities for friendship exist for a large group with other-race, cross-sex, or disabled individuals, and statistical data show a systematic bias toward same-group relations, then discriminatory processes may reasonably be inferred. This reasoning informs much of the literature on school-age discrimination because deeply entrenched norms and also explicit prejudicial discourse can be absent, particularly for the youngest age groups.

Basically six different procedures have been used to make these measurements: peer nominations, peer ratings, teacher nominations, teacher ratings, behavior observations, and peer assessments (Hallinan, 1981; Mc-

Connell & Odom, 1986; Terry & Coie, 1991). In virtually all the research, the data were collected in school contexts, and children's friendships or playmate preferences with their classmates were assessed. Thus, we know very little about friendship discrimination outside of school settings. This is a very serious methodological concern because friendship choices have been shown to be markedly influenced by structural characteristics of the school and classroom. For example, in traditional classrooms, friendship choices are largely based on academic achievement, whereas in open classrooms, this is not the case (Hallinan, 1981). In that African-American students, for example, typically perform more poorly than European-American students, traditional classrooms relative to open ones would more likely lead to an absence of cross-racial friendships. The problem is exaggerated in schools that have ability tracking. These classroom structural effects may not be merely methodological, of course; some educators believe that traditional classroom structure as well as ability-tracking instruments (e.g., aptitude tests) articulate the bias of the dominant culture and are themselves discriminatory.

Returning to the six procedures, the three most commonly used are peer nominations, peer ratings (these two are known as "sociometric" procedures), and behavioral observations. There are two types of peer nominations, fixed choice and free choice. In *fixed choice methods*, children and adolescents are given a list of their classmates, or their photographs, and asked to name their three best friends, the three individuals they like the most, or some other characteristic. Often they are also asked to list the three people they like the least. In *free choice*, no restriction of numbers is given. There are several problems with these two procedures. First, in fixed choice, some individuals may be erroneously excluded or included, for example, the respondent only has one best friend, or has five best friends but is asked to list three names. Second, in free choice, too many choices may be inadvertently encouraged, some of which do not really fit the criteria the researchers had in mind. Third, for both types, it is also possible that friendships are not being evaluated, but rather esteem or admiration. Fourth, it is highly likely that different age children interpret the tasks differently. Finally, for both types, reliability in nominations is moderate, and improves if negative nominations are used.

In peer ratings, children and adolescents are given a list of their classmates and asked to make the same judgment about each one, usually on a 3- to 5-point scale, for example, "How much do you like each classmate—a lot, a little, not at all?" "Is this classmate a good friend, a friend, or not a friend?" Peer ratings are fairly sensitive to differences in the characteristics being rated, for example, the ratings for "play with" are different from those for "work with." The major problem with this procedure is that most classmates get rated in the middle category. Moreover, young children

tend to rate everyone the same, probably reflecting an unclear understanding of the task. Generally, peer ratings have a higher reliability than peer nominations.

Researchers who frequently use sociometric techniques believe that peer nominations and peer ratings assess different types of relationships. The former probably measures friendships or popularity, whereas the latter measures social acceptability. As a consequence, conclusions drawn about discrimination may differ dramatically as a function of the type of sociometric technique employed.

Behavioral observations of interactions are the most direct way of assessing discrimination or friendship. If nondisabled children, for example, are rarely seen positively interacting with mentally retarded children, then it is likely that they have no mentally retarded friends. The two principal problems with behavioral observations are the limited opportunities in school settings for making the observations and the large amount of time needed for making reliable assessments. Once they are past preschool, children and adolescents have nearly all their school time structured. The three exceptions are lunch, recess, and walking to and from school. These provide a limited sample of friendship activities. As a consequence, beyond preschool, relatively few studies use observations as the principal method of assessing friendship choices.

Teacher nominations and teacher ratings parallel peer nominations and ratings. They are most often used with preschool- and kindergarten-age children, usually as methods to validate peer reports or behaviors. The two major problems with teachers' data are that the teachers do not know all the children in their classes equally well, and they use somewhat different criteria than the children themselves for determining friendships. However, experienced teachers can provide very valuable information about their students' peer interactions.

If the five procedures just discussed were all assessing friendship patterns in equivalent ways, then one would expect that the intercorrelations among them would be moderate to high. In their literature review, McConnell and Odom (1986) found the intercorrelations to range from low to moderate. This is problematic and indicates that one should be cautious in interpreting the results of any single study.

Finally, we consider peer assessments. Strictly speaking, this is not a technique for assessing friendship, but is used to assess the behaviors that may underlie friendship choices. In this procedure, children and adolescents are given a list of behavioral characteristics, for example, smart, athletic, unhappy, bully, and are asked to identify three classmates who best fit each description. In Terry and Coie's (1991) study, peer assessments of eight characteristics were examined in relation to both peer nominations and peer ratings of popularity. They found that the different popularity catego-

ries, for example, popular, average, rejected, were associated with unique patterns of peer assessments. Additionally, they found that peer nominations were more strongly related to peer assessment than were peer ratings. This last finding is consistent with the conclusion that ratings and nominations measure different aspects of interpersonal relationships.

As with the measurement of prejudice, when the just mentioned discussion is considered as a whole, caution must be exhibited when evaluating research concerning the development of discrimination. The various measures apparently assess different things. The wise course would be to look for developmental patterns across studies that utilize various assessment procedures.

OVERVIEW OF THE CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL BASES OF PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION

The assessment was made in the preceding chapters that there are four types of causes underlying the development of prejudice and discrimination: genetic/evolutionary, psychological, normative, and power–conflict. Although these sets of causes are interrelated, they are not static. The genetic/evolutionary ones are the most stable, and the psychological, the least. The normative and power–conflict causes are intermediate and may change through relatively short historical periods.

Thus, in order to assess normative and power–conflict influences in the development of peer prejudice and discrimination, it is essential to have a historical perspective. A “snapshot” of the contemporary period may give a distorted picture of the relationship between dominant and subordinate groups. For example, in 1948, the United States armed forces were first racially integrated by President Harry Truman. But it is highly unlikely that discriminatory practices by Whites toward Blacks immediately stopped. To understand this racial integration, one must examine it in the context of pre- and post-Civil War military practices.

In addition to being “needed” to assess the current situation, a historical approach is required to understand the development of social norms. We stated that historical traditions are used to buttress these norms. And the traditions can only be known by studying them, rather than by inferring them from the current situation.

As noted earlier, four categories of peer prejudice and discrimination are dealt with in this book: prejudice and discrimination toward members of the opposite sex, individuals of a different race, and deaf and mentally retarded persons. These categories were selected because of both their importance in U.S. culture and the existence of appreciable developmental data for them. Thus, for the reasons given, we begin our examination of

each group with a brief cultural history of the group in the United States, surveying its emergence as a subordinate group. This history will identify the social norms and power–conflict practices of the dominant groups of the United States toward these subordinate groups.

Yet, without denying the overall importance of historical comparison, there are two cautions that should be noted. The first concerns the age groups and content historians emphasize. When studying females and African Americans, historians generally focus on the adults and on a wide range of content areas. When examining deaf and mentally retarded individuals, historians emphasize both children and adults and primarily focus on education, secondarily on employment. Thus the histories of the four groups will be based on somewhat different data sets. As a consequence, we have to be somewhat cautious about the conclusions we draw.

The second caution is that within each history, there is tremendous diversity among members of the target group. For example, historians have studied females from hundreds of major Native-American tribes, as well as females of African-American descent, Asian descent, and European descent. Research has been done on recent immigrants and on females whose families have been in the United States for generations. Females across these groups were treated differently, and, of course, there were substantial within-group differences. African-American experiences were markedly affected by region of residence (South vs. North), whether the home environment was urban or rural, and, of course, whether or not the subjects or their recent ancestors had been slaves. Similarly, there are many levels of impairment among the deaf and mentally retarded. Historically, the two groups may have received similar treatment, but obviously there was and is great diversity of experience within and between these groups.

A challenge that any study of the issue of diversity faces is the fact that historians do not write about all subgroupings. Implicitly or explicitly, they make choices about whom to focus on. And as a psychologist writing about these histories, I must make additional choices. Fortunately, from this writer's point of view, historical trends can be observed in each of these four major groupings that appear to have wide, within-grouping applicability. There seems to be a "forest" we can observe and discuss, even though lots of individual trees will be unseen as we write about that forest.

BRIEF EDUCATIONAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN DEAF CHILDREN

Individual cultural histories of the deaf usually start with a family tragedy—hearing parents learn that their child was born deaf, or through illness or accident has become deaf. In this respect, the emergence of the cultural identity of the deaf is similar to the mentally retarded but unlike that of

gender or race. For these parents, a normal child thus becomes transformed into an abnormal one, or in contemporary parlance, a handicapped or disabled one. To a large extent, it is the psychological consequences of that tragedy that have determined the socialization and education of the deaf (Benderly, 1980; Lane, 1984; Sacks, 1989).

Nearly all parents, everywhere, want what is best for their child. That typically involves leading a life similar to theirs, getting married, having children, being economically self-sufficient, and staying involved with the family of origin. Physically and mentally handicapping conditions often interfere with one or more of these desired outcomes. Historically, deafness and its concomitant, the absence of speech, interfered more profoundly than other conditions, including blindness and lameness. Deaf people without speech in a hearing society were perhaps the most isolated of disabled individuals. Because of an absence of spoken language, their social interactions were limited, as was their knowledge of the immediate environment. Without an adequate symbol system, deaf, nonspeaking people are unable to adequately understand many social and physical events surrounding them (Lane, 1984; Moores, 1982).

However, in North America, there has been another group of families of deaf children who did not experience this tragedy—families in which one or both parents were deaf and used sign language. Their children were not perceived as abnormal, nor were they socially or intellectually handicapped. These children readily learned to communicate fully with their parents and easily became part of a deaf community. Their development was usually normal in all ways (except hearing, of course) and they eventually married (about 80% marrying other deaf people), became economically independent, had children (about 80% of whom had normal hearing), and in some cases even earned PhDs (Gannon, 1981; Padden & Humphries, 1988). Remarkably, there is no evidence whatsoever to indicate that deafness by itself necessarily interferes with any aspect of a child's development. This, of course, is consistent with "experiential canalization," the process by which the development of the nervous system (genetic influences, e.g., language-inducing processes) establishes adaptive connections to the developmental setting (environmental influences, e.g., learning English, ASL, or both).

The community in which the nonverbal deaf fully participate need not consist of even a majority of deaf people. But they must be a "signing" community. Nora Ellen Groce (1985) described a large network of villages on Martha's Vineyard, a Massachusetts island, from approximately 1700 to 1952, in which everyone signed. It turns out that there was a great deal of intermarriage on the island that frequently exposed a recessive gene for deafness. In some villages, as many as one fourth of the people were deaf, and nearly every person on the island had deaf relatives. In these villages, every-

one signed and thus freely communicated with each other. Often the hearing would communicate among themselves by signing rather than speech. The last deaf member of this community died in 1952. In interviews with people who had grown up with the deaf, the latter were never remembered as handicapped, and indeed, without prodding, were not even remembered as deaf.

Although the example of Martha's Vineyard illustrates the extent to which the absence of the hearing norm leads to the absence of discrimination, it is also an exception in a history of American deaf that is not nearly so benign. There are some parallels with the history of American females and African Americans in that two of the major foci and stumbling blocks for the deaf have been education and employment. The theme of separatism versus pluralism versus integration has played a continuous role in the treatment of the deaf, as it has for females and Blacks. Also, all three groups have had to combat prejudices and discrimination concerning their "handicaps," that is, deafness, femininity, and race; yet the handicap of deafness feels different than the other two. There is a quality of "correctability" about it that's quite different from the characteristics of gender and race. Hearing parents of deaf children, especially those from the middle and upper social classes, have always sought ways to make their children as normal as possible, that is, as much like hearing children as possible, and to lead "normal" lives, that is, like theirs. However, in this process of attempted normalization, they often overprotected and stigmatized their children. Hearing parents frequently isolated their deaf offspring from certain kinds of experiences, for example, riding bikes in the neighborhood, playing sports with hearing children. Overprotection may be a form of stigmatization in that it assumes "incompleteness." But stigmatization was often more overt, such as discouraging "signing" as well as disguising hearing aids (Benderly, 1980; Gannon, 1981; Higgins, 1980; Lane, 1984).

What is *deafness*? The answer is very complex, involving historical period, particularly whether or not useful hearing aids were available, degree of residual hearing, age of onset, and whether one's parents were deaf (Padden & Humphries, 1988; Quigley & Paul, 1986). To go through all the combinations of these variables would not be very productive for the present purposes, so we consider only a few of them. Degree of hearing loss is one starting point. Can the individual process spoken language readily? Can he or she process it readily with an excellent hearing aid? The severe and the profoundly deaf cannot do so, but they do have some residual hearing; "Stone" deafness is rare. Hearing aids for the lesser impaired may be useful in quiet settings for one-to-one conversations; but in noisy settings or with two or more people talking, children (and adults) often turn them off. Portable hearing aids started to become widely available in 1900, so that date is an important historical demarcation.

Historically, approximately 1 in 2,000 American children are profoundly or severely prelingual deaf (Gannon, 1981; Lane, 1984). However, the total number of hard-of-hearing and deaf children is closer to 1 in 300 (Moores, 1982). The crucial question concerning age of onset (prior to about 1950, most deaf children acquired their impairment from illness) was whether the loss occurred before (prelingual) or after (postlingual) the development of spoken language. Most writers point to age 3 as a useful marker, but clearly a child deafened at 16 years has very different language skills and knowledge than one deafened at 3 years. Finally, deaf children of signing deaf parents start to acquire a useful language and communication system during their first year of life. Deaf children of nonsigning, hearing parents usually must wait a considerably longer time until they start to acquire any language. This delay can have dramatic intellectual and social consequences.

It is useful to consider four periods in the history of education of the deaf (Lou, 1988): 1817–1860, Manual Approaches; 1860–1900, Growth of Oralism; 1900–1960, Domination of Oralism; and 1960–the present, Total Communication Approaches. The central dispute throughout the entire history was whether deaf children should be educated by manual methods, that is, some form of hand signing, or by oral methods, that is, speaking English. Until the most recent period, this was usually argued as an “either–or” issue. However, those who strongly advocated manual approaches acknowledged that for some postlingually impaired children, speech instruction would be useful. At the heart of the dispute was a set of wishes and beliefs about deaf children and sign language. Those who advocated oral methods wished that the children could be normal and be fully integrated into the normal (hearing) society. They believed that sign language, at best, was a primitive and inadequate version of spoken language. They further believed that exclusive reliance on sign language would interfere with children’s development and thought processes, make them unemployable for skilled work, socially isolate them from their family, and force them into an inferior deaf community (Lane, 1984). The arguments against sign language, especially between 1860 and 1900 were often virulent and not founded on fact. As will be seen, the arguments were wrong in many ways. The amount of heat generated by many of the oralists without shedding light was still another tragedy for the deaf.

Chance plays a major part in the story of the first period. In 1815, Thomas H. Gallaudet was hired by some wealthy New Englanders to go to Europe to learn the methods for teaching deaf so that a school for them could be set up in Connecticut. He first went to England to learn oral methods from the Braidwood family, who apparently were running successful schools there. For financial reasons, the Braidwoods refused to teach him, and by chance Gallaudet was told about the highly successful French man-

ual methods introduced by Abbe de l'Epee in 1755. Gallaudet went to France, was welcomed by l'Epee's successors, and started to learn the French methods and sign language. He persuaded Laurent Clerc, a deaf teacher of the deaf in the French schools to leave Paris to help him set up his school. They returned to America in 1816, and in 1817, opened their public school, the first in America.

American Sign Language (ASL) is a direct outgrowth of French Sign Language with about a 50% vocabulary overlap today. ASL is not, however, signed English, but rather has a different grammatical structure. For example, an ASL translation of "I gave a man a book" is "I-give-him man book" (Padden & Humphries, 1988). In order to make English speech and sign language nearly identical, additional signs have to be employed, for example, to mark tense and number. Initially, in the American school, as in the French schools, these additional signs were used in the classroom, thus paralleling the relation between spoken and written English. A major problem with signed English is that the additional grammatical signs are not really necessary for understanding, and indeed, may interfere with it. As in the French schools, the students outside of class "talked" to each other in the more natural sign language (ASL). By 1835, signed English was dropped and instruction occurred in ASL (Lane, 1984).

In 1818, the New York School for the Deaf opened, and between then and 1860, more than two dozen others followed throughout the country. All used ASL as the primary mode of instruction, and most of the principals and chief teachers had been students of Laurent Clerc (Lou, 1988). In this period, about 60% of the teachers were hearing male college graduates who learned their craft on the job. About 40% of the teachers were deaf themselves and had been students in one of the schools for the deaf. With few exceptions, these schools were residential, that is, boarding schools, and students returned home on weekends and/or vacation periods. Minimum age of enrollment was never lower than age 8 years, and the average age of enrollment was about 11 or 12 years of age. For the overwhelming majority of children, these schools were their first introduction to the deaf community and their first fully social lives. Given that nearly all of the prelingual deaf were without spoken language and illiterate, it is difficult to imagine what their preresidential-school lives were like.

The second period from 1860 to 1900 involved the beginning and growth of strictly oral instruction in North America. Although the manualists had a clear field until this time, three factors worked against their continuing exclusivity. First, there were strong and apparently highly successful, strictly oralist schools in Germany and England, two countries in which many Americans had their cultural roots, and all had their intellectual roots. Second, several prominent American educators and scientists, as early as Horace Mann in 1844, went to England and Germany to learn

about oral methods and came back home enthusiastic about them. Third, many teachers of the deaf and most parents of postlingual deaf believed that speech training would be highly desirable. In 1867, two purely oral schools opened, one in New York and one in Massachusetts. They were not necessarily antimanual, but rather enrolled postlingual deaf who did not have profound or severe hearing losses. In 1865, the National Deaf-Mute College (in 1894, renamed Gallaudet College) was opened with Gallaudet's son, Edward Miner Gallaudet, as its chief executive. Although instruction was primarily in ASL, Edward argued strongly that oral methods, including speech reading, should be emphasized for those who could benefit by it (Lane, 1984; Lou, 1988). In 1869, Horace Mann opened the first permanent day school, and pure oral methods were used.

Between 1870 and 1890, Alexander Graham Bell (the inventor) carried out an active campaign promoting purely oral methods and disparaging manual ones. Although his wife was deaf, he developed a set of genetic principles whose goal was to prevent inherited deafness. That he persisted in the latter is amazing given the then available knowledge that deaf parents primarily have hearing offspring and that more than 90% of deaf children have hearing parents (Lane, 1984). In 1880, the International Congress on Education of the Deaf met in Milan, Italy. The deck was stacked against manual methods and, overwhelmingly, the participants voted to suppress these methods and adopt strictly oral methods of teaching. The five Americans attending voted against these resolutions (Lane, 1984). The impact in Europe was almost immediate—teaching in sign was abolished—and of course, the voting supported those Americans pressing for pure oralism. By 1900, approximately 50% of deaf students were taught by oral methods.

Two other significant educational changes occurred during this period. First, the percentage of both hearing men, and deaf men and women teachers declined markedly. By the end of the century, approximately two thirds of the teachers were hearing, noncollege educated women and only about 20% of all teachers were deaf (down from 40% prior to 1860). Second, many of the day schools, all of which used pure oral methods, started accepting young children, some 3 years old. Thus, hearing parents could more readily participate in their children's early education. The reduction in deaf teachers is explained by the growth of oral methods; whereas the increase in women teachers was likely caused by their reduced pay relative to men.

The next period, 1900–1960, brought to an end pure manual instruction, and in almost all schools, instruction by ASL was prohibited. By the end of World War I, Lane (1984) estimated that 95% of deaf students were receiving instruction in spoken English. Thus, the central goal of schools for the deaf became the teaching of English skills. Students spent an enor-

mous part of their day in listening, speaking, and speech reading. Where manual methods were used, these methods served to augment understanding of English, that is, finger spelling, signed English, as contrasted with transmitting information or promoting thinking skills. Profound or severely prelingual deaf students received even more of this instruction than others because they had so much more to learn.

Three factors contributed to the nearly complete victory of oralism. First, battery operated hearing aids became available in 1900, followed by vacuum tube hearing aids in 1921, and transistor hearing aids in 1950. These were dramatic improvements both in amplification and portability over the earlier sound-capturing devices. With hearing aids, analogous to prescription glasses, children could be normalized. Second, a more integrative, scientific approach emerged to understand deafness and teach spoken language to the deaf. The leader in this new approach was Dr. Max Goldstein, who founded the Central Institute for the Deaf in 1914. His "acoustic method" was applicable for anyone who had any residual hearing, and not just the mild or moderate hard of hearing (Gannon, 1981; Lou, 1988). The third factor was the accumulation of research comparing academic achievement between those taught by predominantly manual methods versus those taught by predominantly oral methods. Quigley and Paul (1986) summarized much of the significant data collected between 1916 and 1927. In these studies, students taught by purely oral methods, especially those in day schools, on average, had about 1 year higher reading skills and English language understanding than those taught by manual methods. However, these same studies showed that deaf high school graduates were performing at about only the fourth- or fifth-grade level. Further, gains in reading and language for the deaf were quite small after about age 15.

The current period, 1960 to the present, is witness to the disenthronement of pure oralism in favor of "total communication" methods. These primarily consist of the simultaneous use of spoken and signed English during instruction as well as the teaching of finger spelling, speechreading, and manual signing. The two central goals of total communication are teaching English and teaching educational content. Currently only a minority of schools still adhere to pure oralism (Benderly, 1980; Moores, 1982).

Several factors contributed to the demise of oralism. First, as noted in the previous paragraph, oralism was an academic failure. The data for the early part of the 20th century, unfortunately, were replicated in studies carried out 50 years later (Quigley & Paul, 1986). Not only were deaf students far behind in English, they lagged behind the hearing in all content areas. Moreover, only a small percentage of prelingual deaf ever developed understandable speech, and only a minority could "read" speech effectively.

Second, a wealth of research came available during the 1960s that clearly showed that deaf children of deaf parents (i.e., they knew ASL well), per-

formed much better academically than those of hearing parents (i.e., they didn't know ASL), and often performed as well as hearing children. Moores (1982) noted that a far greater percentage of deaf children of deaf parents go to college than the deaf of hearing parents.

Third, a series of studies by William Stokoe, starting in 1960, convincingly showed what most signing deaf knew all along—that ASL was a genuine natural language capable of all the subtlety and profundity of thought manifested by spoken English. This legitimation of ASL helped remove much of the stigma toward ASL held by both the hearing and deaf communities.

Fourth, the academic failures of oralism led to an increased emphasis on, and enrollment in, preschool education for the deaf. The reasoning was that oralism failed because it was not started early enough. Moores (1982) summarized research indicating that no positive lasting effects have been found on the academic achievements of those receiving preschool oral education.

Fifth, a reanalysis of the earlier research favoring oral over manual instruction showed that the children receiving oral instruction had higher IQs and better entering language skills than those receiving manual instruction. In short, the studies were biased to favor oralism (Quigley & Paul, 1986).

At the present time, there is no one method of “total communication.” The field is in flux, but ongoing research should indicate how best to match type of teaching methods with type of deaf child (Schlesinger, 1986).

Two other types of changes have occurred in the current historical period that are at least partially related to the civil rights movement of the 1960s. First, pluralism as an accepted mode of minority status started becoming applicable to the deaf. In this regard, the National Theater of the Deaf was created in 1966 and began touring the next year. Signing and captioned speech started to occur on television and are prominent at political conventions. The children's program, *Sesame Street*, has a character who uses ASL. Local deaf clubs and deaf athletic competition have become commonplace. There are several deaf national organizations. There is a deaf culture relying on ASL that is different than the hearing culture. The members of this culture usually have a history of residential education, and other experiences unique to the deaf (Padden & Humphries, 1988). Some deaf comfortably move in and out of this culture to periodically join with the hearing, but others do not because of their incapacities with spoken English.

The second change involves the types of schooling available to the deaf. Federal legislation guaranteeing equal educational access and freedom of choice for “least restrictive” educational environments have caused dramatic shifts in patterns of school enrollment. College education opportunities, including technical education, are now more widespread than Gallau-

det College in Washington, DC. There are other programs on both coasts and in the heartland. The “least restrictive” law has required local public school districts to provide adequate “in-house” schooling for deaf children residing in their communities. This has resulted in a dramatic decrease in residential school enrollment and a dramatic increase in integrated classrooms, that is, *mainstreaming*. It is not at all clear whether the effects of these latter changes will in the long run be positive or negative for either the social or intellectual achievements of the deaf.

Looking back over this 175-year history, we can see civil rights gains for the deaf and a decline in the stigmatization of deafness. However, it is not yet clear whether there have been appreciable educational gains for profoundly and severely prelingual deaf children of hearing parents. The chief stumbling block appears to be their relative deprivation of a working language relationship with their parents, which may in part be brought about by stigmatization. Many of these parents are unwilling or unable to learn ASL and to continuously use it with their prelingual deaf child. As a consequence, these children often have marked language and conceptual deficits, which hamper progress in formal educational settings. Many have argued that bilingualism should be the goal of deaf education—using ASL and reading/writing English. But until parents commit to learning and using ASL themselves, the bilingual goal will be achieved with difficulty and with possible consequent academic deficits of the children. For children who can readily benefit from the use of hearing aids or who were deafened well after spoken language was acquired, the picture is more optimistic. Many of them do well academically and have well-adjusted social lives.

DEVELOPMENT OF DISCRIMINATION TOWARD DEAF INDIVIDUALS

This section reviews practically all the recent research involving hearing-impaired (deaf) and normal-hearing (hearing) children and adolescents in integrated settings. These studies utilized either behavioral observations or sociometric techniques for comparing the two groups. None of the studies evaluated prejudice of normal-hearing children toward hearing-impaired children. There is some literature bearing on this issue, but the attitude measures are embedded in scales dealing with prejudice toward the “physically handicapped.” In that research, little information is given about the experiences the hearing children have had with the deaf. As a consequence, the research is of limited value for present purposes.

All of the genetic/evolutionary processes have potential applicability in understanding the results in this section. Badging mechanisms play the initial primary role. From the hearing persons’ view, the extent to which the

deaf are perceived as being either visually or behaviorally different will determine the extent to which they are seen as outsiders. The presence of hearing aids to some extent has this effect, but more importantly, the deaf are usually considerably different than the hearing in their speech and in certain classes of interactive behaviors. Thus, given the factors of inclusive fitness and intergroup hostility, the hearing should show favoritism to other hearing children or adolescents, and perhaps some hostility toward the deaf. Symmetry of reactions from the deaf toward the hearing would be expected for the same reasons.

The genetic/evolutionary mechanism of authority acceptance may have inconsistent influences. On one hand, the deaf are viewed as subordinate to the hearing—they are handicapped and need special compensating treatment. In a sense, they are clients of the “normal” hearing society. This view leads to the hearing treating the deaf in subordinating ways. On the other hand, through mainstreaming and laws leading to special positive treatment of the deaf by the school system and their teachers, the view is presented that the deaf are to be positively valued, treated as different, but equal. It is not clear which view will win out in any given academic setting. Finally, it is possible that outgroup attractiveness will play a role in deaf-hearing interactions. This would take the form of either or both groups emulating each other’s behavior. For example, one might observe the hearing classmates using sign language. It is not clear what reciprocal behaviors would be shown by the deaf.

The cultural/historical influences parallel those cited for authority acceptance. In North American culture, the deaf have always been treated as a lower status group than the hearing. Their language differences have been viewed as deficits, and through “benevolent” attempts to make them like their hearing counterparts, the imposed oralism has usually led to their performing at lower academic levels than the hearing. This, of course, reinforces their perceived lower status. What is not clear from this history is whether the perception by the hearing of the lower status of the deaf is age-related. It is possible that as academic performance gains importance with increasing age, the status effects will be more pronounced. Hence, discrimination would be expected to increase. However, authority acceptance and badging mechanisms play indeterminate roles, and the matter will have to be settled empirically.

The major problem with this research area is the rarity of more than one deaf child or adolescent being integrated in the same classrooms with the hearing. The main exceptions are the preschool studies and the two experiments involving college students at the Rochester Institute of Technology. Thus, for children between the ages of 6 and 18 years, nearly all the research deals with the reactions of hearing students to the single deaf student in their classroom. A second problem involves the effects of degree of

impairment of the deaf children. Across and within the studies there was a great range of hearing disability—from mild to profoundly deaf. This means that even with hearing aids, the range of understanding and using speech was quite varied. Children with only mild hearing impairment can readily understand and use speech with hearing aids; those with profound losses can generally do neither. Given the centrality of speech to interactions, generalizations may be limited.

Six of the papers using observational methods deal with preschool children aged $3\frac{1}{2}$ to 6 years. One additional paper deals with first and second graders (R. W. McCauley, Bruininks, & Kennedy, 1976), and one with first through sixth graders (Antia, 1982). Age effects are not reported in any of these studies, primarily because of the small number of deaf children involved.

In the Brackett and Henniges (1976) study, all the deaf preschool children used hearing aids and had mild to profound hearing losses. Both the deaf and hearing children spent part of each day in a structured language learning class and part in a free play setting. Each child's behavior was observed in both settings. For purposes of analysis, the deaf children were divided into two groups based on their language abilities. The major finding relative to discrimination was that the hearing children interacted more with deaf children having good language abilities than with those having poor language abilities. The latter children interacted mainly with their teachers and with other hearing-impaired children. The results of research by Arnold and Tremblay (1979) and Levy-Shiff and Hoffman (1985) are consistent with these findings: Preschool hearing and deaf children interact primarily with children of similar hearing status.

Cause-effect relationships are difficult to determine in this research. Do hearing children reject the deaf with poor language abilities, or do the latter only seek out teachers and other deaf children with whom to interact? Brackett and Henniges (1976) did not provide enough clues for an answer. The Vandell and George (1981) and Vandell, Anderson, Ehrhardt, and Wilson (1982) experiments do help with this question. These studies took place in the same setting—an integrated preschool focused on hearing-impaired children. Equal numbers of deaf and hearing children were involved and spent part of each day together. The children were systematically observed in pairs in a separate playroom. In the Vandell and George experiment, the focus was on children's interaction initiatives—their frequency, type, and success. The major findings were that pairs of hearing children had the highest levels of interaction, and mixed pairs—that is, hearing with deaf—the lowest levels. Deaf children initiated more interactions with hearing children than the reverse; however, the deaf children were more likely to be ignored or rejected by the hearing children than were the hearing by the deaf. Both groups of children used the same kinds of social initiatives, and the deaf children were more persistent in their at-

tempts to interact. Finally, mixed pairs were more likely to use inappropriate initiatives—for example, signaling to a peer when his back was turned—than were pairs of hearing or pairs of deaf children. These results indicate that normal-hearing children would rather interact with other hearing children than with deaf children, despite the persistence of the latter in initiating interactions.

The Vandell et al. (1982) experiment dealt with attempts to modify the frequent and persistent refusal of normal children to interact with profoundly deaf peers. The researchers spent 15 to 30 min a day for 15 consecutive days with half of the hearing children, training them to be more knowledgeable about and to develop more appropriate communication skills for interacting with hearing-impaired children. The other half of the hearing children received no special training. The results were striking. In virtually every measure concerning interaction success between deaf and hearing children, the trained hearing children performed more *poorly* than those who were untrained. It appears that sensitizing normal-hearing children to the needs of deaf peers makes them less willing to interact with the latter.

The research by Lederberg, Ryan, and Robbins (1986) provided some insight into the just mentioned findings. Lederberg et al. paired deaf 5- and 6-year-olds once with each of four different play partners. The pairs were placed alone in a small playroom with age-appropriate toys. One of the partners was a familiar deaf playmate; one, a familiar hearing playmate; one, an unfamiliar but “experienced” hearing playmate who was a friend of another deaf child; and one, an unfamiliar hearing playmate who was “inexperienced” with deaf children. None of the deaf children had developed spoken language.

A variety of measures of social interactions, communication styles, and type of play were coded. Some of the major results were as follows: Deaf children interacted most frequently and effectively with other deaf children, and next most effectively and frequently with a familiar hearing playmates. Familiar hearing playmates were more likely than unfamiliar ones to modify their communication style to accommodate their deaf playmate. For example, the familiar playmates were more likely to use visual communication techniques than were the two unfamiliar ones. In general, there were few differences between unfamiliar experienced and inexperienced hearing playmates—both had considerable difficulty interacting with their deaf playmate. This pattern of results indicates that for preschool children, interaction success with a deaf playmate stems from knowing and having experience with the particular playmate, and not from the use of generalized skills acquired in interactions with other deaf children.

McCauley et al. (1976) observed first and second graders in the classroom, with one deaf child per class. The deaf children had moderate to

profound hearing losses, all wore hearing aids, and all were receiving speech therapy. McCauley et al. did not report the relative frequency with which hearing children interacted with the deaf child. Rather, they reported on the type of interactions both groups had—that is, positive versus negative, verbal versus nonverbal—and with whom they interacted—that is, peers versus teachers. The hearing and deaf children were similar in all ways but one: The hearing children interacted more with their peers than with the teacher, whereas the reverse was the case for the deaf children. The authors suggested that the deaf children seek out teachers because interactions with them are more rewarding than those with normal-hearing children.

Antia (1982) observed deaf and normal-hearing first through sixth graders in integrated classes and the same deaf children in special segregated classrooms. Antia took essentially the same kinds of measures as McCauley et al. (1976). The major findings were these: Hearing and deaf children were rarely isolated within the classroom, and thus had ample opportunity for peer interactions. As in McCauley et al. (1976), the deaf children were more likely to interact with teachers than were the hearing children, and less likely to interact with peers. The hearing children also interacted more frequently with other normal-hearing children than with their deaf peers. In the special classes, the deaf children increased their interactions with teachers, but not the frequency of peer interactions.

The experiments just mentioned point to the following conclusions. Normal-hearing children from preschool through sixth grade prefer interacting with other normal-hearing peers rather than with deaf children. The latter children prefer interacting with teachers and with other hearing-impaired peers rather than with hearing peers. The motivation behind these choices seems to be based on ease of communication and the rewards of the interaction. In a sense, both groups of children follow the path of least effort. These results are consistent with the genetic/evolutionary processes of badging mechanisms and of ingroup favoritism based on inclusive fitness. There is limited support for the effects of intergroup hostility—exclusion of the deaf by the hearing in certain play interactions. There is no evidence of direct hostility. The mixed messages given by authorities support the separatism of the two groups as well as the preference for the deaf to interact with their teachers. Finally, there is no evidence supporting the influences of outgroup attractiveness.

Other research investigating communication styles in deaf and hearing children support these conclusions. Jones (1985), who observed 6- to 8-year-old deaf and hearing children from segregated schools, found that in face-to-face interactions, deaf children keep about 25% more distance from each other than do hearing children. Musselman, Lindsay, and A. K. Wilson (1988) found that among deaf 3- to 9-year-old children in segregated

settings, those with the greatest hearing losses had the greatest difficulty in peer interactions. Finally, McKirdy and Blank (1982) studied the verbal "dialogues" among deaf and hearing 5-year-old children in segregated settings. All had IQs in the normal range. The dialogues among the deaf were much more restricted than among the hearing. Level of complexity both as initiators of interactions and as responders was much lower for the deaf than the hearing.

We now examine research using sociometric methods for evaluating acceptance by hearing children of their deaf peers. The participants in these experiments were between the ages of 7 and 18. Four studies were carried out in school settings, and one, by Hus (1979), in a summer day camp. Hus's paper assessed only five deaf and four normal-hearing children. Age effects were not reported or found in any of the research.

Kennedy and Bruininks (1974) studied first and second grade deaf children enrolled in integrated classrooms. Their degree of hearing loss ranged from moderate to profound, with the majority falling in the severe/profound categories. All wore hearing aids full-time and had been previously enrolled in preschools with hearing children. Best-friends and roster-and-ratings measures were used to assess sociometric status. The principle results were that the scores for deaf and hearing children on all measures were essentially the same. However, there was a strong trend for the children with profound/severe losses to be more popular than the average hearing child in their classes. Those with moderate losses tended to be less popular than their normal-hearing peers. The number of mutual choices for best friends was equivalent for deaf and hearing children. Thus, the higher sociometric scores for those with profound/severe losses can not readily be attributed to unidirectional (i.e., hearing to deaf) sympathy. One possible explanation for these surprising findings is that the children with profound/severe losses required positive special attention from their teachers and classmates, which had the effect of making them better known and more likable. These observations are consistent with the outgroup attractiveness hypothesis.

Kennedy, Northcott, McCauley, and Williams (1976) followed 11 of the severely to profoundly deaf children from Kennedy and Bruininks (1974) for 2 years. They administered the same tests as in the aforementioned study, and additionally carried out observations of peer and teacher interactions. Focusing on the second year of the followup, when nine of the students were in third grade, a very different pattern of results emerged: These students were now either less popular (on one measure) or equally popular (on another measure) as the average normal-hearing child in their class. The number of mutual friendship choices was equivalent in the hearing and deaf groups. Regarding behavioral interactions, the quality of these interactions (i.e., positive, negative, verbal, nonverbal) was equivalent for the

two groups; but similar to the previous research reported, the deaf children interacted more with their teachers and less with their peers than did the hearing children.

The experiment by Elser (1959) helps us understand whether the relative popularity of deaf children is related to age and/or degree of impairment. Elser measured both friendship choices and reputation (status and personality) in 9- to 12-year-olds (Grade 3 through Grade 7) with predominantly moderate hearing loss, in fully integrated classes. None of the children had profound losses. Elser, for the purposes of data analysis divided the deaf children into two groups: those with losses less than 50 db (mild and moderate), and those with greater losses. Virtually none of the children in the former group wore hearing aids full time. Generally, consistent with Kennedy et al. (1976), both groups of deaf children were perceived by their hearing peers as being in the lower third of the class in both friendship choices and positive reputation. There were no differences in personality traits. Somewhat consistent with Kennedy and Bruininks (1974), children who did not wear hearing aids (had a milder impairment) were less accepted than those who did wear hearing aids.

Elser suggested that the lower popularity of children without hearing aids may be due to their appearance of having normal-hearing ability, which predisposes others to assume they will behave similarly to the nonimpaired. That they socially interact differently, for no apparent reason, may have led normal-hearing children to reject them somewhat.

The overall reduction in popularity of deaf children relative to the first and second graders in Kennedy and Bruininks (1974) is buttressed by the findings of Hus (1979). In the summer camp study, severe to profoundly deaf 8- to 10-year-olds were liked far less than their hearing peers.

We summarize the results of the four experiments as follows. Six- and 7-year-old deaf children with severe to profound losses are more popular than their hearing peers, whereas, those with moderate losses are less popular. From about age 8 and older, deaf children decline in popularity, especially those with less severe impairments. By age 12, the deaf are now rated as less popular than their hearing peers. These results are consistent with the cultural/historical view that as academic performance increases in importance, the hearing children will view their deaf peers more negatively. They are also consistent with the genetic/evolutionary explanations given for the behavioral data just presented.

Selman's (1980) analysis of friendships and peer groups also helps us understand these phenomena. Six- and 7-year-olds tend to view friendship as one-way assistance rather than reciprocity. The latter is an important aspect of 9- to 12-year-olds' conception of friendship. Six- and 7-year-olds view peer groups as consisting of unilateral relations, not involving common goals. Nine- to 12-year-olds see peer groups as consisting of bilateral

relations and common goals. Thus, the assistance that hearing 6- and 7-year-olds give to deaf peers might lead to the development of friendship. But that same assistance by 9- to 12-year-olds would not because it is not reciprocated or bilateral.

Ladd, Munson, and Miller (1984), in a 2-year longitudinal experiment, studied hearing and deaf juniors and seniors in public high school occupational education programs. In these programs, deaf and hearing students frequently worked closely together on laboratory projects. The deaf students were mainstreamed into these schools when they were juniors, typically one or two students per class. The hearing students had been enrolled since at least their sophomore year. The researchers used sociometric scales, qualitative observations, and parent, teacher, and student interviews to assess how successfully the deaf were socially integrated. Unfortunately, for the present purposes, no data were presented for the hearing students, and few comparisons were made between the deaf and the hearing.

Some of the principal findings were: Deaf students socially interacted more with hearing students during their senior than their junior years; peer ratings by hearing students of several personality characteristics of the deaf—for example, social ability, considerateness—yielded no appreciable differences between the hearing and the deaf. Interviews with parents of deaf adolescents indicated that few hearing peers from school ever visited their home. The teachers of these adolescents reported frequent in-school friendships between the hearing and deaf, but were aware of few out-of-school friendships. The overwhelming majority of deaf and hearing students reported having in-school friendships with students of a different hearing status, that is, hearing and deaf. These results indicate that in-school friendships among older deaf and hearing students readily occur, especially after both groups have had extensive experience with each other.

The last two experiments are concerned with normal-hearing students' reactions to deaf college students who were integrated in both classrooms and residence halls. Emerton and Rothman (1978) gave a questionnaire to hearing freshmen and transfer students at the Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT) concerning attitudes toward the deaf. RIT is also the home of the National Technical Institute for the Deaf (NTID), which enrolled approximately 1,200 (in 1990) deaf college students. Students at NTID have the choice of taking some or all their courses at RIT, with full support services available. The hearing students were given the questionnaire before entering college, and 6 months later. In general, their attitudes were positive, that is, they rejected about 80% of stereotypes about the deaf, but these attitudes became slightly more negative after 6 months. The latter scores were unaffected by whether the hearing students lived in integrated dorms (deaf and hearing) or segregated dorms. The majority of the hearing students on the sixth month questionnaire saw the deaf relative to the

hearing as immature, with more psychological problems and passive about taking leadership roles.

The study by P. M. Brown and Foster (1991) dealt with the same two populations of students at RIT and NTID. Theirs was a qualitative research project in which the hearing students, who had been at RIT for an average of 2½ years, were interviewed, using in-depth, open-ended strategies. Half were men, half had lived in integrated residence halls, and all but one had taken at least one course with a deaf student. Some of the principal findings were as follows. The hearing students felt that the deaf were equally capable of performing well in class, and were unconcerned by the special instructional and support services the deaf were given. But, the structure of the classroom essentially precluded positive interactions between the two groups. The deaf always sat close to the front where they could readily see the teacher and the interpreter. The hearing sat in other locations, and formed acquaintances through casual conversations with their hearing neighbors. Any out-of-class communications the hearing had were with these acquaintances. However, several hearing students reported much more positive social experiences with deaf partners in laboratory settings.

The hearing reported a fair amount of difficulty living in the same residence halls as the deaf. They usually spoke in either negative terms about the deaf or identified a small number of deaf as "exceptional." Some of the negative behaviors were making too much noise, pushing in line, blocking the hallway. Some of the negative attitudes mentioned were rudeness, cockiness, arrogance, and self-centeredness. The "exceptional" deaf usually had good speech, read lips, behaved similarly to the hearing, and showed a desire to interact with hearing students. Very few hearing students reported any long-standing friendships with deaf peers. On those explicitly social occasions to which deaf and hearing students were invited, the two groups rarely mixed. Generally, the deaf and hearing joined separate clubs and enjoyed separate social networks.

Brown and Foster (1991) understood these findings as reflecting a conflict between the culture of the deaf and the somewhat inappropriate expectations of the hearing. For example, the deaf often get someone's attention by pounding on a table. When conversing, they establish a "sign visibility distance," which, as previously noted, is greater than the usual distance between hearing speakers. Both examples are disruptive to the hearing—the former is seen as inconsiderate and the latter as rude when the deaf block a stairway or hallway. Because the deaf look like the hearing, attend the same college, and have equivalent intellectual abilities, the hearing expect them to act like hearing students. In other words, the hearing evaluate the deaf "with reference to a hearing norm."

It can be concluded from the Ladd et al. (1984) and Brown and Foster (1991) research that friendships between deaf and hearing older adoles-

cents and young adults can occur within certain types of classroom situations. These are most likely found in laboratory settings where the deaf and hearing work together closely and collaboratively. But the friendships rarely go beyond the classroom. Foster and Brown (1989), based on in-depth interviews with deaf students at RIT, suggested that neither the deaf nor the hearing are strongly motivated to develop friendships with each other. Simply put, it takes a great deal of effort and patience to attain comfortable social interactions. Given other available options for developing satisfying relationships, intense involvement between those of a different hearing status is not pursued.

From both genetic/evolutionary and cultural/historical views, these results indicate that badging mechanisms and status differences continue to play significant roles in the interactions of these two groups. Additionally, intergroup hostility emerges in the college students, especially in situations where authorities are not present. In classroom settings, friendly relations often exist, but these are rarely continued on the outside. As with research with younger children and adolescents, there is little evidence for outgroup attractiveness. Rather, behavioral differences are usually viewed negatively by both groups.

SUMMARY

Seven methodological concerns about research on prejudice development were discussed.

1. No clear distinction exists in the literature between "prejudice" and "negative stereotypes."
2. Different measures of prejudice often lead to different conclusions.
3. The testing context (persons and materials) has been shown to influence children's expressed attitudes.
4. Forced-choice techniques may confound preference of one group with rejection of the other.
5. Tests assessing prejudice fail to distinguish between reactions to some characteristic of the target group versus reactions to the members themselves.
6. Tests of prejudice fail to distinguish between children's attitudes toward target groups as opposed to their knowledge of social stereotypes.
7. Apparent developmental decreases in prejudice may reflect changes in knowledge of social desirability and not changes in prejudice.

Six different procedures have been used to infer level of discrimination: peer nominations, peer ratings, teacher nominations, teacher ratings, behavior observations, and peer assessments. In most cases, data were collected in school settings. Thus, relatively little is known about discrimination outside of these settings. Additionally, various classroom structures have been found to have differential effects on friendship choices. Concerning the different measures, children of varying ages may interpret the tasks differently. Teachers and children may interpret them differently from each other. Moreover, the correlations among the measures are typically low to moderate.

In outlining the history of the education of the deaf, four periods with distinctive theoretical approaches were described: 1817–1860, Manual Approaches; 1860–1900, Growth of Oralism; 1900–1960, Domination of Oralism; and 1960 to the present, Total Communication Approaches. Perhaps the central issue of this history has been attempts by adults to make their children “normal,” that is, just like their nonhearing-impaired parents. Deafness has been regarded by the dominant culture as “handicapping” rather than as “disabling”—in other words, deaf people were viewed as incomplete and deficient instead of different. As a consequence, the educational and communication battles have been over the role of sign language. Initially academic instruction occurred primarily in ASL. Efforts by Alexander Graham Bell and like-minded oralists eventually led to the prohibition of its use. Subsequent research showed that exclusive reliance on oral methods was associated with poor academic progress, and for the profoundly and severely deaf, poor social adjustment with the non-impaired. Currently, ASL has regained acceptance in educational settings, and instruction occurs in it and various oral methods.

Our examination of discrimination toward the deaf among school-aged children revealed its development even in the earliest age groups. Research using observational methods indicates that normal-hearing children from preschool through sixth grade prefer interacting with other hearing peers than with the deaf. Deaf children prefer interacting with teachers and deaf peers than with hearing children. The motivation behind these choices seems to be based on ease of communication and the rewards of interaction. Research using sociometric methods indicates that 6- and 7-year-old deaf children with severe to profound losses are more popular than their hearing peers, whereas those with moderate losses are less popular. From about age 8 and older, deaf children decline in popularity. By age 12, the deaf are now rated as less popular than their hearing peers. Many of these results are consistent with both genetic/evolutionary and cultural/historical analyses. However, there is little evidence for the existence of outgroup attractiveness.

Research with older adolescents and young adults in academic environments indicates that friendships between deaf and hearing students can occur within certain types of classroom settings. However, social distance is the norm outside of the classroom primarily because it is too effortful for members of the two groups to attain rewarding and comfortable interpersonal interactions. These results are also consistent with certain genetic/evolutionary and cultural/historical analyses.

In general, observations of interactions between deaf and hearing children in school settings illustrates the extent to which pragmatic choice, supported by genetic/evolutionary and cultural/historical processes, can lead to patterns of discrimination. The distancing between the groups, based largely on their differing means of communication, can lead to misunderstanding, stereotyping, and distrust. There is nothing inherent in deafness that leads to discrimination, as was shown in the cultural/historical account, but the social separation inherent in establishing a communicative norm is a critical factor that cannot easily be overcome.

Prejudice and Discrimination Toward Mentally Retarded Individuals

This chapter examines prejudice and discrimination toward mentally retarded people with three goals in mind. The first is to give an overview of the history of prejudice and discrimination toward the mentally retarded, with a focus on mentally retarded children in educational settings. Indeed, much of this prejudice and discrimination has involved the way educators have grappled with pedagogical issues, that is, with the degree to which and the method by which retarded children can be taught to function in mainstream American society. This is not to say that such prejudice and discrimination did not exist in the United States before the advent in the mid-19th century of special schooling for mentally retarded children. Rather, it was this broadly defined pedagogical imperative that set the tone for residential asylums, a eugenics movement, special education classes, and eventually “mainstreaming” mentally retarded people in regular school classrooms. And beyond this, it gave institutional stature to the role mentally retarded people would play in American society.

The second and third goals of the chapter involve the development, respectively, of prejudice and discrimination among individuals with mental retardation. In particular, we look at interactional preferences, friendship preferences, and expressed attitudes to assess the development of prejudice and discrimination in various age groups and in school settings where mentally retarded children spend time in integrated classrooms or other integrated social and instructional activities. What factors, we ask, tend to exacerbate or diminish prejudice and discrimination? What is the effect of *labeling*, such that in an integrated classroom, mentally retarded children are known and identified as such? Are prejudice and discrimination di-

rected toward the person or merely toward the unconventional behaviors the person exhibits? Finally, to what extent do genetic/evolutionary and cultural/historical analyses help us understand the results of research in this area? These questions will guide our examination of prejudice and discrimination in this chapter.

BRIEF EDUCATIONAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN CHILDREN WITH MENTAL RETARDATION

Although there are some similarities between the educational histories of the deaf and the mentally retarded, the differences are more pronounced. There has rarely been a problem in identifying a young child as normally hearing versus hearing impaired. Certainly there are degrees of impairment, and occasionally deafness and mental retardation have been confused. But, in nearly all cases, children who appear to be normal but who cannot speak and cannot understand spoken language are hearing impaired. The degree of impairment has its main effect on ease of teaching the child to speak and to understand speech. Identification of mental retardation has usually been much more difficult—its definition has varied considerably with the historical period. Moreover, the degree of retardation has dramatically affected how children are educated and cared for. Although deafness and sign language have been and still are stigmatizing, these are mild compared to the frequent compulsory segregation and the history of sterilization of the retarded.

As noted earlier, the incidence of deaf and hard-of-hearing children is about 1 in 300. The incidence of mental retardation—from mild to profound—is about 3 in 100, nine times greater than hearing impairment (Patton, Payne, & Beirne-Smith, 1990). Those who are mildly retarded generally look and act like normally developing children, but progress socially and intellectually at a slower rate, and reach a lower level of final development. This retardation is often not identified until they are 5 or 6 years old. Many marry and have children. Those who are profoundly retarded look different and act very differently from normally developing children, develop at a far slower and different rate, and have much lower social and intellectual attainments. Many in this group never learn to talk or to gain bowel control. Approximately 75% of mentally retarded fall in the mild range, about 20% in the moderate range (the “trainable”), and about 5% in the profound range (Patton et al. 1990; Zigler & Hodapp, 1986).

There are three basic types of causes of mental retardation. The first, Zigler and Hodapp (1986) referred to as *familial*. This is most often mild retardation genetically transmitted from one or both parents who are themselves mildly retarded. The second type is *genetically transmitted* by non-

retarded parents (97% of those parents are not retarded), and usually involves brain damage produced by some genetic anomaly, for example, Down Syndrome or Fragile X syndrome. The children are usually moderately to severely retarded. The third type is produced by *environmental insults* during fetal development at birth (e.g., oxygen deprivation) or in early childhood (e.g., lead poisoning). The children may be severely, moderately, or mildly retarded. Zigler and Hodapp (1986) suggested that a fourth possible type, retardation produced by *environmental deprivation*, is rare. It is important to note, that whatever the causes, the level of retardation reached can be positively or negatively affected by the social, emotional, and intellectual environment in which the children are reared.

Based on a reading of the following books, which in whole or part deal with the history of the education of the mentally retarded in North America, four major historical periods can usefully be identified (Kanner, 1964; Pasanella & Volkmon, 1981; Patton et al., 1990; President's Committee on Mental Retardation, 1976, 1977; Rotatori, Schwenn, & Fox, 1985; Wallin, 1955). The first period is 1848–1896, Residential Care; the second is 1896–1950, Special Education and Sterilization; the third is 1950–1975, Advocacy and Expanded Education; and the fourth is 1975 to the present, Deinstitutionalization, Mainstreaming, and Inclusion.

A central underlying theme, which cuts across all four periods, is the question of how much change toward normal development can be produced by educational interventions. Although the European pioneers in this field in the early 1800s initially believed that the retarded could be completely normalized, this gave way by 1850 to the belief that at best, only substantial gains could be obtained. At certain points in this history many maintained that no gains were possible, and indeed, that the mentally retarded were dangerous to society. Few people hold the "danger" view anymore, but it subtly became transformed into a belief that mental retardation is harmful to society, at least in financial costs, but probably also in social costs.

In 1818 some mentally retarded children were temporarily placed in the Hartford School for the Deaf, and the first historical period, Residential Care, started in 1848. In that year, the state of Massachusetts, at the urging of Samuel Gridley Howe paid for the residential education of 10 children in a wing of the Perkins Institute for the Blind. Several other public residential institutions were opened in the next 10 years, and by 1898, 24 institutions existed in 19 different states. There were also a number of private institutions, but these comprised less than 10% of the residential population. In 1876, the medical directors of these public and private schools formed a national association and published a journal. That association exists today as the American Association on Mental Retardation (Patton et al., 1990).

Who were the residents of these early institutions? As previously stated, the definition of mental retardation has changed considerably with historical period. Because intelligence tests did not emerge in the United States until 1910, other means of identification were employed, mainly in the context of medical diagnosis and social functioning. The first students were generally 7 to 14 years old and primarily cretins (children with severe mental deficiency caused by severe thyroid deficiency), those with Down Syndrome (then known as "mongolism"), those with very slow language development, and children with serious behavior control problems. Excluded from these schools were all children whom the directors believed could not be developmentally improved. These included those considered "insane"; children who were epileptic, paralyzed, or severely brain injured; and children with *hydrocephaly* (markedly enlarged heads). From the point of view of mild, moderate, profound, and severe retardation, it appears that most of the residents were moderately retarded, with a small proportion in the mild range (some of those with behavior problems), and a small proportion in the profound and severe range.

Wolfensberger (1976) divided this first historical period into three partially overlapping stages. In the first, from 1848 to 1880, the goals of the residential schools were to educate these children so that they would develop (in Wilbur's words, in 1852) ". . . nearer the common standard of humanity, in all respects, more capable of understanding and obeying human laws; of perceiving and yielding to moral obligations; more capable of self-assistance, of self-support, of self-respect, and of obtaining the greatest degree of comfort and happiness with their small means" (Wolfensberger, 1976, p. 49).

The institutions in this first stage were small, typically containing 10 to 20 children. They were seen as analogous to boarding schools, from which the students would be returned to society to carry out useful roles. The directors of these schools believed that by segregating the retarded children and giving them loving care and education in a family-type context, this could cause the desired outcomes to occur.

By 1870, some data concerning success were in. Probably no more than 20% of residents were able to return to their communities and become self-sufficient. Moreover, the nature of the institutions had changed dramatically. They had become much larger and admitted many children who were unlikely to ever attain self-sufficiency. Long waiting lists developed. These problems worsened over the next 10 years. In this second stage, from 1870 to 1890, the institutions became transformed from schools into asylums, whose main goal was permanent custodial care.

Given this goal, three trends occurred in the development of these institutions (Wolfensberger, 1976). They were built in isolated locations, far from urban centers, presumably to increase the happiness of the inmates.

Second, they were substantially enlarged, presumably for the benefit of the residents—for example, they could be protected more easily, they would have more of their own kind with whom to associate. Third, the institutions were run in increasingly economical ways. The increased size helped to accomplish this, but also costly educational programs were eliminated. In many cases, the institutions ran farms, and occasionally the most able residents were kept on the farm to work (with no wages) rather than being returned to the community.

In Wolfensberger's third stage, 1880 to 1900, mentally retarded individuals were progressively seen as a social menace that should be controlled. Not only were the institutions a financial drain, but many started to believe that retarded individuals had criminal instincts, were sexually promiscuous, were prone to alcoholism, and generally lowered the moral standards of the community. Many directors of institutions and politicians argued that those who were retarded should not be allowed to marry, should be sexually segregated within institutions, and should even be sterilized.

At least three events occurred that supported these attitudes. A famous study of the Jukes family was published in 1877 that "showed" the close links over many generations between criminality, immorality, and mental retardation (the well-known comparable study on the Kallikaks was published in 1912). Second, many young mentally retarded criminals were, in fact, being sent to these institutions for custodial care. Third, a strong *eugenics* movement (i.e., control of human mating) emerged in the 1870s, based on Darwin's theory. Recall that Alexander Graham Bell was then advocating eugenic control of the deaf. Thus, in this first historical period, hope became transformed into fear.

The next historical period, 1896 to 1950, was characterized by three major events that shaped the way mentally retarded people were treated in the United States. The first event was the establishment of the first special class for the mentally retarded in a day school in Providence, Rhode Island (Kanner, 1964). The idea of special classes (as opposed to residential care) spread rapidly in the next 10 years to many major cities. With few exceptions, during this entire period, these special classes were for children who were mildly retarded. The first training school for teachers of special classes opened in 1905.

As noted, placement in residential asylums was based on medical diagnosis and social behavior. These criteria excluded the vast majority of mentally retarded, who behaved acceptably and had a normal appearance. So, what happened when special classes were established for these latter children? Basically, compulsory education created a new group of children with social problems—they learned very slowly and could not keep up with their more intelligent peers. They were not much of a problem initially because in 1880, only 6% of adolescents over the age of 13 were enrolled in school.

Moreover, the younger children (90% of whom were enrolled) attended class about half as many days as do children today (Fishbein, 1984). As school terms lengthened and more adolescents went to high school (about 30% in 1920) the mildly retarded became a greater social problem.

The number of special education classes grew rapidly until about 1920 and then remained stable until about 1950. Although most educators saw the potential benefits of special education for the mildly mentally retarded, state legislatures were reluctant to increase funding for them. Indeed, legislation was frequently passed to exclude many moderately, severely, and profoundly retarded children from school altogether. Thus, the overwhelming majority of these children had essentially no educational opportunities.

The second major event during the 1896 to 1950 period was the adaptation for North Americans in 1911 of the Binet-Simon intelligence tests (Binet & Simon, 1905). Binet and Simon were two French scientists who were asked by the French government to devise a test to determine the most appropriate type of schooling for retarded children. Their scale, which measured mental age, first appeared in 1905 in France. In the United States, as in other countries, educators for the first time had an objective means for assessing the educability of its children. The term *mildly retarded* eventually emerged from this test and described children whose IQ (intelligence quotient—mental age divided by chronological age) was between 2 and 3 standard deviations below average, that is, IQs between 55 and 70. School systems and state legislatures started to make educational and funding decisions for the retarded based on their IQ scores. Social adaptation level still was used to assess degree of retardation, but it took a distant second place to IQ.

The third major event during this period was the widespread enactment of eugenics laws. Indiana passed the first sterilization law for the mentally retarded in 1907. By 1926, 23 states had them, and by 1930, 30 states had passed laws permitting involuntary sterilization of the retarded. In 1927, the United States Supreme Court in an 8 to 1 vote declared these laws constitutional. The great jurist, Oliver Wendell Holmes, wrote the majority opinion in which he declared, "Three generations of imbeciles are enough," referring to the genetic transmission of mental retardation. It is estimated that as many as 40,000 "mentally retarded" individuals were sterilized, the last probably in Virginia in 1972. It appears from the diatribes in favor of involuntary sterilization that a high percentage of the "retarded" were criminals, prostitutes, never-married mothers, and paupers who were residents of the asylums. They were sterilized to prevent further reproduction of "morally inferior" citizens.

After about 1935, involuntary sterilization slowed down considerably. Many of the early ardent advocates changed their minds. Some did so for humanitarian reasons, but most did so because sterilization did not seem to

work. Only a small percentage of those eligible were actually being sterilized, and recent scientific evidence had indicated that the links between criminality and mental retardation were weak. Thus concluded quite an extraordinary historical period in the treatment of the mentally retarded, one that indicated the inhumaneness and the destructive power of prejudice and ignorance.

The third period (1950–1975), Advocacy and Expended Education, started with the founding of the National Association for Retarded Children, a group mainly composed of parents of mentally retarded children. By 1959, it had about 50,000 members, including a large number of professional workers involved with research and teaching in mental retardation. This group has strongly and persistently advocated for more research on, more and better educational opportunities for, and a more humane treatment of the mentally retarded.

Two other organizations made up predominantly of professionals also had a strong impact on changing attitudes and practices toward the retarded: the American Association on Mental Deficiency (AAMD) and the Council for Exceptional Children (CEC). The AAMD membership grew from 664 in 1940 to approximately 12,000 in 1975. They took very active positions on setting standards for facilities and delivery of services, litigation on behalf of the retarded, development of social policy, and support of research. The CEC is concerned with all exceptional children. Its membership grew from 3,500 in 1938 to 67,000 in 1975. In 1963 it created a division on mental retardation. Its goals are similar to those of the AAMD, but it places more emphasis on promoting research concerning education of retarded individuals and on developing legislation to benefit retarded persons.

A fourth major nongovernmental organization that strongly advocated for the mentally retarded was the Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr. Foundation, founded in 1946. The foundation was named for the older brother of the then-future president of the United States. It became a powerful influence on the field after John F. Kennedy assumed the Presidency in 1961. Important legislation creating research centers and the National Institute of Child and Human Development were affected by efforts of this foundation. The foundation either gave substantial monies or helped raise money for research, education, and clinical treatment. It was also instrumental in creating the Special Olympics and other physical fitness programs for retarded people. Through its contribution to the President's Panel on Mental Retardation of 1962, it helped determine the future course of government action on behalf of retarded individuals.

Thus, in a trend starting in 1950 and greatly enhanced by the election of a strongly supportive U.S. president in 1961, mental retardation came out of the closet and started to occupy a more central stage in the educational

arena. The most dramatic changes occurred in special education programs, predominantly for the mildly retarded. In 1950, fewer than 100,000 children were enrolled in these programs. This number rose to about 250,000 in 1962, 750,000 in 1970, and 1,250,000 in 1975. Public advocacy provided the push, but federal and state legislatures provided the money, and teachers colleges and school systems provided the personnel. During this same historical period, the moderately retarded (with IQs from about 30 to 55) received expanded educational opportunities. In some states, separate schools for the handicapped were created. These accommodated small numbers of moderately retarded children who could not be taught in the public schools. For the profoundly and severely mentally retarded, little change in residential treatment occurred. There was a growing sentiment, however, in favor of either enhancing educational programs in these institutions or bringing the children home to be educated in their own communities.

In the last historical period (1975 to the present) the signal event was the passage in 1975 of Public Law 94-142, the Education for All Handicapped Children Act. There were at least four major provisions of this law affecting education of the mentally retarded:

1. That free appropriate public education be provided for every handicapped child;
2. that this education occur in a "least restrictive environment," which meant that handicapped children be educated in regular classes with nonhandicapped children to the greatest extent possible and appropriate;
3. that an individualized education program be written for each handicapped child in conjunction with that child's parents;
4. that due process legal procedures on behalf of the handicapped child be followed if parents and educators cannot agree on the appropriate education for that child.

This law also mandated that states provide educational services for handicapped individuals between the ages of 3 and 21 years. During the next few years after 1975, other legislation was enacted that both clarified and expanded this law.

The consequent changes in residential treatment and educational practices were marked. First, what started as a trickle in deinstitutionalization in the 1970s became a flood. The number and size of asylums for the retarded were dramatically reduced. Currently only the most profoundly retarded and multiply handicapped are in institutional care. All the rest are being cared for in the home and educated in the community. Second, moderately retarded children are being educated in public schools in "inclusion" or "mainstreaming" programs—spending some of the time in the same class-

rooms with normally developing children. Third, many mildly retarded children are being included in classrooms with nondisabled students; if trends continue, most will be integrated into regular classrooms in the future. This means that the number of retarded children in special education classes has declined since 1975.

Mainstreaming of the mildly retarded has been supported by considerable research showing that segregated retarded students (i.e., in special classes) perform no better academically than retarded students who are taught in integrated classrooms, and who receive tutoring services (Pasanella & Volkmon, 1981). Moreover, recent research has shown that social acceptance by their normally developing peers is greater for integrated than for segregated retarded children; and that self-esteem is higher for integrated than for segregated retarded children (Strain & Kerr, 1981).

From this 145 year history it is clear that educational opportunities for mentally retarded persons have undergone marked positive changes. The starting point was the recognition that retardation takes many forms and that these forms require different educational experiences. Progress was set back by the unfortunate belief that immorality and retardation were closely linked. Parental advocacy moved things forward again, and progress gained tremendous momentum through the efforts of a charismatic president who had a mentally retarded sister. At the present time, children with mental retardation are increasingly being educationally integrated with their normally developing peers. Normalization processes for mentally retarded are now in high gear, and these promise to ultimately produce a reduction in prejudice and stigmatization.

DEVELOPMENT OF PREJUDICE TOWARD PEOPLE WITH MENTAL RETARDATION

Unlike research concerned with hearing-impaired persons, there is a substantial literature dealing with prejudice of nonretarded children and adolescents toward their mentally retarded peers. As we noted already, there are basically three levels of mental retardation—mild, moderate, and profound. Those with mild retardation (about 75% of all retarded persons) generally look like normally developing children but are somewhat different in behavior. Those with moderate retardation (about 20% of retarded persons; e.g., those with Down Syndrome) generally look and act differently than nonretarded persons. Children with mild and moderate retardation are often mainstreamed in classes with nonretarded children for part of the school day. Those with profound retardation (about 5% of retarded persons) are markedly different than nonretarded persons and are usually segregated from them.

Predictions based on genetic/evolutionary and cultural/historical considerations parallel those stated for the deaf. Badging mechanisms play a major role in the prejudice research. For those children and adolescents with moderate and profound retardation, physical appearance should lead to clear outgroup identification by normally developing children; and hence, through the factors of inclusive fitness and outgroup hostility, both ingroup favoritism and outgroup prejudice will be displayed by the non-retarded children. For these groups and the mild mentally retarded, behavioral differences will lead to outgroup identification by the nonretarded, with the consequent ingroup favoritism and outgroup prejudice. Symmetry of reactions from the mentally retarded toward the nonretarded would be expected for the same reasons. Additionally, and unlike the literature dealing with the deaf, gender differences in prejudice are assessed in this literature. Based on genetic/evolutionary considerations, more prejudice is expected from males than females.

As with our discussion of discrimination toward the deaf, the genetic/evolutionary mechanism of authority acceptance may have inconsistent effects. On one hand, all groups of mentally retarded are viewed as handicapped and in need of special treatment. This is especially the case for the moderate and severely retarded, and would be expected to lead to prejudice. On the other hand, through mainstreaming and special positive treatment of the mentally retarded by the schools, the authorities present them as persons to be valued and treated equally to the nonretarded. This should minimize prejudiced reactions. If the two effects cancel one another, then the other genetic/evolutionary factors will hold sway. Finally, it's not clear how outgroup attractiveness would play a role in prejudice between these two groups. It is possible that outgroup favoritism would be shown by either group in some circumstances, which would be an indicator of this attractiveness.

The cultural/historical influences have consistently viewed the mentally retarded as having lower status than the nonretarded. As was previously shown, their treatment by the nonretarded was often very negative, including forced sterilization. Thus, we expect prejudiced reactions by the normally developing toward the mentally retarded. It is not clear from the history whether perceptions of lower status of mentally retarded persons is age-related. It is possible that as academic performance becomes more important with increasing age, status effects and the consequent prejudice will become more pronounced. However, authority acceptance plays an indeterminate role and the issue will have to be determined empirically.

The studies by Condon, York, Heal, and Fortschneider (1986), J. Gottlieb and Switsky (1982), Graffi and Minnes (1988), and Voeltz (1980, 1982) in part deal with the effects of nonretarded children's age and the amount of prejudice expressed. Unfortunately, the youngest age group studied was

kindergarten aged children (only by Graffi & Minnes, 1988) and none of the research included adolescents. These experiments primarily include children between second and sixth grade. Across the studies, several different kinds of attitude measures were used. These include an adjective checklist, an acceptance scale of the mentally retarded, and various forms of friendship scales that assess the types of activities that nonretarded children would be willing to carry out with mentally retarded peers.

With one exception, in all these experiments, older nonretarded peers showed increasing positive attitudes and decreasing negative attitudes toward the mentally retarded. These results are consistent with an authority acceptance view of the positive characteristics of mentally retarded children. In the Graffi and Minnes (1988) study, third graders had more positive attitudes than kindergarten children toward peers who were described as mentally retarded, in results consistent with the aforementioned. However, the kindergartners had more positive attitudes toward peers who were shown in photographs to have Down Syndrome. These results are particularly puzzling because, in contrast to all the other research findings, the kindergarten children had more positive attitudes toward children with Down Syndrome than toward normal-appearing children. Although this is only one finding, it is consistent with the outgroup attraction hypothesis.

In addition to these studies, the experiments by Bak and Siperstein (1987b), Elam and Sigelman (1983), Hemphill and Siperstein (1990), Siperstein and Chatillon (1982), and Siperstein, Budoff, and Bak (1980) evaluated gender effects. In these studies, nonretarded children were presented with either audiotapes or videotapes of mentally retarded children reading alone or interacting with a nonretarded same-sex child. They were then administered attitude measures similar to those just noted.

In most of the research girls were found to either have more positive attitudes or less negative attitudes toward mentally retarded peers than did boys. Graffi and Minnes (1988) reported no gender effects, and both Elam and Sigelman (1983) and Hemphill and Siperstein (1990) found girls to be more negative when the mentally retarded child was labeled as retarded in addition to merely manifesting some behavioral deficiencies. The tendency for girls to have more positive attitudes than boys toward mentally retarded peers is consistent with the hypothesis of enhanced male prejudice based on genetic/evolutionary considerations. An alternative hypothesis is that in all cultures, girls are socialized to be more nurturant and responsible toward dependent individuals than are boys (Fishbein, 1984). Mentally retarded peers probably fall into this category, and hence would elicit more positive feelings from girls than from boys.

In contrast to the deaf who comprise less than one half of 1% of all children, approximately 3% are classified as mentally retarded. Thus, it is likely that most nonretarded children have had some contact with retarded

peers. Does the amount of contact influence attitudes? The studies by Condon et al. (1986), Siperstein and Chatillon (1982), and Voeltz (1980, 1982) compared children who had either no school contact with mentally retarded peers; low contact with them (classes for the retarded were located in the school, but there was no mainstreaming); or substantial contact with them (mainstreaming and/or special programs involving nonretarded and retarded peers). The results consistently show that the greater the current contact that nonretarded children have with retarded peers, the more positive and/or less negative are their attitudes toward the retarded children. However, research that examined self-reports by nonretarded children of prior nonschool contact with mentally retarded peers gives a somewhat different picture (Condon et al., 1986; Graffi & Minnes, 1988; Van Bourgondien, 1987). Van Bourgondien found that positive attitudes toward mentally retarded children correlated with the amount of prior contact, but Graffi and Minnes and Condon et al. found no effects.

The results of school-based contact are consistent with the view that the more that authorities (i.e., the school) approve of or sanction contact between retarded and nonretarded peers, the more positive will be the children's attitudes. Being in the same classroom reflects greater authority approval than merely being in the same school. For the self-report data, we have no idea about the contexts and qualities of prior contact, and hence can make no clear statements about the inconsistent results.

As has been emphasized in our previous discussions, a central factor involved with the development of prejudice and discrimination is the perceived behavioral differences between members of ingroups and those of outgroups. These differences were well defined in discrimination toward the deaf (and its converse). Several imaginative experiments have addressed this issue as it pertains to the mentally retarded. In these studies, researchers investigated the effects of the social skills manifested by mentally retarded peers on the attitudes of nonretarded children.

Van Bourgondien (1987) showed videotapes to nonretarded girls of two normal-appearing girls interacting. In one tape, one of the girls acted inappropriately—for example, she spoke too loud, stared more, moved too close to the other girl; in the other tape, both girls acted appropriately. Half the participants were told that the inappropriately acting girl was in a special class for the retarded, and the other half were only told that she was in the same grade as they. In the Bak and Siperstein (1987b) study, nonretarded children were shown videotapes of normal-appearing nonretarded peers, normal-appearing but mildly retarded peers, and peers with Down Syndrome. The children were shown first reading, and then discussing personal interests. The nonretarded children read with ease, the mildly retarded made some errors, and those with Down Syndrome showed some difficulty reading a much lower level text. In Siperstein et al. (1980) non-

retarded children listened to an audiotape of two children participating in a spelling bee. One child (the control) was always a competent speller, whereas the other child (the target child) was either competent with difficult words or incompetent with easy words. The subjects were shown photographs of the spellers. The control speller was always normal appearing, whereas the target child was either normal appearing or had Down Syndrome. In addition, the target child was either labeled as "mentally retarded" or as a "retard," which would enhance the operation of badging mechanisms.

Finally, in Hemphill and Siperstein's (1990) study, a normal-appearing, mentally retarded child was paired in conversation with a same-age non-retarded child. Through coaching of the mentally retarded child and skillful editing of the conversations, two videotapes were produced. In one, the mentally retarded child showed age-appropriate conversational abilities, and in the other, the child showed deficits characteristic of mentally retarded children—for example, unexpected topic "leaps," repeating a small set of conversational topics, long pauses. As in the aforementioned studies, for half the participants, the target child was labeled as being in a special class for learning problems, and for the other half, the child was referred to as being in a "classroom like yours."

In all these experiments, irrespective of the label given the depicted children by the researchers, nonretarded children showed more positive attitudes toward the competent and/or socially appropriate peer than toward the incompetent and/or inappropriate peer. In the Van Bourgondien (1987) study, the labeling of the target child as retarded had no effect on a measure of willingness by nonretarded children to interact with the child. In Bak and Siperstein's (1987b) study, nonretarded children showed similar attitudes toward a mildly retarded and a child with Down Syndrome, both less positive than toward a normal appearing child. In the Siperstein et al. (1980) study, labeling a normal appearing child a "retard" had negative effects on children's attitudes, but labeling a child with Down Syndrome a "retard" had no differential effects as compared to labeling him "mentally retarded."

In Hemphill and Siperstein's (1990) study, the conversationally deficient target was viewed less positively than the nondeficient target and as more likely to be rejected or isolated by peers. Labeling generally had no effects, with the exception mentioned before involving sex of rater. These studies indicate that nonretarded children's negative attitudes toward their mentally retarded peers are based primarily on the intellectually incompetent, socially inappropriate, or conversationally deficient behaviors of the retarded. Appearance differences from the "normal" seem secondary to behavior differences. This entire pattern of results is consistent with the badging mechanism/ingroup favoritism hypothesis, as well as the cultural/

historical view of lower status differences for mentally retarded individuals. There appears to be little support for the outgroup hostility hypothesis or for outgroup attraction.

DEVELOPMENT OF DISCRIMINATION TOWARD PEOPLE WITH MENTAL RETARDATION

Two types of studies are discussed in this section: those based on observations of interactions between mentally retarded and nonretarded peers, and those based on sociometric ratings. Regarding observations, which we discuss first, the majority of experiments that have been carried out deal with preschool-age children; and the remainder with junior and senior high school students. There are apparently no observational studies with children in kindergarten through Grade 6. Predictions based on genetic/evolutionary and cultural/historical factors are exactly the same as those developed for prejudice.

Guralnick (1980) observed nonretarded and mildly, moderately, and severely retarded 4- to 6-year-old children during free-play periods in integrated preschool classrooms. Measurements were taken of playmate preferences at the beginning and end of the academic year. The principal findings were that the nonretarded and mildly retarded children interacted more with one another than they did with the other two groups. Moreover, this discrimination increased from the beginning to end of the year. The moderately and severely retarded children showed no interactional preferences among the four groups. It is important to note that the mildly retarded children were, on average, 1 year older than their nonretarded peers. Thus, it is possible that the principal factor determining playmate preferences for the nonretarded and mildly retarded groups was developmental level, for example, mental age, and not relative developmental level, for example, IQ.

The experiment by Guralnick and Groom (1987) answered the aforementioned question and provided important information about the social competencies of mildly retarded 4-year-olds. In their study, eight independent preschool play groups were constructed for a 4-week period, each consisting of three nonretarded 4-year-olds, three nonretarded 3-year-olds, and two mildly retarded 4-year-olds who were matched in developmental level with the nonretarded 3-year-olds. However, the 3-year-olds had superior language ability relative to the retarded children.

Overall, nonretarded 4-year-olds most preferred playing with other nonretarded 4-year-olds and relatively avoided playing with children in the other two groups. The nonretarded 3-year-olds preferred playing with other nonretarded 3- and 4-year-olds and relatively avoided playing with

their retarded peers. The retarded children most preferred playing with 4-year-old nonretarded peers, and relatively avoided playing with 3-year-old nonretarded peers. The retarded children engaged in more solitary play than the other two groups. In most of the other behaviors (e.g., leading peers in activities, modeling behaviors, following activities without instructions), the highest level of social competence was shown by 4-year-old nonretarded, then 3-year-old nonretarded, and finally 4-year-old retarded children. In contrast to their nonretarded peers, the retarded children were infrequently used as a resource by their peers, for example, in seeking information or explanations from them. Finally, over the course of the 4-week period, only the children in the retarded group showed a decline in their ability to positively engage peers in social interactions. These findings are consistent with the badging mechanism/ingroup favoritism hypothesis for the nonretarded children, and with the outgroup attractiveness hypothesis for the mentally retarded children. There is limited evidence in support of outgroup hostility, which consists of exclusion of the mentally retarded by the nonretarded. The data indicate that mildly retarded children are deficient in social skills. Does this deficiency also affect enduring social interactions such as friendships?

The experiment by Guralnick and Groom (1988a) addressed this question. They examined both unilateral and reciprocal friendships in the same group of children they studied in 1987. A *unilateral friendship* was defined as one in which a child directs at least one third of positive peer-related interactions to a specific playmate. A *reciprocal friendship* involved two children, each directing at least one third of these interactions toward the other. Regarding unilateral friendships, there were essentially no differences between the three groups in frequency of occurrence. However, in a pattern consistent with the 1987 results, children in all three groups most preferred the 4-year-old nonretarded children for this type of friendship. The pattern for reciprocal friendships was quite different. The 4-year-old nonretarded children had the most reciprocal friendships, followed by the 3-year-old nonretarded, and then the retarded children. The nonretarded children preferred same-age peers on this measure. Only two of the 16 retarded children had reciprocated friendships, so no pattern could be established for them. These results indicate that attempts at reciprocated friendships are far less successful when made by retarded than nonretarded peers matched for either chronological or developmental age.

The next study, by Rynders, R. T. Johnson, D. W. Johnson, and Schmidt (1980) focused on the effects of cooperative, individualistic, and competitive structures on the interactions between adolescents with Down Syndrome and same-age (13 to 15 years) nonretarded peers. The two groups attended different schools but were brought together 1 hour a week for 8 weeks to bowl together. In the cooperative condition, the adolescents were

instructed to help each other improve their bowling scores in order to maximize the group's score. In the competitive condition, they were instructed to try to get the best score in the group. In the individualistic condition, they were instructed to try to improve their scores by a certain amount each week. The authors coded numbers of positive peer interactions, for example, praising, encouraging, under all three conditions. The results were striking. Both retarded and nonretarded adolescents in the cooperative condition directed about 10 times as many positive acts toward both categories of peers than did adolescents in the other two conditions. These results indicate that positive interactions can occur between retarded and nonretarded peers who are at very different developmental levels. Moreover, the findings are consistent with the hypothesis that positive authority acceptance will reduce discrimination toward retarded by nonretarded peers.

The study by Zetlin and Murtaugh (1988) used experimenter participant observation methods to investigate the nature of friendships among nonretarded and very mildly retarded (i.e., IQs averaged 73) adolescents attending the same senior high school. Retarded students were mainstreamed into several classes each day. The researchers attended classes with the students, hung out with them at lunch, between classes, and after school, and occasionally interviewed them. The study lasted an entire school year. Although the authors do not tell us the extent of friendship segregation among these students, it is clear from their discussion that very few friendships occurred between retarded and nonretarded peers.

Although friendship patterns within each group overlapped somewhat, there were substantial differences that would lead to friendship segregation between the two groups. Some of the most salient differences are as follows. Nonretarded relative to retarded students were much more likely to form large, mixed-sex friendship groups. For about half of the retarded students (but few of the nonretarded ones), interactions with friends were mainly limited to the school setting and telephone conversations. Relative to those among nonretarded students, friendships among retarded relative to nonretarded students were generally less intimate, that is, they self-disclosed fewer personal issues, exhibited less empathy to problems experienced by a close friend, and were often characterized by frequent and intense conflicts. The latter characteristic led to less enduring friendships. The authors suggest that many of these differences are based on the relatively restricted experiences that retarded adolescents have had, and are probably unrelated to their retardation as such. The two main sources of restriction are classroom segregation and close parental supervision of their time out of school.

These studies indicate that discrimination by nonretarded toward retarded peers is at least partially based on the lower level of social skills manifested by the latter group. For those children and adolescents with moder-

ate and severe retardation, it is unlikely that these skills, even with training, could reach levels attained by nonretarded persons. For many mildly retarded persons (who comprise the majority of those with mental retardation), however, enhanced social skills are attainable. The Rynders et al. (1980) experiment indicated that interactions between moderately retarded and nonretarded peers can be positive, even if friendships do not occur. As with the just mentioned studies, these results are consistent with the badging mechanism/ingroup favoritism hypothesis. There is some evidence of outgroup hostility—exclusion from friendships and social interactions—and no evidence supporting outgroup attractiveness.

Turning now to the sociometric studies, all but one used the roster-and-rating method (Stager & Young, 1981). Unfortunately, that experiment was the only one dealing with senior high school students. With the exception of the Guralnick and Groom (1987) and Strain (1985) experiments involving preschool children, all the remaining experiments were concerned with children between Grades 2 and 7.

Recall that in the Guralnick and Groom (1987) experiment, independent groups consisting of 3- and 4-year-old nonretarded and 4-year-old mildly retarded children were observed. At the end of the 4-week period, all the children were asked to rate each of their classmates on how much they like playing with them. The retarded children received lower average ratings and lower numbers of positive ratings than the other two groups, who received equivalent ratings. These results agree with the observational scores regarding the retarded children, but are somewhat discrepant regarding the two nonretarded groups. Recall that observations indicated that children in the 4-year-old nonretarded group were the most preferred. Strain (1985) measured various social and nonsocial behaviors of two groups of moderately retarded preschoolers. One group received relatively high sociometric ratings from their nonretarded peers, and the other group, relatively low ratings. Children in the higher rated group were often observed to organize play, share, show affection, help, and act less negatively than children in the lower rated group. Thus, social competence leads to relatively high sociometric ratings.

The experiments by J. Gottlieb, Semmel, and Veldman (1978), Roberts and Zubrick (1992), and A. R. Taylor, Asher, and Williams (1987) examined the relationship between nonretarded peers' evaluations of the behavior/personality of mainstreamed mildly retarded peers and liking of those peers. In all three studies, the children were in middle school, between Grades 3 and 7. The specific measures employed by Gottlieb et al. and Roberts and Zubrick were similar and hence are discussed first. In all these experiments, retarded children received lower friendship ratings than nonretarded children.

In the Gottlieb et al. (1978) study, the social acceptance and social rejection of mildly retarded mainstreamed children were compared with peers' and teachers' perceptions of the retarded children's cognitive and disruptive behavior, and with the amount of time they were integrated into regular classes. Statistical analyses indicated that social acceptance was related to peer and teacher ratings of cognitive competence and unrelated to disruptive behavior. Social rejection was related to peer and teacher ratings of disruptive behavior and teachers' ratings of cognitive ability. The amount of time retarded children were integrated was unrelated to either social acceptance or rejection. The results are consistent with the badging mechanisms/ingroup favoritism hypothesis, but not with outgroup hostility. The fact that amount of time of integration was unrelated to ratings indicates that authority acceptance played no role in these findings.

Roberts and Zubrick (1992) replicated and extended the Gottlieb et al. (1978) research by using very mildly retarded children (average IQs were 73). Statistical analyses indicated that social acceptance of retarded children was positively related to teachers' and peers' perceptions of their academic abilities and negatively related to peers' perceptions of their disruptive behavior. Social acceptance of nonretarded children was only related to teachers' and peers' perceptions of academic abilities. Different patterns emerged for social rejection. For retarded children, peers' perceptions of disruptive behavior was the only significant predictor. For nonretarded children, both peers' perceptions of academic abilities and disruptive behavior were significant predictors of social rejection.

The results of these two studies are not completely in agreement. However, they do point to two important conclusions. First, the bases of social acceptance and social rejection of retarded children by nonretarded peers are different, consistent with a badging mechanism hypothesis. Being positively liked appears to depend on being academically competent, but being disliked depends on being disruptive. Second, nonretarded children seem to use different criteria in evaluating social acceptance and rejection when assessing retarded and nonretarded peers. This implies that identifying peers as mentally retarded (badging mechanism) influences subsequent judgments about them, and the extent of their perceived differences determines the extent of ingroup favoritism and outgroup hostility.

In the A. R. Taylor et al. (1987) experiment, mainstreamed mildly retarded and nonretarded children were compared on peer assessments of cooperation, disruptive behavior, shyness, fighting, and leadership, and on teacher assessments of friendliness, avoidance behavior, bossiness, and aggressiveness. These two lists are similar, but not equivalent. This research helps us understand the outcome of badging mechanisms in the perception of mildly retarded and nonretarded children. Retarded children, rela-

tive to nonretarded ones, were seen by their peers as less cooperative, more shy, and less likely to be named as leaders. They were not seen to differ in disruptive or aggressive behavior. Teachers perceived retarded children as less friendly and more avoidant than nonretarded ones. No differences were found for bossiness or aggressiveness. Recall, that the retarded children received lower friendship sociometric ratings than their nonretarded peers. These results indicate that perceived bossiness or aggressiveness do not underlie the relative dislike of retarded children by their nonretarded peers. Rather, in interactions with nonretarded peers, retarded children are shy or withdrawn and are lacking in cooperative and leadership social skills. These characteristics were seen by Guralnick and Groom (1987) for mildly retarded preschool children, suggesting that they are deeply entrenched patterns that emerge when retarded children interact with nonretarded peers.

The previously mentioned research indicates that various social and academic deficiencies underlie the low sociometric friendship ratings given by nonretarded children to their mildly retarded peers. The experiments by Bak and Siperstein (1987a) and Acton and Zarbatany (1988) addressed the issue of whether competence in a specific game situation can modify sociometric ratings. In the Bak and Siperstein experiment, groups of one mildly retarded and two nonretarded peers from the same classes (Grades 4 to 6) were asked to play a beanbag-tossing game. The children were instructed to focus on the team's score because they were in competition with other teams. The scoring was "rigged" such that the experimenter determined each player's performance outcome. For half of the game, the retarded player "performed" the best, and for the other half, he or she "performed" as an average player. On days prior to and after the game playing, various sociometric measures were taken. The authors found that nonretarded children were much more likely to choose a highly successful retarded child as a partner in future games than to choose one who only had an average performance. However, game performance had no influence on nonretarded children's willingness to engage in other friendship-related activities with the retarded children. Thus, the specific positive competencies did not carry over into other interactional realms. This finding is similar to that seen for deaf and hearing individuals, where friendships could occur in the restricted classroom setting, but not outside of the school. Authority acceptance of positive attributes of the subordinated group member may be the basis for both sets of findings.

Acton and Zarbatany (1988) used the same rigged game with children in Grades 2 to 6 as Bak and Siperstein (1987a) used. The children played in pairs—one mildly retarded child and one nonretarded one—and the retarded child's scores were rigged to be average or poor. Additionally, half of the pairs were instructed to encourage or coach each other because they

were operating as a team (high interaction), whereas the other half were asked to sit quietly while their partner performed (low interaction). A variety of sociometric measures were taken on days before and after the game. Although the children attended the same school, they did not attend the same classes, unlike the children in the Bak and Siperstein (1987a) study. The principal results, similar to Bak and Siperstein, were that game playing competence had no effect on sociometric ratings. However, nonretarded children rated their game partners more positively than they rated other retarded children in their grades. Additionally, partners in the high-interaction condition were more positively rated by their nonretarded peers than were children in the low-interaction condition. These two findings are different from those of Bak and Siperstein, and lead to the following conclusion. For relatively unacquainted retarded and nonretarded children, a positive social experience will have generalized positive effects on how the retarded children are viewed by their nonretarded peers. But for children who are relatively well-known to each other, one particular experience will have essentially no generalized effects.

These results are consistent with the badging mechanisms/ingroup favoritism hypothesis. Where retarded children are already known by their nonretarded peers, the new information adds only a little to the perceived attributes of the retarded peers. Where the retarded children are not well known, the new information contributes significantly and positively to the perceptions of nonretarded peers.

In Stager and Young's (1981) experiment, mainstreamed mildly retarded senior high school students were sociometrically rated ("best-friends technique") by their nonretarded classmates and by other retarded peers from their special education classes. Questions were also asked about the types of social contact that occurred with the mainstreamed students. The principal results were that retarded peers from special education classes were much more likely than nonretarded peers to be best friends with the mainstreamed students. Similarly, peers from special education classes had significantly more social contacts with their mainstreamed peers than did nonretarded peers. Indeed, there was virtually no social contact between retarded and nonretarded peers. Measurements taken at the beginning and end of the semester were essentially the same. Thus, the picture seen of social segregation in younger children strongly persists among older adolescents, consistent with genetic/evolutionary and cultural/historical explanations previously given.

When the observational research is compared with the sociometric research, the major results are in complete accord: (a) nonretarded children and adolescents prefer interacting with and forming friendships with other nonretarded individuals; (b) these preferences are based on social and behavioral deficiencies of retarded peers; and (c) positive interactions and

preferences by nonretarded toward retarded peers can readily occur in highly specific situations such as game-playing. Friendships can infrequently occur between nonretarded and retarded peers, especially if the latter have adequate social skills. These results and the explanations for them are highly consistent with our conclusions involving discrimination toward the deaf by normal hearing children, adolescents, and young adults.

In comparing the prejudice and discrimination research, two inconsistencies emerge. First, none of the discrimination research points to reliable sex or age effects, whereas these do tend to occur in the prejudice literature. One plausible explanation is that social desirability issues concerning unknown peers influences prejudice but not discrimination judgments. The underlying processes likely involve positive social obligations expressed by authority figures that are accepted as beliefs by older than younger children. Females are more likely to respond positively to retarded peers than are males because of a genetic/evolutionary predisposition to do so. However, it seems that with females and older children, generosity of spirit occurs relatively easily at a distance. The choosing of friends has immediate and concrete effects.

Second, in the prejudice research, increased contact leads to decreased prejudice, whereas in discrimination, length of contact appears to have no affect on friendship choices. A badging mechanism explanation may be relevant. The longer the contact, the more likely that common elements will be observed between outsiders (the mentally retarded) and ingroup members (the normally developing). This should lead to a decrease in prejudice. But having less prejudice toward mentally retarded individuals is obviously not enough to cause a nonretarded child to have them as friends. Both the prejudice and the discrimination literatures are in agreement that perceived social competence mediates positive choices and attitudes of the retarded by the nonretarded. Thus some socially competent retarded children will be valued positively and chosen as friends by their nonretarded peers. But the literature indicates that this is an uncommon occurrence.

SUMMARY

This chapter examined prejudice and discrimination toward mentally retarded individuals, beginning with an overview of the goals and methods of U.S. educators in designing appropriate programs for them. In particular, four periods in the history of the education of children with mental retardation were discussed: 1848–1896, Residential Care; 1896–1950, Special Education and Sterilization; 1950–1975, Advocacy and Expanded Education; and 1975 to the present, Deinstitutionalization, Mainstreaming, and Inclu-

sion. A central underlying theme cutting across all four periods is the question of how much change toward normal behavior can be produced by educational interventions. In the first period, there was widespread belief that with small, family-like residential care and instruction, substantial progress toward normality could be accomplished. During the next period, educational efforts started to shift toward special classes for mildly retarded children and custodial care only for severely and profoundly retarded children. Many retarded adults were involuntarily sterilized because of the presumed link between retardation and criminal activity. During the next two periods, parental advocacy and a sympathetic president of the United States paved the way for expanded educational opportunities and more compassionate treatment.

We then turned to the development of prejudice and discrimination among children, examining school settings where mentally retarded individuals were integrated or mainstreamed into conventional environments to various degrees and in various ways. Generally these were sociometric or observational studies that looked to expressed attitudes as a measure of prejudice and interaction or friendship choices as a measure of discrimination. Prejudice by nonretarded individuals toward their mentally retarded peers to some extent depends on the level of retardation. The youngest age group studied was in kindergarten. Between kindergarten and Grade 6, older nonretarded children are less prejudiced than younger ones. Generally, girls show less prejudice than boys, which is consistent with the speculation based on genetic/evolutionary considerations. As was the case with the other discussions of prejudice, behavioral differences were found to be the primary basis of nonretarded children's negative attitudes. Finally, increasing the amount of school contact between retarded and nonretarded children decreases the amount of prejudice of the latter group toward the former one. These findings were explained by the power of badging mechanisms leading to both ingroup favoritism and to a lesser extent, outgroup hostility. These genetic/evolutionary processes are supported by cultural/historical treatment of the mentally retarded.

Observational studies of discrimination of nonretarded toward their mentally retarded peers is at least partially based on the lower level of social skills manifested by the latter group. Mildly retarded children and adolescents with competent skills do occasionally form friendships with nonretarded peers. All but one of the sociometric studies used the roster-and-rating method. Various social and academic deficiencies underlie the low sociometric ratings given mildly retarded children by their nonretarded peers. Specific positive competencies demonstrated by retarded children positively influence the interactions of nonretarded peers toward them. However, these effects do not carry over into areas other than that of the

specific competency. In senior high school, nonretarded adolescents report virtually no social contacts with their mainstreamed, mildly retarded peers.

Explanations of the discrimination literature generally parallel those given for understanding deaf–hearing interactions. Additionally, it appears that genetic/evolutionary and cultural/historical explanations are more applicable to prejudice development than to discrimination. As noted in chapter 1, the correlation between prejudice and discrimination is relatively low. Prejudice is just one among many factors that influence discrimination. Finally, behavioral differences comprise formidable obstacles to social interaction between mentally retarded and nonretarded individuals, thus prejudice and discrimination toward this group may be among the most intractable in American society.

Prejudice and Discrimination Against the Opposite Sex

This chapter examines prejudice and discrimination related to gender, with particular attention to the role of females in American society. We begin with a historical overview of American gender relations, examining the way European Americans, from the earliest colonial settlements, established a cultural norm in which women were subordinate to men. The history traced from that point involved largely a struggle by women for an expansion of legal rights, social and cultural roles, employment and educational opportunities, position in domestic life, and control over sexuality and childbirth.

Beyond these cultural/historical roots of gender inequity are the processes that emerged during the period in which our ancestors lived in tribally based, hunter-gatherer societies. Will the operative devices in our genetic/evolutionary history have a role in contemporary sex-role acquisition? For example, we want to know the relative influence of fathers versus mothers on the sex-role predispositions of their children and the differential acquisition by males and females, with increasing age, of knowledge of opposite-sex-role stereotypes, of opposite sex-typed behaviors, and of self-esteem.

Our central goal is to examine prejudice and discrimination arising from gender, and we summarize as completely and accurately as possible the two designated literatures. I previously attempted a brief summary (Fishbein, 1992), but many important details were omitted in that effort. This survey helps determine more precisely the sources of influences of gender differentiation. Would we expect to find, for example, more or less sex-role differential in traditional versus nonconventional family types?

What is the influence of peers and teachers and how does it differ from that of parents? What is the relative influence of boys versus girls? What role do opposite-sex beliefs—particularly counterstereotypes—play in resisting or accommodating sex-role acquisition? Are there discernible age shifts where particular social and developmental factors govern attitudes toward and socialization with the opposite sex?

This chapter takes a focused look at the socialization of sex-typing, which plays an important role in children's development of opposite-sex prejudice and discrimination. *Sex-typing* refers to concepts, preferences, behaviors, and a personal identity related to maleness and femaleness. These characteristics incorporate the differential cultural values about males and females, which in large part form the basis of how peers interact with and evaluate each other. In all these matters, we bear in mind our fundamental question: What is the relation between sex-role acquisition and the development of the cultural norms that are manifested so vividly as opposite-sex prejudice and discrimination? We are also attentive to the extent that behavioral differences underlie gender prejudice and discrimination.

BRIEF CULTURAL HISTORY OF THE ROLE OF FEMALES IN AMERICAN SOCIETY

The focus in this section, owing to space limitations, is primarily on European Americans. The women's histories by C. L. Evans (1989) and Ryan (1975), various African-American histories, and the general history of the United States by Nash, Jeffrey, Howe, Frederick, Davis, and Winkler (1990) suggested the existence of six major cultural periods between 1607, the English settlement of Jamestown, Virginia, and the present time. Not surprisingly, most of the periods are identified by the wars that marked them. These periods are as follows: 1607–1770, Colonization; 1770–1825, Revolution and Consolidation; 1825–1865, Expansion and the Civil War; 1865–1920, Reconstruction, World War I, and Suffrage; 1920–1945, Prosperity, Depression, and World War II; 1945 to the present, Postwar Growth and Change.

To a large extent, the changes in female roles and women's rights from 1607 to the present have involved the social rewriting of the biblical Fifth Commandment (honoring your mother and father), and the Tenth Commandment (wives are property of their husbands). In a nutshell, women have gained substantial legal, political, economic, military, sexual, and educational rights since the colonists settled in Jamestown. The changes have not been equivalent in all these areas, the paths of improvement have often been circuitous, with setbacks along the way, and functional equality with men as contrasted with relative legal equality has still not been attained in

any of these areas. Women are no longer men's "property," but they still hold subordinate social roles.

Although our treatment must be highly abbreviated, it is useful to indicate some of the most significant findings about women's history in each of the mentioned six periods. This discussion relies primarily on the books by S. M. Evans (1989) and Ryan (1975). In the first, Colonization period (1607–1770), women's lives could be captured by the image of cycles of pregnancy, birth, and child care. The average number of live births was eight. Women and their daughters worked very hard in the home and in their gardens. Families were generally economically self-reliant, and men and women had nearly equivalent economic roles in the home. But despite this economic equality, women depended on their husbands' status outside the home in almost every other aspect of life. Females were less literate than males; many schools were closed to girls; married women usually could not own land and businesses independently of their husbands (although widows could own land and businesses); women could not vote, sit on juries (although they could sue for divorce), hold public office, nor participate in the religious hierarchy.

Although courtship and femininity were downplayed, women's sexual enjoyment was not suppressed. Premarital sex following engagement for marriage was frequent and expected. However, a double sexual standard existed; married men sometimes "fornicated" with other women, but married women committed "adultery" with other men. The chances of a woman successfully suing for divorce because of her husband's infidelity were slim (though she would be successful on a charge of wife beating), whereas her husband's suit would be successful on a similar charge.

The socialization of girls appears to have been relatively straightforward during this period. They worked closely with their mothers and were heavily involved in child care, homemaking, and economic activities related to what could be made at home or grown in the garden. Relatively few had an extensive formal education, and many were illiterate. There were scarce opportunities and no role models for a life not intimately tied to marriage and the family.

The next period, Revolution and Consolidation (1770–1825) produced a number of short-term and some long-term changes in women's roles. Prior to and during the war, the country was politicized. Women were forced to look beyond both the home and the nearby community and to become actively involved in ongoing issues and events. Their sons, husbands, or fathers went to war against the British, or took pro-British stances. No one could be neutral or uninvolved. Members of the same church were often in opposition. When husbands went to war, women often had to take charge of the family as well as the family business. Widowhood made these changes permanent. In some cities, nearly 10% of the small shops were owned by women.

Substantial social class differences emerged during this period, in part due to urbanization, in part to immigration, and in part to increased trade. Social roles for women varied, thus providing a wider range of models than had been available in the preceding period. Upper-class women did little economic work and had considerable free time for social activities, shopping, and volunteerism in benevolent and religious societies. Middle-class women were still heavily involved in family life, including economic activities, but they also engaged in volunteer work. Women of the lowest social classes had the greatest autonomy in most aspects of life, but struggled the most for economic survival. Many were employed in textile industries, receiving considerably lower pay than men. Many lived off welfare provided by the local government and by benevolent societies founded by middle- and upper-class women.

Upper- and middle-class girls received a fair amount of formal education, presumably to enable them to become better wives and mothers. And an increased number of women became schoolteachers during this period. Members of lower-class families received little formal education.

The republican spirit of equality produced by the independence movement had two principle long-term effects on women's roles: It led to the formation of many women's voluntary organizations directed toward promoting social well-being, and it led to greater esteem for the role of motherhood for producing virtuous citizens. Motherhood was celebrated in the first child-rearing manual, which appeared during this period. Schooling was thought to serve this function, too. But women were cautioned to control their displays of education and intelligence lest men feel manipulated by them. Birthrates fell during this time, from eight live births to about six, suggesting a more planned approach to parenthood.

Despite these changes, women's formal political, legal, and property rights remained relatively unchanged. And despite some changes in church-related activities, the religious hierarchy was still controlled by men. Socialization of girls became more complicated during this period. There were tremendous social class differences, rural versus urban differences, and schooling became very influential. An active social, religious, and economic life outside the home became a likelihood for many.

The next period, Expansion and Civil War (1825–1865), involved a marked polarization of women's roles. This is most clearly seen in the establishment of two "utopian" societies, the Shakers and the Oneida Community. Both were economically self-contained, with men and women taking on egalitarian roles. They were communal, and profits from external sales were shared. In the Shaker communities, there was rigid sex-segregation, with sexual abstinence the governing rule. Within the Oneida Community, monogamy was abolished and sexual intercourse with several concurrent

partners was encouraged. Many men and women formed "complex" marriages, which could be readily dissolved.

Although women's sexuality was not *the* central issue in this period, it was important. Magazines, literature, and marriage manuals directed toward middle- and upper-class women defined them as guardians of the hearth—as pure, pious, and embodying the best moral values of the nation. They were encouraged to reign in the home as queens and care for their children and their husbands, who struggled in the workplace and the political arena. Despite appeals to their romantic nature, despite the glorification of romantic love leading to marriage, women were seen as appropriately lacking in sexual passion and men as often being too passionate. Women were responsible for "cooling" their husbands. Those women with strong sexual urges were considered abnormal and surgical removal of the clitoris was occasionally recommended. Long periods of sexual abstinence in marriage was the norm, partially accounting for a further drop in the birth rate in this period, from six live births to five.

Women's moral roles were dramatically extended outside the family to the larger society, where they were viewed as the "mothers of civilization." Large numbers of middle- and upper-class women formed moral reform, temperance, antislavery, and religious evangelistic societies. These concerns enhanced their awareness of the marked gender inequities in the society, which, in turn, gave feminism a large boost. White, nonpropertied men gained voting rights in most states in the 1820s, which further highlighted gender differences in voting rights and other legal entitlements. However, within the next 10 years, many states enacted laws guaranteeing women's property rights independent of their husbands'.

In the early part of this period, middle- and upper-class women rarely were employed outside the home. With Western expansion and increased education for girls, there was a dramatic growth in the need for women teachers, whose pay was typically far less than their male counterparts. Increasingly large numbers of working-class women and female immigrants entered the marketplace where their pay was usually one half to one third that of men. As a consequence of near-starvation wages, many women's labor organizations were founded. A number of labor strikes by women occurred during this period, with limited success. The Civil War brought new work opportunities for educated women to fill the jobs men had and to directly aid the war effort. The two major occupations were office clerk and nursing. The professional hierarchy was cracked by women: In 1849, the first woman received a medical degree in the United States, and in 1852, the first woman was ordained as a minister in a mainstream Christian denomination. Subsequently, medical schools quickly closed their doors to women, who, in response, founded several women's medical colleges in the 1850s and 1860s.

Socialization of girls became much more complex than it had been in the previous period, owing to the wide variety of social roles open to them. Books and magazines oriented toward girls from the middle and upper class emphasized their roles as wives and mothers. But many adult females were highly involved in social action and in jobs outside the home. Some were moving into work traditionally held by men, albeit with lower wages. Feminism as a philosophy of equal opportunity and equal treatment of women and men became embodied in formal organizations, thus challenging traditional social roles.

The next period, Reconstruction, World War I, and Suffrage (1865–1920) involved an acceleration and resolution of some of the issues that had been prominent in the preceding period. Upper- and middle-class women continued to be seen as “mothers of civilization,” the moral carriers of society, and they founded nationwide societies to carry out this role. They started the Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) in 1874 and the Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA) shortly afterward. The WCTU had considerable influence during the remainder of the century and was an important training ground for female political activists. A national alcohol prohibition act was passed by Congress in 1917. The YWCA focused on helping immigrants and working-class women get settled in their new urban environments. Hull House, a large settlement house for immigrant families, was founded by women in 1889. It was very successful and led to the spread of other settlement houses throughout the country.

The numbers of immigrants and working-class women employed in low paid, unsafe, and unhealthy environments continued to increase. These groups formed labor unions and periodically went on strike for improved wages and working conditions. Some limited changes occurred, though ultimately child and women’s labor laws were passed that did improve work life. Correspondingly, middle-class women increasingly established themselves professionally in teaching, nursing, and the newly created field of social work. Some women even became lawyers, and in 1879, won the right to argue cases before the United States Supreme Court.

Women’s cultural organizations, known as “women’s clubs,” started to flourish among middle- and upper-class women. Women’s college organizations were formed that kept women’s social and intellectual networks alive. At about the same time, toward the end of the 19th century, women founded national ethnic associations, including the National Council of Jewish Women and the National Association for Colored Women. Others followed in the early 20th century.

Shortly after the passage in 1869 of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution granting voting rights to all males, including the recently freed slaves, the women’s suffrage movement gained momentum. Ultimately, nearly every women’s organization

took up its cause. Although constitutional laws concerning women's suffrage were first proposed in 1868, it was not until 1910 that women could vote in any state elections. By 1914, nine western states had granted women voting rights, and in Montana, the first woman in the country was elected to Congress. U.S. involvement in World War I in 1917 and 1918, a fight for European freedom, contributed to the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment. It was ratified in 1920, granting all voting-age women the right to vote.

Birthrates declined further in this period, to four live births per woman. Men continued to be concerned about women's sexuality. Some male physicians writing in the 19th century said that women should be discouraged from riding bicycles lest they be sexually overaroused by the seats (J. S. Haller & R. M. Haller, 1974). By the second decade of the 20th century, however, sexual freedom increased, and single women came to be known in the press and magazines as "bachelor girls" instead of "spinsters."

One enduring 20th century dilemma for women solidified during this period—career versus marriage. Many working-class women had jobs to help support their families. Many middle- and upper-class women entered professions before getting married. Others, because of smaller family size, no longer had to spend a lifetime raising children and chose to work outside the home. In the years 1890 to 1920, approximately 60% of professional women were unmarried and remained so. Thus, for most college-educated women interested in a profession, the choice of a career precluded marriage.

The next period, Prosperity, Depression, and World War II (1920–1945), involves marked swings in women's roles. The central issues appear to have been women's sexuality, women's autonomy, women's work, political activism, and career versus marriage. The end of World War I and the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment led to increasing feelings of autonomy and freedom in women. These feelings joined with the preceding "bachelor girl" decade and the growth of the film industry to create an increased emphasis on and openness about women's sexuality. The 1920s were the decade of the "flapper"—the bubbly, sexy, outgoing, and fun-loving woman. Through new dance crazes, new levels of physical intimacy and self-exposure became acceptable. Consumerism was on the rise and with it the growth of advertising. Sex, especially sexy women, sold products to men and women. Single women were working in increasing numbers and had money to spend on themselves, instead of having to help support their parents and younger siblings. Books and magazines directed toward female adolescents became prominent. They emphasized the desirability and perhaps even the necessity of appearing and being sexy in order to get a man. Marriage was still seen as the primary goal of these activities, a marriage involving romantic love, sexual pleasure, and companionship.

Was there something wrong about women's sexuality? Freud and both his male and female followers found fault with it. According to their psychoanalytic theories, not only did little girls suffer from penis envy, but women achieved orgasm through clitoral instead of the allegedly more mature vaginal stimulation. Thus women's sexual enjoyment, they maintained, was inappropriately immature. Of course, these pronouncements flew in the face of known biological facts, but the facts were thrown out to support the new theory. Other psychoanalytic doctrine, presumably based on biological considerations, led to the conclusion that the most appropriate role for women was that of a relatively passive wife and mother. A new female disease emerged in the 1940s—frigidity.

Women's success with the passage of alcohol prohibition laws and the suffrage amendment had long-term costs in the attainment of female equality. The steam was taken out of collective efforts on behalf of feminism. In 1923, an equal rights amendment was defeated in Congress. Many women fought against it because the amendment threatened some of the privileges women had attained in previous legislation. With the right to vote, women joined the mainstream of American political life. But the mainstream was controlled by men and men's values. Women's organizations during the Depression and World War II were concerned with national issues, not feminist ones. Indeed, feminism came to be seen as self-centered and selfish.

Many of the gains in women's employment opportunities in the 1920s were lost in the 1930s because of the Depression. Jobs were usually sex segregated, that is, there were "women's jobs" that were lower paying but often protected by legislation. Many states passed laws restricting married women to certain types of employment. However, the New Deal of President Roosevelt brought new employment opportunities for highly educated women with administrative experience. Roosevelt's Secretary of Labor for 12 years was a woman; she and Eleanor Roosevelt were instrumental in bringing many women into responsible governmental jobs.

For most women, the Depression had produced a loss in autonomy. World War II brought it back, along with new work opportunities and a social partnership with men. Women were barred from few traditionally masculine occupations, and worked side by side with men. They received equal pay for equal work, for which the unions had fought. But there was a cloud hanging over this flowering of women's rights—that the changes were only for "the duration." War's end, which everyone dreamed of, might also bring to an end woman's recent gains.

The last period, Postwar Growth and Change (1945 to the present) started with extraordinary joy and optimism. The economy was in full swing, delayed marriages were consummated, and the birth of babies boomed. White married couples started moving to the suburbs in large numbers, and the trend for Black families moving from the South into the

northern cities continued. Consumerism prevailed, and this was encouraged in the 1950s by the widespread ownership of television sets.

Although many women lost their jobs to returning veterans after the war ended in 1945, the percentage of working women steadily increased from the late 1940s to the present. Most of their jobs were in the service industries and in traditional female professions—teaching, nursing, librarian, and social work. Shortly after the end of World War II, some laws restricting married women's employment were enacted, but all these laws were rescinded by the middle 1960s. Jobs were still highly segregated by sex through the 1970s, and to some extent still are. Until the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964, women were often paid less than men for the same job; and of course, women's jobs in general paid far less than those held by men. It was not until the 1980s that federal and state governments started job reclassification programs assigning equal pay for jobs of comparable worth. These programs are still in process, and although women's pay relative to men's has increased over the past 20 years, parity has not yet been achieved.

The apparent expansiveness of the move to the suburbs brought with it the increased isolation of women from the political, economic, and social aspects of society. The theme of the "woman's place is in the home" strongly re-emerged after 1945, and this was supported by the sociological studies of Talcott Parsons, by the child rearing books of Dr. Spock, and by magazines directed to women and adolescent females. Many women became involved in community organizations, but these were typically child-centered, for example, the PTA or the Scouts, and hence oriented toward the family, as opposed to the outside world.

The women's movement was dormant until the mid-1960s. The National Organization of Women (NOW) was founded then, and many "women's liberation" groups emerged. The focus of most of those groups was on equal economic and, by implication, educational opportunities. Many anti-discrimination laws were passed, influenced by women's groups, and new professional education opportunities arose in law and medicine. The number of women elected to local and state offices started to increase markedly, but in the 1990s, the percentage of women in public office was well below the percentage of men.

The invention and widespread use of "the Pill" as a contraceptive method brought with it considerable sexual freedom. Abortion rights were guaranteed in 1973 in the *Roe v. Wade* U.S. Supreme Court decision. Women's organizations also gave considerable support to lesbianism as a viable and valuable lifestyle. These events gave rise to strong antifeminist reactions among many groups of men and women. Conservative United States presidents were elected in the 1980s, both of whom espoused traditional (i.e., "patriarchal") roles for men and women. Strong anti-abortion,

anti-lesbian, and anti-“promiscuity” campaigns emerged that threatened the personal freedoms women had gained in the postwar period.

At the present time (early 2000s), the socialization of females is very complex and often contradictory. The forced choice of career versus marriage is still problematic for most women. Equality of effort and responsibility in managing a home and family life is rarely the norm for parents who both hold full-time jobs—women do much more than their husbands. Additionally, the prospects of enduring marriages have progressively grown slimmer. Many women are choosing to not bear children, and choosing not to marry. In pre-suffrage days, some women found career to be a primary source of self-worth. They remained unmarried and also were involved in social causes. Today many women are choosing a similar path. A major vehicle for increased power and autonomy in American society is through education. But, as Valerie Walkerdine (1990) convincingly argued, and as we saw in chapter 1, our educational systems place roadblocks in front of that vehicle by socializing young girls to be incompetent in pursuing educational goals. Additionally, career and work advancement is usually controlled by men who typically value more highly the contributions and prospects of other men than those of women. Finally, the issue is still being debated by men and women as to whether females have “a different voice” because of the way they are socialized, or because they are genetically predisposed to be different.

ANTECEDENTS OF OPPOSITE-SEX PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION

We have seen in the previous section that American culture bears a legacy of profound gender differentiation in its European roots. Cultural norms deeply embedded in the most fundamental American institutions—for example, the family, the workplace, religious bodies—all have contributed to the subordination of women. Yet we know that these cultural norms are but one component of opposite-sex prejudice and discrimination, which are the outcome of three factors: (a) the genetic/evolutionary predisposition to form and differentially evaluate ingroups and outgroups; (b) cultural norms, which attach higher status and dominance to males than females; and (c) the socialization of sex-typing.

In this section I briefly discuss the implications of the genetic/evolutionary and cultural/historical perspectives on the development of opposite-sex prejudice and discrimination. In the next section, I present an extensive description of the socialization of sex-typing. To a large degree, socialization practices encompass and are built on these two factors. In the following section, I discuss the relevant literature on opposite-sex prejudice. It should be

noted that little of this literature was produced from the viewpoint of prejudice, but rather the focus was primarily on stereotyping. Recall that stereotyping may differ from prejudice by (a) the reasonableness of its generalizations, (b) the absence of an affective component, and (c) the lack of predisposition to behavior. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of opposite-sex discrimination.

GENETIC/EVOLUTIONARY PREDISPOSITIONS

As was noted in chapter 2, the genetic/evolutionary bases of prejudice and discrimination evolved in a tribal context for which protection of group members from other tribes and competition for scarce resources with those tribes was the norm. Two of the genetic/evolutionary processes most pertinent to the present discussion are authority—acceptance and the acquisition of badging mechanisms, that is, behavioral and nonbehavioral characteristics that differentiate groups from one another. In contemporary North American cultures, unlike hunter-gatherer tribal cultures, a large number of different groups exist that are in competition with one another and have different power and status. Authority figures in North America condone these differentiations, which include groupings by gender.

Infant boys and girls are extremely similar physically and behaviorally. However, their parents produce gender differences in appearance and encourage behavioral differences. These provide badges for distinguishing the two sexes, for example, pink for girls, blue for boys, long hair and bows for girls, short, unadorned hair for boys (the behavioral effects are discussed under *sex-typing*). Badging differences are maintained throughout childhood and adulthood.

The genetic/evolutionary model predicts ingroup (i.e., same-sex favoritism) and outgroup (i.e., opposite-sex) hostility. The historical survey of American females earlier in this chapter confirms these predictions for male attitudes and behavior, but is mute about females. The remaining sections of this chapter remedy that gap. We observed in chapter 2 that females and males in human and nonhuman primate societies engage outgroups differently—females migrate to other groups whereas males harbor considerable intergroup hostility. This led us to speculate that males would develop stronger prejudices than females. This speculation can be evaluated here. The discussion in chapter 2 of the genetics of prejudice concluded that *within-family influences* relative to *nonfamily influences* were small. This leads to the prediction that family influences relative to broad cultural influences on the socialization of sex-typing will be small. It is not clear how outgroup attractiveness will influence the aforementioned effects, especially in light of the role of authority acceptance in condoning male–female differentiation.

Finally, the discussion of the development of group identity in chapter 2 led to the prediction that prejudice and discrimination would emerge between the ages of 3 and 4 years, and undergo a marked change at about 7 years of age. These age-related changes are consistent with the conclusions of Fischer and Bullock (1984), based on a thorough review of the research literature on cognitive development. They identify four large-scale, age-related reorganizations of thought, which occur at ages 4, 6 to 7, 10 to 12, and 14 to 16 years. Other research in social cognitive development indicates that a further reorganization occurs at about age 18 or 19 (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, & Lieberman, 1983, for moral development; Damon & Hart, 1988, for development of self-knowledge; Kohlberg & Ullian, 1974, for development of sex-role knowledge; Selman, 1980, for development of interpersonal knowledge; and Turiel, 1983, for the development of social conventions). These findings lead to the prediction that additional changes in prejudice and discrimination should also occur at these older age periods, that is, 10 to 12, 14 to 16, and 18 to 19 years.

CULTURAL NORMS

One of the central arguments made in chapter 1 was that prejudice and discrimination were normative in a culture owing in part, to the differential power and status of ingroups and outgroups. The dominant groups attempt to maintain their superior position through prejudicial and discriminatory acts directed toward subordinate groups. Members of subordinate groups, owing in part to their unfair treatment by dominant groups, respond to the latter in prejudiced ways, and where possible, in a discriminatory manner also. We saw in the historical survey earlier in this chapter that American females from colonial days to the present have been discriminated against by the dominant males, whose prejudicial attitudes have undergirded that discrimination. What is not clear from that historical research is the extent to which status differences occurred between young boys and girls (the differences were obvious in adolescence as reflected in academic and occupation opportunities). It is possible that children recognize male-female status differences among adolescents and adults, but not among themselves (there are a number of permutations on this theme, of course.)

There are several likely consequences of the cultural/historical differences between males and females.

1. Fathers, who have more at stake than mothers in maintaining the dominance status quo will show greater differentiation than mothers in socializing their sons and daughters. That is, fathers should be

- more likely than mothers to encourage traditional sex-typed behavior in their children.
2. Owing to gendered status differences, girls should acquire knowledge of opposite-sex-role stereotypes earlier than boys.
 3. Boys should show more traditional sex-typing than girls and this difference should increase with age, owing to their increasing awareness of cultural values.
 4. Owing to self-perceived lower status, females should be more likely to adopt male sex-typed behaviors and values than the converse. This difference should increase with increasing age.
 5. Owing to gendered status differences, self-esteem in males and females should be more highly related to masculine rather than feminine characteristics.
 6. Owing to gendered status differences, with increasing age, opposite-sex prejudice should be diminished for females more so than for males.

SOCIALIZATION OF SEX-TYPING

As noted in the introduction, to a large extent, opposite-sex prejudice and discrimination are built on the differential sex-typed socialization experienced by males and females. With increasing maturity, the "badges" of masculinity and femininity become more pronounced, insuring that grouping on the basis of gender will strongly occur. Sex-typing, however, is multidimensional, as Huston (1983, 1985) clearly documented. Table 5.1 is Huston's attempt to visually indicate some of this complexity. The table displays a matrix consisting of two factors, sex-typed *constructs* and sex-typed *content*. The constructs involve four different ways, approaches, or constructions of sex-typing. These four ways are the following: (a) gendered concepts or beliefs, which include sex stereotypes; (b) gender identity or self-perception; (c) gender preferences, attitudes and values toward self or others; and (d) gendered behavior. Huston identifies five content areas to which each of these constructs apply: biological gender, activities and interests, personal-social attributes, gender-based social relationships, and stylistic and symbolic content. For example, personality tests assessing masculinity and/or femininity would deal with one's gender identity (construct) of personal-social attributes (content).

As seen, we can not simply talk about the socialization of sex-typing. The various cells of the matrix may involve different developmental paths and different developmental levels attained. Some of the general attainments may even be contradictory, for example, a girl prefers playing with dolls

TABLE 5.1
A Matrix of Sex-Typing Constructs by Sex-Typed Content

<i>Content Area</i>	<i>Construct</i>			
	<i>A. Concepts or beliefs</i>	<i>B. Identity or SelfPerception</i>	<i>C. Preferences, Attitudes, Values (For Self or Others)</i>	<i>D. Behavioral Enactment, Adoption</i>
1. Biological gender	A1. Gender Constancy	B1. Gender identity as inner sense of maleness or femaleness. Sex role identity as perception of own masculinity or femininity	C1. Wish to be male or female or gender bias defined as greater value attached to one gender than the other.	D1. Displaying bodily attributes of gender (including clothing, body type, hair, etc.).
2. Activities and interests: Toys Play activities Occupations Household roles Tasks Achievement areas	A2. Knowledge of sex stereotypes or sex role concepts or attributions about others' success and failure.	B2. Self-perception of interests abilities; or sex-typed attributions about own success and failure	C2. Preference for toys, games, activities, attainment value for achievement areas: attitudes about sex-typed activities by others (e.g., about traditional or nontraditional roles for women).	D2. Engaging in games, toy play, activities, occupations, or achievement tasks that are sex-typed.
3. Personal-social attributes: Personality characteristics Social behavior	A3. Concepts about sex stereotypes or sex-appropriate social behavior.	B3. Perception of own personality (e.g., on self-rating questionnaires)	C3. Preference or wish to have personal-social attributes or attitudes about others' personality and behavior patterns.	D3. Displaying sex-typed personal-social behavior (e.g., aggression, dependence).

4. Gender-based social relationships: Gender of peers, friends, lovers, preferred parent, models, attachment figures	A4. Concepts about sex-typed norms for gender-based social relations.	84. Self-perception of own patterns or friendship, relationship, or sexual orientation	C4. Preference for male or female friends, lovers, attachment figures, or wish to be like male or female, or attitudes about others' patterns.	D4. Engaging in social or sexual activity with others on the basis of gender (e.g., same-sex peer choice).
5. Stylistic and symbolic content: Gestures Nonverbal behavior Speech and language patterns, Styles of play, Fantasy, Drawing, Tempo, Loudness, Size, Pitch	A5. Awareness of sex-typed symbols or styles.	85. Self-perception of nonverbal, stylistic characteristics	C5. Preference for stylistic or symbolic objects or personal characteristics or attitudes about others' nonverbal and language patterns.	D5. Manifesting sex-typed verbal and nonverbal behavior, fantasy, drawing patterns.

Note. From "Sex-Typing" by A. C. Huston, 1983, in P. H. Mussen (Ed.), *Handbook of Child Psychology*, Vol. 4, pp. 390-391. Copyright © 1983 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. This material is used by permission of John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

rather than trucks, but thinks it appropriate for women to be doctors. Thus, when we discuss sex-typing, we have to specify the particular measures employed. Huston points out that in general, the research indicates greater male/female overlap in the personality traits and social behavioral areas than in play activities, peer preferences, and occupations.

Socialization of sex-typing starts shortly after birth (Huston, 1983; P. A. Katz, 1983). Research has found that parents of day-old boys see their babies as "big" to a greater extent than do parents of day-old girls, despite equivalence of length or weight. Boys are seen as "stronger" and "firmer," girls as "softer" and "finer." **In** an experimental study with the same 3-month-old infant, adults unfamiliar with the child treated it differently depending on whether the infant was identified with a boy's or girl's name. When they believed it was a girl, for example, they used a doll more frequently in play interactions. When they thought it was a boy, they talked about "his" absence of hair and strong grip. Analogous findings occurred in research with 6-month-old and 9-month-old infants.

The home physical environment of boys and girls is also markedly different during infancy (Katz, 1983; Pomerleau, Bolduc, Maleint, & Cossette, 1990). The quality and quantity of toys, colors, types of clothing, and motifs of rooms vary considerably by infant's sex. Boys are provided with more sports equipment, tools, and vehicles; girls are given more dolls, fictional characters, and furniture. Thus, parents strongly proclaim to the community at large, to themselves, and to the child, that "he is a boy" or "she is a girl." The stakes are obviously high.

Socialization of sex-typing occurs in films, television, and books, and is performed by teachers, peers, parents, and other adults. Regarding television, where differential gender stereotyping of males and females is very marked, Huston (1983) and Signorielli and Lears (1992) suggested that its influence on socialization of sex-typing of children may be even greater than that of parents. **In** television, males are much more highly developed behaviorally and psychologically than are females. Usually females do little more than follow the lead of their more central male companions. Men have the most prestigious and interesting jobs, and are nearly always supervisors of women. As we noted in chapter 1, the chief players in history books are men, and Huston (1983) points out that this is typical in children's storybooks and textbooks.

Parents' Socialization of Sex-Typing

In this section, we address the following three questions: (a) Do parents treat their sons and daughters differently? (b) Are fathers more likely than mothers to differentiate their treatment of sons and daughters? (c) How do mothers and fathers affect the sex-typed behavior of their children? For all

these questions, we focus on traditional, White, middle-class families, on which most of the research has been carried out. In the next section, we examine the impact of family type on socialization.

There are three extensive reviews by Huston (1983), Lytton and Romney (1991), and Siegal (1987), and a recent experiment by Kerig, P. A. Cowan, and C. P. Cowan (1993), dealing with the first two questions. The conclusions of all are quite similar. Lytton and Romney carried out a meta-analysis of 172 published and unpublished studies dealing with parents' differential socialization of boys and girls. Their analyses encompassed three age ranges, 0 to 5 years, 6 to 12 years, and 13 years to adulthood—and eight major socialization areas, including "encouraged sex-typed activities." The other areas were: interaction, encourage achievement, warmth, encourage dependency, restrictiveness, discipline, and clarity/reasoning.

With the exception of sex-typing, there was a great deal of variation of effects in all the socialization areas. The statistical meta-analyses showed that overall differences between parents, and differential treatment of boys and girls at any age, were very small and statistically insignificant. In the area of sex-typing, though, at all ages mothers and fathers did significantly treat their sons and daughters differently. For example, both parents encouraged sex-typed toys, activities, and household chores. Generally, parents were similar in their sex-typing; however, fathers were more likely than mothers to both encourage male sex-typed behavior in boys, and to discourage male sex-typed behavior in girls. There was also a tendency for fathers to interact more with sons than with daughters, with the converse holding for mothers and daughters.

The research in this area indicates that parents do treat their sons and daughters differently as it relates to socialization of sex-typing. Sons are encouraged by mothers and fathers to be active, assertive, and competent, daughters to be dependent and compliant. In general, fathers are more likely than mothers to differentially socialize boys and girls. This supports the prediction made in the section on cultural norms that fathers, as members of the dominant male group, have more at stake in maintaining cultural values and norms than do mothers, who are members of the subordinate group.

How do fathers and mothers influence the sex-typing of their children? We examine two categories of experiments in answering this question. The first category briefly deals with fine-grain analyses of interactions between parents and their 1½- to 2¹^h-year-old children. This is the age range in which children are developing a verbal gender identity and a preference for sex-typed toys. The second category briefly deals with the effects of mothers' employment outside the home on older children's sex-role stereotyping.

Three recent experiments deal with fine-grain analyses. In the first, Eisenberg, Wolchik, Hernandez, and Pasternack (1985) studied 1½- to 2-

year-old boys and girls in their home, separately interacting with their mothers and fathers. The experimenters returned approximately 6 months later to repeat their observations. In the second, Fagot and Leinbach (1989) observed 1½- to 2-year-old boys and girls interacting at home with both parents present. The researchers returned 9 months later for additional observations. In the third, Caldera, Huston, and O'Brien (1989) observed 1½- to 2-year-old boys and girls interacting separately with their mothers and fathers in a laboratory setting.

Some of the principal results were as follows. Eisenberg et al. (1985) and Fagot and Leinbach (1989) found that parents of boys generally selected masculine-type toys for them, and parents of girls selected gender-neutral toys. Because of their greater availability, boys were more likely to play with masculine than feminine or neutral toys, and girls were more likely to play with neutral than with feminine or masculine toys. Eisenberg et al. (1985) observed that parents of different families varied somewhat in how much they differentially reinforced same-sex versus opposite-sex toy play. The extent of this differentiation during the child's third year of life (but not second year) was positively related to the development of gender identity. Fagot and Leinbach found, however, that parents' high affective involvement (positively and negatively) with their child's same-sex and opposite-sex toy play during the second year of life (but not the third year) led to the development of early gender identity.

Caldera et al. (1989) found that fathers were initially most interested in masculine toys when they were with their son, and mothers were initially most interested in feminine toys when they were with their daughter. However, after this initial reaction, parents' nonverbal involvement in play, verbal behavior, and proximity to their child were influenced by the type of toy played with, independent of sex of parent or sex of child. In contrast to the just mentioned two studies, 1½- to 2-year-old children were more engaged with same-sex than with opposite-sex toys, controlling for any systematic differences in parents' behaviors. This finding probably reflects both parents' initial reactions to sex-typed toys and the differential experiences with sex-typed toys that boys and girls bring to the laboratory.

Taken together, these three experiments indicate that two factors largely determine the early development of gender identity in children: parents' differential selection of toys for their sons and daughters; and the extent to which parents are involved with or concerned about their child's sex-typed play. These factors start manifesting their effects as early as 1½ years, and have taken hold by age 2½.

Turning now to the effects of mother's employment outside the home, Fishbein (1984) and Huston (1983) examined much of the relevant literature, and arrived at similar conclusions. However, two more recent experiments, by Baruch and Barnett (1986) and McHale, Bartko, Crouter, and

Perry:Jenkins (1990) indicated that the issue is quite complicated, with no clear answer. Fishbein and Huston found for two-parent, middle-class families, that children between the ages of 5 and 12 years with externally employed mothers held fewer sex-role stereotypes than those whose mothers were primarily housewives. The effects were somewhat larger for girls than for boys. For children in working-class families, some research showed similar effects, but other research showed no effects of maternal employment. Fishbein explained the social-class differences in terms of working by choice in satisfying jobs versus working to help support the family in less desirable jobs.

Baruch and Barnett (1986) found that for middle-class families, mothers' external employment had no effect on their children's sex-role stereotypes. However, mothers who held nontraditional attitudes toward the male role had children with relatively nontraditional sex-typed attitudes. McHale et al. (1990), for middle-class children, found that sons' (but not daughters') evaluation of their own participation in male and female sex-typed household chores was influenced by mother's work status and father's attitudes and behaviors. If mothers worked externally and fathers helped with chores, then sons evaluated their own carrying out of chores positively. If mothers had no external employment and fathers helped little with chores, then sons evaluated their carrying out of chores negatively. Girls were unaffected by any of these factors.

Influence of Family Type on Socialization

We now look at three studies that examine the effects of nonconventional family structures and/or orientations on the sex-typing of children. A *conventional family* is one in which children are reared by male and female married parents who hold traditional sex-typed attitudes and generally accept prevailing cultural norms. Mothers mayor may not be employed outside the home in conventional families, but they do carry out most of the domestic and feminine-typed household tasks. Obviously, being conventional is not an all-or-none category; there is some variation among conventional families in the degree to which they hold traditional beliefs.

Weisner and Wilson-Mitchell (1990) reported on the sex-typing of 6-year-old boys and girls who were raised in either a conventional family or in one of five categories of nonconventional types of families. The latter varied considerably in terms of their commitment to a stable nuclear family lifestyle, for example, one of these five categories involved a communal living setting. They also differed somewhat in their practice of gender-egalitarian beliefs and activities as well as their opposition to other conventional cultural norms.

The major findings were as follows. On measures of observed free play and children's stated play preferences with toys and with friends, no differences in children's sex-typing were found as a function of type of family in which the child was reared. Similarly, there were no family-type related differences in psychologists' ratings of children's gender-appropriate appearance or behavior; nor were there differences as a function of family category in parents' ratings of children's sex-typed personality characteristics. However, family category did influence children's sex-typing of occupational classifications and preferences as well as sex-typed knowledge of toys and objects. Specifically, children from the nontraditional family categories gave more non-sex-typed responses than those from conventional families. The extent of this difference was related to the degree of family non-conventionality. Finally, all children showed considerable knowledge of sex-typing and sex roles, with girls being less traditional in their responses than boys.

Consistent with the genetics of prejudice literature, these results indicate that marked differences in family orientation and structure have minimal effects in development of sex-typing by 6-year-old children. The primary influence was on children's beliefs about occupations and objects, which were consistent with the nontraditional gender belief systems of their parents. As the authors of this research indicate, all families are embedded in essentially the same American culture, and the gendered cultural norms pervade most areas of children's lives. The values of an individual family can only have a small impact on modifying cultural meanings and norms.

The aforementioned conclusions are strongly supported by the results from Stevenson and Black's (1988) literature review on the effects of paternal absence and children's sex-role development, and Patterson's (1992) literature review on the sex-role development of children reared by lesbian and gay parents. The general conclusions of Stevenson and Black were that on a variety of measures of sex-typing as a function of father absence, the effects on boys were small, and the effects on girls were generally absent. The typical findings for boys were that those living with both parents held slightly greater sex-role stereotypes and chose slightly greater male sex-typed activities and preferences than those raised by only their mothers. However teachers' and mothers' ratings of aggressive behavior show father-absent boys to score higher than father-present boys. For all these findings, the largest effects were found for boys whose father was away on military service, as contrasted with absent fathers due to divorce or death. Age, race, and socioeconomic status (SES) effects were generally small, and somewhat questionable, on methodological grounds.

Patterson (1992) indicated that owing to tremendous societal and methodological problems, the research with lesbian and gay parents is not exten-

sive and sample sizes are generally small. Among the societal problems, for example, are the legal threats to homosexuals maintaining custody of their children. Thus, most lesbian and gay parents will not openly agree to be studied in the context of their homosexuality.

Most of the research compares boys and girls reared by divorced lesbian mothers with children reared by divorced heterosexual mothers. These mothers were the household heads, although some currently lived with another woman (lesbian mothers) or with a man (heterosexual mothers). The former was much more frequent than the latter. Another potentially important difference between the two groups was that children of lesbian mothers were more likely to have contact with their biological fathers than children of divorced heterosexual mothers.

In general, the boys and girls studied were in the primary grades. For these children (ages 5 to 12), researchers, using projective techniques and interviews, found no differences in same-sex gender identity between those raised by lesbian mothers and those raised by heterosexual mothers. Using questionnaires and observations, no group differences were found for children's sex-typed interests, activities, behavior, or peer relationships. Regarding adolescents and adults, the male and female children of lesbians and gays were no more likely to report having homosexual preferences than comparable-age individuals in the population as a whole.

On the surface, the Patterson (1992) findings are remarkable—children raised by lesbian and gay parents develop normal/traditional sex-typed beliefs and behaviors. The fact that the findings appear to be remarkable hinges on the linked assumptions that parents who are homosexual will also be nontraditionally sex-typed in other important ways and, moreover, they will consciously or unconsciously attempt to transmit those nontraditional values and behaviors to their children. Both assumptions may be false. Indeed, lesbians and gays may try extra hard to transmit traditional sex-typing to their children in order to protect them from a hostile society.

Taken as a whole, these three studies indicate that variations in sex-typed family structures, beliefs, values, and behaviors have only a limited effect on the development of children's traditional sex-typing. This is also consistent with the genetics of prejudice literature that found extrafamilial influences to be much stronger than within-family social influences. As previously argued, culture is powerful, and it is difficult for families to not expose their children to and involve their children in the norms of their culture. Many do try, of course, and turn to institutions such as home schooling, alternative schools, controlling access to the media in the home, and involvement in exclusive social circles such as religious sects in order to stem the influence of mainstream social norms. Controlling societal influence is a daunt-

ing ambition, however-not only the media, but peers, teachers, and other adults transmit and reinforce traditional sex-typed norms.

Influence of Peers and Teachers on Socialization

Several recent experiments have explored the role of teachers and peers in shaping traditional sex-typed behavior in infants, toddlers, and young children. Two classes of behavior are examined: the development of assertive/aggressive acts, and the choice of sex-typed toy play. Fagot and colleagues provide important information of the first class (Fagot & Hagan, 1985; Fagot, Hagan, Leinbach, & Kronsberg, 1985).

Fagot et al. (1985) studied 13-month-old infants in infant play groups, and the same children 10 months later, when they were in toddler play groups. During infancy, no sex differences were observed in frequency of communicative behaviors (e.g., gesturing, talking) or assertive/aggressive behaviors (e.g., hitting, grabbing objects from a peer). However, teachers punished and rewarded boys' assertive/aggressive behaviors more than they did girls' behaviors, with the converse holding for communicative behaviors. Peers did not differentially respond to boys and girls for either category of behaviors. During toddlerhood, boys and girls showed somewhat different patterns of communicative and assertive/aggressive acts. Teachers responded equivalently to boys and girls for both categories of behavior. But for assertive/aggressive acts, boys received more negative reactions from peers than did girls, and girls were ignored more than boys.

Fagot et al. (1985) interpreted these results as follows. Teachers hold stereotypic views about sex-typed behavior predispositions. Boys are assumed to be more aggressive than girls, and girls are assumed to seek attention through lower intensity communicative acts. During infancy, where there were, in reality, no behavioral differences between boys and girls for these categories, teachers responded as if there were, and essentially shaped sex-typed behavior. During toddlerhood, boys' and girls' sex-typed behaviors conformed to stereotypes, and teachers then responded to children's behaviors and not to their gender. Peers responded to a combination of gender and behavior, a circumstance that may further have shaped sex-typed gender differences.

Fagot and Hagan (1985) then focused on assertive/aggressive behavior (hereafter referred to as "aggression") and sought to extend the already mentioned results. They studied three age groups of toddlers in multi-age play groups: children who were 20 months, 27 months, and 33 months old. The question they addressed was the impact of teachers' and peers' reactions on the continuation of aggressive acts. The first finding was that there were no sex differences in these effects. Second, for the youngest group, rewarding, punishing, or ignoring the child had no differential effect on ter-

minating or sustaining the aggressive behavior. For the two oldest groups, however, negative peer and teacher reactions prolonged aggression relative to positive reactions or ignoring the aggression. Given that girls' aggression is more likely to be ignored, and boys' aggression more likely to be responded to negatively, these results indicate that boys', but not girls' aggression, is indirectly encouraged by teachers and peers.

What effects do peers and teachers have on more broadly defined sex-typed activities than aggression? Fagot (1985) addressed this issue for 2-year-old children in multi-age nursery school play groups. Male-typed play included rough-and-tumble activity and play with large blocks. Female-typed play included play with dolls and dressing up; gender-neutral play included climbing and sliding, playing with clay, and doing puzzles. Continuation or termination of play following teacher or peer reactions were used as the measure of the effect of the reaction.

The results are somewhat surprising. When male peers rewarded boys' activities, irrespective of gender-typing, boys continued the activity longer. Teachers' and female peers' differential reactions had no noticeable effect on the continuation of boys' activities. When teachers and female peers rewarded girls' activities (relative to punishing or ignoring them), irrespective of gender-typing, girls continued the activity longer. Boys' differential reactions had no noticeable effect on girls' activities. Additional analyses indicated that boys, but not girls, periodically received peer sex-typed punishment—for example, "That's dumb, boys don't play with dolls," when they engaged in female sex-typed play.

Fagot (1985) interpreted these results as follows. Boys' male peers encourage them to stay away from female-typed activities and to play with other boys. Girls' female peers encourage them to play with other girls but do not discourage them from engaging in male-typed activities. Teachers appear to encourage in boys and girls the kind of classroom calmness that is associated with female-typed and gender-neutral activities. This interpretation of boy-girl differences is consistent with the cultural norm of higher male than female status. Boys attempt to maintain status differences, but girls do not.

Lamb and colleagues (M. E. Lamb, Easterbrooks, & Holden, 1980; M. E. Lamb & Roopnarine, 1979) examined the effects of peer reactions to sex-typed play in 3- and 4-year-old nursery school children (Lamb & Roopnarine, 1979) and in nursery school and kindergarten children (Lamb et al., 1980). Their categories of male and female sex-typed activities, peer reactions of reward and punishment, and effects of the latter on continuation of play activity were all similar to those assessed by Fagot (1985).

The major results were as follows. In both studies boys and girls generally engaged in sex-appropriate activities. Both male and female peers rewarded boys more than girls for male sex-typed play, and rewarded girls

more than boys for female sex-typed play. Punishment for sex-typed play infrequently occurred, but it had the effect of terminating play. Finally, boys continued to reward male-typed play more than girls did, and girls continued to reward female-typed play more than boys did. Additionally, Lamb et al. (1980) found that following punishment, boys terminated female-typed play more rapidly than girls did and girls terminated male sex-typed play more rapidly than boys did. There were no age differences in any of these results.

These findings suggest to the authors that 3- to 5-year-old children have acquired the knowledge of sex-appropriate and sex-inappropriate activities, and the motivation to carry out these activities. Children reward and punish peers for adherence to or deviation from the gender norms. These results further suggest, as compared to the findings of Fagot (1985) that one major development that occurs between the ages of 2 and 3 years is boys' and girls' susceptibility to gender role enforcements (rewards and punishments) by both male and female peers.

Taken together, the data on the socialization of sex-typing indicate that from a very early age, parents, peers, teachers, the media, and all forms of cultural norm transmission operate to ensure that males and females will develop very different gender identities and behaviors. That even 2-year-olds contribute to this differentiation is remarkable. Nearly every one in the culture becomes invested in these identities. The children themselves manifest a variety of "badges" to ensure that the two gender groups will not be confused. The adopting of another's badge is readily noted, and peers are likely to take corrective measures to get things straight. There may be a genetic component to gender roles, but even if there is not, sex-typing seems to develop like canalized behaviors. Even such apparently nontraditional types as having two homosexual parents have little effect on the development of gender. As is seen in the next two sections, the outcomes are significant for males and females and for the culture as a whole.

DEVELOPMENT OF OPPOSITE-SEX PREJUDICE

Indirect Measures

In an earlier section of this chapter, Cultural Norms, six predictions were made based on the consequences of status and dominance differences between males and females in North American societies. Only one of the predictions directly dealt with developmental changes in opposite-sex prejudice. The other five indirectly dealt with prejudice in that they involved either a female sex-role devaluation or a male sex-role enhancement. The first prediction, confirmed in the section Socialization of Sex-Typing, stated

that fathers would be more involved than mothers in traditional sex-typing of their children because they had more to gain by the status quo. The effect of encouraging compliance in girls and assertiveness in boys is likely to work against females in a society where males make and enforce the rules.

This first prediction dealt with parents, whereas the others dealt with children. The second prediction was that owing to gendered status differences, girls should acquire knowledge of opposite-sex stereotypes earlier than boys. On the surface, there is nothing prejudiced about this. However, given a theory that links knowledge acquisition to the social value of that knowledge, a gendered sequence of opposite-sex knowledge acquisition would suggest a higher value for the stereotype first acquired. That is, if girls acquire opposite-sex knowledge before boys do, this implies that male sex-typing is more valuable social knowledge than female sex-typing. Is this not merely a restatement of the cultural norm that males have higher status than females? Of course it is. In this way, female and male children essentially acknowledge the higher valuing of male roles over female roles. But it is an *indirect* measure of prejudice. In the remainder of this section we examine the research relevant to the four predictions dealing with indirect measures of opposite-sex prejudice in children.

O'Brien (1992) and Levy and Fivush (1993) reviewed literature relevant to the just covered prediction concerning the acquisition of knowledge about opposite-sex stereotypes. In the typical experiments, boys and girls are shown pictures of objects or activities associated with male and female children, and adults and are asked to identify with which sex the object or activity is usually associated. Preschool boys and girls age 2 and older have greater knowledge of same-sex than other-sex, gender-typed knowledge. However, the discrepancy is greater for boys than for girls. Indeed, in some studies, girls showed equivalent knowledge of the two sex-typed categories that was equaled only by the same-sex knowledge attained by boys. Thus, the second prediction is confirmed.

The third prediction made was that boys should show more traditional sex-typed preferences than girls, and, owing to increasing awareness of cultural values, the difference should increase with age. This prediction differs from the second one in two ways: It focuses on preferences rather than on knowledge and it predicts age-related developmental changes. The research literature strongly confirms this prediction (Huston, 1983; P. A. Katz, 1983; P. A. Katz & Boswell, 1986; O'Brien, 1992; Signorella, Bigler, & Liben, 1993). Interestingly, most researchers refer to the shift to more opposite-sex preferences by girls as evidencing their increased "flexibility" relative to boys.

The experiment by Serbin and Sprafkin (1986) is an excellent example of research in this area. The authors tested boys and girls from five age groups between 3 and 7 years old on various measures of sex-typed knowl-

edge and sex-typed preferences. The authors found essentially no differences between boys and girls in their ability to identify children's and adults' sex-typed objects and activities. Regarding preferences, one of their tests, "affiliation," involved pictures of men and women, with the same-sex adult doing nothing, and the opposite-sex adult doing something interesting. The children were asked with which adult they would like to be. Girls choose females about half the time at each age level (40% at age 3). Boys, on the other hand, showed a pronounced increase in choosing males, from 30% at age 3 to 75% at age 7.

The fourth prediction made was that, owing to their self-perceived lower status, females should be more likely to adopt male sex-typed behavior and values than the converse. This prediction is similar to the third one except that the focus here is both more specific (i.e., on behaviors) and more general (i.e., on values). Although we would expect similar predictions to have similar outcomes, Huston (1983) taught us that sex-typing is multidimensional and that development of the various sex-typed components are not necessarily correlated with one another.

Huston (1983) and O'Brien (1992) summarized literature that supports this prediction. Baruch and Barnett (1986) and others have found that girls are more likely than boys to perform opposite-sex-typed household chores. Smetana (1986), in studying preschoolers' conceptions of sex-role transgressions, found that both boys and girls judged male sex-role transgressions more severely than female sex-role transgressions. In the area of occupational aspirations, Etaugh and Liss (1992), studying children from kindergarten through eighth grade, found girls, but not boys, increasingly interested in opposite-sex-typed occupations. Finally, in reviewing literature on children's preferences for being like various television characters when they grew up, boys almost never chose a woman but about one fourth of girls chose a man (Fishbein, 1984).

The fifth prediction made was that owing to gendered status differences, self-esteem in males and females should be more highly related to masculine than to feminine characteristics. There is a corollary prediction that, owing to the connection between self-esteem and depression (Harter, 1993), females should be more likely than males to suffer from depression. Although the data are somewhat limited concerning the fifth prediction, two large studies with high school students confirm it (Massad, 1981; Spence & Helmreich, 1978).

In both studies concerned with self-esteem, the Personal Attributes Questionnaire (PAQ) developed by Spence and Helmreich (1978) was used to assess masculine and feminine personality traits. The assumption underlying the development of the PAQ was that masculinity and femininity were independent personality dimensions, that is, a high score on one dimension did not imply a low score on the other. In developing the PAQ,

they included only those characteristics that were positively valued by both male and female adolescents. Spence and Helmreich (1978) found for both males and females that self-esteem was moderately to strongly positively correlated with masculinity scores, that is, high masculinity was associated with high self-esteem. However, femininity for both sexes was weakly correlated with self-esteem. Massad (1981) found that males with high masculinity scores had higher self-esteem than those with low masculinity scores, and that their femininity scores had no effect on this relationship. Females with high masculinity and high femininity scores had the highest self-esteem, and those with low scores on both had the lowest self-esteem. Thus, masculine characteristics boosted female self-esteem.

Regarding the development of depression, two papers have reviewed the literature, reaching identical conclusions (Cantwell, 1990; Petersen et al., 1993). Distinctions should be made between *depressed mood*, *depressive syndrome*, and *clinical depression*. The three categories can be seen as points along a continuum of severity of depression, with clinical depression apparently occurring in 3% to 5% of adolescents and close to 0% in preadolescent children. In the other two categories, adolescents also have a higher occurrence than preadolescents. For each of these three categories, the data are very consistent: Preadolescent boys and girls, that is, 8- to 12-year-olds, have approximately equal rates of depression, whereas for adolescents age 14 and older, females have higher rates of depression than males. The latter pattern persists into adulthood. Petersen et al. (1993) suggested that one causal factor for the gender differences is that the biological changes in puberty strengthen one's gender identity. Obviously, from the present point of view, stronger identity with a subordinate group (females) would be more depressing than with a dominant group (males).

In summary, all four predictions concerning either the enhancement of male sex-typed characteristics or the devaluation of female sex-typed characteristics were supported. This may give the impression that opposite-sex prejudice is unidirectional. However, as will be seen in the next section, which deals with more direct measures of prejudice, males and females both evidence opposite-sex prejudice.

Direct Measures

Opposite-sex prejudice is discussed in two ways. In the first, we look at the negative and positive sex-role stereotypes that boys and girls hold for themselves and for the opposite sex. For example, if boys hold stronger negative female sex-role stereotypes than girls do, and weaker positive female sex-role stereotypes than girls do, it may be inferred that boys have prejudiced attitudes toward girls. Three studies use this approach. In the second way, we examine children's evaluations of counterstereotyped (or opposite-sex)

behavior that they and/or male and female peers carry out, for example, girls playing with trucks or football. Negative reactions to counterstereotyped play can be viewed as a devaluation of the opposite sex, and hence, as an indicator of prejudice. Three studies take this approach. From a genetic/evolutionary view, positively enhanced same-sex valuation is consistent with ingroup favoritism, and negatively enhanced opposite devaluation is consistent with outgroup hostility. It is assumed, of course, that badging mechanisms lead to identification of group membership.

Kuhn, Nash, and Brucken (1978) compared knowledge of sex-role stereotypes for 2½- and 3½-year-old boys and girls involved in a nursery school. The children were shown two paper dolls—one clearly resembling a girl, the other, a boy—and asked to identify them. All did so correctly. The children were then read a list of 72 statements that dealt with traits (e.g., "I'm strong"), activities (e.g., "I like to play ball"), or future roles (e.g., "When I grow up, I'll fly an airplane"). These were all items that adults and older children had clearly identified as being sex-role stereotyped. For each statement, the children were asked to point to the doll that best fit in.

The results showed that children agreed with adult stereotypes about two-thirds of the time, a rate that is statistically well above the range of chance. There were no age or sex differences in amount of stereotyping. Significantly, boys and girls sometimes disagreed about the statements that they stereotyped. Boys, but not girls, believed that girls cried, were slow, and complained about hurt feelings and not having a turn at play. Girls, but not boys, believed that girls looked nice, gave kisses, never fought, and said, "I can do it best." Thus boys held more negative attitudes and fewer positive attitudes toward girls than girls held about themselves.

How do beliefs about boys fit into this picture? Girls, but not boys, believe that boys enjoy fighting, are mean, weak, and say, "I did wrong." Boys, but not girls, believe that boys enjoy hard work, are loud, naughty, and make people cry. Except for the last three items, which may be too ambiguous to categorize accurately, girls held more negative attitudes and fewer positive attitudes toward boys than boys held toward themselves. It can be inferred from these findings that 2½- and 3½-year-olds do hold opposite-sex prejudices.

The study by Albert and Porter (1988) dealt with sex-role stereotypes among 4-, 5- and 6-year-olds enrolled in preschool programs. The children were shown both a male and a female doll and told two stories, one concerning the child's home, and the other, the school environment. Intermittently throughout the stories, the child was asked to point to the doll that engaged in the activity or event just described. In all, 32 activities were noted, all judged by adults to be either positive or negative as well as clearly sex-role stereotyped. For example, the item, "Which one throws toys around when told not to?" is a negative male sex-role stereotype; "Which

one goes over to take care of the little child?" is a positive female sex-role stereotype.

Overall, children were found to be more accurate (i.e., to agree with adult ratings) in the sex-role stereotyping of their own than of the opposite sex. Older children were also more accurate in their sex-role stereotypes than were younger children. Girls were more likely than boys to associate all the negative male sex-role stereotypes with the male doll. Moreover, the strength of these judgments was greater for older than for younger girls. For all of the positive male sex-role stereotypes, boys scored higher than, or the same as, girls. In findings similar to those for the negative stereotypes, older girls were less positive than younger ones.

A similar pattern was found for female sex-role stereotypes, with boys and girls holding reversed positions. That is, boys generally viewed girls more negatively and less positively than girls saw themselves. The opposite-sex disparity, however, was not as great as that seen for male sex-role stereotypes.

Zalk and Katz (1978) tested second- and fifth-grade Black and White children on race and gender biases. For the latter, they were shown slides of boys and girls and given either a positive or negative description of one of them. The participants were then asked to point to either the boy or the girl who best fit the description, for example, "Which child always answers the teacher's questions wrong?" The descriptions dealt with both academic and nonacademic characteristics, with six involving positive attributes, and seven involving negative ones.

The pattern of results was similar for second and fifth graders, although the older children were less biased than the younger ones. Both the males and females rated same-sex children more positively than opposite-sex children, consistent with the aforementioned results for preschoolers. Females rated males much more negatively than they did females; and males rated males somewhat more negatively than they did females. But unlike the results for preschoolers, males rated males somewhat more negatively than they did females. One possible explanation for the discrepancy with males is that in these school settings, boys are more frequent troublemakers than girls and are criticized by teachers for this. Four of the seven negative descriptions involved school-related activities; hence, children's negative evaluations may partially reflect their school experiences.

Taken together, the results of the just presented research indicate, consistent with the gender identity literature, that opposite-sex prejudice starts to emerge at age 2½, is clearly seen in 4-year-olds, and increases until about age 8 (the second-graders in Zalk & Katz, 1978). Between ages 8 and 10, it declines somewhat, probably because of increases in sex-typed flexibility and in the ability to balance beliefs and experiences. The overall set of findings is consistent with hypotheses based on the genetic/evolutionary factors

of badging mechanisms, ingroup favoritism, and outgroup hostility. There is no evidence of outgroup attractiveness.

The experiment by Bussey and Bandura (1992) dealt with nursery school children's self-evaluation of how they would feel after they had played with same-sex or opposite-sex toys, and with their evaluation of older boys and girls they saw on television playing with opposite-sex toys (special videotapes were produced for this task). The children were taught to indicate their evaluations by pressing light switches that were associated with the following five categories: *real great*, *kinda great*, *nothing special*, *kinda awful*, *real awful*. For purposes of data analyses the preschoolers were divided into two groups, with average ages of 3 years and 4 years, respectively.

The major findings were as follows. For self-evaluations, the 3-year-olds tended to evaluate same-sex toy play positively and opposite-sex toy play negatively, but this was not statistically significant. For the 4-year-olds, this pattern was quite pronounced, and statistically significant. Regarding evaluations of televised older children, there were no age or sex differences, but generally, the participants reacted negatively to opposite-sex toy play, for example, boys playing with dolls, girls playing with trucks. These results are consistent with the studies dealing with preschoolers' negative judgments of opposite-sex characteristics, and positive judgments of same-sex characteristics.

Martin (1989) studied two groups of boys and girls with average ages of approximately 4½ and 8½ years. The participants were shown pictures of same-age boys and girls and were read descriptions about their friends and interests. Only one target child was shown at a time. There were four target children of each gender, representing four gender characteristics. One of each sex was depicted in a gender neutral way; one of each as having same-sex stereotyped interests; one of each as having opposite-sex counterstereotyped interests; and finally, one boy was labeled as a *sissy* and one girl as a *tomboy*. After each description was read, the participants were asked to make three "liking" ratings from *not at all* to *a lot*: (1) How much do you like the target? (2) How much do other boys like the target? (3) How much do other girls like the target?

In a pattern consistent with those observed in previous work, boys overall liked male targets better than female ones, with the converse holding for females. The younger boys and girls disliked the tomboys more than all other target children, whereas the older boys and girls disliked sissies the most. There were no significant differences in liking or disliking as a function of depicted neutral, stereotyped, or counterstereotyped interests. Regarding the judged liking of the target children by other boys or girls (second and third questions), the pattern for younger children was identical to that of older children. For the younger participants, the only significant finding was their expectation that other boys would like boys better than girls, with the converse holding for girls.

From the perspective of opposite-sex prejudice, the most important results involved the age-related shift from younger children most disliking tomboys to older children most disliking sissies. One possible explanation for these results, consistent with a cultural/historical point of view, involves the idea that for both age groups, male characteristics are seen as somewhat more highly valued than female characteristics. The younger children assume that male characteristics "belong" to males and thus see tomboys most negatively. This is consistent with Smetana's (1986) results, noted in the previous section. The older children, however, value male characteristics in both sexes, and view sissies most negatively because they have rejected these characteristics.

The paper by Label, Bempechat, Gewirtz, Shaken-Topaz, and Bashe (1993) follows these leads from Martin's (1989) research in very imaginative ways. The possible drawback to their research is that it was carried out in Israel with 10- to 12-year-old Israeli children. Although the article was published in a North American journal and Lobel et al. (1993) took a number of measures that demonstrate the comparability of these children's responses with those of North Americans, Israel is nevertheless a different culture. In this experiment, the researchers made four videotapes all involving 10- to 12-year-old children. In the first, one boy (the target) and three girls played "Chinese jump rope" together (a girls' game in Israel). In the second, one girl (the target) and three boys played soccer together (a boys' game). In the third, a boy played soccer with three other boys. In the fourth, a girl played Chinese jump rope with three other girls. The participants were shown only one of the videos and then asked: (a) to rate the target child on sixteen masculine and feminine traits, (b) to rate the popularity of the target with his or her peers, (c) to rate how much they personally liked the target child, and (d) to indicate whether or not they would like to engage in a variety of activities with the target child.

Regarding rated masculinity and femininity, the target boy and target girl who played soccer were both rated about the same, and more masculine than feminine. The target boy and target girl who played jump rope were both rated about the same, and more feminine than masculine. Regarding judged peer popularity, the least popular was the boy who played jump rope with girls. The popularity of the other targets was essentially the same. This pattern is consistent with that found by Martin (1989) for the older children—that is, sissies were disliked most. Regarding personal liking, girls playing with girls (i.e., in a traditional sex-typed way) were liked the most by both boys and girls. There were only slight differences among the other three conditions. This is inconsistent with Martin's findings, and may indicate a level of comfort that older children feel with traditional girls. Finally, boys would most prefer to engage in other activities with the girl who played soccer with the boys, and girls would most prefer engaging

in activities with the boys who played soccer with other boys. This finding is consistent with the view that masculine characteristics are most highly valued by boys and girls. Additionally, it indicates that heterosexual interests are starting to play a role in opposition to opposite-sex prejudice.

Taken together, these three experiments indicate that opposite-sex prejudice emerges at age 3 and is strongly in place at age 4. At these ages, the prejudice is bidirectional-boys devalue girls' characteristics and girls devalue boys' characteristics, as predicted by the factor of outgroup hostility. Between the ages of 4 and 8 years, in a pattern consistent with the results reported in chapter 2 concerning group identity, a shift occurs. Both girls and boys reject boys who take on female characteristics. Although the underlying processes may be different, both sexes at about age 8 effectively state that male characteristics are more valued than female ones, as predicted by cultural/historical analysis. Between ages 8 and 10 years, the enhancement of male characteristics strengthens, but a new element enters and opposes opposite-sex prejudice-heterosexual interest. Boys want to be involved with masculine girls, and girls want to be involved with masculine boys, consistent with the higher status of males than females. The picture is somewhat cloudy during preadolescence in that boys and girls personally like traditional girls the most.

The results in this section have bearing on the prediction made in the Cultural Norms section that owing to gendered status differences, opposite-sex prejudice should diminish with increasing age for females more than for males. The results from the first three experiments dealing with negative judgments about opposite-sex stereotypes are inconsistent with this prediction; but those concerned with evaluations of counterstereotyped behaviors support the prediction. There is no obvious resolution to this disparity.

DEVELOPMENT OF OPPOSITE-SEX DISCRIMINATION

As discussed earlier, opposite-sex discrimination as defined in chapter 1 has apparently never been studied with North American children and adolescents. The basic assumption made here is that freely chosen gender segregation reflects exclusion based on gender differences. This exclusion may be harmful, and hence, discriminatory. At a minimum, it shows the genetic/evolutionary influences of badging mechanisms and ingroup favoritism. In the following studies, two principal methods of assessing segregation are employed: For preschool and kindergarten children, behavioral observations; for older children, peer nominations (a sociometric technique). Only five experiments are described out of potentially dozens, primarily for illustrative purposes. That is, the age-related pattern of gender segregation is clear. The Shrum and Cheek (1987) and Shrum, Cheek, and

Hunter (1988) research were selected because they studied virtually an entire school system from Grade 3 through Grade 12. The others were chosen because of the clarity of their methods and results.

LaFreniere, Strayer, and Gauthier (1984) studied 15 long-standing play groups of children 1½, 2¼, 3, 4, and 5½ years old. They observed how frequently children directed positive social initiatives to same- and opposite-sex peers. For the 1½-year-olds, no sex preferences were shown, 2¼-year-old girls, but not boys, showed same-sex preferences; by age 3, both boys and girls were directing twice as many initiatives to same-sex as to opposite-sex peers. This ratio remained stable for the girls; for the 5½-year-old boys, however, the ratio changed to 3-to-1. Thus, 3-year-olds of both sexes are reliably showing opposite-sex discrimination.

Maccoby and Jacklin (1987) studied the social play of groups of 4½-year-old nursery school children and 6½-year-old kindergarten children. For each child engaging in either parallel or interactive play, it was noted whether the child's partner was the same or opposite sex or whether the child was part of a mixed-sex group. Both age groups participated in mixed-sex groups approximately one third of the time. The 4½-year-olds were about 2½ times more likely to be playing with a same-sex than with an opposite-sex partner, but the 6½-year-olds were 11 times more likely to be doing so. The results for the 4½-year-olds are consistent with those reported by LaFreniere et al. (1984) and those for the 6½-year-olds are consistent with other published data. Thus, a dramatic increase in opposite-sex discrimination occurs between the ages of 4½ and 6½.

The results of the research on both opposite-sex prejudice and opposite-sex discrimination for young children are very consistent. By age 2½, children show attitudinal and behavioral preferences for the same sex over the opposite sex. These remain relatively stable until about age 4½, after which they grow stronger. By age 6½, the phenomenon of opposite-sex discrimination is striking. The dramatic increase in children's sex discrimination after age 4½ is consistent with the argument made in chapter 2 that group identity emerges between the ages of 3 and 4 and increases between the ages of 4 and 5.

Hayden-Thomson, Rubin, and Hymel (1987) conducted two experiments using sociometric techniques to assess same-sex and opposite-sex preferences of children in kindergarten through Grade 3 (Experiment 1) and Grades 3 through 6 (Experiment 2). The children in each classroom were given a set of photographs of each of their classmates and asked to place them in one of three boxes. One box was for *children you like a lot*, the second for *children you sort of like*, and the third for *children you don't like*. In each experiment, children rated same-sex classmates higher than those of the opposite sex. Both boys and girls in Experiment 1 showed an increasing negative bias toward opposite-sex classmates with increasing age, that is,

from kindergarten to Grade 3. However, in Experiment 2, there were no particular trends for either boys or girls as a function of age. Most conservatively, one could conclude that opposite-sex discrimination increases from kindergarten to Grade 3, and remains relatively stable from Grade 3 to Grade 6. Thus ingroup favoritism, but not outgroup hostility, is supported by the data.

Shrum and Cheek (1987) and Shrum et al. (1988) studied virtually all the 3rd through 12th graders in a racially integrated school district in a community in the southern United States. The data were collected in conjunction with an ongoing biomedical research program. The single question analyzed in both studies was *Who from school are your bestfriends?* Using sophisticated statistical methods, Shrum and Cheek (1987) analyzed the answers in order to understand how age, race, and gender influenced the social networks in the schools. **In** particular, they sought to discover how three social categories—*isolates*, *liaisons*, and *groups*—changed as a function of age, and how gender and racial heterogeneity of groups changed with age. **In** simple terms, an *isolate* is a person who has zero or one reciprocated friendship. A *liaison* is a person who has reciprocal friendships with several others, but not exclusively with members of a particular group. A *group* is a set of at least three individuals who have linked friendships.

In general, the proportion of children and adolescents who were isolates decreased slightly from Grade 3 to Grade 12. The proportion of liaisons strongly increased from Grade 3 to Grade 12, with the biggest changes occurring from Grade 7 (entrance into junior high school) to Grade 12. Finally, group membership mirrored liaison status, with the largest drop occurring between Grades 7 and 12. Thus the entrance into junior high school is a "watershed" for the development of peer relations. What about the gender composition of groups? In Grade 3 through Grade 6, an average of only 17% of groups were mixed gender. In Grade 7 and Grade 8, this rose to 66%; and in Grades 9 to 12 (senior high school), 100% of groups were mixed gender. These results indicate that the relatively rigid gender segregation seen in elementary school starts to markedly change in junior high school where heterosexual affectional interests come into play.

Shrum et al. (1988) presented a fine-grained analysis of friendship choices (as distinct from group membership), indicating that extensive gender integration is far from the norm at any of the ages studied. Two measures of level of opposite-sex friendship were analyzed: segregation and preference. Both assess the extent to which gender friendships occur relative to chance expectations. That is, if no sex discrimination occurred, then the proportion of male-male, male-female, and female-female friendships would be tied to the proportion of males and females in the school. The two measures are similar in this regard, and hence the age-related pattern of results is quite similar. Both showed that mixed-gender friendships were

very infrequent throughout Grade 3 to Grade 12. Starting in junior high school, the frequency increased somewhat and continued through Grade 12. The patterns were slightly different for males and females. Same-sex preferences were highest for the boys at Grade 3 and Grade 6; for the girls, they peaked at Grade 7. At a minimum, children and adolescents in all grades reported an average of at least five times as many same-sex as opposite-sex friends.

How does one explain the presence of opposite-sex discrimination in 2¹^h-year-olds and its continuation through adolescence? Maccoby (1988, 1990) presented a thoughtful analysis of this phenomenon, and links gender segregation to preferred play and interaction styles, consistent with the factor of badging mechanisms. Maccoby suggests that in nursery school, discrimination is not closely tied to sex-typed activities because many of the activities are gender neutral. Same-sex preferences are also unrelated to children's own relative masculinity or femininity as personality traits.

Two factors seem to be involved in same-sex segregation in nursery school. First, boys in this age range are more likely than girls to enjoy rough-and-tumble play and to be oriented more toward competitive and dominance-related activities. Girls seem to find these activities less pleasurable and often even distasteful. Boys tend to be more excitable and girls calmer and quieter in their experiencing of these activities. Second, by age 3½, girls find that they are not able to influence readily the play activities of boys, but can do so with girls. Boys can influence both sexes. (Fagot, 1985, showed the lack of influence at age 2 to be symmetrical.) There is a difference between the approaches of the two sexes: Girls make polite suggestions, whereas boys make direct physical and vocal demands. Thus boys learn to enjoy being with boys, and girls with girls, in approximately a 2-to-1 ratio. This ratio remains stable for about 2½ to 3 years, and then dramatically increases when boys develop a male group identity and girls a female group identity.

As boys and girls remain in same-sex groups, they powerfully socialize themselves in sex-typed interaction styles, interests, activities, and social structure. For example, girls are more likely than boys to become members of smaller groups, to congregate in private homes as opposed to public spaces, and to form intimate friendships with one or two girls, as opposed to boys' less intense friendships with many others. Boys continue throughout childhood and adolescence to be more concerned with dominance and competition, whereas girls continue to be more concerned than boys with collaboration and seeking agreement. Thus, the same-sex group interaction patterns seen in preschool are very similar to those that develop in childhood and adolescence.

A study by Bukowski, Gauze, Hoza, and Newcomb (1993) of children in Grade 3 through Grade 7 confirms some of Maccoby's (1988, 1990) conclu-

sions. Bukowski et al. (1993) examined personality and behavioral correlates of children's own same-sex and opposite-sex friendship choices, and their popularity with same-sex and opposite-sex peers. Among the principal findings were these: Same-sex preferences were primarily due to liking same-sex peers rather than to disliking opposite-sex peers; boys who preferred to engage in large motor activities (e.g., playing ball, riding bicycles) had a stronger preference than other boys for same-sex friends; the more a child was rejected by opposite-sex peers, the more likely that child was to prefer same-sex friends; finally, high levels of aggressiveness were negatively related to friendship choices, but especially so for girls. The latter points to the important role of behavior, and hence, badging mechanisms in mediating same-sex and opposite-sex segregation. There is no evidence for the operation of outgroup attraction in these data.

How do the results concerning opposite-sex prejudice and discrimination fit with the prediction based on the development of group identity and cognitive development? Five age-related shifts in knowledge organization were identified, at ages 4,6 to 7,10 to 12, 14 to 16, and 18 to 19 years. The research on development of prejudice showed that shifts in either magnitude or direction to occur between ages 3 and 4, 4 and 8, and 8 and 11 years. These are consistent with the first three age periods. There are apparently no data available for the two older age periods. The research on discrimination identified shifts between ages 3 and 4, 4 and 6, 6 and 9, 11 and 13, and 14 and 18 years. These are consistent with the first four age periods, with two exceptions: There is a shift between ages 6 and 9, and the 14- to 18-year-old age-range partially overlaps two of the aforementioned age periods (i.e., 14 to 16, and 18 to 19 years). These findings point to the effects of a strong cognitive factor in the development of both opposite-sex prejudice and discrimination.

SUMMARY

This chapter began its treatment of gender prejudice and discrimination by briefly surveying the history of gender relations in the United States, with an emphasis on European-American cultural norms. From the time of the earliest European settlements, this history was distinguished by male dominance, and its progression from that point traced the sequence of efforts by American women to gain sociopolitical equity. Six major cultural/historical periods framed these efforts: 1607-1770, Colonization; 1770-1825, Revolution and Consolidation; 1825-1865, Expansion and Civil War; 1865-1920, Reconstruction, World War I, and Suffrage; 1920-1945, Prosperity, Depression, and World War II; and 1945 to the present, Postwar Growth and Change. Women have made substantial legal, political, economic, military,

sexual, and educational gains over this time span. Although they have attained legal equality with men, there is still not functional equality in any of these areas. Some of the greatest gains were made in times of war, when new demands and opportunities occurred for them. Females of different social classes had very different socialization experiences from the post-Revolutionary War period to the present, which led to unique opportunities to combat prejudice and discrimination.

In addition to norms deeply embedded in European-American culture, we looked at genetic/evolutionary predispositions as antecedents of opposite-sex prejudice and discrimination. Badging mechanisms establish distinct male and female group identities and acute sensitivity to gender difference very early in life; these differences, in turn, foster the emergence of ingroup favoritism and outgroup hostility. These lead to the maintenance of male-female status differences. Several predictions were made based on evolutionary/genetic and cultural factors concerning developmental, gender, parental, and familial effects on prejudice and discrimination.

In the section concerned with the socialization of sex-typing, the complexity and multidimensionality of sex-typing was emphasized. Sex-typing of infants starts virtually at birth and pervades nearly all aspects of children's physical and social environments. Parents socialize their sons and daughters differently. Fathers are more likely to do so than mothers, consistent with the suggestion that they have most to gain in maintaining the cultural norms of male dominance. The development of gender identity is strongly affected by parents' toy selection and by involvement in their child's sex-typed play. Consistent with predictions based on genetic analyses of prejudice, variations in family type (e.g., conventional vs. nonconventional, single parent vs. two parents, single homosexual parent vs. single heterosexual parent) have very little effect on either boys' or girls' development of gender identity. Teachers and peers in preschool settings, however, appear to have strong effects on the differential gender identity of boys and girls.

The development of opposite-sex prejudice was assessed by both indirect and direct measures. In the section dealing with indirect measures, four predictions based on the consequences of cultural/historical male and female status and dominance differences were evaluated. The predictions concerned either the enhancement of male sex-typed characteristics or the devaluation of female sex-typed characteristics by children and adolescents. Importantly, these indirect measures demonstrated that gender prejudice is bidirectional—that both girls and boys participate in the ongoing preferential valuation of male sex-typed characteristics.

For the direct measures, two categories of experiments were examined. In the first, we looked at the negative and positive sex-role stereotypes that boys and girls hold for themselves and for the opposite sex. In the second,

we assessed children's evaluations of counterstereotyped behavior that they and/or male and female peers carry out. Results of research for the first category indicate that opposite-sex prejudice starts to emerge at age 2½, is clearly seen in 4-year-olds, and increases until about age 8. Between age 8 and age 10, it declines somewhat. Data for older children are unavailable. Results of research for the second category are somewhat inconsistent with the just mentioned results. Between ages 4 and 8 years, both sexes start to value male more than female characteristics, which tends to produce female prejudice among females. Between 8 years and 10 years this enhanced valuing of male characteristics strengthens, but the emergence of heterosexual interests after age 10 complicates the developmental pattern.

The research on opposite-sex discrimination identified developmental shifts between ages 3 and 4, 4 and 6, 6 and 9, 11 and 13, and 14 and 18 years. These are fairly consistent with predictions based on the development of group identity and cognitive development. These results point to the effects of a strong cognitive factor mediating this discrimination. Analyses by Maccoby and others concerning differences between males and females in sex-typed interaction styles, interests, activities, and social structure suggest that these differences underlie opposite-sex discrimination.

The tenacity of prejudice and discrimination is perhaps no more vivid than in the realm of gender. From the earliest ages, even in integrated settings, powerful badging mechanisms arise that confound what might otherwise be seamless social integration. Parents, peers, and teachers can provide subtle yet powerful preferential cues; boys and girls share bidirectionally the differential valuation of male and female sex-typed characteristics. Overall, gender prejudice and discrimination is pervasive, and penetrates social life in powerful yet subtle ways.

A Cultural History of African Americans

We turn to the last of the four target groups, focusing on prejudice and discrimination related to race. On the surface, bias based on race and ethnicity should be the most arbitrary and thus the most superficial. But as readers are no doubt aware, history has proven race bias to be deeply influential and pervasive in American culture. Without doubt, this is due to the profound societal injury suffered as a consequence of African slavery. So, although race prejudice has many forms, in America it has become widely associated with the African-American experience. For this reason we center our discussion of race prejudice and discrimination on African Americans and European Americans.

The coverage of this subject will span two chapters. This chapter will focus on the African-American experience, laying the historical foundation with an account of slavery, reconstruction, the civil rights movement, and the nature of ethnicity in America. Chapter 7 will cover the psychological assessment of peer prejudice and discrimination related to race.

Specifically, this chapter has four goals. The first is to discuss the cultural history of African Americans, with particular attention to the development of cultural norms that embody prejudice and discrimination toward African Americans. The historical span from forced slavery to the civil rights movement has been a vivid public encounter, easily one of the defining themes of cultural America.

The second goal is to present a brief summary of perhaps the most socially significant research that has been carried out in North America by psychologists—Kenneth and Mamie Clark's work on the development of race prejudice in children. The Clarks' studies played an important role in

the judicial decision to prohibit school segregation along racial lines. Thus they established the psychology of prejudice and discrimination as a fundamental theme of civil rights. Their research also helped set the stage for and provided a major impetus to the study of racial prejudice.

The third goal is to describe and explain the literature on the development of ethnic identity. What is ethnicity, we ask, and what are the positive and negative psychological consequences of ethnic experience.

The fourth goal is to compare the cultural histories of the four groups examined in this book, looking for common themes and patterns of difference that illuminate the cultural development of prejudice and discrimination. These issues give us historical and cultural footing as we turn to race prejudice and discrimination in chapter 7.

BRIEF CULTURAL HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS

It is estimated that over a 350 year period, at least 10 million African slaves arrived in the New World, approximately 5% of whom were brought to the North American colonies. It is not clear how many died in transit, but probably at least one in six, and perhaps considerably more (Meier & Rudwick, 1976). Survival in the New World largely depended on the topography of the land and on the climate. Mortality was high in the swampy, insect-infested regions of the West Indies, but relatively low in most regions of the North American colonies.

It is useful to view African Americans as having had four different types of socialization/enculturation experiences: (a) as non-enslaved ("free") status in the North, (b) "free" status in the South, (c) enslavement in the North, and (d) enslavement in the South (Nash et al., 1990). Prior to the Civil War, 85 to 90% of the African Americans living in the colonies (and states) were slaves, and those who were not were either recently freed or descended from slaves. Being "free" in the North was much less restrictive than "freedom" in the South, but was not equivalent to that of White free persons.

Northern slaves typically worked in the household, were very familiar to their owner and his family, and often had child care responsibilities as part of their work. Unlike Southern plantation slaves, they lived mainly in urban settings and usually had considerable unsupervised time in the town. The field slaves in the South (men and women) worked extremely long hours, usually under quite unsympathetic conditions. Treatment by their masters was frequently brutal, food supplied to them often inadequate (they could supplement it by their own extra farming efforts), and they were usually closely watched.

According to a number of writers, for example, Aptheker (1971), Franklin (1984), and Harding (1981), the central theme in the entire span of Af-

frican-American history (pre- and post-Civil War) is the pursuit of freedom. This pursuit included, but was not limited to justice, equality, and self-determination. There is no convincing evidence that even a substantial minority, let alone a majority, of enslaved Black Africans readily accepted their bondage. Rather, there are ample records that document Africans' fierce struggle for freedom, even before they arrived in the American colonies. For example, many committed suicide by drowning rather than be transported abroad. After arriving in the colonies, attempted escapes were frequent, especially in the South. Many fled to the North and to Canada. Others went to Florida where they found acceptance by the Seminole Indians. Thomas Jefferson estimated that in 1 year in Virginia, 30,000 slaves attempted to escape (Harding, 1981).

With the pursuit of freedom as its guiding theme, this section surveys the cultural history of African Americans. As with the historical survey of American females, this history falls into discrete periods identified by the wars that marked them. These periods are as follows: 1607-1770, Colonization; 1770-1825, Revolution and Consolidation; 1825-1865, Expansion and Civil War; 1865-1920, Reconstruction, World War I, and Suffrage; 1920-1945, Prosperity, Depression, and World War II; 1945 to the present, Postwar Growth and Change.

In the Colonization period (1607-1770), dramatic changes occurred in the conception of and treatment of African slaves. During the early part of the period, slavery itself was defined, and this varied by region (North vs. South). By the end of this period, abolition of slavery was being debated in most of the colonies. Initially, in both the North and the South, the slaves were treated essentially the same as the White indentured servants. Many of them married, had children, and were freed after a relatively long period of service. Their children were born free, similar to those of the White indentured servants. This indentured service status changed over the next 40 years into a system of heritable slavery—the Africans legally became slaves for life, and their children were born as slaves owned by their mothers' masters (Harding, 1981; Meier & Rudwick, 1976; Nash et al., 1990).

Virginia and Maryland led the way for negative changes in African-American status in the South. These included prohibitions against education, ownership of weapons, travel, ownership of property, participation in African religious practices, and any legal rights. White Christians attempted to convert them to Christianity, and in 1667, the Virginia legislature passed an act that stated that a person's state of bondage was unaffected by baptism, that is, a Christian slave was still a slave.

Slavery in the Northern colonies started in 1638 in Massachusetts. Slaves in New England had the greatest legal and personal rights including the right to sue their masters. In general, their treatment was relatively mild, and their numbers were quite small. In New York, Pennsylvania, and New

Jersey (the Middle Atlantic states), treatment of slaves was less harsh than in the South, although their slave laws were quite comparable. In New York City, where about 40% of households owned slaves in the early 1700s (Nash et al., 1990), there were occasional slave rebellions, and these were responded to violently by the White militia. Rebellions by slaves occurred in both the North and South during the Colonization period and nearly always resulted in the killing and mutilation of the rebellious slaves.

Owing to growth of the slave trade and the number of Southern plantations, the number of African slaves in the South grew dramatically during the Colonization period. What kept the Africans spiritually alive, even thriving? The answer can be found in three interconnected themes that emerge in the various histories of this period: (a) hope of freedom, (b) family life, and (c) religion. Regarding freedom, most slaves were aware of others who successfully escaped. They knew of many Africans in the South who had legally acquired their freedom from earnings or manumission. Moreover, new slaves from Africa frequently appeared, who reminded them of an alternative life to slavery.

Family life was the norm for all slaves, including marriage and child rearing. It was an "after work hours" life that was encouraged by the slave owners because families provided inducements to be compliant and to not escape. Family life was not respected by the owners who readily split up families to sell any slaves as needed or desired. But bringing new children into the world is inherently hopeful, and in the case of slaves, embodied hopes for freedom.

Religious life was a major feature of all the cultures from which the African slaves descended. In the highly segregated plantations, they could maintain their old religious practices. When Christianity was forced on them, this produced a merger of the African traditions with the new religion (Berry & Blassingame, 1982). The figures of Moses and Jesus became central to their world view: Moses to lead them to the promised land (freedom) in this life, and Jesus to lead them to the promised land in the next.

In the second period of American history, 1770 to 1825 (Revolution and Consolidation), essentially nothing positive changed for the Southern slaves. Their numbers increased dramatically, in part because cotton became a highly viable crop "requiring" more slaves, and in part because the White agricultural population expanded in the Southwest. The African slave trade in the United States was officially abolished in 1808. After that date, many slaves were smuggled into the South, but the majority of slave traffic was from slaveholders on the East coast to the cotton plantation owners farther west.

Ironically, one of the first men killed in the Boston Massacre of 1770 was Crispus Attucks, a runaway slave from Framington, Massachusetts (Berry & Blassingame, 1982). At the conclusion of the Revolutionary War most of the

Northern states started to end slavery, and two of the Southern states, Virginia and North Carolina, passed laws encouraging slave owners to emancipate their slaves. By 1820, all the Northern states except New York and New Jersey had abolished slavery, but none of the Southern states, who depended economically on the slaves, did so. Despite the strong White anti-slavery sentiment in the North, there was still strong White racism. The abolitionists generally were not interested in promoting racial integration. Many believed equality was impossible owing to the scientifically "proven" inherent inferiority of the Africans. As a consequence of these attitudes, various "colonization" societies were formed whose goal was to help Blacks return to Africa. Most, but not all, Blacks opposed this view.

The life of the free Blacks improved after the Revolutionary War, especially for those in the North, where slavery was rapidly declining. Many of them moved to towns and cities where they lived in segregated neighborhoods. They formed mutual-benefit organizations to help other free Blacks get work, housing, food, and perhaps most importantly, education. Schools were nearly always segregated in the North and the South, but they received more private White support in the North, including money and teachers. Of equal importance to the mutual-benefit societies was the establishment of "African" Baptist and Methodist churches independent of the White religious hierarchy. The Black ministers became both religious and secular leaders of their communities. Many Southern Whites opposed these churches for fear that antislavery ideas would be promoted, and periodically broke up religious meetings (Harding, 1981; Meier & Rudwick, 1976).

This historical period came to a close with the Missouri Compromise of 1820. The nation had been rapidly expanding to the West, and Northern Congressmen wanted to prevent the spread of slavery. Maine and Missouri had both applied for statehood in 1820, and the following compromise was reached: Maine would be admitted as a free state, Missouri as a slave state, but no other states north of latitude $36^{\circ}30'$ would be admitted as a slave state (Missouri itself was north of that line). Thus, the strong conflicts between Northern and Southern states on the issue of slavery were put on hold.

The next period, Expansion and Civil War (1825-1865), saw further movement toward the regionalization of slavery, leading eventually to war. By 1830, Northern states abolished slavery. The slave population increased from approximately $1\frac{1}{2}$ million in 1820 to 4 million in 1860, and free Blacks increased during the same period from about $\frac{1}{4}$ million to $\frac{1}{2}$ million. The latter were evenly divided between the North and the South (Nash et al., 1990).

Three events occurred in the early 1830s that had powerful effects on the treatment of Southern slaves and Black free people: Nat Turner's Insurrection (1831); the founding of the first antislavery society (1833); and England's abolition of slavery (1833). Nat Turner was a religious and highly regarded slave in Virginia. During a deep session of prayer, he received a

message from God telling him to slay his enemies, the White slaveholders. He organized a group of slaves and free Blacks and killed all the Whites (55 in all) they encountered, including the husband, wife, and children of the family who owned him (Harding, 1981).

In 1833, William Lloyd Garrison, a White editor of an abolitionist newspaper, along with several other Northern Whites and Blacks, founded the American Antislavery Society. This group and allied organizations heavily propagandized state and federal legislative bodies to abolish slavery.

Finally, although relations between England and the United States were frequently tense, Americans often looked toward the mother country with admiration. In 1833, England abolished slavery from all its colonies, which included the nearby West Indies. (Slavery had been abolished in England in 1772.)

Owing to these events, and the preexisting White slaveholders' fears about rebellion, the noose tightened considerably around Southern African Americans' necks. Most states passed laws prohibiting manumission of slaves, thus discouraging their hopes of freedom. Regarding free Blacks, unrestricted movement within the home state was limited and movement between states was prohibited. They could not serve on juries or give testimony against Whites. Many states imposed an evening curfew on group meetings. Some states required the attendance of at least one White person at both religious and nonreligious gatherings of Blacks. Legal ownership of weapons was hindered and consorting with slaves was strongly discouraged. Free Blacks convicted of crimes received more severe punishment than Whites, and those convicted of vagrancy or who were unable to pay their debts were occasionally sold into slavery.

Although conditions for the African Americans in the North were less restrictive than for those in the South, they were discriminated against by Whites in nearly all areas of life. They were not allowed to join state militias or the army. Even when the Civil War broke out in 1861, they could not volunteer. The navy, short on recruits, did accept them, and Blacks accounted for about one fourth of its size. In 1863, Blacks were allowed to join the army and served with distinction. Virtually none, however, were permitted to become officers.

Free Blacks had few political rights. By the 1840s, they were disenfranchised from the majority of Northern states except New York and New England. Most of the "Old Northwest States" (e.g., Ohio, Indiana, Illinois) passed laws in the 1840s prohibiting African Americans from immigrating into their territory. However, free Blacks organized suffrage societies and state and national conventions directed toward combating discrimination and attaining equal rights.

Not only were Northern Blacks discriminated against in the political arena, but they suffered job discrimination, education discrimination, and

discrimination in housing, transportation, and public accommodations such as hotels and restaurants. Regarding jobs, for example, many leading White abolitionist business owners refused to hire well-qualified Blacks. Generally, new White immigrants from Europe were given preferential job treatment. Race riots against Blacks occurred in most major cities, predominantly by lower income Whites. Public transportation was typically segregated, and hotels and restaurants who catered to Whites refused to accommodate Blacks. Schools were nearly always segregated, and until the 1850s, many Northern states refused to fund public education for Blacks. The theme of colonizing Blacks elsewhere was still strong in this period. Lincoln himself held these views at about the time of his election to the Presidency.

On the positive ledger, Northern Blacks were relatively free. They ran their own churches and businesses, formed independent antislavery societies, founded newspapers and journals, created organizations to assist fugitive slaves, and received charters from England for fraternal organizations such as the Masons and the Odd Fellows (Northern Whites refused to extend membership to Blacks). Many leaders emerged during this period through these activities and organizations. Some were ex-slaves, such as Frederick Douglass and Sojourner Truth. They were dynamic, impassioned, and gifted with either the written or spoken word. David Walker's *Appeal*, a 76-page pamphlet written in 1829, and Martin Delaney's *Condition*, published in 1852, are two of the most powerful works in the tradition of Black protest (Harding, 1981).

At the beginning of the next period, Reconstruction, World War I, and Suffrage (1865-1920), Lincoln was assassinated and replaced by Andrew Johnson from Tennessee. Johnson was much more sympathetic to the Southern White plantation owners than to the ex-slaves, and indirectly supported efforts of the former to reinstate Black servitude in the South. Over Johnson's vetoes, Congress passed both the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Reconstruction Act of 1867. These Acts brought a light into the South that lasted for 10 years, and was not to return for another 90 years (Nash et al., 1990).

Southern Blacks (95% of whom were ex-slaves) were mainly interested in economic independence, education, religious freedom, legal protection (nearly always against the Whites) and the right to vote. Regarding economic independence, African Americans were primarily farmers. They had been promised by General Sherman the opportunity to buy, at reasonable cost, 40 acres of land. Few plantation owners (all had their land legally returned to them) agreed to sell. As a consequence, almost all the rural ex-slaves worked as "sharecroppers" or moved to Southern cities, and continued their economic dependence on Whites. The only post-Reconstruction change in this pattern occurred in the 20th century, when substantial numbers of Blacks moved to Northern cities. In 1920, however, about 85% of all African Americans still lived in the South (Meier & Rudwick, 1976).

Perhaps the most long-lived positive change was in educational opportunities. Immediately after the war, both volunteer and government sponsored Northerners (nearly all were White) came south and opened schools for the Blacks. These continued throughout and beyond Reconstruction and were augmented by funds from state legislators for public education. Essentially all southern schools were racially segregated (as were those in the North), and those for Blacks were usually the most impoverished. Many Black leaders and White Northern supporters felt that education of African Americans should be under the control of other African Americans. But few of the latter had the educational background to teach. As a consequence, wealthy Northerners between 1865 and 1870 paid for the establishment of a number of Black colleges in the South, including Hampton Institute, Fisk, Atlanta, and Morehouse. These continue to be influential institutions at present (Berry & Blassingame, 1982).

After the Civil War, religious freedom increased enormously for the ex-slaves. Membership in the Negro Baptist church and the African Methodist Episcopal church more than doubled. No longer were the African Americans restricted by White overseers. They could now openly select their own ministers and freely organize their own services. The church became an even more central part of their lives than it had been before the war. This centrality exists into the present, with many Black leaders including Elijah Muhammad, Martin Luther King, and Jesse Jackson, having been trained in the ministry (Nash et al., 1990).

Congressional Reconstruction required that African Americans participate in the development of new state constitutions for the ex-slave states, as well as giving the ex-slaves the right to vote. In South Carolina and Mississippi, Blacks made up the majority of the population. In the subsequent voting, Blacks were elected to public office in all the Southern states. Two men were elected as United States Senator from Mississippi; 14 were elected from various states to the House of Representatives. None were elected governor, but many were elected as lieutenant governor, secretary of state, or state treasurer. Blacks held a very large number of local offices. However, in the presidential election of 1877 a compromise was reached between Northern and Southern congressmen, which selected Rutherford B. Hayes as president and formally ended Reconstruction. Gradually, but completely, over the next 20 years, Blacks became disenfranchised in the South. The light was extinguished. Jim Crow laws were passed in all these states that made it legal to discriminate against Blacks. State and federal courts upheld these laws (Berry & Blassingame, 1982; Meier & Rudwick, 1976).

The Ku Klux Klan was founded in 1866 with the support of all Southern White social strata. Organized and spontaneous violence against Southern African Americans rapidly became the norm. Race riots in all Southern cities occurred, often with the overt support of the police or elected officials.

There appears to have been an economic basis for this violence—Blacks and Whites frequently competed for the same jobs—but also many Whites felt the ex-slaves had to be reminded of their "correct" place in society. There was nothing that African Americans could do to prevent the violence, and little to protect themselves. Fear and intimidation became a way of life for many of them (Shapiro, 1988).

Prior to the end of this historical period, two important Black-oriented national organizations were founded. In 1909, under the leadership of W.E.B. DuBois, the NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People) was established to enhance the civil and political equality of African Americans. In 1911, the National Urban League, under the influence of Booker T. Washington, was established to improve employment opportunities for African Americans. These organizations have continued to be influential in both the Black and White communities into the present.

In the next period, Prosperity, Depression, and World War II (1920–1945), Black migration to the Northern cities continued. It slowed during the Depression years, which were devastating for everyone, especially for Black skilled workers. Migration then accelerated during World War II when the demand for workers in defense industries increased (Berry & Blassingame, 1982; Nash et al., 1990). By the end of World War II, approximately 25% of African Americans lived in the North.

The 1920s brought with it a flowering of Black artists, musicians, and writers, which has been referred to as the Harlem Renaissance (Aptheker, 1971; Meier & Rudwick, 1976). Centered in New York City initially, there was a tremendous outpouring of African-American creativity. What was new about this was the magnitude of White support, both in terms of patronage and media commitment. The music and literature of this period especially have been incorporated into American culture and continue to be influential today.

The Harlem Renaissance could not mask the extensive segregation and discrimination in the North and the South against African Americans. There was no lessening of discrimination in housing, civil liberties, education, treatment in the armed forces, and, until midway into the war, employment. Regarding jobs in the 1920s, all the major unions refused to allow Black membership. In the 1930s, the CIO unions accepted large numbers of African Americans, partly because of idealism, but also because of pressure from the creation of independent Black unions and competition from the AFL unions, which excluded Blacks until the 1940s.

During the early part of the war, defense industries discriminated against Blacks. But in response to a threatened protest march in Washington, D.C., led by A. Philip Randolph (a Black editor, writer, and union organizer) and to pressure from other Black leaders and Eleanor Roosevelt, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802, requiring equal employment opportu-

nities for African Americans. President Roosevelt also brought into the government, at subcabinet levels, a small number of African-American men and women. The New Deal created many federal jobs, which Blacks in increasing numbers came to hold. This trend continued and today a high proportion of federal jobs are held by Blacks (Berry & Blassingame, 1982; Meier & Rudwick, 1976; Nash et al., 1990).

There was one positive outcome of segregated housing in Northern cities—increased political influence. This was especially true in Chicago, which had a large segregated population. In 1928, African Americans there elected the first Black member to Congress anywhere in the United States since 1901. Chicago is composed of many voting districts, and local political jobs are controlled by the leaders of those districts. The same pattern exists in nearly all large Northern cities with similar positive results for the African Americans in districts where they were in the majority (Meier & Rudwick, 1976).

Somewhat related to the growth of Black political influence in the North were the widespread and effective activities of the NAACP. They were heavily involved in a large number of cases dealing with African-American civil and political rights. Its most famous case in the 1920s involved the defense (by attorney Clarence Darrow) of Dr. Ossian Sweet, a physician in Detroit, who was accused of murdering a member of a mob threatening his home and family. Dr. Sweet's acquittal by an all-White jury sitting before a White judge in a racially inflamed city was a victory for everyone. In the 1930s, the NAACP became increasingly controlled by African Americans, both in the office and in the courtroom. This trend continues to the present time (Shapiro, 1988).

Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, a number of major African-American leaders urged Blacks to pursue the course of separatism, Black nationalism, and Pan-Africanism. These included Marcus Garvey (who founded the Universal Negro Improvement Association), W.E.B. DuBois (who organized five national and international Pan-African conferences between 1919 and 1945), and W. D. Fard (who established the Nation of Islam, or the Black Muslims). Although these were very diverse groups, they held in common the belief that equal treatment by Whites in the United States was unlikely to occur. They argued that Blacks would benefit the most by joining forces with each other both here and abroad to obtain the rights and privileges that all humans deserved. Some members encouraged colonization in Africa—DuBois himself emigrated there shortly before his death. Others encouraged unofficial or official separatism here. The issue of integration versus separatism has not disappeared in contemporary African-American dialogue, although few Blacks seriously suggest emigration to Africa (Berry & Blassingame, 1982).

In the last period, Postwar Growth and Change (1945 to the present) substantial gains in justice, equality, and self-determination occurred for Af-

frican Americans. These gains primarily came about through the continued activities of the NAACP in the courts, through commitment to social change by Presidents Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson, and through Black activism, frequently supported by White participants. It can be argued that the most central factor, directly or indirectly, in continued positive changes for African Americans was their ability to elect public officials.

Three of the signal events in the 1940s were the start of racial integration in professional sports (Jackie Robinson broke the color line in baseball in 1947), President Truman's barring race discrimination in federal agencies, and his desegregation of the military by executive order in 1948. The impact of military desegregation was profound; moreover, it was further enhanced 3 years later when integrated combat units were sent to Korea. The military academies started accepting African Americans and the number of senior Black officers started to increase. From the 1960s to the present the military engaged in two more wars with Black and White servicemen performing equivalently (Berry & Blassingame, 1982; Nash et al., 1990). Even though the percentage of Black officers is still lower than that of Whites, one of the recent chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, is an African American.

Three of the most important events of the 1950s were the decision by the Supreme Court in 1954 banning school segregation, the successful bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama, led by Rosa Parks and Martin Luther King, Jr., in 1955 (about 1 year later, the Supreme Court banned bus segregation), and the Congressional Civil Rights Act of 1957, which further guaranteed voting rights. Black activists and White supporters coordinated their efforts to get these laws implemented. Many White Southerners, including elected officials, often violently resisted these changes. Integration of public transportation occurred relatively rapidly. Integration of Southern schools, including colleges and universities however, came very slowly; for example, in 1962, only 8% of Black children attended integrated schools (Berry & Blassingame, 1982; Meier & Rudwick, 1976; Nash et al., 1990).

Voting rights in the South came slowly. However, the congressional Voting Rights Act of 1965 suspended literacy and other voter tests. In conjunction with voter registration drives by Black and White activists, this law dramatically increased the pool of Black voters. As a consequence, the number of elected Black officials in the South rose enormously, for example, from 72 in 1965 to more than 1,600 in 1974. This trend continued through the 1970s and 1980s, where an African American was elected Governor of Virginia. In both the North and the South, African Americans were elected mayors of our largest cities and won seats in the U.S. House of Representatives (Meier & Rudwick, 1976).

African Americans continued to migrate to Northern and Western cities during the 1950s and 1960s. By 1970, and to the present, only slightly more

than 50% of African Americans live in the South. These population movements had little effect on a persistent civil rights problem—contact with the criminal justice system. Blacks are arrested more frequently than Whites, are sentenced to prison more frequently, and serve longer sentences. There are relatively few African-American police officers, district attorneys, judges, or prison officials. Berry and Blassingame (1982) pointed out that urban riots have often been triggered by real and perceived police brutality toward Blacks. The 1992 riots in Los Angeles are consistent with this view, as are the 2001 riots in Cincinnati.

The decades of the 1950s and 1960s involved the peak of Black activism. Two important themes, for the present purposes, characterize this period: separation versus integration and violent versus nonviolent methods of achieving African-American goals. To some extent, both themes became transformed into a single theme involving Black political power, Black pride, and Black nationalism. Over the long term, the assassinations of Malcolm X in 1965 and Martin Luther King in 1968 probably contributed to the decline of a strategy of violence. The election to public office of African Americans indicated that Black activism could be directed more toward voting and less toward protest. Black nationalism emphasizes the connection that African Americans have a bond with one another through a positive common heritage. A major goal of Black nationalism is defined as a pluralistic society rather than a melting pot, with differences between groups being valued (Berry & Blassingame, 1982; Meier & Rudwick, 1976).

The subtitle of Vincent Harding's 1981 book, *There Is a River*, is *The Black Struggle for Freedom in America*. The struggle continues today, reflected in the socialization experiences of young African-American boys and girls. They have to be ever vigilant and have to continue to fight for rights that have not yet been attained. But the history of African Americans, especially that of the post World War II period, indicates that ultimately, they will succeed.

BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION

The psychologist Kenneth B. Clark prepared a report in 1950 for the Mid-Century White House Conference on Children and Youth called "The Effects of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality Development in Children." This report and other social science studies were extensively relied on by the U.S. Supreme Court for its 1954 decision in the case, *Brown v. Board of Education*. The justices noted that so-called "separate but equal" public education facilities were inherently unequal when the segregation was based on race. They maintained that such racial segregation denoted "inferiority," which affected African-American children's motivation to learn. When segregation was sanctioned by law, it tended to "retard the educa-

tional and mental development of Negro children." Therefore the segregated children were being "deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." Such segregation in public education was ruled by the court as unconstitutional.

In 1955, Clark revised his White House paper, which appeared as the book, *Prejudice and Your Child*. In 1963, the book was enlarged to include several appendixes related to the Supreme Court decision, leaving intact the 1955 material. What follows is my brief summary of those aspects of the book dealing with the research carried out by Clark and others concerned with the development of racial self-image.

The starting point for Clark's research, which he began in the late 1930s with his wife, Mamie Clark, was their conviction that Negro and White children (Clark's words) "learn social, racial, and religious prejudices in the course of observing, and being influenced by, the existence of patterns in the culture in which they live" (Clark, 1963, p. 17). How do these American cultural patterns affect the racial awareness and racial preferences of African-American children? The Clarks initially studied this question with 3- to 7-year-olds using the "dolls" test. The children were presented with four identical dolls, with the exception that two were brown and two were white. The children were asked by the African-American experimenter to identify the "White doll," the "colored doll," and the "Negro doll." More than 75% of 4- and 5-year-olds living in both the North and the South correctly identified the "races" of the dolls. This percentage increased with increasing age.

Clark pointed out that African-American children whose skin color is indistinguishable from that of White people showed a delayed ability to reliably identify the dolls. However, by age 5 or age 6 the majority of these children made correct social identifications, that is, that African-American dolls were brown, and White dolls were white, despite the fact that they themselves had "white" skin color. Clark concluded that racial awareness developed in African-American children as young as age 4. He noted that other researchers found parallel results with White children.

The Clarks additionally asked the African-American children to point to the doll "which is most like you." Overall, approximately two thirds of the children were correct, the percentage increasing with increasing age: 37% of 3-year-olds and 87% of 7-year-olds chose the brown dolls. Again, children with light skin color had more difficulty with this task than the darker children. Thus, there are close parallels between the development of racial awareness and racial identification.

The Clarks then went on to study racial preferences of African-American children. The researchers asked the following four questions:

1. Give me the doll that you like to play with.
2. Give me the doll that is the nice doll.

3. Give me the doll that looks bad.
4. Give me the doll that is a nice color. (Clark, 1963, p. 23)

They found that the majority of children of all ages preferred the white doll to the brown one. Other researchers have found comparable white-to-brown-doll preferences for White children. Clark concluded that the self-rejection of African Americans as indicated by their preference to be White "reflects their knowledge that society prefers White people" and their acceptance of this racial attitude.

What are the personal and emotional consequences of racial self-rejection by African-American children? The Clarks carried out another experiment, called the "coloring test." They reported both objective and more impressionistic or clinical data in this research. Children were given a sheet of paper with drawings of familiar "things" such as a leaf, an apple, a boy and a girl, along with a box of crayons. The children were asked to color all the things except the boy and girl. Only the 5- to 7-year-olds consistently used the correct colors in this task. The researchers then asked these children to color the same-sex drawing "the color that you are" and to color the opposite-sex drawing the color they liked little children to be. All the light-skinned African-American children colored the same-sex drawing with a white or yellow crayon, and 15% of the medium or dark-brown children did the same or used a bizarre color like red or green. When asked to color the opposite-sex child, 48% of all these children chose brown, 37% chose white, and 15% chose an irrelevant color. These results were generally consistent with the dolls test and indicated racial self-rejection.

Were there differences between African-American children from the North and South? Yes, dramatic ones. About 80% of the Southern children, but only about 36% of the Northern children colored their preferences brown. Moreover, Southern children rarely used bizarre colors, but 20% of the Northern children did so. Additionally, only 20% of Northern children, but 82% of Southern children spoke to themselves or to the researcher as they worked, indicating guardedness by the Northerners. Finally, none of the Southern children, but some (no percentages are given) of the Northern children were very distressed by this task, for example, crying or refusing to finish the task without coaxing.

What do these numbers and observations mean? Clark believed that the Northern African-American children actually had a psychologically healthier reaction to the inner conflict between whom they were racially and whom the society valued. Their preference for white over brown, choice of bizarre colors, relative silence during the task, but intermittent emotional upheaval indicates that they did not willingly accept a devalued racial identification. The acceptance of a brown racial status by the Southern children indicated an acceptance of an "inferior social status." In the dolls task, for

example, some of the Southern African-American children would point to the brown doll and say "This one. It's a nigger. I'm a nigger" (Clark, 1963, p.45).

Clark (1963) concluded this section of the book with the following powerful statement regarding the implications of his research:

As minority-group children learn the inferior status to which they are assigned and observe that they are usually segregated and isolated from the more privileged members of their society, they react with deep feelings of inferiority and with a sense of personal humiliation. Many of them become confused about their own personal worth. Like all other human beings they require a sense of personal dignity and social support for positive self-esteem. Almost nowhere in the larger society, however, do they find their own dignity as human beings respected or protected. Under these conditions, minority-group children develop conflicts with regard to their feelings about themselves and about the value of the group with which they are identified. Understandably they begin to question whether they themselves and their group are worthy of no more respect from the larger society than they receive. These conflicts, confusions and doubts give rise under certain circumstances to self-hatred and rejection of their own group. (pp. 63-64)

DEVELOPMENT OF ETHNIC IDENTITY

In this section, four predictions are made based on the cultural/historical dominance of Whites over all other racial/ethnic groups in the United States. First, owing to the high status of Whites relative to that of other racial/ethnic groups, self-esteem in all races should be more highly related to White cultural behaviors and values than to the behaviors and values of their own races. Second, owing to their self-perceived lower status, Blacks and other minorities should be more likely to adopt White cultural behaviors and values than the converse. Third, Blacks and other minority groups should acquire knowledge of White cultural norms prior to Whites' acquisition of knowledge of minority cultural norms. Fourth, owing to the higher status of Whites than that of other racial/ethnic groups, with increasing age, race prejudice and discrimination should diminish on the part of minority groups more than on the part of Whites.

In the preceding section, from a psychological viewpoint, the central argument of the Clarks was that identification by Black children with a minority group having an inferior status leads to deep feelings of inferiority and a sense of personal humiliation. The Clarks base this conclusion on both qualitative observations of racial conflict among Black children and by the children's systematic identification with and preference for White dolls over Black ones. However, it is possible that direct measures of self-esteem

may not confirm this conclusion. That is, Black children may identify with and prefer White dolls or pictures more than Black ones, and *not* have a low self-esteem. This, of course, is not to suggest that racial bias is to be exonerated as a societal ill, either in its own right or in relation to prejudice and discrimination.

What do the data show? Overall, in studies carried out both before and after the start of the civil rights movement and passage of civil rights legislation in 1964, for both children and adolescents, there is no systematic relationship between measures of self-esteem and measures of racial preference or ethnic identity (Aboud, 1988; Cross, 1987; Phinney, 1990). That is, children and adolescents may have high or low self-esteem and either positively or negatively value their own ethnic group. This is a surprising result, counter to the Clarks' conclusions, and apparently counter to the prediction that Black self-esteem will be positively related to White cultural values and behaviors. How is it explained?

Let us first start with some definitions. Racial groups and ethnic groups are not equivalent. In the United States, they do tend to covary, for example, African Americans, Chinese Americans, Indian Americans do form racial/ethnic groups. But Jewish Americans, Greek Americans, and Italian Americans are all White and often indistinguishable physically. In Canada, French Canadians and English Canadians look alike, but form distinct ethnic groups. It is helpful to remember that many of these different groups of European "Whites" were once meticulously distinguished as "races," with identifiable physical traits that were overlooked in the presence of the large, unintegrated population of African Americans. Recent research in the United States usually compares different racial/ethnic groups with each other or with Whites as a whole. The ethnic groups chosen are primarily the subordinated minority groups, especially African Americans, of whom race and ethnicity equally define them.

Nearly all writers in this field offer definitions of ethnic groups. Rothram and Phinney's (1987) definition captures the essential features of the concept. An *ethnic group* is "any collection of people who call themselves an ethnic group and who see themselves sharing common attributes" (p. 12). Note that race and minority status are not relevant to the definition. *Ethnic awareness* refers to a person's ability to make distinctions between different racial/ethnic groups. *Ethnic identity* goes beyond this. It refers to one's sense of belonging to an ethnic group and acquiring its behavior patterns. Thus, being Jewish American, or African American, or Japanese American does not automatically place an individual in an ethnic group, though others may do so. If the person does not have a sense of belonging, and does not share behavior patterns characteristic of a particular ethnic group, then the person does not identify as a member of that group. However, that person may certainly be aware of the existence of different ethnic groups. *Ethnic*

preference refers to an individual's valuing or preferring one racial/ethnic group over others. The preferred group is not necessarily the individual's racial/ethnic group.

Ethnic awareness is typically measured by presenting children with dolls or pictures depicting different racial/ethnic groups and asking them to point to the picture/doll of a specific group, for example, White, Native American, Black, Chinese. Another technique involves presenting children with three pictures of people, two from the same racial/ethnic group and one from another group. The children are asked to choose the two who are most similar. Ethnic identity is typically measured by showing children dolls or pictures depicting different racial/ethnic groups and asking them to point to the doll/picture that most looks like them. Ethnic preference is typically measured the way the Clarks did as described in the previous section. Children are shown pictures or dolls representing different ethnic groups and they are asked questions about which doll they'd like to play with, which is the nicest, and so forth. We defer discussing research dealing with ethnic preference until the next chapter on the development of prejudice.

Rotheram and Phinney (1987) and Beuf (1977) each hypothesized three stages in the development of children's ethnic identity. The following is a synthesis of their views. In the first stage, which characterizes most groups of 3- and 4-year-olds, children have little awareness of racial/ethnic differences. In the second stage, ages 4 to 6 years, most Black and White children show accurate ethnic awareness, but Native Americans, Chinese Americans, and Mexican Americans do not. White children tend to acquire awareness earlier than those of other racial/ethnic groups. Also in this stage, White children demonstrate accurate ethnic identity, but the other North American ethnic groups do not. They typically point to the White doll/picture equally or slightly more frequently than that of their own racial/ethnic group in response to the question, "Which doll (picture) looks like you?" In the third stage, between 7 and 10 years of age, all groups of children demonstrate accurate ethnic identity and have developed an understanding of "racial constancy." Prior to this stage, children believe that they can willfully change their race, or that variations in apparel or hair (e.g., wearing Native-American clothes or a blond wig) produce changes in one's race. White children achieve racial constancy at earlier ages in this stage than other racial/ethnic groups. These findings are consistent with the prediction, based on cultural/historical considerations, that subordinated groups should be more likely to adopt the behaviors and values of dominant group members than the converse. We previously discussed the observation that girls, as members of a subordinate class, attain opposite-sex knowledge before boys do, which supports this hypothesis.

The phenomenon in the second stage in which children of non-White ethnic groups identify with White dolls/pictures rather than their own eth-

nic dolls/pictures has been referred to as "misidentification" (Rotheram & Phinney, 1987). This is a crucial part of the phenomena the Clarks discovered and that formed the basis for their conclusions about Black self-devaluation. We saw that misidentification is unrelated to self-esteem. What does it mean, then?

Beuf (1977), Cross (1987), and G. M. Vaughn (1987) offered similar explanations of this phenomenon. The essential aspects of their models are as follows. The *self-concept* can be viewed as composed of two major components, a social identity and a personal identity. One's social identity includes all the various social groupings, including ethnic groups, that a child is aware of and to which he or she belongs. To a large extent, the social structure of a society, which includes devaluation of certain minority groups, determines the social groupings of which children are aware. In developing one's own social identity, children make comparisons between attributes of those groups of which they are aware, and locate themselves as members of some of the groups. Thus, minority children learn they are members of ethnic groups devalued by the majority culture. A child's personal identity includes all the attributes that she or he notes in making interpersonal comparisons with other individuals he or she is in contact with. This includes beliefs, emotional states, skills, interpersonal competence, and self-esteem. Hence, one can acquire high self-esteem but identify with a devalued minority group.

When minority children in the second stage are asked who they look like, and then point to the White doll/picture, Beuf (1977), Cross (1987), and Vaughn (1987) argued that the children are not interpreting the question as one of personal identity, but rather one of preferred social identity. These authors maintain that children in the second stage know who the most highly valued group is (Whites). Because they believe that race is a fluid category, it can be changed at will. Hence, their pointing to the White doll/picture reflects that belief and their desire to be part of a highly valued group. In the third stage, children no longer misidentify their ethnicity. That is because they have acquired racial constancy, which is parallel to other attainments in the stage of concrete operations (Piaget, 1971). They now accept their membership in a particular ethnic group because that membership can not be willed or wished away.

A critical feature of being a member of an ethnic group, especially from the viewpoint of prejudice and discrimination, is that one has acquired patterns of behaviors, beliefs, and feelings that distinguish ingroup from outgroup members. In that groups differ in a large number of ways, the question must be answered, "Which ways are most central?" Drawing from an extensive survey of anthropological and social psychological literature, Rotheram and Phinney (1987) identified four dimensions that capture the essential types of social rules involved with structuring ingroup interper-

sonal interactions. These can be construed as behavioral badges that can be used to identify group members. The four dimensions are as follows:

1. An orientation toward group affiliation and interdependence versus an individual orientation emphasizing independence and competition.
2. An active, achievement-oriented style versus a passive accepting style.
3. Authoritarianism and the acceptance of hierarchical relationships versus egalitarianism.
4. An expressive, overt, personal style of communication versus a restrained, impersonal, and formal style. (p. 22)

Thus, individuals who differ substantially from the behavioral norms of a group on any of these dimensions are likely to experience conflicts with that group, for example, a person has an active, achievement-oriented style but the group she or he is interacting with has a norm of passive acceptance. This was clearly seen in Maccoby's (1988, 1990) discussion of the varying degrees of group affiliation of male and female members. Presumably, ethnic groups that differ on two or more dimensions will experience considerable conflict with each other. One major consequence of this intergroup conflict is a confirmation of boundaries between ingroups and outgroups.

In addition to these four dimensions, other writers, for example, Heller (1987) and Kochman (1987), emphasized differences in language and communication styles as being fundamental to conflicts between different ethnic groups. Heller maintains that members of an ethnic group participate in particular social networks, have access to particular social roles (including various work and play roles), and share resources controlled by the group, for example, certain churches, neighborhoods, or shops. "Shared language is basic to shared identity, but more than that, identity rests on shared ways of using language that reflect common patterns of thinking and behaving, or shared culture" (Heller, 1987, p. 181). Heller argues that language shapes identity formation in two essential ways: It marks the boundary between groups and it carries the meaning of shared experiences. Perhaps the most dramatic cases illustrating Heller's views involve the different languages used by the deaf and the hearing, as described in chapter 3. Different languages keep outsiders out, and reinforce the shared experiences of insiders. Language may be the primary badging mechanism used to define ingroup membership.

Kochman (1987) is in essential agreement with Heller (1987) that certain features of language are "boundary maintaining markers." Members of ethnic groups know these features well and use them to affirm self and others as ethnic group members. In the African-American community, *Black intonation* and *expressive intensity* are two such features. Black intonation is a

speech pattern of rising and falling pitch that is distinctive among Blacks. Blacks who do not use this pattern are often accused of "acting White." Expressive intensity involves a great deal of animation and vitality in speech as opposed to subdued, low-keyed communicative acts. When Blacks talk in the latter manner, they are also accused of "acting White." Other components of Black vernacular speech, especially heard among male adolescents, are "boasting" and "verbal dueling" (Dundes 1973). Both involve a type of sense of humor and self-presentation that are characteristically identified with African Americans.

A study by Rotheram-Borus and Phinney (1990) illustrated how membership in different ethnic groups influences children's interpretations of the same social experience. In that different interpretations lead to different social expectations, it is but a short step to infer that conflict and the consequent boundary marking is a likely outcome. In other words, where social expectations of two ethnic groups differ substantially for any of the four behavioral dimensions, there might likely be conflict based on that type of behavior.

In their experiment, the participants were third- and sixth-grade African-American and Mexican-American boys and girls attending the same ethnically integrated schools. The children were shown eight videotapes of brief social encounters involving same-ethnicity peers that were designed to invoke the four dimensions of cultural variation previously described by the authors (Rotheram & Phinney, 1987). Two of the scenes dealt with the issue of group versus individual orientation, two with attitudes toward authority, two with excessive versus restrained emotionality, and two with active versus passive responses to social situations. After each scene was presented, the children were asked what they would do if they were the principal character in the scene—for example, a female teacher is shown scolding a child because she is disappointed in him. If you were the child, "what would you do?" Children's responses to each scene were coded by the experimenters into three or four different categories. These categories are the measures of social expectations.

The principal findings were as follows. There were relatively few differences in social expectations among Mexican-American and African-American third-graders for any of the four dimensions of cultural variation. However, the two ethnic groups differed considerably in sixth grade. In a sophisticated statistical test that assessed the similarity of responses to same and different ethnic-group children, there were, with few exceptions, well-defined response patterns for all members of each of these two ethnic groups. Generally, Mexican-American sixth graders were more group oriented than African Americans. They also relied more on authorities for solving problems than the latter group. Conversely, African Americans were more emotionally expressive and verbal than Mexican Americans.

Finally, the former group also used more active coping strategies in response to social situations, whereas Mexican-American sixth graders were more willing to accept situations as they were. Rotheram-Borus and Phinney (1990) pointed out that the sixth-grader findings are consistent with other research using adult members of the two ethnic groups.

The just mentioned age-related findings are connected to another important aspect of the development of ethnic *identity-bicultural socialization* (Cross, 1987; Rotheram & Phinney, 1987; Vaughn, 1987). This concept has been implied in much of the preceding discussion, but was conceptualized as minority children identifying with the White majority. The more accurate way to discuss the socialization of ethnic minorities is that they acquire at least two ethnic identifications: those of majority culture and own-group minority culture. It is obvious that in order to be minimally competent in society, one needs to know some of the majority group social rules of that society. Moreover, in North American societies, virtually everyone is exposed to majority culture through television, printed media, and schools. Majority children, on the other hand, have little pressure to acquire knowledge of minority cultures, and often have little exposure to minority groups. Even in integrated settings, social rules are usually determined by the majority culture. This analysis is consistent with the prediction that Blacks and other minority groups should acquire knowledge of White cultural norms prior to Whites' acquiring knowledge of minority cultural norms. We found parallel results regarding the opposite-sex acquisition of knowledge for boys and girls.

Two of the consequences of differential socialization of majority and minority children is that the former readily develop a clear social identity at a relatively early age, and the latter develop at least two social identities, which are occasionally in conflict. This is essentially the "divided consciousness" of African Americans, which W.E.B. DuBois so eloquently described in his, *The Souls of Black Folk* (1903). Thus, there may be confusion among the minority group at early ages that leads to a delayed development of a minority identity. Our previous discussion of the three stages of acquisition of ethnic identity support this view as do the results of the aforementioned study. What further complicates the picture for minority children, however, is that their own ethnic group is devalued by the majority culture. As noted earlier, when race constancy emerges, minority children must identify with this devalued group.

Vaughn (1987) suggested that there are three possible outcomes of the latter phenomenon. Children may accept their group's inferior status, they may fight it, or they may emphasize what is uniquely positive in their ethnic group. It is likely that members of minority groups do all three: the first because of life-long conditioning by the majority culture; and the second and third because ingroup valuing and outgroup devaluing nearly always occur,

and individuals usually strive for a positive self-image. Thus, from Vaughn (1987), one might expect that for minority children and adolescents, after race constancy is acquired, same-race preferences would progressively increase with increasing age. This is counter to the previously stated cultural/historical prediction that as children get older, prejudice and discrimination should diminish more for minority groups than for Whites.

COMPARISONS AMONG THE HISTORIES

In chapter 3, we began our examination of four selected groups with the suggestion that cultural history is a fundamental necessity in the psychological study of prejudice and discrimination of *V.S.* minorities. Prejudice and discrimination, we argued, operates through norms deeply embedded in cultural history. Having now examined the groups individually, we turn to a comparative view, which will allow inferences to be made about the motivations underlying the norms. It is very unlikely, for example, that economic considerations were the major determinants in discriminating against the deaf and mentally retarded, but they may have been operative in the treatment of females and African Americans. Thus, comparisons of histories broaden our perspectives on the cultural bases of prejudice and discrimination.

Comparisons among the four cultural histories will reap another benefit. As is seen, over the time period studied, discrimination and perhaps prejudice has markedly decreased toward each of these target groups. Comparing the four may allow us to make inferences about the factors that underlie the positive changes.

We have seen in preceding chapters that there are four types of causes underlying the development of prejudice and discrimination: genetic/evolutionary, psychological, normative, and power-conflict. Genetic/evolutionary influences are the most stable, and psychological influences, the least. The normative and power-conflict causes are important here because they are intermediate and may change over relatively short historical periods. Moreover, it is in the arena of these normative and power-conflict causes that positive changes may occur and also that intervention can be expected to have a positive influence. In order to obtain an accurate assessment of the normative and power-conflict causes of prejudice and discrimination, it is thus necessary to carry out cultural-historical analyses. Two cautions, however, are to be noted about these analyses for the four target groups: (a) the age groups and content areas considered differ among them, and (b) there is tremendous diversity of experience among members within these target groups.

A number of common features emerged concerning the maintenance of prejudice and discrimination toward these groups. The four groups have always held subordinate positions in the culture. All were initially viewed as

incomplete or inferior, and the specific themes of prejudice and discrimination for each are long-standing rather than recently developed. The dominant groups in the culture have attempted and in many cases continue to attempt to control the sexuality, education, and job opportunities for these target groups.

These four groups were consistently subordinate, but one can imagine alternative scenarios; groups starting in a dominant position and becoming subordinate, for example, conquerors who are overthrown. There have also been groups starting in a subordinate position and becoming members of the dominant group, as was the case with Irish immigrants to the United States in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The present target groups were initially viewed, and to some extent still are, by the dominant culture (i.e., White males), as being inherently inferior, perhaps as handicapped or incomplete. This presumed inferiority was (and to some extent, still is) used as a justification for paternalistic and discriminatory treatment. The dominant groups frequently appealed to and to some extent still appeal to "scientific" evidence to support their beliefs, thus giving the appearance of an objective assessment of inferiority. Consistent with an enduring subordinate status, each history contains long-standing themes of prejudice and discrimination, which get modified, transformed, and replayed over time. Very few new inferiorities that feed into prejudice and discrimination emerge over the course of these histories. An exception to this rule was the transitory linkage between mental retardation and immorality seen in the early part of the 20th century.

As stated, control by the dominant group has often worked by regulating the sexuality, education, employment, and economic opportunities of the subordinate group. Regarding sexuality, regulation and/or prevention were periodically attempted. Public education was typically limited and often prohibited. Job opportunities were controlled through restricting educational opportunities, apprenticeships, and hiring practices. At a conscious level, these controls were exerted because of the presumed inferiority of the target groups. Perhaps at a more unconscious level, the controls ensure that the status quo will be maintained, that the target groups will stay subordinate.

In the 1960s, all target groups and the dominant culture started to come to terms with the general issue of pluralism. Does equality in our culture mean "sameness"? Does "different" imply inferiority or, can there be equality in difference? Individuals and groups have varying strengths and weaknesses. Members of the dominant culture have been slowly acknowledging the "equal but different" and "strengths and weaknesses" arguments, which has led to renewed thinking about prejudice and discrimination.

There are notable differences in the histories. African-American, deaf, and mentally retarded individuals have been consistently stigmatized by the

dominant culture. White females have not, although their "limitations" have been pointed out. Subordinate groups, even as stigmatized groups, have also been regarded for positive moral or psychological qualities—moral innocence, emotional authenticity (e.g., "soul"), sexuality, and innate artistic or musical talent. To the extent that this has led to emulation by the dominant group, it is consistent with the genetic/evolutionary factor of outgroup attractiveness. More so than the other three groups, genuine moral strength and leadership of women have been acknowledged throughout the entire history.

Another set of differences is related to whether the target groups had the capacity for normal functioning according to the norms of the dominant society. Initially, expectations for normalcy applied to the mentally retarded and the deaf. Following the Civil War, a window opened for African Americans, but closed for about 90 years. After World War I, it opened for women. Currently, owing to the recognition of a more expansive and more widely varied view of normalcy, great strides have been made in the inclusion of all but mentally retarded individuals.

Economic competition is one of the major motivations subordinating minority groups, and it has been an operative theme for the subordination of Blacks and females by White males. This motivation seems lacking regarding the deaf and mentally retarded, although economic considerations certainly played a role in their treatment. Deaf and mentally retarded children were stigmatized because of their impairments—their deviation from the norm. Unfortunately, efforts by some parents and well-meaning others to make them "normal" have occasionally sustained the stigmatization.

Regarding change, with the possible exception of limited educational progress for some of the deaf, the histories provide evidence that discrimination (and perhaps prejudice) have markedly declined for all the target groups. Opportunities now exist for members of these groups that could only be dreamed of before World War II. Issues of equality and pluralism are not yet sorted out, nor will they be in the near future.

There appear to be three interrelated factors that together led to changes in discrimination, and perhaps also prejudice, toward all four subordinate groups. These are: (a) self-advocacy by members of the subordinate groups (or by their family) for change; (b) advocacy for change by powerful and/or substantial numbers of the dominant group (i.e., White males); and (c) changes in law either through legislation or executive edict.

Regarding the first factor, self-advocacy, this was clearly seen for Blacks both prior to and after the Civil War, for women, especially after the Revolutionary War, and for the deaf and the mentally retarded, for whom family members urged the development of special schools. The advocacy brought persistent pressure on the dominant culture to change. It was effective because members of the subordinate groups had developed organizational

and leadership skills through the clubs, special interest groups, and churches to which they belonged and participated. There is power in collaboration, as contrasted with individual action, especially if the cause is just.

With the second factor, there have also been powerful and/or substantial numbers of the dominant group who took up the cause of the subordinate groups. They were encouraged by the latter in at least two ways: moral persuasion and political influence. From colonial days onward, there were always members of the dominant groups who felt that prejudice and discrimination were wrong. With efforts by subordinate groups, this sense of "wrongness" became transformed into feelings of obligation to make changes. There may also have been an added inducement in threats to political power; when subordinate groups started to influence voters or marketplace practices, the motivation to change was further strengthened. But many motives for action are always in play, and they have to be weighed before change occurs—for example, feelings of obligation versus anticipation of losing status. During certain periods—in the 1960s, for example—many from the dominant group disavowed the status markers of their class in order to lend alliance to various subordinate groups.

Finally, regarding the third factor, changes in the law had to be made in order for widespread decreases in discrimination to occur. These changes were made by powerful members of the dominant culture aided by, and influenced by the advocacy of members of subordinate groups. School segregation based on race was declared unconstitutional by nine White men of the United States Supreme Court. The case was argued by a Black lawyer from the NAACP. Passage of women's suffrage, racial integration of the armed forces, public education for the deaf and mentally retarded, all came about through changes in the law. And these changes were made by members of dominant groups. Frequently the president of the United States acted alone, as Harry Truman did in racially integrating the armed forces. The federal civil rights laws of the 1960s were an important turning point for all four groups. These groups now had antidiscrimination laws on their side along with high-ranking advocates upholding the laws. Also, they had the courts, which attempted to impartially allow advocates to challenge the ways that the laws were being enforced.

Despite the great progress that has been made, the histories indicate that there is a long way to go to attain the goals of equality and self-determination. But the fact that real progress has occurred gives hope for the future.

SUMMARY

We began our examination of prejudice and discrimination toward African Americans with an overview of its cultural roots. During the first cultural! historical period, the slavery of African Americans came to be defined as

the fact that they were inheritable bondsmen rather than indentured servants. Prior to the Civil War approximately 90% of African Americans were slaves living in the South, 5% were "free" in the North, and 5% were "free" in the South. But throughout the entire history, freedom for Blacks was never equivalent to that of Whites. For about 10 years after the Civil War, during Reconstruction, an extraordinary window of freedom opened for Southern Blacks. They owned land, attended school, voted, and were elected to state and federal offices. In the ensuing 90 years, Jim Crow laws were enacted, and gains against discrimination were minimal. The major exception was President Truman's racial integration of the armed forces. From the 1960s to the present, African Americans have made substantial progress toward the goals of equality, freedom, and self-determination.

Psychological research, especially that carried out by Kenneth and Mamie Clark, had a significant impact on the U.S. Supreme Court decision that racial segregation of schools was unconstitutional. Using forced choice methods with different colored dolls, the Clarks found that both White and Black 4- to 7-year-olds reliably identified with the White dolls. Moreover, the children attributed positive characteristics to White dolls, and negative characteristics, to Black dolls. The Clarks concluded that Black but not White children were self-rejecting.

With the Clarks as a starting point, we turned to an examination of the nature of ethnic identity. Research on the development of ethnic identity shows that, counter to the Clarks' assertions, young Black children may negatively evaluate their own ethnic group and still have a high self-esteem. The explanation for this phenomenon is that personal identity and ethnic identity are somewhat independent developmental characteristics. Ethnic groups differ from each other along several fundamental perceptual and behavioral dimensions, including language patterns. We saw that it was on the basis of these fundamental differences that ethnic conflict can arise. Children's development of an ethnic identity follows three stages: (a) awareness of ethnic differences at ages 3 to 4 years, (b) accurate ethnic awareness at 4 to 6 years, and (c) accurate ethnic identity at ages 7 to 10 years. The last stage involves children's understanding of racial constancy.

As in previous chapters, we have sought here to account for the cultural and historical foundation for prejudice and discrimination related to African Americans. Indeed, so central has it been to the course of American culture, the African-American experience has accumulated an almost paradigmatic status for race prejudice and discrimination in general. Our comparative examination of four target groups, however, demonstrated definitive similarities and differences that suggest the overall generality of prejudice and discrimination. The four underlying influences-genetic/evolutionary, psychological, normative, and power-conflict-operate differently and to different degrees within each group. But in each case, domi-

nant groups in the culture have sought to control the sexuality, education, and job opportunities for the subordinate groups. Authoritative evidence, sometimes given the status of "scientific," is employed by the dominant group as evidence of the inferiority of subordinate groups.

Yet, despite the pervasiveness of these norms throughout the culture, there is for each group evidence of steady progress in the decline of prejudice and discrimination. Outspoken and influential advocates from the subordinate group have spoken decisively on behalf of freedom and opportunity and have organized collective activity to exact pressure to bring about social change. And powerful individuals from the dominant society have provided moral persuasion and political influence to bring about structural change.

These threads of similarity have suggested some American cultural norms and influences common to all the groups. But they have also suggested the existence of the underlying psychological basis for prejudice and discrimination that transcends particular circumstances. In the next chapter, we turn to the psychological development of race prejudice and discrimination, giving due attention to the genetic/evolutionary and cultural! historical components that we believe are its underlying influences.

Race Prejudice and Discrimination

This chapter examines race prejudice and discrimination, following the thread of cultural history from chapter 6 to a consideration here of genetic/evolutionary issues. Mindful of themes common to the other target groups, we look in sequence at race prejudice and then race discrimination. Finally, we close our consideration of the target groups with a comparative assessment of prejudice and discrimination related to each group.

Specifically, this chapter has three goals. The first goal is to evaluate several hypotheses related to the genetic/evolutionary and cultural/historical material previously discussed. These hypotheses will parallel those presented in the previous chapter for opposite-sex prejudice. The second goal is to summarize as accurately as possible the literatures dealing with the development of prejudice and discrimination for race/ethnicity, with an emphasis on Black and White racial groups.

As the last in the series of chapters on the development of prejudice and discrimination in the target groups, this chapter then turns to comparative observations that discern similarities and differences among the groups. Its third goal is thus to integrate the four prejudice and discrimination literatures discussed in the present and previous chapters in order to find common themes in this research.

The shift in this chapter from historical to evolutionary concerns follows the course established in previous chapters, testing hypotheses against contemporary research. In particular, we look at two hypotheses, one more speculative than the other, both based on the genetic/evolutionary material. First, in our evolutionary heritage, adolescent females but not males migrated to other groups and were less involved in intergroup hostility than

males. This suggests that males may be genetically predisposed to form stronger commitments to ingroups, which leads to the prediction that males would develop stronger degrees of prejudice and discrimination than females. This hypothesis was supported for opposite-sex prejudice, and is probably applicable to race prejudice and discrimination. Second, based on the group identity and cognitive development literature, it was predicted that prejudice and discrimination would emerge between the ages of 3 and 4 years and undergo age-related shifts at 7, 10 to 12, 14 to 16, and 18 to 19 years. As with previous comparisons, badging mechanisms that identify racially based behavioral differences should play a role in observed prejudice and discrimination.

Based on cultural/historical considerations, two predictions are made for the prejudice and discrimination literature. First, owing to the higher status of Whites than Blacks, Black children should be more likely to show White preferences than are White children to show Black preferences. Second, owing to the higher status of Whites than other racial/ethnic groups, with increasing age, race prejudice and discrimination should diminish more for minority groups than for Whites.

DEVELOPMENT OF RACE PREJUDICE

Owing to voluminous literature, this chapter emphasizes Black and White racial groups. Fortunately, two excellent reviews of most of this research have been reported by Aboud (1988) and Williams and Morland (1976); we frequently rely on their discussions.

Most of the research carried out since the 1960s with young children has been strongly influenced by the materials and methods developed by Williams and Morland (1976), which they fully describe in their book. Researchers use variants of their two forced choice tests: the Color Meaning Test (CMT) and the PRAM II. In the CMT, children are shown different colored photographs of two animals that are identical except for coloring; one is black and the other white. After the experimenter reads a short story about each of these animals, the child is asked to identify the animal described. For example, "Here are two cats. One of them is a bad cat and scratches on the furniture. Which is the bad cat?" Half the stories depict positive qualities, and half negative qualities. If a child consistently chooses one color for the positive qualities (e.g., black) and the other color for the negative qualities (e.g., white), then the child is assumed to have a color bias (e.g., pro-Black).

In the PRAM II, children are shown photographs of two nearly identical drawings of humans—male and/or female, young and/or old—except that one has a pinkish-tan skin color and the other medium-brown. The chil-

dren are read brief stories about one of the people and asked to make a choice. For example, "Here are two little girls. One of them is an ugly little girl. People do not like to look at her. Which is the ugly little girl?" As with the CMT, half the qualities are positive, and half negative. It is assumed by researchers that consistent pro-White or pro-Black choices reflect racial bias. With older children, a variety of attitude measures have been employed. A frequent measure is the social distance scale. With this scale, participants are asked questions like the following: Would you feel comfortable living next door to a Black family? *Yes, definitely; Yes, probably; I don't know; No, probably; No, definitely.*

As we indicated in chapter 3, there may be serious methodological difficulties stemming from the use of forced choice methods to infer the development of race prejudice. Consistently choosing the "white" over the "black" picture certainly indicates a preference for white over black, but it does not necessarily indicate a rejection of black. For example, I may nearly always prefer chocolate to vanilla ice cream, but in the absence of chocolate, I would readily consume vanilla. In order to overcome the forced choice problems, Aboud and Mitchell (1977) used a continuous measure of how much 6- and 8-year-old White children like their own and three other racial/ethnic groups: Asian, Hispanic, and Native Indian. Generally they like their own group the best, but only slightly more than their next preferred group. The least liked group was rated relatively neutrally, as contrasted with being disliked. Thus, pro-White did not mean anti-non-White. Unfortunately, very few studies of race prejudice (but not race discrimination) have used continuous measures.

In our presentation in chapter 6 of the three-stage model of ethnic identity, we stated that most children show accurate racial/ethnic awareness between 4 and 6 years of age and that White children show accurate ethnic identity in this age range. Children of other racial/ethnic groups do not consistently choose pictures or dolls of their own ethnic group until age 7 or older. Not surprisingly, ethnic preference follows this pattern. Three types of procedures have been used to assess these preferences. In the first, children are given depictions of two or more racial/ethnic groups, including their own, and asked with which children they would most like to play. In the second, they are asked to choose the picture or doll they would most rather be (racial/ethnic self-preference). In the third, with White and Black children, the PRAM 11, CMT, or other attitude measures were employed.

White Children and Adolescents

For ease of understanding, we present findings for White and Black children separately. White children clearly show White ethnic preferences at 4 years of age. The strength of these preferences, in most studies, increases to

about 7 or 8 years, and then either declines or levels off between age 8 and age 12 (Aboud, 1988; Williams & Morland, 1976). At all ages, however, Whites most prefer Whites. Moore, Hauck, and Denne (1984), using a nonforced choice social distance scale, found no decline in race prejudice for adolescents between ages 12 and 16 years, but Williams and Morland (1976), using the evaluative scale of the semantic differential did report a decline for adolescents between 14 and 18 years. Baker and Fishbein (1998) found a decline in prejudice for males and females between the ages of 8 and 17 years with a nonforced choice social distance measure comparable to that of Moore et al. (1984). With a forced choice behavior disposition measure, they found no change in that age range for females, but an apparent increase in prejudice for males. For the latter measure, children and adolescents in Grades 3, 6, 7, 9, and 11 were presented with a sheet of photographs of unfamiliar same-age children, four each of White males, White females, Black males, and Black females. They were asked to select five of the photographs of individuals whom they would like to know better. The age curve for females was relatively flat. For males, the curve was flat for Grades 3, 6, and 7, but far fewer Black adolescents were chosen by the participants in Grades 9 and 11. Instead, the White males in these higher grades selected more White females than their younger schoolmates.

Baker and Fishbein (1998) suggested, following the argument of P. A. Katz et al. (1975), that social desirability may mediate the age-related decline in prejudice when using relatively transparent measures. Also, it is not clear whether prejudice toward Blacks increases or same-race interest increases. Thus, the data do not allow us to conclude whether White prejudice toward Blacks increases, decreases, or stays the same during the junior and senior high school years. It is possible, of course, that the different components of prejudice—beliefs, affect, and behavior dispositions—have different developmental courses (P. A. Katz & Zalk, 1978), but there are not enough data for conclusions to be drawn.

In the beginning of this chapter, two predictions were made based on genetic/evolutionary considerations: Males would be more prejudiced than females and shifts in prejudice would occur at ages 4, 7, 10 to 12, 14 to 16, and 18 to 19 years. Concerning sex differences, Aboud (1988) reviewed the relevant literature for preadolescent children and concluded that there are no reliable or consistent sex differences. However, four studies with adolescents and young college students reached a different conclusion. Moore et al. (1984), with Black and White 12- through 16-year-olds found females to be less prejudiced than males on nearly all measures of prejudice. There were no race-by-sex or grade-by-sex statistical interactions. Baker and Fishbein (1998) found White females in Grades 3, 6, and 7 to be equally or more prejudiced than White males on two measures of prejudice, but on both measures males in Grades 9 and 11 were more prejudiced than fe-

males (no Black students were assessed). Qualls, Cox, and Schehr (1992) tested undergraduates from a nearly all-White liberal arts college (mean age of 19.6 years) on a questionnaire assessing opposite-sex, homosexual, and racial prejudice. They found that females had less racial prejudice than males. Finally, testing only White students, Hoover and Fishbein (1999) found junior and senior high school and college males to be more prejudiced than females on three different measures of prejudice, including against African Americans and two measures of sex-role stereotyping. Thus, it may be concluded that for adolescents, but not necessarily preadolescents, White males express more racial prejudice than White females. This is partially consistent with the genetic/evolutionary hypothesis. It is not clear why this phenomenon does not hold for younger children. One possibility is that the latter have less of a commitment to group norms and identity than do adolescents.

Black Children and Adolescents

We now turn to research concerning the development of racial prejudice in Black children. Aboud (1988), Williams and Morland (1976) and I have reviewed a large number of studies dealing with this issue; most of the studies employed the PRAM or some variant of it. The principal findings are as follows. Black 4-year-olds generally equally prefer Blacks and Whites or show a greater preference for White dolls or pictures. Their pro-White bias usually increases between 4 and 6 years of age. Between the ages of 7 and 10 years, in most studies, Black children develop a positive Black preference. Those children who had previously been pro-White, become racially neutral in their choices, and those who were neutral, become pro-Black. There is some evidence, however, from Semaj's (1980) study that during the age range of 8 to 10 years, pro-Black attitudes decline somewhat. Thus, pro-Black attitudes form a curvilinear relationship with age. Importantly, in studies where researchers have independently assessed attitudes toward White and Black children, as Black children become more pro-Black, their attitudes toward Whites become neutral, as opposed to negative. When taken in conjunction with the White prejudice literature, the combined pattern supports the cultural/historical prediction that Black children are more likely to show White preferences than the reverse.

As with White racial attitudes, the data for Black adolescents are not nearly as extensive as for preadolescents. Moore et al. (1984) reported no age changes in Black racial attitudes between the ages of 12 and 16 years. Williams and Morland (1976) reported that Black attitudes toward Whites became progressively more negative between 14 and 18 years. Patchen (1982) did not report age effects for his senior high school students (presumably, there were none), but stated that only about 11% of these stu-

dents held negative attitude toward Whites. For some attitude categories, for example, *willing to help Blacks, fun to bewith*, Blacks were much preferred to Whites. But for most categories, for example, *starts/fights, are mean, expect special privileges*, Black students perceived both racial groups equivalently. Given the small number of studies as well as inconsistent results, no conclusions can be drawn regarding Black adolescent racial attitudes.

Before turning to the genetic/evolutionary hypotheses, one important study is described, that by Bagley and Young (1988). The authors gave the PRAM II and CMT to preschoolers in Britain, Jamaica, Canada, and Ghana. They found that 4- to 7-year-old Black children of Ghanaian parents living in England, Canada, and Ghana generally had positive Black and negative White biases on both tests. This implies that the positive White biases just reported for other Black children is linked to their being raised by Black parents who themselves were raised in White dominant cultures. Thus, it is not inevitable that Black preschoolers in North America will initially develop positive White, negative Black biases.

Our hypotheses regarding age- and sex-related effects revealed mixed results. For sex differences in prejudice among Black children, the data are inconsistent with younger children and too sparse with adolescents to make an assessment. Regarding age-related changes in prejudice, the literature only supports the first two predicted age shifts (at ages 4 and 7 years). No consistent changes are found for any of the other age periods. At age 4, children develop a positive White racial bias. At age 7 marked changes occur for both Black and White children, which are correlated with the development of race constancy. Aboud (1988) indicated that between the ages of 8 and 12, children of both races shift in their ethnic judgments toward individualization and away from group membership. These shifts are correlated with decreased prejudice. However, the decline in prejudice starts at about ages 7 to 8 years, and hence does not fit into the 10- to 12-year-old age period.

These data also bear on the cultural/historical prediction that with increasing age, race prejudice should diminish more for Blacks than for Whites. When examined along with the findings for White children, the prediction was not supported. Both Black and White children showed a decline in race prejudice between 8 and 12 years, and the results were inconsistent during adolescence.

DEVELOPMENT OF RACE DISCRIMINATION

Basically there are three kinds of research dealing with racial discrimination, one based on observations of behavioral interactions, a second on self-reports of behavioral interactions, and a third based on sociometric ratings.

The sociometric procedures are of two types (Singleton & Asher, 1977). In the first or "best friends" type, children and adolescents are given the names of all their classmates and asked to identify their best friends or those with whom they most prefer playing. In the second-roster and rating-children and adolescents are given the names of all their classmates and asked to rate on a 5- or 7-point scale how much they like to play with or to work with each of them. These two procedures often lead to very different conclusions about racial discrimination. In the behavioral research, the children and adolescents are observed in the classroom, school playground and cafeteria. The researcher notes with whom they are interacting. In the self-report research, the children and adolescents are asked to indicate how frequently they interact with or talk to members of different races and/or opposite sexes. Self-reports are more similar to behavioral observations than to sociometries, and hence are grouped with the former. We first describe the observational research, restricting our discussion to research carried out in the United States.

Behavioral Observations

The earliest three studies concerned with preschool children observed during free play found no systematic relationship between play partner preferences and race (H. W. Stevenson & N. G. Stevenson, 1960, for 2½-year-olds; M. E. Goodman, 1952, for 4-year-olds; and Porter, 1971, for 5-year-olds). However, the sample sizes in these studies were small, and gender preferences were not controlled. Fishbein and Imai (1993) corrected this problem and measured dyadic playmate preferences and behavior patterns of play activities, social involvement, verbalization, and negative acts for all 90 children enrolled in an urban preschool. The behavior patterns were similar for boys and girls and for Black, White, and Asian racial groups. Overall, all groups of children preferred playing dyadically with same-sex classmates. Girls showed a relative preference (to chance expectations) for playing dyadically with same-race, same-sex classmates, and a greater relative avoidance for White boys than either Black or Asian boys. Boys, on the other hand, showed a relative preference for dyadically playing with White-race/same-sex classmates, and least relative avoidance for same-race girls. These results obviously are inconsistent with implications from the racial attitudes literature in that playing with White children would be the preferred choice for both boys and girls. The Fishbein and Imai (1993) results for Black and White playmate preferences were replicated in an independent study carried out by Fishbein, Stegelin, and Davis (1993). There were not enough Asian children in their study to carry out the relevant playmate analyses. Fishbein and Imai (1993) offered an explanation for these findings, which we consider shortly.

Finkelstein and Haskins (1983) observed White and Black kindergarten children during both classroom instruction and playground recess periods in both the fall and spring academic quarters of a single school year. The authors examined four categories of interactions—*group play*, *talk*, *negative*, and *command-and*—and assessed whether observed and chance expectations were significantly different. Comparable measures were made for dyadic interactions. During the fall quarter, both racial groups preferred same-race to other-race contacts (sex differences were not analyzed). These same-race preferences were greater on the playground than in the classroom. In the latter situation, teachers have a strong influence in directing interactions. During the spring quarter, same-race classmate preferences increased in strength, suggesting that children's interracial experiences strengthened their segregation tendencies. The authors proposed, based on their observations, that race-based differences in behavior predispositions underlie the increased segregation. For example, Black and White children differed in how much they used talk, negative behavior, and commands in their interactions. This explanation is consistent with both the argument of Rothram and Phinney (1987) concerning the effects of different ethnic socialization on behavioral predispositions and interethnic conflict, and the role of badging mechanisms in discrimination.

The aforementioned pattern of results is different from those of Fishbein and Imai (1993), in that both Black and White children here preferred same-race playmates. Unfortunately, Finkelstein and Haskins (1983) did not separately examine the four race-by-sex combinations used by Fishbein and Imai. However, in the age range studied, boys overwhelmingly preferred playing with boys, and girls with girls—probably leading to same-race/same-sex preferences. Regarding the "fit" of these results with the prejudice literature, at ages 6 to 7, Black children are shifting to a positive Black bias. Although no attitude measures were taken, it is likely that the same-race behavioral preferences were consistent with changes in racial attitudes.

Another study to observe classmate preferences on the basis of race was carried out by Singleton and Asher (1977) with third-grade children. The observations were made in classroom settings as contrasted with the playground. The authors assessed whether there were race or sex differences in the frequency of children being alone, interacting with the teacher, or interacting with peers. There were no significant effects. The authors also assessed whether there were race or sex differences in the percentage of peer interactions that were positive. With the main exception of Black males having relatively fewer positive interactions with Black peers, there were no appreciable race or sex effects on this measure. Also, there were very strong same-sex preferences, consistent with the two studies just covered. However, inconsistent with both studies, in the present research, females preferred interacting with same-race peers, whereas males showed no racial

preferences. Unfortunately, the authors did not examine preferences on the basis of the four race-by-sex combinations, but it can be assumed that for the girls, preferred interactions were with same-race and same-sex peers.

In the Schofield and Sagar (1977) study, seventh and eighth graders in a newly and voluntarily racially integrated school were observed over the course of 1 year. The focus was on seating arrangements in the school cafeteria. Students' choices were analyzed by sex and race; specifically, relative to chance expectations what were the sex and race of schoolmates sitting next to and directly across from each student? Data analyses did not consider the four race-by-sex combinations. However, the results were very clear. Seating segregation by sex was stronger than by race for both seventh and eighth graders. And, in both grades adolescents significantly preferred sitting next to members of the same race, with females showing a stronger effect than males. The race effects were influenced, however, by students' academic experiences. That is, in seventh grade, where no academic tracking existed, cross-racial seating choices increased over the academic year. In eighth grade, where academic tracking did exist, and which led to increased classroom segregation, same-race seating segregation increased over the academic year.

Schofield and Francis (1982) studied classroom peer interactions in the racially mixed accelerated eighth grade classes from the same school investigated by Schofield and Sagar (1977). The majority of these students had been enrolled for 2 years, but some had newly transferred the year of the study. The race and sex of peers involved in the interaction (the four categories used by Fishbein & Imai, 1993), the tone of the interactions (positive, negative, or neutral), and the orientation of the interactions (task-related or social) were coded. The students overwhelmingly interacted with same-sex peers. The females showed a strong preference for interacting with same-race peers, whereas the males showed no such race preferences. There were no race or sex differences in tone, with all but 1% of interactions being positive or neutral. There were no sex differences in orientation; however, same-race interactions tended to be social in nature, and cross-race ones tended to be task-oriented. The pattern of results from same-race preferences by females but not males is consistent with the classroom results of Singleton and Asher (1977).

Before attempting to pull all these findings together, one additional experiment is presented, that by Damico and Sparks (1986). These authors asked seventh-grade students in two structurally different schools to indicate "how frequently they talked to every other student" in their grade. Their four choices ranged from *a lot* to *never*. This question was not restricted to in-class interactions. One of the schools (no tracking) organized students in teams. Classes were heterogeneous in ability, and substantial in-

class peer interactions were encouraged through cooperative learning activities. The other school (tracking) ability tracked students and used teacher lecture and student recitation instructional methods. Thus, limited in-class peer interactions occurred. The data were organized along the lines of the four race-sex categories previously described. A consistent picture emerged across both types of schools. Students of both races most preferred talking with same-race, same-sex peers. White students next preferred talking with cross-race, same-sex peers, but Black students tended to have their second preference for opposite-sex, same-race peers. All four race/sex groups least preferred interacting with opposite-sex, cross-race peers. Overall, there was less cross-racial interaction in the tracking than no-tracking school.

The principal race-related results of these six studies can be summarized as follows. In free-play or other nonclassroom settings, from kindergarten through Grade 8, males and females prefer interacting with same-race, same-sex peers. In preschool, this is true for females, but males prefer interacting with White males. In classroom settings, in kindergarten through Grade 8, females prefer interacting with same-race peers, and males show little or no racial preference. Thus, there are two issues to be resolved: (a) the shift for Black males in free play settings from preschool to kindergarten, and (b) the discrepancy between classroom and nonclassroom settings.

One plausible interpretation for the first issue follows that proposed by Fishbein and Imai (1993). Briefly there is substantial experimental evidence that children's playmate choices are influenced by two factors: racial status and physical attractiveness. Status can be roughly approximated by scores on tests of racial bias, such as the PRAM II. For preschool age children, Whites have higher status. For older children, same-race children have higher status. It is assumed that males and females evaluate same-race peers as more attractive than other race peers. The research literature shows that physical attractiveness is more important for females than males as a determinant of friendship choice, but is a factor for males, also (Krantz, 1987; G.J. Smith, 1985; Vaughn & Langlois, 1983). In preschool, physical attractiveness outweighs racial status for Black females, but for Black males the opposite occurs. There is no conflict between the two factors for White children. In kindergarten, racial status has shifted for Black children in a positive Black direction, and hence they show a same-race bias, and prefer interacting with Black peers.

One plausible explanation for the classroom/nonclassroom discrepancy also hypothesizes the operation of two factors: sex differences in friendship bonds and the constraints of classroom settings. Schofield and Sagar (1977) and Schofield and Francis (1982) argued that males cast a wider social net than females, owing to their interest in large-group activities as well as competition and dominance striving. Females prefer interacting with

small groups of close friends. Both males and females prefer same-race friendships, but females are more closely bonded to their friends than are males. In classroom settings, the primary social constraint operating is to focus on academic tasks and secondarily, on maintaining friendships. Owing to their stronger bonding to close friends, females, but not males, merge the primary and secondary social constraints and interact most with same-race females. In the absence of an academic task constraint, males also prefer interacting with same-race, same-sex peers.

Self-Reports

The material discussed in this section deals with self-observations by high school students of interracial interactions (Patchen, 1982). Patcheri's study was remarkable in scope in that it included interviews and/or questionnaires with over 5,000 students, 1,800 teachers, and administrators from all 12 public high schools in Indianapolis, Indiana. Unfortunately, Patchen did not report his results by grade, but the sheer numbers of participants minimized that concern. Patchen asked students a number of questions about three categories of behaviors concerned with same versus other race interactions: *interracial avoidance*, *friendly contacts*, and *unfriendly interactions*. For interracial avoidance, the majority of Black and White students reported avoiding sitting near an other-race student at least once during the current semester. About half reported avoiding talking with other-race students, and substantial minorities reported avoiding standing or walking near other-race students. Strong majorities of White and Black students were uninfluenced by race in matters such as attending school events, joining activities, or going to parties. There were essentially no race differences for the interracial avoidance category.

Friendly cross-racial contacts were frequent within the school setting, but much less frequent off campus. Interracial dating and visiting the home of cross-racial peers were very infrequent. About half the students reported never doing things with cross-racial peers outside of school. However, the overwhelming majority reported greeting, having friendly talks, and walking with cross-racial peers in school. The majority reported doing school work with cross-racial peers. There were essentially no racial differences for this category.

For unfriendly interracial interactions, there were substantial differences between the reports of Black and White students, consistent with a badging mechanisms hypothesis of perceived behavioral differences. White students were more likely than Blacks to report being talked to in an unfriendly way, to being called bad names, to being purposely blocked from passing, and to being threatened with bodily harm. There were much smaller disparities in

reports of interracial arguments, pushing, and fighting. These approximated the frequency for same-race reports. Thus, White students perceived themselves as being more threatened by Black students than the converse, but hostile physical contact between the two groups was equivalent.

Patchen (1982) reported race-by-sex correlations for these three categories. In general, Black males and Black females responded similarly, with one small exception-females reported fewer unfriendly contacts than males. For White students, there were more consistent sex differences. Females reported less avoidance, fewer unfriendly contacts, and more positive racial attitudes than did males. In all these cases, the correlations were relatively small. These findings are consistent with the genetic/evolutionary prediction of less female than male prejudice and discrimination.

The Patchen (1982) findings showed a fair amount of interracial wariness among these high school adolescents, especially of the White students. However, friendly acts frequently occurred, primarily in the school setting. Importantly, when students were asked "What kind of experiences you have usually had with other-race people at this high school?," the answers were equivalent for both racial groups: 13% said *not too friendly* or *unfriendly*, 55% said *fairly friendly*, and 32% said *very friendly*. The interracial wariness and friendliness indicated considerable ambivalence in these relationships.

Sociometric Experiments

We now turn to the sociometric experiments. Jarrett and Quay (1984) used both roster-and-rating and best-friends techniques in assessing kindergarten and first-grade playmate preferences in two long-standing integrated schools. Consistent with the research just cited, sex was a more powerful factor than race with both techniques in determining peer preferences for all groups of children. The two sociometric techniques led to very different results regarding racial preferences. With the roster-and-rating method, both Black and White kindergarten and first-grade children had a stronger positive preference for White than Black peers (no analyses were carried out on the four sex-by-race categories), and a stronger rejection of Black peers. With the best-friends technique, however, kindergartners showed no racial preferences, but first-graders showed same-race preferences. Jarrett and Quay (1984) also performed correlational analyses between the two techniques and found children's scores to be unrelated. The authors suggested that the higher status of White children may underlie the results with the roster-and-rating techniques.

Singleton and Asher (1977) used a roster-and-rating scale to assess two kinds of preferences among third-grade children: how much they liked to play with each of their classmates, and how much they liked to work with them. The data were analyzed for the four race-by-sex categories just described. The results were very similar for the work-and-play categories.

Children of both races strongly preferred same-sex to opposite-sex peers. They showed a mild tendency to prefer same-race peers. The percentage of variation in preferences accounted for by sex of peer was about 40%, but for race of peer it was only 1%. This pattern of results for race is different than that of Jarrett and Quay (1984) and different than Singleton and Asher's (1977) own results using observational methods.

Singleton and Asher (1979) asked the same questions of the same children 3 years later, when they were in sixth grade. They tested an additional group of third-grade children to assess cohort effects. Concerning the latter children, their response patterns were virtually identical to those tested by Singleton and Asher (1977). The pattern of results for the sixth graders was very similar to when they were in third grade. The two small exceptions were that Black children showed a greater positive Black race bias in Grade 6 than in Grade 3, and all groups of children showed small declines in same-sex preferences between Grade 3 and Grade 6. Nevertheless, peer preferences based on sex were far stronger than those based on race.

Carter, DeTine, Spero, and Benson (1975) used a roster-and-rating method with seventh and eighth graders to assess how much they perceived classmates as fulfilling their needs for academic acceptance (achievement recognition) and social acceptance. There were essentially no differences in the response patterns of adolescents in Grade 7 and Grade 8. Using analyses of variance, there were no race preferences by either Black males or Black females for academic acceptance. However, both groups preferred Black to White peers for social acceptance. Both White males and females, conversely, preferred White peers for both types of acceptance. Using multiple regression analyses, a high grade point average (GPA) was the strongest predictor for all four race/sex groups for academic acceptance. It is useful to think of GPA as a badge of personal identification that is correlated with race; sex being the next strongest predictor for all but the Black males; race had essentially no predictive value. For social acceptance, Black and White females most strongly preferred same-sex peers. A high GPA was an important, but secondary factor for both. Black males most strongly preferred same-race peers, with a high GPA being the next most important factor. White males most strongly preferred peers with a high GPA and secondarily, same-sex peers. Thus, with the exception of Black males, and only in the realm of social acceptance, same-sex preferences were stronger than race preferences, which is consistent with the Singleton and Asher (1977, 1979) studies. The new findings in this study are the importance of GPA to students' academic and social preferences, and the relatively unique pattern for Black males.

The relative importance of GPA in predicting social acceptance underscores the behavioral, and hence badging, underpinning of race preference. GPA-intended as a socially benign pedagogical tool-is in fact a stat-

us marker that permeates much of the organized activity of schools. In contrast, nontracking schools are designed explicitly to avoid the conflation of achievement and status, and students achieve social status by successfully adapting their traditional behavioral dimensions to integrated cooperative activities. Consequently, we have seen that cross-racial interaction in such settings is less inhibited.

Patchen (1982) reported a best-friends sociometric task in his study of senior high school students. To the question concerning the number of other-race persons among students' five best friends, approximately 80% of both Black and White students reported *none*. Approximately 11% reported *one*. Thus, close interracial friendships were very infrequent. To the question concerning the racial composition of the informal group that students "hang around with," approximately 72% of Black and White students said that their group is *all the same race*. Thus, strong racial preferences do not completely prevent secondary friendships from occurring.

The final two experiments discussed are those by Shrum and Cheek (1987) and Shrum et al. (1988). Recall that in both studies, a best-friends sociometric procedure was used with the 3rd- through 12th-grade students in a single community school system. Shrum and Cheek (1987) found that the percentage of students who associated with peers in mixed race groups was 83% in Grade 3, 42% in Grade 4 to Grade 6, 0% in Grade 7 and Grade 8, and 0% in Grade 9 to Grade 12. The senior high school results are consistent with those reported by Patchen (1982) for his sociometric data. The discrepancy-0% versus 28%-is only apparent in that Shrum and Cheek (1987) based their findings on connected sets of best friends, whereas Patchen (1982) asked about the race of peers that students "hang around with." The latter are not necessarily restricted to best friends.

Shrum et al. (1988) reported their results in two ways: the overall pattern of race preferences at each grade and the pattern of same-race, same-sex preferences at each grade. Regarding the first, both Black and White groups showed increasing same-race preferences from Grade 3 to Grade 12-with White students, especially females, dramatically preferring same-race peers in Grade 8 and Grade 9. For same-race, same-sex preferences, in general, all four sex/race groups evidenced a curvilinear relationship with grade level. These preferences were lowest at Grade 3, highest in Grades 6, 7, and 8, and lower at Grades 11 and 12. Black students (male and female) were less self-segregated at the higher grade levels than White students; however, this was relative in that same-race self-segregation was very marked from Grade 7 on. Recall that Patchen (1982) found no differences between the two racial groups. Finally, Shrum et al. (1988) pointed out that from Grade 7 on, self-segregation by race is a much stronger factor in intergroup relations than is sex segregation. In fact, the senior class in this school system had separate proms for Blacks and Whites.

In these studies, a clear pattern of results was found with best-friends' sociometric methods. In kindergarten, not controlling for sex, no same-race preferences were found. From Grade 1 on, both Black and White children and adolescents showed strong same-race, same-sex preferences. These preferences peaked in Grade 6 to Grade 8, where self-segregation was particularly strong. In these and older grades, Blacks tended to be less race/sex segregated than Whites, and for both races, race was a more powerful factor in self-segregation than sex. The roster-and-rating results were quite different. In kindergarten and first grade, both Black and White children preferred Whites. In Grade 3 through Grade 8, there was a mild same-race preference, but a very strong same-sex preference. From Grade 6 to Grade 8, race became relatively more important for Blacks, particularly males. There are no data for senior high school students.

Two apparent contradictions emerge between the results from the two methods: (a) In best-friends techniques, race self-segregation markedly increases through Grade 8, especially in comparison to sex segregation, whereas with roster-and-rating techniques, race is much less important than sex; and (b) in best-friends techniques, Grade 6 to Grade 8, Whites are more racially self-segregated than Blacks, but for roster-and-rating, Black males have stronger race preferences than White males.

A plausible explanation of these contradictions is as follows. The best-friends method assesses students' actual practices, primarily in nonclassroom settings. This includes both unscheduled time in school as well as off-campus activities. One's best friends, we learned from the nonclassroom observational research, are of the same race and same sex. Roster-and-rating methods primarily emphasize in-school settings, usually in-class ones. These ratings thus have an academic emphasis, more so than do best-friends ratings. We learned from the classroom observational research that race is much less important than sex in peer preferences, especially for males. Thus, regarding the first apparent contradiction, same-sex preferences are strong with both methods, but the setting being assessed determines the relative importance of race. In classroom settings, it is not very important, but outside of class, it is.

Regarding the second contradiction, that Whites had fewer Black best friends than the converse, is consistent with the cultural/historical prediction that owing to racial status differences in the culture, Blacks were more likely to show White preferences than the converse. The shift in a positive Black direction for Black males in roster-and-ratings probably reflects an attempt on their part to adapt to the competitive disadvantage they have in the classroom setting. Recall that in the Carter et al. (1975) results with the multiple regression analyses, GPA was very important for both academic and social acceptance. It can be inferred from their analyses that Whites generally had higher GPAs than Blacks, and hence would tend to be pre-

ferred. But, as has been previously argued, males are more competitive than females and hence would be less willing than females to concede a subordinate status. Black males, by preferring other Black males for social and academic acceptance, would keep experienced status differences to a minimum.

In concluding our discussion of the development of race discrimination, let us relate these findings to the hypotheses presented at the beginning of the chapter. Based on genetic/evolutionary considerations, it was speculated that males would discriminate along racial lines more so than females. **In** all studies but two, there were either no sex differences or females discriminated more than males; thus, this hypothesis is rejected. Given that there was no support for this hypothesis in the race prejudice literature, it is safe to conclude that this genetic/evolutionary consideration has no bearing in the domain of race for children and adolescents.

In findings similar to those for race prejudice, there is supportive evidence for developmental shifts occurring at ages 4 and 7 years. Another shift occurs between 12 and 15 years, but that appears to be based on a marked increase in heterosexual interests, and not changes in group identity or cognitive development. That is, race discrimination peaks in the 12- to 15-year age range, and then declines somewhat afterward. These findings are consistent with the absence of any shifts in race prejudice during this age range.

The hypothesis based on cultural/historical considerations that with increasing age, race discrimination would decrease more for Black than White individuals is not supported. Most studies show no age-related differences, but some find Blacks more discriminatory than Whites, and others show the converse. There may be an age-related pattern for a particular methodology, but nothing consistent emerges across the various methods used. The lack of consistency fits with the race prejudice data. Hence, it is probably safe to conclude that this cultural/historical consideration also has no bearing in the domain of race for children and adolescents.

COMPARISON OF PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION OF THE TARGET GROUPS

A poet once said that a rose was still a rose by any other name. That concept does not apply to the development of prejudice and discrimination. That is, prejudice and discrimination vary as a function of target group. For example, knowing how racial prejudice develops does not accurately inform us about the development of opposite-sex prejudice. Moreover, knowledge of the development of prejudice for any target group does not necessarily predict discrimination patterns toward that group. **In** other words, prejudice

and discrimination generally follow somewhat different developmental paths. What have we learned in our survey about these effects?

First, in briefly comparing the development of prejudice and discrimination among the four target groups, the consistency appears to be greater for prejudice than for discrimination. Second, the results for opposite-sex prejudice and discrimination most closely fit the predictions based on genetic/evolutionary and cultural/historical conceptualizations. Third, in all cases, behavioral differences between the groupings at least partially underlie both prejudice and discrimination. Finally, in all groupings, the first two age periods of change predicted by group identity conceptualizations emerge, indicating that social cognitive development partially underlies the early development of prejudice and discrimination.

Let us first examine the prejudice literature. Data on preschool children were only available for opposite-sex and race prejudice. For these groupings, the emergence of prejudice (or its proxy, negative stereotyping) occurs by age 3 years, and is strongly evident in 4-year-olds. However, this must be qualified because Black preschool children often show prejudice toward Blacks at this age. From age 4 and older, different patterns are found for these two groupings as well as for prejudice toward mentally retarded peers. *Opposite-sex prejudice*, which is bi-directional, increases in strength to about age 8, and declines somewhat between ages 8 and 10 years. However, girls, but not boys, between ages 8 and 10 start to increasingly value opposite-sex characteristics. *Race prejudice* by Whites increases to age 7 or 8 years, declines or levels off between 8 and 12 years, and follows no consistent pattern at older ages. For Blacks, a positive-White bias exists until about age 7, when it shifts to neutrality or White prejudice. Between 8 and 10 years, prejudice toward Whites declines slightly. No firm pattern emerges thereafter. *Prejudice toward the mentally retarded* is seen in nonretarded kindergarten children. It declines in strength thereafter through age 12 years. Little is known for adolescents.

For all three groupings, males are found to be more or equally prejudiced as females, which is consistent with the genetic/evolutionary speculation based on the assumption of stronger group commitments by males than by females. For all three groupings, behavioral differences were found to be correlated with prejudice, consistent with the genetic/evolutionary concept of *badging*. This was especially pronounced for opposite-sex prejudice and prejudice toward the mentally retarded.

Predictions based on cultural/historical considerations do not always have parallel results for opposite-sex and race prejudice. No relevant data are available for prejudice toward the mentally retarded. The predictions concerning the effects of subordinate status—that Blacks and females would acquire knowledge, behavior, and values of male and White cultural norms prior to the converse—were supported. However, cultural/historical

based predictions concerning self-esteem and age-related decreases in prejudice held for females in relation to males, but not for Blacks in relation to Whites.

Regarding the discrimination literature, observational data are available for preschool children for all four groupings. For *opposite-sex* and *race discrimination*, same-race, same-sex preferences are generally present in preschool and these preferences increase between ages 6 and 8 and either decline or level off until age 12. However, for race discrimination in classroom settings, females but not males continue to racially discriminate. Discrimination toward the *deaf and mentally retarded* by the nonhandicapped is present in preschool and remains high thereafter, with no apparent age-related trends. In preschool, mentally retarded children prefer interacting with nonretarded peers, whereas deaf children prefer interaction with teachers.

For the sociometric methods, with best-friends data, all four groupings show essentially the same patterns from Grade 3 and higher-discrimination is quite marked at all ages. It is also stronger in this age range than it is for younger children. But ingroup/outgroup friendships do occur infrequently for all groupings.

In general, roster-and-ratings measures indicate far less discrimination than best-friends measures. This is especially the case for in-class or in-school academically oriented activities. Discrimination by sex appears much stronger than by race. For nonhandicapped/handicapped interactions, no comparable information is available.

For both observational and sociometric methods, ingroup/outgroup behavioral differences-badging-underlie the discrimination. This was most readily seen regarding the mentally retarded where degree of social competence could be assessed. But it was also notable with the other groupings.

Regarding the genetic/evolutionary speculation concerning sex differences in discrimination, there was no support for it in the opposite-sex literature and it was contradicted in the race literature. No reliable sex differences were identified for discrimination toward mentally retarded or deaf peers.

The cultural/historical predictions that discrimination of subordinates would decline relative to that of dominant groups were either unsupported (opposite-sex and racial discrimination) or were not investigated (deaf and mentally retarded).

Finally, there was strong support for age-related shifts in discrimination occurring in the first two periods that were predicted by the group identity and cognitive development literature. Parallel findings occurred for the development of prejudice. Additionally, for opposite-sex prejudice, two later-predicted age-related shifts were noted. These results suggest that the early development of prejudice and discrimination are linked with social cognitive development.

In summary, the early development of opposite-sex prejudice, race prejudice, and prejudice toward the mentally retarded is tied to group identity processes and social cognitive development. However, each of the three groupings has a unique pattern of development from preschool through junior high school. No consistent patterns emerge in senior high school. Badging mechanisms appear to underlie the various categories of prejudice. Discrimination follows different developmental paths than prejudice, and the various methods of assessing discrimination produce different patterns of results. One of the most consistent results is that within-school, academically oriented discrimination is much lower than out-of-school or in-school, socially oriented discrimination. In junior and senior high school, Blacks and Whites, males and females, deaf and hearing, mentally retarded and nonretarded all prefer ingroup to outgroup peers. Badging mechanisms likely play a role in these choices.

SUMMARY

Race prejudice and race discrimination follow different patterns and are assessed by different methods. Studies of race prejudice have been strongly influenced by their methods and materials. In large part, their results are to be qualified for their use of forced-choice methods—for example, PRAM II or CMT—which do not conclusively indicate race prejudice rather than preference. Also, changes in social desirability complicate preferential decisions and thus also measurement instruments for race prejudice.

In addition, race prejudice has different developmental paths for Black and White children. White children show White ethnic preferences by 4 years of age. The strength of these preferences increases to about age 8, and either levels off or declines between ages 8 and 12 years. No clear pattern emerges thereafter; but at all ages, Whites prefer Whites. There is an indication that in adolescence and young adulthood, White females are less prejudiced than White males. Black children follow a different path, demonstrating White ethnic preferences between ages 4 and 6 years. Between 7 and 10 years, they generally show Black preferences. Between 8 and 10 years, the positive Black preferences decline slightly and attitudes toward Whites become neutral.

Regarding genetic/evolutionary predictions we sought to assess, the data are inconsistent regarding age differences in adolescence or sex differences at any ages. For both races, age shifts in prejudice predicted by the group identity and cognitive development literature are partially consistent with the evolutionary hypothesis. Also, age-based decline in prejudice is similar for both races, contradicting the cultural/historical prediction that prejudice would diminish more in the subordinate race.

The three techniques to study race discrimination—observational, rating-and-roster sociometries, and best-friends sociometrics—do not lead to equivalent conclusions. With observations, Black preschool boys prefer playing with White boys, but White boys and girls and Black girls prefer same-race peers. From kindergarten through senior high school, in free play or nonclassroom settings, children prefer interacting with same-sex, same-race peers. In classroom settings in kindergarten through Grade 8, females prefer same-race peers, but males show little or no racial preferences.

There were two unexpected results from these discussed studies. First, in free-play settings beginning in kindergarten, Black males shift interaction preference from White males to Black males, presumably due to conflicts with physical attraction preference. Second, there is a discrepancy between free-play and classroom settings such that in classroom settings, males of both races show little or no race preference. That females do so is presumably due to their tendency to overlay structured classroom activity with close-friendship social expectations.

With roster-and-ratings sociometric methods, kindergarten and first-grade children prefer Whites to Blacks. In Grades 3 through 8, a mild same-race preference, but a very strong same-sex preference occurs. There are no data for senior high school students. One noteworthy roster-and-rating result was the correlation of academic achievement (GPA) with social acceptance, with GPA as the strongest predictor—stronger even than race or sex—of social acceptance.

With best-friends sociometric methods, in kindergarten settings, no race preferences were found. From Grade 1 through senior high school, both Black and White children and adolescents preferred same-race, same-sex friends. These preferences were strongest in Grades 6 to 8. Age shifts predicted by the group identity and cognitive development literature were partially supported. Consistent with cultural/historical analysis, there were higher cross-racial friendships ratings for Black respondents than for White ones. There was a discrepancy between best-friends and roster-and-ratings results, attributed to the tendency of the best-friends method to reflect out-of-school and unstructured settings (where race preference is operative), and the roster-and-rating method to reflect in-school and structured settings (where academic achievement is operative).

In contradiction to the proposed genetic/evolutionary hypothesis, there was no tendency for males to discriminate by race more than females. Furthermore, as with race prejudice, the race discrimination age decline was not greater for Blacks than for Whites, as predicted by the cultural/historical hypothesis. There were developmental shifts at ages 4, 7, 12, and 15, with the latter two shifts attributed to heterosexual interests.

This chapter concludes our treatment of the target groups, each of whose status within American culture has been characterized by persistent

prejudice and discrimination. We surveyed the development of prejudice and discrimination for each group and we suggested its cultural/historical and genetic/evolutionary causes. Each historical survey has been marked by an ongoing hope by some that prejudice and discrimination might be reduced or eliminated. We have heretofore left unanswered the question of whether this hope can be fulfilled. Can prejudice and discrimination be reduced? This is the subject of the next chapter, in which we survey and assess two prominent psychological theories on the reduction of prejudice and discrimination and research related to these theories.

Modifying Prejudice and Discrimination¹

INTRODUCTION

In the preceding chapters we saw how a genetic/evolutionary approach helps us understand the development of prejudice and discrimination. We identified four principle factors involved with this development, three of which usually lead to ingroup preferences and outgroup antipathy, and one of them—outgroup attraction—leads to outgroup assimilation. However, essentially no prejudice and discrimination research exists that focuses on the positive characteristics of outgroups.

In this chapter, it is useful to consider how badging mechanisms in conjunction with three of the four evolutionary factors can be utilized to modify prejudice and discrimination. Badging mechanisms lead to identification of group membership, and in an evolutionary sense, are essential to survival and reproduction. When operating at a distance (distally) there is essentially no opportunity to modify perceptions of the group identity of individuals. However, when operating nearby (proximally) such as through interactions with outgroup members, there are many opportunities to perceive similarities between the ingroup and the outgroup. In order to modify prejudice, similarities should be emphasized and group differences minimized. Vicarious interactions, such as through the media, and especially television, can probably substitute to some extent for personal interactions.

We saw how authority acceptance usually operates to perpetuate or create prejudice and discrimination. However, authorities can be a major vehi-

¹This chapter was written in collaboration with Catherine M. Johnson.

cle for modifying prejudice. Authorities should promote changes of attitudes and behavior for ingroup members, and condemn prejudice and discrimination. This, of course, is what the D.S. Supreme Court attempted to do in the *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954/1955) case. That decision had to be implemented by state and local authorities, as well as community leaders in order to be influential in changing prejudice and discrimination. As we see in this chapter, authority acceptance plays a central role in successful attempts to modify attitudes and behavior.

Outgroup attraction can play a significant role in modifying prejudice and discrimination. We see numerous examples of this in daily life for African-American and female athletes and entertainers. Many people of all races and both genders admire and want to emulate these very attractive outgroup members. If we take the tack of seeing them as exceptions, then little will change in terms of intergroup relations. If we broaden our perspective, especially through interactions with outgroup members, guided by authorities, we can start to perceive the positive qualities in many outgroup members, and eventually come to see them and us as members of the same overarching group. For example, in Cincinnati, an elderly upper socioeconomic status (SES) Jewish female friend described the Appalachians (who are all Christian) she has gotten to know. She talks about them as the most caring and loyal friends for which a person could hope. In many groups in Cincinnati, Appalachians are thought of as "rednecks." But if people came to see their valued characteristics, the redneck image would change, and ingroup-outgroup disparities would likely diminish.

The third factor, ingroup favoritism, can operate to modify prejudice and discrimination, if outgroup members can also be seen as part of the ingroup. The Sherifs' experiments (Sherif et al., 1961; Sherif & Sherif, 1953) discussed in chapter 2, indicated that cooperative activities between ingroups and outgroups can lead to the formation of an overarching group that includes previous ingroups and outgroups. Another vehicle is the structuring of interactions that lead to perceptions of increased similarity between ingroups and outgroups. Authorities and others in the community can take steps that will lead to perceptions of the similarities between the various groups in a community. Once common group identification is achieved, then favoritism will become widespread throughout the new, inclusive group.

Given this background, there are five goals of this chapter. The first is to make predictions in terms of genetic/evolutionary and cultural/historical considerations about reducing prejudice and discrimination in children. The second goal is to describe the two theories that are most often associated with prejudice reduction-Contact Theory and Lewinian Theory. The third goal is to briefly describe the types of measures used in studying the reduction of prejudice and discrimination. The fourth goal is to summarize

several of the principle bodies of research that have been carried out on the topic of the reduction of prejudice and discrimination. The fifth goal is to present a multifactor approach designed to reduce prejudice and discrimination in children and adolescents.

Two of the major legally mandated attempts aimed toward reducing prejudice and discrimination have been racial school desegregation, and mainstreaming of the physically and mentally handicapped. A substantial literature from the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s exists for both of these. No similar legislation exists for reducing opposite-sex prejudice between children in schools. Relatively little research on modifying prejudice and discrimination has been carried out in the 1990s. This raises the question of the generality of the earlier findings to the current century. Based on the prejudice and discrimination research that has been done, described in earlier chapters, as well as recent research on modifying prejudice and discrimination, our judgment is that generalization of the older data is substantial.

Predictions

In regard to the first goal, five predictions are made. Based on the genetic/evolutionary model it was previously predicted and found that prejudice held by males would be stronger than that held by females. Based on these findings and the underlying theory, it is predicted that it will be easier to change attitudes and behaviors of girls than those of boys. Second, based on the cultural/historical importance of dominance in establishing prejudice, modification of status differences between groups will likely be an important factor in the reduction of prejudice and discrimination. Third, owing to the importance of authority acceptance in the acquisition of cultural knowledge, including prejudice and discrimination, one would expect that involvement by authorities in sanctioning acceptance of other groups would lead to a decrease in prejudice.

The fourth prediction is based on the importance of cooperation to group identity. One would expect that children placed in cooperative teams would include their teammates in their ingroup, regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, or disability. Behaviors and attitudes toward these teammates should become relatively positive. One would not necessarily expect, however, that these attitudes and behaviors would extend to other people of that same race, ethnic group, sex, or disability because these "other" people were not part of their ingroup. Finally, one major prediction of the group identity and cognitive development literature is that there should be shifts in the development of prejudice at ages 4, 6 to 7, 10 to 12, 14 to 16, and 18 to 19 years. Consequently, one would expect differences in the effects of interventions to reduce prejudice and discrimination at these ages.

Based on the fact that genetics and evolution, culture and history, and social development all play a role in the acquisition of prejudice and discrimination, interventions based on anyone of these factors will probably have a limited effect in reducing prejudice and discrimination. This implies that a multifactor approach to change should be used wherever possible.

Contact Theory

One of the theories frequently cited to explain changes in prejudice is Contact Theory (Allport, 1954). Allport cautioned that for contact to work in reducing prejudiced attitudes (a) the parties involved must share equal status, (b) the community must sanction the change, (c) the groups must be in the pursuit of common objectives (cooperation), and (d) the association must be deep and genuine (intimate). The next few pages are devoted to defining each of these factors in more detail and linking them to the genetic/evolutionary and cultural/historical models.

Differential power and status are important in the development of prejudice and discrimination. This suggests that equal status would be central to reducing those attitudes and behaviors. According to Allport (1954), *equal status* occurs for children when they have similar manners, modes of speech, moral attitudes, mental ability and their parents have comparable amounts of property. Cohen's (1984) Status Equalization Project indicated that in school settings, reading ability is also an important status factor for fifth- and sixth-grade European-American, African-American, Asian-American, and Hispanic-American students.

Norvell and Worchel (1981) discovered that the status children bring with them from other settings is often more important than their status in the current situation. Thus a student with high status, say as an athlete, would bring that status with her to classroom activities even if she did not excel scholastically. This finding fits well with the genetic/evolutionary factor of outgroup attraction. Robinson and Preston (1976) found that characteristics that indicate high status of Whites, for example, reading ability, are occasionally different than those that indicate high status among Blacks. Thus there is some agreement that status is an important factor in changing prejudice, but it is not as clear what factors influence status in a given situation. However, Slavin and Cooper (1999) and Genesee and Gandara (1999) seriously questioned whether equal status can readily be attained in classroom settings. Special training of teachers to boost the status of children has occasionally been successful. It is possible that rather than equal status as a factor in reducing prejudice, it is more important and more feasible to instill in students mutual kindness and respect for one another.

Community sanction is linked to the concept of authority in the genetic/evolutionary model and cultural/historical model. By *community sanction*, or

institutional supports, Allport (1954) meant law, custom or local atmosphere that promotes changes in prejudice. Research supports Allport's hypothesis and indicates that the atmosphere regarding prejudice in the classroom, the school, and the surrounding community all impact a child's perception of community sanction (Lachar, 1972; Schofield, 1979).

As already discussed, cooperation is an important aspect of group identity. Allport (1954) defined *cooperation* as a pursuit of common objectives. This factor is of enough importance that a whole body of literature has been developed on the effects of cooperation on the reduction of prejudice and discrimination. Thus the concept of cooperation has been expanded and is discussed in detail later in the chapter.

Similar to cooperation, intimacy is an aspect of group identity. Allport (1954) believed that casual contact reinforced stereotypes and prejudiced attitudes while intimate contact served to decrease prejudice. By *intimacy*, he means deeper and more genuine associations. Intimacy between individual members of groups—for example, individual European-American and African-American children—develops when they work, study, and play together consistently over a period of time. The intimacy does not necessarily extend to all members of the outgroup. Thus this factor should have a greater effect on discrimination than on prejudice.

Lewinian Theory

Lewinian Theory is a form of field theory and postulates that a person's attitudes are at a quasistationary equilibrium (frozen) when driving forces for change are equal to restraining forces for staying put (Lewin, 1948). When the strength of a driving force (or restraining force) is altered, that is, increased or decreased, the attitude will become unfrozen, change, and refreeze at a new level.

A simplified behavioral example might be helpful here. One of us (Cathy Johnson) has a specified amount of time each week to ride my horse. Factors that drive me toward riding more are: I enjoy the activity, I enjoy being outdoors and in the woods, I wish to improve my skill level, it's more fun than cleaning the house, and my horse needs the exercise. There are factors that, if considered alone, would limit my riding (restraining forces): I have to earn money to pay for the horse, too much time in the sun is bad for my skin, most of my friends do not ride, and my horse also enjoys being out in the pasture. Taken together these driving and restraining forces keep my weekly riding time relatively constant. If either the driving or restraining forces change, I would spend a different amount of time riding. For example, acquiring a second horse would increase the "horse exercise" driving force and I would spend more time riding. Additionally, winning the lottery would reduce the "earning money" restraining force and increase my time riding.

Similarly, driving and restraining forces apply to attitudes. First we discuss restraining forces. Lewin (1948) indicated that group belongingness and interdependence of fate serve as restraining forces to attitude change. Group belongingness is similar to group identity and therefore is tied to intergroup mechanisms and ingroup favoritism. Allport's community sanction for acceptance of the outsider would be viewed by Lewin as a reduction of the "authority" restraining force. Interdependence of fate for Lewin is based on cultural/historical factors of collective memory of history, language, religion, and morality. Keep in mind that owing to cognitive/social development, the effects on prejudice change with age, causing this force to be stronger or weaker depending on the age group in question. Other scientists have used field theory to discuss additional restraining forces. J. H. Evans (1976) suggested that strain in social interactions, that is, uneasiness, inhibition, and uncertainty, is one of the forces in the maintenance of prejudiced attitudes and thus a restraining force to the development of more positive attitudes. Donaldson (1980) hypothesized that discomfort, a restraining force, is caused by the expectation of inappropriate social behavior by outgroups.

Factors like cognitive and social development serve as driving forces to attitude change. These factors are age related and thus the relative strength of driving forces will change with maturation. Additionally, Donaldson (1980) suggested that the empathy children feel toward others acts as a driving force to positive attitude change. We see later in the chapter that more recent research supports this suggestion.

Measures Employed

Most of the measures utilized in prejudice reduction experiments assessed either the cognitive or the behavioral predisposition component of attitudes. None measured the affective component. Measures of discrimination generally include friendship choice or playmate choice. The common measures are now described.

A social distance scale is one way to measure the behavioral predispositions component of prejudice. In a typical social distance scale, the subject is instructed to place a drawing of a child that represents the self into a number of different scenes. A scene might depict children working in the classroom, playing at recess, or playing at home. Scoring is done by actually measuring the distance between the self-figure and other figures in the scene.

Activity preference scales also measure the behavioral intention aspect of prejudice. A typical one includes showing children a picture of homogeneous students, for example, same-race/same-sex working together and a

similar picture with heterogeneous students. The children are then asked which group they would like to join or have as friends.

There are several ways to measure the cognitive aspect of prejudice including attitude scales and stereotype rating scales. An example of an attitude scale is the PRAM 11, where children choose between drawings of Black and White figures in response to evaluative adjectives. A stereotype rating might list a series of unfavorable characteristics (e.g., sneaky, dirty, bad) and favorable characteristics (e.g., brave, strong, friendly). The child is asked to identify whether all, most, some, few, or no children of a particular category fit that characteristic. For younger children, a picture-story technique might be used to measure stereotypes.

The measures of discrimination generally include sociometries or observation. Observation is used to measure playmate choice and is usually conducted during a short period of free time before and following any interventions. Sociometric scales can measure either playmate choice or friendship choice.

We identified the types of measures used in the prejudice and discrimination reduction literature. Throughout the following discussion, *prejudice measures* are referred to as social distance scales, activity preference scales, stereotype ratings, and attitude scales. *Discrimination measures* are observation, sociometric playmate choice, or sociometric friendship choice.

DESEGREGATION

On May 17, 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a decision in the case of *Brown v. the Board of Education* (1954/1955) that ultimately brought an end to segregation in the public schools. The court's decision was based, in part, on the information in an *amicus curiae* brief signed by 35 psychologists, which stated that desegregation would decrease cross-racial prejudice, that is, Black children toward Whites and White children toward Blacks.

More than 40 years have passed since *Brown v. the Board of Education* (1954/1955), giving us ample time to evaluate the results of school desegregation. One of the goals of this section is to present information on the results of those studies. In the discussion, attention will be paid, where possible, to differentiating results by age, sex, race, and geographic location. Consideration is given to the effects of forced busing on prejudiced attitudes.

The second goal of this section is to interpret the data in terms of two of the predictions already made. First, following desegregation, girls' attitudes toward children of a different race will generally be more positive than those held by boys. Second, one would expect differences in the results of desegregation to be age related. As discussed in the next section, the data are insufficient to evaluate the effects of community sanction and modification of status.

The third and final goal of this section is to discuss the results of desegregation in terms of Contact Theory and Lewinian Theory.

The Studies

Table 8.1 contains information regarding 23 studies and was designed to give as clear a picture as possible of the factors that influenced the outcomes of desegregation. The column headings, or core characteristics, were chosen based on patterns that emerged from examining the literature. The response of the community to desegregation is identified as a core characteristic, although it is not mentioned in many studies. Allport (1954) identified it as an important factor and we attempt to determine whether a pattern exists when the available data are examined. The studies are listed in order first by time since desegregation, followed by region and type of desegregation. This method was chosen to aid the reader in identifying important patterns.

The dependent measure, while important, was not listed as a core characteristic, because it did not seem to have a consistent impact on the outcome, and no patterns emerged. Three types of prejudice measures were used: stereotype ratings, attitude surveys, and social distance scales. In none of this research were sociometric data employed as the dependent measure.

The 23 experiments yielded 37 outcome results. Of these, 16 reveal an increase in prejudiced attitudes following desegregation, 10 show no change, and 11 indicate a decrease in prejudice. Approximately 40% of the studies showed a decrease in prejudice for Blacks, whereas the number for Whites is only 25%.

Do the effects of desegregation change over time, for example 1 year versus 5 years after a school has been desegregated? The answer depends on the race of the child. Research falls into three time-related categories, based on the length of time the school had been desegregated prior to the study taking place. In short-term studies, initial data were collected prior to desegregation and the research was completed within 1 year following desegregation. No control groups were used in these studies. Medium-term data were compiled from schools that had been desegregated 1 to 5 years prior to the study, with segregated schools used for control groups. Long-term studies compared schools desegregated for 5 years or more to segregated schools.

When examining Table 8.1 for effects of time since desegregation, differences in prejudice for European-American children show an interesting pattern. An increase in prejudice or no change following desegregation was seen for the White children when data were collected on a short-term basis. The children in medium-term conditions displayed a decrease in prejudice

TABLE 8.1
Summary of Core Study Characteristics and Outcomes

Study	N	Grade	Time Since Desegregation	Region	Type of Desegregation	Community Response	Outcome	
							Black	White
Barber (1968)	200	8	Short	North	Voluntary	Negative		
Carrigan (1969)	570	K-5	Short	North	Forced	? ^a		
Dentler & Elkins (1967)	1,230	3-6	Short	North	Natural			
Evans (1969)	198	4-6	Short	S-W ^b	Forced	?		
Garth (1963)	94	9-12	Short	South	Voluntary	?	+	
McWhirt (1967)	152	10	Short	South	Voluntary	?	+	
Campbell (1956)	746	8, 10, 12	Short	South	Forced	?		
Lombardi (1963)	344	9-10	Short	South	Forced	Neutral		0
Silverman & Shaw (1973)		7-12	Short	South	Forced	Negative	0	0
Whitmore (1956)		8, 10, 12	Short	South	Forced	?		0
Green & Gerard (1974)	1,769	K-6	Short	West	Voluntary	Mixed		0
Webster (1961)	104	7	Short	West	Forced	?	+	
Speelman & Hoffman (1980)	72	Pre, 1, 3	Short	?	?			0
Armor (1972)	171	7-12	Medium	North	Voluntary			
Gardner, Wright, & Dee (1970)	260	6-8	Medium	North	Voluntary		+	+
Singer (1966)	136	5	Medium	North	Natural		+	+
Seidner (1971)	96	3	Medium	South	Voluntary		0	0
Friedman (1980)		K-3	Long	North	Natural			+
Koslin, Amarel, & Ames (1969)	129	1-2	Long	North	Natural	?	+	+
Lachat (1972)C	?	12	Long	North	Natural	Neutral		
Lachat (1972)	?	12	Long	North	Natural	Positive		+
Herman (1967)	350	6	Long	North	Natural	?	0	
W. G. Stephan (1977)	750	5-6	Long	S-W	Natural	?		
Williams, Best, & Boswell (1975)	483	1-4	Long	South	Voluntary	?		0

^a? Indicates no information in the report. ^bS_ indicates Southwest. ^cLachat is listed twice due to distinctly different community responses in the study.

toward Blacks following desegregation in two of the studies and no change in one. In the six long-term studies, seven results were reported for White students. Three revealed decreases in prejudice as a result of desegregation, three showed increases, and one showed no change in attitude.

The results for African-American children were mixed in all three time-related categories in Table 8.1. Five short-term studies showed an increase in prejudiced attitudes, one revealed no change, and three indicated a decrease in prejudice toward Whites. Of the four medium-term results, two revealed a decrease in prejudice as a result of desegregation, one showed an increase and one showed no change. One of the three long-term studies revealed a decrease in prejudice, one showed an increase, and one revealed no change.

We can conclude from these studies that for White children, prejudice is at best unchanged immediately after desegregation, decreases between 1 and 5 years following desegregation, but after 5 years, the results are mixed. The racial attitudes of Black students tend to be less effected by time and the results are mixed for all three time categories. Unfortunately, there are no published studies that have monitored the effects of desegregation in a single school system for more than 1 year. Hence, the longitudinal effects of desegregation are not known.

Regional differences, particularly discrepancies in results between Northern and Southern schools, are of interest. Examination of Table 8.1 reveals eight studies that investigated prejudice of Northern Black children toward Whites. Of these, three found decreases in prejudice, four found increases, and one found no change. Ten outcomes for White students are also listed. Five of these show an increase in prejudice as a result of desegregation and five reveal a decrease.

Looking toward the South, prejudice toward Blacks increased for White children in two of the studies and remained unchanged in the remaining four (see Table 8.1). The picture for Black children in the South is different. Two studies demonstrated decreases in prejudice following desegregation and two showed no change. While conducting studies in the Southwest, Evans (1969) and W. G. Stephan (1977) discovered that Black children develop greater prejudice toward Whites following desegregation. W. G. Stephari's (1977) study revealed parallel findings for White children.

Some conclusions can be drawn from these data. European-American children in the North become either significantly more or significantly less prejudiced as a result of desegregation, whereas in the South, their prejudice either increased or was unaffected. African-American students experience desegregation similar to Whites in the North, but in the South their prejudice was more likely to decrease or remain unchanged. Two studies are not enough to highlight the Southwest as a special case, but prejudice did increase for both White and Black populations.

Desegregation has typically occurred in three distinctly different ways, as indicated in Table 8.1. *Forced desegregation* is generally the result of a school board order or court order and occurs within the entire school system of a given city. Students are bused from their own neighborhood to a school in another neighborhood. *Voluntary desegregation* can occur in an individual school or in an entire school system. Some of the students in these schools are also bused to other schools, generally through a process of open enrollment. An example of this would be a school in a predominately Black neighborhood offering advanced placement courses in order to attract White students from other neighborhoods. *Natural desegregation* occurs when the neighborhood is integrated and the school accurately reflects the neighborhood population.

It seems appropriate to mention a word about the difference between integration and desegregation. The two terms have similar meanings and are often used interchangeably to denote the ending of segregation and the coming together of people of various races and ethnic groups. *Desegregation* is the process of bringing the races together and *integration* is the condition that occurs following desegregation. Often the word "integration" is used to connote the condition that exists when the minority group is accepted on a completely equal basis (Pettigrew, 1971; St. John, 1975).

Examining the results of the studies in Table 8.1, based on the way desegregation occurred, reveals some interesting patterns. First it should be noted that all of the forced desegregation "experiments" were short-term in nature, whereas those that examined voluntary or natural desegregation span the entire time continuum. Research in which the attitudes of White children were examined following forced desegregation revealed an increase or no change in prejudice. The outcomes for White students following voluntary desegregation are mixed: Three studies found no significant change, two found an increase, and one found a decrease. Of the eight outcomes for natural desegregation, half found an increase in prejudice and the remaining half, a decrease.

The outcomes for African-American children are mixed for all three types of desegregation. In situations where the desegregation was forced, two studies found an increase in prejudice toward Whites, one found a decrease, and one found no change. For voluntary desegregation, prejudice increased in three studies, decreased in three studies, and remained unchanged in one. The results are similar in cases of natural integration. Two studies found increases in prejudice, two showed decreases, and one saw no change.

One can draw the following conclusions from these data. White children who experience forced desegregation tend to become more prejudiced. When desegregation is voluntary or natural, the results are mixed. No such patterns exist when the results for Black children are viewed by type of desegregation; the results are mixed for all three types.

Only three of the studies in Table 8.1 differentiated results by sex. In general, White girls experienced more positive attitude changes as a result of desegregation than White boys, whereas Black girls' attitudes became more negative than those of Black boys (Dentler & Elkins, 1967; Silverman & Shaw, 1973; Singer, 1966). Singer studied fifth-grade children in naturally integrated schools. He found that both White girls and boys displayed positive attitudes toward Blacks, but girls showed the most positive attitudes and were more willing than any other group to associate with Blacks. However, Black girls held negative stereotypes of Whites, whereas the attitudes of Black boys were generally positive. Recall that it was predicted that girls would have more positive attitudes toward other races than boys and that girls' attitudes would change more readily than boys; thus the prediction is not supported for Blacks.

Does the age of the child at the onset of desegregation effect the outcome? The studies in Table 8.1 are divided into three age-related categories for the following discussion. The first group of children experienced desegregation in preschool through second grade, that is, less than 8 years old. For the second group the onset of desegregation was between the third and sixth grades (age 8 to age 12). The third group is Grades 7 through 12 (age 12 to age 18).

First let's look at the results for Black children. Five of the outcomes in Table 8.1 include the youngest age category. Of these, three found an increase in prejudice as a result of desegregation, one showed a decrease and one, no change. The results for the middle age group are similar with five showing an increase in prejudice, two a decrease, and two, no change. For the oldest age group, two of these studies found an increase in prejudice, four showed a decrease, and one showed no change. Thus there is a tendency for the effects of desegregation to be more positive for the older group than for the two younger ones.

The picture for White children is different. Looking at outcomes for the youngest age group, two report an increase in prejudice, two, a decrease and four, no change. For the middle age group the 11 outcomes are fairly evenly divided between an increase in prejudice, a decrease, and no change. In Grades 7 through 12, White children's prejudice increased in five of the studies, decreased in two, and showed no change in three. Thus there is a tendency for the effects of desegregation to be more negative with the older group than for the two younger ones.

Recall that it was predicted that there would be differences in the results of prejudice intervention methods at certain ages, that is, 4, 6 to 7, 10 to 12, 14 to 16, and 18 to 19 years. The results of Table 8.1 do not support this prediction. There does seem to be a shift at age 12 to slightly more prejudice as a result of desegregation for White children and a similar shift to less prejudice for Black students. It is not clear how to interpret these results.

Contact Theory

Why have we not seen a consistent decrease in prejudice for any groups of children as a result of desegregation? One possibility is that the conditions stipulated by Allport (1954) were not met. Recall that Allport's conditions included community sanction, equal status, cooperation, and intimate association.

The desegregation research is relatively mute regarding Allport's (1954) suggestion that community sanction is an important factor in prejudice reduction. In the one case where the community openly supported desegregation, prejudice decreased (see Table 8.1). Five of the studies include negative, neutral, or mixed community reactions. In all these cases, Black and White children either became more prejudiced or their attitudes did not change. These data are insufficient to evaluate community sanction.

None of the schools attempted to modify or equalize status. Reading ability and economic factors play a role in determining status. In forced busing situations, the Black students often came from lower economic neighborhoods and the White students came from suburban middle class schools. Additionally, in many situations, the level of education available in previously segregated Black schools was lower than that available in previously segregated White schools. When these students were brought together, reading ability differences existed. One can conclude that equal status was not attained for the children in the studies.

Allport (1954) also indicated that the pursuit of common objectives or cooperation is an important factor in reducing prejudice. None of the studies included cooperative contact. Hence this aspect of Contact Theory can not be proved or disproved by the literature.

Allport (1954) believed that casual contact reinforced stereotypes and prejudiced attitudes whereas intimate contact served to decrease prejudice. Similar to cooperation, the experiments in Table 8.1 do not indicate whether intimacy existed in the schools studied. Recall that short-term desegregation resulted in an increase or no change in prejudice for White students. This may, in part, be due to the fact that it takes time for intimacy to build and 1 year is not enough.

Given these considerations, it would be surprising if school desegregation had produced the expected decreases in prejudiced attitudes for children because the Contact Theory conditions did not exist in any of the schools. We do know, however, that decreases in prejudice for both White and Black children are possible.

Lewinian Theory

From Lewinian Theory, one could expect desegregation to produce decreases in prejudice for both Black and White children. Let us look at some

of the restraining and driving forces to see how they fit with the data presented in this section.

The expectation of socially inappropriate behavior and discomfort caused by strain in social interactions are forces that restrain White and Black children from changing their attitudes. One might expect interactions in desegregated schools to lessen or eliminate these forces because Black and White children play, interact socially, and perform in comparable ways. This display of socially acceptable behavior by both races of children may not have occurred very often, and if it did, the effects were not consistent in reducing the prejudice of either group.

Respect for authority can be either a restraining or driving force in Lewinian Theory. As already noted, the data in Table 8.1 are relatively mute regarding the effects of community response. It is likely that in most cases, the community was negative or neutral regarding desegregation, but most studies did not report this information.

One of the driving forces to change prejudiced attitudes is empathy. One could expect that desegregation would increase empathy and therefore reduce prejudice. However, the development of empathy requires active contact between members of the two racial groups. If this contact occurred, the effect on empathy was not consistent.

It does not appear that Lewinian Theory is very helpful in explaining the results of desegregation. It is possible, however, that there was not enough interaction between the races in traditional schools for driving forces for change to develop. Later in the chapter, we look at the importance of interaction in changing both attitude and behavior.

MAINSTREAMING

Until 1975, the concept of equal protection under the law did not generalize to disabled children. The *Education for All Handicapped Children Act* changed that and initiated the concept of *mainstreaming*. Mainstreaming refers to the placement of children with disabilities into educational programs for and with nondisabled children (Karnes & Lee, 1979; Safford & Rosen, 1981; Tawney, 1981; A. P. Turnbull & Blacher-Dixon, 1981). Current terminology includes *inclusive education* and the *regular education initiative*.

The first goal of this section is to examine the mainstreaming research. When looking at the results of mainstreaming, many researchers primarily focus on changes in academic and social skills for disabled children. A few have examined changes in prejudice and discrimination for nondisabled children toward the disabled as a result of mainstreaming. We first look at the latter group of studies. Attention is paid to differentiating results by

type of handicap, age, and sex. Next, the first body of literature is discussed in light of the effect changes in academic and social skills may have on nondisabled children's prejudice and discrimination.

The second goal of this section is to interpret the data in terms of two predictions made earlier. First, it was predicted that girls' attitudes toward disabled children will generally be more positive following interventions than those held by boys. Second, it was predicted that age-related differences would occur in the results of mainstreaming. The third and final goal of this section is to discuss the results of mainstreaming in terms of Contact Theory and Lewinian Theory.

The Prejudice and Discrimination Studies

There is a moderate body of literature that examines the effects of mainstreaming on prejudice and discrimination by nondisabled children. Eleven studies are shown in Table 8.2. Experiments dealing with cooperative learning in mainstreamed settings are not included because these types of experiments are specifically dealt with in the following section. The first five studies compare a mainstreamed condition to a segregated condition, whereas the remaining six look at various aspects of mainstreaming. Six of the studies measure prejudice and the remaining five measure discrimination.

Does type of handicap effect the prejudice or discrimination by nondisabled children? The answer is yes. Represented in the studies were children with mild, moderate, and severe mental retardation, orthopedic limitations, emotional disabilities, sensory impairments, and learning disabilities. Some decrease in prejudice and discrimination by nondisabled children was found in relation to all these types of disabilities; but most experiments did not differentiate results by type of disability.

Two studies specifically looked at the reactions of nondisabled children to different types of handicaps. T. Parish, Ohlsen, and J. Parish (1978) used an attitude scale to assess the prejudice of nondisabled children toward children with three types of disabilities. The results indicated a preference in the following order: physically challenged, learning disabled, and emotionally disabled. In a similar study, Miller, Richey, and Lammers (1983) used a social distance scale and determined that nondisabled children preferred learning disabled children more than they did nondisabled ones. The remaining handicaps were preferred in this order: hearing impaired, physically challenged, mildly mentally retarded, and visually impaired. Mainstreaming does generally create more positive attitudes and behaviors toward all types of handicaps. There does however, seem to be a hierarchy of preference by type of handicap.

Examining the studies in Table 8.2 for differences based on the age of the nondisabled students reveals no general patterns, which is inconsistent

TABLE 8.2
Summary of Mainstreaming Study Characteristics and Outcomes

<i>Study</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Grade</i>	<i>#/Type Disability^a</i>	<i>Independent Variable</i>	<i>Dependent Measure</i>	<i>Outcomes for Nondisabled</i>
Archie & Sherrill (1989)	229	4-5	9/MR/PD, SI	Mainstreaming vs. segregated control	Attitude scale	Mainstreamed found handicapped more fun and interesting vs. seg. control.
Gottlieb, Cohen, & Goldstein (1974)	499	3-6	30/MR	Mainstreaming vs. segregated control	Stereotype scale	Mainstreamed less accepting of handicapped vs. seg. control.
Rapier et al. (1972)	152	3-5	25/PD	Mainstreaming (before vs. after) age differences	Attitude scale	Shift to less prejudice toward disabled after mainstreaming. Greater shift for 5th vs. 3rd grade.
Sheare (1974)	400	9	30/MR	Mainstreaming vs. segregated control sex differences	Attitude scale	Mainstreaming more accepting of disabled vs. seg. Girls more accepting vs. boys.
York et al. (1992)	181	7-9	24/MR, PD, SI	Mainstream (before vs. after) academic and behavioral differences for handicapped children	Sociometric playmate	More accepting of disabled after mainstreaming. Perceived positive academic and social skills changes in disabled children.
Brewer & Smith (1989)	457	1-5	20/MR	Number of years mainstreamed (.7-5.7)	Sociometric playmate	No differences based on years mainstreamed.
Goodman et al. (1972)	40	1-6	18/MR	Sex differences	Sociometric friendship	Girls more accepting of disabled vs. boys.
Miller et al. (1983)	?	4-7	?/LD, SI, PD, MR	Type of handicap	Social distance scale	Order of preference: LD, N, HI, PD, MR, VI.
Parish et al. (1978)	131	5-7	?/LD, PD, ED	Type of handicap	Attitude scale	Order of preferences: N, PD, LD, ED.
Roberts & Zubrick (1992)	194	3-7	97/MR	Academic and behavioral differences for handicapped children	Sociometric friendship	Preferred MR children with high-level social and academic skills.
Taylor et al. (1987)	64	3-6	34/MR	Behavioral differences for handicapped children	Sociometric playmate	MR displaying socially acceptable behavior preferred.

^a# = Number of handicapped children in the study. ED = Emotionally Disturbed; MR = Mentally Retarded; VI = Visually Impaired; LD = Learning Disabled; HI = Hearing Impaired; SI = Sensory Impaired; Seg = Segregated; PD = Physically Disabled.

with predicted age effects. Rapier, Adelson, Carey, and Croke (1972), however, did find some age differences. In their study, the attitudes of nondisabled third, fourth, and fifth graders (age 8 to age 11), toward orthopedically disabled children were examined using an attitude scale. Although the overall shift was from neutral to more positive attitudes, the shift was greatest for fifth graders and least for children in the third grade. The failure to find predicted age effects is consistent with the desegregation studies. This implies that social cognitive factors play little part in these two types of nonspecific interventions. In the previous discussion of the prejudice and discrimination literature, the predicted age effects were only found for opposite-sex prejudice and discrimination. In the other categories, consistent with the present findings, age had no systematic impact.

As predicted, there seem to be sex differences in prejudice and discrimination toward the disabled in this research (Table 8.2). Sheare (1974) studied nonhandicapped students, divided equally between boys and girls. Half of the students were placed with mildly mentally retarded children in their classes. The other students had no mentally retarded students in their classes. Sheare found that girls in both mainstreamed schools and segregated schools were less prejudiced than boys in both conditions. Similarly, H. Goodman, Gottlieb, and Harrison (1972) found that girls discriminate less than boys. These studies support the prediction that prejudice held by male children is stronger after the intervention than that held by females.

An additional important question to ask is: Do higher social and academic skills of disabled children result in less prejudice and discrimination by their nondisabled peers? Consistent with the idea of badging mechanisms, the answer is *yes* for discrimination, but there are no data for prejudice. Three of the studies in Table 8.2 link reduced discrimination by nondisabled children with the socially acceptable behavior of disabled children.

York, Vandercook, MacDonald, Heise-Neff, and Caughey (1992) studied nondisabled students in two schools that had been mainstreamed for 1 year when the final data were collected. The results indicated that the nondisabled students perceived positive social skills changes and academic changes in the disabled children, and were also more accepting of them than prior to classroom integration.

The study done by A. R. Taylor et al. (1987) was also noteworthy. They looked at the effects of mentally retarded children's social behavior on discrimination by nonretarded children. Taylor et al. found that retarded children who behaved in socially competent ways were more accepted by their nonretarded peers than those who displayed avoidant and withdrawn behavior or those who were aggressive and disruptive. In a similar study, Roberts and Zubrick (1992) found that both social and academic competency in retarded children were connected with the amount of discrimination by nonretarded children.

These data indicate that social and academic competencies in mainstreamed disabled children do result in less discrimination by their non-disabled peers. Additionally, it is probable that moderately and severely mentally retarded children will experience discrimination by their non-disabled peers because they are less able to display social and academic competence.

The Social and Academic Skill Studies

The question remaining is: Do the social and academic skills of disabled children improve as a result of mainstreaming? We know that social and academic competency for disabled children is connected with decreased discrimination by nondisabled children. We assume that mainstreaming will be effective in reducing discrimination by nondisabled children if improvements in social or academic skills for disabled children occur, which is consistent with badging mechanisms and ingroup favoritism considerations. Four studies were found that connect mainstreaming to the improvement of academic and social skills for primarily mildly mentally retarded preschool children (Cole, Mills, Dale, & Jenkins, 1991; Guralnick & Groom, 1988b; Jenkins, Spelts, Odom, 1985; R. E. Wylie, 1974).

Three of the four studies deal with the effects of mainstreaming on the social skills of disabled children (Guralnick & Groom, 1988b; Jenkins et al., 1985; R. E. Wylie, 1974). The studies are similar with the exception of the subject population, and all of them show higher levels of social skills in the mainstreamed condition than in the segregated condition. R. E. Wylie (1974) studied mildly to moderately retarded preschoolers, Guralnick and Groom (1988b) examined mildly mentally retarded preschoolers, and Jenkins et al. (1985) included mildly mentally retarded, orthopedically challenged, sensory impaired, and normally abled preschoolers. Wylie (1974) looked at social play interactions in mainstreamed and segregated settings. Interactions for all but two of the retarded children increased when the nonretarded children were introduced. The two children who did not display an increase in social play were nonverbal.

Two of the studies were designed to examine the academic skills of disabled children resulting from mainstreaming (Cole et al., 1991; Jenkins et al., 1985). The outcomes of these experiments are not consistent. In Cole et al. (1991) mentally retarded preschoolers in mainstreamed classes were compared with similar students in segregated classes. All students were tested on general cognition, vocabulary, language, and early reading ability prior to beginning their first year of classes and at the end of the school year. The results showed that the higher functioning students gained more academically from integrated classes, whereas those that were functioning at a lower level gained more from segregated classes. No significant differ-

ences were found between variously abled mainstreamed and similar segregated students in the study by Jenkins et al. (1985).

The data just cited indicate that the social and academic skills of high-functioning, disabled preschool children improve as a result of mainstreaming. We saw earlier that this improvement is associated with a decrease in discriminatory behavior by nondisabled children. The results are different for lower functioning, moderately to severely mentally retarded. The social and academic skills of these children do not improve in mainstreamed settings and they continue to be perceived as members of the outgroup. Thus, discrimination by nonretarded children toward their low functioning retarded peers probably remains unchanged.

Contact Theory

Can we explain the decreases in prejudice and discrimination by nondisabled children toward the disabled based on Contact Theory? The answer seems to be *no*. As you will recall, Contact Theory includes equal status, community sanction, cooperative contact, and intimate contact.

There is no evidence to suggest that equal status exists for disabled children anymore than it did for Black children following desegregation (Hertel, 1991). In many studies where a decrease in prejudice or discrimination was seen among the nondisabled students, these students were acting as role models for the disabled children (Snyder, Apolloni, & Cooke, 1977). Additionally, the nondisabled children interacted with the disabled children in a helping way, which seems to be an important factor in reducing discrimination (Cooper, D. W. Johnson, R. T. Johnson, & Wilderson, 1980; D. W. Johnson, R. T. Johnson, & Maruyama, 1983; R. T. Johnson, Rynders, D. W. Johnson, Schmidt, & Haider, 1979). This evidence indicates that equal status is not related to a decrease in prejudice or discrimination by nondisabled children toward the disabled.

Community sanction is the second factor in the Contact Theory. No studies examined community support of mainstreaming. There is, however a debate about the effectiveness of mainstreaming, with strong opinions from both sides. The participants in this debate are parents, educators, and psychologists. There likely is not strong community support for an issue that is being argued so aggressively (M. Bymes, 1990; Davis, 1989; Jenkins, Pious, & Jewell, 1990; Lieberman, 1990).

Cooperative and intimate contact are the final two components. None of these studies included cooperative interactions. Hence this aspect of Contact Theory can not be proved or disproved by the aforementioned literature. Although there was probably intimate contact among the preschool groups, there is no evidence that intimate contact is required to change attitudes or behaviors of nondisabled students toward the disabled. Substantial

research has found that decreases in prejudice and discrimination toward the disabled can occur following lectures and video presentations without any contact (Donaldson, 1980; Lazar, Gensley, & Orpet, 1971; Sedlick & Penta, 1975).

Although Contact Theory appeared to be helpful in explaining the negative results of desegregation, it does not seem to apply to mainstreaming. Most of the criteria were not present in mainstreamed schools where decreases in prejudice were found.

Lewinian Theory

Lewinian Theory may better explain why mainstreaming causes a decrease in prejudice and discrimination. Let us examine some of the driving and restraining forces that are salient. Recall that strain in social interactions is one of the forces in the maintenance of prejudiced attitudes and thus a restraining force to the development of more positive attitudes. Seeing disabled children performing normal tasks in school alleviates this strain, and provides a reduction in the restraining forces.

The expectation of inappropriate social behavior by the disabled is another restraining force and discovering that disabled children behave appropriately reduces the force. The study by Taylor et al. (1987) supported this conclusion. Recall they found that mentally retarded children who behaved in socially acceptable ways were chosen as playmates more by non-retarded children than those who were avoidant and withdrawn or aggressive and disruptive.

Finally, the empathy that nondisabled children feel toward the disabled provides a driving force to positive change in attitudes. It is assumed that "helping behavior" by nondisabled children toward the disabled produces empathy, and hence, prejudice reduction (Donaldson, 1980).

COOPERATIVE INTERACTION

The third substantial body of literature on prejudice and discrimination reduction is based on cooperative interaction. Slavin and Cooper (1999) described eight different types of school-based approaches, but all share the following common characteristics. Cooperation implies that there must be positive goal interdependence, which can take the form of shared rewards, divided resources, or complementary roles (D. W. Johnson & R. T. Johnson, 1992). *Interaction* means that children work or talk together as a group as opposed to simply occupying the same room, and working individually. The groups may be formally structured by the teacher, lasting one class pe-

riod to several weeks, informal and not structured by the teacher, or "base" groups that last an entire term (D. W. Johnson & R. T. Johnson, 2000).

The first goal of this section is to discuss the results of the cooperative interaction research. The second goal is to interpret the data in terms of two predictions made earlier. The first prediction is based on the idea that badging mechanisms during cooperative interaction lead to perceptions of similarity of ingroup and outgroup members, which in turn lead to inclusion of both groups into a single overarching group (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2000). This should lead to ingroup favoritism of the inclusive group. It is expected, then, that cooperative interaction will reduce prejudice and discrimination toward outgroup members who become cooperative teammates. This reduction is not expected to generalize to all members of the same outgroup because they have not been part of the cooperative interactions. The second prediction is that one would expect differences in the effects of prejudice and discrimination reduction interventions at ages 4, 6 to 7, 10 to 12, 14 to 16, and 18 to 19 years. The third and final goal of this section is to discuss the results of cooperative interaction in terms of Contact Theory and Lewinian Theory.

The Studies

Table 8.3 contains 20 studies that examined the effects of cooperative interaction in academic settings on prejudice and discrimination toward different racial and ethnic groups and the opposite sex, as well as discrimination toward the disabled. Three of the experiments measured prejudice and discrimination toward more than one comparison group (outgroup). Fourteen findings pertained to racial/ethnic prejudice or discrimination, three pertained to opposite-sex, and six, to prejudice and discrimination between disabled and nondisabled children. The average sample size was 134 subjects but the number ranged from 11 to 558. The children in these studies ranged in age from 7 to 18 years (Grade 2 to Grade 12), but most were in the 5th through 10th grade.

The interventions took on average 1 hour each day for 4 weeks. The only brief intervention (15 minutes) was in the P. A. Katz and Zalk (1978) experiment. A variety of dependent measures were used. The first four studies listed in Table 8.3 included some measure of attitude toward the outgroup in the general population. The second grouping of experiments, six in all, utilized observations to measure behavior toward classmates. The remaining ten experiments collected sociometric data. Four of the experiments included follow-up data ranging from 2 weeks after the intervention to 9 months.

Fourteen of the studies in Table 8.3 had children working in cooperative teams as the single experimental condition. The majority of these experi-

TABLE 8.3
Summary of Cooperative Contact Study Characteristics and Outcomes

<i>Study</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Grade</i>	<i>Doss/Hrs. Per Day</i>	<i>Dependent Measure</i>	<i>Comparison Group</i>	<i>Outcomes/Follow-up</i>	
						<i>Attitude</i>	<i>Behavior</i>
<i>Attitude</i>							
Weigel et al. (1975)	324	7 & 10	100/1	Attitude scale	Black	+0 ^a	0
				Activity preference	White	+0	0
				Sociometric friend & playmate	Hispanic	+0	+
D. W. Johnson et al. (1978)	30	5-6	50/1	Activity preference	Euro ^b	+0	+
				Attitude scale	Girls	+	+
				Sociometric friend	Boys	+	+
P. A. Katz & Zalk (1978)	40	2&5	1/1/4	Attitude scale	Black	0/0	0/0
				Social distance	White	0/0	0/0
				Sociometric friend			
Ziegler (1981)	146	5-6	10/1/½	2-week follow-up			
				Attitude scale	Italian	+/0	+/+
				Sociometric friend	Asian	+/0	+/+
				10-week follow-up	Greek	+/0	+I+
					West Indian	+/0	+I+
	Euro	+/0	+I+				
<i>Behavior: Observation</i>							
R. T. Johnson et al. (1979)	30	7-9	6/1	Observation	Retarded		+
Martino & D. W. Johnson (1979)	12	2-3	9/1	Observation	Nonretarded		+
					LD ^c		+
Rynders et al. (1980)	30	7-10	8/1	Observation	Nondisabled		+
					Retarded		+
D. W. Johnson & R. T. Johnson (1981)	51	4	16/1	Observation	Nonretarded		+
					Black		+
					Sociometric playmate	White	
Rogers et al. (1981)	11	6	4/½	Observation	Black		+
					White		+

D. W. Johnson & R. T. Johnson (1982)	76	4	15/1	Observation Sociometric friend 5-month follow-up	Black White	+/+ +/+
<i>Behavior: Sociometric</i>						
Ballard et al. (1977)	200	3-5	40/½	Sociometric playmate	Retarded Nonretarded	+ +
Blaney et al. (1977)	304	5	18/1	Sociometric playmate	Black White Hispanic	+ + +
Slavin (1977)	65	7	20/1	Sociometric friend	Euro Black White	+ + +
DeVries et al. (1978)	558	7-12	18/4	Sociometric friend	Black White	+ +
Slavin (1979)	294	7-8	50/1	Sociometric friend 9-month follow-up	Black White	+/+ +/+
Armstrong et al. (1981)	40	5-6	20/1½	Sociometric friend	LD Nondisabled	+ +
Cooper et al. (1980)	60	7	15/3	Sociometric friend	Girls Boys Black White LD Nondisabled	+ + + + + +
Slavin & Oickle (1981)	230	6-8	50/1	Sociometric friend	Black White	+ +
D. W. Johnson & R. T. Johnson (1985)	48	6	10/1	Sociometric playmate	Black White	+ +
Warring et al. (1985)	125	4&6	11/1	Sociometric friend	Girls Boys Black White	+ + + +

" +0 = Positive change toward classmates, no change in general attitude. bEuro = European-American. cLD = Learning disabled.

ments included some interaction between teams within a class. The control condition in 18 of the studies involved children working individually. Six of the experiments included two experimental conditions, one cooperative and one competitive. The results from the competitive conditions are discussed together at the end of this section.

Opposite-Sex Prejudice and Discrimination

One of the studies in Table 8.3 examined the effects of cooperative interaction on opposite-sex prejudice and two examined the effects on discrimination. The first is by D. W. Johnson, R. T. Johnson, and Scott (1978). White students were divided into cooperative and control conditions. In the cooperative condition, the students worked in teams on math assignments completing one answer sheet per team. They were instructed to share ideas and seek clarification from each other and were rewarded and praised as a group.

Two measures of opposite-sex prejudice were used following the intervention, an activity preference scale and an attitude scale. The results from both measures indicated that boys and girls in the experimental condition were less prejudiced toward the opposite sex than their counterparts in the control condition.

The cooperative condition for Cooper et al. (1980) and Warring, D. W. Johnson, Maruyama, and R. T. Johnson (1985) also included children working together in teams on school assignments. Increases in opposite-sex friendship choices toward classmates were found following cooperative interaction when compared with the control.

The three studies just cited indicate that cooperative interaction does reduce discrimination toward opposite-sex classmates and prejudice toward unknown members of the opposite sex. The latter results do not support the prediction that cooperative interaction will only have effects for the outgroup classmates worked with and not for unknown members of that outgroup. This generalization of effects phenomenon is consistent with the conclusions of a meta-analysis by Pettigrew and Tropp (2000) evaluating a wide range of studies on intergroup contact exclusive of school-based cooperative interactions.

Racial and Ethnic Prejudice and Discrimination

Does cooperative interaction also effect attitudes and behaviors between different racial and ethnic groups? Fourteen studies in Table 8.3 examined the effects of cooperative interaction on racial/ethnic prejudice and discrimination. Of the 17 outcomes reported, 3 measured prejudice and 14 measured discrimination.

Weigel, Wiser, and Cook (1975) compared White and minority (African-American and Mexican-American) students in cooperative English classes with those in a control group. In the cooperative condition, students worked in teams, and their grades were rewarded individually with bonus points given based on group performance.

A stereotype scale was used to assess prejudice toward classmates, whereas an attitude scale and an activity preference scale were used to measure prejudice toward unknown members of the other racial and ethnic groups. The results of the stereotype scale indicated a decrease in racial/ethnic prejudice toward classmates. The results of the other two measures showed no differences in racial/ethnic prejudice following either the cooperative intervention or the control situation.

P. A. Katz and Zalk (1978) had children putting together jigsaw puzzles for 15 minutes. The children in the experimental groups were White and Black. The control groups were exclusively White children who also worked together on jigsaw puzzles. The dependent measures, an attitude scale and a social distance scale, were administered before the intervention, immediately following, and 2 weeks later. The results showed no difference in cross-racial prejudice either immediately following or 2 weeks after the intervention.

Ziegler (1981) did find changes in attitudes toward other ethnic groups following cooperative interaction. Conducted in Toronto, the study included Anglo Canadians, West Indian Canadians, Chinese Canadians, Greek Canadians, and Italian Canadians. Children in the experimental condition learned material and then taught that material to their teammates. Quizzes were given biweekly and each child's grade was composed of an individual score and a home team score.

The dependent measure, an attitude scale, was administered before, immediately after, and 10 weeks after the intervention. At the end of the experiment, the children in the cooperative condition showed a significantly greater increase in positive attitudes toward other ethnic groups than did those in the control condition. The effects substantially decreased 10 weeks later and were no longer statistically significant.

These three studies taken together indicate that lasting changes in racial/ethnic attitudes toward the general population do not occur as a result of cooperative interaction. When a change was noted, the effects disappeared within 10 weeks. Although the data are limited, attitudes toward outgroup classmates seem to improve following cooperative interaction.

No age effects were noted in any of these experiments. The studies included children in Grade 2 through Grade 10 (ages 7 to 16) and the results were the same regardless of the age group.

Of the 14 experiments in Table 8.3 that measured racial/ethnic discrimination, 3 used observations as the dependent measure. The first of these, by

Rogers, Miller, and Hennigan (1981), studied Black and White girls for 2 weeks during recess. Cooperative interactions consisted of playing cooperative games 2 days per week. The girls were observed prior to and following the experiment. Prosocial cross-racial interactions increased significantly on a pre-post comparison.

In support of these data, D. W. Johnson and R. T. Johnson (1981, 1982) observed White and Black students in their two experiments. In the cooperative condition, the students worked together in teams to finish their school work. Each team completed one answer sheet and was rewarded as a group. In order to observe behaviors, 10 minutes of free time were given after each class. Significantly more cross-racial interaction was noted between students in the cooperative condition than those in the control condition.

These three studies taken together indicate that cross-racial discrimination decreases as a result of cooperative interaction. The experiment by D. W. Johnson and R. T. Johnson (1982) indicated that the positive changes may be long-lasting (5 months).

Thirteen studies in Table 8.3 used sociometric data to measure racial/ethnic friendship and playmate choices as related to cooperative interaction. The first of these are by Weigel et al. (1975), P. A. Katz and Zalk (1978), and Ziegler (1981), described earlier in this section. Both Weigel et al. (1975) and P. A. Katz and Zalk (1978) found no differences for Whites or Blacks between the cooperative condition and the control condition on measures of playmate or friendship choice. However, Weigel et al. (1975) and Ziegler (1981) did find positive changes regarding cross-ethnic (other than Black/White) preferences. Additionally, Ziegler's results held on follow-up 10 weeks later.

Slavin (1977, 1979), Slavin and Oickle (1981), and DeVries, Edwards, and Slavin (1978) measured cross-racial Black and White friendship choices before and after cooperative interactions. Slavin (1977, 1979) included Black and White students from two different English classes in both experiments. Slavin and Oickle (1981) and DeVries et al. (1978) included students studying a variety of subjects. The small teams of adolescents in the experimental condition listened to a presentation from the teacher and then worked together to learn the material. They were quizzed individually and each team was given a score based on the average performance of its members on the quizzes. The results of all four studies indicated a greater increase in cross-racial friendship choices following cooperative interaction when compared with the control condition. Additionally, the Slavin (1979) experiment included a 9-month follow-up, which indicated that the results are long-lasting.

Six similar experiments confirmed the just mentioned pattern of results (Blaney, C. Stephan, Rosenfield, Aronson, & Sikes, 1977; Cooper et al., 1980; D. W. Johnson & R. T. Johnson 1981, 1982, 1985; Warring et al.,

1985). All found more racial/ethnic friendship or playmate choices following the cooperative condition when compared with the control. D. W. Johnson and R. T. Johnson (1982) showed that the effect lasted 5 months after the intervention.

These 13 studies taken together indicate that racial/ethnic discrimination generally decreases immediately following and up to 9 months after cooperative interaction in classroom settings has occurred. Additionally, the results from the Blaney et al. (1977) experiment indicated that the decrease is greater toward cooperative teammates than toward other children in the class. This finding is consistent with the idea that ingroup favoritism is restricted to members of the cooperatively interacting group.

When examined together, the 14 studies on the effects of cooperative interaction on racial/ethnic prejudice and discrimination support the prediction that cooperative interaction would reduce prejudice and discrimination toward outgroup members who become cooperative teammates but not necessarily toward unknown members of the outgroup. The Weigel et al. (1975) study showed less racial/ethnic prejudice toward teammates in the cooperative condition but these results did not generalize to unknown members of another race or ethnic group. When racial/ethnic attitudes toward the general population did show some change it was not long-lasting. However, using a wider context of intergroup contact than cooperative interaction, Pettigrew and Tropp (2000) found generalization of positive effects. They did not report about long-term effects. Thus, this latter issue is still unresolved.

The results of these studies do not, however, support the second prediction made at the beginning of this section that there would be age differences in the effects of cooperative interventions. In general, irrespective of age, attitudes toward unknown members of other racial/ethnic groups do not change as a result of cooperative interaction. Racial/ethnic attitudes and behaviors toward known classmates become more positive for children of all ages as a result of cooperative interventions.

Discrimination Toward the Disabled

The remaining group for whom we need to evaluate results is the disabled. None of the studies in Table 8.3 measured attitude change toward the disabled as a result of cooperation. Six of the studies did, however, measure discrimination. Of these, three used observations and three used sociometric data.

R. T. Johnson et al. (1979) and Rynders et al. (1980) studied mildly mentally retarded and nonretarded students. In both studies, the children were placed into a cooperative or a control condition. Those in the cooperative

condition were instructed to improve their group bowling score, whereas control condition students were instructed to improve their individual scores. Nonretarded children in the cooperative condition interacted positively with and cheered for the retarded children more than did those in the control condition.

In a similar study, Martino and D. W. Johnson (1979) used swimming instead of bowling and learning disabled instead of retarded children. Observations were done in a 15-minute free-swim period after each class. In the cooperative condition, the number of friendly interactions between learning disabled and nonlearning disabled children increased and the number of hostile interactions decreased over time, whereas those in the individual condition stayed the same.

What happens when sociometric data are used in place of observations to measure discrimination? Ballard, Corman, Gottlieb, and Kaufman (1977) studied mildly retarded and nonretarded children in a cooperative and a control condition. The cooperative experience was created by placing children in teams where they worked together to produce a multimedia presentation (e.g., a slide show or skit). One of the teams in each classroom contained a retarded student and two or more teams did not. On completion of the presentations, new teams were formed for a second cycle of the process. Children in the control condition continued with their normal class work throughout the 8 week experiment.

Sociometric playmate choice questionnaires were given before and after the experiment. Nonretarded children in the cooperative condition who had a chance to work with a retarded student chose their retarded peers more often as playmates than did either those in the experimental condition who did not work with a retarded child or those in the control condition. Additionally, because all nonretarded children in the experimental condition interacted positively with retarded children, their liking for their retarded peers increased when compared to the control group.

Similar experiments were conducted by Armstrong, D. W. Johnson, and Balow (1981) and Cooper et al. (1980). The Cooper et al. (1980) study was described earlier. Differences between the two studies are noted in Table 8.3 and include subject age and educational content. The results of both experiments indicated that nonlearning disabled students in the cooperative condition chose their learning disabled peers more often as friends than did similar students in an individual setting.

Two predictions were made at the beginning of this section: one regarding outcomes toward cooperative teammates versus those toward unknown outgroup members, and one regarding age differences. Although it is evident from these six experiments that the behavior of nondisabled children toward their disabled classmates changes as a result of cooperative interaction, we do not know if these changes generalize to other handicapped per-

sons nor whether attitudes change as well. Additionally, there were no systematic differences in results based on age of the subject.

Competitive Studies

As mentioned at the beginning of this section, six of the experiments included a competitive condition. In four of these, the competitive condition was confounded by mixing cooperation and competition, that is, a cooperative team competed with another cooperative team for rewards (DeVries et al., 1978; D. W. Johnson & R. T. Johnson, 1985; Rynders et al., 1980; Warring et al., 1985). In the remaining two studies, children in the competitive condition were instructed to outperform their teammates, and rewards were given to the winners (Cooper et al., 1980; D. W. Johnson & R. T. Johnson, 1982). The results of these studies were mixed. Three of the experiments found less discrimination as a result of competitive interaction and three found no difference between the competitive condition and the control.

Contact Theory

Can the results of these cooperative interaction studies be understood in terms of Contact Theory? Let's look at each aspect of the theory.

Does equal status exist in cooperative interaction studies? In many of the studies, the answer is *yes*, but in the studies on behavior toward disabled children particularly, the answer is *no*. In the majority of these studies, nonhandicapped children felt they helped their handicapped peers but did not feel that those peers helped them. Does cooperation exist? The answer to this question is definitely *yes*. How about community sanction? It would probably appear to the children that the teacher or facilitator is sanctioning working together and in many of these studies, such behavior is rewarded by the authority figures present. So the answer is *yes*.

Finally, does intimacy exist? We have to answer *yes* to this question also. Groups of children teaching, assisting, and encouraging each other seems as intimate as most other types of contact they may have. So it appears that with the exception of equal status between normally developing and disabled children, the Contact Theory does help us explain these results.

Lewinian Theory

Lewinian Theory is also useful in explaining the results of this research. Let's examine some of the driving and restraining forces that are salient.

You recall from the previous section on mainstreaming that strain in social interactions is a restraining force to the development of positive atti-

tudes and behaviors. Working with children who are different from oneself (e.g., opposite-sex, differently abled, different race) over a period of time and finding out that they are not so very different would decrease this restraining force.

A second restraining force that pertains to cooperative interaction is authority acceptance. This force is decreased when the authority figure (teacher) sanctions and rewards those who are interacting together.

The final restraining force is the discomfort caused by the expectation of inappropriate social behavior. **In** many of these studies, it was found that off-task or inappropriate behavior decreased in the cooperative setting. This would indicate that the children in these groups behaved appropriately and worked well together. Thus this restraining force is also decreased with cooperative interaction.

The development of empathy would be a driving force to change attitudes and behavior. The opportunity to work with and help their different race, disabled, or opposite-sex peers would aid in the development of empathy. The result of this would be to increase this driving force.

THE MEDIA

The effects of media, particularly television and movies, on attitude change have been of high interest since the dawn of television. **In** their book on the influence of media, Liebert and Sprafkin (1988) detailed research that shows that the media are effective in reinforcing existing attitudes and modifying rather than completely revising them. **In** a study done by Alper and Leidy (1970), they found that television was a useful medium for immediately changing attitudes and that these changes were smaller but still present 6 months later. Given the evidence that the media affects attitudes, it is important to discuss how it effects prejudice in children.

There are two goals of this section. The first is to present the results of studies on the effects of media on prejudice and discrimination reduction in children. It is expected, based on the roles of badging mechanisms, which can lead to perceptions of outgroup similarity, and outgroup attraction, which can lead to the perception of valued characteristics in outgroup members, that carefully designed television programs will lead to decreased prejudice and discrimination. The second is to discuss the results in terms of Contact Theory and Lewinian Theory.

The Studies

Five studies that measure the effects of television and film on prejudice in children are described in the next few pages (Gorn, Goldberg, & Kanungo, 1976; Graves, 1999; Houser, 1978; Kraus, 1972; Westervelt & McKinney,

1980). The studies used a variety of methods to measure prejudice. The children in the studies ranged in age from 3 to 17 years (preschool to 11th grade).

The first study was by Kraus (1972) and included 11th grade (ages 16 to 17), White adolescents. An 11-minute film showing two teachers aiding an African-American student in applying and getting into a White private college was the experimental manipulation. Four versions of the film, varying the races of the teachers, were produced: (a) both teachers were White, (b) both teachers were Black, (c) one White and one Black teacher, and (d) one Black and one White teacher (roles reversed). The study design included a pretest, a posttest, and a control group.

An attitude scale and a social distance scale were used to measure prejudice. The results indicated that both versions of the film that included both a Black and a White teacher were effective in reducing prejudice when compared to both the control group and the pretest data. The other two versions did not produce attitude change.

In the study by Corn et al. (1976) White, English-Canadian preschoolers (ages 3 to 4) viewed *Sesame Street*. Professionally produced, 2- to 3-minute-long segments of children playing together in various settings were inserted into the program. Two versions of each segment were produced; (a) an integrated version with White, Oriental, and American-Indian children, and (b) a minority only version with Oriental and American-Indian children. Subjects in the experimental condition saw one of the two versions of the inserted segments, whereas those in the control condition watched *Sesame Street* with no inserts.

To measure prejudice, an activity preference scale was administered. The results indicated that children viewing either the integrated segment or the minority only segment were significantly less prejudiced toward Oriental and American-Indian children than those in the control group.

The third study was by Houser (1978) and included White, Black, Oriental, and Hispanic kindergarten through third-grade children (ages 5 to 9). For the experimental group, Houser (1978) created films showing children of different ethnic groups talking to each other. Much of the talk centered around the idea that appearance and skin color are not important when relating to others. The control condition saw no films.

A stereotype rating scale was used to measure prejudice. The findings indicated that prejudice decreased following the experimental manipulations. The results held equally well regardless of age, sex, ethnicity of the subject, and ethnicity of the tester.

The fourth study was done by Westervelt and McKinney (1980). Fourth-grade (ages 9 to 10) boys and girls completed a pretest and a posttest. The experimental condition involved a 13-minute film showing physically disabled children in wheelchairs participating with nondisabled children in

physical education and classroom activities. The control group saw no films.

A social distance questionnaire and a stereotype rating scale were used to evaluate both a child in a wheelchair and another one with leg braces using crutches (as a test for generalization). Prejudice was assessed in three situations: school, home, and peer group. The measures were administered immediately following the film and again 9 days later.

Both measures showed that prejudice toward children in wheelchairs decreased both when compared to the pretest and to the control group. However, attitudes toward children on crutches were unaffected. Nine days later the positive changes disappeared.

The fifth study, by Graves (1999), summarized two unpublished evaluation projects of the video curriculum, *Different and the Same*, designed for classroom use with early elementary children. The subjects in Graves' research were predominantly third graders. The nine 12- to 15-minute videos use racially/ethnically neutral puppets and racially/ethnically diverse adult actors who model successful cross racial/ethnic interactions. Conflict resolution is a featured aspect of these videos. Various behavioral, attitudinal, and cognitive measures were used with the experimental groups, who saw and discussed the videos, and the control groups, who did not. In general, this video curriculum was very successful in changing prejudice, discrimination, and stereotyping, although the effects were not equivalent for all racial/ethnic groups.

Although the number of studies just described is small, the results consistently show that television and film have an immediate impact in reducing prejudice and discrimination in children and adolescents. The films were effective regardless of the age, race, or sex of the subjects. The results were similar for prejudice toward Black, Oriental, Hispanic, and wheelchair-bound children. It is interesting to note that in the Westervelt and McKinney (1980) study, prejudice reduction was observed only toward the specific physical disability shown and the results did not generalize to children on crutches. Additionally, the positive effects were short-lived. Further research is needed to determine long-term effects for media interventions. Fishbein (1984) summarized research dealing with the impact of television on attitude change and found that unless the interventions were repeated, the effects were usually short-lived.

Contact Theory

One might say that Contact Theory does not apply to these media studies because no actual contact exists. It is, however, interesting to note the aspects of the theory that are present. The films contain children who are working together (cooperation) in a way that denotes equal status and

intimacy. We cannot know if the subjects presume that community sanction exists.

Lewinian Theory

Lewinian Theory may be more helpful in explaining this research. Viewing children working and playing together would decrease the restraining forces that serve to maintain prejudice. The subjects could see that the Black or disabled children in the films were similar to themselves in some ways and that they behaved appropriately. This would decrease the strain in social interactions and discomfort caused by expectations of inappropriate behavior. Additionally, empathy (driving force) would be increased by viewing and getting to know these children on the screen.

ROLE-PLAYING SIMULATIONS

There is evidence that role-playing is an effective way to change attitudes. It is believed that increased empathy underlies these attitude changes (Doyle & Aboud, 1995; W. G. Stephan & Finlay, 1999). Increased empathy may have its effects in several ways. Following the evolutionary model, empathy may lead to outgroup attraction in that it highlights the positive qualities of the outgroup, a view that can best be attained through being "in their shoes." Prejudice reduction may also occur through enhanced empathy by decreasing the psychological distance between ingroup and outgroup members, making it more difficult psychologically to treat them as the "other." This phenomenon may lead to the perception of increased similarity between these groups, and thereby decreased prejudice.

Research has shown that people will change their attitudes about an issue through simple role play (Janis & King, 1954; King & Janis, 1956; Mann & Janis, 1968; McGuire, 1985). A study done by Clore and Jeffrey (1972) revealed that college students became significantly less prejudiced toward the physically disabled after playing the role of a person in a wheelchair. Byrnes and Kiger (1990) found that White college students' attitudes toward Black people improved following a role play designed by Jane Elliott called "Blue Eyes-Brown Eyes" (Peters, 1985). Elliott designed this simulation, following the death of Martin Luther King, Jr., which allowed her third-grade students to feel the effects of discrimination. Doyle and Aboud (1995) found in a naturalistic longitudinal study that third-grade children whose role-taking abilities increased the most from kindergarten showed the largest reductions in prejudice.

The central question is: Are role-playing simulations of any value in changing the attitudes of White children toward Black children, nondis-

abled children toward the disabled, or boys toward girls? The first goal of this section is to examine the literature that investigates race prejudice as well as prejudice toward the disabled. No studies were found that examined the effectiveness of simulations for changing opposite-sex prejudice. The second goal is to discuss the results in terms of Contact Theory and Lewinian Theory.

The Studies

Five simulation studies were found that dealt with changing prejudice in children through active role-play simulations (Dahl, Horsman, & Arkell, 1978; Handlers & Austin, 1980; Margo, 1983; Marsh & Friedman, 1972; Weiner & Wright, 1973). The dependent variable in all of the experiments was prejudice. **In** none of the studies was discrimination measured.

Three of the studies included students role-playing disabilities involving motor skills (Dahl et al., 1978; Handlers & Austin, 1980; Margo, 1983). All of these found a decrease in prejudice following the simulation. Dahl et al. (1978) used fifth-grade (age 10 to 11) classes in their experiment. The classes were pre- and posttested using a social distance scale and an attitude scale. **In** the experimental condition, students spent 10 minutes experiencing each of three disabilities: hearing, visual, and a physical impairment. Decreases in prejudice toward deaf or blind people were not found. The only decrease in prejudice noted was toward the other physical impairment group, in connection to maneuvering a wheelchair.

The research done by Margo (1983) had similar results. **In** Margo's study, each fifth- and sixth-grade (age 10 to 12) student role played four physical impairments by restraining fingers, using crutches and leg weights, and maneuvering a wheelchair. Margo found decreases in prejudice only toward people in wheelchairs when compared to the pretest. There were no similar decreases toward the other three impairments.

For both of these experiments, the difference between decreasing prejudice and no effects seems to lie in the realness of the simulation. Restraining a finger or using leg weights may simulate an experience close to what a disabled person feels, but everyone knows that disabled persons do not wear leg weights. The participants are also likely to realize the potential of being in a wheelchair in their own life, whereas the potential of waking up one morning to find two fingers fused together is nonexistent.

Blindness was simulated in three of the studies (Dahl et al., 1978; Handlers & Austin, 1980; Marsh & Friedman, 1972). Two of these experiments showed a decrease in prejudice toward the blind following the role play and one found no difference. Close inspection of the studies to determine the cause of these discrepant results revealed a difference in the setting of the

experiments. The two studies that found a decrease in prejudice were part of a larger program that included discussions about stereotypes and the students' feelings about blindness and blind people, whereas the third study contained no such discussions. These data indicated that simulations that may have limited effect in isolation can have a greater effect if a well-facilitated, relevant discussion is held before and after the role play.

Only one of the experiments examined the effects of role playing on race prejudice (Weiner & Wright, 1973). The simulation was based on Jane Elliot's "Blue Eyes-Brown Eyes," mentioned earlier. In their experiment, Weiner and Wright divided a third-grade (age 8 to age 9) class into two groups distinguished by green and orange armbands. On the first day, the class was told that the Orange students were smarter, cleaner, and better behaved than the Green students. Orange children were also granted special privileges and praised throughout the day whereas the Green children were criticized. On day two, the situation was reversed, allowing the Green children to be the superior group. The simulation became very real for the students and tension between the groups developed.

The principal results using pre- and posttest comparisons were that the children held less racial prejudice and were more likely to commit to having future crossracial interactions following the simulation. The effects were strong immediately following the role play and again 2 weeks later. The data fit nicely with the anecdotal evidence from Elliot's third-grade students both when she performed the simulation and later when the students became adults (Peters, 1985).

These studies show that simulations can be effective in reducing prejudice in children. In order to be effective, the simulations must be as real as possible. Discussions before and after the role play are important both to attitude change and to alleviate any stress felt by the participants during the experience. As with the media research, the long-term effects of these interventions are not known.

Contact Theory

It is difficult to make the connection between the effectiveness of role-play simulations in reducing prejudice and Contact Theory. The factors in Contact Theory are equal status, community sanction, cooperative contact, intimate contact, and the situation must be real. Role plays do not promote equal status. As a matter of fact, simulations like the one done by Weiner and Wright (1973) seem to rely on the feelings of "superiority" and "inferiority" felt by the participants. Furthermore, community sanction, intergroup cooperation, and intimate contact are not present in these situations.

Lewinian Theory

Lewinian Theory is useful in explaining the results of this research. The development of empathy for disabled persons or persons of other races during the simulation experience (Kiger, 1992) would be a driving force to developing more positive attitudes toward those persons. There are no obvious restraining forces produced by the simulations.

INDIVIDUATION AND SELF-ACCEPTANCE

The final body of literature discussed is the research on individuation and self-acceptance. A definition of each will help get us started. *Individuation* is the process of differentiating people from one another. The process applies to separating one's self from others (*self-individuation*) or differentiating other individuals from the groups to which they belong. Self-acceptance is part of the self-individuation process (Aboud, 1988). It is defined by Rubin (1967a) to mean "a willingness to confront ego-alien as well as ego-syntonic aspects of the self and to accept rather than deny their existence" (p. 234). In other words, a person with high *self-acceptance* recognizes and accepts all aspects of the self, and a person with low self-acceptance sees and accepts only some aspects of him or herself while denying that other aspects exist. The *ego-alien* or *denied aspects* of the self are generally those that society deems "unacceptable." It is important to note the difference between self-acceptance and self-esteem. *Self-esteem*, simply put, is pride in oneself. An individual can be low in self-acceptance and high in self-esteem—denying some aspects of the self while maintaining pride in who she or he believes herself or himself to be.

Much of the literature on self-acceptance is based on the research detailed in *The Authoritarian Personality* (Adorno et al., 1950). One of the conclusions of that research can be summarized as follows: Nonprejudiced people are aware of both their "acceptable" and "unacceptable" characteristics, whereas prejudiced people tend not to see their "unacceptable" characteristics and fail to integrate them into their self-image.

As will be seen, the research evidence supports the view that both self-individuation and individuation of others leads to decreases in prejudice. This effect is brought about by allowing people to set aside outgroup stereotypes and to treat others as individuals. When this is done, people come to perceive similarities between others and self, and to find positive or admired qualities in the others. As noted in a previous section, the latter is an example of the evolutionary factor of outgroup attractiveness. Self-individuation probably produces these effects by being correlated with a predisposition to seek out or observe individuating characteristics of others,

thereby breaking down categorical judgments of them. Fiske (2000) referred to this latter process as "moving perceivers from the category-based (e.g., race-based) to the attribute-based (i.e., individual trait-based) end of the continuum" (p. 116).

A search of the literature locates nine studies that look at the relationship between self-individuation and prejudice. Of these, seven deal with people between the ages of 19 and 59 (Berger, 1952; Cook, 1972; D. Katz, Sarnoff, & McClintock, 1956, 1957; Rubin, 1967a; Sheerer, 1949; Stotland, D. Katz, & Patchen, 1972), and two deal with children and adolescents between the ages of 9 and 18 (Phillips, 1951; Trent, 1957). A variety of measures have been used for both self-acceptance and prejudice. The next section contains more information on each experiment.

There are two goals of this section. The first is to present the literature on individuation, including the self-acceptance research. The second goal is to discuss the results in terms of Contact Theory and Lewinian Theory.

Research on Children

Both of the studies that used children and adolescents as subjects were designed to determine if a correlation exists between self-acceptance and prejudice (Phillips, 1951; Trent, 1957). In both experiments, two questionnaires were designed and validated, one to measure self-acceptance and one to measure racial/ethnic attitudes. Phillips (1951) administered his scales to White high school (age 15 to age 18) and college (age 18 to age 21) students. His attitude scale measured prejudice toward other racial and ethnic groups. Trent (1957) looked at self-acceptance and prejudice in 9- through 18-year-old (Grades 4 to 12) Black children. His attitude questionnaire was organized according to the three dimensions of racial prejudice: cognitive, emotional and behavioral intention. The results of both experiments showed that high self-acceptance was correlated with low prejudice.

Research on Adults

Correlational studies have also been done with adults. Of the seven studies on adults, three examined the relationship between self-acceptance and prejudice. Sheerer (1949) studied counseling cases (White adults) for statements of self-acceptance and racial/ethnic prejudice. Berger (1952) measured self-acceptance and racial/ethnic prejudice for White college students (age 18 to age 21). In a study designed to assess the effects of contact with Blacks on White college students, Cook (1972) administered pre- and posttests measuring self-acceptance and racial attitudes. All three experiments showed that high self-acceptance was correlated with low racial/ethnic prejudice.

Sheerer (1949) also examined counseling cases for changes over time. Sheerer found an increase in self-acceptance during the course of therapy and a corresponding decrease in prejudiced attitudes. This was the first study that suggested that there was more than just a correlation between the two characteristics.

Katz et al. (1956, 1957) and Stotland et al. (1972) also found a cause and effect relationship between self-acceptance and prejudice toward African Americans. All three studies included White college students, and a series of pretests and posttests. Self-acceptance was assessed using a projective story completion test. Measures of prejudice were a stereotype scale and a social distance scale. In order to influence self-acceptance, each subject was asked to read a paper on denial and projection and a related case study. The case history described the life story of a college student and her or his struggles with denial and self-acceptance. It was designed to produce self-acceptance on the part of the subject. The results of all three experiments indicated that self-acceptance increased as a result of the intervention, which was accompanied by a corresponding decrease in prejudice.

In support of the study just cited, Rubin (1967a, 1967b) found that prejudice toward Black people decreased following an intervention designed to increase self-acceptance. Rubin's study was detailed in two separate articles. His experiment consisted of White participants in a 2-week sensitivity training workshop. The subjects ranged in age from 23 to 59 years, and the study design included a pretest, a posttest, and a control group. The participants served as their own control by being tested 2 weeks prior to the experiment and again at the onset of the study. A sentence completion test was used to measure self-acceptance and an attitude scale assessed prejudice toward African Americans. Rubin found that as a result of the workshop, the participants' self-acceptance increased and their prejudice decreased.

The nine studies just described indicate that self-individuation leads to decreased prejudice. The first five experiments showed a negative correlation between self-acceptance (individuation) and prejudice. The remaining four studies showed that interventions that increased self-acceptance also decreased racial/ethnic prejudice. There were no experiments that measured discrimination.

Individuation of Others

Only a few experiments were found that linked individuation of others with prejudice. (Aboud & Fenwick, 1999; P. A. Katz, 1973; P. A. Katz & Zalk, 1978; Langer, Bashner, & Chanowitz, 1985). The subjects in Katz's studies were second-, fifth-, and sixth-grade (age 7 to age 8 and age 11 to age 12) White and Black students from integrated schools. An attitude scale, a social distance scale, and a stereotype scale were administered before and af-

ter the experimental manipulation. The White children in the experimental condition were taught either to differentiate between pictures of Black people with various skin tones, hair, and facial expressions (Katz, 1973), or to associate particular names with particular faces (Katz & Zalk, 1978). The African-American children in these conditions performed the same task with pictures of European-American people. All the children in the control condition were simply shown pictures of White and Black people. The results indicated that the children in the experimental groups were less prejudiced compared to both the pretest results and to the control group.

The Langer et al. (1985) experiment looked at how individuation of others for nondisabled sixth graders (age 11 to age 12) effects prejudice toward the wheelchair bound, the blind, the deaf, and people with only one arm. During the 5-day intervention, the children in the experimental condition were taught to make distinctions between different types of disabled people and to distinguish between beliefs about the disabled and reality. For example, the children were shown a picture of a person in a wheelchair working as a newscaster and were given written information about that person. The children wrote down what was occurring in the photograph, four reasons why the pictured individual would be good at his or her job, and an explanation of how the depicted person could do his or her job. In the control condition pictures were shown with no differentiation manipulation. A social distance scale and an activity preference scale assessed prejudice toward the disabled. The results indicated that following the experimental condition, nondisabled children were less prejudiced toward the disabled when compared to those in the control condition, and to their own pretest results.

In the Aboud and Fenwick (1999) experiment, groups of fifth graders in racially/ethnically integrated schools were either taught from a curriculum, *More Than Meets the Eye* (the experimental groups), or from a standard curriculum focusing on personal and social development (the control groups). The experimental program lasted 11 weeks and included carrying out 11 different activities once or twice a week. The activities focused on getting the children to focus on the internal qualities of individuals rather than external characteristics associated with racial differences. This program also put emphasis on the fact that friends often differ from one another, but that these differences are appreciated, and that nonfriends are often similar to each other. The teachers also discussed with the students, in some depth, the issues surrounding stereotyping.

Students were given pretests, and posttests 2 months after the program was completed. Several measures were used to evaluate the impact of the experimental program—perceived dissimilarity within race using photographs, verbalized descriptions of internal similarities between same-race pairs, and a racial attitude measure. No significant pre-post differences

were found between the experimental and control groups for perceived photograph dissimilarity. This held for both Black and White students. For changes in verbalizations of internal similarities, White but not Black experimental students showed dramatic increases, indicating substantial changes in individuation. Finally, high, but not low prejudice White students showed substantial decreases in prejudice, and Black students showed no significant changes. These results indicated that by increasing the individuation of high prejudice White students, prejudice toward Blacks is decreased.

Although the number of studies is limited, they do suggest that individuation of others can lead to decreased prejudice both toward people of other races and toward the disabled. When considered in light of all the individuation experiments, the data provide strong support for this factor playing a role in prejudice reduction efforts. Unfortunately, none of the experiments in this section measured discrimination.

Contact Theory

Contact Theory cannot be used to explain why individuation leads to decreased prejudice. Recall that cooperation, intimacy, community sanction, and equal status are factors in Contact Theory. No contact exists in the self-individuation studies. The experiments on individuation of others do include viewing pictures of and learning about disabled people or people of another race. This may be indirectly related to intimacy. There is, however, no cooperation and no information is given on either status or community sanction.

Lewinian Theory

Lewinian Theory is more helpful in explaining the data. Let us examine some of the driving and restraining forces. Learning about people from outgroups in order to differentiate between outgroup individuals serves to develop empathy (driving force) and decrease strain in social interactions (restraining force). Also recall that cognitive development and individuation serve as driving forces to attitude change.

A MULTIPLE FACTOR APPROACH

Based on the fact that prejudice and discrimination are determined by multiple factors (genetics and evolution, culture and history, and social development), and moreover, that these factors have different effects on different targets, interventions based on anyone of them should have a limited impact. Additionally, the broader social context in which any interventions

occur can have a strong moderating effect on the success of these interventions (M. C. Taylor, 2000). For example, Taylor (2000) pointed out that historically, and currently, racial housing segregation and employment discrimination have had powerful effects on racial prejudice and discrimination. These and other important contextual influences, such as educational opportunities, can most readily be changed through political processes and not psychological ones. Yet, as psychologists, we strive to induce change, but are usually unable to influence the broader social context, and may be seriously hampered by this inability.

We saw in this chapter that desegregation had little effect on reducing racial prejudice and discrimination. Mainstreaming had a moderate impact on decreasing prejudice and discrimination toward the disabled, especially those whose social and academic skills were relatively advanced. Cooperative interaction was highly effective in reducing discrimination toward other racial/ethnic groups, the disabled, and the opposite sex. Many of these effects were long-lasting. It had an appreciable impact on changing opposite-sex attitudes and a more modest effect toward other racial/ethnic groups. The results further indicated that these positive effects were short-lived.

Research on media effects was limited. It showed that video depictions, especially those created for educational use, produced consistent reductions in prejudice toward both other racial/ethnic groups and the disabled. Similarly, the limited data on role-playing simulations showed decreases in prejudice toward both the disabled and other racial groups. Likewise, increasing individuation of self and others reduces prejudice toward both other racial/ethnic groups and the disabled. No data are available concerning the impact of films, role-playing simulations, and individuation on discrimination.

Based on these findings, we suggest that multiple approaches be used in the schools to combat prejudice and discrimination. Importantly, some of them can be used in nonintegrated settings. Due to the consistent access to large numbers of children, the school system is the ideal situation for interventions designed to reduce prejudice and discrimination. We saw that desegregation by itself has limited effects in changing attitudes and behaviors. However, cooperative learning has been shown to have strong, widespread effects on reducing discrimination. We believe that this form of teaching should become an integral part of the educational system, especially in racially integrated and mainstreamed settings. An added benefit of this approach is that it gives students the impression that the community, especially authority figures, support the importance of changing attitudes and behaviors toward members of other groups.

Mainstreaming has been shown to be a moderately effective approach in reducing prejudice and discrimination toward the disabled. Recall that the

effects are limited when the disabled student is moderately to severely mentally retarded. Therefore, cooperative learning in these cases should be done cautiously.

In that individuation of self and others is effective in reducing prejudice, we believe that teaching methods that promote self-acceptance and valuing differences among people should become an integral part of the normal education process. This fits well with local and national efforts to promote the valuing of diversity. Aboud (1988) suggested the use of psychological tests that reveal personal profiles to help individuals discover unique aspects of self. These profiles can then be compared with others to look for similarities and differences. Finally, films and role-playing simulations are effective tools in reducing prejudice, and therefore should be used intermittently throughout the academic year. W. G. Stephan and Finlay (1999) showed that empathy training, independent of role-playing simulations, can have a positive effect on reducing prejudice. It would also serve to enhance other interpersonal relations. Other than cooperative interaction, there are no known methods of reducing opposite-sex prejudice.

These proposed changes are quite dramatic. Many might question whether they are feasible. However, there are school systems in the United States that have successfully instituted cooperative learning programs. Additionally, many schools throughout the country are including individuation and valuing diversity programs in their curricula. It is clear that the social, educational, and emotional problems created by prejudice and discrimination will not be resolved if we continue with the status quo. We need strong viable interventions to resolve the issues. The proposed changes may go a long way toward alleviating these problems.

SUMMARY

There are two theories frequently cited to explain changes in prejudice and discrimination—Contact Theory and Lewinian Theory. The important conditions in Contact Theory are: equal status, community sanction, cooperation, and intimacy. Contact Theory helps us understand the results of the research on desegregation, cooperative interaction, and the media. It is less helpful in explaining the literature on mainstreaming, role-playing simulations, and individuation.

Lewinian Theory is a form of field theory with driving and restraining forces. The forces that restrain children from changing their prejudiced attitudes include: authority acceptance, intergroup mechanisms, ingroup favoritism, strain in social interactions, and the expectation of inappropriate social behavior by outgroup members. Driving forces for change include: cognitive development, individuation, and empathy. Lewinian Theory is

useful in discussing the results of the research on mainstreaming, cooperative interaction, the media, simulations, and individuation. It does not aid us in understanding the results of the desegregation experiments.

Data from 23 studies on the effects of desegregation on prejudice and discrimination yield some interesting conclusions. Desegregation is largely ineffective in decreasing either prejudice or discrimination. The results, however, tend to be more positive for Black children than for Whites. In general, there were no systematic differences in outcomes between boys and girls and there were no age effects noted in the experiments. The absence of equal status between students and lack of community support appear to be important factors in determining the outcomes of these studies.

Fourteen studies were discussed on the effects of mainstreaming on prejudice and discrimination of nondisabled children toward the disabled. Mainstreaming does create more positive attitudes toward all types of handicaps, but is less effective on prejudice toward the moderately to severely mentally retarded. There are differences based on the age of the nondisabled children, with older children (ages 10 and up) developing more positive attitudes when compared to younger ones (ages 8 and below). Mainstreamed girls tend to be less prejudiced than their male peers.

Cooperative interaction implies positive goal interdependence and children working or talking together. Twenty studies were discussed on the effects of cooperative interaction (predominantly cooperative learning) on prejudice and discrimination toward different racial and ethnic groups, the opposite sex, and the disabled. There are lasting effects on discrimination (9 months) but not on attitudes. Cooperative interaction does effect both opposite-sex and racial/ethnic prejudice and discrimination, with the effects for the former groups being stronger than for the latter groups. The discriminatory behavior of nondisabled children toward their disabled classmates decreases as a result of cooperative interaction.

Five studies that measure the effects of media, particularly television and movies, on attitude change were discussed. Television and film do effect prejudice in children and adolescents. The films were effective regardless of the age of the subjects and seem to impact all three aspects of prejudice. The effects are present for prejudice toward the disabled and other racial/ethnic groups. No studies were found that examined the effectiveness of films for changing opposite-sex prejudice or for changing discrimination toward any group.

There is evidence that role playing is an effective way to change attitudes; there is no information on discrimination. Examination of the literature reveals five studies that investigated race prejudice and prejudice toward the handicapped. No studies were found that examined the effectiveness of simulations for changing opposite-sex prejudice or for reducing discrimination toward any group. In order to be effective, simulations must be as

real as possible. Discussions before and after the role play are important both to attitude change and to alleviate any stress felt by the participants during the experience.

Individuation is the process of differentiating people from one another and can apply to the self (self-acceptance) and to others. Nine studies were discussed on the relationship between self-acceptance and prejudice, but no experiments on discrimination were found. Nonprejudiced people are high in self-acceptance, whereas prejudiced individuals have low self-acceptance. Manipulations designed to increase self-acceptance result in decreased racial/ethnic prejudice and prejudice toward the disabled. Four experiments dealing with the connection between individuation of others and prejudice were presented, but no data were available on discrimination. Teaching children to differentiate among disabled people and among individuals from other racial/ethnic groups causes a decrease in prejudice toward the differentiated group.

A multiple factor approach is needed to produce decreases in prejudice and discrimination toward the opposite-sex, the disabled, and other racial/ethnic groups. Cooperative learning and processes that promote self-acceptance and valuing differences among people must become an integral part of our academic programs. Finally, films and role-playing are useful tools to decrease prejudice and should be used intermittently throughout the academic year.

Parents, Peers, and Personality

One of the great facts of psychology is that for nearly all characteristics, there are marked individual differences across people. This is certainly true for prejudice and discrimination. We argued that there are powerful genetic/evolutionary processes at work that strongly predispose us to develop prejudice and discrimination toward certain socially prescribed targets. However, the extent to which any individual develops these attitudes and behaviors depends on his or her genetic inheritance and socialization experiences. We have seen, for example, that authorities can direct people for or against any particular outgroup. If you have experienced the "against," then you will tend to be prejudiced against that outgroup. We also noted that outgroup attraction can play a role in countering prejudice and discrimination, but the extent to which people are affected by this process will depend on their particular experiences with those outgroups as well as what they have seen and heard about them.

When people are asked to identify the most powerful influences for acquiring prejudice and discrimination, most, including psychologists, invariably say, "It's the parents." This seems so obvious that it almost makes little sense to question it. Fortunately, there are several researchers who have done so, and we shortly present their findings. But before that, it should be noted that there are other psychologists who assert that parents have relatively little to do with influencing their children's behavior or attitudes (Harris, 1995; Plomin, 1990). Harris (1995) argued that it is the peer group that has the strongest socialization influences on children and adolescents. Harris proceeds to document this by drawing on a wide variety of psychological findings. Plomin (1990) based an argument on very extensive behav-

ior genetics analyses showing that individual differences and similarities in personality, intelligence, and psychopathology primarily depend on genetic differences and similarities, and secondarily, on nonshared environmental (predominately social) differences. In particular, shared environmental influences within the family setting appear to have little to do with psychological similarities between siblings and parents. In chapter 2, we showed support for the behavior genetics position from Eysenck's (1992) research on prejudice. Thus, it is plausible that parental prejudices do have little or no influence on the development of their children's prejudice.

How do we study this question? The simplest and most direct way is to give sets of parents and children the same, or highly similar tests of prejudice and correlate their scores. If children's and parents' scores are positively correlated, and there are individual differences across the entire set of parents and children, then that is evidence for parental influences. This assumes, of course, that the influence mainly goes in the direction of parents to children, and not the reverse. If the scores are not positively correlated, then this is evidence that the influences are very small or nonexistent. A second way to study this question is to examine particular child rearing strategies, such as the extent to which parents use authoritarian approaches, or the extent to which parents teach children about racial bias and discrimination, and relate these strategies to children's prejudice. We saw in chapter 1, for example, that highly prejudiced adults tend to describe their parents as authoritarian. To what extent does this relationship hold for a concurrent assessment of parents and children?

PARENTAL INFLUENCES ON CHILDREN'S PREJUDICE

Only a few studies have dealt with this issue since 1960. And of these, all but one dealt exclusively with ethnic prejudice. It is possible that the influence parents have on their children's prejudice varies considerably with the target of the prejudice. We will see that that is the case. Also, few of the studies assess both mother's and father's prejudice. It is also possible that mothers and fathers differentially influence their children's prejudices. We will also see that that is the case.

We have found only three studies showing a moderate influence, in the intended direction, of parents' attitudes or behaviors on their children's ethnic prejudice. Two other studies found effects in the opposite direction of what parents intended. Two studies found essentially no parental influence on children's prejudice. And one study found varying influences on children's prejudice, depending on the parent and the type of prejudice.

Regarding the first group of studies, Mosher and Scodel (1960) examined the relationship between White mothers' (fathers were not assessed)

authoritarian child-rearing strategies and their scores on a modified version of the Ethnocentrism scale from Adorno et al. (1950) and their 11- or 13-year-old children's ethnic attitudes, using a social distance measure for 10 different ethnic groups. In general, mothers who were ethnocentric were also authoritarian. However, only ethnocentrism was directly and moderately related to prejudice. Ethnocentric mothers tended to raise prejudiced children. Authoritarianism, by itself, had no significant effect on children's prejudice.

Spencer (1983) examined the relationship between Black mothers' approaches for teaching their 3- to 9-year-old children about race and civil rights in the United States and their children's racial prejudice (fathers were not assessed). The mothers were given a questionnaire that allowed Spencer to identify two broad approaches. In the first approach, mothers emphasized to their children both how Blacks have been discriminated against in this society and the centrality of civil rights to their lives. In the second approach, mothers emphasized the positive recent gains of Blacks in integration and in the overall racial climate of this country. The children were given the PRAM 11 scale to assess racial preferences or biases. Recall that in the PRAM 11, children are shown pairs of drawings of Black and White children and adults and are asked to point to the picture that fits the positive or negative description. The effects of mothers' strategies were not observed until the children were about 7 years old—teaching strategy had no noticeable effect on 3- to 6-year-olds. For the 7- to 9-year-olds, if their mothers emphasized discrimination and civil rights, children tended to give more pro-Black responses on the PRAM 11. If their mothers emphasized racial climate and integration, the children tended to give more pro-White responses. The latter is a surprising result in that mothers presumably wanted their children to have positive Black attitudes.

Carlson and Iovini (1985) examined the relationship between Black and White adolescent boys' attitudes (no ages were given) and those of their fathers' (mothers' attitudes were not assessed). Three items of a social distance measure were used for both fathers and adolescents, dealing with working with a person of another race, marrying a person of another race, and inviting a person of another race to one's house. For White families, there was a moderate positive correlation between fathers' and sons' attitudes, but for Black families there was no significant correlation.

Taken as a group, these three studies provide only modest support for parental influences. When they are present, they emerge after the age of 6 years, and are not consistently found across race and type of parenting strategy.

The two studies that found effects opposite to those intended by the parents were carried out by Branch and Newcombe (1980, 1986). Both studies dealt with Black mothers and their children (fathers were not assessed). In

the 1980 study, the children were 4 to 5 years old, and were given the PRAM 11 and the Clark's doll test. Recall that in the Clark's doll test, children are presented with four White and Black dolls and given either negative or positive descriptions of one of the dolls. The children are asked to select the doll that best fits the description. Based on questionnaire data, the parents were classified as being civil rights activists or nonactivists. No relationship was found between parents' activism and children's prejudice on the PRAM 11. For the Clark's test, however, the higher the parents activism, the more pro-White were the children. The children of the nonactivist parents showed no racial preferences.

In the 1986 study, the children were either 4 to 5, or 6 to 7 years of age. They were given three different tests of racial bias—the Clark's doll test, the PRAM 11, and another multiple-choice doll test. For the latter measure, children could make positive or negative responses toward both racial/ethnic groups. The mothers were given two questionnaires, one assessing Black ethnocentrism and one assessing attitudes toward teaching their children pro-Black attitudes. For the 4- to 5-year-olds, the PRAM 11 and Clark tests were unrelated to mothers' attitudes, but for the multiple-choice doll test, they were related in the opposite direction. The more anti-White were the mothers, the more pro-White were the children. For the 6- to 7-year-olds, seven out of the eight correlations between mothers' and children's attitudes were not statistically significant. In one case, there was modest agreement between their attitudes.

These results indicate, for Black families, that mothers can have unintended, and even opposite influences on the racial attitudes of their 4- to 5-year-old children. Whatever small influence they may have on their 6- to 7-year-olds, this influence does seem to be in the intended direction.

The two studies that found essentially no parental influence were carried out by Davey (1983) and Aboud and Doyle (1996). In the Davey (1983) study, the attitudes of British White, Asian, and Black mothers and fathers and their 7- to 10-year-old children were assessed. The children were given photograph sorting tasks, stereotype measures, and sociometric choices in order to evaluate their responses toward the other two races. The parents were interviewed on a wide range of topics concerning interethnic beliefs, values, and attitudes. All groups showed a positive bias toward their own group, but Davey found no systematic relationship between parents' and children's attitudes toward either of the outgroups. In general, each racial/ethnic group of children expressed prejudice toward the other two groups, even though their parents for the most part were accepting of those groups.

Aboud and Doyle (1996) studied White Canadian mothers and their 9-year-old children (fathers were not assessed). The children were given the PRAM 11 and the Multiresponse Racial Attitude Measure. The latter test allowed them to evaluate three different racial/ethnic groups: White, Black,

and Native Canadian Indian. Unlike the PRAM 11, which involved a forced-choice procedure, children could assign positive or negative evaluations to any combination of these groups. The mothers were given a racial attitudes test that assessed positive and negative attitudes toward Blacks. The authors found no significant relationships between the children's attitudes on either test and mothers' positive or negative attitudes toward Blacks.

The aforementioned two investigations contradict the results of those studies that have found parental influences on 7- to 10-year-old children. Taken as a whole, this research indicates, at best, a very modest relationship between parents' racial/ethnic attitudes and those of their preadolescent and adolescent children.

The final, and most comprehensive study was carried out by O'Bryan, Fishbein, and Ritchey (1999). The participants were 15- and 17-year-old White students enrolled in Catholic schools, and both of their biological parents. The adolescents and parents were given the identical tests, which assessed prejudice against people with HIV/AIDS, homosexuals, Black people, fat people, and male and female sex-role stereotyping. The parents were individually tested in their home by one of the research assistants and the adolescents were tested at school. Through the use of multiple regression statistical tests (a complex form of multiple correlational analyses) in which both parents' scores were examined separately, parents were found to have a small but consistently positive effect across all six areas of prejudice and sex-role stereotyping. However, mothers and fathers had different effects. Mothers, but not fathers, influenced their adolescent children's prejudice toward people with HIV/AIDS, people who were fat, and Black people. Fathers, but not mothers, influenced their adolescent children's male and female sex-role stereotyping and homosexual prejudice.

How do we understand these results? There are at least two related possibilities. The first is that the primary influence for prejudice is the mother, unless the father is especially concerned about some area(s). We saw in chapter 5 that fathers have a stronger commitment than mothers in the socialization of sex identity. This implies that fathers would have a stronger influence than mothers for male and female sex-role identity and homosexual prejudice. The second possibility is that parental influence is largely culturally determined. In North American culture, mothers are more involved than fathers in issues dealing with health and weight, and fathers are more involved than mothers with issues dealing with sex identity. Thus, mothers would be the primary influence for attitudes toward HIV/AIDS and fatness, and fathers for stereotyping and homosexuality. Unfortunately, there is no evidence about the relative strength of mothers' and fathers' concern about race.

Looking over all the research in this section, there is some evidence that White parents have a consistent, but small effect on their adolescent chil-

dren's prejudices. However, for Black and White parents of 6- to 10-year-olds, the results are inconsistent for race/ethnic prejudice, and for younger children, parental influence is either nonexistent, or for Blacks, in the opposite direction of parental intentions.

Because parents are the first major authority figures in children's lives, how is it that degree of parental prejudice has little consistent impact on children's prejudice? There are at least three possible answers to this question. First, parents convey a large amount of information to their children, nearly all of which is consistent with generalized societal norms. Thus, inadvertently, parents mediate culturally held beliefs and values about the various groups in the culture. Second, there are a variety of authorities in the culture that tend to convey the same kinds of messages to everyone. Perhaps children assimilate this information with some type of averaging process. Parents' views may be important, but not the only important ones. Third, the research reported was carried out with parents who mainly had moderate views against outgroups, and may not reflect the effects of extremist views on prejudice and discrimination. Perhaps parents who are members of the American Nazi party or the Ku Klux Klan have a stronger affect on their children than the parents utilized in these studies.

We conclude from this research and discussion that examining parental influence provides little understanding of the sources of individual differences in children's prejudices, except to suggest looking elsewhere. Perhaps the answer lies with peers, as Harris (1995) would have us believe. Let us examine that literature.

PEER INFLUENCES ON CHILDREN'S PREJUDICE

Children and adolescents are initially attracted to and choose their friends based on perceived similarity to themselves (Aboud & Mendelson, 1996; Newcomb & Bagwell, 1995). The most important characteristics underlying these choices are age, sex, ethnicity, mutual liking, and activity preferences. To a lesser extent, forming friendships is also based on similarity of attitudes and values. Adolescent friends resemble each other in a wide range of attitudes and behaviors such as school-related attitudes, academic achievement orientation, smoking, drinking, sexual activity, drug use, aggression, and delinquency (Aboud & Mendelson, 1996; B. B. Brown, 1990; R. B. Cairns & B. D. Cairns, 1994; Hartup & Stevens, 1997).

Longitudinal research indicates that attitudes and behaviors may be shaped by adolescent friends (R. B. Cairns & B. D. Cairns, 1994; Kandel, 1978; Lea & Duck, 1982; Savin-Williams & Berndt, 1990). These effects have been shown for substance abuse, delinquency, educational aspirations, academic achievement, alcohol and marijuana use, and antisocial behavior.

Additionally, we saw in chapter 8 that prejudice in children can be influenced through contact with peers through cooperative learning in schools. Research by Slavin and Madden (1979) with IOth graders in racially integrated schools found that peer interaction, including talk about race and participating on mixed ethnic athletic teams, had positive effects on modifying racial attitudes. And more recently, Aboud and Fenwick (1999) reported that for 8- to 11-year-olds, pairing high and low racially prejudiced friends and asking them to discuss racial issues reduced prejudice for the high prejudiced friends, whereas having no effect on the low prejudiced ones.

Taken together, all these studies strongly suggest that friends can at least modestly influence each other's prejudices. This influence should show up in positive correlations in their attitudes. The deck is stacked in this direction. Significant positive correlations can come about either because friends initially chose each other because of attitude similarity, or because they influenced each other after they became friends. So, finding positive correlations with respect to prejudice should come as no surprise.

In our literature search, we were able to find only three studies that examined the correlations between friends' prejudices and/or sex role stereotyping. The first was carried out by Glock, Withnow, Piliavin, and Spencer (1975) with more than 4,000 adolescents from Grades 8, 10, and 12, in three towns located outside of New York City. The data were collected in 1963, but were not analyzed and published until 1975. Several analyses were performed; the two of greatest interest involved White, non-jewish adolescents' prejudices toward Blacks and Jews. The measure used was negative stereotypes of each of these two groups.

To measure the influence of friends, the average scores of each person's five best friends was compared with his/her own scores. Seven categories of increasing prejudice were identified. If friends were either chosen for their corresponding level of prejudice or were influenced by each others' prejudice, then it was expected that the higher a person's prejudice score, the higher would be his or her friends' scores. Correlations were not used, which would have made the results more comparable to those of other studies. Nevertheless, Glock et al. (1975) found that for anti-Semitism, there was a statistically significant and modest correspondence between adolescents' and their friends' scores in two of the three towns. For the third town, the relationship among scores was not significant. For Black prejudice, the scores across all three towns were combined, and no relationship was found between adolescents' scores and those of their friends. Thus, at best, a weak relationship was obtained for friendship influences in that study.

The second study was carried out by Aboud and Doyle (1996). The participants were Canadian 8- to 11-year-old White, Black, Chinese, and East Indian children. The prejudice measures used were the Multiresponse Ra-

cial Attitude test, focusing on Black, White, and Chinese children, and a projective test called the Picture Test of Cross-Race Peer Contact. In the latter test, the participants were shown pictures of a White child and a Black child together in different settings (e.g., playing at recess, having lunch) and were asked to make up a story about each picture dealing with the thoughts, feelings and behaviors of both depicted children. The stories were coded for the positive and negative reactions of the depicted Black and White children, such as *wants to befriends*, *likes*, *fights*, *leaves to play with others*.

The children were also asked to identify their friends. Each child was given a list of the same-sex children in their grade and was asked to indicate how good a friend each child was using the numbers from 5 (*bestfriend*) to 2 (*not a friend*). The experimenters considered two children friends if at least one of them rated another as a 5 and was rated in turn by the other with a 4 or a 5. Nonfriends were those who rated each other with a 2 or a 3. A child could be counted once as a friend to one other child, and once as a nonfriend, depending on the correspondence of ratings.

The basic findings were that on neither test of prejudice were there any consistent correlations between the friends or nonfriends. For the friends, only one of the 14 correlations was statistically significant, and for the nonfriends, two of the correlations were significant.

The third experiment was carried out by Ritchey and Fishbein (2001). In their study, over 400 15- and 17-year-old White Catholic school adolescents completed questionnaires that evaluated race, homosexual, HIV/ AIDs, and fat prejudice, and sex-role stereotyping. A factor of overall intolerance was also determined using all five scales. That is, scores on all five tests were positively intercorrelated, which resulted in a single score of intolerance. Friendship closeness was determined in a similar way to Aboud and Doyle (1996). Each adolescent was asked to list up to his or her five closest same-sex classmates in the classroom. Closeness to friend was determined by their ratings on two questions dealing with how often they shared private feelings and talked about things that they didn't want other people to know. Two types of friendships were identified-reciprocal and unilateral friends. *Reciprocal friends* were those who listed each other as friends, irrespective of degree of closeness. *Unilateral friends* involved only one member of the pair identifying the other as a friend.

Ritchey and Fishbein (2001) carried out 84 multiple regression analyses across the four types of prejudices and sex-role stereotyping, and involving such variables as reciprocal friends, unilateral friends, degree of closeness, best friends, one versus two friends. They found only three of the 84 Betas (a type of correlation) to be statistically significant. Simply, this means that friends' prejudices and stereotyping were not associated with each other.

That is, in this research, friends did not influence each other's prejudices and stereotyping. This is consistent with the Aboud and Doyle (1996) results, and for race prejudice, consistent with the Glock et al. (1975) results.

How can this be? Ritchey and Fishbein (2001) offered four possible explanations of their results. First, the adolescents, on average, were relatively low in prejudice and stereotyping for nearly all the scales. It is possible that individuals at the high extremes and who belong to formal organizations such as those in the Ku Klux Klan, may choose or be influenced by friends who have similar sentiments. A second possibility is that discussions of prejudice and stereotyping may be rare in adolescents' interactions with their friends because these issues are normally relatively unimportant to them in peer settings. This may especially be the case for those attending racially homogenous schools as did the participants in this study.

A third possibility is that adolescents likely assume that their friends have very similar attitudes to themselves, and do not challenge that assumption. Several studies have found that even in such domains as grade point average, substance use, and academically disruptive behavior, adolescents overestimate the similarity of their friends to themselves. A fourth possibility is that adolescents may not readily be influenced by discriminatory behaviors of their friends, leaving their own prejudices and stereotypes intact. For example, adolescents may readily engage in discriminatory talk against Blacks or homosexuals or fat people with their friends in order to remain part of the group, even if such talk goes against their beliefs. We saw in chapter 1 that there is often a discrepancy between attitudes and behavior, consistent with this explanation.

Although there are only three studies dealing with the topic of friendship influences on prejudice and stereotyping, they do point to very similar conclusions. We know that friends often influence each other's attitudes and behavior and can influence each other's prejudices in controlled settings, but they generally did not do so in these three studies. The cautious scientific approach is to assume the veracity of these studies and accept their conclusions until further research calls their findings into question.

If parents have only a modest effect on their children's prejudices and stereotyping and friends have essentially no influence, then what produces individual differences in prejudice and stereotyping? Thinking back to chapter 1 and the authoritarian personality, perhaps the answer lies in personality differences. It may be the case that one's personality predisposes him or her to accept or to reject the prejudices and stereotypes that are prominent in the culture. It is likely that nearly all of us know the prominent attitudes about the various groups in the culture, but some of us strongly believe them, others, weakly so, and still others reject them. Maybe it is personality differences across people that produce these outcomes.

PERSONALITY INFLUENCES ON PREJUDICE

Personality has been defined in various ways. At the core of these definitions are the ideas that it is a hierarchically organized pattern of relatively enduring internal dispositions and behavioral characteristics of the self that partially determine how an individual interacts in the environment. Two specific definitions are as follows. Pervin (1996) defined personality as "the complex organization of cognitions, affects, and behaviors that gives direction and pattern (coherence) to the person's life" (p. 414). Funder's (1997) definition is "an individual's trait patterns of thought, emotion, and behavior, together with the psychological mechanisms—hidden or **not**—behind those patterns" (p. 1).

Personality, in part, acts as a filter for determining which social information will have an impact on the individual, and the nature of that impact. Thus, personality may predispose each individual to either accept or reject certain cultural messages about dominant and subordinate groups in society. Parents, friends, media, religious organizations, and many other social institutions offer a variety of explanations for social inequalities, including prejudices. Personality affects which explanations are accepted and absorbed into the individual's schemas about social hierarchies, and which are not. We learned from chapter 1, for example, that those high in the personality trait of *authoritarianism* accept explanations that justify a social hierarchy in which certain groups occupy positions of power that enable them to dominate other groups, such as men versus women, Whites versus Blacks, and Christians versus Jews. Those low in authoritarianism are more likely to understand these inequalities in terms of dominant groups' using power and resources to maintain their positions at the expense of subordinate groups.

In the remainder of this section, we discuss the impact of four personality characteristics on the acceptance or rejection of cultural prejudices. These are religiosity, right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and humanistic egalitarianism. Although we attempt to discuss each separately, the research often includes two or more of these traits in the same study, and hence will occasionally be discussed together. Finally, almost none of the research has been carried out with children. Rather, college students and older adults have nearly always been the research participants. Don't children's personalities influence their acceptance of prejudices? We think *so*, and hopefully in the future, researchers will focus on this question.

Religious Beliefs and Practices

Batson and Burris (1994) told us that

All major religions in our society preach love and acceptance of others. The acceptance is to be unconditional, not qualified by race, creed, sex, or color. Christianity in particular prides itself on its message of universal love. If a religion can indeed lead its followers to adopt and live such a belief, then it is a powerful antidote for prejudice—one overlooked by most social psychologists. (p. 149)

They then go on to document what has been found about the relationship between various types of religiosity and prejudice.

In their discussion of 44 findings in 36 studies carried out between 1940 and 1975, dealing with the association between prejudice and amount of religious involvement, they report that the greater the degree of religious involvement, the *higher* the degree of prejudice. Batson and Burris (1994) divided the studies into three different measures of religious involvement—church membership or attendance, strength of religious attitude, and strength of orthodoxy or conservatism. There were essentially no differences in the pattern across these measures. Overall, 34 findings showed a positive correlation between involvement and prejudice, 8 showed no clear relationship, and only 2 showed a negative correlation.

As these patterns became known during the period from 1940 to 1975, many scholars became very concerned about the apparent negative influence of religiosity. Allport and Ross (1967) argued that the "way" one was religious was an important consideration that had been ignored in prior research. They suggested that two types, or ways, of being religious were likely to be influential. They referred to these as "extrinsic" versus "intrinsic" orientations. An *extrinsic orientation* uses religion as a self-serving means to non-religious ends, such as forming good social relationships and gaining personal security. An *intrinsic orientation* views religion as an end in itself, and serves as a "master motive" in one's life. Allport and Ross (1967) proposed that religious, intrinsically oriented individuals should find prejudice incompatible with their beliefs, and be relatively low in prejudice, whereas religious, but extrinsically oriented individuals might find prejudice compatible with their beliefs and be relatively high in prejudice.

Batson and Burris (1994) summarized research carried out through 1977 and indeed found that intrinsically oriented individuals had lower racial prejudice, ethnocentrism, and anti-Semitism than extrinsically oriented persons. But the story is more complex. In studies that included persons who had little or no involvement in organized religion, researchers found that the intrinsically oriented were no less prejudiced than the non-religious. Thus, an intrinsic orientation is neither compatible with nor antagonistic to prejudice.

Batson and Burris (1994), based on Batson's earlier work, proposed still another model of religious involvement having three dimensions—religion as means, religion as ends, and quest. The means and ends dimensions

roughly correspond to Allport and Ross's (1967) extrinsic and intrinsic orientations, respectively. *Quest* is a new dimension that assesses the extent to which "the individual seeks to face religious issues such as personal mortality or meaning in life in all their complexity, yet resists clear-cut, pat answers" (p. 157). They also made an important distinction between prejudices "proscribed" (prohibited) by their home church, such as racism, and those not proscribed, such as homosexual prejudice.

In their summary of research findings through 1990, using the three-dimensional model, Batson and Burris (1994) concluded that the intrinsic orientation to religion was related to low prejudice when the target of the prejudice was proscribed, for example, race. However, it was correlated with high prejudice when the target was not proscribed, for example, homosexuality. The extrinsic orientation to religion was related to high prejudice only when the target of the prejudice was proscribed. It was unrelated to nonproscribed targets. *Quest*, on the other hand, was related to low levels of prejudice for both proscribed and nonproscribed targets.

What does more recent research show? Fisher, Derison, Polley, Cadman, and Johnston (1994) examined the relationship between intrinsic (ends), extrinsic (means), and quest religious orientations in predominantly White Christian college students and their attitudes toward gays and lesbians (a nonproscribed prejudice). Unlike the summary findings of Batson and Burris (1994), Fisher et al. (1994) found that both extrinsic and intrinsic orientations were positively correlated with prejudice toward gays and lesbians. Consistent with Batson and Burris, however, was the finding that quest scores were modestly negatively correlated with prejudice.

Duck and Hunsberger (1999) studied religious orientation and prejudice among a group of 17- to 56-year-old adolescents and adults. They used the Batson and Burris (1994) three-dimensional scale of religious orientation, the proscribed prejudice of racism, and the nonproscribed prejudice of homophobia. Consistent with the Batson and Burris (1994) summary results, race prejudice was negatively correlated with the intrinsic (ends) and quest orientations, whereas with an extrinsic (means) orientation, it was positively correlated. For homosexual prejudice, there was a positive correlation for intrinsic orientation, but negative correlations for extrinsic and quest orientations, partially consistent with the Batson and Burris (1994) summary.

Finally, Case, Fishbein, and Ritchey (2000) studied religious orientation and prejudice among a large group of predominantly White college students. They used the ends (intrinsic), means (extrinsic), and quest orientations, and four prejudice measures—race (proscribed), females (nonproscribed), homosexuals (nonproscribed), and obesity (nonproscribed). In addition they statistically analyzed the prejudice measures and found a single higher order factor of intolerance that included all four measures.

Their principal findings were that an ends orientation was positively correlated with all four measures of prejudice, inconsistent with the Batson and Burris (1994) summary, and with the single factor of intolerance. The quest orientation was negatively correlated with prejudice against females and homosexuals (both nonproscribed), uncorrelated with race and obesity prejudice, but negatively correlated with intolerance, consistent with Batson and Burris. The means orientation was positively correlated with prejudice against homosexuals and uncorrelated with the other individual measures and with intolerance, inconsistent with Batson and Burris.

What can we conclude from these last studies in relation to Batson and Burris (1994)? Basically, three patterns emerge. First, a quest orientation is consistently negatively correlated with prejudice, whether to religiously proscribed or to nonproscribed targets. Second, an intrinsic (ends) orientation is consistently positively correlated with nonproscribed targets of prejudice, but inconsistently correlated with proscribed targets. Third, an extrinsic (means) orientation is inconsistently correlated with proscribed or nonproscribed targets of prejudice.

Other researchers had earlier noticed problems with the construction of the intrinsic and extrinsic orientation measures, and were also troubled by the findings that those with a deep commitment to their religion, that is, the intrinsically or ends oriented, were highly prejudiced to targets not proscribed by their church. The "intrinsic" sometimes gave the appearance of being unprejudiced by their attitudes toward the proscribed groups. So, does being highly religious lead one to being highly prejudiced? Recent research has reframed the issue slightly, and has instead looked at religious fundamentalism and authoritarianism in relation to prejudice. It builds on the findings dealing with the quest orientation.

Hunsberger (1995) summarized the research dealing with quest and has also concluded that it is negatively related to prejudice, in great part because people high in quest are open to change, are willing to face existential questions, and will consider doubts and challenges to their religious beliefs. To some extent, quest is the opposite of fundamentalism and authoritarianism. In fact, Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) found in a large sample of adults that quest and religious fundamentalism were correlated $-.79$, and quest and authoritarianism were correlated $-.67$.

What is *fundamentalism*? Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) defined it as a religious orientation distinct from religious orthodoxy. Religious fundamentalists assume that they have the basic, enduring, essential truths about God and all of humanity. They believe that these truths are opposed to the forces of evil, and are the only truths that can defeat these forces. They also believe that if you follow these truths, you will have a special relationship with God. To challenge these truths is to engage in evil acts. Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) constructed The Religious Fundamentalism Scale, and

related it to prejudice toward various ethnic groups, hostility towards homosexuals, and punitiveness toward criminals. In all cases, fundamentalism was positively correlated with prejudice and punitiveness. Moreover, it correlated highly with right-wing authoritarianism. Altemeyer (1996), in reviewing these and other findings, answered the question as to why fundamentalists are more prejudiced than others. He stated that it is because it is "a religious manifestation of right-wing authoritarianism" (p. 161).

Two other studies are relevant to this discussion. L. Wylie and Forest (1992) found that with a group of adult noncollege students, religious fundamentalism, right-wing authoritarianism, and various measures of prejudice were positively intercorrelated. However, multiple regression analyses showed that authoritarianism was still positively correlated with prejudice after controlling for fundamentalism, but fundamentalism was uncorrelated with prejudice after controlling for authoritarianism. In other words, fundamentalism is correlated with prejudice because it is correlated with authoritarianism.

Unfortunately, the matter is not settled so neatly. Laythe, Finkel, and Kirkpartick (2001) examined the relationships among right-wing authoritarianism, fundamentalism, and race and homosexual prejudice in college students. They also performed correlations and multiple regression analyses. They too found strong positive correlations among all the variables. However, in the multiple regression analyses, both authoritarianism and fundamentalism were found to correlate with both types of prejudice. Controlling for fundamentalism, authoritarianism was positively correlated with race and homosexual prejudice, and controlling for authoritarianism, fundamentalism was negatively correlated with race prejudice, but positively correlated with homosexual prejudice. The authors suggest that religious fundamentalism has two components in relation to prejudice, an authoritarian one that leads to prejudiced attitudes and a religious one that may lead to or inhibit prejudiced attitudes.

What can we conclude about the personality characteristic of religiosity in relation to prejudice? First, the way in which one is religious determines the extent to which a person will be prejudiced. Second, those for whom religion is a quest for finding personal truths and truths about God and human nature will tend to be relatively low in prejudice. These people are in important ways the opposite of fundamentalists. Third, fundamentalists tend to be relatively prejudiced individuals. Much of this prejudice stems from their also being right-wing authoritarians. However, there is some evidence that fundamentalism may have effects independently of authoritarianism. It is clear from all the aforementioned research that strong religious beliefs and commitments are not a powerful antidote for prejudice.

Finally, it may be useful to speculate on the relation between genetic/evolutionary factors and religiosity. Specifically, an argument can be made

that the quest religious orientation is closely related to the factor of out-group attraction. Persons high in quest are not regular church attendees, welcome challenges to accepted religious dogma, and are open to change and to new world views. Two of the questions from Altemeyer and Hunsberger's (1992) quest scale that captured this orientation are: "Religious doubt allows us to learn," and "The real goal of religion ought to be to make us wonder, think, and search, not take the word of some earlier teachings" (p. 132). People high in quest are seekers of new points of view of potential value to their cognitive and spiritual lives. All this suggests that they would be drawn to and perhaps be inspired by certain teachings and values held by people outside of their current religious group. The quest scales do not tap this idea directly, but instead focus on the individual's search for meaning. However, in this search, the attraction to outgroups may be enhanced.

Right-Wing Authoritarianism

Most of the discussion in this section comes from a very engaging series of books authored by Altemeyer (1981, 1988, 1996). Each book builds on the previous one, with the last book, *The Authoritarian Specter*, incorporating most of the major findings and conclusions of the earlier ones. More recent research, for example, Case, Fishbein, and Ritchey (2001), Duck and Hunsberger (1999), and Hunsberger, Owusu, and Duck (1999) was highly supportive of the results described by Altemeyer (1996).

What is *right-wing authoritarianism* (RWA)? It is a combination of three attitudinal clusters that are found in varying degree in all persons. These three clusters were part of the original authoritarian personality scale (the F scale) described by Adorno et al. (1950), which consisted of nine "anti-democratic" characteristics. The attitude questions assessing the three clusters are different for the F scale and the RWA scale, but the underlying concepts are essentially the same.

The three RWA clusters are: authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism. *Authoritarian submission* refers to the belief that one should submit to the perceived authorities in a culture. You should accept at face value their statements and actions, and be willing to comply with their instructions. In its simplest terms, you act on the principle that the authorities know best. *Authoritarian aggression* is the willingness to harm others, either physically, psychologically, or financially, whom you believe that the authorities in the culture want to see harmed, or would approve of your harming them. Authoritarian aggression serves, in part, to preserve the authority structure of a culture. *Conventionalism* refers to being strongly committed to and adhering to the social conventions or traditional social norms of a culture. People scoring high on this cluster believe that the au-

thorities in the culture strongly support these norms. Altemeyer believes that these norms are also religion-based, but Case et al. (2001) showed that this assumption is not necessary to the description of the attitude cluster. In a large number of statistical analyses, Altemeyer and others have found that the three attitude clusters are highly intercorrelated with each other, so much so, that it makes a good deal of sense to consider them as being part of a single personality characteristic-RWA.

The most recent versions of the RWA test consist of 30 items that are typically scored on a 7- or 9-point scale from *strongly disagree* to *strongly agree*. However, Case et al. (2001), by eliminating items confounded with religion, prejudice against women, and prejudice against homosexuals, reduced the number of eligible items to eight. And instead of a 7- or 9-point scale, they used a 4-point scale. Despite these dramatic changes, RWA was still found to correlate positively with prejudice against women and homosexuals, though not as highly as the correlations found with the Altemeyer questionnaire. Altemeyer's (1981, 1988, 1996) version of the RWA has been used and validated with college students and nonstudent adults in North America, South Africa, Ghana, Australia, and Russia. The scale rather consistently predicts authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism. In the realm of authoritarian aggression, for example, those high on RWA, relative to low scorers, give longer prison terms in hypothetical criminal trials, and in the Milgram obedience to authority paradigm (e.g., Milgram, 1963), set higher levels of shock for errors made by "learners." In addition, those high on RWA are more likely to anonymously self-report assaults against women, and are more likely to volunteer to help the government eliminate undesirable groups such as communists, homosexuals, members of religious cults, and radicals.

In the realm of prejudice, across a wide range of cultures, RWA scores have been found to correlate between .30 and .70 with various types of prejudice. The average correlation is probably between .40 and .50, which is considered moderate, as contrasted with modest or strong. College students as well as their parents typically show correlations of .40 to .50 between RWA and ethnocentrism, but in some cultures, the correlation has been reported as high as .69. It is typically between .40 and .50 for homosexual prejudice, but for hostility toward homosexuals the correlation has ranged from about .50 to .70. Prejudice against feminists and adherence to traditional sex roles correlate with RWA at values between .30 to .70.

Correlations on RWA between college students and their parents average about .40. Altemeyer has collected data on thousands of parent-child pairs of scores, typically students in introductory psychology courses at the University of Manitoba, and their mothers, fathers, or both. The students fill out the RWA scale for course credit, and the parents are asked by their children to fill it out so that the children can receive extra course credit.

Do children inherit RWA from their parents, or do they learn it from them? Plomin (1990) reported that the genetic inheritance of certain personality characteristics, psychopathology, and intelligence is about 40% to 50%, with family environmental influences being between 5% and 10%. As described earlier, this is determined by behavior genetics analyses. Altemeyer (1996) reported on a set of studies that attempted to evaluate this issue for RWA. Unfortunately the results are not highly consistent. When the correlations for identical and fraternal twins, reared together or reared apart, are compared, the identicals have relatively high correlations, and the fraternal, sometimes high and sometimes low correlations. On balance, it appears that genes account for, at most, 30% of individual differences in RWA. But the Manitoba adoption study tells another story. Among the thousands of student-parent pairs of scores, a small number involve adoptions, specifically, 44 students, 35 adoptive mothers, and 40 adoptive fathers. The correlations between mothers or fathers and their adopted children on the RWA averages about .55, higher than the correlation of .40 for genetically related parents and children. These latter results are incompatible with behavior genetics theory in that the correlations for biologically related parents and children should be the same (if genes play no role) or substantially higher (if they do) than for adopted children and parents. Nevertheless, the adoption results do strongly suggest that there are strong environmental influences for acquiring RWA.

What is the nature of these influences? Altemeyer (1996) adopted a social learning theory approach (Bandura, 1977) to answering this question. The essential idea is that we learn to become authoritarian, or not, through the reinforcements given to us by parents, peers, teachers, media, in short, all the various social influences in our lives. Altemeyer believes that the period of adolescence is especially important, including ages 18 to 22, the college years. The social experiences at earlier ages start to shape our attitudes and values, but RWA tends to take its final form during these later years. Altemeyer (1996) reported that the RWA correlations among best friends in college is about .30. He reported that RWA declines about 10% or more over the course of 4 years of college, especially for those who have high RWA scores. And he reported that having children after college tends to raise one's RWA scores relative to those who did not have children. RWA scores do not inevitably go up or down following college graduation.

In sum, genetic inheritance probably lays the groundwork for acquiring an authoritarian personality. It likely operates by making the developing individual susceptible to being influenced by a variety of environmental experiences. It is possible that temperament plays a part in this, but there is apparently no published research that has linked temperament to authoritarianism. Also, we do not know the childhood antecedents to RWA in that there is no child's version of the scale. We know that parents and peers, a

college education, and becoming a parent influence level of RWA. No one of these influences seems powerful enough to transform high RWAs to low ones, but cumulatively their effects are strong.

Altemeyer (1996) ended his book with a list of 50 outcomes of studies that strongly differentiate between those scoring high and low on RWA. As he says, these do not paint a pretty picture of the high scorers. In addition to the outcomes already noted for prejudice and ethnocentrism, some of the most relevant for the present discussion are: Those with high RWAs

accept unfair and illegal abuses of power by government authorities; weaken constitutional guarantees of liberty, such as the Bill of Rights; go easy on authorities who commit crimes and people who attack minorities; are highly self-righteous; uncritically accept insufficient evidence that supports their beliefs; help cause and inflame intergroup conflict; and seek dominance over others by being competitive and destructive in situations requiring cooperation. (pp. 300-301)

From a genetic/evolutionary point of view the research on RWA fits most comfortably with the factor of authority acceptance. In a sense, high RWAs are "extra strength" authority acceptors. As we have argued several times in this book, all of us are predisposed to accept, believe, and act on what the authorities in our culture tell us or show us. Without this predisposition, we would not have evolved into the species we are.

As with any trait or characteristic, there are bound to be substantial individual differences among members of a group, be it hunter-gatherer or postindustrial. When interacting with nonsocietal persons, being a high RWA can be seen as benefitting the home society. This is especially true during times of intersocietal conflict. During peaceful times, if the authorities pursue peaceful activities and urge their followers to do similarly, then a high RWA will also benefit the home society. A high RWA can become destructive when certain leaders/authorities from within a society urge their followers to discriminate against other groups within the same society. This leads to the list of dangerous outcomes shown by Altemeyer's and other's research. As noted in chapter 8, however, the situation is not hopeless in that methods and approaches exist to ameliorate prejudice and discrimination. I assume that these will work with children and adolescents who are on the path to high RWA.

Social Dominance Orientation

Sidanius and Pratto (1999) noted that once people moved from the hunter-gatherer mode of subsistence, and economic surpluses came to be part and parcel of these newer cultures, then social hierarchies emerged. Basically, there were groups of people who stepped forward to control the surpluses

and thus became dominant in the culture. Often these groups were bound together by family ties, but other characteristics such as political affiliation, language, religion, and race also served this binding function.

Where there are dominant groups, there are, of necessity, subordinate ones. As we discussed in chapter 1, the dominant groups wish to maintain their advantages, and the subordinate ones often try to change their own status. Sidanius and Pratto (1999) described the myths and belief systems that these groups promote as either "hierarchy enhancing" (for the dominants) or "hierarchy equalizing" (for the subordinates). Politically, the dominants attempt to establish social policies and establish laws that support their social position, and the subordinates, who have less power, try to change the laws in order to promote their interests.

Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, and Malle (1994) defined social dominance orientation (SDO) as

the extent to which one desires that one's ingroup dominate and be superior to outgroups. We consider SDO to be a general attitudinal orientation toward intergroup relations, reflecting whether one generally prefers such relations to be equal, versus hierarchical, that is, ordered along a superior-inferior dimension. (p. 742)

Two of the items from the SDO scale are: "To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups"; and "Inferior groups should stay in their place."

SDO is different from both RWA and interpersonal dominance. None of the items on the SDO scale, for example, deal with obeying authorities, protecting them from radical elements, getting rid of troublemakers, or supporting old-time values or traditions. The RWA scale largely focuses on individuals, whereas the SDO scale exclusively focuses on groups. More importantly, research by Pratto et al. (1994), Whitley (1999), and Sidanius and Pratto (1999) reported that correlations between scores on the RWA and SDO scales are low and generally statistically nonsignificant. Additionally, Whitley (1999) found that the two personality characteristics are differentially related to various components of prejudice.

Interpersonal dominance is a personality measure that assesses whether persons like to be in charge of social situations, whether they are assertive, forceful, or decisive and domineering. Persons who score low in interpersonal dominance are accepting of the current social situation, do not try to direct others, and are rather unassuming. Pratto et al. (1994) related two of the most reliable tests of interpersonal dominance to individual's scores on SDO. The correlations were very low and statistically nonsignificant.

What does SDO predict? Sidanius and Liu (1992) found SDO to be positively correlated with "belief in racial superiority, caste-maintenance orien-

tation, support of the Gulf War, and approval of police behavior in the beating of Rodney King" (p. 685). Pratto et al. (1994) found SDO to be positively correlated with anti-Black racism, nationalism, sexism, cultural elitism, and patriotism, and to be negatively correlated with policies supporting social programs, equal treatment of different races and ethnicities, women's rights, and gay and lesbian rights. Research has found SDO to be positively correlated with racism (Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996); with racism and homosexual prejudice (Whitley, 1999); and with prejudice against women and homosexuals (Case et al., 2001). In most cases, the correlations were in the range of .40 to .50.

As would be expected from the items of the questionnaire and from the underlying theory, those groups lower in social status would have a lower SDO than those with a higher societal rank; thus, women should have a lower SDO than men, and African Americans a lower SDO than European Americans. These expectations are confirmed by the empirical research. Sidanius, Pratto, and Rabinowitz (1994) measured SDO, ethnic status, and attachment to one's ethnic group for White, Black, and Hispanic male and female college students. There was general agreement across students concerning the social status of the various ethnic groups. In all cases, males had higher SDO scores than females, higher status groups had higher SDO scores than lower status groups, and group attachment was positively correlated with group status, confirming all predictions.

Consistent with these findings, Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo (1994) found males to have a higher SDO than females across the following demographic variables: ethnicity, nation of birth, education, income, religion, political conservatism, and racism. Also consistent were the results of Sidanius, Levin, and Pratto (1996) in comparisons of African-American and European-American college students. They found that SDO scores were higher for White than Black students; moreover, Black and White agreement with the cultural beliefs and myths legitimizing social status differences were disproportionately skewed in favor of the Whites. That is, the disparity in agreement with the cultural belief system was greater than would be expected from differences in SDO scores.

Finally Pratto et al. (2000) assessed gender differences in SDO, the relationship between SDO and sexism, and the relationship between SDO and within-culture ethnic prejudice for six samples of college and noncollege adults in Canada, Taiwan, Israel, and China. The questionnaires were written in the native language and were administered by a native speaker. The major results were that in all cultures, SDO and sexism were positively correlated, and in three of the cultures, SDO and ethnic prejudice were also positively correlated. For both Canadian samples, for one of the two Israeli samples, and for the Chinese sample, men had reliably higher SDO scores than women. Thus, despite striking cultural and ideological differences

across the four societies, SDO appears to operate in similar ways to those found for North American adults.

Jost and E. P. Thompson (2000) provided an interesting analysis of the discrepancies between White and Black Americans on the SDO scale. The authors administered the SDO scale, measures of self-esteem, ethnocentrism, neuroticism, and various ideological scales to four different samples of Black and White college students. A sophisticated statistical analysis determined that the SDO can better be understood as being composed of two positively correlated factors rather than the single "social dominance orientation" factor reported in previous research. These two factors are identified as *opposition to equality* and *support for group-based dominance*. For both, Whites score higher than Blacks, as would be expected.

Among the principal findings were these: (a) The opposition to equality factor was positively correlated with self-esteem and ethnocentrism for Whites, but negatively correlated to both for Blacks; (b) opposition to equality was positively correlated with neuroticism for Blacks, but negatively for Whites, with the reverse holding for the factor of support for group-based dominance; and (c) opposition to equality was negatively correlated with ingroup favoritism for Blacks, but positively correlated for Whites. The various ideological scales did not reliably differentiate the two factors for the two racial groups. These results strongly indicate that the SDO scale has very different meanings and personal and social connections for Black and White college students. It would be of interest to make comparable assessments for males and females, as well as other dominant and subordinate groups in a culture.

From a genetic/evolutionary view, Sidanius and Pratto (1999) suggested that social dominance orientation has its roots in the factor of inclusive fitness. We have previously argued that inclusive fitness is highly consistent with behavioral manifestations of ingroup favoritism. Some writers, including Sidanius and Pratto, maintain that inclusive fitness is also related to discrimination and hostility against outgroups. However, we are persuaded that theoretically, outgroup discrimination is most comfortably understood as having its basis in the genetic/evolutionary factor of intergroup hostility. Both factors emerged through interactions with members of other tribes, but in multicultural societies, they become inappropriately directed to outgroups within the society. In closely examining the SDO scale, elements related to both factors can be discerned. Perhaps both genetic/evolutionary factors are involved with SDO.

Humanitarianism-Egalitarianism

The Humanitarian-Egalitarian Scale is a 10-item questionnaire developed by I. Katz and Hass (1988). The intent of the scale is to assess the strength of a value system held by many people who have a "communal" outlook on

their culture. By this is meant that all members of a culture are considered to be equal elements of the same community, deserving of kindness, respect, and aid in times of need. Some of the items in the scale are: "One should be kind to all people"; "A good society is one in which people feel responsible for one another"; "Acting to protect the rights and interests of other members of the community is a major obligation for all persons." The attitudes embodied in the scale are opposed to more individualistic values, such as is exemplified in the Protestant work ethic. In fact, I. Katz and Hass (1988) developed such a scale and evaluated it in the same study. They predicted that humanitarianism-egalitarianism would be negatively correlated with anti-Black attitudes and positively correlated with pro-Black attitudes, in contrast to opposite predictions for the Protestant work ethic. In two extensive experiments with White college students, all predictions for both scales were supported.

Three other recent experiments have tested predictions based on the Humanitarianism-Egalitarianism Scale. In the first, predominantly White college students from Arkansas were given this questionnaire along with attitude measures assessing prejudice against Blacks, as well as positive attitudes toward them (Glover, 1994). Consistent with the findings of I. Katz and Hass (1988), students high in humanitarianism-egalitarianism were high in positive Black attitudes and low in Black prejudice.

In the second, the Humanitarianism-Egalitarianism Scale was used to assess attitudes toward illegal immigrants (presumably Mexican), toward legal Mexican Americans, and toward an incident in which illegal Mexican immigrants were beaten by the police (Cowan, Martinez, & Mendiola, 1997). The subjects were students, of several different races/ethnicities, from three local community colleges near Los Angeles. Across all racial/ethnic groups, those students who were high in humanitarianism-egalitarianism, relative to those who scored low, had more positive attitudes toward illegal immigrants, held fewer negative stereotypes toward illegal immigrants, were more positive toward legal Mexican Americans, and were more negative toward the police beatings of illegal immigrants.

Finally, Case et al. (2001) studied the relationship between humanitarian-egalitarian attitudes and prejudice against women and homosexuals, using a large sample of predominantly White college students. In their statistical analysis of the content of the Humanitarianism-Egalitarianism Scale, they found that the scale assessed three moderately correlated factors, which they identified as "kindness," "equality," and "obligation to others." They combined the factors, however, into a single score. Consistent with the just covered previous research, humanitarianism-egalitarianism was found to be negatively correlated with both homosexual prejudice and prejudice against women.

Although the number of studies is limited, their results are highly consistent. It can be concluded that among college students, at least, a humanitarian-egalitarian personality is associated with low prejudice. The correlations are not strong, however, most falling in the range of .30 to .10, similar to those for quest, but lower than those for RWA and SDO.

The likely genetic-evolutionary underpinnings of humanitarianism-egalitarianism are those that Fishbein (1976) identified as reciprocal obligations among members of hunter-gatherer groups. The ability and propensity to form reciprocal obligations are seen as canalized behavior characteristics that were essential to the effective functioning of these groups. C. M. Turnbull (1972), in discussing the Ik, a former hunter-gatherer group who were forced to abandon that subsistence mode, evaluates hunter-gatherer interactions as follows:

... hunters frequently display those characteristics that we find so admirable in man: kindness, generosity, consideration, affection, honesty, hospitality, compassion, charity, and others. This sounds like a formidable list of virtues, and so it would be if they were virtues, but for the hunter they are not. For the hunter in his tiny, close-knit society, these are necessities for survival; without them society would collapse. It is a far cry from our society, in which anyone possessing even half these qualities would find it hard indeed to survive, yet, we are given to thinking that somehow these are virtues inherent in man. (p. 31)

SUMMARY

Three broad classes of influences on individual differences in prejudice were examined. The first dealt with parental influences. The results of eight investigations were examined and compared. Three of the studies, utilizing only one of the parents, found modest correlations between parents' child rearing approaches or their prejudices, and their children's prejudices. Two studies, dealing with Black mothers and their children, found opposite effects to those expected based on child rearing practices, in that the children became more prejudiced against Blacks following certain parental practices. Two studies carried out in England and Canada, with 7- to 10-year-old children and either their mothers only, or both parents, found no correspondence between parents' and children's prejudices. Finally, one study with adolescents and both of their biological parents found modest correlations between parents' and children's prejudices. However, mothers and fathers had different influences that corresponded to the cultural roles that the parents differentially held. Considering all mentioned research,

parents have, at best, a modest influence on the development of their children's prejudices.

Despite the large number of studies that have been performed in recent years concerning peer influences on children's and adolescents' attitudes, values, and behavior, only three studies were found, carried out within the past 30 years, that dealt with prejudice. In one, prejudice against Jews and Blacks were assessed in non-Jewish, White adolescents living in towns outside of New York City in 1963. In this study, modest correspondences among friends were found in two of the three towns for anti-Semitism, but no relationship was found for prejudice against Blacks.

In another study, carried out in Canada with different racial/ethnic groups of preadolescents, no significant correlations were found among friends' racial/ethnic prejudices. In the third experiment, carried out with White American adolescents, dealing with four different types of prejudice and sex-role stereotyping, no systematic relationship was found between friends' prejudices or stereotyping. It can be concluded from this research, meager though it is, that friends have essentially no influence on each other's prejudices. Two possible explanations for these findings are that it may be rare in children's and adolescents' interactions with their friends to discuss these issues, and moreover, children and adolescents likely assume that their friends hold similar attitudes to their own, even though they may not.

In the realm of personality influences, the view was taken that personality differences may differentially lead individuals to accept or reject prejudices and stereotypes that are prominent in the culture. Nearly all the research employed adults as the research participants. Four broad types of personality traits were examined. The first dealt with religiosity. Based on a large number of studies, the major conclusions that can be drawn are, first, that the way in which one is religious determines the extent to which a person will be prejudiced. Second, those for whom religion is a quest for finding personal truths and truths about God and human nature, will tend to be relatively low in prejudice. Third, religious fundamentalists tend to be relatively prejudiced individuals, but fourth, much of this prejudice stems from their also being RWAs. It is clear from this research that strong religious beliefs and commitments are not an antidote for prejudice.

The research dealing with RWA has its origins in the research by Adorno et al. (1950) on the F Scale. RWA consists of three of the nine attitude clusters that were identified on the F Scale—authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism. These three clusters are highly intercorrelated and together yield a single RWA score. A large number of studies using the RWA scale have yielded a highly consistent picture. Basically, those high on RWA are prejudiced against almost any conceivable minority group in a culture. Correlations on RWA between parents and

their college student children are moderate, as are correlations among friends. There is some evidence for a modest genetic influence on RWA, but there is stronger evidence for nonfamily environmental influences. From a genetic/evolutionary view, the research on RWA fits most comfortably with the factor of authority acceptance. **In** a sense, high RWAs are "extra strength" authority acceptors.

SDO is another powerful personality trait that influences prejudice. SDO measures "the extent to which one desires that one's ingroup dominate and be superior to outgroups" (Pratto et al., 1994, p. 742). Those high in SDO believe it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups in order to get ahead, and that inferior groups should stay in their place. SDO is uncorrelated with either RWA or interpersonal dominance. A large number of experiments have consistently found that SDO is related to prejudice against nearly all subordinate groups, against supporting social programs designed to help subordinate groups, and against civil rights of subordinate groups. Males have higher SDOs than females, and Whites, higher than Blacks. The predicted effects of SDO on prejudice and ethnocentrism have been found across a wide range of demographic variables in the United States, as well as in other countries. From a genetic/evolutionary view, SDO is most likely related to inclusive fitness and outgroup hostility.

Finally, a few studies have examined the relation between a humanitarian-egalitarian personality and prejudice. This trait assesses the strength of a value system in which all members of a culture are considered to be equal elements of the same community, deserving of kindness, respect, and aid in times of need. **In** experiments with varied ethnic/racial groups of college students, high scorers on this trait were found to be consistently less prejudiced and less discriminatory toward subordinate groups than low scorers. From a genetic/evolutionary view, the roots of humanitarianism-egalitarianism are likely the canalized characteristic of reciprocal obligations found in hunter-gatherer groups, because reciprocal obligations were essential to the effective functioning of these groups.

Recapitulation

DOMINANT AND SUBORDINATE GROUPS

As I reflect about the intellectual journey I have been on while writing this book, my mind keeps being drawn to the worldwide horrors currently being produced by prejudice and discrimination. The Northern Irish Protestants and Catholics are still violent opponents, the Bosnian Serbs and Muslims have yet to sit together and discuss peace, and the Palestinians and Israelis are still killing each other. Religious and/or ethnic differences underlay the violence in these cultures. I think, too, about the abolition of apartheid in South Africa and the election of a Black president in that tortured yet hopeful country. Knowing the agonizing history of African Americans, peace and equality will not come quickly there, but progress will occur.

The account I've given in this book describes prejudice and discrimination by the dominant toward subordinate groups as being an integral part of the social knowledge of North American culture—they are expected and normative reactions by group members. Thus, the absence, not presence, of prejudice and discrimination in individuals might be a surprise. Prejudice and discrimination are sustained because members of the dominant groups benefit from them. These members, such as White males, ensure the continued well-being of their family and friends by maintaining and reinforcing their value systems in all the major social institutions of the society—family, schools, media, religion, politics, business, justice system, and armed forces. Children in the dominant groups are socialized to incorporate these values and beliefs into their social knowledge and to act in ways consistent with that knowledge. Given the consistent reinforcement chil-

dren receive for holding the values of the dominant group, they become adolescents and then adults committed to these values.

People are seekers of consistency. When experiences occur that do not comfortably fit with what we believe and "know" to be true, we find ways to explain the discrepancies. We often create categories called *exceptions* or *special cases* to do so. The social knowledge that includes prejudice and discrimination toward outgroups is constantly being challenged by reality. "The United States Secretary of State is Black? He looks almost White." "The President of a Fortune 500 company is a woman? She's probably very masculine." "A young man with Down Syndrome is a television star? There's not another like him." "A deaf person is now a college president? He used to be hearing." Sometimes the number of exceptions mount up and can no longer be easily seen as exceptions. Then members of the dominant group find different ways to disqualify others, for example, "Affirmative action unfairly got them where they are."

The stigmas attached to subordinate groups are deep in our subconsciousness. In some cultures, for example, the contamination of women during menstruation prevents their contact with men until the flow has stopped. But the potential for contamination is always present. The subordinate groups in North American cultures are seen as having the possibility of contaminating others. Children seem to learn this at an early age, but the costs of acquaintanceship or friendship with outgroup members are not very high, and thus these friendships or acquaintanceships can occur.

Members of the subordinate groups in North American cultures have also been socialized by the value system of the dominant groups. This usually leads to a devaluation of one's own group. Thus, Blacks, females, the deaf, and the mentally retarded grow up believing that their group is inferior to the dominant groups. Moreover, members of subordinate groups often act in ways that perpetuate the belief in their inferiority, as was seen in the discussion of patriarchy and female socialization.

I painfully experienced this self-denigration by Blacks a number of years ago when I was practicing family therapy. The wife of a middle-class Black couple related an incident when she and her husband went to a movie theater in a White neighborhood. She described the strange looks and extra distance given her and her husband by the other patrons while waiting in line. But the part that stays with me was her statement that prior to leaving home for the movie, she bathed and put on perfume to ensure that she was clean and smelled good. She said she did not want to offend any of the White people she would encounter.

Because societies are open systems, the values of the dominant groups are not static but are susceptible to a variety of influences both within and outside of the culture. Immigration by different ethnic/racial groups has had profound effects in challenging the alleged superiority of European

Americans. An inordinate number of academically and artistically talented individuals are of Asian descent. Gifted Hispanic political leaders have emerged in the past decade. And of course, there is no shortage of women and African Americans who have succeeded academically, artistically, politically, and economically.

Equal opportunity is becoming more of an American reality than in previous decades, and this has often led to dominant and subordinate groups performing equally in a wide variety of tasks and settings. Because of this, sexism, racism, and "handicappism" are being chipped away with each passing decade, but long-held values by the dominant groups in the culture are still strongly believed.

CULTURAL CHANGE

The positive changes in the treatment of females, African Americans, the deaf, and the mentally retarded were clearly seen in the historical sections of earlier chapters on the target groups. The changes described were quite marked although there were setbacks along the way. In the Colonization Period (1607-1770), for example, women's place was in and around the home, tending their gardens and rearing children. Because families were economically self-reliant, women had major economic functions. However, schools were usually closed to girls, women could not legally own land or businesses independently of their husbands, vote, sit on juries, hold public office, or be an official of the church. In the last period, Postwar Growth and Change (1945 to the present) women are very definitely out of the home and into schools, churches, the judiciary, the political and economic marketplace, and even the military. Some of the greatest gains were made in times of war, when new demands and opportunities opened for them. However, women themselves created many of these opportunities through political skills they had acquired over many years of fighting social inequities.

Despite the gains, prejudice and discrimination toward these groups still exist. Members of the most dominant group, that is, White males, view other groups as being inferior, frequently basing this assessment on "scientific" evidence. The dominant group has attempted to control the sexuality, education, and job opportunities for all four subordinate target groups. As the laws have changed supporting equity and equality, members of the dominant culture have had to find more covert means for maintaining discrimination. The "old boys" network is still intact and powerful.

The positive changes in discrimination and prejudice did not occur solely because of "enlightened" self-interest or through the acquisition of a newer and higher moral sense by White males, although a little of both

probably played a part. Abraham Lincoln wished to abolish slavery because it was wrong, but his initial political stance was to limit its spread. Moreover, it is clear from his writings that he was not particularly interested in social integration of the races.

Although I assume that prejudice toward the four target groups has declined across historical time, the extent of this decline is not clear. However, it is obvious that overt discrimination has dramatically decreased. From these histories, it appears that three factors together led to the positive change. First, members of the target groups, or their family, had to strongly advocate for themselves. They had to publicly declare that their treatment by the dominant culture was prejudicial. They had to organize and collaborate with group members to combat this unfairness. Some of our most powerful and eloquent speeches and literature were produced by these people. Every time I hear Martin Luther King, Jr.'s "I have a dream" speech, I get chills. The self-advocates appealed to our sense of justice and fairness, but also to the fears we have about social unrest.

Self-advocacy by subordinate groups is insufficient by itself to produce substantial positive social change unless it leads to revolution. It often induces increasing numbers of the dominant group to take up their cause. It is likely that dominant group members already believed that treatment of a particular subordinate group was unfair. Lincoln, after all, did not invent abolition. Some members of the dominant group were awakened by the self-advocates of the subordinate groups, and some of the former were re-awakened; their submerged feelings of justice and fairness reemerged. With the constant pressure provided by the subordinate groups, dominant group members stimulated each other to advocate for change. In many cases, these dominant group advocates enacted changes themselves. They could open up job or educational opportunities. They could help integrate neighborhoods, churches, and private clubs. They could extend their hand in friendship to members of subordinate groups. These are all important acts. But they usually do not go much beyond the local level.

Widespread changes in discrimination occurred when powerful members of the dominant group made changes in the law. These changes occurred because of the continued self-advocacy by subordinate groups and advocacy from members of the dominant group. Changes in the law offer opportunities for enforcement. Initially this must be carried out by the dominant group (who may drag their feet) but eventually, subordinate group members gain positions of power to enforce the laws themselves; they sit on juries, are judges, lawyers, and police. When the laws change, some of the official power held by the dominant group is transferred to subordinate groups; this is a remarkable process. Several years ago I heard a talk about this by a Black state treasurer. He said that when the White community trusts you with their money, you know you have made real progress.

GENETIC/EVOLUTIONARY PREDISPOSITIONS

Underlying the culturally persistent acts of prejudice and discrimination is a strong genetic/evolutionary predisposition to make significant distinctions between one's own and other groups. Our analysis shows that we are fundamentally tribal beings. In human evolutionary history, the tribe—a genetically and culturally related community of subsistence groups—emerged as our central mode of social organization. This is different from that of gorillas, chimpanzees, and bonobos, for whom the single subsistence group is the primary social organ. Different subsistence groups for them are actual or potential enemies; for humans, it is different tribes. For the apes, an outsider is an individual who is not known; for human hunter-gatherers, an outsider is not only unknown, but also a person who is not a member of the tribe.

People are identified as tribal members by the various perceptual "badges" they display: language, dialect, dress, specific behavioral habits, and customs. Because of the importance of badges, we have developed exquisite sensitivities to recognize them. Failure to identify outsiders can lead to physical harm or death. Spying by foreign agents is a modern version of the attempt to conceal one's true tribal (national) identity in order to harm the enemy.

The two major genetically predisposed effects of distinguishing "own group" from "other group" are that we favor members of our own tribe relative to outsiders, and are wary of and often hostile to members of other tribes. The former effect is part of the nature of Darwinian selection processes. The latter is a feature of intergroup relations seen in the gorillas, chimpanzees, bonobos, and human hunter-gatherers. We infer that intergroup hostility is an ancient evolved characteristic dating back to at least the common ancestor of the four species. These two predispositions lead to very simple and very safe ways of interacting with others—be friendly to tribal members, be wary of those from other tribes. It is important to point out that these are behavioral *predispositions*, not *reflexes*. Individual learning plays a part in determining how these predispositions develop into behavioral interaction tendencies. We learn that some tribal members are to be avoided and that some outsiders can be trusted.

A third genetic/evolutionary predisposition directly relates to the complexity of human hunter-gatherer societies relative to the apes, and indirectly to the development of prejudice and discrimination: authority acceptance. In order to be a contributing member of these societies, one has to acquire an inordinate amount of diverse information in a relatively short period of time. Learning by conditioning, trial and error, and imitation are inadequate to complete the task. Authority acceptance directs us to accept

as true the messages transmitted by the authorities in our culture. In its most positive manifestation, cultural authorities share their wisdom and knowledge, which includes personal histories as well as the history of the culture. In hunter-gatherer societies, which are egalitarian, this knowledge is relatively benign regarding status differences among members. Some of the knowledge directs tribal members to attend to badges that distinguish them from outsiders. In industrial societies, however, the authorities' knowledge and wisdom include "known" characteristics of dominant and subordinate groups and thus serve to maintain the power and status of the dominant ones. This is part of the basis of prejudice and discrimination.

From a developmental perspective, authority acceptance operates by about age 2 years. Own group preferences and intergroup hostility, however, start to come into play when children are older and have acquired a group identity. Some of the most salient groups in our society are based on sex, ethnicity, and presence or absence of disabilities. Because of physical and behavioral differences (badges) between these groups, distinctions among them readily occur. Moreover, societal authorities indicate that distinguishing these groups is important. Thus, authority acceptance and group processes reinforce each other and enhance status differences among groups. However, authority acceptance can also work to combat prejudice if the cultural authorities both practice and preach egalitarian acceptance and respect for members of the subordinate groups in the culture.

Psychological research indicates that group identification starts to emerge at about age 3 years and is stable by age 4. Over the next 3 years, by age 7, children's understanding of group processes has grown substantially. These findings suggest that the nature of prejudice and discrimination will change in systematic ways between ages 4 and 7.

There is a fourth genetic/evolutionary factor that can operate against the development of prejudice and discrimination toward the outsider-outgroup attractiveness. Owing to the often deleterious effects of genetic drift and inbreeding in hunter-gatherer groups, there was a necessity for gene flow into the tribe in order to maintain its viability, especially in times of marked environmental changes. The most likely source of gene flow is migration from other tribes. In order to psychologically support this migration, processes must have developed that made aspects of the outsider seem attractive to the host tribe. This led to either acceptance of the outsider into the tribe, or occasionally, incorporation of specific attributes of the outsider into the tribe. The net effect of outgroup attractiveness is to mitigate outgroup hostility. When outgroup attractiveness is coupled with authority acceptance, it may be possible to overcome the pro-prejudice effects of inclusive fitness and outgroup hostility.

DEVELOPMENT OF PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION

As defined, prejudice and discrimination are different but typically related psychological phenomena. Numerous studies with adults show that there is often a discrepancy between the two-between attitudes and overt behavior. One of the principal distinctions between measuring prejudice and discrimination in children is that the former primarily assesses reactions to unknown others, whereas the latter assesses reactions to known peers. Thus, it should not be surprising that individuals may be prejudiced toward a particular group, in the abstract, but have friendly relations with familiar peers of that group. The converse may also hold. Prejudice seems to be closely tied to the acceptance of cultural values, whereas discrimination seems more closely tied to one's experiences in a particular context. These considerations suggest that prejudice and discrimination may have different developmental paths.

In addition to the aforementioned, prejudice and discrimination may develop differently depending on the involved target groups. It is possible that our genetic/evolutionary heritage differentially predisposed us to respond to the badges displayed by different groups. This question has not been explored. However, we know that in each culture the various dominant and subordinate groups are differentially valued. Moreover, individuals are often members of dominant and subordinate groups at the same time; for example, White females are members of the dominant White group, but the subordinate female group. We do not know the calculus people use for combining and evaluating these combinations.

The research surveyed in this book supports the mentioned ideas. Prejudice and discrimination have different developmental trajectories, which additionally vary with the target groups being examined. In all cases, prejudice does emerge by age 4 years. Thereafter, opposite-sex prejudice, race prejudice, and prejudice toward the mentally retarded show different age-related patterns. For all three groupings, many predictions based on genetic/evolutionary considerations were supported. For example, males were generally more prejudiced than females, and ingroup-outgroup behavioral differences (badges) were correlated with degree of prejudice.

Predictions based on cultural/historical considerations were differentially supported for opposite-sex and race prejudice. For opposite-sex prejudice, females were more likely than males to acquire opposite-sex knowledge, behavior, and values. The age-related decline in opposite-sex prejudice was greater for females than males. Also, female self-esteem was strongly associated with male values but male self-esteem was not associated with female values. For race prejudice, Blacks were more likely to acquire knowledge, behavior, and values of White cultural norms than the con-

verse. However, the predictions concerning self-esteem and age-related decreases in prejudice were not supported.

The discrepancies between opposite-sex and race prejudice concerning the cultural/historical predictions are quite interesting. The dominant culture apparently gives a consistent and life-long message about the relative value of males and females and Whites and Blacks. There are few opposing groups that successfully contradict those values dealing with gender; in a sense, there cannot be because the salient cultural norms are those of White males, not just those of males. Thus, females can oppose males, but how do they oppose Whites, especially because the majority are themselves White? Additionally, most females form families with males, and thus become part of a system that supports male values. For the Blacks, there is a strong opposing group that often successfully contradicts the White values. Blacks can form highly supportive and nurturant relations with other Blacks. To some extent, they have a separate culture from Whites and that culture often provides a solid grounding for positive self-esteem and racial pride. To get along in a predominantly White culture, however, they have to be knowledgeable about White values, behaviors, and norms.

The discrimination literature is much more complicated than that for prejudice because the various measures of discrimination often lead to different conclusions. Using observational methods, race and opposite-sex discrimination are clearly seen in 4-year-olds, increase to about age 8, and decline or level off until adolescence. In classroom settings, as opposed to free play, females but not males evidence race discrimination. Discrimination toward the deaf and mentally retarded are also strongly present in 4-year-olds and remain high thereafter, with no particular age trends seen.

With best friends sociometric data, all four groupings show very marked discrimination at all ages, especially after age 8. Ingroup-outgroup friendships infrequently occur in all groupings, for example, nonretarded with mentally retarded peers. Roster-and-ratings measures indicate far less discrimination than best friends measures. Children and adolescents are much more likely to discriminate in social than academic settings. Thus children from different groups who willingly help each other with schoolwork will usually not eat lunch together, and certainly not hang out with the same set of friends. These findings reinforce the idea that for discrimination, context is very important.

For all four groupings, there is firm support for the view that behavioral differences underlie some of the observed discrimination. Males and females, Blacks and Whites, mentally retarded and nonretarded, deaf and hearing often act and interact differently from each other. Certainly language use varies across these groups (the extreme, of course, is deaf vs. hearing), but the types of social skills employed in interactions are often discrepant. Given that badging mechanisms are deeply ingrained in our genetic

makeup, it is not surprising that ingroups and outgroups should be sensitive to behavioral nuances. Of course, because culture categorizes people into these groups, we tend to exaggerate even slight differences among them. We probably also "perceive" differences that are more imagined than real.

There was consistent support for the two age-related shifts-at ages 4 and 7-in discrimination predicted by the group identity literature (the shifts were also seen in the prejudice literature). These findings indicated that social cognitive developmental processes play a role in the early development of prejudice and discrimination. That is, as the nature of children's social understanding changes, the ways in which they enact prejudice and discrimination also change.

Finally, essentially none of the other genetic/evolutionary predictions or those based on cultural/historical considerations were supported in the discrimination literature (in many cases no data were available). Although the discrepancy here with the prejudice literature supports the idea that the underlying processes between the two are very different, it is nevertheless puzzling. In my 1976 book, I stated that "evolutionary processes are fundamentally involved with the acquisition of information or knowledge about the environmental niche of the species" (p. 86). Knowledge was related to effective action in the environment. Presumably cultural knowledge has similar positive effects on action. But the research shows many genetic/evolutionary and several cultural/historical links with knowledge (prejudice) and few with action (discrimination). One possible explanation for this dilemma is that discrimination is based on a number of general and specific knowledge considerations including prejudice, and these must be weighed before action is taken. Prejudice is more or less pure knowledge which only implies action, but does not require it.

MODIFYING PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION

Prejudice and discrimination will be eliminated when perceived and believed differences between groups are reconstrued as differences within groups. That is, when Americans view all Americans as belonging to the same group as opposed to different and opposing ones, then the core problem will disappear. Everyone knows that people differ from each other. These differences are usually accepted by ingroup members; but when they appear in members of outgroups, they are often identified as being unacceptable. The goal of transforming "between" to "within" is occasionally achieved. For example, a sense of "we" as opposed to "us versus them" occurs during crises, the prime example being wartime. But crises are neither normative nor desirable.

An alternative goal is to attempt to change people such that they accept and equally value members of other groups. That is, encourage people to maintain the belief that ingroups and outgroups are different, and yet not favor their own group or disfavor others. I think that this goal flies in the face of inclusive fitness and outgroup hostility considerations, and hence, is likely to fail. However, systematic utilization of outgroup attractiveness coupled with authority acceptance has not been tried or studied. Thus, to some extent, this issue is still open.

We saw that merely putting children together as in school desegregation and mixed gender classes had essentially no impact on modifying prejudice and discrimination. However, cooperative learning was very effective in reducing discrimination, but had a lesser effect on reducing prejudice. Mainstreaming of disabled children and adolescents had a moderate effect on decreasing prejudice and discrimination toward them by the nondisabled. Research on media effects, role-playing simulations, and individuation all indicated some effectiveness in decreasing prejudice. No data were available for discrimination.

These approaches were successful for a variety of reasons, but what they seemed to share was implied or explicit community sanction. That is, the authority structure of the school or other community institutions "stated" that members of the various groups should be treated with fairness and respected as individuals. This, of course, capitalizes on the genetic/evolutionary factor of authority acceptance. Another shared aspect in these successful approaches is that directly or indirectly, they helped individuals see that members of different groups were similar in many ways to one's own group. As perceived differences become diminished, it is a short step to view others as members of one's own group.

No single one of the aforementioned approaches was successful in reducing prejudice and discrimination across all ingroups and outgroups. This is understandable because the processes underlying them are multiple, and as we previously noted, prejudice and discrimination vary with developmental status and target group. We recommend, however, that cooperative learning in integrated and mainstreamed schools should be the linchpin for change. It embodies an essential ingredient for maintaining group cohesion-cooperation. It has been shown to be effective in reducing discrimination, and it is at least as effective as other approaches in promoting academic achievement. Integral also in our recommendation is the incorporation of teaching methods or content that promote self-acceptance and acceptance of individuals who differ from ourselves. This approach has been shown to effectively reduce prejudice. Films and role-playing should periodically be employed because they too, have been effective in reducing prejudice.

The strongly implied message of the proposed dramatic changes is that the authority structure of all our communities should endorse, even mandate, these changes. We cannot readily change the genetic structure of our species as a means of eliminating prejudice and discrimination. But we can positively use the characteristics with which we are endowed. The paradox in our proposal is as follows. Prejudice and discrimination serve to maintain the power and status of the dominant groups. These are typically the same groups whose members are the authority figures in our culture. We are proposing that the authority figures initiate changes that will ultimately reduce their own power and status through the merger of ingroups and outgroups. Of course, if the authority structure can be persuaded to see these changes as promoting their self-interest, then it is no paradox at all.

PARENTS, PEERS, AND PERSONALITY

Related to the issue of modifying prejudice and discrimination is the issue of the causes of individual differences in them. Although it is widely believed that parents are the primary agents in their children's development of prejudice, a number of recent studies have shown that parental influences, at best are modest. Parents seem to have the most consistent effects on their adolescent children, but mothers and fathers have differential influences. Fathers mainly influence sex-typed prejudices, and mothers, the remaining ones. This may have to do with the cultural roles that mothers and fathers inhabit.

The few studies dealing with friendship influences are even more surprising, especially in light of some psychologists' views that peers carry the most weight for influencing children's and adolescents' behavior. In short, friends have been found to have essentially no influence on prejudice development. But, research shows that in controlled environments, friends can have a strong influence in modifying prejudice. The likely reasons for the discrepancy are that friends normally do not talk about prejudice, and that friends assume that they share the same attitudes.

The largest and most reliable influence on prejudice development is personality. Two personality traits-religious quest and a humanitarian/egalitarian orientation-have been consistently found to be negatively correlated with prejudice. And two other personality traits-right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation-have been consistently found to be positively correlated with prejudice. The latter seems to be more a powerful influence than the former, that is, correlations with prejudice are higher.

The obvious question to ask is: Where do the personality differences come from? Plomin (1990) showed for a wide range of personality, intellec-

tual, and abnormal characteristics, that the genetic influence of parents is substantial. The limited research that has been carried out with RWA has been inconsistent in identifying genetic influences. However, social environmental influences in adults have reliably emerged. We know little about the sources of SDO, quest, or humanitarianism/egalitarianism in children or adults. If we can uncover the sources of these personality differences, then we may be in a position to rear children so as to maximize the antiprejudice traits, and minimize the pro-prejudice traits. The available research does not give even the faintest clue as to where to look. For example, parental effects on prejudice in young children are almost nonexistent. To what extent do parents shape their children's personality? It is not clear, even, that the answer lies in the family. This paucity of data should not be taken as a motive for withdrawal, but rather as a challenge for research action.

A FINAL NOTE

I have been discussing the ideas in this book with friends and colleagues for several years. Two related questions keep recurring. Doesn't the genetic/evolutionary view mean that prejudice and discrimination will always be with us? How does the genetic/evolutionary view help us attempt to modify prejudice and discrimination? I tell them, in response to the first question, that the underlying pressures for prejudice and discrimination will always be with us. This implies that we have to be closely vigilant and make strong efforts to combat these tendencies.

In response to the second, I tell them that we have to make use of the underlying processes toward different ends. It is not in our genes to be prejudiced and discriminatory against groups within our society, but it is in our genes to favor ingroup members, to disfavor outgroup members, to occasionally find outgroup members attractive, and to accept what authorities tell us. The latter two are the keys to successful change. It often takes courage for the authorities to take new positions on these matters. Fortunately, they occasionally do so, as President Truman did in racially integrating the armed forces and as the Congress and President Johnson did in passing civil rights legislation. But the authorities should take the lead in identifying the most positive characteristics in outgroup members, those that we all could admire and emulate.

One cannot legislate changes in our hearts and souls. Prejudiced attitudes, by their nature, are relatively unresponsive to new and contradictory information. Certainly new messages from authorities will speed the process of change, but because these attitudes infuse a large number of our beliefs and actions toward outgroup members, additional experiences will be required. My belief is that challenging discrimination is more likely to sue-

ceed in modifying prejudice than challenging prejudice directly. Mandated cooperative interactions between in groups and outgroups is likely to be the most successful set of new experiences for accomplishing this goal.

Finally, I believe that our success in modifying prejudice and discrimination in children will be severely limited unless prejudice and discrimination are modified in adults. Adults not only have to create the circumstances that will promote change in our children, but we must also give a consistent message based on our own behavior. To do otherwise is to belie the earnestness of our intentions.

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